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Merge pull request #684 from Mathieu4141/actors-targeting-ukraine
Actors targeting ukraine
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commit
21be83e3e9
1 changed files with 17 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -4190,6 +4190,12 @@
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{
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"description": "Unit 42 threat researchers have recently observed a threat group distributing new, custom developed malware. We have labelled this threat group the Gamaredon Group and our research shows that the Gamaredon Group has been active since at least 2013. In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities.",
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"meta": {
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"cfr-suspected-victims": [
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"Ukraine"
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],
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"cfr-target-category": [
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"Government"
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],
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"refs": [
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"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution",
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"https://www.lookingglasscyber.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Operation_Armageddon_Final.pdf",
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@ -4200,7 +4206,8 @@
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"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/18/digging-up-invisimole-hidden-arsenal/",
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"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine",
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"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/",
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"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/"
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"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/",
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"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021/"
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],
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"synonyms": [
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"Primitive Bear",
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@ -8450,18 +8457,24 @@
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{
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"description": "Ghostwriter is referred as an 'activity set', with various incidents tied together by overlapping behavioral characteristics and personas, rather than as an actor or group in itself.",
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"meta": {
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"attribution-confidence": "50",
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"cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "Belarus",
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"cfr-suspected-victims": [
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"Germany",
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"Latvia",
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"Lithuania",
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"Poland"
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"Poland",
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"Ukraine"
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],
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"cfr-target-category": [
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"Government"
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],
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"country": "BY",
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"refs": [
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"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/07/ghostwriter-influence-campaign.html",
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"https://twitter.com/hatr/status/1377220336597483520"
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"https://twitter.com/hatr/status/1377220336597483520",
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"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc1151-linked-to-belarus-government",
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"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/meta-ukrainian-officials-military-targeted-by-ghostwriter-hackers/"
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]
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},
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"uuid": "749aaa11-f0fd-416b-bf6c-112f9b5930a5",
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@ -8953,5 +8966,5 @@
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"value": "TA2541"
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}
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],
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"version": 212
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"version": 213
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}
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