diff --git a/clusters/mitre-fight-techniques.json b/clusters/mitre-fight-techniques.json
index 81f3641..0c93783 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-fight-techniques.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-fight-techniques.json
@@ -6456,90 +6456,6 @@
       "uuid": "0551e810-74ac-5a51-82c1-abaebeb3dfd4",
       "value": "Self Location Measurement"
     },
-    {
-      "description": "An adversary may position itself on the radio interface, to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](/techniques/FGT1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](/techniques/FGT1565.002).\r\n\r\nAdversary can deploy a fake gNB, eNB (a 4G base station) or WiFi access point, or a back-to-back fake gNB-UE combination to act as an adversary-in-the-middle, in order to intercept, inject and possibly modify communication and relay communication to and from intended recipient over the radio interface. \r\n\r\nThis attack assumes the following to have taken place: the UE has been bid-down (see [Bid down UE](/techniques/FGT1562.501)) to a less secure Radio Access Network such as 4G, or the UE connects to an eNB because the network is 5G Non-Standalone, or due to EPS fallback, or the UE connects to a WiFi access point (to access 5G services).",
-      "meta": {
-        "architecture-segment": "RAN",
-        "bluf": "An adversary may position itself on the radio interface, to support follow-on behaviors such as  [Network Sniffing](/techniques/FGT1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](/techniques/FGT1565.002).",
-        "criticalassets": [
-          {
-            "Description": "All signaling transmitted to and from subscriber can be modified or intercepted in the clear",
-            "Name": "Subscriber signaling"
-          },
-          {
-            "Description": "UE/subscriber geographical location can be intercepted.",
-            "Name": "UE location"
-          },
-          {
-            "Description": "All data and voice transmitted to and from subscriber can be modified or intercepted in the clear",
-            "Name": "Subscriber traffic"
-          }
-        ],
-        "detections": [
-          {
-            "detects": "UE measurements of received power levels from all base stations nearby, and their identifiers Reference clause 6.24 of [3]",
-            "fgdsid": "FGDS5002",
-            "name": "UE signal measurements"
-          }
-        ],
-        "external_id": "FGT1557.501",
-        "kill_chain": [
-          "fight:Collection",
-          "fight:Credential-Access"
-        ],
-        "mitigations": [],
-        "object-type": "technique",
-        "platforms": "5G",
-        "postconditions": [
-          {
-            "Description": "Transient technique; works only as long as adversary-in-the-middle is able to retain connection.",
-            "Name": "Temporary loss of subscriber data confidentiality or integrity."
-          }
-        ],
-        "preconditions": [
-          {
-            "Description": "Subscriber security profile must allow bidding down to less secure service OR system must employ null integrity or encryption.",
-            "Name": "Permissive subscriber security profile OR system employs null integrity or encryption."
-          }
-        ],
-        "procedureexamples": [
-          {
-            "Description": "The adversary employs a back to back gNB-UE combination. When UE security profile allows bidding down, or the UE connects to 4G due to EPS fallback, or to WiFi, an adversary acts as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept and possibly modify communication to and from intended recipient.",
-            "Name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle on air interface for a given UE"
-          },
-          {
-            "Description": "Alternatively, if the 5G system employs null integrity or encryption, subscriber data traffic can be eavesdropped or modified in transit over the air interface",
-            "Name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle on air interface for any UE"
-          },
-          {
-            "Description": "Adversary uses a fake base station to broadcast spoofed configuration messages to UEs nearby. Reference [3] (appendix B) contains a taxonomy of attacks against 5G UEs, passive and active. One concerns message attacks (fake MIB/SIB – Master Information Block/System Information Block)",
-            "Name": "Spoofed configuration messages from fake base station"
-          }
-        ],
-        "refs": [
-          "[1] European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA : “ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks” Report, section 4.4, December 2020. - https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-for-5g-networks",
-          "[2] Hu, X. et al: “A Systematic Analysis Method for 5G Non-Access Stratum Signalling Security”, August 2019 - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8817957",
-          "[3] 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP  TR 33.809: “Study on  5G security enhancements against False Base Stations (FBS ”, Technical Report, v0.18.0, February 2022. - https://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33809.htm",
-          "https://fight.mitre.org/data%20sources/FGDS5002",
-          "https://fight.mitre.org/techniques/FGT1557.501"
-        ],
-        "status": "Observed in earlier 3GPP generations and expected in 5G.",
-        "subtechnique-of": "FGT1557",
-        "typecode": "fight_subtechnique_to_attack_technique"
-      },
-      "related": [
-        {
-          "dest-uuid": "fa9ee8fb-7f25-554c-9682-0e50e774812d",
-          "type": "detected-by"
-        },
-        {
-          "dest-uuid": "5ecccab0-9d6d-504c-92c4-408091a3c114",
-          "type": "subtechnique-of"
-        }
-      ],
-      "uuid": "125336d2-ca71-57b5-a46e-faca5013c555",
-      "value": "Radio interface"
-    },
     {
       "description": "A malicious app consumes subscriber data allocation to deny or degrade service to that UE. \r\n\r\nA malicious application might consume a UE's limited data plan, denying or throttling service.",
       "meta": {