update mitre galaxies - add external id and killchain

This commit is contained in:
Deborah Servili 2018-05-19 12:56:20 +02:00
parent 4c07e583fe
commit 730353f63d
28 changed files with 17224 additions and 12512 deletions

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{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"version": 2,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.",
"value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010",
"uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433"
},
{
"description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).",
"value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014",
"uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124"
},
{
"description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.",
"value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008",
"uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c"
},
{
"description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.",
"value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006",
"uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564"
},
{
"description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n* On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level.\n* On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.",
"value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001",
"uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d"
},
{
"description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.",
"value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003",
"uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.",
"value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004",
"uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321"
},
{
"description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.",
"value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002",
"uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c"
},
{
"description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.",
"value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007",
"uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9"
},
{
"description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.",
"value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013",
"uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1"
},
{
"description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.",
"value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005",
"uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d"
},
{
"description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.",
"value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011",
"uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1"
},
{
"description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.",
"value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012",
"uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee"
},
{
"description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.",
"value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009",
"uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8"
}
]
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.",
"value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010",
"uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1010"
}
},
{
"description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).",
"value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014",
"uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1014"
}
},
{
"description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.",
"value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008",
"uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1008"
}
},
{
"description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.",
"value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006",
"uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1006"
}
},
{
"description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n* On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level.\n* On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.",
"value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001",
"uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1001"
}
},
{
"description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.",
"value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003",
"uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1003"
}
},
{
"description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.",
"value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004",
"uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1004"
}
},
{
"description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.",
"value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002",
"uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1002"
}
},
{
"description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.",
"value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007",
"uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1007"
}
},
{
"description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.",
"value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013",
"uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1013"
}
},
{
"description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.",
"value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005",
"uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1005"
}
},
{
"description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.",
"value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011",
"uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1011"
}
},
{
"description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.",
"value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012",
"uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1012"
}
},
{
"description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.",
"value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009",
"uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1009"
}
}
]
}

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{
"name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"version": 2,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
"value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
"Sofacy",
"Pawn Storm",
"Fancy Bear",
"STRONTIUM",
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
]
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
}
]
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
"value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
"Sofacy",
"Pawn Storm",
"Fancy Bear",
"STRONTIUM",
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
],
"external_id": "G0007"
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
}
]
}

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{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"version": 2,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "Xbot is a family of Android malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot) that \"tries to steal victims' banking credentials and credit card information\", \"can also remotely lock infected Android devices, encrypt the user's files in external storage (e.g., SD card), and then ask for a U.S. $100 PayPal cash card as ransom\" and \"will steal all SMS message and contact information, intercept certain SMS messages, and parse SMS messages for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication Number) from banks.\"\n\nAliases: Xbot",
"value": "Xbot - MOB-S0014",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/"
],
"synonyms": [
"Xbot"
]
},
"uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4"
}
]
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "Xbot is a family of Android malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot) that \"tries to steal victims' banking credentials and credit card information\", \"can also remotely lock infected Android devices, encrypt the user's files in external storage (e.g., SD card), and then ask for a U.S. $100 PayPal cash card as ransom\" and \"will steal all SMS message and contact information, intercept certain SMS messages, and parse SMS messages for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication Number) from banks.\"\n\nAliases: Xbot",
"value": "Xbot - MOB-S0014",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/"
],
"external_id": "MOB-S0014",
"synonyms": [
"Xbot"
]
},
"uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4"
}
]
}

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{
"name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"version": 2,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)",
"value": "APT16 - G0023",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT16"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
]
},
"uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
},
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
"value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
"Sofacy",
"Pawn Storm",
"Fancy Bear",
"STRONTIUM",
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
]
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
},
{
"description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)",
"value": "Cleaver - G0003",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Cleaver",
"TG-2889",
"Threat Group 2889"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
]
},
"uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
},
{
"description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)",
"value": "APT12 - G0005",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT12",
"IXESHE",
"DynCalc",
"Numbered Panda",
"DNSCALC"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
]
},
"uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
},
{
"description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Departments (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)",
"value": "APT1 - G0006",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT1",
"Comment Crew",
"Comment Group",
"Comment Panda"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
]
},
"uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
},
{
"description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)",
"value": "Night Dragon - G0014",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Night Dragon"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
"http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf"
]
},
"uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
},
{
"description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)",
"value": "APT17 - G0025",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT17",
"Deputy Dog"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
]
},
"uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
}
]
}
"name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
{
"description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)",
"value": "APT16 - G0023",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT16"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
],
"external_id": "G0023"
},
"uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
},
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
"value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
"Sofacy",
"Pawn Storm",
"Fancy Bear",
"STRONTIUM",
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
],
"external_id": "G0007"
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
},
{
"description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)",
"value": "Cleaver - G0003",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Cleaver",
"TG-2889",
"Threat Group 2889"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
],
"external_id": "G0003"
},
"uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
},
{
"description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)",
"value": "APT12 - G0005",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT12",
"IXESHE",
"DynCalc",
"Numbered Panda",
"DNSCALC"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
],
"external_id": "G0005"
},
"uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
},
{
"description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department\u2019s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)",
"value": "APT1 - G0006",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT1",
"Comment Crew",
"Comment Group",
"Comment Panda"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
"external_id": "G0006"
},
"uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
},
{
"description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)",
"value": "Night Dragon - G0014",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Night Dragon",
"Musical Chairs"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf",
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/"
],
"external_id": "G0014"
},
"uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
},
{
"description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)",
"value": "APT17 - G0025",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"APT17",
"Deputy Dog"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
],
"external_id": "G0025"
},
"uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
}
]
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "fa7016a8-1707-11e8-82d0-1b73d76eb204",
"version": 3,
"icon": "map"
}
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "fa7016a8-1707-11e8-82d0-1b73d76eb204",
"version": 4,
"icon": "map"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"uuid": "fb5a36c0-1707-11e8-81f5-d732b22a4982",
"version": 3,
"icon": "chain"
}
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"uuid": "fb5a36c0-1707-11e8-81f5-d732b22a4982",
"version": 4,
"icon": "chain"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Enterprise Attack -Intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "1f3b8c56-1708-11e8-b211-17a60c0f73ee",
"version": 3,
"icon": "user-secret"
}
"name": "Enterprise Attack -Intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "1f3b8c56-1708-11e8-b211-17a60c0f73ee",
"version": 4,
"icon": "user-secret"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "fbb19af0-1707-11e8-9fd6-dbd88a04d33a",
"version": 3,
"icon": "optin-monster"
}
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "fbb19af0-1707-11e8-9fd6-dbd88a04d33a",
"version": 4,
"icon": "optin-monster"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "fbfa0470-1707-11e8-be22-eb46b373fdd3",
"version": 3,
"icon": "gavel"
}
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "fbfa0470-1707-11e8-be22-eb46b373fdd3",
"version": 4,
"icon": "gavel"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "1c6d1332-1708-11e8-847c-e3c5643c41a5",
"version": 2,
"icon": "map"
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "1c6d1332-1708-11e8-847c-e3c5643c41a5",
"version": 3,
"icon": "map"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"uuid": "0282356a-1708-11e8-8f53-975633d5c03c",
"version": 2,
"icon": "chain"
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"uuid": "0282356a-1708-11e8-8f53-975633d5c03c",
"version": 3,
"icon": "chain"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "0314e554-1708-11e8-b049-8f8a42b5bb62",
"version": 2,
"icon": "user-secret"
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "0314e554-1708-11e8-b049-8f8a42b5bb62",
"version": 3,
"icon": "user-secret"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Malware",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "03e3853a-1708-11e8-95c1-67cf3f801a18",
"version": 2,
"icon": "optin-monster"
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Malware",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "03e3853a-1708-11e8-95c1-67cf3f801a18",
"version": 3,
"icon": "optin-monster"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "1d0b4bce-1708-11e8-9e6e-1b130c9b0a91",
"version": 2,
"icon": "gavel"
}
"name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "1d0b4bce-1708-11e8-9e6e-1b130c9b0a91",
"version": 3,
"icon": "gavel"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "1f665850-1708-11e8-9cfe-4792b2a91402",
"version": 2,
"icon": "map"
}
"name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "1f665850-1708-11e8-9cfe-4792b2a91402",
"version": 3,
"icon": "map"
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
{
"name": "Pre Attack - Intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "1fb6d5b4-1708-11e8-9836-8bbc8ce6866e",
"version": 2,
"icon": "user-secret"
}
"name": "Pre Attack - Intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "1fb6d5b4-1708-11e8-9836-8bbc8ce6866e",
"version": 3,
"icon": "user-secret"
}

View file

@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
value['meta']['kill_chain'] = []
for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']:
value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name'])
if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp:

View file

@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
temp = d['objects'][0]
value = {}
value['description'] = temp['description']
if 'description' in temp:
value['description'] = temp['description']
value['value'] = temp['name'] + ' - ' + temp['external_references'][0]['external_id']
value['meta'] = {}
value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases']
if 'aliases' in temp:
value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases']
value['meta']['refs']= []
for reference in temp['external_references']:
if 'url' in reference and reference['url'] not in value['meta']['refs']:
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
value['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
values.append(value)

View file

@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
value['meta']['kill_chain'] = []
for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']:
value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name'])
if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp:

View file

@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
value['meta']['kill_chain'] = []
for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']:
value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name'])
if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp: